1
20
144
-
https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/f51dc99ef93d040908b142ebb835179a.pdf
d210fbed6580d80dafbf3af881e514fc
PDF Text
Text
Elaboration of *Nuclear energy and obligations to the future*:
A note on expertise and methodology.
Some people may ask why philosophers, who know nothing about
nuclear physics, should be dealing with this area, which surely
should be left to the province of the real experts in the area,
nuclear physicists and those with direct experience and authority
in the area of nuclear power.
One of the most irritating things in this area for a
philosopher is the sight of such people constantly presented, by
themselves and others, as experts and authorities whose pronounce
ments on the issue should be accepted without question by laymen
(see e.g. articles [15] and [16]), when in fact the issues involve
quite crucially issues of and assumptions about values and morality^
matters concerning which the so-called ’’authorities" and "experts"
commonly know less than the average first year student in philosophy.
Value issues and moral issues and issues of social and political
theory are probably more crucially concerned in the nuclear issues
than are issues of fact concerning nuclear power, and certainly
they are just as important.
Few philosophers nowadays would want to claim to be "experts"
or "authorities" on matters of value or morality in the way nuclear
experts claim to be authorities on matters of nuclear power, who
can tell people what to do in way which is authoritative or
which must be uncritically accepted by the non-experts/non
philosophers.
Rejection of the argument from authority is basic
in proper philosophical method, going back to Plato and beyond,
and forming a basic position without which the subject, as critical
inquiry into basic assumptions, could not operate as it does and
traditionally has.
Indeed rejection of the argument from
authority is one feature which distinguishes philosophy proper
from closely related areas such as theology, casuistry, some
�2.
areas of legal thought and various types of apology.
But a form
/of the argument from authority*—the claim to entitlement to have
one’s word or views accepted, not on the basis of what one says
and how sound it is,!^ but of who one is - appears however to be
an important element in the modern cult of the ''scientific expert"
which has played such a large part in the contempory Australian
discussion of the neclear issue.
While most philosophers would
reject the view that they were "experts" in this sense on values
or moral issues, philosophers can fairly lay claim to a number of
special skills which enable them to bring out explicit assumptions
about values or morality, and expose defects in arguments.
Most
philosophers also have moral view’s, that is, they believe some
things to be morally acceptable and others morally unacceptable,
although some might prefer to express similar attitudes without
use of explicit moral terminology.
In writing this paper then we don’t hope to be accepted as
’authorities’ or ’experts’ on moral questions, but only to have
skills which may throw light on some areas.
We have tried to
bring out value and moral assumptions, expose logical defects and
inconsistencies in the structure of some of the arguments and in
certain sorts of argumentsconcerning the future, and to argue that
if one accepts a certain moral judgment (which we accept and which
we believe would be widely agreed on*), one should, if one is
going to be consistent, non-arbitrary, and follow through one’s
principles, accept a certain other one.
This seems to us a propei
area for philosophical work.
The non-philosophical or background factual assumptions which
are essential for discussing the issue are not large, and are in
substance only those of the Fox Report (p.110, in particular)•
* We are sure that philosophers can be found who will disagree wit!
virtually every statement we make.
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Draft Papers
Description
An account of the resource
Sylvan's literary executor encountered an archive in which “all his projects were current", since manuscripts were undated and unattributed.
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Text
Any textual data included in the document
Elaboration of *Nuclear energy and obligations to the future*:
A note on expertise and methodology.
Some people may ask why philosophers, who know nothing about
nuclear physics, should be dealing with this area, which surely
should be left to the province of the real experts in the area,
nuclear physicists and those with direct experience and authority
in the area of nuclear power.
One of the most irritating things in this area for a
philosopher is the sight of such people constantly presented, by
themselves and others, as experts and authorities whose pronounce
ments on the issue should be accepted without question by laymen
(see e.g. articles [15] and [16]), when in fact the issues involve
quite crucially issues of and assumptions about values and morality^
matters concerning which the so-called ’’authorities" and "experts"
commonly know less than the average first year student in philosophy.
Value issues and moral issues and issues of social and political
theory are probably more crucially concerned in the nuclear issues
than are issues of fact concerning nuclear power, and certainly
they are just as important.
Few philosophers nowadays would want to claim to be "experts"
or "authorities" on matters of value or morality in the way nuclear
experts claim to be authorities on matters of nuclear power, who
can tell people what to do in way which is authoritative or
which must be uncritically accepted by the non-experts/non
philosophers.
Rejection of the argument from authority is basic
in proper philosophical method, going back to Plato and beyond,
and forming a basic position without which the subject, as critical
inquiry into basic assumptions, could not operate as it does and
traditionally has.
Indeed rejection of the argument from
authority is one feature which distinguishes philosophy proper
from closely related areas such as theology, casuistry, some
2.
areas of legal thought and various types of apology.
But a form
/of the argument from authority*—the claim to entitlement to have
one’s word or views accepted, not on the basis of what one says
and how sound it is,!^ but of who one is - appears however to be
an important element in the modern cult of the ''scientific expert"
which has played such a large part in the contempory Australian
discussion of the neclear issue.
While most philosophers would
reject the view that they were "experts" in this sense on values
or moral issues, philosophers can fairly lay claim to a number of
special skills which enable them to bring out explicit assumptions
about values or morality, and expose defects in arguments.
Most
philosophers also have moral view’s, that is, they believe some
things to be morally acceptable and others morally unacceptable,
although some might prefer to express similar attitudes without
use of explicit moral terminology.
In writing this paper then we don’t hope to be accepted as
’authorities’ or ’experts’ on moral questions, but only to have
skills which may throw light on some areas.
We have tried to
bring out value and moral assumptions, expose logical defects and
inconsistencies in the structure of some of the arguments and in
certain sorts of argumentsconcerning the future, and to argue that
if one accepts a certain moral judgment (which we accept and which
we believe would be widely agreed on*), one should, if one is
going to be consistent, non-arbitrary, and follow through one’s
principles, accept a certain other one.
This seems to us a propei
area for philosophical work.
The non-philosophical or background factual assumptions which
are essential for discussing the issue are not large, and are in
substance only those of the Fox Report (p.110, in particular)•
* We are sure that philosophers can be found who will disagree wit!
virtually every statement we make.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
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Box 59, Item 1: Draft of Elaboration of 'Nuclear energy and obligations to the future': a note on expertise and methodology
Subject
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Typescript of draft, with handwritten emendations, undated.
Description
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Unnumbered paper from collection, item number assigned by library staff.
Creator
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<a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=val+routley&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&range=&collection=&type=&user=&tags=&public=&featured=&exhibit=&geolocation-mapped=&geolocation-address=&geolocation-latitude=&geolocation-longitude=&geolocation-radius=10&submit_search=Search+for+items">Val Routley</a>
<a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Routley&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&range=&collection=&type=&user=&tags=&public=&featured=&exhibit=&geolocation-mapped=&geolocation-address=&geolocation-latitude=&geolocation-longitude=&geolocation-radius=10&submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Routley</a>
Source
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<span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&pageSize=20&sortBy=score&sortDirection=Desc&searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span>, Box 59, Item 1
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
<a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a>
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This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>.
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For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library.
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[2] leaves. 1.56 MB.
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<a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:536f5c3">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:536f5c3</a>
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n/a - location unidentified in manuscript finding aid
Box 59: Nuclear
-
https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/b660995c442b4ed34e33174523ca0eaf.pdf
e2754cf92cd4759c1c7554709975a749
PDF Text
Text
94K Fraser Court,
Kingston, 2604.
6th February, 1975
Dear Sir,
A possible change of government later this year should not
be a matter for too much concern, since the difference in policies
between the Labor government and the conservative alternative is
becoming increasingly difficult to discern.
Thus in September
Dr. Cairns told us all to work harder, and at Christmas Mr. Bryant
urged us to buy more.
In January the Prime Minister insisted that
wage demands were the cause of inflation, and in February our
'socialist' Treasurer who had previously exhorted us to buy more
cars, tells us, in effect, that the business of Australia is
business.
That the Labor government, although presenting itself as one
of "change and reform", has a commitment to the industrial- consumer status quo and protecting business, and an aversion to
politically difficult decisions approaching that of its predecessors
is demonstrated by its determination that there shall be no
restructuring (even on a long-term basis) of employment in the
motor vehicle industry.
This industry is widely recognised as a
major polluter and waster of resources, and was, until recently,
the favourite target of several ministers who are now strangely
silent on the subject.
The employment in this environmenta lly
damaging industry which the government is determined to preserve
without change, on a long term basis and apparently at virtually
any cost, is of such poor quality that the industrial sabotage which
was common a few years ago and is now reappearing was attributed by
the unions to the miserable nature of the work.
In normal times of
full employment the immigration program played an essential part in
maintaining the supply of workers to fill these undesirable jobs.
The impression of the early days of the Labor government that
Australians had somehow managed to elect a government of courage,
independence and principle has long since faded.
But nowhere is the
lack of these qualities so clear as in the decision to compete with ·
the opposition in the development stakes and to proceed withthe sale
of uranium for 'peaceful purposes'.
The Prime Minister has
attempted to quell doubts about environmenta l hazards by appealing
to the inadequate standards of the Internationa l Atomic Energy
Authority and by stating that no one overseas to whom he spoke cared
a jot about the hazards of pollution from controlled nuclear plants
or waste, and that (therefore) no one here should either.
Mr. Connor,
displaying a similar slavish concern for what the internationa l
neighbours think, claims that the Australian government would become
a laughing stock if it attempted to act with courage and principle
on the matter of
ur a 11 /um
sales.
The request for a public
inquiry to enable adequate public discussion of the momentous moral
issues involved in ur.ani- um sales has been refused, on the thin and
question-begg ing grounds that this would jeopardise one prematurely
concluded contract and others in the pipeline.
The switch to nuclear fission energy sources which the
Australian government's decision will greatly assist is likely to
impose enormous burdens and risks on future people for nuclear waste
disposal as long as 200,000 years in the future on conservative
estimates. There are clear alternatives to its use.
The moral
position of Australia, as an important supplier of this material,
may be likened to that of an arms
or heroin peddler - obtaining a
comfortable existence for itself at the expense of enormous costs
to other people.
Just as in the case of the a..rft'\S or heroin
dealer, the moral responsibili ty of the supplier cannot be evaded
by the pretence that the moral decision is entirely that of his
customer.
V.
&
R. Routley
�94K Fraser Court,
Kingston, 2604.
6th February, 1975
Dear Sir,
A possible change of government later this year should not
be a matter for too much concern, since the difference in policies
between the Labor government and the conservative alternative is
becoming increasingly difficult to discern.
Thus in September
Dr. Cairns told us all to work harder, and at Christmas Mr. Bryant
urged us to buy more.
In January the Prime Minister insisted that
wage demands were the cause of inflation, and in February our
'socialist' Treasurer who had previously exhorted us to buy more
cars, tells us, in effect, that the business of Australia is
business.
That the Labor government, although presenting itself as one
of "change and reform", has a commitment to the industrial__: consumer status quo and protecting business, and an aversion to
politically difficult decisions approaching that of its predecessors
is demonstrated by its determination that there shall be no
restructuring (even on a long-term basis) of employment in the
motor vehicle industry.
This industry is widely recognised as a
major polluter and waster of resources, and was, until recently,
the favourite target of several ministers who are now strangely
silent on the subject.
The employment in this environmentally
damaging industry which the government is determined to preserve
without change, on a long term basis and apparently at virtually
any cost, is of such poor quality that the industrial sabotage which
was common a few years ago and is now reappearing was attributed by
the unions to the miserable nature of the work.
In normal times of
full employment the immigration program played an essential part in
maintaining the supply of workers to fill these undesirable jobs.
The impression of the early days of the Labor government that
Australians had somehow managed to elect a government of courage,
independence and principle has long since faded.
But nowhere is the
lack of these qualities so clear as in the decision to compete with
the opposition in the development stakes and to proceed withthe sale
of uranium for 'peaceful purposes'.
The Prime Minister has
attempted to quell doubts about environmental hazards by apF ealing
to the inadequate standards of the International Atomic Energy
Authority and by stating that no one overseas to whom he spoke cared
a jot about the hazards of pollution from controlled nuclear plants
or waste, and that (therefore) no one here should either.
Mr. Connor,
displaying a similar slavish concern for what the international
neighbours think, claims that the Australian government would become
a laughing stock if it attempted to act with courage and principle
on the matter of
u r ,i A ,'ufrL
sales.
The request for a public
inquiry to enable adequ~te public discussion of the momentous moral
issues involved in l.lia.ni~ .um sales has been refused, on the thin and
question-begging grounds that this would jeopardise one prematurely
concluded contract and others in the pipeline.
The switch to nuclear fission energy sources which the
Australian government's decision will greatly assist is likely to
impose enormous burdens and risks on future people for nuclear waste
disposal as long as 200,000 years in the future on conservative
estimates. There are clear alternatives to its use.
The moral
position of Australia, as an important supplier of this material,
may be likened to that of an atMJ
or heroin peddler - obtaining a
comfortable existence for itself at the expense of enormous costs
to other people.
Just as in the case of the a.rAt!
or heroin
dealer, the moral responsibility of the supplier cannot be evaded
by the pretence that the moral decision is entirely that of his
customer.
V.
&
R. Routley
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Notes, Correspondences and Marginalia
Description
An account of the resource
In one obituary, Sylvan's handwriting was said to have "looked like the oscilloscope for a patient in intensive care", and thus "not for the timid".
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Text
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94K Fraser Court,
Kingston, 2604.
6th February, 1975
Dear Sir,
A possible change of government later this year should not
be a matter for too much concern, since the difference in policies
between the Labor government and the conservative alternative is
becoming increasingly difficult to discern.
Thus in September
Dr. Cairns told us all to work harder, and at Christmas Mr. Bryant
urged us to buy more.
In January the Prime Minister insisted that
wage demands were the cause of inflation, and in February our
'socialist' Treasurer who had previously exhorted us to buy more
cars, tells us, in effect, that the business of Australia is
business.
That the Labor government, although presenting itself as one
of "change and reform", has a commitment to the industrial- consumer status quo and protecting business, and an aversion to
politically difficult decisions approaching that of its predecessors
is demonstrated by its determination that there shall be no
restructuring (even on a long-term basis) of employment in the
motor vehicle industry.
This industry is widely recognised as a
major polluter and waster of resources, and was, until recently,
the favourite target of several ministers who are now strangely
silent on the subject.
The employment in this environmenta lly
damaging industry which the government is determined to preserve
without change, on a long term basis and apparently at virtually
any cost, is of such poor quality that the industrial sabotage which
was common a few years ago and is now reappearing was attributed by
the unions to the miserable nature of the work.
In normal times of
full employment the immigration program played an essential part in
maintaining the supply of workers to fill these undesirable jobs.
The impression of the early days of the Labor government that
Australians had somehow managed to elect a government of courage,
independence and principle has long since faded.
But nowhere is the
lack of these qualities so clear as in the decision to compete with ·
the opposition in the development stakes and to proceed withthe sale
of uranium for 'peaceful purposes'.
The Prime Minister has
attempted to quell doubts about environmenta l hazards by appealing
to the inadequate standards of the Internationa l Atomic Energy
Authority and by stating that no one overseas to whom he spoke cared
a jot about the hazards of pollution from controlled nuclear plants
or waste, and that (therefore) no one here should either.
Mr. Connor,
displaying a similar slavish concern for what the internationa l
neighbours think, claims that the Australian government would become
a laughing stock if it attempted to act with courage and principle
on the matter of
ur a 11 /um
sales.
The request for a public
inquiry to enable adequate public discussion of the momentous moral
issues involved in ur.ani- um sales has been refused, on the thin and
question-begg ing grounds that this would jeopardise one prematurely
concluded contract and others in the pipeline.
The switch to nuclear fission energy sources which the
Australian government's decision will greatly assist is likely to
impose enormous burdens and risks on future people for nuclear waste
disposal as long as 200,000 years in the future on conservative
estimates. There are clear alternatives to its use.
The moral
position of Australia, as an important supplier of this material,
may be likened to that of an arms
or heroin peddler - obtaining a
comfortable existence for itself at the expense of enormous costs
to other people.
Just as in the case of the a..rft'\S or heroin
dealer, the moral responsibili ty of the supplier cannot be evaded
by the pretence that the moral decision is entirely that of his
customer.
V.
&
R. Routley
94K Fraser Court,
Kingston, 2604.
6th February, 1975
Dear Sir,
A possible change of government later this year should not
be a matter for too much concern, since the difference in policies
between the Labor government and the conservative alternative is
becoming increasingly difficult to discern.
Thus in September
Dr. Cairns told us all to work harder, and at Christmas Mr. Bryant
urged us to buy more.
In January the Prime Minister insisted that
wage demands were the cause of inflation, and in February our
'socialist' Treasurer who had previously exhorted us to buy more
cars, tells us, in effect, that the business of Australia is
business.
That the Labor government, although presenting itself as one
of "change and reform", has a commitment to the industrial__: consumer status quo and protecting business, and an aversion to
politically difficult decisions approaching that of its predecessors
is demonstrated by its determination that there shall be no
restructuring (even on a long-term basis) of employment in the
motor vehicle industry.
This industry is widely recognised as a
major polluter and waster of resources, and was, until recently,
the favourite target of several ministers who are now strangely
silent on the subject.
The employment in this environmentally
damaging industry which the government is determined to preserve
without change, on a long term basis and apparently at virtually
any cost, is of such poor quality that the industrial sabotage which
was common a few years ago and is now reappearing was attributed by
the unions to the miserable nature of the work.
In normal times of
full employment the immigration program played an essential part in
maintaining the supply of workers to fill these undesirable jobs.
The impression of the early days of the Labor government that
Australians had somehow managed to elect a government of courage,
independence and principle has long since faded.
But nowhere is the
lack of these qualities so clear as in the decision to compete with
the opposition in the development stakes and to proceed withthe sale
of uranium for 'peaceful purposes'.
The Prime Minister has
attempted to quell doubts about environmental hazards by apF ealing
to the inadequate standards of the International Atomic Energy
Authority and by stating that no one overseas to whom he spoke cared
a jot about the hazards of pollution from controlled nuclear plants
or waste, and that (therefore) no one here should either.
Mr. Connor,
displaying a similar slavish concern for what the international
neighbours think, claims that the Australian government would become
a laughing stock if it attempted to act with courage and principle
on the matter of
u r ,i A ,'ufrL
sales.
The request for a public
inquiry to enable adequ~te public discussion of the momentous moral
issues involved in l.lia.ni~ .um sales has been refused, on the thin and
question-begging grounds that this would jeopardise one prematurely
concluded contract and others in the pipeline.
The switch to nuclear fission energy sources which the
Australian government's decision will greatly assist is likely to
impose enormous burdens and risks on future people for nuclear waste
disposal as long as 200,000 years in the future on conservative
estimates. There are clear alternatives to its use.
The moral
position of Australia, as an important supplier of this material,
may be likened to that of an atMJ
or heroin peddler - obtaining a
comfortable existence for itself at the expense of enormous costs
to other people.
Just as in the case of the a.rAt!
or heroin
dealer, the moral responsibility of the supplier cannot be evaded
by the pretence that the moral decision is entirely that of his
customer.
V.
&
R. Routley
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
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Box 23, Item 1: Val Routley and Richard Routley to "Sir", 6 Feb 1975
Subject
The topic of the resource
Two copies of typescript letter addressed to "Sir", from Val Routley (later Val Plumwood) and Richard Routley (later Richard Sylvan). The letter to government addresses nuclear energy.
Description
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Unnumbered paper from collection, item number assigned by library staff.
Creator
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<a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Val+Routley&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&range=&collection=&type=&user=&tags=&public=&featured=&exhibit=&geolocation-mapped=&geolocation-address=&geolocation-latitude=&geolocation-longitude=&geolocation-radius=10&submit_search=Search+for+items">Val Routley</a>
<a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Routley&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&range=&collection=&type=&user=&tags=&public=&featured=&exhibit=&geolocation-mapped=&geolocation-address=&geolocation-latitude=&geolocation-longitude=&geolocation-radius=10&submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Routley</a>
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
<span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&pageSize=20&sortBy=score&sortDirection=Desc&searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span>, Box 23, Item 1
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
<a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a>
Date
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1975-02-06
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>.
Rights
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For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library.
Format
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Letter, [2] leaves. 3.65 MB.
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Correspondences
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
<a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:329e04d">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:329e04d</a>
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
n/a - not numbered or identified in locator field
Box 23: More Green
-
https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/48e20123bb1a0afc4c75d56b9df2ed2b.pdf
3a5b14ed1024ae543ea015e4c65d7a7e
PDF Text
Text
(SECTIC;. i'v'j
174
/al Plumwood 1 and Richard Rout ley
Peter
like
Singer,
so-e
basic
wish
Philosophic
to
question,
assumptions
underpinning estern can's attitudes loaros nis role in the
moral universe ana his relationship to nonhunan animals.
1
*vai •Plumwood has done most of ner work under ner married name:
• v a 1 “Routley.
*ln deference, however, to her wish tc establish herself under
•Plur »ooi that name
■ill oe used throughout this work.
In
a
passage reiininscent of Singer's call for
examination of unguestioneo assumptions, they state:
..nodern
moral
philosophers
--
fulfilling
tneir now established function of providing a
theoretical superstructure to explain and
justify
contemporary
rather
than
.oral
sensibilities
questioning
fundamental
asumptions -- tend to argue tnat tne bias
toward human interests, which is an integral
part
of
going ethical theories, is not just
hich is
both possible and aesiraole tc eliminate, out
another form of
class
cnauvinism
is ratner a restriction nctated by tne logic
of
evaluative
an-
.oral concepts, ana tnat
the
�Page 2
coherent, possible, or viable
alternative to the "human chauvinism" of.
standard etnical theories. 2
there is no
“Richard “Routley “sand\& “Vai “Routley.
'‘Against the “inevitability of “Human
2
“Cnauvinisr .
“>ln\a “Goodpaster, “r.,“E. "&ar At *K.“ .
“Sayre, "o.eds\&.
“ttric
s ano “Problems of tne 21st “Century.
“ one “Lame, “.-Diversity of "-otre “Dame “t ress,
If
class
cnauvinism
Jo-7.
differential,
"is
discriminatory and inferior treatnent (oy sufficiently many
members of the class) for items outside the class, for which
there
is
not
suiXiciect
chauvinism is tne form of
justification"3,
class
chauvinism
in
then
which
human
the
species, uaao Sapleur., substantially morally discriminates
against everything nonhuman by an insufficiently justified
assumption of human rnoral uniqueness.
“R, “Routley “4<and\i. *v, “Routley, “Hunan "Chauvinisi? and “Environmental “Ethics.
“kln\& “ annison, “D.“S.,
c“Ror>bie, “m.“A., “aand\&
“R. “Routley,
“Environmental “Philosophy.
“Canberra, “A“ "u, 1980; 96.
*&eds\&.
The
contention
that
man
is tne sole subject of value and
�Page J
morality
fallacy.
by
definition
This
runs
contention
aground
takes
the
the
seif-validating ana unchallengeable;
consideration oeing exclusive
to
on
a
definitional
definition ot moral
human
realm
to
be
The fallacy of the definitional move is that
of
believing
that
by
converting
the
substantive evaluative
theses
of
nu<an
chauvinism to matters of definition they
become somehow exempt from challenge or need
for
justification,
iris is comparable to
justifying discriminatory menbership for a
club by referring to the rules, similarly
conceived as self-validating and exempt from
question or need of justification. 4
v
v r'r sr °Ut3sy "&andX& "v • *Routiey.
'Against the 'Inevitability of 'Human
In this case the club rules define the Moral Club.
These
definitions
can
upon
either
Physical
characteristics or a set of properties that are logically
connected with qualification for moral consideration,
it is
onvious that the physical characteristics are not morally
relevant:
*
x
It is impossible to restrict moral terms to
particular species, when species distinctions
are
defined
in
terms
of
physical
characteristics
which
are
not
morally
relevant,
•ore generally, an attempt to derive a
logically
necessary
connection
net eet
humanity itself and the applicability of
morality is bound to fail, for creatures
anatomically ana zoologically aistinct fro
hurans
>hicii arc identical with humans in
terms ot morally relevant
features
arc
logically possible,
upsetting any logical
linkage. 5
5•
and Houtley.
W Koutley
■■
Against the inevitability of Human Chauvinism;
39.
X
rnerefore , the characteristics neeoed to support the
defintional
move
have
to
be
other
than physical
characteristics. However, if properties logically tiea „itn
moral considerations are examined closely, it is fauna that
they do not support the exclusive eligibility of hur ans to
tne Moral Clue. Three conditions or adequacy ore set down
for making tne Clue exclusive to humans:
�Page 4
1.
The set of characteristics must
he
possessed
oy
at
least
all
properly
functioning humans,
since
tc
omit
any
si unit leant aroup usually considered subject
to iroral consiceratin, suer as infants, young
children,
prinitive tribesmen, etc., ano to
allow that it was ierrissiole to treat these
groups
in
the
ay
it
is considered
permissible to treat non-humans, that is, as
mere
instruments,
would
certainly
lc
repugnant to modern moral sensibilities and
would offend common intuitions as to the
orotherhood of mar., the vie- that all humans
are possessors of inalienable rights, Thus
human chauvinism , if it
is to produce a
coherent
theory which does not unacceptably
rule out some groups of humans, must find
so e set cf features cc on to the rust
diverse ' en ters of hu" anKiriu....
(luu loiax
Auclusloa
2.
in order tor nu an chauvinis;
to be
justified, this sec ot characteristics ust
not be possessed by any non-nuran.
Uiie
ioXai i-xclusiau
3. The set of characteristics must oe not
merely norally relevant but sufficient to
justify, in a ncn-circuiar way,
the cut-oil
of moral consideration at exactly tne right
point.
If human chauvinism is to avoio the
charge of arbitrariness and unjustifiability
and to demonstrate its inevitability ana tne
impossibility of alternatives, it rust erneroe
from tne characteristics why items not having
tne f ay oe used as i: ere instruments to serve
tne interests of
those which do possess
tne . b
(lac
Xb^Xxxi&euXai Ju&xxxXcaXXQa
liS&UuaXlbU )
b
“Routley and "Routley.
39-40.
"Against tne "Inevitability of "Human "Chauvinism J
But tne properties usually assumed to give humans
exclusive entry into tne moral Cluo when tested against
these conditions of adequacy either admit nonhumans or
exclude humans.
Thirty-two such properties are tested oy
Plumwood and Routely XuXb£ alia,
using
tools,
using
language, self-awareness,
ceing a■are of the Inevitability
ot one s own death, being aoie to answer questions about
moral
issues sucn as human chauvinism, having interests,
having projects, belonging to a social community,
being
morally responsible tor one's actions, etc., and all are
found anting on at least one count.
�Page 5
However, the conditions of adequacy night oe challenged
as too stmgent. Yet, if tne '<oral Club is to be exclusive
to humans and neither arbitrary nor unjustified, then
condition 1 - tnat all functioning humans possess the
property - must apply, etherise tne requirerents for Club
member snip are drawn too narrowly and some humans are
excludes.
against this condition it might be argued tnat
numan is too
__
_____
_ _ and it is only persons (where
oread________
in scope
, .
re
j_eVdnt_ "para
parametre)
person is defined by some morally
relevant
e’tre) who
should
De considered,
this would mean that those humans
buran
, ,---- -—
-no
did not qualify as persons aouIo net oe eligible for
treatment as
oncers of tne
oral Clue or if they tie
treated as members that eligibiility was arbitrary and
unjust.
it it is the case that’all humans (persons) must
possess this property, then it must also be the case tnat no
nonhuman possesses it,
otherwise an Argument From Analogy
and Anoiiioiy applies.
if some nonhumans possess the property
or properties then the requirements for Club membership are
ara^n too broadly ana some nonnumans are eligible
_J. Finally,
it
is not enough to separate the eligible
- ’ J ~ ' •- from the
ineligible (or pernaps the edible from tne inediblej,
it
must oe snown why the ineiigiole are not only ineligible for
membership, but why tney cannot even oe consldereo for
membership, otherwise tne difference in treatment is not
justified.
To carry tne Club metaphor
..
a little farther,
pernaps too far, while remoers n.a,
ay h-.nave certain privileges,
this aoes not necessarily mean tnat
that in addition to not
enjoying these special privileges, nonrnembers can also oe
un*arrantly deprived of benefits common to memoers and
non-memoers.
why should membership devalue nonmenoers ano
put tneTi at the disposal of members?
it is o y this
condition that human chauvinism must show why humans are the
exclusive subjects of intrinsic value and the value of
nonhumans can be handled in terms of instrun.enr.al value to
humans.
If these conditions of adequacy stand, then
tne
definitional necessity of exclusiveness fails. Yet another
approach at making the realms of value ano
morality
exclusive to humans is to examine no.< values are thougnt to
operate.
. prototype argument tor this is laio out as
follows:
A.
values are
determined
through
tne
preference
rankings
of valuers
(tne aa
dfixacuafiie Karnes
,
Valuers'
preference rankings are determined through
valuer s interests (tne preXcifiace £aauci.ioa
thesis).
C.
valuers are humans (persons)
(tne saecsas assaaplioa).
I.
Therefore,
values are determines tnrouqn human interests
(tnrough tne interests ot persons).
8
Routley and Routley. Against the Inevitability of human Chauvinism:
The use of persons in this quotation is a reference to agru.rents aimed at
�Page 6
saving tne exclusiveness of the doral Club by limiting membership to humans
with some given capacity, characteristic or excellence or combination of
these.
while this argument may succeed in preventing non- u.ans tror
consideration, it is at the cost of non-paradigr atic i,.<ins.
From this argument It is sometimes concluded that "not only
is it perfectly accceptatie for humans to reduce matters of
value and morality to natters of human interest, but
oreover there is no rational or possible alternative to
going
so;
any alternative is simply incoherent." 9
ithever, it this argument is disrantled it is snown to rest
on
a
set of false assumptions that even Charitable
tanipulation cannot save.
9
43.
Routley and Routley.
Against me Inevitability of Human Chauvinism;
an ambiguity resides in the use of 'determined through'
in precise
I,
if
'determined through' means 'have to ce
determined*, men Plumwood and Routley feel,
mat it is
’Odaliy
upgraded
"to
reveal the sneer necessity of
conclusion J." 10
10
“Routley and “Routley.
Against the inevitability of Human Chauvinism:
no-ever, this involves a similar modificiition of p r e tn i s e C
or eise a nodal fallacy is involved. The
C._ stronger
ci
necessary
sense is preferable in forcing tne conclusion,
J -- as shall be
seen snortly when premise C is considered, but tne more
cnaritaoie move for tne argument is to weaken the use of
'determined mrougn' to something like 'reflect ' or 'are a
ratter of'. Despite either modification to resolve the
ambiguity
of 'determined through' premise A is still
susceptide to the charge:
value rankings cannot however ce cashed in
for
preference
rankings
since,
as 1 s
well-known, preference rankings and value
rankings car
diverge;
a valuer can prefer
wnat has less value and can value what is not
, referred.
11
Premise a is , therefore ( modified to read:
Al Values are determined through the value
rankings of (appropriate) valuers,
12
11
"Routley and “Routley. Against the Inevitability of Human Chauvinism
44.
12
Ro tley and Routley,
Against me inevitability of num Chauvinism:
44.
Bypassing premise B for a moment, premise C,
the
St-ficieb aSiuuiptAob, can be seen as a "circular way of
reintroducing tne logical version of human chauvinism by
restricting tne class of valuers a priori to humans" and at
�Page 7
Snr1 ^'?2Hy2enriy*-^rae'
13 11 is essential to the argument
lse1 c to oe a necessary condition that humans are
the only valuers.
ithout that the argument ooes not
human chauvinsitic conclusion.
if persons is
usea instead of humans, tnen it becomes
-ore defensible,
since not all humans are valuers, but not all valuers are
human,
if not all valuers are numar' or persons,
tnen to
sustain
the
human chauvinistic conclusion it becomes
necessary either to reject ail non-human (person) values or
i? i‘,’o e«- a "'ove m premise a such that 'interests' are
United to human (person) interests.
43-4.
Routley and Houtley.
Against the Inevitability of Human Chauvinism!
, „ It is just such a move at premise B ,
that ma k e s it,
tor them, tne most objectionable of the premises, Premise 6
is a group selfisnness
To
eirrsnness argument.
io show
tn
at
the
that
conclusion and particularly premise
‘
pre ise “B is
little more than an
argument for group
oup egoism in an environmental setting,
they
oisplay it against
ainst an argument baldly for
egoism.
if
pre ise A is recast replacing 'preferences'
ith 'values' as
ov°'v-i^2'preTn!ern ?rS0 0ds.to have 'preferences' replaced
attention in
is no- shifted to
interests .
interests can oe usea either in a weax and
- ,
-se so tnat anything tne valuer values is in tne
Ya|uer s interest
,ln stronger, but false sense tnat is
intended to support interests as ceing in the valuer's
advantage:
to sum. up tne dilemma for the argument then:
when. "interests" is usea in its weaker sense
premise u may be accepted out
tne argument
does not establish its inter, oea conclusion or
in any way sucpoert human chauvinism.
For
tne intended effect of the argument in the
cruae form is this; in determining values it
is
enough
to look at human advantage;
nothing else counts.
If tne argument -ere
correct,
tnen one could assess values bv
cneckmq out tne local (selfish) advantage of
hu ans,
or, more generally, tne aavanta ,e of
tne case class someho* assembled.
it, on thP
otner hano,
"interests":
is usea in its
strong sense, tne conclusion would license a
form of human crauvinis , but premise
no,
false.
14
Rout ley ano
Routley.
“Against the “Inevitability of “Human "Chauvinism:
�Page 8
This argument has a second
,
aspect to it which they
explore.
if tne argument is not acceptable as it stands,
then supposelv, neither is tne alternative of rejecting its
conclusion.
Precise A is opposed to the conclusion D (~a or
D / D-> A) to shod
either one accepts the conclusion,
ith its
consequent instru entalist account of value,
or one is committed to an intrinsic or
cetacned value theory wnich takes values to
oe completely independent of valuers,
no
------------ , ano
and r.c
ay determined oy tneit, out, it is assumed,
the latter theory is a ell Known as untenable,
and rr.ay even _.
____ as involving mysticism
be seen
or as oeing irrational
inus,
it may te
conduced,
there is no real alternative to
hu-an chauvinism.
lb
#15
Routley and Routley.
Against tne inevitability of Human Chauvinism;
but this choice is rejectee «
as a x
false
«js>c one:
u < < c.
To reject the instrumentalist conclusion D is
bv no means to be commited tc a, or to the
view that tne valuers
. _____
__
,____
and
their
preference
rankings play no role in determining values
and tnat values are
a_ further
'set„
o
—
__ ___ .
of
items
mysterious independent iters
in the world
somehow perceived by valuers
through
a
special (even mystical and nonr ational) moral
sense.
16
Against, the Inevitability of Human Chauvinism:
Parallel to this dichotomy between A and u is the dichotomy
Detween instrumental and intrinsic values so central in tne
division and treatment of members from nonmembers in tne
hor a1 Club;
Tne dicnotomy frequently presentea between
instrumentalist accounts of. value, on tie one
hand, ana detached tneories
(or what die
mistakenly taken to 0e the same, intrinsic
tneories) is, for the same reason, a false
one.
Instrumental theories ore those men
attempt to
reduce
value
to
what
is
instrumental to or contributes to a stated
goal.
Typically such theories taxe tne goal
to oe tne furtherance of the interest of a
privileged class;
tor example, tne goal may
oe taken to be determined in terms of the
interests, concerns, advantage, or welfare of
tne .class of humans, or of persons, or of
sentient creatures, cej ending on t>e type of
cnauvinism.
In particular, human chauvinist
tneories
are,
characteristically,
instrumentalist theories.
in contrast, an
item is valued intrinsically where it is
16
Routley and Routley.
47.
47.
�Page 9
valued for its own sake, and not merely as a
means
to
something
further;
and
an
intrinsic-value theory allo is that some items
are
intrinsically
valuable.
valuable,
. intrinsic
theories tnen,
then, contrast with
- it n ___
instr urn on cal
theories,, and *hat
vhat "intrinsic" tells us is no
more
tnan
that
tne
the
iter
taken
as
intrinsically valuable is not valued merely
as a means tc some goal, i.e.,
is, not merely
- - is
instrumentally valued. Accordingly
- 117 detached
value
theories,
since
< disjoint
1
from
instrumental theories, are a suo-ciass of
intrinsic value theories;
and they are a
proper suoclass since intrinsic values need
not be detached, lSomething may __
______ _
be valuaole
in itself without its ceing detached frott all
valuing experience.
17
17
Routley and Routley. Against tne inevitability 01 ■ uman •Chauvinism
Because detacned value theories are only a subclass of
intrinsic value theories the dichotomies bet een A and b and
between instrumental and instrinsic theories are false.
Since detached theories cannot be maintained and totally
instrumental value theories leao to an infinite regress,
which is manifest if, consistent witn tne theory, the goals
of a valuer are taken as instrumental, then neither of tnese
extremes is acceptable, but values do exist, so some other
vie-, besides those offered in the dichotomy must
be
advanced, Plumwood ana Routley advance one vie* tnat denies
the dichotomy, yet does not limit valuers to humans and does
not li it tne value of objects to human instrumental values;
A person is the source of value-judgments and
values .in one sense,
i.e.
s/he is tne
valuer;
out not in another, namely s/ne is
not responsible for a valued item having its
valued properties.
or is there any licence
for reducing tne values assignee to those
tnat serve tne interests of tne valuer.
18
18
Routley and Routley. Hunan chauvinism and Environmental Ethics:
This solution seems to do little more than shift the
detached value argument back one step.
-hy snould tne
qualities of an item be valued except that a valuer places
some value on them? Tnat is to say, all items (objects of
moral concern) have qualities,
out
tnat some of these
Qualities
are valued ana some are not inaicates tne
(instrumental) choices of a valuer
(unless a theory of
detacher values, *hich has just teen rejected, is adopted.)
me intent behind this value theory is to avoid positing
detacned values,
yet to maintain sone basis for intrinsic
values tnat cannot be cashed in tor instrumental values.
io
158
47’8.
�Page 10
do this requires that the intrinsic value of the qualities
not be seen also as instrumental values.
it is not,
tneretorej a natter of assigning intrinsic values to tne
goals of instrumental value tneories,
it is a matter of
finding a way in which a particular goal or item or being is
capable of possessing value that is neither detached from,
the notion of a valuer nor , if connected in some manner to
a valuer, merely a means to another end.
Asserting the
valued qualities are resident
in the iter; is intended to
separate it from the valuer's evaluation and denying the
reauction of values to the interests of tne valuer is
intended to provide for an intrinsic worth in items and
separate intrinsic values from purely instrumental values,
if tne intrinsic value of an object is
conceptually
different from its instrumental value, then tne intrinsic
value must be taken into consideration separate from its
instrumental uses and instrumental judgments about the item.
Therefore, the item (object of moral concern) is
granted
respect in, of ana tor itself and this is the ultimate goal
of the P1U' .-ood/Koutley position.
An item can have an Intrinsic and an instrumental
worth,
but this does not in and of itself remove the humans
bias to arcs intrunentai values or towards the properties
valued.
For this the aerial that humans (persons) are tne
only valuers is needed:
It is simply a (common) mistake to think mat
values and rights do not have a meaning, or
an application, outsice tne human context or
situation:
to establish tnis point (on which
i-oore rightly insisted) it is enough to point
out again that (hypothetical) valuers, not
necessarily nun an or persons, can assign
values with respect to situations and worlds
devoid of hunans ano of persons altogether.
19
houtley ano "Routley. “Human Chauvinisr and “Environmental “mthics:
19
it can now be asserted tnat items in the environment have a
value beyond those assignee to then by humans (persons)) ana
that ceings other than humans can be valuers,, but what is
left to do is to establish tne relative ranks or
'pecking
In this regari tne greater value
order' of valuers.
things
may
nave
assumption "that ever, trough other
instrinsic value, people <or humans are more valuable than
anything else, and rank more highlyi (no matter how large
their numoer) ' must be denied.
20
Houtley and Pout ley.
Human Chauvinism and Environmental Ethics:
The greater value assumption, a weaker form, ot human
chauvinism, is open to most of objections made against numao
chauvinisr.
and to examples contrasting morally repugnant
humans
ith norally non-repugnant nonhumans illustrating t.ne
171.
157-b.
�Page 11
•
•
unacceptable outcomes of this assumption, such as:
if tnere is only roc
in one's life boat
for
one ano one fust cnccse oet-.een saving Adolf
Hitler and a combat ^hicn nas lived a decent
life and never narirea a living creature, one
is morally obliged to choose the former. 21
21
Routley and Routley.
Against tne Inevitability of Human Chauvinism:
5 7.
Having set aside tne arguments for
value
being
exclusive to humans tney no focus on arguments for morality
being exclusive to humans.
One such argument is tne
contractual argument:
J.
K.
L.
M.
N.
22
fne
only
justification
of
moral
principles (only X) is a contractual one,
i.e., the entry into contracts of agents
(Zry).
Agents only enter into contracts (only Z)
it it serves tneir. o*n interests.
(The
Ciaisl.
ifiii J
Humans (persons) are the only agents that
enter into contracts (tout Zj,
therefore, oy K ano i;
Humans
(persons)
only
enter
into
contracts (only Z) if it serves tneir own
interests.
Tnerefore, from J and
:
Tne
only
justification
for
moral
principles
(only X)
is the (selfisn)
interests of humans (persons). 22
"Routley ano "Routley.
"Against the Inevitability of Human Chauvinisms
This entire contract argument can oe faulted as a
strawman, out tne general effect of the argument ano tne
conclusion still carry tne intention of human chauvinistic
arguments oased on the exclusiveness of morality to numans.
Thus tnis prototype is illustrative ana descriptive of the
sorts of conclusions in force and the sorts of premises usea
to support then.
Therefore, the counterarguments usea
against trie contractual argument and its close relatives
oesignate the sorts of attacxs that can be launched against
arguments for human cnauvlnis ano moral exclusiveness.
It is assumed tnat conditions other tnan contractual
ones
, e.g.
community based, can be substituted into
pre ■ ise J and with appropriate modifications to the rest of
tne argu ent tne same conclusion can be reached. Premise d
proports to set tne parameters of tne argument oy selecting
an activity with moral relevance that does not violate tne
second condition of adequacy previously set down.
In an
52.
�Page 12
attempt to describe an exclusively hui<<an i oral context,
premise J's use o£ the ^oro 'only' to support entry into
contracts, a purely hu.an (person's) endeavour, makes it
obviously raise. turtnernore, in supporting the contract
-hdicinq as a purely human (person s) endeavour, however,
"premise J imports the very chauvinism that is at issue in
tne conclusion." 2J
23
“Routley ana “Routley.
Against tne inevitability of Human “Chauvinism:
53.
premise J is found to be faulty on several points.
If
moral obligation is tasen to ce a moral principle then
premise J
is not sufficient
to
include
all
moral
obligations.
"There is no actual contract underlying tne
principle that one ought not to be cruel to animals,
children, and otners not in a position to contract." 24 Ii
this too narrow scope »ere not enough to condemn tne theory,
then;
The social
contract
account
of
moral
obligation is defective because it implies
tnat moral obligations can really only hold
between responsible moral agents and attempts
to account for all. moral ooliqation as based
on contract.
but of course tne account is
correct as an account of the origin of some
tyr.es of moral ooligatlon;
there are moral
ooli ,ations of type that can only
hold
oetween
free and responsible agents and
others which only apply within a social and
political
context.
let other types of
ooligatlon, such as the obligation not to
cause suffering, can arise only with respect
to sentient or prefercnce-naving creatures -.•no are not necessarily morally responsible
-- ana could not significantly arise
itn
res.ect to a nonsentient such as a tree or a
rock.
25
Routley and Routley. Against the Inevitability of Human Chauvinism:
Routley ano Routley. Against tne Ir.evitablility of human Chauvinism:
24
25
A moral agent could have a moral obligation to a being
incapable of being or becoming a moral agent. Even when
precise J is amended to something besiaes a contractual,
foundation, it still comes to grief on tne sticking point of
obiigations.
Premise K, the egoist assumption;
is faulted on the same grounds as egoism
itself.
For agents sometimes enter into
contacts that are not in their awn interests
but are in tne interests of other persons or
54.
5b.
�Page 13
creatures, or are undertaken on behalf of,
tor instance to protect, other items tr at do
not nave interests at all, e.g.,
rivers,
ouildings, forests.
Against the Inevitability of u an Chauvinism:
what is not pellucid nere, is that entering into a contract
on oenalf of another is not, or cannot, be in the interests
of the contracting agentand therefore a denial of premise K,
Entering into acontract that protects something that is
itself incapable of interests nay indirectly oe in the
interests of tne contracting agent even though tne agent's
interests are not directly recognized by tne contract.
by
example, an agent may enter into a contact that proctects a
virgin forest and the river that flos through it, in order
to protect the agent's access to water downstream of tne
forest.
Or pernaps even more indirectly, an agent ray sign
over his land as a wildflower sanctuary because
his
neighbour,
*no he nates,
is allergic to wildflowers.
It
would seer that wnat has to oe snown is that an agent would
enter a contract on behalf gf anotner -nen tne interests of
the other are directly opposed to tne interests of tne
conrtracting agent,
Opposition to tne contracting agent's
interests may oe, however, too strinqent a condition.
If
breaking the premise rests in showing tnat an agent will act
outside nis selfish interests, tnen it is only necessary to
snow tnat an agent
vould enter into a contract when his
selfish interests
-ere not involved.
In sucn a case,
entering a contract tc protect a river, building, or forest
could ce sufficlent.
26
-^outley and Routiey.
53.
Premise K can be amended to reflect the ability to
enter into contracts for beings or things other tnan tne
contracting agent:
27
However even if premise . K were amended to
ad-iiit that agents may enter into contracts on
oenalt of nonhuman items,
it would still
result in a form of numan chauvinis given
familiar -assumptions, since nonhun-an items
will
still
ce
unable to create moral
obligaions except through a human sponsor or
patron, who will presumably
aole to choose
-hetner or not to protect them. 27
"Routley and "Routiey.
"Against the "Inevitability of "Human "Chauvinism:
but if tnis modification is made and nonhuman items are
unable to create a moral, obligation on the agents
(agents
ceing under moral obligations only where they cnoose to De),
then tnis premise assumes tne conclusion ■. It is only the
interests of the humans
Involved tnat justify the moral
obligation imposed by tne contract.
53.
�Page 14
Premise L is strengthened by trie use of
person* "tor
otherwise premises suer, as e and its variations are suspect,
since tnere is nothing,
legally or morally,
to prevent
consortia,
organizations, and other nonhumans from entering
into contracts (and tnese items are appropriately counted as
persons in the larger ieg.,1 sense)." 2t
28
-? 3 •
Routley and Routley.
Against the Inevitability of Hunan Chauvinism:
■<hile premise L may be the better by this move premises
j and k are both tne worse. J remains false and K is either
false or assumes the conclusion if modified to allow for
conditions tnat would save tne human chauvinistic elements
of it.
thus contractual arguments land alter natives of the
same form as this prototype) for the substantiation of a
human cnauvinistic-oased environmental ethics are lost.
ine
assumptions underlying tne premises are simply not. equal to
the task of supporting the conclusion. Further modification
of
the premises is at the expense oi violating the
conditions of adequacy for exclusive human membership in the
.'oral Clue.
if the restrictions (such as 'only') on
oremdses ltxe J (or variations of it) are removed, then
leeway is
left for including soie npnhumans oi excluding
some humans.
Cn the other hand,
restrictions may oe
retained and tne contractual portion is modified put the
result is tne sane.
ire -ore vital premise for establishing
tne human cnauvinistic conelusion, premises like K tnat 1ink
t?e exclusive numan justification ot moral actions to human
interests, either assume the conclusion or may re countered
by examples that snow them to be false.
Plum-ood and Routley conclude;
it is not possible to provide criteria
hich
would jusill* distinguishing,
lr the sharp
way standard western ethics do,
between
numans and certain nonhuman creatures, and
particularily those creatures which
have
preferences or ^referred states. For sucn
criteria appear to depend upon tne mistaken
assumption
that moral respect for other
creatures is due only when they can be shown
to
measure
up
to
some
ratner
axaltbai.ll4=u£.t.££aifi£d and JLaauea tests for
membership of a privileged class (essentially
an elitist view),
instead of upon,
say,
respect
for
tne
preferences
of other
creatures.
Accordingly tne
sharp
moral
distinction, commonly accepted in ethics bv
philosophers and ethers alike,
all
bureaus aea all olb££ aniial ^pbclax*. lac&£ a
Sall^laClQty; Cobfitbul
29
�Page 15
29
103.
“Koutley ana “Routley.
“Chauvinisi
ar.) “•.nviron : ental “£tnicss
Having broken the exclusiveness of value and morality
to humans and naving disconnected the link of values and
morals to solely human interests,
■ nat alternatives are
there to human chauvinistic systens? Given tne analysis
just made of value and morality, Plumwood ano Routley
maintain:
what emerges
____ __ _ is
________
____ of
__ types of
__
____
a picture
oral
obligation as associated with a nest of rings
or annular bounaary
classes,
with
the
innermost
class,
consisting
of
highly
_
creatures,
intelligent,
social,
sentient
having tne full range of moral obligations
applicable to them, ana outer classes of sucn
nonsentient
items as trees and rocks having
only a much more restricted range of moral
obligations significantly applicable to them,
In
in some cases there
is no sharp division
between tne rings,
'but there is no single
uniform privileged class of items, no one
base class,
to which all ano only moral
principles directly apply, and moreover the
zoological ■class of humans is not one or tne
really significant boundary classes.
Tne
recognition
tnat
sone
types
of moral
ooiiqation only apply -<ithin tne context of a
particular
sort
of society, or through
contract, does nothing to support the case of
human cnauvinlsfi .
3
30
55.
Routley and “Routley.
-gainst tne inevitability of human Chauvinism
This notion of nested zones or an annular
classes ; ay be diagramed as in Diagram i. 31
picture
of
�Page lb
31
"Routley, "Richard.
"Canberra, 1981: 2.
"In "defense of "Cannibalise,
"Unpublished paper.
The laoels for the rings or zones represent;
32
respectively different soils of objects
such
as,
objects
of
moral
concern,
/.elf are-having
objects,
preference-havers
(and
cnoice-na<ers),
right-nolders,
obligation-holders
and
responsibilitybearers,
trose contractually- co<ni!'ittea- and
tne different sorts of obligations that can
significantly apply to such objects.
ot all
the tyoes of objects indicated are distinct,
nor is the listing intended to be exhaustive
but rather illustrative.
for
strictly the
laoels given should oe expanded, as the
distinctions are categorical ones, so tnat
what matters is net whether an object is, tor
instance, contractually committed in sore
fasnion out whether it is tne sort of thing
that can be,
whether it can significantly
enter into or be committed by arrangements of
a contractual xina,
32
Routley and Routley.
human Cnauvinlsin and Environmental Ethics:
oreover,
tne categorical distinctions that demarcate the
various rings or zones are morally relevent categories.
ine
annular
picture
does
not. reject traditional ethical
categories, tut does reject the limitation of categories to
one snecies or case class.
.Also it rejects unjustified
distinctions tnat are not "...categorical distinctions .hich
tie analytically -itn ethical notions...."
33
107-8.
�Page 17
Routley ana "Routley.
"Human "cnauvinis
and "Environmental "Ethics:
inis celng tne case:
it is certainly in no «ay species chauvinist
or nuian chauvinist. For none of tne zones
of tne annular picture couprises the class o£
humans
(or its
jincr variant tne class of
persons);
for tnis class is not of moral
relevance.
34
_Routley and Routley.
Human Chauvinism ana Environmental Ethics:
Returning again to tne metaphor of tne oral Club, under tr.e
annular ring picture membership in tne Club is automatic to
all objects of moral concern, out tne privileges within tne
Club are limited by moral capacities to use the facilities
ot me Club.
Tne obligations and the extent of those
ooligations of human members to nonhuman members rest upon
tne type of moral object . tne nonhuman is and on its
capacities (illustrated by its overlay on the annular rings)
not upon a comparison of tne nonhuman to tne human. For
example a being capaole of contractual obligation could
justifiaoly discriminate against a being unaole to make
contracts
with reference
to
contractual
ooligations,
regardless of
the species of tne t/o beings.
dy tie same
token,
it would be unjust of a
preference-haver
to
discriminate against another preference-haver solely because
tne two preference-havers were of uifferent species.
loo it snould be notes tnat Diagram 1 illustrates tne
position of humans as a species ano not tnat ot a particular
human. Any given nuran, as ith any given object of
noral
concern plotted on tne annular rings, .»ould not necessarily
mater? in each detail the plot of tne species to «nicn it
oelonjs:
Just as tnere are relevant divisions beyond
tne class of perference-havers , so tnere are
ithir. the class. Tnus tne suggestion tnat
tne class to.-a rds which noral obligations
(ano a corresponding Sait ot moral concern
which ta<es account ot creatures* states) ay
oe neld is bounded
by
tne
class
of
preference-havers,
does not ot course imply
tnat oo disxiUGXicas can be nade -iiwl- the
class of preference-navers with respect to
tne kind of behaviour appropriate to them.
For example, contractual obligations -- wnicn
Dy no means exnaust obligation -- can only be
nela directly
(as distinct from by way of
representative) with respect to
a
n.ucn
narrower class of creatures, from which many
•
108.
�P a g e 1«
humans are excluded.
35
10 7.
3b
“Routley and “Routley.
“Human “Chauvinis
and “Environmental “Ethics;
The shift from determining moral regard by a comparison
o£ nonnumans to humans to a determination oy an examination
ot categorical distinctions expands tf.e range of nonhuman
objects of moral concern.
ay rejecting tne base class
assumption, value as determined oy use or production by the
base class is also rejected. inis does not mean tnat human
values *111 be rejected, but tnat values will no longer oe
judged solely in human terms and that human values -ill no
longer automatically taxe precedent over all other values,
inus a particular ecosystem, e.g. a swamp, is recognized a.,
having value other tnan the possible location of an oil
bearing geosyncline or a salt dome.
It is seen to nave
value as the home of a number of various flora and fauna
species with a complex set of inter-relationships and as a
system in itself that is not reducible to the interests of
one species or even group of species within it.
Inis last point tnat the value of an ecosystem, or any
similar complex of values, interests, preferences, etc,, is
not reducible to the values, interests, or preferences of
either the individual components or toe whole, ignoring tne
individual components, is called by them tne "no-reduction
position".
Inis position permits a middle ground between
tne extremes of particularistic and holistic views and
thereby provides a loc is for what they term "the ecological
outlook":
in a closely related
-ay,
the no-reduction
position can provide a suitable metaphysical
base for an ecological
outloox vor*
i
ax vuuxuurs
worldview,
in which man is seen
:
as .part
_
of a natural
community, part of natural systems seen as
integrated
wholes
and with .welfare and
interests
bound
whole, ......
ano not
__________ ____
__ up with the
.....................
as,
in tne typical .estern view, a separate,
self-contained actor standing outsue tne
syster
and manipulating it in the pursuit of
self-contained interests,
36
36
Routley, Vai and Richard Routley. Social rneories, oelf management,
and Environmental Problems.
“&“ln\s annison,
.s., iCRobbie,
.a. “ .anoX*
R. Routley, “&edsX&. Environmental Philosophy. Canberra, am), I960:
319.
One of the offsooots ot this no-reductior position is a
policy of respect for the systei , its parts, and for the
inter-relationships between parts and the parts and the
h ole;
�Page 19
Tne no-reduction position can thus provide a
natural
foundation
for
a
genuinely
environmental ethic, one *nicn allows human
actions to be guided oy respect, cure and
concern for the natural world and rejects tne
"human
Egoist"
tnesis
that
tne
only
constraints on nunan action concerning nature
arise from tne interests of other numans.
For sucn relations of interdependence between
man and nature must give rise to constraints
on numan action in the same
*ay
tnat
appropriate
relations
of. interdependence
between en do, so tne thesis that action can
and must oe unconstrained by any concerns
other than human ones fails, as does tne
thesis tnat nature is no more than a means to
hu an ends, a mere tool.
37
37
Routley and Routley.
Social theories, Self management, and Environmentaifroblems:
Tne respect position .is cased on one or
general ooligation principles:
1.
ore
of
three
Ine general principle cf respect
. .. .. _ _ i for preference-navers
(.formerly
applied
only
to
human
preferences)
is
transferred to the larger arena of all oeinys or items
that can be placed in a disprefer red state> •
..the requisite, important and non-ar.itrary
distinction is to ce ora*n which narKS out
the class
of
creatures
to.-,arcs
-hicn
obligations
may ce held;
tnat is,
the
usually
recognisec
principles
oi
consideration
towards
others
(of
tne
privileged class) properly extend or should
be generalized to consideration for other
creatures
having
preferences,
and
xgg
geaaxal aeXeriSiCle GGliGaiiaa
-iu.cci„14i is fiat Lii put
aXfaets
XoXuui
PitfiXetfiaGfisfiaAzexsl iuia a dis^raXaxxfia state
1CC GQ GQGU reuses, 38
Routley and Routley,
2.
39
Hunan Chauvinism and Environmental Ethics:
Preferences alone, ho-.ever, are still too narro
to
develop an environmental ethic or ecological outlooK. So
tne second principle applies to beings or
iters
<itn an
interest'
or
'welfare',
v-nere rf...an 'interest' or
welfare in tne broaa sense is a Xclus or life-goal, as
possessed by living things, or an equilibrium or system
goal, as possessed oy living ecosystems." 39
Routley and Routley,
104.
'
Human Chauvinism and Environmental Ethics:
106,
319.
�Page 20
iherefore, tne second principle is:
that the -altaic or
of animate
objects and also such biological items as
ecosystems can ce affected in one way oi
another, e.g.
increased, decreased, upset.
Foi instance, the wellbeing of a coastal
community and of the individual trees in it
can ce reduced to zero oy sandmining, and it
can be seriously threatened by pumping vaste
detergent into trie nearoy ocean. Tnere is a
general ocligaiton principle corresponding
likewise to tnis more comprehensive class of
,»elf are-bearers, namely, dpX to jaopafoxse
ttfi ..ulijeiiju ui aaiuxai oPJecxs uc
-J.4--UU1 JiCu ±£aiGU.
4<)
40
3.
Routiey and Routiey.
Human Chauvinism and Environmental Ethics;
lOu- /.
Beyond preference-havers and beings or systems
ith
interests or welfares,
the environment contains items,
sucn as rocKS, soils and «:ater*ays tnat nave value, out no
preferences or interests;
unlike higher animals sucn items
cannot
literally be put into dispreferred states
(and In
obvious sense, as opposed to the
ider sense of 'interests' tied to welfare,
they have no interests),
out they can be
damaged or destroyeo or nave their Maiue
eroded or impaired. 41
41
Routiey ana Routiey.
Human Chauvinism and Environmental Ethics;
Tne three generalizable obligation principles
are
parallel in their structure and application and vary omv in
/.hat rings of the annular Picture that
they
cover.
Exclusiveness of the principles to a particuair ring,
however, snould not ce assumed.
ine principle of not
damaging or destroying the value of an object of in oral
concern could extend across the entire annular picture.
Thus tne overlay of a ^articular ouject of moral concern
will indicate which principle(s) of obligation may be
applied to a particular case. An object of moral concern,
e.g. a wornoat, may very veil be capdole of being placed in
a
dispreferred
state,
its
wellbeing
or
interests
jeopardizej, or devalued at one ana tne same time.
in tne
other hand, another object of moral concern, e.g. Ayers
Rock, may, perhaps, only be disvalued.
109.
�Page 21
Further tne respect position not only gives generalized
principi.es of od! igat ion , but it also reverses tne common
notion of when tnese principles are applied:
Cn tne alternative thoroughgoing
respect
vie.'.,
whi.cn
is
illustrated o y various
nonexploitive non- estern ethics, one starts
from a restricted position, a position of no
interference and no exploitation, a position
at peace witn tne natural world so to say,
and allots interference -- not as on
■estern
tninxlng,
restricts i terference -- for aooa
reasons.
ine onus of ,-roof is tnus entirely
inverted:
good reasons are required lax
interference, not xa siax interference. 42
_____ Routley and Routley.
nunan Chauvinism and Environmental Ethics:
174.
<*?verLi? ’
onus 01 proof leads to shifts and
inversions in otner areas as well. Requiring good reasons
for interfering crings about a shift in tne notion of
property ownership. Operating under a respect position, it
can no longer oe assumed that tne environment or pieces of
lii?an QofSrivate Property t0 De done with or disposed of at
■'•ill.
Before a s-amp can ce drained, or a forest" cut, or a
steam polluted seme
jooa reason must be given, Human
convenience and economic gain would not count as good
Respect does not preclude use, nut it does
preclude
certain
sorts of use.
it is
inco catioie aoove all -itn property vie ano
>.itn regarding something as no lore than a
eans to tne user's eras. 43
Routley* Social theories, Self management, and Environmental Problems:
The respect position is not only incompatible witn the
property view, it is also incompatible
1th tne strong
dichotomy between use and nonuse:
me conventional wisdom of
western Society
tends to offer a false dichotomy of use
versus respectful nonuse - a false choice
wnicn cones out especially clearly again in
tne treat ent of animals.
Here the choice
presented in -estern thought is typically one
of exxoex use without respect or serious
constraint, of using animals for example in
the ways cnaracteristic of largescare
mass-production farming and a market economic
systep wnich are inconpatiole with respect,
ox on the otner nand of not making any use of
animals at all, for e x ampie, never making use
322 .
�Page 22
of animals for food or for farming purposes,
•hat is left out in unis choice is trie
alternative tne Indians and other non--.estern
teople have recognizee,
the alternative oi
li 'ited and respectful use, which enaoles use
to be made of animals, but does not allow
animals to oe used in an unconstrained way or
merely as means tc human ends.
44
44
Routley and Routley, human Chauvinism aid Environmental Ethics: 179.
bt^taKerVup tr^a^a ter °cn^t er*™ pe0fie' sever’di groups of Australian Aborigines, will
^either, then, is tne respect position a reverence
position tnat also arises from the use/nonuse oicnotoi y.
the lives, preferences, choices, and considerations of otner
species or objects of oral concern are not to be taken as
sacred and inviolable. out as has been pointed out before a
good reason must be given before interference can oe
orooKe . interference is acceptable, as in tne case of
’essential predation... nlch is essential to the normal
livelihood of the predator, and where tne predator takes tor
itself no more than it requires for its livelihood," 45
Routley, Richard.
in Defense of Cannibalism•;
32.
thus an alternative to tne western dichotomy of use versus
nonuse
is
to
mitigate,
if
possible,
tne
user's
considerations with the considerations of the item:
io so ise somethin i itnout treating it as
available for unlimited or unconstrained use
tor
numan
ends
is
characteristic
of
x;esfcicci.XuX use.
In contrast non-respectful
use treats the use of the Iten as constrained
by no considerations arising from the item
itself and tne user's relationship to it, but
as constrained only in a derivative way, by
considerations of the convenience, welfare
ano so forth of otner humans. 4b
Routley and Routley.
Human Chauvinism and Environmental Ethics:
For there to be a respectful position that denies tne
dichotomy of unconstrained use versus respectful nonuse and
tnat allows tor the relationsnip Detween tne user and tne
item and the considerations of the item to be taken into
account, one fundamental change in tne present relationship
between humans and tne environment tnat must eventuate is
for individual users to take direct responsibility for their
impact:
Respect
positions
can
only
be
generally
179.
�Page 23
realized in a society in whicn tne basic
social structure and economy enables people
to take direct responsibility for tne impact
on tne natural world their needs and tneir
statisfaction create , such as in tne economy
of cooperative, involvement, 47
Routley and Routley. Social theories, Self "anagement, and Environmental Problems:
Human users taking direct responsibility tor tneir impact
snould lover tneir impact. If users bear tne responsibility
tor producing and managing what they need, then they should
produce, in a manner like unto tne 'taking' of essential
oreaation only wnat they neeo and should 'qo lighter' on tne
world:
323 .
..self-management can offer the alternative
of a
social^ in wnich nothing is
produced wnich uoes not correspond to genuine
needs an .i in which production is designed to
satisfy tnose needs «itn a minimum of
aste.
Tne possiclity of production of material
*nicn does not correspono to genuine neeos is
eliminated oy two factores in the ecomony of
cooperative exchange ano involvement;
first,
a direct relationsnip between tne possiblity
of use of an iter and direct expenditure of
labour on tne part of tne user, and second,
direct
cooperative
involvment
bet een
producers and users.
48
48
Routley and Routley.
social Theories, Self
anagement, and Environmental Problems:
Tne respect position, tnerefore, is intended to lower
the impact of human users on the entire environment, -nile
extending tne position's own impact goes far beyond tne
interrelations of human and other species. It is intended,
when applied to «estern cultures, to face among other issues
tne econonic/etnicai conflicts tnat nave been at tne core of
many of tne practical ethical problems concerning humans ana
nonhumans and that nave given rise to much of tne current
debate over inter-specific ethics.
ine respect position is
a strong repalcement to the Dominion Thesis that has been
tne ruleing and guiding principle of western though on
etnical relationsnips between numans and nonhumans. bike
the Dominion Thesis, tne respect position is a oasic set of
principles from whicn a wnoie range of problems, situations, '
and questions can oe approached. Tne alterations to the cut
of
-estern societies tnat would result from its adoption as
tne pattern of etmcal progress would oe more drastic tnan
that of either a Stewardship
Principle (or some other
weakened form of the Dominion Thesis) or an extension
principle, sucn as the Utilitarian extension proposed by
Singer.
fet these seeniniy drastic alterations, or some
313.
�Page 24
otnef
equally drastic set, r^ay be no more tnan *nat is
■■eeje.; to restyle current practices as a more just ano less
ar o i t rary .
�
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(SECTIC;. i'v'j
174
/al Plumwood 1 and Richard Rout ley
Peter
like
Singer,
so-e
basic
wish
Philosophic
to
question,
assumptions
underpinning estern can's attitudes loaros nis role in the
moral universe ana his relationship to nonhunan animals.
1
*vai •Plumwood has done most of ner work under ner married name:
• v a 1 “Routley.
*ln deference, however, to her wish tc establish herself under
•Plur »ooi that name
■ill oe used throughout this work.
In
a
passage reiininscent of Singer's call for
examination of unguestioneo assumptions, they state:
..nodern
moral
philosophers
--
fulfilling
tneir now established function of providing a
theoretical superstructure to explain and
justify
contemporary
rather
than
.oral
sensibilities
questioning
fundamental
asumptions -- tend to argue tnat tne bias
toward human interests, which is an integral
part
of
going ethical theories, is not just
hich is
both possible and aesiraole tc eliminate, out
another form of
class
cnauvinism
is ratner a restriction nctated by tne logic
of
evaluative
an-
.oral concepts, ana tnat
the
Page 2
coherent, possible, or viable
alternative to the "human chauvinism" of.
standard etnical theories. 2
there is no
“Richard “Routley “sand\& “Vai “Routley.
'‘Against the “inevitability of “Human
2
“Cnauvinisr .
“>ln\a “Goodpaster, “r.,“E. "&ar At *K.“ .
“Sayre, "o.eds\&.
“ttric
s ano “Problems of tne 21st “Century.
“ one “Lame, “.-Diversity of "-otre “Dame “t ress,
If
class
cnauvinism
Jo-7.
differential,
"is
discriminatory and inferior treatnent (oy sufficiently many
members of the class) for items outside the class, for which
there
is
not
suiXiciect
chauvinism is tne form of
justification"3,
class
chauvinism
in
then
which
human
the
species, uaao Sapleur., substantially morally discriminates
against everything nonhuman by an insufficiently justified
assumption of human rnoral uniqueness.
“R, “Routley “4<and\i. *v, “Routley, “Hunan "Chauvinisi? and “Environmental “Ethics.
“kln\& “ annison, “D.“S.,
c“Ror>bie, “m.“A., “aand\&
“R. “Routley,
“Environmental “Philosophy.
“Canberra, “A“ "u, 1980; 96.
*&eds\&.
The
contention
that
man
is tne sole subject of value and
Page J
morality
fallacy.
by
definition
This
runs
contention
aground
takes
the
the
seif-validating ana unchallengeable;
consideration oeing exclusive
to
on
a
definitional
definition ot moral
human
realm
to
be
The fallacy of the definitional move is that
of
believing
that
by
converting
the
substantive evaluative
theses
of
nu<an
chauvinism to matters of definition they
become somehow exempt from challenge or need
for
justification,
iris is comparable to
justifying discriminatory menbership for a
club by referring to the rules, similarly
conceived as self-validating and exempt from
question or need of justification. 4
v
v r'r sr °Ut3sy "&andX& "v • *Routiey.
'Against the 'Inevitability of 'Human
In this case the club rules define the Moral Club.
These
definitions
can
upon
either
Physical
characteristics or a set of properties that are logically
connected with qualification for moral consideration,
it is
onvious that the physical characteristics are not morally
relevant:
*
x
It is impossible to restrict moral terms to
particular species, when species distinctions
are
defined
in
terms
of
physical
characteristics
which
are
not
morally
relevant,
•ore generally, an attempt to derive a
logically
necessary
connection
net eet
humanity itself and the applicability of
morality is bound to fail, for creatures
anatomically ana zoologically aistinct fro
hurans
>hicii arc identical with humans in
terms ot morally relevant
features
arc
logically possible,
upsetting any logical
linkage. 5
5•
and Houtley.
W Koutley
■■
Against the inevitability of Human Chauvinism;
39.
X
rnerefore , the characteristics neeoed to support the
defintional
move
have
to
be
other
than physical
characteristics. However, if properties logically tiea „itn
moral considerations are examined closely, it is fauna that
they do not support the exclusive eligibility of hur ans to
tne Moral Clue. Three conditions or adequacy ore set down
for making tne Clue exclusive to humans:
Page 4
1.
The set of characteristics must
he
possessed
oy
at
least
all
properly
functioning humans,
since
tc
omit
any
si unit leant aroup usually considered subject
to iroral consiceratin, suer as infants, young
children,
prinitive tribesmen, etc., ano to
allow that it was ierrissiole to treat these
groups
in
the
ay
it
is considered
permissible to treat non-humans, that is, as
mere
instruments,
would
certainly
lc
repugnant to modern moral sensibilities and
would offend common intuitions as to the
orotherhood of mar., the vie- that all humans
are possessors of inalienable rights, Thus
human chauvinism , if it
is to produce a
coherent
theory which does not unacceptably
rule out some groups of humans, must find
so e set cf features cc on to the rust
diverse ' en ters of hu" anKiriu....
(luu loiax
Auclusloa
2.
in order tor nu an chauvinis;
to be
justified, this sec ot characteristics ust
not be possessed by any non-nuran.
Uiie
ioXai i-xclusiau
3. The set of characteristics must oe not
merely norally relevant but sufficient to
justify, in a ncn-circuiar way,
the cut-oil
of moral consideration at exactly tne right
point.
If human chauvinism is to avoio the
charge of arbitrariness and unjustifiability
and to demonstrate its inevitability ana tne
impossibility of alternatives, it rust erneroe
from tne characteristics why items not having
tne f ay oe used as i: ere instruments to serve
tne interests of
those which do possess
tne . b
(lac
Xb^Xxxi&euXai Ju&xxxXcaXXQa
liS&UuaXlbU )
b
“Routley and "Routley.
39-40.
"Against tne "Inevitability of "Human "Chauvinism J
But tne properties usually assumed to give humans
exclusive entry into tne moral Cluo when tested against
these conditions of adequacy either admit nonhumans or
exclude humans.
Thirty-two such properties are tested oy
Plumwood and Routely XuXb£ alia,
using
tools,
using
language, self-awareness,
ceing a■are of the Inevitability
ot one s own death, being aoie to answer questions about
moral
issues sucn as human chauvinism, having interests,
having projects, belonging to a social community,
being
morally responsible tor one's actions, etc., and all are
found anting on at least one count.
Page 5
However, the conditions of adequacy night oe challenged
as too stmgent. Yet, if tne '<oral Club is to be exclusive
to humans and neither arbitrary nor unjustified, then
condition 1 - tnat all functioning humans possess the
property - must apply, etherise tne requirerents for Club
member snip are drawn too narrowly and some humans are
excludes.
against this condition it might be argued tnat
numan is too
__
_____
_ _ and it is only persons (where
oread________
in scope
, .
re
j_eVdnt_ "para
parametre)
person is defined by some morally
relevant
e’tre) who
should
De considered,
this would mean that those humans
buran
, ,---- -—
-no
did not qualify as persons aouIo net oe eligible for
treatment as
oncers of tne
oral Clue or if they tie
treated as members that eligibiility was arbitrary and
unjust.
it it is the case that’all humans (persons) must
possess this property, then it must also be the case tnat no
nonhuman possesses it,
otherwise an Argument From Analogy
and Anoiiioiy applies.
if some nonhumans possess the property
or properties then the requirements for Club membership are
ara^n too broadly ana some nonnumans are eligible
_J. Finally,
it
is not enough to separate the eligible
- ’ J ~ ' •- from the
ineligible (or pernaps the edible from tne inediblej,
it
must oe snown why the ineiigiole are not only ineligible for
membership, but why tney cannot even oe consldereo for
membership, otherwise tne difference in treatment is not
justified.
To carry tne Club metaphor
..
a little farther,
pernaps too far, while remoers n.a,
ay h-.nave certain privileges,
this aoes not necessarily mean tnat
that in addition to not
enjoying these special privileges, nonrnembers can also oe
un*arrantly deprived of benefits common to memoers and
non-memoers.
why should membership devalue nonmenoers ano
put tneTi at the disposal of members?
it is o y this
condition that human chauvinism must show why humans are the
exclusive subjects of intrinsic value and the value of
nonhumans can be handled in terms of instrun.enr.al value to
humans.
If these conditions of adequacy stand, then
tne
definitional necessity of exclusiveness fails. Yet another
approach at making the realms of value ano
morality
exclusive to humans is to examine no.< values are thougnt to
operate.
. prototype argument tor this is laio out as
follows:
A.
values are
determined
through
tne
preference
rankings
of valuers
(tne aa
dfixacuafiie Karnes
,
Valuers'
preference rankings are determined through
valuer s interests (tne preXcifiace £aauci.ioa
thesis).
C.
valuers are humans (persons)
(tne saecsas assaaplioa).
I.
Therefore,
values are determines tnrouqn human interests
(tnrough tne interests ot persons).
8
Routley and Routley. Against the Inevitability of human Chauvinism:
The use of persons in this quotation is a reference to agru.rents aimed at
Page 6
saving tne exclusiveness of the doral Club by limiting membership to humans
with some given capacity, characteristic or excellence or combination of
these.
while this argument may succeed in preventing non- u.ans tror
consideration, it is at the cost of non-paradigr atic i,.<ins.
From this argument It is sometimes concluded that "not only
is it perfectly accceptatie for humans to reduce matters of
value and morality to natters of human interest, but
oreover there is no rational or possible alternative to
going
so;
any alternative is simply incoherent." 9
ithever, it this argument is disrantled it is snown to rest
on
a
set of false assumptions that even Charitable
tanipulation cannot save.
9
43.
Routley and Routley.
Against me Inevitability of Human Chauvinism;
an ambiguity resides in the use of 'determined through'
in precise
I,
if
'determined through' means 'have to ce
determined*, men Plumwood and Routley feel,
mat it is
’Odaliy
upgraded
"to
reveal the sneer necessity of
conclusion J." 10
10
“Routley and “Routley.
Against the inevitability of Human Chauvinism:
no-ever, this involves a similar modificiition of p r e tn i s e C
or eise a nodal fallacy is involved. The
C._ stronger
ci
necessary
sense is preferable in forcing tne conclusion,
J -- as shall be
seen snortly when premise C is considered, but tne more
cnaritaoie move for tne argument is to weaken the use of
'determined mrougn' to something like 'reflect ' or 'are a
ratter of'. Despite either modification to resolve the
ambiguity
of 'determined through' premise A is still
susceptide to the charge:
value rankings cannot however ce cashed in
for
preference
rankings
since,
as 1 s
well-known, preference rankings and value
rankings car
diverge;
a valuer can prefer
wnat has less value and can value what is not
, referred.
11
Premise a is , therefore ( modified to read:
Al Values are determined through the value
rankings of (appropriate) valuers,
12
11
"Routley and “Routley. Against the Inevitability of Human Chauvinism
44.
12
Ro tley and Routley,
Against me inevitability of num Chauvinism:
44.
Bypassing premise B for a moment, premise C,
the
St-ficieb aSiuuiptAob, can be seen as a "circular way of
reintroducing tne logical version of human chauvinism by
restricting tne class of valuers a priori to humans" and at
Page 7
Snr1 ^'?2Hy2enriy*-^rae'
13 11 is essential to the argument
lse1 c to oe a necessary condition that humans are
the only valuers.
ithout that the argument ooes not
human chauvinsitic conclusion.
if persons is
usea instead of humans, tnen it becomes
-ore defensible,
since not all humans are valuers, but not all valuers are
human,
if not all valuers are numar' or persons,
tnen to
sustain
the
human chauvinistic conclusion it becomes
necessary either to reject ail non-human (person) values or
i? i‘,’o e«- a "'ove m premise a such that 'interests' are
United to human (person) interests.
43-4.
Routley and Houtley.
Against the Inevitability of Human Chauvinism!
, „ It is just such a move at premise B ,
that ma k e s it,
tor them, tne most objectionable of the premises, Premise 6
is a group selfisnness
To
eirrsnness argument.
io show
tn
at
the
that
conclusion and particularly premise
‘
pre ise “B is
little more than an
argument for group
oup egoism in an environmental setting,
they
oisplay it against
ainst an argument baldly for
egoism.
if
pre ise A is recast replacing 'preferences'
ith 'values' as
ov°'v-i^2'preTn!ern ?rS0 0ds.to have 'preferences' replaced
attention in
is no- shifted to
interests .
interests can oe usea either in a weax and
- ,
-se so tnat anything tne valuer values is in tne
Ya|uer s interest
,ln stronger, but false sense tnat is
intended to support interests as ceing in the valuer's
advantage:
to sum. up tne dilemma for the argument then:
when. "interests" is usea in its weaker sense
premise u may be accepted out
tne argument
does not establish its inter, oea conclusion or
in any way sucpoert human chauvinism.
For
tne intended effect of the argument in the
cruae form is this; in determining values it
is
enough
to look at human advantage;
nothing else counts.
If tne argument -ere
correct,
tnen one could assess values bv
cneckmq out tne local (selfish) advantage of
hu ans,
or, more generally, tne aavanta ,e of
tne case class someho* assembled.
it, on thP
otner hano,
"interests":
is usea in its
strong sense, tne conclusion would license a
form of human crauvinis , but premise
no,
false.
14
Rout ley ano
Routley.
“Against the “Inevitability of “Human "Chauvinism:
Page 8
This argument has a second
,
aspect to it which they
explore.
if tne argument is not acceptable as it stands,
then supposelv, neither is tne alternative of rejecting its
conclusion.
Precise A is opposed to the conclusion D (~a or
D / D-> A) to shod
either one accepts the conclusion,
ith its
consequent instru entalist account of value,
or one is committed to an intrinsic or
cetacned value theory wnich takes values to
oe completely independent of valuers,
no
------------ , ano
and r.c
ay determined oy tneit, out, it is assumed,
the latter theory is a ell Known as untenable,
and rr.ay even _.
____ as involving mysticism
be seen
or as oeing irrational
inus,
it may te
conduced,
there is no real alternative to
hu-an chauvinism.
lb
#15
Routley and Routley.
Against tne inevitability of Human Chauvinism;
but this choice is rejectee «
as a x
false
«js>c one:
u < < c.
To reject the instrumentalist conclusion D is
bv no means to be commited tc a, or to the
view that tne valuers
. _____
__
,____
and
their
preference
rankings play no role in determining values
and tnat values are
a_ further
'set„
o
—
__ ___ .
of
items
mysterious independent iters
in the world
somehow perceived by valuers
through
a
special (even mystical and nonr ational) moral
sense.
16
Against, the Inevitability of Human Chauvinism:
Parallel to this dichotomy between A and u is the dichotomy
Detween instrumental and intrinsic values so central in tne
division and treatment of members from nonmembers in tne
hor a1 Club;
Tne dicnotomy frequently presentea between
instrumentalist accounts of. value, on tie one
hand, ana detached tneories
(or what die
mistakenly taken to 0e the same, intrinsic
tneories) is, for the same reason, a false
one.
Instrumental theories ore those men
attempt to
reduce
value
to
what
is
instrumental to or contributes to a stated
goal.
Typically such theories taxe tne goal
to oe tne furtherance of the interest of a
privileged class;
tor example, tne goal may
oe taken to be determined in terms of the
interests, concerns, advantage, or welfare of
tne .class of humans, or of persons, or of
sentient creatures, cej ending on t>e type of
cnauvinism.
In particular, human chauvinist
tneories
are,
characteristically,
instrumentalist theories.
in contrast, an
item is valued intrinsically where it is
16
Routley and Routley.
47.
47.
Page 9
valued for its own sake, and not merely as a
means
to
something
further;
and
an
intrinsic-value theory allo is that some items
are
intrinsically
valuable.
valuable,
. intrinsic
theories tnen,
then, contrast with
- it n ___
instr urn on cal
theories,, and *hat
vhat "intrinsic" tells us is no
more
tnan
that
tne
the
iter
taken
as
intrinsically valuable is not valued merely
as a means tc some goal, i.e.,
is, not merely
- - is
instrumentally valued. Accordingly
- 117 detached
value
theories,
since
< disjoint
1
from
instrumental theories, are a suo-ciass of
intrinsic value theories;
and they are a
proper suoclass since intrinsic values need
not be detached, lSomething may __
______ _
be valuaole
in itself without its ceing detached frott all
valuing experience.
17
17
Routley and Routley. Against tne inevitability 01 ■ uman •Chauvinism
Because detacned value theories are only a subclass of
intrinsic value theories the dichotomies bet een A and b and
between instrumental and instrinsic theories are false.
Since detached theories cannot be maintained and totally
instrumental value theories leao to an infinite regress,
which is manifest if, consistent witn tne theory, the goals
of a valuer are taken as instrumental, then neither of tnese
extremes is acceptable, but values do exist, so some other
vie-, besides those offered in the dichotomy must
be
advanced, Plumwood ana Routley advance one vie* tnat denies
the dichotomy, yet does not limit valuers to humans and does
not li it tne value of objects to human instrumental values;
A person is the source of value-judgments and
values .in one sense,
i.e.
s/he is tne
valuer;
out not in another, namely s/ne is
not responsible for a valued item having its
valued properties.
or is there any licence
for reducing tne values assignee to those
tnat serve tne interests of tne valuer.
18
18
Routley and Routley. Hunan chauvinism and Environmental Ethics:
This solution seems to do little more than shift the
detached value argument back one step.
-hy snould tne
qualities of an item be valued except that a valuer places
some value on them? Tnat is to say, all items (objects of
moral concern) have qualities,
out
tnat some of these
Qualities
are valued ana some are not inaicates tne
(instrumental) choices of a valuer
(unless a theory of
detacher values, *hich has just teen rejected, is adopted.)
me intent behind this value theory is to avoid positing
detacned values,
yet to maintain sone basis for intrinsic
values tnat cannot be cashed in tor instrumental values.
io
158
47’8.
Page 10
do this requires that the intrinsic value of the qualities
not be seen also as instrumental values.
it is not,
tneretorej a natter of assigning intrinsic values to tne
goals of instrumental value tneories,
it is a matter of
finding a way in which a particular goal or item or being is
capable of possessing value that is neither detached from,
the notion of a valuer nor , if connected in some manner to
a valuer, merely a means to another end.
Asserting the
valued qualities are resident
in the iter; is intended to
separate it from the valuer's evaluation and denying the
reauction of values to the interests of tne valuer is
intended to provide for an intrinsic worth in items and
separate intrinsic values from purely instrumental values,
if tne intrinsic value of an object is
conceptually
different from its instrumental value, then tne intrinsic
value must be taken into consideration separate from its
instrumental uses and instrumental judgments about the item.
Therefore, the item (object of moral concern) is
granted
respect in, of ana tor itself and this is the ultimate goal
of the P1U' .-ood/Koutley position.
An item can have an Intrinsic and an instrumental
worth,
but this does not in and of itself remove the humans
bias to arcs intrunentai values or towards the properties
valued.
For this the aerial that humans (persons) are tne
only valuers is needed:
It is simply a (common) mistake to think mat
values and rights do not have a meaning, or
an application, outsice tne human context or
situation:
to establish tnis point (on which
i-oore rightly insisted) it is enough to point
out again that (hypothetical) valuers, not
necessarily nun an or persons, can assign
values with respect to situations and worlds
devoid of hunans ano of persons altogether.
19
houtley ano "Routley. “Human Chauvinisr and “Environmental “mthics:
19
it can now be asserted tnat items in the environment have a
value beyond those assignee to then by humans (persons)) ana
that ceings other than humans can be valuers,, but what is
left to do is to establish tne relative ranks or
'pecking
In this regari tne greater value
order' of valuers.
things
may
nave
assumption "that ever, trough other
instrinsic value, people <or humans are more valuable than
anything else, and rank more highlyi (no matter how large
their numoer) ' must be denied.
20
Houtley and Pout ley.
Human Chauvinism and Environmental Ethics:
The greater value assumption, a weaker form, ot human
chauvinism, is open to most of objections made against numao
chauvinisr.
and to examples contrasting morally repugnant
humans
ith norally non-repugnant nonhumans illustrating t.ne
171.
157-b.
Page 11
•
•
unacceptable outcomes of this assumption, such as:
if tnere is only roc
in one's life boat
for
one ano one fust cnccse oet-.een saving Adolf
Hitler and a combat ^hicn nas lived a decent
life and never narirea a living creature, one
is morally obliged to choose the former. 21
21
Routley and Routley.
Against tne Inevitability of Human Chauvinism:
5 7.
Having set aside tne arguments for
value
being
exclusive to humans tney no focus on arguments for morality
being exclusive to humans.
One such argument is tne
contractual argument:
J.
K.
L.
M.
N.
22
fne
only
justification
of
moral
principles (only X) is a contractual one,
i.e., the entry into contracts of agents
(Zry).
Agents only enter into contracts (only Z)
it it serves tneir. o*n interests.
(The
Ciaisl.
ifiii J
Humans (persons) are the only agents that
enter into contracts (tout Zj,
therefore, oy K ano i;
Humans
(persons)
only
enter
into
contracts (only Z) if it serves tneir own
interests.
Tnerefore, from J and
:
Tne
only
justification
for
moral
principles
(only X)
is the (selfisn)
interests of humans (persons). 22
"Routley ano "Routley.
"Against the Inevitability of Human Chauvinisms
This entire contract argument can oe faulted as a
strawman, out tne general effect of the argument ano tne
conclusion still carry tne intention of human chauvinistic
arguments oased on the exclusiveness of morality to numans.
Thus tnis prototype is illustrative ana descriptive of the
sorts of conclusions in force and the sorts of premises usea
to support then.
Therefore, the counterarguments usea
against trie contractual argument and its close relatives
oesignate the sorts of attacxs that can be launched against
arguments for human cnauvlnis ano moral exclusiveness.
It is assumed tnat conditions other tnan contractual
ones
, e.g.
community based, can be substituted into
pre ■ ise J and with appropriate modifications to the rest of
tne argu ent tne same conclusion can be reached. Premise d
proports to set tne parameters of tne argument oy selecting
an activity with moral relevance that does not violate tne
second condition of adequacy previously set down.
In an
52.
Page 12
attempt to describe an exclusively hui<<an i oral context,
premise J's use o£ the ^oro 'only' to support entry into
contracts, a purely hu.an (person's) endeavour, makes it
obviously raise. turtnernore, in supporting the contract
-hdicinq as a purely human (person s) endeavour, however,
"premise J imports the very chauvinism that is at issue in
tne conclusion." 2J
23
“Routley ana “Routley.
Against tne inevitability of Human “Chauvinism:
53.
premise J is found to be faulty on several points.
If
moral obligation is tasen to ce a moral principle then
premise J
is not sufficient
to
include
all
moral
obligations.
"There is no actual contract underlying tne
principle that one ought not to be cruel to animals,
children, and otners not in a position to contract." 24 Ii
this too narrow scope »ere not enough to condemn tne theory,
then;
The social
contract
account
of
moral
obligation is defective because it implies
tnat moral obligations can really only hold
between responsible moral agents and attempts
to account for all. moral ooliqation as based
on contract.
but of course tne account is
correct as an account of the origin of some
tyr.es of moral ooligatlon;
there are moral
ooli ,ations of type that can only
hold
oetween
free and responsible agents and
others which only apply within a social and
political
context.
let other types of
ooligatlon, such as the obligation not to
cause suffering, can arise only with respect
to sentient or prefercnce-naving creatures -.•no are not necessarily morally responsible
-- ana could not significantly arise
itn
res.ect to a nonsentient such as a tree or a
rock.
25
Routley and Routley. Against the Inevitability of Human Chauvinism:
Routley ano Routley. Against tne Ir.evitablility of human Chauvinism:
24
25
A moral agent could have a moral obligation to a being
incapable of being or becoming a moral agent. Even when
precise J is amended to something besiaes a contractual,
foundation, it still comes to grief on tne sticking point of
obiigations.
Premise K, the egoist assumption;
is faulted on the same grounds as egoism
itself.
For agents sometimes enter into
contacts that are not in their awn interests
but are in tne interests of other persons or
54.
5b.
Page 13
creatures, or are undertaken on behalf of,
tor instance to protect, other items tr at do
not nave interests at all, e.g.,
rivers,
ouildings, forests.
Against the Inevitability of u an Chauvinism:
what is not pellucid nere, is that entering into a contract
on oenalf of another is not, or cannot, be in the interests
of the contracting agentand therefore a denial of premise K,
Entering into acontract that protects something that is
itself incapable of interests nay indirectly oe in the
interests of tne contracting agent even though tne agent's
interests are not directly recognized by tne contract.
by
example, an agent may enter into a contact that proctects a
virgin forest and the river that flos through it, in order
to protect the agent's access to water downstream of tne
forest.
Or pernaps even more indirectly, an agent ray sign
over his land as a wildflower sanctuary because
his
neighbour,
*no he nates,
is allergic to wildflowers.
It
would seer that wnat has to oe snown is that an agent would
enter a contract on behalf gf anotner -nen tne interests of
the other are directly opposed to tne interests of tne
conrtracting agent,
Opposition to tne contracting agent's
interests may oe, however, too strinqent a condition.
If
breaking the premise rests in showing tnat an agent will act
outside nis selfish interests, tnen it is only necessary to
snow tnat an agent
vould enter into a contract when his
selfish interests
-ere not involved.
In sucn a case,
entering a contract tc protect a river, building, or forest
could ce sufficlent.
26
-^outley and Routiey.
53.
Premise K can be amended to reflect the ability to
enter into contracts for beings or things other tnan tne
contracting agent:
27
However even if premise . K were amended to
ad-iiit that agents may enter into contracts on
oenalt of nonhuman items,
it would still
result in a form of numan chauvinis given
familiar -assumptions, since nonhun-an items
will
still
ce
unable to create moral
obligaions except through a human sponsor or
patron, who will presumably
aole to choose
-hetner or not to protect them. 27
"Routley and "Routiey.
"Against the "Inevitability of "Human "Chauvinism:
but if tnis modification is made and nonhuman items are
unable to create a moral, obligation on the agents
(agents
ceing under moral obligations only where they cnoose to De),
then tnis premise assumes tne conclusion ■. It is only the
interests of the humans
Involved tnat justify the moral
obligation imposed by tne contract.
53.
Page 14
Premise L is strengthened by trie use of
person* "tor
otherwise premises suer, as e and its variations are suspect,
since tnere is nothing,
legally or morally,
to prevent
consortia,
organizations, and other nonhumans from entering
into contracts (and tnese items are appropriately counted as
persons in the larger ieg.,1 sense)." 2t
28
-? 3 •
Routley and Routley.
Against the Inevitability of Hunan Chauvinism:
■<hile premise L may be the better by this move premises
j and k are both tne worse. J remains false and K is either
false or assumes the conclusion if modified to allow for
conditions tnat would save tne human chauvinistic elements
of it.
thus contractual arguments land alter natives of the
same form as this prototype) for the substantiation of a
human cnauvinistic-oased environmental ethics are lost.
ine
assumptions underlying tne premises are simply not. equal to
the task of supporting the conclusion. Further modification
of
the premises is at the expense oi violating the
conditions of adequacy for exclusive human membership in the
.'oral Clue.
if the restrictions (such as 'only') on
oremdses ltxe J (or variations of it) are removed, then
leeway is
left for including soie npnhumans oi excluding
some humans.
Cn the other hand,
restrictions may oe
retained and tne contractual portion is modified put the
result is tne sane.
ire -ore vital premise for establishing
tne human cnauvinistic conelusion, premises like K tnat 1ink
t?e exclusive numan justification ot moral actions to human
interests, either assume the conclusion or may re countered
by examples that snow them to be false.
Plum-ood and Routley conclude;
it is not possible to provide criteria
hich
would jusill* distinguishing,
lr the sharp
way standard western ethics do,
between
numans and certain nonhuman creatures, and
particularily those creatures which
have
preferences or ^referred states. For sucn
criteria appear to depend upon tne mistaken
assumption
that moral respect for other
creatures is due only when they can be shown
to
measure
up
to
some
ratner
axaltbai.ll4=u£.t.££aifi£d and JLaauea tests for
membership of a privileged class (essentially
an elitist view),
instead of upon,
say,
respect
for
tne
preferences
of other
creatures.
Accordingly tne
sharp
moral
distinction, commonly accepted in ethics bv
philosophers and ethers alike,
all
bureaus aea all olb££ aniial ^pbclax*. lac&£ a
Sall^laClQty; Cobfitbul
29
Page 15
29
103.
“Koutley ana “Routley.
“Chauvinisi
ar.) “•.nviron : ental “£tnicss
Having broken the exclusiveness of value and morality
to humans and naving disconnected the link of values and
morals to solely human interests,
■ nat alternatives are
there to human chauvinistic systens? Given tne analysis
just made of value and morality, Plumwood ano Routley
maintain:
what emerges
____ __ _ is
________
____ of
__ types of
__
____
a picture
oral
obligation as associated with a nest of rings
or annular bounaary
classes,
with
the
innermost
class,
consisting
of
highly
_
creatures,
intelligent,
social,
sentient
having tne full range of moral obligations
applicable to them, ana outer classes of sucn
nonsentient
items as trees and rocks having
only a much more restricted range of moral
obligations significantly applicable to them,
In
in some cases there
is no sharp division
between tne rings,
'but there is no single
uniform privileged class of items, no one
base class,
to which all ano only moral
principles directly apply, and moreover the
zoological ■class of humans is not one or tne
really significant boundary classes.
Tne
recognition
tnat
sone
types
of moral
ooiiqation only apply -<ithin tne context of a
particular
sort
of society, or through
contract, does nothing to support the case of
human cnauvinlsfi .
3
30
55.
Routley and “Routley.
-gainst tne inevitability of human Chauvinism
This notion of nested zones or an annular
classes ; ay be diagramed as in Diagram i. 31
picture
of
Page lb
31
"Routley, "Richard.
"Canberra, 1981: 2.
"In "defense of "Cannibalise,
"Unpublished paper.
The laoels for the rings or zones represent;
32
respectively different soils of objects
such
as,
objects
of
moral
concern,
/.elf are-having
objects,
preference-havers
(and
cnoice-na<ers),
right-nolders,
obligation-holders
and
responsibilitybearers,
trose contractually- co<ni!'ittea- and
tne different sorts of obligations that can
significantly apply to such objects.
ot all
the tyoes of objects indicated are distinct,
nor is the listing intended to be exhaustive
but rather illustrative.
for
strictly the
laoels given should oe expanded, as the
distinctions are categorical ones, so tnat
what matters is net whether an object is, tor
instance, contractually committed in sore
fasnion out whether it is tne sort of thing
that can be,
whether it can significantly
enter into or be committed by arrangements of
a contractual xina,
32
Routley and Routley.
human Cnauvinlsin and Environmental Ethics:
oreover,
tne categorical distinctions that demarcate the
various rings or zones are morally relevent categories.
ine
annular
picture
does
not. reject traditional ethical
categories, tut does reject the limitation of categories to
one snecies or case class.
.Also it rejects unjustified
distinctions tnat are not "...categorical distinctions .hich
tie analytically -itn ethical notions...."
33
107-8.
Page 17
Routley ana "Routley.
"Human "cnauvinis
and "Environmental "Ethics:
inis celng tne case:
it is certainly in no «ay species chauvinist
or nuian chauvinist. For none of tne zones
of tne annular picture couprises the class o£
humans
(or its
jincr variant tne class of
persons);
for tnis class is not of moral
relevance.
34
_Routley and Routley.
Human Chauvinism ana Environmental Ethics:
Returning again to tne metaphor of tne oral Club, under tr.e
annular ring picture membership in tne Club is automatic to
all objects of moral concern, out tne privileges within tne
Club are limited by moral capacities to use the facilities
ot me Club.
Tne obligations and the extent of those
ooligations of human members to nonhuman members rest upon
tne type of moral object . tne nonhuman is and on its
capacities (illustrated by its overlay on the annular rings)
not upon a comparison of tne nonhuman to tne human. For
example a being capaole of contractual obligation could
justifiaoly discriminate against a being unaole to make
contracts
with reference
to
contractual
ooligations,
regardless of
the species of tne t/o beings.
dy tie same
token,
it would be unjust of a
preference-haver
to
discriminate against another preference-haver solely because
tne two preference-havers were of uifferent species.
loo it snould be notes tnat Diagram 1 illustrates tne
position of humans as a species ano not tnat ot a particular
human. Any given nuran, as ith any given object of
noral
concern plotted on tne annular rings, .»ould not necessarily
mater? in each detail the plot of tne species to «nicn it
oelonjs:
Just as tnere are relevant divisions beyond
tne class of perference-havers , so tnere are
ithir. the class. Tnus tne suggestion tnat
tne class to.-a rds which noral obligations
(ano a corresponding Sait ot moral concern
which ta<es account ot creatures* states) ay
oe neld is bounded
by
tne
class
of
preference-havers,
does not ot course imply
tnat oo disxiUGXicas can be nade -iiwl- the
class of preference-navers with respect to
tne kind of behaviour appropriate to them.
For example, contractual obligations -- wnicn
Dy no means exnaust obligation -- can only be
nela directly
(as distinct from by way of
representative) with respect to
a
n.ucn
narrower class of creatures, from which many
•
108.
P a g e 1«
humans are excluded.
35
10 7.
3b
“Routley and “Routley.
“Human “Chauvinis
and “Environmental “Ethics;
The shift from determining moral regard by a comparison
o£ nonnumans to humans to a determination oy an examination
ot categorical distinctions expands tf.e range of nonhuman
objects of moral concern.
ay rejecting tne base class
assumption, value as determined oy use or production by the
base class is also rejected. inis does not mean tnat human
values *111 be rejected, but tnat values will no longer oe
judged solely in human terms and that human values -ill no
longer automatically taxe precedent over all other values,
inus a particular ecosystem, e.g. a swamp, is recognized a.,
having value other tnan the possible location of an oil
bearing geosyncline or a salt dome.
It is seen to nave
value as the home of a number of various flora and fauna
species with a complex set of inter-relationships and as a
system in itself that is not reducible to the interests of
one species or even group of species within it.
Inis last point tnat the value of an ecosystem, or any
similar complex of values, interests, preferences, etc,, is
not reducible to the values, interests, or preferences of
either the individual components or toe whole, ignoring tne
individual components, is called by them tne "no-reduction
position".
Inis position permits a middle ground between
tne extremes of particularistic and holistic views and
thereby provides a loc is for what they term "the ecological
outlook":
in a closely related
-ay,
the no-reduction
position can provide a suitable metaphysical
base for an ecological
outloox vor*
i
ax vuuxuurs
worldview,
in which man is seen
:
as .part
_
of a natural
community, part of natural systems seen as
integrated
wholes
and with .welfare and
interests
bound
whole, ......
ano not
__________ ____
__ up with the
.....................
as,
in tne typical .estern view, a separate,
self-contained actor standing outsue tne
syster
and manipulating it in the pursuit of
self-contained interests,
36
36
Routley, Vai and Richard Routley. Social rneories, oelf management,
and Environmental Problems.
“&“ln\s annison,
.s., iCRobbie,
.a. “ .anoX*
R. Routley, “&edsX&. Environmental Philosophy. Canberra, am), I960:
319.
One of the offsooots ot this no-reductior position is a
policy of respect for the systei , its parts, and for the
inter-relationships between parts and the parts and the
h ole;
Page 19
Tne no-reduction position can thus provide a
natural
foundation
for
a
genuinely
environmental ethic, one *nicn allows human
actions to be guided oy respect, cure and
concern for the natural world and rejects tne
"human
Egoist"
tnesis
that
tne
only
constraints on nunan action concerning nature
arise from tne interests of other numans.
For sucn relations of interdependence between
man and nature must give rise to constraints
on numan action in the same
*ay
tnat
appropriate
relations
of. interdependence
between en do, so tne thesis that action can
and must oe unconstrained by any concerns
other than human ones fails, as does tne
thesis tnat nature is no more than a means to
hu an ends, a mere tool.
37
37
Routley and Routley.
Social theories, Self management, and Environmentaifroblems:
Tne respect position .is cased on one or
general ooligation principles:
1.
ore
of
three
Ine general principle cf respect
. .. .. _ _ i for preference-navers
(.formerly
applied
only
to
human
preferences)
is
transferred to the larger arena of all oeinys or items
that can be placed in a disprefer red state> •
..the requisite, important and non-ar.itrary
distinction is to ce ora*n which narKS out
the class
of
creatures
to.-,arcs
-hicn
obligations
may ce held;
tnat is,
the
usually
recognisec
principles
oi
consideration
towards
others
(of
tne
privileged class) properly extend or should
be generalized to consideration for other
creatures
having
preferences,
and
xgg
geaaxal aeXeriSiCle GGliGaiiaa
-iu.cci„14i is fiat Lii put
aXfaets
XoXuui
PitfiXetfiaGfisfiaAzexsl iuia a dis^raXaxxfia state
1CC GQ GQGU reuses, 38
Routley and Routley,
2.
39
Hunan Chauvinism and Environmental Ethics:
Preferences alone, ho-.ever, are still too narro
to
develop an environmental ethic or ecological outlooK. So
tne second principle applies to beings or
iters
<itn an
interest'
or
'welfare',
v-nere rf...an 'interest' or
welfare in tne broaa sense is a Xclus or life-goal, as
possessed by living things, or an equilibrium or system
goal, as possessed oy living ecosystems." 39
Routley and Routley,
104.
'
Human Chauvinism and Environmental Ethics:
106,
319.
Page 20
iherefore, tne second principle is:
that the -altaic or
of animate
objects and also such biological items as
ecosystems can ce affected in one way oi
another, e.g.
increased, decreased, upset.
Foi instance, the wellbeing of a coastal
community and of the individual trees in it
can ce reduced to zero oy sandmining, and it
can be seriously threatened by pumping vaste
detergent into trie nearoy ocean. Tnere is a
general ocligaiton principle corresponding
likewise to tnis more comprehensive class of
,»elf are-bearers, namely, dpX to jaopafoxse
ttfi ..ulijeiiju ui aaiuxai oPJecxs uc
-J.4--UU1 JiCu ±£aiGU.
4<)
40
3.
Routiey and Routiey.
Human Chauvinism and Environmental Ethics;
lOu- /.
Beyond preference-havers and beings or systems
ith
interests or welfares,
the environment contains items,
sucn as rocKS, soils and «:ater*ays tnat nave value, out no
preferences or interests;
unlike higher animals sucn items
cannot
literally be put into dispreferred states
(and In
obvious sense, as opposed to the
ider sense of 'interests' tied to welfare,
they have no interests),
out they can be
damaged or destroyeo or nave their Maiue
eroded or impaired. 41
41
Routiey ana Routiey.
Human Chauvinism and Environmental Ethics;
Tne three generalizable obligation principles
are
parallel in their structure and application and vary omv in
/.hat rings of the annular Picture that
they
cover.
Exclusiveness of the principles to a particuair ring,
however, snould not ce assumed.
ine principle of not
damaging or destroying the value of an object of in oral
concern could extend across the entire annular picture.
Thus tne overlay of a ^articular ouject of moral concern
will indicate which principle(s) of obligation may be
applied to a particular case. An object of moral concern,
e.g. a wornoat, may very veil be capdole of being placed in
a
dispreferred
state,
its
wellbeing
or
interests
jeopardizej, or devalued at one ana tne same time.
in tne
other hand, another object of moral concern, e.g. Ayers
Rock, may, perhaps, only be disvalued.
109.
Page 21
Further tne respect position not only gives generalized
principi.es of od! igat ion , but it also reverses tne common
notion of when tnese principles are applied:
Cn tne alternative thoroughgoing
respect
vie.'.,
whi.cn
is
illustrated o y various
nonexploitive non- estern ethics, one starts
from a restricted position, a position of no
interference and no exploitation, a position
at peace witn tne natural world so to say,
and allots interference -- not as on
■estern
tninxlng,
restricts i terference -- for aooa
reasons.
ine onus of ,-roof is tnus entirely
inverted:
good reasons are required lax
interference, not xa siax interference. 42
_____ Routley and Routley.
nunan Chauvinism and Environmental Ethics:
174.
<*?verLi? ’
onus 01 proof leads to shifts and
inversions in otner areas as well. Requiring good reasons
for interfering crings about a shift in tne notion of
property ownership. Operating under a respect position, it
can no longer oe assumed that tne environment or pieces of
lii?an QofSrivate Property t0 De done with or disposed of at
■'•ill.
Before a s-amp can ce drained, or a forest" cut, or a
steam polluted seme
jooa reason must be given, Human
convenience and economic gain would not count as good
Respect does not preclude use, nut it does
preclude
certain
sorts of use.
it is
inco catioie aoove all -itn property vie ano
>.itn regarding something as no lore than a
eans to tne user's eras. 43
Routley* Social theories, Self management, and Environmental Problems:
The respect position is not only incompatible witn the
property view, it is also incompatible
1th tne strong
dichotomy between use and nonuse:
me conventional wisdom of
western Society
tends to offer a false dichotomy of use
versus respectful nonuse - a false choice
wnicn cones out especially clearly again in
tne treat ent of animals.
Here the choice
presented in -estern thought is typically one
of exxoex use without respect or serious
constraint, of using animals for example in
the ways cnaracteristic of largescare
mass-production farming and a market economic
systep wnich are inconpatiole with respect,
ox on the otner nand of not making any use of
animals at all, for e x ampie, never making use
322 .
Page 22
of animals for food or for farming purposes,
•hat is left out in unis choice is trie
alternative tne Indians and other non--.estern
teople have recognizee,
the alternative oi
li 'ited and respectful use, which enaoles use
to be made of animals, but does not allow
animals to oe used in an unconstrained way or
merely as means tc human ends.
44
44
Routley and Routley, human Chauvinism aid Environmental Ethics: 179.
bt^taKerVup tr^a^a ter °cn^t er*™ pe0fie' sever’di groups of Australian Aborigines, will
^either, then, is tne respect position a reverence
position tnat also arises from the use/nonuse oicnotoi y.
the lives, preferences, choices, and considerations of otner
species or objects of oral concern are not to be taken as
sacred and inviolable. out as has been pointed out before a
good reason must be given before interference can oe
orooKe . interference is acceptable, as in tne case of
’essential predation... nlch is essential to the normal
livelihood of the predator, and where tne predator takes tor
itself no more than it requires for its livelihood," 45
Routley, Richard.
in Defense of Cannibalism•;
32.
thus an alternative to tne western dichotomy of use versus
nonuse
is
to
mitigate,
if
possible,
tne
user's
considerations with the considerations of the item:
io so ise somethin i itnout treating it as
available for unlimited or unconstrained use
tor
numan
ends
is
characteristic
of
x;esfcicci.XuX use.
In contrast non-respectful
use treats the use of the Iten as constrained
by no considerations arising from the item
itself and tne user's relationship to it, but
as constrained only in a derivative way, by
considerations of the convenience, welfare
ano so forth of otner humans. 4b
Routley and Routley.
Human Chauvinism and Environmental Ethics:
For there to be a respectful position that denies tne
dichotomy of unconstrained use versus respectful nonuse and
tnat allows tor the relationsnip Detween tne user and tne
item and the considerations of the item to be taken into
account, one fundamental change in tne present relationship
between humans and tne environment tnat must eventuate is
for individual users to take direct responsibility for their
impact:
Respect
positions
can
only
be
generally
179.
Page 23
realized in a society in whicn tne basic
social structure and economy enables people
to take direct responsibility for tne impact
on tne natural world their needs and tneir
statisfaction create , such as in tne economy
of cooperative, involvement, 47
Routley and Routley. Social theories, Self "anagement, and Environmental Problems:
Human users taking direct responsibility tor tneir impact
snould lover tneir impact. If users bear tne responsibility
tor producing and managing what they need, then they should
produce, in a manner like unto tne 'taking' of essential
oreaation only wnat they neeo and should 'qo lighter' on tne
world:
323 .
..self-management can offer the alternative
of a
social^ in wnich nothing is
produced wnich uoes not correspond to genuine
needs an .i in which production is designed to
satisfy tnose needs «itn a minimum of
aste.
Tne possiclity of production of material
*nicn does not correspono to genuine neeos is
eliminated oy two factores in the ecomony of
cooperative exchange ano involvement;
first,
a direct relationsnip between tne possiblity
of use of an iter and direct expenditure of
labour on tne part of tne user, and second,
direct
cooperative
involvment
bet een
producers and users.
48
48
Routley and Routley.
social Theories, Self
anagement, and Environmental Problems:
Tne respect position, tnerefore, is intended to lower
the impact of human users on the entire environment, -nile
extending tne position's own impact goes far beyond tne
interrelations of human and other species. It is intended,
when applied to «estern cultures, to face among other issues
tne econonic/etnicai conflicts tnat nave been at tne core of
many of tne practical ethical problems concerning humans ana
nonhumans and that nave given rise to much of tne current
debate over inter-specific ethics.
ine respect position is
a strong repalcement to the Dominion Thesis that has been
tne ruleing and guiding principle of western though on
etnical relationsnips between numans and nonhumans. bike
the Dominion Thesis, tne respect position is a oasic set of
principles from whicn a wnoie range of problems, situations, '
and questions can oe approached. Tne alterations to the cut
of
-estern societies tnat would result from its adoption as
tne pattern of etmcal progress would oe more drastic tnan
that of either a Stewardship
Principle (or some other
weakened form of the Dominion Thesis) or an extension
principle, sucn as the Utilitarian extension proposed by
Singer.
fet these seeniniy drastic alterations, or some
313.
Page 24
otnef
equally drastic set, r^ay be no more tnan *nat is
■■eeje.; to restyle current practices as a more just ano less
ar o i t rary .
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Box 3: Environmental Ethics
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Nuclear waste, obligations to the future, and social choice.
The bus example.
very long journey.
Suppose we consider a bus which, hopefully, is to make a
Early in the journey of the bus someone consigns on it,
to a far distant destination, a package which contains a highly toxic and explo
sive gas.
This is packaged in a thin container, which as the consigner well
knows may well not contain the gas for the full distance for which it is con
signed, and certainly will not do so if the bus should strike any trouble, for
example if there is a breakdown and the interior of the bus becomes very hot,
if the bus should strike a very large bump or pothole of the sort commonly found
on some of the bad roads it has to traverse, or if some passenger should interfere
deliberately or inadvertently with the cargo or perhaps try to steal some of the
freight.
If the container should break the resulting disaster would probably
kill at least some of the people on the bus, while others could be maimed or
contract serious diseases.
Most of us would condemn such an action.
parcel say to try to justify it?
What might the consigner of the
He might say that it is not certain that the
gas will escape and that it is mere speculation to suppose it will, that the world
needs his product and it is his duty to supply it, and that in any case he is not
responsible for the bus or the people on it.
These sorts of excuses however would
normally be seen as ludicrous.
Suppose he says that it is his own pressing needs which justify his action.
The firm he owns, which produces the material as a by-product, is in bad financial
straits, and couldn't afford to produce a better container (even if it knew how to
make one).
If the firm goes broke, he and his family will suffer, his employees
will lose their jobs and have to look for others, and the whole village, through
loss of spending and the cancellation of the Multiplier Effect, will be worse off.
The poor of the village whom he would otherwise have been able to help, will
suffer especially.
Few people would accept this story even if correct, as justification.
Even
where there are serious risks and costs to oneself or some group for whom one is
concerned one is usually thought not to be entitled to simply transfer the burden
of those risks and costs onto other uninvolved parties, especially where they arise
from one’s own chosen life style and the transfer of costs creates a risk of
serious harm to others (the transfer principle).
�2.
The nuclear comparison.
One of the major problems arising from the use of nuclear
power is the disposal of highly radioactive wastes which
must be segregated from the biosphere for periods on the
order of a million years (Ringwood 78, p.l).
The wastes are highly toxic and will be spread around the world if large-scale
nuclear development goes ahead as planned.
Yet there is no method of packaging
them whose safety has been demonstrated beyond reasonable doubt and which we can
be confident will be generally used.
Despite recent ’new strategies for safe
disposal of nuclear waste’, it remains true^ that
there is at present no generally accepted means by which
high level waste can be permanently isolated from the
environment and remain safe for very long periods. (Fox Report, p.110).
It was presumably largely for this sort of reason that the Fox Report endorsed
the conclusion of the British (Flowers) Report ’with respect to nuclear waste’
namely:-
There should be no commitment to a large programme of
nuclear fission power until it has been demonstrated
beyond reasonable doubt that a method exists to ensure
the safe containment of long-lived radioactive waste for
the indefinite future (Fox Report, p.189; our italics).
- a reliable method, the Report should have added, whose commercial viability and
use is assured.
example.
The need for these further conditions can be seen from the bus
The consigner can hardly justify his action as regards the people on
the bus, the people of the future, by saying that a better container is too
expensive, or that he does have a strategy for producing or theory which will
enable him to produce a superior container if he has failed to use the method.
It is thus a non sequitur to argue as Ringwood does on the basis of his
proposed strategy for the safe disposal of radwastes (i.e. high-level nuclear
wastes) that the radwaste problem is no reasonable ground upon which to curtail
use of nuclear power:
The principle conclusion of this book is that the problem
of isolating high level nuclear wastes from the biosphere
can be solved. Although there may be other objections to
the use of nuclear power, the radwaste problem cannot reasonably
be cited in justification of policies to abandon its use
(78, Ringwood’s italics).
Even if the premiss that the problem can be solved had been established — it
hasn’t
at all^ - the no-abandonment-of-nuclear-power conclusion in no way follows.
There is a large gap between the theoretical possibility of a method of safe
storage (hardly an important issue in the nuclear debate) and the availability of
a commercial containment method whose reliability has been demonstrated beyond
�3.
reasonable doubt and whose general use can be reasonably assumed.
It is the
latter that is required for Ringwood’s no-abandonment-of-nuclear-power conclusion;
but of the latter Ringwood’s strategy gives no assurance.
There is in fact
little reason to believe that nuclear pollution will be treated in a different
fashion from other forms of pollution, where the availability of more satisfactory
methods of control is by no means sufficient to guarantee their effective employ
ment, especially if they are expensive.
It is methodologically unsound to ignore
social, ethical and political factors and to regard the radwaste problem as a
purely technological one which can be classed as solved should a theoretical
solution with practical application possibilities be reached.
The practical
likelihood, even given (what we lack) a disposal method proven safe beyond
reasonable doubt, remains — that nuclear wastes will not be adequately contained,
with the result that nuclear power will impose serious costs and risks on future
people who do not benefit.
For nuclear fission generates wastes which may remain toxic for a million years,
but even with the breeder reactor it could be an energy source for perhaps only
150 years.
Thus 30,000 generations of future people could be forced to bear
significant risks,'without any corresponding benefits, resulting from the provision
of the extravagant energy use of only 5 generations or so.
Like the consigner in
the bus example, contemporary industrial society proposes, in extricating itself
from a mess arising from its own life style - the creation of economies dependent
on an abundance of non-renewable energy which is limited in physical supply - to
pass on costs and risks of serious harm to others who will obtain no corresponding
energy benefits.
The solution may enable the avoidance of some uncomfortable
changes in the lifetime of those now living and their immediate descendants, just
as the consigner’s action avoids uncomfortable changes for him and his immediate
surroundings, but at the expense of passing heavy burdens to other uninvolved
parties.
For these reasons the nuclear energy option is, like the consigner’s
action morally unacceptable.
What makes matters worse is that present industrial
society has clear alternatives to its nuclear choice, which is made essentially
to avoid changing wasteful patterns of consumption and to protect the interests
of those who profit from them.
Obligations to the future.
One way of trying to escape the conclusion that
present large-scale nuclear development involves serious injustice with respect
to people of the distant future is to deny, as the occasional philosopher has,
that there are moral obligations to remotely future people.
But the view that
there are no such obligations, that we are free to do as we like with respect
to future people, is a very difficult one to sustain.
Would scientists, for
example, in the course of conducting an experiment, be entitled to do something,
say release a disease-carrying organism with a very long incubation period, which
�4.
while not affecting the present, could cause death and disease for many future
people, for example?
Most people would say they certainly are not.
Nevertheless
’The future can take case of itself;
why should we worry about it, we have enough
problems’ is also a common attitude.
But it is not as if in the nuclear case we
are simp1y leaving the future alone to take care of itself.
We are causally
influencing it and in doing so acquire moral responsibilities with respect to
future people, namely the obligation to take account of people affected and their
interests in what we do, to be careful in our actions, to take account of the
probability of our actions causing harm, and to see that we do not act so as to
rob future people of the chance of a good life — and a satisfactory environment.
That there are obligations to the distant future, which follows logically from
examples, such as that of scientists who act wrongly in deliberately or carelessly
damaging people displaced in time, may be argued, more generally, on the basis of
the spatial analogy (that the temporal dimension is like spatial dimensions and
remoteness in space does not eliminate, or substantially diminish, obligation),
or on the basis of ethical theories, and general principles common to such theories.
The main modern theories of obligation, e.g. utilitarian, contractual, intuitionistic,
when properly applied, converge to show that there are moral obligations to people
in the distant future of the same sort that there are to present people.
(Thus
the rejection of nuclear development as morally unacceptable does not depend on a
particular ethical theory, but uses only ground common to the main theories.)
The convergence of theories may be accounted for in terms of conditions of adequacy
an ethical theory should meet.
The principles of obligation of such a theory
should be universalisable or lawlike in that they do not make exceptions for
particular times or places or peoples (such as those of contemporary industrial
society):
to make exceptions would be to accept unfairness, and so injustice.
Thus the temporal position of a person cannot affect that person’s entitlement to
just and fair treatment;
these are the same sorts of general obligations to future
people as to present.
Engineering and economic comparisons and assessments of different energy options
are usually inadequate because they neglect these general features of obligation.
Just as the fact that the consigner and his immediate environment will benefit
from sending the parcel does not show it is morally acceptable, so arguments for
nuclear power based on alleged economic benefits for the present, or a favourable
benefit-risk analysis, do not even begin to show that it is morally acceptable.
Economics and engineering must (like law) operate within the framework of moral
constraints, not determine those constraints.
�5.
Uncertainty arguments*
Elements of uncertainty or indeterminacy in a situation
(especially in our knowledge of the situation) provide no exemptions from general
obligations, any more than they upset or modify the operation of general physical
laws.
It is commonly argued, however that we cannot really be expected to take
account of the interests of future people, because the damage to the future from
nuclear waste is by no means certain, we cannot be sure that future people will
not develop a way of coping with the problem or will care about the risk anyway.
Aren’t we being asked to forego tangible benefits for the present for the sake of
avoiding a merely speculative risk of harm to people we do not even know will exist?
This sort of argument may seem initially plausible, but a little reflection on
examples, such as the bus example, shows that it is mistaken.
It is like the
consigner saying that there is nothing wrong in his sending his parcel, since it
is not certain the gas will escape, or that there will be anybody on the bus when
it does, or that the people on the bus may think of a way of coping with the problem,
or may not care anyway.
Can he really be expected to forego tangible benefits for
himself and his family just to avoid speculative harm to the possibly non-existent
passengers?
The answer of course is yes.
The damage to the passengers does not
have to be certain or even probable - it is enough that a significant risk of
serious harm is imposed on the unconsenting and uninvolved passengers.
In the nuclear case it is clear that a significant risk will be imposed on
the future.
The circumstances in which nuclear waste disposal could be improper
or ineffective are only too easy to envisage, and must be considered real risks
with a real evidential basis, not merely idle speculation or science-fiction
possibility.
And uncertainty about the future is not so great as this line of
argument likes to make out - there is uncertainty about many details of little moral
consequence concerning the future, such as which girls’ names will be used commonly
in 100 years, but we do have good reason to believe, especially if we consider
3000 years of history, that future people will have basic needs and desires rather
like our own, that they will need a healthy biosphere for a good life, and that
their lives will not be improved by an increased incidence of disease and cancer
from increased radiation.
written off in this way:
Moral conflict arguments.
The legitimate interests of future people cannot be
These uncertainty arguments are moral cop-outs.
The alternative to disputing obligations to the future
is to appeal to overriding obligations involving the present (which induce
situations where obligations conflict).
According to moral conflict arguments,
nuclear development does have its morally undesirable aspects, but the only
practical alternatives to nuclear development are morally even worse.
Observe
that such arguments are only satisfactory provided the options presented are
�6.
genuine and exhaustive, all practicable alternatives being considered and shown
to be worse than the option under consideration:
this necessary condition is not satisfied.)
in the nuclear development case
Moral conflict arguments are commonly
advanced in favour of nuclear development, some alleging competing and overriding
duties to future people, and some analogous duties to present people.
The main (and representative) argument of the last class, laying stress on
duties to present people, is the Poverty Argument, according to which there is an
overriding obligation to the poor, both of the third world and the industrialized
countries who, according to the argument, will suffer or be denied the opportunity
to reach affluence if nuclear development does not proceed.
In neither case does
the argument stand up to examination.
There is good evidence that large-scale nuclear energy will help to increase
unemployment and poverty in the industrial world, through the diversion of very
much available capital into an industry which is not only an exceptionally poor
provider of direct employment, but also helps to reduce available jobs through
encouraging substitution of energy use for labour use.
The argument that nuclear
energy is needed for the third world is even less convincing.
Nuclear energy is
both politically and economically inappropriate for the third world, since it
requires massive amounts of capital, requires numbers of imported scientists and
engineers, and creates negligible employment.
Politically it increases foreign
dependence, adds to centralised entrenched power and reduces the chance for change
in the oppressive political structures which are a large part of the problem something which may help explain why it is attractive to many of the military
governing elites of these countries.
The poverty argument then — like many modern economic arguments for development
which appeal to the way in which development will, allegedly, assist the poor - is
a fraud.
Nuclear energy will not be used, except incidentally, to help the poor.
Both for the third world and for the industrialised countries there are well-known
energy conserving alternatives and the practical option of developing other energy
sources, alternatives which are morally acceptable and socially preferable to
nuclear development, and which have far better prospects for helping the poor.
The other, major, moral conflict argument appeals to a set of supposedly
overriding and competing obligations to present and future people.
We have, it is
said, a duty to pass on the immensely valuable things and institutions which our
culture has developed.
The argument is essentially that without nuclear power,
without the continued level of material wealth it alone is assumed to make possible,
the lights of our civilization will go out, our valuable institutions and traditions
will fall into decay or be swept away.
Future people also will be the losers.
�The assumptions upon which this Lights-going-out Argument is based are
untenable.
It appears to assume that existing high-energy consumption society
is uniformly and uniquely valuable and that it cannot be directed towards energy
conservation or alternative energy sources without utter collapse.
But no enormou:
reduction in energy use, and perhaps little in real welfare, is needed to obviate
the need for nuclear power in the shorter term, and alternative energy strategies
to nuclear will have, in any case, to be adopted for the longer term anyway.
High
rates of energy use may be necessary to maintain the political and economic status
quo, but they are scarcely necessary to maintain what is really valuable in our
society, much of which we inherited from a past with a vastly lower energy con
sumption, and much of which might well be better fostered in lower (energy) con
sumption society with less concentration of political and economic power.
Not
only are the extravagant levels of energy consumption upon which the "need" for
nuclear power is premissed unnecessary to maintain what is valuable, but there is
some reason to believe they are positively inimical to doing so.
Nuclear develop
ment may help in passing on to future generations some of the worse aspects of
our society, the consumerism, alienation, destruction of nature and latent authori
tarianism, while many valuable aspects, such as the degree of political freedom and
those opportunities for personal and collective autonomy which exist, would be lost
or diminished.
But it is not the status quo, but what is valuable in our society,
presumably, that we have an obligation to pass on to the future, and if possible
enhance.
Both moral conflict escape routes are closed then, because the arguments
depend on false contrasts, ignore practicable alternatives which are not morally
worse than nuclear power, and in painting their picture of inevitability, vastly
understate the extent of available social choice.
It is like the consigner of
the parcel arguing that if he does not send his parcel his family and the village
will starve, when in fact there appear to be viable, but perhaps less profitable,
alternatives he has not troubled to consider or investigate seriously
Alternative energy options.
The future energy option that is most frequently
contrasted with nuclear, that based on coal, is not without ethical problems.
Certainly there is no radioactive waste disposal problem, and other important
grounds for moral and political concern over extensive reliance on nuclear energy
are removed, namely problems arising from the real possibilities of proliferation
of nuclear weapons, of deliberate release or threat of release of radioactive
materials as a measure of terrorism or of extortion, and of catastrophic releases
of radiation or of radioactive fuel or waste into the environment following an
�accident such as reactor melt-down, and from security measures adopted to reduce
such eventualities.
But the coal-based option carries nonetheless serious
costs and risks both to the environment and to health — because of the likelihood
of severe pollution and associated damaging phenomena such as acid rain and
atmospheric heating, not to mention the despoliation caused by extensive strip
mining, all of which will result from use of coal in meeting very high projected
consumption figures.
Such an option would also fail, it seems, to satisfy the
transfer principle, because it would impose widespread costs on nonbeneficiaries
for some concentrated benefits to some profit takers and to some contemporary
users who do not pay the full costs of production and replacement.
These are the conventional options and a third is often added which emphasizes
soft or benign technologies, such as those of solar energy.
However the fundamental
choice, such options usually neglect, is not technological but social, and involves
both the restructuring of production, and change of consumption, away from energy
intensive uses: at a more basic level there is a choice between consumeristic
and nonconsumeristic futures.^ It is not just a matter of deciding in which way
to meet unexamined goals but also a matter of examining the goals and underlying
values.
That is, we are not just faced with the question of comparing different
technologies or substitute ways of meeting some fixed or given demand or level of
nonsumption, and of trying to see whether we can meet this with soft rather than
hard technologies;
we are also faced, and primarily, with the matter of examining
those alleged needs and the cost of society that creates them.
It is not just
a question of devising less damaging ways to meet these alleged needs conceived
of us inevitable and unchangeable.
There are solar ways of producing unnecessary
trivia no one really wants and of squandering energy, as well as nuclear ways.
This is not to deny that softer options may be superior to the ethically unacceptable
features of the others.
But it is doubtful that any technology however benign in principle will be
likely to leave a tolerable world for future people if it is expected to meet
limitless and uncontrolled energy consumption and demands.
Even the more benign
technologies such as solar technology may well be used in ways which create costs
for future people and are likely to result in a deteriorated world being transmitted
to them.
Consider, to take one important example, the effect on the world’s
forests, which are commonly counted as a solar resource, of use for production of
methonal or of electricity by woodchipping, as already planned by forest authorities
in California and contemplated by many other energy organisations.
Few would
object to the use of genuine waste material for energy production, but the un
restricted exploitation of forests - whether it goes under the name of "solar
energy" or not - to meet ever increasing energy demands would have a very damaging
effect on the world’s already hard pressed natural forests.
Some of us do not
�9.
want to pass on - we are not entitled to pass on
- to the future a world largely
devoid of natural forests and accordingly much impoverished in fauna and flora,
any more than we want to pass on one poisoned by nuclear products or polluted by
coal products.
In short, a mere switch to a more benign technology - important
though this is - without any more basic structural and social changes is inadequate.
Social options.
The deeper social options involve challenging and trying to
change a social structure which promotes consumerism and an economic structure
which encourages the use of highly energy-intensive modes of production.
This
involves, for instance, trying to change a social structure in which those who are
fortunate enough to make it into the work force are cogs in a production machine
over which they have very little real control and in which most people do unpleasant
or boring work from which they derive very little real satisfaction in order to
obtain the reward of consumer goods and services.
A society in which social rewards
are obtained primarily from products rather than processes, from consumption, rather
than from satisfaction in work and in social relations and other activities, is
bound to be one which generates a vast amount of unnecessary consumption.
(A
production system that produces goods not to meet genuine needs but for created
and nongenuine needs is virtually bound to overproduce.)
Consumption frequently
becomes a substitute for satisfaction in other areas.
The social change option is a hard option, but it seems the only way to avoid
passing on serious costs and risks to the future5
and there are not only ethical
grounds, but ecological reasons for choosing it.
Conventional technology-oriented
discussions of energy options and of how to meet future energy "needs” obscures
the social change option, in part because the option questions values underlying
current social arrangements.
The conventional discussion proceeds by taking
alleged demand (often restated as wants or needs) as unchallengeable,
and the
issue to be one which technology can be most profitably employed to meet them.
This effectively presents a false choice, and is the result of taking needs and
demand as lacking a social context so that the social structure which produces
the needs is similarly taken as unchallengable and unchangeable.
The social
changes that the option requires will be strongly resisted because they mean
changes in current social organisation and power structure, and to the extent that
the option represents some kind of threat to parts of present political and economic
arrangements it is not surprising that official energy option discussion proceeds
g
by misrepresenting and often obscuring it.
�FOOTNOTES
1.
2.
Some leading proponents of nuclear development admit the absence of
satisfactory storage and disposal methods;
others do not.
Some
of the newer strategies for waste disposal, e.g. that promoted by
Cohen 77 fail, conspicuously, to meet conditions of adequacy on
disposal (see Routley and Routley 78, footnote 1).
Ringwood’s
new strategy, in 78, was immediately rejected by some of the
pronuclear establishment both as too expensive (even allowing
Ringwood’s optimistic costguestimates) and as unnecessary, which
does not augur well for its use.
Yet Ringwood cast serious doubt
on the adequacy of alternative disposal strategies, notably
immobilisation of wastes in glass and in supercalcine.
All Ringwood has shown conclusively is that he can
create an artificial equivalent of a uranium one-body
(Hallam 79)
What Ringwood’s ’strategy for radwaste disposal’ amounts to is a
further possible method of treating radwaste, with significant gaps
in the argument, a considerable lack of experimental and practical
support, no commercial feasibility studies, etc: see Martin 78 and
Hallam 79.
3.
It depends on several processes whose large-scale commercial viability
has very definitely not been shown beyond reasonable doubt, including
reprocessing (Fox Report, p.29).
It appears to be far too expensive
for the nuclear industry, and certainly for poorer nations that have
embarked on nuclear power projects.
There are moreover reasons for
thinking that governments may not want or favour permanent irretrievable
disposal methods; they may want to keep open their options for
employing waste components either for military purposes or for use in
breeder reactors or elsewhere.
4.
On alternative technology and softer energy options, see especially
Lovins 77; also Lovins 76.
For criticism of Lovins’ comparative
neglect of social alternatives, see Martin 77 (and Lovins’ reply
thereto).
5.
The already very serious situation of the world’s forests, especially
the wet tropical forests, is not sufficiently widely appreciated.
It is a commonplace reflection, however, among rainforest botanists
and ecologists that nearly all tropical lowland rainforest and much
highlevel rainforest will have been cut over by about the year 2000.
Moreover such forests cannot at present be utilised on a sustained
yield basis or as a renewable resource (see, e.g. p.219 of Prance and
Elias 77).
Worse, there are now few forestry operations anywhere in
the world where the forests are treated as completely renewable in the
sense of the renewal of all their values.
In many temperate regions
too the rate of exploitation which would enable renewal has already been
exceeded.
The addition of a major further demand source - that for
energy, whether advertised as part of a ’’soft” energy path or otherwise and especially one which shows every sign of being not readily limitable,
on top of the present sources is a development which anyone with a
realistic appreciation of the conduct of forestry operations, who is also
properly concerned about the longterm integrity of the forests and
remaining natural communities, must regard with considerable alarm.
�6.
The transmission principle, that one should not hand the world on to
our successors in substantially worse shape than we received it, is a
corollary of the transfer principle - applied in the bus example and
suggested as a necessary condition on energy options - that to be
morally acceptable
a course of action should not involve the transfer
of significant cost and risks onto uninvolved parties who are not
beneficiaries.
For if we violated the transmission principle, there
would be a significant transfer of costs, contradicting the transfer
principle.
The transmission principle can be independently argued for,
e.g. on the basis of contract (and other) theories of obligation.
7.
Thus it is argued by representatives of such industries as transportation
and petroleum, as for example by McGrowth of the XS Consumption Co.,
that people want deep freezers, air conditioners, power boats, ... and
that it would be authoritarian to stop them satisfying these wants.
The
argument conveniently ignores the social framework in which such needs
and wants arise or are produced.
To point to the determination of many
such wants at the framework level is not however to accept a Marxist
approach according to which they are entirely determined at the framework
level (e.g. by industrial organisation) and there is no such thing as
individual choice or determination at all.
It is to see the social
framework as a major factor in determining certain kinds of choices and
to see apparently individual choices made in such matters as being channelled
and directed by a social framework determined largely in the interests of
commercial and political advantage.
8.
This paper draws on material from Routley and Routley 78 and 79 where
fuller discussion of many of the topics covered, especially the question
of obligations to the future and uncertainty arguments, may be found.
�REFERENCES
B.L. Cohen, ’The disposal of radioactive wastes from fission reactors’,
Scientific American 236 (June 1977) 22-31.
Flowers Report: Nuclear Power and the Environment. Sixth Report of
the British Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution, London, 1976.
Fox Report: Ranger Uranium Environmental Inquiry First Report,
Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1977.
J.R. Hallam, ’Synroc or Cinroc? *, (Wn tetion 4 (2-3) (1979)
4-5.
A. Lovins, ’Energy strategy: the road not taken:’, Foreign Affairs
55 (1) (October 1976) 65-96.
A. Lovins, Soft Energy Paths, Friends of the Earth, San Francisco, 1977.
B. Martin, ’Is alternative technology enough?’, Chain Reaction
3 (2) (1977) 17-21.
B. Martin, ’Call for research into Synroc’, The Canberra Times,
December 6, 1978, p.15.
G.T. Prance and T.S. Elias (editors), Extinction is Forever, New York
Botanic Garden, 1977.
A.E. Ringwood, Safe Disposal of High Level Nuclear Reactor Wastes:
A New strategy, ANU Press, Canberra, 1978.
R. and V. Routley, ’Nuclear energy and obligations to the future’,
Inquiry 21 (1978) 133-179.
R. and V. Routley, ’Some ethical aspects of energy options’, in
Energy and People: Social Implications of Different Energy Futures,
edited by M. Diesendorf, Society for Social Responsibility in Science
(A.C.T.), Canberra, 1979.
�
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Nuclear waste, obligations to the future, and social choice.
The bus example.
very long journey.
Suppose we consider a bus which, hopefully, is to make a
Early in the journey of the bus someone consigns on it,
to a far distant destination, a package which contains a highly toxic and explo
sive gas.
This is packaged in a thin container, which as the consigner well
knows may well not contain the gas for the full distance for which it is con
signed, and certainly will not do so if the bus should strike any trouble, for
example if there is a breakdown and the interior of the bus becomes very hot,
if the bus should strike a very large bump or pothole of the sort commonly found
on some of the bad roads it has to traverse, or if some passenger should interfere
deliberately or inadvertently with the cargo or perhaps try to steal some of the
freight.
If the container should break the resulting disaster would probably
kill at least some of the people on the bus, while others could be maimed or
contract serious diseases.
Most of us would condemn such an action.
parcel say to try to justify it?
What might the consigner of the
He might say that it is not certain that the
gas will escape and that it is mere speculation to suppose it will, that the world
needs his product and it is his duty to supply it, and that in any case he is not
responsible for the bus or the people on it.
These sorts of excuses however would
normally be seen as ludicrous.
Suppose he says that it is his own pressing needs which justify his action.
The firm he owns, which produces the material as a by-product, is in bad financial
straits, and couldn't afford to produce a better container (even if it knew how to
make one).
If the firm goes broke, he and his family will suffer, his employees
will lose their jobs and have to look for others, and the whole village, through
loss of spending and the cancellation of the Multiplier Effect, will be worse off.
The poor of the village whom he would otherwise have been able to help, will
suffer especially.
Few people would accept this story even if correct, as justification.
Even
where there are serious risks and costs to oneself or some group for whom one is
concerned one is usually thought not to be entitled to simply transfer the burden
of those risks and costs onto other uninvolved parties, especially where they arise
from one’s own chosen life style and the transfer of costs creates a risk of
serious harm to others (the transfer principle).
2.
The nuclear comparison.
One of the major problems arising from the use of nuclear
power is the disposal of highly radioactive wastes which
must be segregated from the biosphere for periods on the
order of a million years (Ringwood 78, p.l).
The wastes are highly toxic and will be spread around the world if large-scale
nuclear development goes ahead as planned.
Yet there is no method of packaging
them whose safety has been demonstrated beyond reasonable doubt and which we can
be confident will be generally used.
Despite recent ’new strategies for safe
disposal of nuclear waste’, it remains true^ that
there is at present no generally accepted means by which
high level waste can be permanently isolated from the
environment and remain safe for very long periods. (Fox Report, p.110).
It was presumably largely for this sort of reason that the Fox Report endorsed
the conclusion of the British (Flowers) Report ’with respect to nuclear waste’
namely:-
There should be no commitment to a large programme of
nuclear fission power until it has been demonstrated
beyond reasonable doubt that a method exists to ensure
the safe containment of long-lived radioactive waste for
the indefinite future (Fox Report, p.189; our italics).
- a reliable method, the Report should have added, whose commercial viability and
use is assured.
example.
The need for these further conditions can be seen from the bus
The consigner can hardly justify his action as regards the people on
the bus, the people of the future, by saying that a better container is too
expensive, or that he does have a strategy for producing or theory which will
enable him to produce a superior container if he has failed to use the method.
It is thus a non sequitur to argue as Ringwood does on the basis of his
proposed strategy for the safe disposal of radwastes (i.e. high-level nuclear
wastes) that the radwaste problem is no reasonable ground upon which to curtail
use of nuclear power:
The principle conclusion of this book is that the problem
of isolating high level nuclear wastes from the biosphere
can be solved. Although there may be other objections to
the use of nuclear power, the radwaste problem cannot reasonably
be cited in justification of policies to abandon its use
(78, Ringwood’s italics).
Even if the premiss that the problem can be solved had been established — it
hasn’t
at all^ - the no-abandonment-of-nuclear-power conclusion in no way follows.
There is a large gap between the theoretical possibility of a method of safe
storage (hardly an important issue in the nuclear debate) and the availability of
a commercial containment method whose reliability has been demonstrated beyond
3.
reasonable doubt and whose general use can be reasonably assumed.
It is the
latter that is required for Ringwood’s no-abandonment-of-nuclear-power conclusion;
but of the latter Ringwood’s strategy gives no assurance.
There is in fact
little reason to believe that nuclear pollution will be treated in a different
fashion from other forms of pollution, where the availability of more satisfactory
methods of control is by no means sufficient to guarantee their effective employ
ment, especially if they are expensive.
It is methodologically unsound to ignore
social, ethical and political factors and to regard the radwaste problem as a
purely technological one which can be classed as solved should a theoretical
solution with practical application possibilities be reached.
The practical
likelihood, even given (what we lack) a disposal method proven safe beyond
reasonable doubt, remains — that nuclear wastes will not be adequately contained,
with the result that nuclear power will impose serious costs and risks on future
people who do not benefit.
For nuclear fission generates wastes which may remain toxic for a million years,
but even with the breeder reactor it could be an energy source for perhaps only
150 years.
Thus 30,000 generations of future people could be forced to bear
significant risks,'without any corresponding benefits, resulting from the provision
of the extravagant energy use of only 5 generations or so.
Like the consigner in
the bus example, contemporary industrial society proposes, in extricating itself
from a mess arising from its own life style - the creation of economies dependent
on an abundance of non-renewable energy which is limited in physical supply - to
pass on costs and risks of serious harm to others who will obtain no corresponding
energy benefits.
The solution may enable the avoidance of some uncomfortable
changes in the lifetime of those now living and their immediate descendants, just
as the consigner’s action avoids uncomfortable changes for him and his immediate
surroundings, but at the expense of passing heavy burdens to other uninvolved
parties.
For these reasons the nuclear energy option is, like the consigner’s
action morally unacceptable.
What makes matters worse is that present industrial
society has clear alternatives to its nuclear choice, which is made essentially
to avoid changing wasteful patterns of consumption and to protect the interests
of those who profit from them.
Obligations to the future.
One way of trying to escape the conclusion that
present large-scale nuclear development involves serious injustice with respect
to people of the distant future is to deny, as the occasional philosopher has,
that there are moral obligations to remotely future people.
But the view that
there are no such obligations, that we are free to do as we like with respect
to future people, is a very difficult one to sustain.
Would scientists, for
example, in the course of conducting an experiment, be entitled to do something,
say release a disease-carrying organism with a very long incubation period, which
4.
while not affecting the present, could cause death and disease for many future
people, for example?
Most people would say they certainly are not.
Nevertheless
’The future can take case of itself;
why should we worry about it, we have enough
problems’ is also a common attitude.
But it is not as if in the nuclear case we
are simp1y leaving the future alone to take care of itself.
We are causally
influencing it and in doing so acquire moral responsibilities with respect to
future people, namely the obligation to take account of people affected and their
interests in what we do, to be careful in our actions, to take account of the
probability of our actions causing harm, and to see that we do not act so as to
rob future people of the chance of a good life — and a satisfactory environment.
That there are obligations to the distant future, which follows logically from
examples, such as that of scientists who act wrongly in deliberately or carelessly
damaging people displaced in time, may be argued, more generally, on the basis of
the spatial analogy (that the temporal dimension is like spatial dimensions and
remoteness in space does not eliminate, or substantially diminish, obligation),
or on the basis of ethical theories, and general principles common to such theories.
The main modern theories of obligation, e.g. utilitarian, contractual, intuitionistic,
when properly applied, converge to show that there are moral obligations to people
in the distant future of the same sort that there are to present people.
(Thus
the rejection of nuclear development as morally unacceptable does not depend on a
particular ethical theory, but uses only ground common to the main theories.)
The convergence of theories may be accounted for in terms of conditions of adequacy
an ethical theory should meet.
The principles of obligation of such a theory
should be universalisable or lawlike in that they do not make exceptions for
particular times or places or peoples (such as those of contemporary industrial
society):
to make exceptions would be to accept unfairness, and so injustice.
Thus the temporal position of a person cannot affect that person’s entitlement to
just and fair treatment;
these are the same sorts of general obligations to future
people as to present.
Engineering and economic comparisons and assessments of different energy options
are usually inadequate because they neglect these general features of obligation.
Just as the fact that the consigner and his immediate environment will benefit
from sending the parcel does not show it is morally acceptable, so arguments for
nuclear power based on alleged economic benefits for the present, or a favourable
benefit-risk analysis, do not even begin to show that it is morally acceptable.
Economics and engineering must (like law) operate within the framework of moral
constraints, not determine those constraints.
5.
Uncertainty arguments*
Elements of uncertainty or indeterminacy in a situation
(especially in our knowledge of the situation) provide no exemptions from general
obligations, any more than they upset or modify the operation of general physical
laws.
It is commonly argued, however that we cannot really be expected to take
account of the interests of future people, because the damage to the future from
nuclear waste is by no means certain, we cannot be sure that future people will
not develop a way of coping with the problem or will care about the risk anyway.
Aren’t we being asked to forego tangible benefits for the present for the sake of
avoiding a merely speculative risk of harm to people we do not even know will exist?
This sort of argument may seem initially plausible, but a little reflection on
examples, such as the bus example, shows that it is mistaken.
It is like the
consigner saying that there is nothing wrong in his sending his parcel, since it
is not certain the gas will escape, or that there will be anybody on the bus when
it does, or that the people on the bus may think of a way of coping with the problem,
or may not care anyway.
Can he really be expected to forego tangible benefits for
himself and his family just to avoid speculative harm to the possibly non-existent
passengers?
The answer of course is yes.
The damage to the passengers does not
have to be certain or even probable - it is enough that a significant risk of
serious harm is imposed on the unconsenting and uninvolved passengers.
In the nuclear case it is clear that a significant risk will be imposed on
the future.
The circumstances in which nuclear waste disposal could be improper
or ineffective are only too easy to envisage, and must be considered real risks
with a real evidential basis, not merely idle speculation or science-fiction
possibility.
And uncertainty about the future is not so great as this line of
argument likes to make out - there is uncertainty about many details of little moral
consequence concerning the future, such as which girls’ names will be used commonly
in 100 years, but we do have good reason to believe, especially if we consider
3000 years of history, that future people will have basic needs and desires rather
like our own, that they will need a healthy biosphere for a good life, and that
their lives will not be improved by an increased incidence of disease and cancer
from increased radiation.
written off in this way:
Moral conflict arguments.
The legitimate interests of future people cannot be
These uncertainty arguments are moral cop-outs.
The alternative to disputing obligations to the future
is to appeal to overriding obligations involving the present (which induce
situations where obligations conflict).
According to moral conflict arguments,
nuclear development does have its morally undesirable aspects, but the only
practical alternatives to nuclear development are morally even worse.
Observe
that such arguments are only satisfactory provided the options presented are
6.
genuine and exhaustive, all practicable alternatives being considered and shown
to be worse than the option under consideration:
this necessary condition is not satisfied.)
in the nuclear development case
Moral conflict arguments are commonly
advanced in favour of nuclear development, some alleging competing and overriding
duties to future people, and some analogous duties to present people.
The main (and representative) argument of the last class, laying stress on
duties to present people, is the Poverty Argument, according to which there is an
overriding obligation to the poor, both of the third world and the industrialized
countries who, according to the argument, will suffer or be denied the opportunity
to reach affluence if nuclear development does not proceed.
In neither case does
the argument stand up to examination.
There is good evidence that large-scale nuclear energy will help to increase
unemployment and poverty in the industrial world, through the diversion of very
much available capital into an industry which is not only an exceptionally poor
provider of direct employment, but also helps to reduce available jobs through
encouraging substitution of energy use for labour use.
The argument that nuclear
energy is needed for the third world is even less convincing.
Nuclear energy is
both politically and economically inappropriate for the third world, since it
requires massive amounts of capital, requires numbers of imported scientists and
engineers, and creates negligible employment.
Politically it increases foreign
dependence, adds to centralised entrenched power and reduces the chance for change
in the oppressive political structures which are a large part of the problem something which may help explain why it is attractive to many of the military
governing elites of these countries.
The poverty argument then — like many modern economic arguments for development
which appeal to the way in which development will, allegedly, assist the poor - is
a fraud.
Nuclear energy will not be used, except incidentally, to help the poor.
Both for the third world and for the industrialised countries there are well-known
energy conserving alternatives and the practical option of developing other energy
sources, alternatives which are morally acceptable and socially preferable to
nuclear development, and which have far better prospects for helping the poor.
The other, major, moral conflict argument appeals to a set of supposedly
overriding and competing obligations to present and future people.
We have, it is
said, a duty to pass on the immensely valuable things and institutions which our
culture has developed.
The argument is essentially that without nuclear power,
without the continued level of material wealth it alone is assumed to make possible,
the lights of our civilization will go out, our valuable institutions and traditions
will fall into decay or be swept away.
Future people also will be the losers.
The assumptions upon which this Lights-going-out Argument is based are
untenable.
It appears to assume that existing high-energy consumption society
is uniformly and uniquely valuable and that it cannot be directed towards energy
conservation or alternative energy sources without utter collapse.
But no enormou:
reduction in energy use, and perhaps little in real welfare, is needed to obviate
the need for nuclear power in the shorter term, and alternative energy strategies
to nuclear will have, in any case, to be adopted for the longer term anyway.
High
rates of energy use may be necessary to maintain the political and economic status
quo, but they are scarcely necessary to maintain what is really valuable in our
society, much of which we inherited from a past with a vastly lower energy con
sumption, and much of which might well be better fostered in lower (energy) con
sumption society with less concentration of political and economic power.
Not
only are the extravagant levels of energy consumption upon which the "need" for
nuclear power is premissed unnecessary to maintain what is valuable, but there is
some reason to believe they are positively inimical to doing so.
Nuclear develop
ment may help in passing on to future generations some of the worse aspects of
our society, the consumerism, alienation, destruction of nature and latent authori
tarianism, while many valuable aspects, such as the degree of political freedom and
those opportunities for personal and collective autonomy which exist, would be lost
or diminished.
But it is not the status quo, but what is valuable in our society,
presumably, that we have an obligation to pass on to the future, and if possible
enhance.
Both moral conflict escape routes are closed then, because the arguments
depend on false contrasts, ignore practicable alternatives which are not morally
worse than nuclear power, and in painting their picture of inevitability, vastly
understate the extent of available social choice.
It is like the consigner of
the parcel arguing that if he does not send his parcel his family and the village
will starve, when in fact there appear to be viable, but perhaps less profitable,
alternatives he has not troubled to consider or investigate seriously
Alternative energy options.
The future energy option that is most frequently
contrasted with nuclear, that based on coal, is not without ethical problems.
Certainly there is no radioactive waste disposal problem, and other important
grounds for moral and political concern over extensive reliance on nuclear energy
are removed, namely problems arising from the real possibilities of proliferation
of nuclear weapons, of deliberate release or threat of release of radioactive
materials as a measure of terrorism or of extortion, and of catastrophic releases
of radiation or of radioactive fuel or waste into the environment following an
accident such as reactor melt-down, and from security measures adopted to reduce
such eventualities.
But the coal-based option carries nonetheless serious
costs and risks both to the environment and to health — because of the likelihood
of severe pollution and associated damaging phenomena such as acid rain and
atmospheric heating, not to mention the despoliation caused by extensive strip
mining, all of which will result from use of coal in meeting very high projected
consumption figures.
Such an option would also fail, it seems, to satisfy the
transfer principle, because it would impose widespread costs on nonbeneficiaries
for some concentrated benefits to some profit takers and to some contemporary
users who do not pay the full costs of production and replacement.
These are the conventional options and a third is often added which emphasizes
soft or benign technologies, such as those of solar energy.
However the fundamental
choice, such options usually neglect, is not technological but social, and involves
both the restructuring of production, and change of consumption, away from energy
intensive uses: at a more basic level there is a choice between consumeristic
and nonconsumeristic futures.^ It is not just a matter of deciding in which way
to meet unexamined goals but also a matter of examining the goals and underlying
values.
That is, we are not just faced with the question of comparing different
technologies or substitute ways of meeting some fixed or given demand or level of
nonsumption, and of trying to see whether we can meet this with soft rather than
hard technologies;
we are also faced, and primarily, with the matter of examining
those alleged needs and the cost of society that creates them.
It is not just
a question of devising less damaging ways to meet these alleged needs conceived
of us inevitable and unchangeable.
There are solar ways of producing unnecessary
trivia no one really wants and of squandering energy, as well as nuclear ways.
This is not to deny that softer options may be superior to the ethically unacceptable
features of the others.
But it is doubtful that any technology however benign in principle will be
likely to leave a tolerable world for future people if it is expected to meet
limitless and uncontrolled energy consumption and demands.
Even the more benign
technologies such as solar technology may well be used in ways which create costs
for future people and are likely to result in a deteriorated world being transmitted
to them.
Consider, to take one important example, the effect on the world’s
forests, which are commonly counted as a solar resource, of use for production of
methonal or of electricity by woodchipping, as already planned by forest authorities
in California and contemplated by many other energy organisations.
Few would
object to the use of genuine waste material for energy production, but the un
restricted exploitation of forests - whether it goes under the name of "solar
energy" or not - to meet ever increasing energy demands would have a very damaging
effect on the world’s already hard pressed natural forests.
Some of us do not
9.
want to pass on - we are not entitled to pass on
- to the future a world largely
devoid of natural forests and accordingly much impoverished in fauna and flora,
any more than we want to pass on one poisoned by nuclear products or polluted by
coal products.
In short, a mere switch to a more benign technology - important
though this is - without any more basic structural and social changes is inadequate.
Social options.
The deeper social options involve challenging and trying to
change a social structure which promotes consumerism and an economic structure
which encourages the use of highly energy-intensive modes of production.
This
involves, for instance, trying to change a social structure in which those who are
fortunate enough to make it into the work force are cogs in a production machine
over which they have very little real control and in which most people do unpleasant
or boring work from which they derive very little real satisfaction in order to
obtain the reward of consumer goods and services.
A society in which social rewards
are obtained primarily from products rather than processes, from consumption, rather
than from satisfaction in work and in social relations and other activities, is
bound to be one which generates a vast amount of unnecessary consumption.
(A
production system that produces goods not to meet genuine needs but for created
and nongenuine needs is virtually bound to overproduce.)
Consumption frequently
becomes a substitute for satisfaction in other areas.
The social change option is a hard option, but it seems the only way to avoid
passing on serious costs and risks to the future5
and there are not only ethical
grounds, but ecological reasons for choosing it.
Conventional technology-oriented
discussions of energy options and of how to meet future energy "needs” obscures
the social change option, in part because the option questions values underlying
current social arrangements.
The conventional discussion proceeds by taking
alleged demand (often restated as wants or needs) as unchallengeable,
and the
issue to be one which technology can be most profitably employed to meet them.
This effectively presents a false choice, and is the result of taking needs and
demand as lacking a social context so that the social structure which produces
the needs is similarly taken as unchallengable and unchangeable.
The social
changes that the option requires will be strongly resisted because they mean
changes in current social organisation and power structure, and to the extent that
the option represents some kind of threat to parts of present political and economic
arrangements it is not surprising that official energy option discussion proceeds
g
by misrepresenting and often obscuring it.
FOOTNOTES
1.
2.
Some leading proponents of nuclear development admit the absence of
satisfactory storage and disposal methods;
others do not.
Some
of the newer strategies for waste disposal, e.g. that promoted by
Cohen 77 fail, conspicuously, to meet conditions of adequacy on
disposal (see Routley and Routley 78, footnote 1).
Ringwood’s
new strategy, in 78, was immediately rejected by some of the
pronuclear establishment both as too expensive (even allowing
Ringwood’s optimistic costguestimates) and as unnecessary, which
does not augur well for its use.
Yet Ringwood cast serious doubt
on the adequacy of alternative disposal strategies, notably
immobilisation of wastes in glass and in supercalcine.
All Ringwood has shown conclusively is that he can
create an artificial equivalent of a uranium one-body
(Hallam 79)
What Ringwood’s ’strategy for radwaste disposal’ amounts to is a
further possible method of treating radwaste, with significant gaps
in the argument, a considerable lack of experimental and practical
support, no commercial feasibility studies, etc: see Martin 78 and
Hallam 79.
3.
It depends on several processes whose large-scale commercial viability
has very definitely not been shown beyond reasonable doubt, including
reprocessing (Fox Report, p.29).
It appears to be far too expensive
for the nuclear industry, and certainly for poorer nations that have
embarked on nuclear power projects.
There are moreover reasons for
thinking that governments may not want or favour permanent irretrievable
disposal methods; they may want to keep open their options for
employing waste components either for military purposes or for use in
breeder reactors or elsewhere.
4.
On alternative technology and softer energy options, see especially
Lovins 77; also Lovins 76.
For criticism of Lovins’ comparative
neglect of social alternatives, see Martin 77 (and Lovins’ reply
thereto).
5.
The already very serious situation of the world’s forests, especially
the wet tropical forests, is not sufficiently widely appreciated.
It is a commonplace reflection, however, among rainforest botanists
and ecologists that nearly all tropical lowland rainforest and much
highlevel rainforest will have been cut over by about the year 2000.
Moreover such forests cannot at present be utilised on a sustained
yield basis or as a renewable resource (see, e.g. p.219 of Prance and
Elias 77).
Worse, there are now few forestry operations anywhere in
the world where the forests are treated as completely renewable in the
sense of the renewal of all their values.
In many temperate regions
too the rate of exploitation which would enable renewal has already been
exceeded.
The addition of a major further demand source - that for
energy, whether advertised as part of a ’’soft” energy path or otherwise and especially one which shows every sign of being not readily limitable,
on top of the present sources is a development which anyone with a
realistic appreciation of the conduct of forestry operations, who is also
properly concerned about the longterm integrity of the forests and
remaining natural communities, must regard with considerable alarm.
6.
The transmission principle, that one should not hand the world on to
our successors in substantially worse shape than we received it, is a
corollary of the transfer principle - applied in the bus example and
suggested as a necessary condition on energy options - that to be
morally acceptable
a course of action should not involve the transfer
of significant cost and risks onto uninvolved parties who are not
beneficiaries.
For if we violated the transmission principle, there
would be a significant transfer of costs, contradicting the transfer
principle.
The transmission principle can be independently argued for,
e.g. on the basis of contract (and other) theories of obligation.
7.
Thus it is argued by representatives of such industries as transportation
and petroleum, as for example by McGrowth of the XS Consumption Co.,
that people want deep freezers, air conditioners, power boats, ... and
that it would be authoritarian to stop them satisfying these wants.
The
argument conveniently ignores the social framework in which such needs
and wants arise or are produced.
To point to the determination of many
such wants at the framework level is not however to accept a Marxist
approach according to which they are entirely determined at the framework
level (e.g. by industrial organisation) and there is no such thing as
individual choice or determination at all.
It is to see the social
framework as a major factor in determining certain kinds of choices and
to see apparently individual choices made in such matters as being channelled
and directed by a social framework determined largely in the interests of
commercial and political advantage.
8.
This paper draws on material from Routley and Routley 78 and 79 where
fuller discussion of many of the topics covered, especially the question
of obligations to the future and uncertainty arguments, may be found.
REFERENCES
B.L. Cohen, ’The disposal of radioactive wastes from fission reactors’,
Scientific American 236 (June 1977) 22-31.
Flowers Report: Nuclear Power and the Environment. Sixth Report of
the British Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution, London, 1976.
Fox Report: Ranger Uranium Environmental Inquiry First Report,
Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1977.
J.R. Hallam, ’Synroc or Cinroc? *, (Wn tetion 4 (2-3) (1979)
4-5.
A. Lovins, ’Energy strategy: the road not taken:’, Foreign Affairs
55 (1) (October 1976) 65-96.
A. Lovins, Soft Energy Paths, Friends of the Earth, San Francisco, 1977.
B. Martin, ’Is alternative technology enough?’, Chain Reaction
3 (2) (1977) 17-21.
B. Martin, ’Call for research into Synroc’, The Canberra Times,
December 6, 1978, p.15.
G.T. Prance and T.S. Elias (editors), Extinction is Forever, New York
Botanic Garden, 1977.
A.E. Ringwood, Safe Disposal of High Level Nuclear Reactor Wastes:
A New strategy, ANU Press, Canberra, 1978.
R. and V. Routley, ’Nuclear energy and obligations to the future’,
Inquiry 21 (1978) 133-179.
R. and V. Routley, ’Some ethical aspects of energy options’, in
Energy and People: Social Implications of Different Energy Futures,
edited by M. Diesendorf, Society for Social Responsibility in Science
(A.C.T.), Canberra, 1979.
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<a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&range=&collection=&type=&user=&tags=&public=&featured=&exhibit=&geolocation-mapped=&geolocation-address=&geolocation-latitude=&geolocation-longitude=&geolocation-radius=10&submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a>
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<span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&pageSize=20&sortBy=score&sortDirection=Desc&searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span>, Box 69, Item 1
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<a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a>
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This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>.
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[12] leaves. 10.44 MB.
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<a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:1542277">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:1542277</a>
Box 69: Unlisted and Untitled Boxes
-
https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/bcd4c977aeb45ad24a2b0192d33d4e5f.pdf
8395b53934a64458ceb2c376d635df47
https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/eaad4ca4a41c9575562add5e549477b6.pdf
c8ca5006d9a3b4562c6d97480c3e4ddf
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Draft Papers
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An account of the resource
Sylvan's literary executor encountered an archive in which “all his projects were current", since manuscripts were undated and unattributed.
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Box 102, Item 1: Working of draft of Culture and the roots of political divergence: a South Pacific perspective with emphasis on the Australian/American contrast
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Working of draft of Culture and the roots of political divergence: a South Pacific perspective with emphasis on the Australian/American contrast
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Letter redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions.
Unnumbered paper from collection, item number assigned by library staff.
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<a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&range=&collection=&type=&user=&tags=&public=&featured=&exhibit=&geolocation-mapped=&geolocation-address=&geolocation-latitude=&geolocation-longitude=&geolocation-radius=10&submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a>
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<span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&pageSize=20&sortBy=score&sortDirection=Desc&searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span>, Box 102, Item 1
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<a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a>
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This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>.
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Box 102: Culture, Politics, Environment, Economics
-
https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/ff145ea0bd7ac945bc30e5341ef74f59.pdf
aa9eea53b0b11981694c3b49a406c07f
PDF Text
Text
THE 'FIGHT FOR THE FORESTS' AFFAIR
Authors:
Richard & Val Routley.
R. Routley has been since 1971
Senior Fellow in the Department of Philosophy, Research School of
Social Sciences, A.N.U.;
the position is tenured with a 5 year
bar, at that time passed more or less automatically. V. Routley
is author of a number of published papers both on philosophy and
on environmental subjects.
Title & Contents:
'The Fight for the Forests' (1st edition 1973,
290 pages) looked at the situation of Australian forests, especially
proposed and progressing industrial development of the forests such
as in pine and woodchip schemes;
it discussed economic, ecological
and social aspects of these schemes and of the planning which
underlay and justified them, as well as associated issues in the
foundations of economics and environmental decision-making.
Qualifications to write the book: These were of a reasonable
generalist kind. As philosophers we were well acquainted with the
theory of scientific methodology~ probability and decision theory,
as environmentalists and keen amateur naturalists we had a reasonable
general knowledge of the biological and ecological aspects involved.
The foundations of economics is also an area of academic research
and interest.
The local forestry literature is .neither very copious
nor very specialised, so that it is fairly easy · to become more or
less completely acquainted with it. Most of it is fairly easily
understood by people with~ut professional forestry training.
'The
Fight for the Forests' laid major emphasis on reasoning and on
methodological considerations in planning and prediction, and on \,
bringing outunderlying or hidden assumptions - especially value
assumptions - in these areas.
This is an area in which we were
well qualified to w.~ite. Given the very large range of areas involved
in discussing forestry as a social phenomenon, rangi n g from scientific
methodology and decision theory through sociology, social science,
economics and many areas of biology and ecology, our own special
areas of academic interest and in-depth knowledge were at least as
generally relevant to the issues concerned as most of those involved
in a conventional forestry training.
Care was taken to provide
full references to background work in cases where specialist areas
of knowledge were involved, so that no one had to rely simply on
our authority for claims made.
The book attempted then to present
an integrated picture of the forestry situation in Australia on
the basis of detailed knowledge of some areas relevant to the field,
as the work of foresters themselves often does,* and much of i.t
consisted of what is now known as 'applied philosophy'.
* These points should help dispel the professionalist myth, propagated
commonly by foresters, that only people with professional forestry
training are qualified to write about the forests.
Often such
foresters also advocate a closed decision-making system in which
they; as the 'relevant professionals' have sole rights of decision .
However, forestry issues raise many questions of social values which
are of general concern and shou d be widely discussed.
As well, as
noted, a very wide range of discipline areas are involved, and some
of the most important for the fate of the forests lie right outside
(continued on next page)
�2.
Character of Book: . 'The Fight for the Forests' was not a very
radical book politically but apparently offended mainly because it
attac~ed cherished programs and because of its strong emphasis on
the control of forests by the large forest industries, the close
connections of these industries with state forest services who were
allegedly employed in the public interest, and the role of professional
foresters in promoting ecologically destructive forestry developments
which were in the interests of industry. At that time the forestry
profession was a sacred cow, virtually beyond criticism, and the
book, rather predictably, was the object of intense hostility from
professional foresters (including academic foresters).
Its main
specific contentions, concerning the excessive nature of the pine
program and overestimation in planning for this program, the destructive environmental effects and uneconomic nature for the public of
pine and woodchip schemes in public forests, were at the time
controversial but have been subsequently vindicated by events and
by a number of later studies by others. The book tended to receive
unfavourable reviews from foresters, but received many favourable,
often highly favourable, reviews from non-foresters.
What happened:
Funds for printing the book were obtained, more or
less by chance, from RSSS, which at that time had a substantial
end-of-triennium surplus, without going through any refereeing system.
After final typing for photo-offset printing WfiS completed and just
a few weeks before the book was due to go to the printer, professional
foresters and sympathisers within the university appear to have got
wind of its likely contents.
(An article on pines published the
previous year, in Australian Quarterly 1972, had a substantial impact*·* l
and provided a good idea of the book's general stance). The then
Vice Chancellor, Professor R.M. Williams, suggested that printlng
should not proceed unless the book was given to the head of the
Forestry School at A.N.U., to be revised in ~ccordance with his
comments.
(Given the attitudes, beliefs, and connections of
professionals in general and this head of Department in particular,
this would almost certainly have crippled or destroyed the book.)
Footnote p.l
continued
conventional forestry training. For example, the major and most
influential papers underlying the original planning for the pine
program in the late sixties (papers which were heavily criticised
in our work) were the product of a botanist, Dr. M.R. Jacobs,
although they were primarily concerned ~ith qti~stions of planning
and decision.
But forconsidering these questions (e.g. the popular
planning methodology of overestimating future demand
and population
to 'play safe'), it is more helpful to understand, say, methodology
and decision theory than it is to understand, say, the patterns
of seeding of various eucalypts.
No one complained about Dr. Jacobs
going outside his 'area of competence', nor was his work suppressed
or subjected to censorship on this ground, because he was covered
by the professional umbrella.
There are many similar cases, which
reveal the arbitrariness with which field restrictions are commonly
applied to restrict inquiry.
** 1
After the article appeared there was for the first time parliamentary
questioning of the pine p ogram, with some strong speeches against
it,
and an increasingly critical attitude was
taken in the press.
�3.
Fortunately, the acting-Director of RSSS at the time was Professor
G. Sawer, who resisted this suggestion, and also kindly read
through the manuscript to check on liability to legal action;
(in the fuss preceding publication it had been suggested also that
publication should not proceed because of possible liability to
such legal action). He suggested a few minor changes of a few lines
at one or two points to safeguard against this.
Publication proceeded. The first edition of the book in 1973
sold out within a few months, and two further editions, revised and
updated, (1974, 1975) also sold out shortly after printing, making
it one of the best selling books ever distributed by A.N.U. Press.
Harassment from irate professionals and their sympathisers
within the university was not over however. We were left in no doubt
that the book had been 'an embarrassment to the university'.
In 1974
the author with library rights was prevented on order from the acting
head of the Forestry School, Professor Carron, from using the
Forestry School library.
As this contains.most forestry publications
and material, this constituted a direct attempt to block further work.
This ban was later overturned as a result of intervention from the
Biological Sciences Library Committee.
Later, RSSS, apparently in response to criticism of certain
school publications, set up a committee to review publications
procedure.
Shortly afterwards we were informed that there would be
no funding available for a further edition o f the book or f o r a
a reprint o f the book. No reasons were given. We were not informed
that the book was the subj e ct of a revi e w (as t he re were at that
time no proposals by us for a further edition) . We were given no
opportunity to nominate referees, to supply relevant information,
or to influence the outcome of the review in any way. Subs e quently
the school adopted a different procedural system in which the
departments and authors concerned nominate suitable referees. There
is little doubt that, had we been given the opportunity to follow
the regular system, suitable referees could have been found to provide
favourable reports.
Meanwhile, orders ~or the now out-of-print book
continue to arrive, and it continues to be favourably reviewed and
mentioned, both in Australia and overseas.
There is little doubt
that a further edition or reprint could have been sold. Attempts to
prevent publication were, therefore, ult.Lmately successful.
As a sequel, the production
publications by School presses one - was a major ground used by
take over the School presses and
For the time being, this attempt
of certain unspecified 'controversial'
of which our book was, reportedl½
ANU Press in its recent attempt to
gain central control over publication.
has failed.
General comments:
The situation in the forestry profession showed,
at the time we were working in the area at least, a very high degree
of suppression and professional cohesiveness, and an exceptional
degree of conformity and absence of critical .voices. This probably
is so pronounced because of the great control and influence exerted
by a highly restricted body of employers, namely, a few large forest
industries and the state forest services. For the same reasons perhaps,
there was a high degree of secrecy and control of information.
�4.
We encountered many severe cases of suppression in the forest~y
profession (applyi·n g in a·cademic, research, bureaucratic and state
forest service areas) and in related biological areas. This
included action by state forest services to terminate the research
projects (in state forests) of those who made public statements
unfavourable to them, or who supplied information or were associa.t~d
with those who did, and many other .- adverse effects on the careers
or prospects of potentially critical professionals. The influence
of state forest services reached within the university (ANU).
Suppression was so regular and pronounced that we believe it is
probably true that no one inside the profession or discipline
could have, at that time, written a book similar to 'The Fight
for the Forests'.
Such criticism could only appear where it slipped
past :· the usual professional c9ntrol and suppression mechanisms,
as our book did.
The general suppression mechanism illustrated by this case
then appears to be:
a combination of indoctrination and intimidation,
plus well-developed professional loyalty, ensures that significant
criticism does not originate from inside the profession or
discipline itself, or does so only in a rare, muted and easily
ov~rlooked form;
at the same time the professionalism mystique
and the discipline system is invoked, as it was in our case, to
ensure that no one outside the profession _can make such criticism
in a way which needs to be treated seriously (e.g. through publication
in a university series), and even to ensure that such criticism ~Y
potentially dangerous outsiders is silenced altogether. The
fragmentation of knowledge, like the fragmentation of work, is
thus used as a method of control.
It's a neat system, which nicely
protects a particular set of doctrines and interests.
R. & V. Routley
Research School of so c ial Sciences
Australian National University
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Draft Papers
Description
An account of the resource
Sylvan's literary executor encountered an archive in which “all his projects were current", since manuscripts were undated and unattributed.
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Text
Any textual data included in the document
THE 'FIGHT FOR THE FORESTS' AFFAIR
Authors:
Richard & Val Routley.
R. Routley has been since 1971
Senior Fellow in the Department of Philosophy, Research School of
Social Sciences, A.N.U.;
the position is tenured with a 5 year
bar, at that time passed more or less automatically. V. Routley
is author of a number of published papers both on philosophy and
on environmental subjects.
Title & Contents:
'The Fight for the Forests' (1st edition 1973,
290 pages) looked at the situation of Australian forests, especially
proposed and progressing industrial development of the forests such
as in pine and woodchip schemes;
it discussed economic, ecological
and social aspects of these schemes and of the planning which
underlay and justified them, as well as associated issues in the
foundations of economics and environmental decision-making.
Qualifications to write the book: These were of a reasonable
generalist kind. As philosophers we were well acquainted with the
theory of scientific methodology~ probability and decision theory,
as environmentalists and keen amateur naturalists we had a reasonable
general knowledge of the biological and ecological aspects involved.
The foundations of economics is also an area of academic research
and interest.
The local forestry literature is .neither very copious
nor very specialised, so that it is fairly easy · to become more or
less completely acquainted with it. Most of it is fairly easily
understood by people with~ut professional forestry training.
'The
Fight for the Forests' laid major emphasis on reasoning and on
methodological considerations in planning and prediction, and on \,
bringing outunderlying or hidden assumptions - especially value
assumptions - in these areas.
This is an area in which we were
well qualified to w.~ite. Given the very large range of areas involved
in discussing forestry as a social phenomenon, rangi n g from scientific
methodology and decision theory through sociology, social science,
economics and many areas of biology and ecology, our own special
areas of academic interest and in-depth knowledge were at least as
generally relevant to the issues concerned as most of those involved
in a conventional forestry training.
Care was taken to provide
full references to background work in cases where specialist areas
of knowledge were involved, so that no one had to rely simply on
our authority for claims made.
The book attempted then to present
an integrated picture of the forestry situation in Australia on
the basis of detailed knowledge of some areas relevant to the field,
as the work of foresters themselves often does,* and much of i.t
consisted of what is now known as 'applied philosophy'.
* These points should help dispel the professionalist myth, propagated
commonly by foresters, that only people with professional forestry
training are qualified to write about the forests.
Often such
foresters also advocate a closed decision-making system in which
they; as the 'relevant professionals' have sole rights of decision .
However, forestry issues raise many questions of social values which
are of general concern and shou d be widely discussed.
As well, as
noted, a very wide range of discipline areas are involved, and some
of the most important for the fate of the forests lie right outside
(continued on next page)
2.
Character of Book: . 'The Fight for the Forests' was not a very
radical book politically but apparently offended mainly because it
attac~ed cherished programs and because of its strong emphasis on
the control of forests by the large forest industries, the close
connections of these industries with state forest services who were
allegedly employed in the public interest, and the role of professional
foresters in promoting ecologically destructive forestry developments
which were in the interests of industry. At that time the forestry
profession was a sacred cow, virtually beyond criticism, and the
book, rather predictably, was the object of intense hostility from
professional foresters (including academic foresters).
Its main
specific contentions, concerning the excessive nature of the pine
program and overestimation in planning for this program, the destructive environmental effects and uneconomic nature for the public of
pine and woodchip schemes in public forests, were at the time
controversial but have been subsequently vindicated by events and
by a number of later studies by others. The book tended to receive
unfavourable reviews from foresters, but received many favourable,
often highly favourable, reviews from non-foresters.
What happened:
Funds for printing the book were obtained, more or
less by chance, from RSSS, which at that time had a substantial
end-of-triennium surplus, without going through any refereeing system.
After final typing for photo-offset printing WfiS completed and just
a few weeks before the book was due to go to the printer, professional
foresters and sympathisers within the university appear to have got
wind of its likely contents.
(An article on pines published the
previous year, in Australian Quarterly 1972, had a substantial impact*·* l
and provided a good idea of the book's general stance). The then
Vice Chancellor, Professor R.M. Williams, suggested that printlng
should not proceed unless the book was given to the head of the
Forestry School at A.N.U., to be revised in ~ccordance with his
comments.
(Given the attitudes, beliefs, and connections of
professionals in general and this head of Department in particular,
this would almost certainly have crippled or destroyed the book.)
Footnote p.l
continued
conventional forestry training. For example, the major and most
influential papers underlying the original planning for the pine
program in the late sixties (papers which were heavily criticised
in our work) were the product of a botanist, Dr. M.R. Jacobs,
although they were primarily concerned ~ith qti~stions of planning
and decision.
But forconsidering these questions (e.g. the popular
planning methodology of overestimating future demand
and population
to 'play safe'), it is more helpful to understand, say, methodology
and decision theory than it is to understand, say, the patterns
of seeding of various eucalypts.
No one complained about Dr. Jacobs
going outside his 'area of competence', nor was his work suppressed
or subjected to censorship on this ground, because he was covered
by the professional umbrella.
There are many similar cases, which
reveal the arbitrariness with which field restrictions are commonly
applied to restrict inquiry.
** 1
After the article appeared there was for the first time parliamentary
questioning of the pine p ogram, with some strong speeches against
it,
and an increasingly critical attitude was
taken in the press.
3.
Fortunately, the acting-Director of RSSS at the time was Professor
G. Sawer, who resisted this suggestion, and also kindly read
through the manuscript to check on liability to legal action;
(in the fuss preceding publication it had been suggested also that
publication should not proceed because of possible liability to
such legal action). He suggested a few minor changes of a few lines
at one or two points to safeguard against this.
Publication proceeded. The first edition of the book in 1973
sold out within a few months, and two further editions, revised and
updated, (1974, 1975) also sold out shortly after printing, making
it one of the best selling books ever distributed by A.N.U. Press.
Harassment from irate professionals and their sympathisers
within the university was not over however. We were left in no doubt
that the book had been 'an embarrassment to the university'.
In 1974
the author with library rights was prevented on order from the acting
head of the Forestry School, Professor Carron, from using the
Forestry School library.
As this contains.most forestry publications
and material, this constituted a direct attempt to block further work.
This ban was later overturned as a result of intervention from the
Biological Sciences Library Committee.
Later, RSSS, apparently in response to criticism of certain
school publications, set up a committee to review publications
procedure.
Shortly afterwards we were informed that there would be
no funding available for a further edition o f the book or f o r a
a reprint o f the book. No reasons were given. We were not informed
that the book was the subj e ct of a revi e w (as t he re were at that
time no proposals by us for a further edition) . We were given no
opportunity to nominate referees, to supply relevant information,
or to influence the outcome of the review in any way. Subs e quently
the school adopted a different procedural system in which the
departments and authors concerned nominate suitable referees. There
is little doubt that, had we been given the opportunity to follow
the regular system, suitable referees could have been found to provide
favourable reports.
Meanwhile, orders ~or the now out-of-print book
continue to arrive, and it continues to be favourably reviewed and
mentioned, both in Australia and overseas.
There is little doubt
that a further edition or reprint could have been sold. Attempts to
prevent publication were, therefore, ult.Lmately successful.
As a sequel, the production
publications by School presses one - was a major ground used by
take over the School presses and
For the time being, this attempt
of certain unspecified 'controversial'
of which our book was, reportedl½
ANU Press in its recent attempt to
gain central control over publication.
has failed.
General comments:
The situation in the forestry profession showed,
at the time we were working in the area at least, a very high degree
of suppression and professional cohesiveness, and an exceptional
degree of conformity and absence of critical .voices. This probably
is so pronounced because of the great control and influence exerted
by a highly restricted body of employers, namely, a few large forest
industries and the state forest services. For the same reasons perhaps,
there was a high degree of secrecy and control of information.
4.
We encountered many severe cases of suppression in the forest~y
profession (applyi·n g in a·cademic, research, bureaucratic and state
forest service areas) and in related biological areas. This
included action by state forest services to terminate the research
projects (in state forests) of those who made public statements
unfavourable to them, or who supplied information or were associa.t~d
with those who did, and many other .- adverse effects on the careers
or prospects of potentially critical professionals. The influence
of state forest services reached within the university (ANU).
Suppression was so regular and pronounced that we believe it is
probably true that no one inside the profession or discipline
could have, at that time, written a book similar to 'The Fight
for the Forests'.
Such criticism could only appear where it slipped
past :· the usual professional c9ntrol and suppression mechanisms,
as our book did.
The general suppression mechanism illustrated by this case
then appears to be:
a combination of indoctrination and intimidation,
plus well-developed professional loyalty, ensures that significant
criticism does not originate from inside the profession or
discipline itself, or does so only in a rare, muted and easily
ov~rlooked form;
at the same time the professionalism mystique
and the discipline system is invoked, as it was in our case, to
ensure that no one outside the profession _can make such criticism
in a way which needs to be treated seriously (e.g. through publication
in a university series), and even to ensure that such criticism ~Y
potentially dangerous outsiders is silenced altogether. The
fragmentation of knowledge, like the fragmentation of work, is
thus used as a method of control.
It's a neat system, which nicely
protects a particular set of doctrines and interests.
R. & V. Routley
Research School of so c ial Sciences
Australian National University
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Box 70, Item 1: Draft of The 'fight for the forests' affair
Subject
The topic of the resource
Printout of draft, undated. Paper published, Routley R and Plumwood V (1986), 'The "Fight for the Forests" affair', in Martin B, Baker CMA, Manwell C and Pugh C (eds) Intellectual suppression: Australian case histories, analysis and responses, Angus and Robertson, Sydney.
Description
An account of the resource
Unnumbered paper from collection, item number assigned by library staff.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
<a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&range=&collection=&type=&user=&tags=&public=&featured=&exhibit=&geolocation-mapped=&geolocation-address=&geolocation-latitude=&geolocation-longitude=&geolocation-radius=10&submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a>
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Box 59: Nuclear
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https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/62dfb49e2e6b38d58a9ab61536132136.pdf
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�28
undiluted anarchism); holistic and tribal means (as, obversely, utterly individualistic ones) are
anarchistically admissible.
The connections can be made in this way:- If there is no head, top or centre, how are
political affairs structured? A standard anarchist response-not essential for mathematical
structure, but incorporated in the modem definition of anarchism-is organisation (of course)
by acceptable means, by noncoercive, nonauthoritarian organisation, what is typically expanded
to voluntary and cooperative organisation. Features of this response will be elaborated in what
follows (starting in the next chapter).
~
5. With in anarkism: green and deep-green anarkism.
~
/\-
1¥ short, a green position or theory is one that reflects sufficient commitment to
environmental causes, with that commitment shown in relevant positive action. Even more
briefly, what is required for such greenness (gre-eenness) is this: environmental commitment
manifested in suitable action. 28
A deep-green theory, is a green theory, that is one reflecting sufficient commitment to
environmental causes, which exhibits depth, roughly some items, notably natural items, that do
not answer back to human interests are valuable in themselves and human interests do not
always predominate. 29 A deep-green political theory is a political theory of this deep-green
sort.
Deep green agents do not have to attempt anything in an explicitly political direction, even
though they have to attempt something for environmental causes. They can live as part of a
minority, as many do, watching what they value degraded or destroyed. They are committed,
in principle (only), to reform. There is no commitment to radicalism. But if such greens wish
to retain enough of what they value, they will have, sooner or later, to become involved in
-------
political issues, in more than merely reformist ways.
!J..,+ 0
..ilfvl
j\ is a m11fatter of completeness, deep-green theory~is bound to touc~/ at leastj; upon
r::'"'
-::i:;,
/./ow,t,-.J~
polit ical issues. B:a.t,\deep-green theory does not, itsel~ force a particular form of political
theory, certainly not anarchoid forms. Rather such forms present appealing options, especially
given the deep-green inadequacy of mere small and marginal variations upon prevailing
unjustified state arrangements. While some, important changes may be achieved in reformist
ways, they are unlikely to do enough. They are for more likely to be, what virtually all
•• idence, suggests: too little, too late.
28
A full account of greenness is easily accessible in GE. So the many elaborating details are not spelt out
here. An overlapping detail also offered in GI.
29
Again these features have been explained in detail elsewhere, esp OOE, also GE.
,/4 11:
�t~ ~ ~ rJjPhc.J.\:r l~~ e,J, k
1 -tt:fo()'l'l,,tiYP...
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~ 0us foc1'J.e..t4), t'.sf-s,
- - · ·-
29
sees
1
----- - - - l;.11n3 .,.,,t.
p1~11a -;_/,;,,
A popular illusion Jla5 Are political structures as satisfactory, the problem ~ the players
who occupy critical niches, a problem that can be solved by rendering these players suitably
green. 30 Hence the call for greener politicians, and extensive efforts to green up''those that are
~o/
there. This assumes that the players are independant of the niches they occupy, instead of that
the players are partially shaped by the niches they occupy.
(Persons can be seen as
constitlf.[ted, in important part, by the roles they occupy). Rather to obtain virtuous green
policy makers and controllers, changes in political structures into which they ~,,,.- appear
/ slut
necessary. In these terms, present structures are inadequate; significant structural change is part
of what is required, again going further than straightforward reform.
It may already be evident that the fuzzy reformist/radical divide does not correspond to the
shallower/deep distlic tion of green positions and actors. As it happens, leading deep ecologists
;;..
e'i
,,;-shMtJ'
who tend not to be enyironmentally deep, are political radical, and in~l~ding Bila committed to
I
o.l• q)
"eco-anarchism" (' 13's "munipal liberterianism"). By contrast some deep-green theorists
(myself included) aim both for environmental depth and political radicalness. However deep<le-f,;,i~\,
(>,S~c~ l
green theory represents a plurallism, of which political radicalism
,.. is,\not an-~··· feature. In any
case, radicalism does not exclude judicious reformist activity of support of reformist measures
(and it is remotely possible that some regions ~ ould just get very 1i ckm:g in reforms). So too
~
while anarchical investigations are politically radical, a good deal of P1at is this ....... may be of
relevance to reformist green theory, both theory and methods.
Like most political theory, green theory spans a range from practical, getting things done
within prevailing arrangements, to highly theoretical, such as envisaging superior organisation
(postponing questions as to how to get from here to there). The present investigations
(parallelling my interests) lie in the more theoretical end, partly because (from where I am)
prevailing arrangements look, not to overstate things, environmentally hopeless.
Whether or not a deep-green approach is limited to reformist practice or not, it is bound to
be revolutionary in theoretical impact. For by yirtue of what is meant by deep-green, any such
dcw,,E.'~ ro~
approach is bound to reject assumptionsi ntegral to modem political theory.
dt\,,;... ... J
Political theory ... address the question of which politically variable institutions
are normatively satisfactory: in particularly, normatively satisfactory from the
point of view of some constituency ... . Modem political theory, at least in the
Western tradition, makes two assumptions in giving further specification to the
enterprise. The first is the ...
[humanist] assumption, that the relevant constituency is human beings, usually
the [individual] human beings who are to live under the institutions ... . And the
30
Thus such despairing c\~lls as the following:
The environmental movement is exhausted by campaigning on so many fronts; what is needed now is for
the decision makers to change their loyalties and priorities-don't just wear the green, think green and act
green!
I
a..
·tQ
1-e
�30
second is the
[local egalitarian] assumption, that the arrangements should be normatively
satisfactory from the point of view equally, of all relevant individuals ... .
These assumptions are almost constituive of Western political thought ....31
Like hi:i;~inent predecessors, Pettit does not offer much argument for these large assumptions,
, Jk
and what is on offer is quite inadequate. The second assumption, his "universalism" ,whic~ takes
as less controversial, obtains only an invalid one-liner: 'If persons are all that matter [a first of
various transformations of the humanist assump~o~ ], they surely matter equally, so universialism
ton
is hard to resist' .32 To emphasis the invalidity, consider a few substitutions: if possessions
(species, assumptions, ... ) are all that matter, they matter equally. What is more, when the first
assumption is duly broken, the second assumption is commonly abandoned. That when other
items than humans do matter, for some other creatures, humans matter more than those others
r-
(this sort of assumption in fact typifies intermediate, opposed to deep, positions). An easy
egalitarianism (which shelves merit distribution issues) tends to become increasingly
controversial, and implausible, as constitf e~ es are further varied and widened; witness the
bf spheric egalitarianism of deep
ecology.33
It is the first assumption, then that deep-green approaches are bound to reject. pettit passes
.-
upon discussion of the 'challenging' 'objection': 'It is that if political arrangements are devised
with a view just to the interests of human beings [note the further transformation] then they are
quite likely to be damaging to the rest of nature' (to grossly understate the problematic
situation). 34 He cannot resist the observation that as 'the interests of human beings are tied up in
great part with those of non-human nature, ... we may hope that in approaching political matters
from a personalist standpoint we will not be insensitive to the needs of non-human species and of
31
Thus Pettit, pp 286-7, who provides some selective docmentation for these claims and that these
assumptions are made. Pettit, dubiously equating persons with humans, calls the first assumption 'the
w sonalist assumption'; but really the l~ ger assumption is that political theory conforms to human
chauvinism (for a critical rejection of which see the final section of EE). He calls the second assumption
'the • iversalist assumption', though it is far from universal, as r.
ds either temporal or spatial
dimensions; for example, states invariably tr~ t foreigners or aliens differently from citizens or
constituents, in ways supported by prevailing theory. It is abandonment of the second assumption, which
Pettit does not discuss, that distinguishes ancient and nonWestern theory. For slaves, members of lesser
castes and tribes and so on, withinf the state were not treated equally (whether they regarded this as
satisfactory or not).
32
Pettit. p.287.
33
34
Pettit p.287.
Jo
~c
f
�31
~~
the bitat that we share with those species' .35 While we share this pious and regularly frustrated
.
)ha.
hope, the feebleness of the observation should not pass unremarked. Evidently there are many
types of interrelations where (limited) interests of a dominant party are no reliable assurance of
~
satisfactory treatment of dominated or lesser relatf master-servant, land-self, and so on. While
some parties may have treated their slaves and animals well and appropriately, many did not.
Nature and its creatures and features are hardly looked after well by present cohorts of humans:
insen~ vity dominates. Many humans, especially substantiaii;;lf-interested humans, are not to
be trusted; so a majority or like consituency of humans can hardly prove satisfactory. The
humanist assumption, part of a pervasive human chauvinism, should be abandoned.
It is very doubtful that the two assumptions i ettit p~ ents are anywhere near consitutive of
J~ )~
modem Western political thought. Further major assumptions concern the role of the state and the
position of individual rights; it is the former that does not enter decisively in tribal and like
socie~ ies, and the latter distinctively modem issue that is downplayed or neglected in nonWestem theory.
Under present political arrangements, the world is divided up, virtually ex~umiativ ly, into
) h.o..us..t/
a set of exclusive states. None of these states should be accounted green, though there are now
very ~ e green tinges to so~
of them. While none exhibit any depth of greenness, there is no
reason, theoretical or pgi\tical why some should not. M~ er deep-green arrangements can, in
principle, be ensured by political structures that are unacceptable on other grounds. More
IV/~
/,
technically, deep-greenness, however necessary, does not supply full conditions of adequacy for
satisfactory political arrangements, environmental and otherwise: for eucracy.
For any
arrangements where political control, a ~riing class for instance, proves suitably disposed can
ensure greenness of depth. Thus such, independently objectionable, arrangements as: green
v
~
(benev,ient) dictatorships, green guardit nships (in the style of an eco-Platonic Green Republic),
green foundations, and caste systems even eco-f~p cisms and eco-totalitarianisms. Many such
arrangements fall down
fnbroadly liberatarian grounds: that they do not allow agents and
creatures to govern their own lives and affairs freely. Other arrangements fail on broadly
egalitarian grounds, that they undul_y privil~ge some classes or agents at the expense of others. ';
-
<Arrangements that meet conditions of adequacy, that is that do not so fail yet are deepgreen, are called eucratic. Eucracy means satisfactory political organisation.
Green anarkism and, still more, deep-green anarkism offer important fresh political
directions and alternatives for sustained green activity, and for the wide green movement more
35
Pettit p.287.
Jo
�32
generally. They are alternatives very compatible with green ideas and broad ideology, as well as
alternatives often implicitly adopted, and certainly heavily borrowed from, by greenr.· There is
0
already a symbi\ tiin relation of sorts. Green and anarchist movements can not only complement
each other substantially; in important ways they need each other, and mutual dependence.
Anarkism stands in need of a significant driving force, an active directed constituency, which the
green movement can apply (or still better, a green movement allied with other alternative forces,
such as peace and feminist movements). Conversely, green succesfD slowing or stopping
#
massive degradation of the Earth, requires very different political directions from those of the
present, or of red (state socialist) or blue (liberal capitalist) colour variations on offer, anarchoidal
directions, so it can plausible be argued. That isl can be argued, persua\ ively if inconclusively
f /s
so far, that a genuinely green future cannot be obtained under present political arrangements; for
S1.1h.sfa"'helA.:1
l<n~s'tr-C1 ,'ht?J..
example this can be argued, in several ways, from the inbuilt commitment to fairly connectional~
economic growth. Accordingly political structures n\ ed to be changed, but so that important
J~
social desiderata that have been more or less achieved over a long and often dark human history
are not lost, in particular personal liberty, democra~c procedur~, just practice; Certain types of
4Q 12:.IJU-Qf~ t
~
,\
green anarchism meet these requirements,36 A··· types, other optiorJdo not satisfactorily.
sre~,i
i:,
Arguments from genuine soerees to • dical change assume the following sort of form:
• Human impact on the Earth, on very many of its ecosystems and habitats, is excessive.
•
Impact will not be significantly reduced under prevailing dominant socio-political
arrangements, under what is called the dominant social paradigm. To the contrary, these
arrangements obligate growth, which is likely to increase, even if now with some shallow
sustainability constraints. 37
Therefore,
• Arrangements slwuld be changed
® There are more and less far-reaching ways of attempting to achieve such changes of
arrangements, from zero, conservative, through reformist, to radical,c.ulminating in total change.
® There are also more and less authoritarian and coercive ways of endeavouring to achieve such
arrangements. (At the more authoritarii n fnd thes~~i~clude green dictatorship, ecofascism, etc.)
The further detail Jargument is that these way should be anarchoid. Briefly, ~
matives to
anarchoid ways not only infringe basic social and environmental desiderata (including, for
instance, noninterfering freedom of choice of individual creatures), but they utterly lack rational
0
~
36
Th#se types encouraging relevant organisation, regulation and control-features 8f which certain sorts of
traditional anarchism stand opposed.
37
While this is substantial thesis, we shall not stop off to argue for it here. The thesis is argued elsewhere,
e.g. GE, GEF.
().II ~uc,'af~ / s
�33
justification.
The detailed argument for anarchoid directions for radical .green change reveals features of
importance concerning the required character of resulting arrangements. For example, what
emerges cannot be a free-for-all for some classes of agents, such as developers. Regulation and
planning will have to be tighter, while different in character, than what now prevails in most
regions.
Accordingly a green anarkism like that to be elaborated differs in ma·or respects from most
of what has hitherto passed as anarchism. Salient differences tum around the following matters
and em~
/ h
, among others
o
regulation of social and environmental kinds.
o
social organisation and political structure, with both bottom-up and also top-down linkages and
constraints.
o
rational organisational and decision practices, including preparation and planning, to ensure
adequate outcomes.
o
reasonable objectives and planning targets, pitched at adequacy, not optimality (or other
maximizing goals).
o
pluralism of arrangements, indeed a plural pluralism, with space for a plurality of cultures and
subcultures within various of an appropriate plurality of political structures.
Such a plurality could well include structures that did not conform to matters emphasized,
not merely inadequate arrangements but adequate ones. For example, with creatures different
from the present run of humans, environmental regulation could prove substantially otiose. To be
sure, it would be hoped, though certainly not required, that arrangements were uniformly benign;
for example that, environmental circumstances permitting, they were evironmentally benign.
Correspondingly, socially, it would be hoped that arrangements aimed to conform to fairly basic
standards of ethical decency, such as
o
basic social (as well as environmental) provision.
Satisfactory arrangements would supply a subsistence floor, meeting the principle: to each
accou~ ing to basic needs. This modified comm unal principle is not confined in scope to
fr-d
~
resident humans, but includes other inhabitants.
o
a presumption of nonviolence, with violence at least not perpt trated against innocent or
/e..
uninvolved parties (including again nonhumans).
REFERENCES
\
J. Burnheim, 'Democracy, nation states and the world system', in NFD pp.218-239.
D. Held, and C. Pollitt, New Forms of Democracy, Sage, London 1986; referred to as NFD.
_
J.W. Gough, The Social Contract: a critical study of its development, Oxford, Claredon Press,
1936.
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�The following have been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions.
•
•
Cutting, The Economist (19 November 1988) ‘Business bribes’, The Economist, 21-24. (4
pages (2 leaves))
Journal, Raise the stakes: the Planet Drum review, no 7 S2, Spring 1983.
�
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Notes, Correspondences and Marginalia
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In one obituary, Sylvan's handwriting was said to have "looked like the oscilloscope for a patient in intensive care", and thus "not for the timid".
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28
undiluted anarchism); holistic and tribal means (as, obversely, utterly individualistic ones) are
anarchistically admissible.
The connections can be made in this way:- If there is no head, top or centre, how are
political affairs structured? A standard anarchist response-not essential for mathematical
structure, but incorporated in the modem definition of anarchism-is organisation (of course)
by acceptable means, by noncoercive, nonauthoritarian organisation, what is typically expanded
to voluntary and cooperative organisation. Features of this response will be elaborated in what
follows (starting in the next chapter).
~
5. With in anarkism: green and deep-green anarkism.
~
/\-
1¥ short, a green position or theory is one that reflects sufficient commitment to
environmental causes, with that commitment shown in relevant positive action. Even more
briefly, what is required for such greenness (gre-eenness) is this: environmental commitment
manifested in suitable action. 28
A deep-green theory, is a green theory, that is one reflecting sufficient commitment to
environmental causes, which exhibits depth, roughly some items, notably natural items, that do
not answer back to human interests are valuable in themselves and human interests do not
always predominate. 29 A deep-green political theory is a political theory of this deep-green
sort.
Deep green agents do not have to attempt anything in an explicitly political direction, even
though they have to attempt something for environmental causes. They can live as part of a
minority, as many do, watching what they value degraded or destroyed. They are committed,
in principle (only), to reform. There is no commitment to radicalism. But if such greens wish
to retain enough of what they value, they will have, sooner or later, to become involved in
-------
political issues, in more than merely reformist ways.
!J..,+ 0
..ilfvl
j\ is a m11fatter of completeness, deep-green theory~is bound to touc~/ at leastj; upon
r::'"'
-::i:;,
/./ow,t,-.J~
polit ical issues. B:a.t,\deep-green theory does not, itsel~ force a particular form of political
theory, certainly not anarchoid forms. Rather such forms present appealing options, especially
given the deep-green inadequacy of mere small and marginal variations upon prevailing
unjustified state arrangements. While some, important changes may be achieved in reformist
ways, they are unlikely to do enough. They are for more likely to be, what virtually all
•• idence, suggests: too little, too late.
28
A full account of greenness is easily accessible in GE. So the many elaborating details are not spelt out
here. An overlapping detail also offered in GI.
29
Again these features have been explained in detail elsewhere, esp OOE, also GE.
,/4 11:
t~ ~ ~ rJjPhc.J.\:r l~~ e,J, k
1 -tt:fo()'l'l,,tiYP...
f
~ 0us foc1'J.e..t4), t'.sf-s,
- - · ·-
29
sees
1
----- - - - l;.11n3 .,.,,t.
p1~11a -;_/,;,,
A popular illusion Jla5 Are political structures as satisfactory, the problem ~ the players
who occupy critical niches, a problem that can be solved by rendering these players suitably
green. 30 Hence the call for greener politicians, and extensive efforts to green up''those that are
~o/
there. This assumes that the players are independant of the niches they occupy, instead of that
the players are partially shaped by the niches they occupy.
(Persons can be seen as
constitlf.[ted, in important part, by the roles they occupy). Rather to obtain virtuous green
policy makers and controllers, changes in political structures into which they ~,,,.- appear
/ slut
necessary. In these terms, present structures are inadequate; significant structural change is part
of what is required, again going further than straightforward reform.
It may already be evident that the fuzzy reformist/radical divide does not correspond to the
shallower/deep distlic tion of green positions and actors. As it happens, leading deep ecologists
;;..
e'i
,,;-shMtJ'
who tend not to be enyironmentally deep, are political radical, and in~l~ding Bila committed to
I
o.l• q)
"eco-anarchism" (' 13's "munipal liberterianism"). By contrast some deep-green theorists
(myself included) aim both for environmental depth and political radicalness. However deep<le-f,;,i~\,
(>,S~c~ l
green theory represents a plurallism, of which political radicalism
,.. is,\not an-~··· feature. In any
case, radicalism does not exclude judicious reformist activity of support of reformist measures
(and it is remotely possible that some regions ~ ould just get very 1i ckm:g in reforms). So too
~
while anarchical investigations are politically radical, a good deal of P1at is this ....... may be of
relevance to reformist green theory, both theory and methods.
Like most political theory, green theory spans a range from practical, getting things done
within prevailing arrangements, to highly theoretical, such as envisaging superior organisation
(postponing questions as to how to get from here to there). The present investigations
(parallelling my interests) lie in the more theoretical end, partly because (from where I am)
prevailing arrangements look, not to overstate things, environmentally hopeless.
Whether or not a deep-green approach is limited to reformist practice or not, it is bound to
be revolutionary in theoretical impact. For by yirtue of what is meant by deep-green, any such
dcw,,E.'~ ro~
approach is bound to reject assumptionsi ntegral to modem political theory.
dt\,,;... ... J
Political theory ... address the question of which politically variable institutions
are normatively satisfactory: in particularly, normatively satisfactory from the
point of view of some constituency ... . Modem political theory, at least in the
Western tradition, makes two assumptions in giving further specification to the
enterprise. The first is the ...
[humanist] assumption, that the relevant constituency is human beings, usually
the [individual] human beings who are to live under the institutions ... . And the
30
Thus such despairing c\~lls as the following:
The environmental movement is exhausted by campaigning on so many fronts; what is needed now is for
the decision makers to change their loyalties and priorities-don't just wear the green, think green and act
green!
I
a..
·tQ
1-e
30
second is the
[local egalitarian] assumption, that the arrangements should be normatively
satisfactory from the point of view equally, of all relevant individuals ... .
These assumptions are almost constituive of Western political thought ....31
Like hi:i;~inent predecessors, Pettit does not offer much argument for these large assumptions,
, Jk
and what is on offer is quite inadequate. The second assumption, his "universalism" ,whic~ takes
as less controversial, obtains only an invalid one-liner: 'If persons are all that matter [a first of
various transformations of the humanist assump~o~ ], they surely matter equally, so universialism
ton
is hard to resist' .32 To emphasis the invalidity, consider a few substitutions: if possessions
(species, assumptions, ... ) are all that matter, they matter equally. What is more, when the first
assumption is duly broken, the second assumption is commonly abandoned. That when other
items than humans do matter, for some other creatures, humans matter more than those others
r-
(this sort of assumption in fact typifies intermediate, opposed to deep, positions). An easy
egalitarianism (which shelves merit distribution issues) tends to become increasingly
controversial, and implausible, as constitf e~ es are further varied and widened; witness the
bf spheric egalitarianism of deep
ecology.33
It is the first assumption, then that deep-green approaches are bound to reject. pettit passes
.-
upon discussion of the 'challenging' 'objection': 'It is that if political arrangements are devised
with a view just to the interests of human beings [note the further transformation] then they are
quite likely to be damaging to the rest of nature' (to grossly understate the problematic
situation). 34 He cannot resist the observation that as 'the interests of human beings are tied up in
great part with those of non-human nature, ... we may hope that in approaching political matters
from a personalist standpoint we will not be insensitive to the needs of non-human species and of
31
Thus Pettit, pp 286-7, who provides some selective docmentation for these claims and that these
assumptions are made. Pettit, dubiously equating persons with humans, calls the first assumption 'the
w sonalist assumption'; but really the l~ ger assumption is that political theory conforms to human
chauvinism (for a critical rejection of which see the final section of EE). He calls the second assumption
'the • iversalist assumption', though it is far from universal, as r.
ds either temporal or spatial
dimensions; for example, states invariably tr~ t foreigners or aliens differently from citizens or
constituents, in ways supported by prevailing theory. It is abandonment of the second assumption, which
Pettit does not discuss, that distinguishes ancient and nonWestern theory. For slaves, members of lesser
castes and tribes and so on, withinf the state were not treated equally (whether they regarded this as
satisfactory or not).
32
Pettit. p.287.
33
34
Pettit p.287.
Jo
~c
f
31
~~
the bitat that we share with those species' .35 While we share this pious and regularly frustrated
.
)ha.
hope, the feebleness of the observation should not pass unremarked. Evidently there are many
types of interrelations where (limited) interests of a dominant party are no reliable assurance of
~
satisfactory treatment of dominated or lesser relatf master-servant, land-self, and so on. While
some parties may have treated their slaves and animals well and appropriately, many did not.
Nature and its creatures and features are hardly looked after well by present cohorts of humans:
insen~ vity dominates. Many humans, especially substantiaii;;lf-interested humans, are not to
be trusted; so a majority or like consituency of humans can hardly prove satisfactory. The
humanist assumption, part of a pervasive human chauvinism, should be abandoned.
It is very doubtful that the two assumptions i ettit p~ ents are anywhere near consitutive of
J~ )~
modem Western political thought. Further major assumptions concern the role of the state and the
position of individual rights; it is the former that does not enter decisively in tribal and like
socie~ ies, and the latter distinctively modem issue that is downplayed or neglected in nonWestem theory.
Under present political arrangements, the world is divided up, virtually ex~umiativ ly, into
) h.o..us..t/
a set of exclusive states. None of these states should be accounted green, though there are now
very ~ e green tinges to so~
of them. While none exhibit any depth of greenness, there is no
reason, theoretical or pgi\tical why some should not. M~ er deep-green arrangements can, in
principle, be ensured by political structures that are unacceptable on other grounds. More
IV/~
/,
technically, deep-greenness, however necessary, does not supply full conditions of adequacy for
satisfactory political arrangements, environmental and otherwise: for eucracy.
For any
arrangements where political control, a ~riing class for instance, proves suitably disposed can
ensure greenness of depth. Thus such, independently objectionable, arrangements as: green
v
~
(benev,ient) dictatorships, green guardit nships (in the style of an eco-Platonic Green Republic),
green foundations, and caste systems even eco-f~p cisms and eco-totalitarianisms. Many such
arrangements fall down
fnbroadly liberatarian grounds: that they do not allow agents and
creatures to govern their own lives and affairs freely. Other arrangements fail on broadly
egalitarian grounds, that they undul_y privil~ge some classes or agents at the expense of others. ';
-
<Arrangements that meet conditions of adequacy, that is that do not so fail yet are deepgreen, are called eucratic. Eucracy means satisfactory political organisation.
Green anarkism and, still more, deep-green anarkism offer important fresh political
directions and alternatives for sustained green activity, and for the wide green movement more
35
Pettit p.287.
Jo
32
generally. They are alternatives very compatible with green ideas and broad ideology, as well as
alternatives often implicitly adopted, and certainly heavily borrowed from, by greenr.· There is
0
already a symbi\ tiin relation of sorts. Green and anarchist movements can not only complement
each other substantially; in important ways they need each other, and mutual dependence.
Anarkism stands in need of a significant driving force, an active directed constituency, which the
green movement can apply (or still better, a green movement allied with other alternative forces,
such as peace and feminist movements). Conversely, green succesfD slowing or stopping
#
massive degradation of the Earth, requires very different political directions from those of the
present, or of red (state socialist) or blue (liberal capitalist) colour variations on offer, anarchoidal
directions, so it can plausible be argued. That isl can be argued, persua\ ively if inconclusively
f /s
so far, that a genuinely green future cannot be obtained under present political arrangements; for
S1.1h.sfa"'helA.:1
l<n~s'tr-C1 ,'ht?J..
example this can be argued, in several ways, from the inbuilt commitment to fairly connectional~
economic growth. Accordingly political structures n\ ed to be changed, but so that important
J~
social desiderata that have been more or less achieved over a long and often dark human history
are not lost, in particular personal liberty, democra~c procedur~, just practice; Certain types of
4Q 12:.IJU-Qf~ t
~
,\
green anarchism meet these requirements,36 A··· types, other optiorJdo not satisfactorily.
sre~,i
i:,
Arguments from genuine soerees to • dical change assume the following sort of form:
• Human impact on the Earth, on very many of its ecosystems and habitats, is excessive.
•
Impact will not be significantly reduced under prevailing dominant socio-political
arrangements, under what is called the dominant social paradigm. To the contrary, these
arrangements obligate growth, which is likely to increase, even if now with some shallow
sustainability constraints. 37
Therefore,
• Arrangements slwuld be changed
® There are more and less far-reaching ways of attempting to achieve such changes of
arrangements, from zero, conservative, through reformist, to radical,c.ulminating in total change.
® There are also more and less authoritarian and coercive ways of endeavouring to achieve such
arrangements. (At the more authoritarii n fnd thes~~i~clude green dictatorship, ecofascism, etc.)
The further detail Jargument is that these way should be anarchoid. Briefly, ~
matives to
anarchoid ways not only infringe basic social and environmental desiderata (including, for
instance, noninterfering freedom of choice of individual creatures), but they utterly lack rational
0
~
36
Th#se types encouraging relevant organisation, regulation and control-features 8f which certain sorts of
traditional anarchism stand opposed.
37
While this is substantial thesis, we shall not stop off to argue for it here. The thesis is argued elsewhere,
e.g. GE, GEF.
().II ~uc,'af~ / s
33
justification.
The detailed argument for anarchoid directions for radical .green change reveals features of
importance concerning the required character of resulting arrangements. For example, what
emerges cannot be a free-for-all for some classes of agents, such as developers. Regulation and
planning will have to be tighter, while different in character, than what now prevails in most
regions.
Accordingly a green anarkism like that to be elaborated differs in ma·or respects from most
of what has hitherto passed as anarchism. Salient differences tum around the following matters
and em~
/ h
, among others
o
regulation of social and environmental kinds.
o
social organisation and political structure, with both bottom-up and also top-down linkages and
constraints.
o
rational organisational and decision practices, including preparation and planning, to ensure
adequate outcomes.
o
reasonable objectives and planning targets, pitched at adequacy, not optimality (or other
maximizing goals).
o
pluralism of arrangements, indeed a plural pluralism, with space for a plurality of cultures and
subcultures within various of an appropriate plurality of political structures.
Such a plurality could well include structures that did not conform to matters emphasized,
not merely inadequate arrangements but adequate ones. For example, with creatures different
from the present run of humans, environmental regulation could prove substantially otiose. To be
sure, it would be hoped, though certainly not required, that arrangements were uniformly benign;
for example that, environmental circumstances permitting, they were evironmentally benign.
Correspondingly, socially, it would be hoped that arrangements aimed to conform to fairly basic
standards of ethical decency, such as
o
basic social (as well as environmental) provision.
Satisfactory arrangements would supply a subsistence floor, meeting the principle: to each
accou~ ing to basic needs. This modified comm unal principle is not confined in scope to
fr-d
~
resident humans, but includes other inhabitants.
o
a presumption of nonviolence, with violence at least not perpt trated against innocent or
/e..
uninvolved parties (including again nonhumans).
REFERENCES
\
J. Burnheim, 'Democracy, nation states and the world system', in NFD pp.218-239.
D. Held, and C. Pollitt, New Forms of Democracy, Sage, London 1986; referred to as NFD.
_
J.W. Gough, The Social Contract: a critical study of its development, Oxford, Claredon Press,
1936.
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The following have been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions.
•
•
Cutting, The Economist (19 November 1988) ‘Business bribes’, The Economist, 21-24. (4
pages (2 leaves))
Journal, Raise the stakes: the Planet Drum review, no 7 S2, Spring 1983.
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Lake George - Floor - Pile 7
Box 13: Green Projects in Progress
Lake George House
Lake George House > Floor > Pile 7
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Dublin Core
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Box 17, Item 1265: Draft of Anarchism
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Handwritten draft of paper on scrap paper, undated. Handwritten at top of first page: Old script.
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<a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&range=&collection=&type=&user=&tags=&public=&featured=&exhibit=&geolocation-mapped=&geolocation-address=&geolocation-latitude=&geolocation-longitude=&geolocation-radius=10&submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a>
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<span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&pageSize=20&sortBy=score&sortDirection=Desc&searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span>, Box 17, Item 1265
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<a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a>
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Australian National University - Bookcase - 1st on Right - 3rd Shelf Down - First Pile
Australian National University Office
Australian National University Office > Bookcase > 1st on Right > 3rd Shelf Down > First Pile
Box 17: Green Projects in Progress
-
https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/8e7daae9baa6742dce79f815f186d6ff.pdf
3cfac978365f5707e5deea901d316501
PDF Text
Text
������������������������������������The following has been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions.
Cutting (photocopy), title page and two pages (158-159) from Snell B (1953) The discovery of the
mind: the Greek origins of European thought (Rosenmeyer TG trans), Blackwell, Oxford. (3 pages (2
leaves))
���������The following has been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions.
Cutting (photocopy), 8 pages (476-483) from Jamieson D (1991) ‘Method and moral theory’, in
Singer P (ed) A companion to ethic, Blackwell, Oxford. (8 pages (4 leaves)
����The following has been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions.
Cutting (photocopy), 14 pages (268-285) from Broad CD (1967) Five types of ethical theory,
Routledge and Kegan Paul, London. (14 pages (7 leaves)
����������������The following has been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions.
Letter (typescript), ? to Richard, 20 Jan 1989 re feedback on draft paper. (1 leaf)
��The following has been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions.
Typescript, Questions for interview with Richard Routley. (2 pages)
������
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Notes, Correspondences and Marginalia
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In one obituary, Sylvan's handwriting was said to have "looked like the oscilloscope for a patient in intensive care", and thus "not for the timid".
Text
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The following has been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions.
Cutting (photocopy), title page and two pages (158-159) from Snell B (1953) The discovery of the
mind: the Greek origins of European thought (Rosenmeyer TG trans), Blackwell, Oxford. (3 pages (2
leaves))
The following has been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions.
Cutting (photocopy), 8 pages (476-483) from Jamieson D (1991) ‘Method and moral theory’, in
Singer P (ed) A companion to ethic, Blackwell, Oxford. (8 pages (4 leaves)
The following has been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions.
Cutting (photocopy), 14 pages (268-285) from Broad CD (1967) Five types of ethical theory,
Routledge and Kegan Paul, London. (14 pages (7 leaves)
The following has been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions.
Letter (typescript), ? to Richard, 20 Jan 1989 re feedback on draft paper. (1 leaf)
The following has been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions.
Typescript, Questions for interview with Richard Routley. (2 pages)
Dublin Core
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Box 19, Item 772: Notes and early drafts of Deep-green ethics
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Handwritten, typescript and printout notes and early drafts of paper, undated. Includes cuttings.
Description
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Title in collection finding aid: Ring Binder - Foundations Ethics. RS: Deep Green Ethics - Contents - Ts + ms. RS: Many pages of notes - occasional connected passages. Verso of scrap papers not digitised.
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<a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&range=&collection=&type=&user=&tags=&public=&featured=&exhibit=&geolocation-mapped=&geolocation-address=&geolocation-latitude=&geolocation-longitude=&geolocation-radius=10&submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a>
Source
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<span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&pageSize=20&sortBy=score&sortDirection=Desc&searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span>, Box 19, Item 772
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<a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a>
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This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>.
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[84] leaves. [75.85 MB]
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<a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:55c3bc1">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:55c3bc1</a>
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Como - Shelves - Bottom - Pile 2
Box 19: More Green
Como House
Como House > Shelves > Bottom > Pile 2
-
https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/74d46ccc038115c6bd0d20b0ef9d25e7.pdf
71c8a8c1be80ed4eafc093ea58b583ca
PDF Text
Text
7t?
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HORKING DRAFT
CULTURE AND THE ROOTS OF POLITICAL DIVERGENCE:
a South Pacific perspective
with emphasis on the Australian/American contrast
A ma.ior function of culture is to regulate and control change,1
Political
in the South Pacific,
change
North,
industrial
can,
in
and political
principle then,
the
be grounded in and
powered
by
One organising theme, a corollary of
features of local and regional.culture.
the
from
divergence
argument, facilitates the transition from principle to
practice:- It
is
that the requisite elements are present in regional cultures, the potentiality
is
South Pacific region (and Australia
the
for
there,
in
particular)
to
proceed in a very different social and political direction from the North (and
USA in particular).
th"
from
American arrangements,
Given the radical
unsatisfactoriness of the
2
in many frequently exposed respects , such a different
direction is worth taking - if it can be.
serious problem in the way of
a
But
arrangements,
from outside or from above.
change is imposition of
And,
political
since imposition shades into
this is
only one of the obstacles impeding change in the
South Pacific and elsewhere.
Another^forcing more and more peoples, no longer
political pressure,
sheltered
into the same type
of
socio-political
is supposed to derive from human nature itself.
Free people are
by geographical isolation,
arrangements
economic people,
in pretty much the American mould,
so it
is
claimed.
By
this route, economic imperialism can replace political imperialism.
1.
Nature,
theory
- one
culture,
to
which
A supposedly key question in political
and control.
we are said to have no satisfactory
answer
in
the
absence of a worthwhile theory of human nature (or human natures) - is this:-
1.
Thus Abraham p.29ff.; Awa p.30.
2.
For a recent trenchant expose, see Cohen and Rogers.
1
�To
extent does human nature alloM for alternative political
Mhat
arrangements? Or, to turn the question around:-
in
virtue
of
nature
the
of
much-promoted
6nglo-6merican
Enl ightenment,
is
oMn
gain
or
(including
technical knoM-hoM),
from
6
the
taboos
(and
Mill
(properly) concerned Mi th
information
3
free people are basically economic people.
but for their
shortage
of
that is to replace one ideology by another.
ideology is no longer so
Enlightenment
of
range
descended
directly
are essentially
people
that is,
interests;
6 s ought noM to be evident,
the
answer ,
self-centred individuals,
become)
broad
that once freed from systems of myths,
superstition,
from
the
"nature" reduce the organisationa! options?
HoM does that
controls,
on
humans
What restrictions are imposed
evident:
Mhat
But
recommends
it?
Under pressure of this sort, the 6nglo-6merican answer gets transformed to the
that the economic picture of human nature is superior,
theme
and fitting
of
That 'self-appointed West European superiority'' has in
4
the
Romantics.
Fortunately,
turn been disputed, since the time of Herder and
rational
creatures.
hoMever, the extensive ensuing dialectic can be substantially avoided.
For all these questions and ansMers presuppose, to begin
Mi th, a certain
misplaced essential ism, that there is such an invariant nature common to human
beings,
Mhich
exactly
separates humans from other
creatures,
suitably constant and invariant
5
necessary and sufficient conditions , are legion. They are
specify
such
an
essence,
attempts
to
given
by
and
a frequent feature of Enlightenment thought. 611 men are the same
because of universal drives [such as to pleasure and the avoidance of
pain]. These drives mill operate independently of any location.
Chief among those drives Mas that toMards self-preservation - Hol bach,
for instance, stipulates:
Me shall call nature in man the collection of properties and
quali t i es Mhich constitute him Mhat he is, Mhich are inherent to
his species, Mhich distinguish him from other animal species or
every man feels, thinks,
Mhich he has in common Mi th them
3^
These people are also picked out under various alternative (but not
strictly equivalent) descriptions, e.g. as acquisitive individuals,
possessive individuals.
2
�acts and seeks his oMn Mell-being at all times;
these are
qualities and properties that constitute human nature ... 6.
But this attempt at essentialist definition of human nature fails,
Fts it stands, the definition is inadequate;
characteristic May.
humans seek just their OMn Mell-being alMays;
hut f?
yoMtc df-e,
other commitments.^
L
to
egoism,
by
HoMever,
replacing
(
'Mell-being'
(such as human vegetables,
definition,
replacing
'every
definition is again inadequate;
example,
in a quite
for not all
some are altruistic,
some have
Ct '
suppose Me avoid such familiar counterinstances
rendering such internal egoism analytic.
examples
the
by
say
'broad
Mell-being',
thus
&nd suppose to avoid other counter-
morons and the like),
man' by 'every normal human'.
Me normalise
the
then
the
But
for it fails to distinguish humans from, for
It applies equally to dolphin nature or, for that matter,
dolphins.
to qori11 a nature.
Of
4.
course
the
definition can again be patched,
by
appealing
to
the
(From previous page) See Berry, p.30ff., from Mhom the quote is taken,
It
is Morth spelling out a little the extent of agreement and
disagreement Mi th Herder. Hhat is applauded is
1. 'Herder's dismissal of the Enlightenment's conception of human nature
as static, acultural and ahistorical' (Berry, p.32), but not.
XI.
Herder's cultural relativism, that 'each culture ... should be
treated on its OMn merits and not judged by some faulty perspective such
_
In the
as la belle_____
nature
' (p.3U), or from any other perspective.
pluralistic framework of the text (Mhich presupposes PPP), a good many
cross-cultural judgements are made and defended.
X2.
Herder's relativisation of human nature to culture, and embodiment
of it in cu1ture; for example, 'it is through language that human nature
Hi th
can be seen to be specifical1y embodied in cu1ture' <p.32).
bu t
relativisation the notion loses its original theoretical point;
Mhile failing in this role, cultural nature is open to many of the same
Nor can language bear the Meigh t
sorts of objections as human nature.
Herder loads upon it.
Herder's human chauvisism: '... it is speech and Mi th that reason
X3.
I1an can choose, man is king'
and freedom, that differentiates man.
Hild animals are free, can choose, communicate, solve puzzles,
(p.36).
carry
out elementary reasoning;
in these respects they surpass
and
and
many
other
humans.
Furthermore,
X3 gets Herder into serious
chi 1dren
not
to
say
inconsistency,
Mi
th
1.
trouble,
5.
6.
Abraham, draMing on Hittgenstein,
essence, p.23ff.
Berry p.17.
presents just these conditions for an
Berry supplies several other similar examples.
3
�cluster of -features that separate humans from other mammals or
anatomical
biological specification of homo sapiens.
the
to
normalised
But the resulting
definition,
Mi th its analytical egoism, does little more than such biological
definitions
of
human:
it does not supply a nature,
does
it
deliver
not
superbiological
features of political relevance. The notion of human nature
-a/"!
thus fragments: into the satisfactory enough biological notion of human, and
an
superbiological (or sociobiological)
unsatisfactory
nature or essence.
addition;
What is this further, problematic, nature?
that
of
The Romantics
can be read as arguing that there is none, no nature as distinct from culture,
only local nature (Herder's term) Mhich coincides Mith culture.
excretions and variations in order to reach an essence leaves,
cultural
off
Peeling
like
Wittgenstein's artichoke, nothing.
The notion of human nature is a theoretical item,
amid cultural variability,
stability
a constant bulMark against
but designed as Mell to justify (as natural or, failing that,
of
type
particular
political
provide
introduced to
economy and legislature, and
relativism,
as superior)
its
a
imposition
7
fashion,
fact
and
that
the
is not so easily dissolved,
notion
by one illustration.
is Mritten large in much
political
but is defective,
illustration reveals,
such
a
HoMever the
theory,
does not shoM that it or the embedding theory is sound.
received,
not,
This resilient notion has been Midely applied in
else.
everyMhere
and
is
f)nd it is
and in its socio-political selectivity it is,
as the
virtually of a piece Mith human chauvinism (Mhich Mould
assign an unduly privileged position to human beings in the ecological
scheme
of things).
In
under
7.
fact
the superbiological notion of human nature begins
any attempt to set it doMn,
in much the May that
attempts
to
dissolve
supporting
Hence the Enlightenment program of imposing enlightened Western culture
everyMhere, later emphasised by Bentham.
The Legislator, knoMing that
human nature is ever the same [different countries do not have different
catalogues of pleasure and pain), can reform the laMS and even transplant
them from one society to another' (Berry, p.18).
�doMn something ethically
chauvinism
3
disintegrate.
The notion of human nature - a nature
human
there
stable or constant social
some
are
features
humans
about
(some special classes of humans excepted perhaps)
humans
that
special
- presupposes
holding
for
across different cultures, Mhich are furthermore distinctive!/ human
peop!es,
features.
The
presupposition fails,
because once cultural variation between
shared
peoples
characteristics
remain ,
Mhich
furthermore
are
shared
various
by
animal
cu1tures, such as those of primates.
Consider ,
books,
or
first,
such
products or tools of more literary cultures as
Since
of contemporary cultures as telephones and computers.
cultures
lacked
such items,
their
possession
most
distribution
or
obviously cannot figure as part of Mhat marks out human nature. Consider next,
Mhat are commonly taken to be key components of (human) nature, certain
then,
basic human needs,
such as food and shelter.
These requirements are far from
free of cultural and environmental determinants.
as required in the May of shelter,
place to place.
Mays,
common
under
For look at Mhat is regarded
and hoM it varies from cu1ture to culture,
(&nd even Mhat is taken as basic can often be met in a myriad
Mays.)
though acceptably in some cultures only in a feM fixed
The
denominator is the rather trivial requirement of some sort
more extreme conditions - a requirement also of Mombats.
The situation
This claim concerning human chauvinism is argued in detail in EE. But the
claim concerning human nature is only sketchily defended in the text. For
.................................
'
t nature, 1 ike
the alleged social-arrangement-dictating
features of' human
determinism,
are
alleged
features
of
economic
or
technological
simi1 ar
insofar
as
they
to
be
removed
especially
rather major obstacles
supposedly severely and inevitably restrict the character of future
societies - than the main business of the present enterprise.
For tunately then the claim, that the superbiological notion of human
nature is a defective theoretical one Mhich dissolves, is defended
elseMhere: not only,
,, in effect, in Mork of Romantics from Herder on, but
also in significant recent literature. Foucault, for example, can be read
as saying that human nature is an invention of the Enlightenment Mhich
dissolves: ''his much discussed ... dissolution of man is nothing more, or
less, than the claim that the attempt to establish order upon a
scientific understanding of human nature is both profoundly mistaken and
italics added).
�food,
Mith
and
sex,
so on,
considerably from race to race,
by
flourish.
Again
the somewhat
conditions,
trivial
lowest
or
more
loosely
Mhere
common
tribal
denominator
Nor are attempts to mark out
by some more complex list of jointly necessary
nature
vary
requirements
Europeans for example being very inefficient
applies also to various groups of animals.
human
Dietary
tribal standards and unable to survive satisfactorily
many
people
is hardly better.
by a cluster of natural
and
features,
the
sufficient
much
more
successful, or of direct political application without the importation of what
is culturally at issue - values. In any case, such vague and general lists as
10
emerge
impose little constraint at all on a political direction, since a
variety of political arrangements is compatible with such listings.
Accordingly,
nature
as such is not. an
important
constraint
on
or a theory of human nature a key ingredient in endeavours
11
work out a political philosophy or political directions .
The reason is
political
to
human
theory,
the reason that determining the conditions for the good life would
like
not
impose a satisfactory constraint on a political theory, namely presupposition
12
failure.
Like the meaning of life , the good life fails to demarcate a
single
thing;
there
are many styles of good lives.
So too there
is
human
*9^
The
converse is seen in the extent to which tribal peoples gain weight
on European diets, At another level, consider the Haori attitude to, and
underlying revulsion by, cooked food: see Alpers, p.7-9.
10.
For one such list, which however requires pruning and adjustment, see
Nilson, p.22. As it happens, Nilson does not make anything much of this
list (which does not supply necessary conditions), immediately presents a
parallel list for insect societies - a list which does considerable
damage to more traditional claims about human nature - and then proceeds
in effect to demolish main criteria that have been used to separate
humans from animals and to restrict cultures to human societies (e.g.
p.39).
For more on contemporary "scientific" efforts to deploy a theory of human
nature for social and political ends, see Appendix 2.
11.
Nhich is perhaps as well, since we still have so little reliable and
unprejudiced information as to what "human nature" amounts to, what its
variational possibilities, in different environments, might be, or of the
possibilities beyond past terrestrial selections of cultures.
12.
On which see Routley and Griffin.
6
�and human nature,
nature
depending on the culture or social paradigm and
on
Nature, both human and not, varies uith culture and environment.
the setting.
Because of this tuo-uay dependence,
there is no unique stable superbiological
human nature.
notion of human
is
nature
the
picture of nature as given, as a
stable
across races and tribes,
notion
uith culture as a variable
There is no such culturally invariant division:
The picture is flaued in much the same uay,
as
perception,
top.
on
culture affects local nature.
as the familiar picture of
then,
stable
consisting of given uninterpreted sense data,
across
(normal) perceivers, uith interpretation imposed on the neutral data.
Nor therefore is culture something that can be creamed off the top, so to
find real human features or basic nature
to
speak,
Certainly,
underneath.
be destroyed; however uhat results from removal by destruction of
not something closer to real people,
but people uith a destroyed
it is also uith attempts like Hobbes or Rauls to peel
organisation
off
the the top,
in order to locate in a
political
quasi-analytical
or
quasi-historical uay, a state of nature underneath or preceding some organised
state
or
other,
derived from mistaken
flaued picture,
questionable
or
presuppositions, is assumed.
Hhat uill be found underneath, or in the original (natural) state, is, it
is usually conveniently assumed, a nature that fits the vieu to be developed uith the
explai ned
and
the
culture's
riqht values very fortunately in-built.
is
privileged
image
status quo -
position of some
of itself,
and
elements of the
as uell
dominant
as
a
be
serves
for
economic man,
social
hardly surprisingly, that
for Enlightenment man,
7
dominant
Northern
fully competitive possessive individualism (much the same model,
uhich
to
or justified is something like present socio-political arrangements
paradigm - underlying human nature turns out to be,
of
Given that uhat
for
the
that is,
"rational
�etc.)
person",
myths,
to
The myth of unique human nature functions,
perpetuate
other
like many
or instil particular social arrangements
and
special
pr ivi1ege.
Thus too the myth of human nature is linked to other culture-based myths,
myths
the
of
predominantly
self-interested
- to
rational)
(normal)
al 1
bring
humans
maximizer s
no firm starting point in human nature,
myths.
of
myths.
None
aboriginal
peoples
comprised
their
least
and
as
insofar
as
they
are
Mith
the
image
of
up
As there is no underlying hard ground,
so there is none in these
repeated
the
Melanesians,
associated
Polynesians
or
Australian
maximizers;
strongly communal lifestyles and
after
especially,
and
(at
individuals
The South Pacific Mas, and remains, rich in cultures Mhich upset these
associated
indeed
aggressive
some of the myths bound
in
urban-industrial humans.
contemporary
as
preparedness
a loM sufficiency threshold had been reached,
source of criticism from the
European cultures
Mork
stop,
to
Mas a major
that
came
to
dominate the region.
forms and types of
Even
aggressiveness,
and approaches to
Mar,
often
taken to be solid ground, are culture and environment dependent, and vary Mi th
13
both
parameters .
Aggressiveness is often supposed to impose
huge
constraints
on political
arrangements.
But there is little substance to the
claim that humans are naturally aggressive independently of social or cultural
setting.
The most that appears
clear is that circumstances can be
through croMding or provocation or cultural
arranged,
for
instance
TEh
A striking illustration of environmental variation is afforded by the
differences betMeen savannah dMelling and forest dMelling tribes of
baboons.
For a local illustration, consider Maori approaches to Mar
(like Mar conventions, a social phenomenon), before European corruption.
Thus Best reports that 'an individual, or a Mhole clan, might decline to
take part in an engagement on account of some evil omen, and such an
action Mould be approved of (p.15).
There are several, apparently
reliable, stories of Maoris engaged in Mar supplying the opposition Mith
equipment or ammunition, or temporarily abandoning their fighting effort
to help out the other (British) side, so the battle could proceed
proper 1y.
relocation,
Mhere
�of
peoples
cultures Mill become aggressive
familiar
more
people of other cultures Mill not,
in the face of immense brutality.
depends
Once
types.
Certainly some arrangements are required to
but these can be of a Mide range of
shortsightedly
again,
Mhat is normally
as fixed:
see
certainly,
such
Mhich
components
nature
human
accounted
varies Mith culture and environment,
and
upon
perhaps
as people often do
but Mill just give up,
cope Mith or suitably isolate aggression,
alternative
- and
often
people
as
selfishness,
cooperativeness, individuality do.
Hhat
is
presently much more important than either culture or nature
determining social arrangements is another factor:
imposition.
social
Whatever
one
from
Mithout,
through
region
and neM arrangements imposed,
Hith long-standing arrangements,
May or another.
invariably
namely, outside control or
arrangements have evolved in a
local nature and culture can be overridden,
imposition
is
and the changes in arrangements typically
especially,
the South Pacific has,
in
almost
involve
either violence in their adaption or mass migration of people or both.
last tMO hundred years,
in
In the
like much of the
been drastically so affected, in a complex May. ^nd the changes,
neMer Morld
still floMing strongly from the North, continue.
He
are
in the last days of the destruction of
old
and
cultures,
economic
destruction is noM to a considerable extent by more subtle cultural,
and
technological
Outside
direct
control can be exercised,
economic sanctions,
film
and
television (i.e.
earlier
times.
in many Mays less blatant
than
such as through introduction
of
etc.,
as
monetary and loan policies,
as through exchange and training programs,
magazines,
14.
or occur,
intervention of one sort or another,
neM technologies,
Mell
means than the cruder methods of slightly
the
textbooks,
through physical
advertising
and
exemplifications of
Hi Ison's argument that humans are innately aggressive involves such an
invalid move: he looks at the behaviour of Semai men Mhen 'taken out of
their nonviolent society' by recruitment in a British colonial army
(p.100)!
^s Mell, Hilson's case rests on a dubious redefinition of
innateness, and a loM redefinition of aggressiveness to take in forms of
mere (nonaggressive) conflict (pp.9?-100).
�of
process of cultural conversion and erosion;
this quieter
are
unwittingly, part
European peoples in the South Pacific are often
culture).
rather than,
victims as well as,
now
but many of
perpetrators (cf.
us
and
Crough
Wheelwright).
Human
communities
have been - and many still are
- as
insensitive
to
other human cultures as they are to the natural environment (witness Americans
and their allies in Vietnam).
or
beyond redemption.
pushed
of
creation
Like an ecosystem, a culture can be destroyed,
This is
disaster
areas proceeds
Yet
the
blatant cases
15
by disruption of culture and lifestyle using violence.
There is
typically
political
furthermore,
where
apace
is possible at all,
recovery
a
sometimes of the order of human generations.
perhaps
well-known.
sufficiently
production
of
imperialism,
these politically
e.g.
USA
in
contaminated
Central America,
- in
recovery
long
period,
Yet there is increasing
regions,
Israel in
especially
Lebanon,
through
Russia
in
Afghanistan, Indonesia in East Timor and West Papua, etc.
In the South Pacific, there are many quieter Northern influences at work,
but
the
strongest now is unquestionably the
businessmen,
films
can
academics,
American.
American
companies,
tourists and warships, their technology and patents,
and television programs,
There
are the most evident and
be various motives and aims (and assumptions) behind the
newer
behind endeavours such as the American to
16
Granted it
everywhere.
"free
enterprise"
philosophy
and
practice
their
17
business
and
American
to
American
economic
supremacy,
mostly contributes to
and
economic imperialism,
15.
These disaster areas should perhaps be cordoned off like those
by communicable disease,
but from continuing disruptive,
interference.
infected
outside
What is said about American cultural and politic al imperial ism applies,
with adaption, in a lesser way, to imperialism and col onial ism by other
nation-states such as USSR, Britain, France and Indonesia. USA has no
monopoly on imperialism. US imperialism in the third wor1 dis in part
documented and analysed in Chomsky and Herman.
17.
Though not invariably as the experience with the Japanese motor industry
has indicated.
10
�the transfer of substantial regional wealth and surplus value to the
to
But
national economic reasons are not the only sort of reasons such
are
pursued;
apart
t^at many
from the side-issue of integrity,
USA.
policies
Americans
really do believe in the optimality of their local ideals to the exclusion
other
of
arrangements, there are deeper and somewhat more respectable ideological
reasons as wel1.
imperialistic
The
that
assumption
for
nature,
be
underpinned
all human nature is at bottom really
political
(a
technological
means.
can
instance highly economically oriented.
distortions
economic)
endeavours
means,
way:
they
by
like
Thus,
descriptive
a
American
human
but for political
analogue of economic externalities)
and
lack
and
other peoples would choose the American (political
simply have not really been given the
For many peoples this is simply not true;
of
opportunity
or
for most other cultures let
us hope, or pray, that this is not the case. Alternatively, or as well, a more
arrogant
prescriptive assumption may be at work,
that all human nature ought
best, because America not only has the best
18
way of life in the world and mostly the best ways of doing things
, but has
to be like American nature at its
a
special
hold
on rationality.
The free-enterprise
system
(perhaps
representative democracy American-style tacked on) is the rational
18.
with
enterprise
Thus, for example, American agricultural textbooks and agricultural
spokespeople are fond of announcing that American agriculture is the best
in the world;
similarly for environmental
protection,
forestry,
technology, university education, and so on.
But since they are the
best, it is evident that these American ways should be exported, isn't
it? Even granting the large assumptions, No, firstly, because that is to
neglect important regional and local variations and differences, and
secondly because these ways may interfere with other significant features
of regional life or culture.
It' has not passed unremarked that the high standard of material life in
USA depends in part on a very fortunate inheritance (e.g. some of the
best and deepest soils) and in part, as in Europe, on a lower standard of
1 i f e and conditions elsewhere, upon siphoning off wealth and especially
resources (US currently uses about one-fifth of world resources and 30 X
To be sure, economic apologetics
of world energy) from other regions.
proffer other explanations of American transcendence, e.g. ingenious
constructions like that of Olson, built on a sandy logic of economic
actors collectively locked into economically determined arrangements,
substantially independent of the resource base.
11
�Certainly the system is sometimes peddled,
embodied.
the
American May,
it.
Mhich Mas often
Mith the same evangelism as Christianity,
and presented as the rational religion,
seen
by genuine believers in
at least before science got
at
science hasn't got at the free-enterprise religion yet, but on the
Hell,
noM has a social division heavily devoted to its justification and
19
furtherance.
HoMever some philosophy has got at the system, sufficiently to
contrary
that it is no unique embodiment of rationality - there is none such
reveal
but
a decidedly irrational practice in many circumstances.
is
irrational if local goals are to preserve local
especially
Thus,
it
environments
is
and
cultures, as much experience helps attest.
is aspects of the false descriptive assumption,
It
Mith
emerge
rejection,that are a main focus in Mhat folloMS (though various
its
the reasons for rejecting the prescriptive assumption
recorded).
broader
and Mhat can
important
An
basic
nor
in
substan t i al 1y
of
Mill also emerge or get
underlying theme Mill continue to be
that
nei ther
varies
human
Mays that are highly political relevant - relevant
to
the
frameMork a society adopts. In
imposed
upon from outside or above, the variation can be
through
cultural
variation
alternative
assumptions,
is part of "nature",
again
"human nature"
variations;
(Mhich
but
in
turn
depends
on
environment,etc)
are then, those of cultural pluralism, that
shaping in particular local human nature. Of course once
can be pared back and back to try to
in this May Mhat are taken to be
important
remove
cultural
superbiological
features of human nature for political theory are also excised (e.g.
that
The
make prisoners' dilemmas and commons' tragedies come out one May
features
rather
than another).
19.
In elaborating on hoM modern societies control their citizens, Foucault
has explained various extensive types of social control exercised and
licensed through received social sciences, by May of approved standards
of normality, health, stability, adequacy, rationality, etc.: see Philp,
p. 15.
12
��Just as different cultures can mean different social arrangements,
so in
a larger setting they can imply different political organisation and different
directions.
political
Where
do
requisite differences
not
occur,
because
incongruous arrangements have been imposed, cultural differences can be a
"A
powerful force for change. Likewise developing elements of cultural difference
can
a potent base for social change - or resistance to imposed
be
(especially) in communities where other more orthodox
as economic incentives or penalties,
have
change
bases for change,
become inoperative or
-
such
failed,
or
used,
but
are not available.
Culture is however a double-edged instrument,
resisted.
example,
For
though
not only to be
indigenous
leading
features of
Pacific cultures are to be reactivated, as forces for change, some
these cultures are to be resisted (such as male domination),
features
Features of culture are thus
modern Western cu1tures.
of
along with
and confront undesirable (implanted or imported) sources
resist
many
used
to
culture;
of
excessive consumerism, persuasive
such as, inequitable political arrangements,
advertising
media and loaded news systems,
structures,
etc.
for
sol id foundation - but also
This
reasons
is as true for American culture as Antipodean.
Mhy
job
forth,
is
to
antagonistic
One
of
the
so
mainstream American culture
so
encouraging
prime sources of
up resistance against,
and
culture.
alienating
It is important not only to build and design alternatives -
which elements of
di sman tie,
chief
holloa suburbia,
that
movements
offering
or
and
alternatives have been repressed by the dominant corporations
the state apparatus (see especially Goldstein).
2
The
Why
work with such an unfavourable contrast case as Australian—society
regional and environmental orientation.'
in defence of themes
concerning
1*'
'yV
4"
cultural variation and their force for change,
contrast
US
it would no doubt be easier to
culture with some other culture which diverges
13
more
strikingly
�Mith some Pacific society poised for revolutionary change, such as perhaps the
Then there are conspicuous differences,
Philippines.
as the following
table
begins to reveal:-
SOME WESTERN CULTURAL THEMES CONTRASTED HITH THIRD HORLD
Fi1i pi no [Melanesian J
North American [AustralianJ
Individual autonomy encouraged;
Mithin paradigm, individual should
individualize, solve oMn problems,
develop OMn opinions
Dependence encouraged; point of
reference is authority, older kin folk
Competition [aJ primarymethod
of motivation
Community reduces or excludes incentive
to excel over others
Relations Mith others informal
and direct
Relations Mith others more formal;
social interactions more structured
Clear distinction betMeen public
and private property
Public property divertable unguililty
into private [Much "property", e.g.
1 and, is communal J
Materialism a dominant value
Spiritual, religious things matter as
much or more than material.
Evident trouble
culture
Mith
the choice of Australia as contrast is that
is not only much influenced (like all
Australian
accessible cultures) by
parts
of American culture, but is very similar in many respects, including evolution
and
comparative
stability.
similarities are often sought,
to
that
in broad outline,
explanations
of
the
and it is debated Mhether the similarities are
by imitation or through similar evolution.
explained
debate is,
is so similar
It
simple:
namely,
The ansMer
to
the
as Mill appear, both types of
mechanism have played a role.
There are,
as
a
main
contentions
so
hoMever,
contrasting
several reasons for Morking Mith Australian culture
case Mith American.
A lesser one is
that
if
regarding differences can be made good in =uch a case it Mill
much the easier Mhere more conspicuous differences occur.
But the aim
the
be
is
not to make a difficult argumentative task more difficult. Rather it is to try
207
This table, adapted from AMa
more discussion is given.
p.30,
14
is draMn from SteMart,
Mhere
much
�to
clear the May for a different philosophy and different political positions
in
Australia,
and
Pacific,
more comprehensively in the South
than
those
slavishly adopted from the North, to clear the May for political arrangements,
grounded in the elements of local culture, Mhich are more benign, both to
the
environment and to other cultures, than those imported from the North.
in several respects,
Australia is,
named from Europe the
Antipodes,
a
(bordered
the north by the Hallace line).
There is some prospect that this region
21
a meaningful sense.
That in turn encourages the
Mill become nuclear-free,in
or be induced in the
faint hope that other socio-political changes may occur,
- a
region
notably
moving
aMay from the dangerous and
nuclear
poMer
and nuclear Meapons.
independence comes from the USA.
Antipodean
exploitative
main
The
damaging pattern,
(and
significant
and
perhaps
this
The USA Mould impose significant
generally it aims to include the region under its
that
to
opposition
components of its Mar system, including nuclear Meapons,
more
attitudes
so Mell exemplified in technological things nuclear,
of the North,
practices
If
includes
Mhich
biological and geophysical region of the South Pacific
distinctive
in
region
inexact
rather
the most important component of that
capitalist
is
already Mell established,
the main) resistance
upon the region; and
to
broken,
be
eventually
must
hegemony.
come
from
Australia.
countries
Smaller
have
resisted
Marships;
first Vanuatu and recently,
genuinely
nuclear-free
suit.
And
politically
21.
if
and
the
the imposition
environmentally
American
initiative is
deeper,
to
Australia
broaden
tied to a more
nuclear
NeM Zealand. If a
more significantly,
South Pacific is to emerge,
nuclear-free
of
must
into
profound
folloM
something
regional
This is just one reason Mhy the recent fashion of trying to count
Australia as part of Asia, Mhich it is not, or as Mithin the (excessively
large) Asian-Pacific region, Mhich it analytically is, should be
resisted.
No doubt looking at the larger region is convenient for
economic and some defence purposes, for trade and aid;
but it is narroM
economically-focussed,
nation-state thinking,
Mhich discounts huge
geographical, biological and cultural differences.
15
�independence
and
then
militarism,
leaders.
Australia
the
Hence
free
self-reliance,
from
of
components
the
must not merely follow,
but be there
interest in American/Australian
cultural
American
Mith
the
differences,
especially those relevant to socio-political divergence.
The
main
cultural groupings of the Antipodean region can
be
developed
from the following diagram:
Aboriginal peoples
Australian
Polynesian
Melanesi an
Anglophi1e
Main
Colonial
Powers
/////
Francophi1e
poli tical1y
entirely
dominated
Poli tical1y
subordinate
Largely
independent
politically*
The independence struggle continues in NeM Caledonia Cohere it Mill
probably succeed soon) and in West Papua (Mhere there appears little
prospect of success against the Javanese without outside support).
The
situation in Fiji is complicated as a result of the colonially-organised
immigration of East Indians (so typical a legacy of British control).
%
Apart from the Indonesian intrusion, there is American penetration
Samoa, and the French remain, most notably in Society Islands.
There
are
Antipodes,
Zealand).
tMO
essentially
major
independent
Melanesian and Anglo-Australasian (i.e. White
in
the
Australian and
NeM
groupings
The latter is the important group from the point of vieM of present
for the usual politico-economic reasons: comparative
change in the Antipodes,
numbers, poMer, influence, Meal th, resources, etc.
cultural features matter,
be
cultural
in
obtained
significantly,
in
such
a
It is Mi th this group that
and Mill make a difference, assuming difference can
May.
For
Melanesian
culture
for the most part in the right sorts of Mays,
American culture.
16
already
differs,
from mainstream
�Though
culture.
already
features
distinctive
language suggests).
with
in
Antipodean
origins and attitudes can be enhanced,
varying
carefully
and
from
and extended to change
away
can
(like
continuing
those of sweet
powerful
Northern
Perhaps
by
directions
of
insensitivity.
intellectual and educational factors,
evolution
influenced,
away
Perhaps that movement
Northern barbarism and socio-environmental
cultural
observable
European
Cultural evolution is proceeding, perhaps with considerable pace (as
situation
European
from
are
there
stock,
the
the peoples of Australasia now consist predominantly of
pea
the
evolution)
forces,
now
suitably
be
predominantly
and multinationalisation, not merely resisted but turned to
22
advantaoe.
Among the questions which immediately arise, but which
Americanisation
local
remain insufficiently
investigated,
life.
are those concerning the interaction
How do
intellectual
cultural
and
culture?
Conversely, what impact do the cultural shifts
intellectual
elements
of
influence
- whatever they are,
a fundamental matter * have on intellectual life, especially in areas that lie
23
at the heart of such life, namely ideological orientation and philosophy?
A
special case,
from which this exercise began, is that where the philosophy is
environmental philosophy,
and
to
the
environment.
where the orientation concerns attitudes to
An
initial question resulting
differential effect of Antipodean culture,
or of the
is:
what
nature
is
the
distinctive elements in
22.
Often these Northern forces are presented as those of internationalism,
which is taken to be desirable. But ask what African, or Latin American,
or even Russian components these forces reflect, and what centres these
forces emanate from, and the extent of internationalism and mix of
nations and companies involved, will become clearer. Certainly there are
desirable qualities in internationalism, but these seem to be displayed
on the faces of internationalism least often observed or paraded.
23.
It is difficult to gauge how much philosophical and speculative concerns
matter to more ordinary people.
In a direct way, not very much, one is
inclined to say; yet ideological themes, like technological changes
deriving from the advance of science, heavily influence them and even perhaps
control the main structure of their lives.
As Keynes wrote in a much
quoted passage, 'Practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt
from any intellectual influences, are usually slaves of some defunct
economist' - or more likely philosopher or shaman (for the fuller quotation,
see Heilbroner, p.12).
17
�24
it, upon attitudes and approach to the environment?
Answers
relations
Mill
be prised out by contrasting differences in attitudes
so far as they can be
to the environment,
Antipodeans Mith those of Northerners.
of attitudes,
set
still
a
discerned,
clearly
even among dominant cultural groups,
in the North.
After
there
Asia,
contrast in attitudes to the natural Morld betMeen
marked
of
there is not a uniform
firstly,
in the usual May the immense complication of
aside
setting
But,
and
the
is
Old
Horld and the NeM Horld. In the Old Horld there Mas and still is comparatively
and practically none for
little feel for the natural environment,
or the need for it or the desirability of it.
Milderness
Unsurprisingly, these attitudes
are ideologically underpinned, in particular by ancient chauvinistic themes as
to
the locus of all value in humans (and,
by more modern,
equally defective,
formerly,
in Mhat they image) and
themes forged in the Enlightenment,
that
superiority is manifested through independence of the natural Morld,
cultural
especially independence of the vagaries of climate and natural plant
25
groMth.
It is not that Europe, by contrast Mith the Antipodes, is entirely
and
devoid
of natural environment,
that there is no natural environment left
in
USSR, say, but that most of it is remote and that the culturally dominant part
of
the
primarily
Soviet
in
community does not live anyMhere near,
the
vicinity
of HoscoM,
environment as of any value for itself,
The
elements
and
does
not
but in
the
cities,
regard
the
natural
but only as a means,
of deeper ecological approaches,
instrumentally.
like the hazards
of
tobacco
smoking and industrial pollution, are not Mell knoMn or Midely advertised in
26
USSR
or the Eastern European block generally - though Eastern European
countries contain much of the least ecologically disturbed of European lands.
24.
And the converse is equally important:
the impact of local environments
on the cultures?
Approaches to the environment are an important
component of culture, more so than such obvious manifestations of culture
as literature (see beloM).
25.
For details of such Enlightenment tests of cultural
intimately
bound
to
the overarching
ideals
Perfectibility, see Berry p.14.
18
superiority, tests
of
Progress
and
�Of course the Old Horld cannot,
environmentally.
European-based
some
Environmental
IUCN
environmentalism.
And
be entirely set
organisations
(such
aside
as
the
and the British National Trust) have been operating
for
time,
considerable
and could never,
and
movements
and
have
influence
an
had
on
Australasian
people in Europe concerned
there have long been
Mi th
happenings in the NeMer Horld, especially the nearest part of it, Africa. But
27
for
the
most part the spirit of European culture
remains
antienvironmental:
there Mas,
and for the most part still is (though things
changing Mi th green movements and parties),
for,
the
natural
environment,
as
little interest in,
gardening
and
more recently plantation forestry.
cultures''
other
exploitation,
such
and
opposed to the managed
environment in Mhich the Mealthier took an interest,
they
e.g.
little
through
for
feel
manipulated
landscape
As for other places'
fit
are
and
plunder
and
at least Mas the dominant attitude and the practice
(and
environments,
Mell
the practice persists at best thinly disguised,
Mere
though no longer uncontested:
Japanese enterprise in the Pacific).
So in Mhat folloMs Old Norld,
28
European approaches
are mostly left out of vieM: the spotlight shifts to the
consider
neMer-fangled North American attitudes, Mhich are hoMever intertMined Mi th Old
Norld sentiments.
The
most
substantial,
most
articulate,
and still
by
far
the
best
26.
(From previous page) In the period folloMing the Russian revolution until
the rise of Stalin, there Mas considerable, if shalloM, concern among
Russian scientists as to the environment (see Neiner). Like much else in
Russian society this rather elitist concern Mas actively discouraged. At
a more popular level environmental concern noM loses out to elements of
economism.
''In a country Mhere the glory of technology and the glitter
of economic groMth still radiate so seductively, radical environmental
protection does not have much of a chance even Mi th the best of
intentions'' (Haren-Grisebach, quoted in Capra and Spretnak, p.78).
27.
Exceptions such as Hill's life-style, for one, represents are exceptions,
and very conspicuous as a result.
28.
These approaches form, of course, the main stock of the disastrous
environmental heritage that Mas sloMly adapted and is still being adapted
in the NeM Morld. The stronger environmental components emerged from the
Northern
European heritage,
not the Latin or Southern
European
inheritance. This is evident too from the Meakness of environmentalism in
Latin America.
19
�documented
past and
And it is uith the situation in North America,
America.
environment
contrast
America
movements are those,
environmental
there
the
adopted,
This is a further major
the other end of the cultural contrast being
as
North
the attitudes to the
that ue best look for contrasts,
Antipodean scene.
of
present,
ue
that
reason
for
developed,
best
taking
and
as
select representative of the industrial North.
ue dig doun to the details of the cultural differences that
Before
to
differing
attitudes in the Antipodes - difference that could
accentuated - there are,
should
come first,
and then junked,
determinism.
rubbish).
are those that some uill think
since they could render much of uhat follous
the issues surrounding determinism,
be
differences
have been brought out (issues uhich can then be throun out uith the
Among the issues postponed,
readily
preliminary issues to be dealt uith, and
as aluays,
issues to be postponed until the substantive cultural
other
yet
lead
of technological,
irrelevant:
economic, and cultural
for example, uere correct,
If Marx's technological determinism,
multitude of productive forces accessible to men determines the
29
nature of society',
then there uould be little scope for a distinct culture
'the
that
or distinctive attitudes to the environment in
the
Antipodes,
the productive forces accessible are supplied from the
can only remain,
of
as it mainly is,
North.
since most of
The Antipodes
predominantly derivative. But the evidence
cultural divergence from the North assembled in uhat follous uill afford a
base on uhich to argue that such deterministic themes are false, that cultural
30
divergence is occurring (and could be accelerated).
And this is happening
though
much,
the economic life by uhich such cultural things are supported is
too
much,
under the influence of the North;
though (under present governments) the
prospects
indeed it is
very
happening
of economic and much higher
cultural independence are bleak (unless, e.g., nuclear disaster befalls us).
2?.
Seiected Horks 1:
31 d.
20
�In
free
some parts of intellectual life,
it is comparatively easy
the heavy influence of the North,
of
for regional intellectual life to
One of these areas is philosophy, especially more narrowly
prosper.
(the
philosophy
sort
break
to
of thing that tends to go
in
on
somewhat
academic
insulated
academies). Academic philosophy is easy, because a few people can do that. For
cultural differentiation, by contrast, ideas have to affect whole communities,
Philosophical ideas can be
to be absorbed and acted upon and in accord with.
like
bubbles
one
community life.
and
positions
with in an office
plays
In any case,
on-going
or
cell,
not
affecting
wider
there undoubtedly are distinctive philosophical
philosophical research projects
in
Australia
(see
For other academic areas, especially those with an empirical base
Prospects).
relying on high technology,
it is more difficult to obtain such independence.
For different reasons, there is also, as with high technology, little prospect
of
This
attaining a full distinctive or independent high culture in the Antipodes.
is partly because the human
people,
deal
at less than 20
million
is (fortunately) too small and widely distributed to support a
in
comprises.
30.
population base,
the
way
of such artifice as parts of
high
It is also because such high culture is,
culture
and
great
substantially
remains,
primarily
(From previous page) Determinism may be pushed into one or other of these
forms: i) it asserts some sort of necessity. Then it is falsified by the
real possibility of alternative technological choices, for instance. Or
ii) it is only contingently true. Then the phenomena of sub-cultures and
rival social cultures refutes it: see Cotgrove.
Technological determinism neglects major causative factors in change,
such as environmental factors. The land or resource base is almost as
important as the technology available, in lower technology societies more
important, so land determinism is at least as plausible as technological
determinism - which helps to show that neither are plausible. But both
can be combined into a broader economic determinism, which is much more
difficult to refute. However even if economics is very broadly construed,
such determinism is false. Economics operates within a framework of moral
and legal and other constraints; many choices - moral, legal and other which affect change significantly fall outside that framework.
Technological determinism and other forms of determinism are important in
bolstering the uniformity of human nature and culture assumptions, or at
least the theme of the convergence of culture with the spread of Hestern
technology and mainstream economics. So its falsity is also important.
21
�31
a European product.
attitudes to the environment, though definitely an important -feature of a
are not part of high culture. Nor do they fit easily into
culture,
but
culture":
"loiter
the
most
been
part,
HoMever
differentiation.
of
the
Mhere attitudes to the environment have not,
for
again is largely because the
that
cultures is a European one,
as
regarded
Mherever
a
significant
division
feature
of
cultural
such attitudes fit - it Mill probably
harm to see them as part of a broader loMer culture,
little
so-called
and at the
same
time help to erode the erroneous idea that interest in natural environment
an
elitist class concern - they tie directly Mith elements of culture at
do
is
the
loMer end.
At the loMer cultural level there are very distinctive features - some of
admittedly
them
features
are
can
gambling,
common
found in many colonies,
and
just
perhaps
be
in the different attitudes of Antipodeans to the
included such things - and attitudes
environment.
- as
them
these
religion,
time, service, etc. Nearer the grass-roots level there is a
Momen,
culture
to
colonial
Some of
- Mhich separate Australasian from Northern culture.
reflected
Here
those
in
Australia
snd
NeM
Zealand
Mith
distinctive
feature^
reflected in folk lore, folksong and myth (not all of them admirable, e.g. the
treatment
of indigenous people,
organised
sports.
Yet
Antipodean cultures,
authoritarianism,
that
there
and of Momen),
are also differences betMeen
differences in pace,
these
tMo
main
religious orientation, ethnic mix,
conservatism, political organisation, values
are sometimes hard to pin doMn precisely.
all-important fact that part of Australia,
31.
and in the mania for similar
There is,
- differences
for instance,
by contrast Mith NeM Zealand
the
(but
It can be argued that philosophy and other intellectual enterprises are
also. This is not so. Philosophy in Asia - from Mhere indigenous
Antipodean people apparently originated - predates that in the Nest.
There are, moreover, grounds for suspecting that the roots of
philosophy Mere imported into the Nest, to Ancient Greece, from India.
AnyMay, every full culture includes an ideology and some rudiments at
least of philosophy.
22
�in Eastern USA),
places
like
Mas settled as a penal
appear to colour many of the differential features of the
origins
culture.
On
the
other
Islanders
is
noM
introducing Polynesian
language,
concepts and attitudes) into NeM Zealand culture,
quite
The
colony.
corresponds
in
side,
increasing presence of
the
strands
Though
Australia.
Australian
Maori
and
elements
of
the
(especially
convict
to Mhich nothing
concentrates
Mhat. folloMS
on
mainstream Australian culture and its contrast Mith American,
much of Mhat is
observed for Australia can be seen to extend to NeM Zealand.
But not all
more conspicuous differences at least Mill be remarked.
any means:
One major difference,
rest
the
of
by
Antipodes,
in
Australia,
hard to miss,
concerns
Mhich separates Australia from
of
the nature
the
environment
itself.
contrast Mith the islands of the remainder of
striking
the
the
Antipodes, is in the first place, vast - approximately the size of continental
USA
or
again
paradigmatically
of
Europe
(including
contrasted Northern
Eastern
Europe),
i.e.
It is also,
regions.
not a geologically neMer mountainous country.
flat land,
from the eastern seaboard and a feM other favoured areas,
of
the
main
an old Morn-doMn
And it
apart
is,
a dry to arid land,
predominantly treeless, a Mide red and grey land, Mith unusual inhabitants. It
is
still seen by Northerners as a harsh and difficult land,
alien and
often
ugly (formerly it Mas also an incomplete and Godless land); and this is hoM it
is
frequently vieMed also by NeM Zealanders.
landscape
and
is,
much
more
to superficial appearance,
congenial
to
from
people
NeM
The much modified
Zealand
much more like the European North,
the
North.
Correlatively,
population of NeM Zealand tends to look
32
more to the North, to England in particular, than that of Australia.
established
European-descended
Australians are often imagined to partake of the land,
earthiness.
promoted
32^
Certainly
image
of the
the
much
its harshness and
corresponding features have been assigned to the muchAustralian-Man-of-the-Land,
Thus, for example, the
ansMers back to London.
tough,
legal appeal frameMorks in NeM
23
tall
and
slim,
Zealand
still
�bronzed, sun and time lined, a stockman or at least a horseman. But so far the
is not so different from that of the Texan (if they spoke,
image
Nor of course is this image of the people at all accurate.
distinguish them).
are mainly (almost 90X) suburban,
Australians
would
that
them 1iving
more than half of
in one of the two huge urban conglomerates , centred on Sydney and Melbourne,
33
The men are often soft, if brown in summer,
on the milder east coast.
increasingly resemble counterparts
in
Hhile there are certainly important features
of
and they
the western American cities.
convergence
technological-economic
for
of
features
the
land
here
determinism
and
pattern,
Thus,
is of some importance in helping
the history
of
its
the
also
network.
communication
and
transport
i t has much 1 ess relevance for
the convergence;
there is
deriving from a similar or common settlement
and
framework
economic
North America to bring out,
from
divergence
(
and Mi th little experience of the
from excess beer consumption,
overweight
account
divergence,
settlement
where
land-based
(a
determinism, so to misleadingly say) are much more important.
overlapping history,
An
part
of
especially of California and the
south-eastern
transforms
(regions which can easily be seen as ecological
of
one
in the convergence:
another),
analogous
frontier
experience,
only
there is not
but there are the miners who
came
in
the
from
there are
major differences:-
of
from
the
Australasia had no Spanish experience,
and the conf 1ic ts
American settlers with the natives were very different
the
compar i son
hostilities
in
Australia or
wars
in
New
Zealand.
character
in
Still,
the
with California avoids complicating features of US history with no
substan ti al analogue in Australia, e.g. the puritanical religious settlements,
the
slave experience and the civil war.
33.
In New Zealand the compact countryside is much more densely settled than
most of Australia, but the population is again mostly suburban (a perfect
target for television) and small town, and is (at about 86X) more urban
than USA.
24
However California is
not
entirely
�but often regarded even in America as something of an anomaly
typical of USA,
(and certainly as much more experimental, cult-ridden, etc., than say the more
conformist Midwest or South).
there are significant cultural differences between
While
especially eastern USA,
USA,
there are also, then,
Australia
and
powerful forces at work
eroding those differences. The differences are already such that extrapolation
Australia of US experience and experiments in socio-political areas can be
to
unreliable, and is strictly illegitimate. For it is evident enough that, where
cultures differ sufficiently, transfer or extrapolation from one to the
may
be
unjustified.
conveniently ignored,
cultural respects.
been
seen
with
What
often
has
not
been
so that damaging
clarity,
have not
agricultural
forestry
to
cutting,
control
Australia.
Examples
burning,
differences
in the people,
have been simply
(clear
and intensive agricultural methods
(heavy
extensive use of herbicides,
machinery,
its
practices
are intensive
etc.)
and
North America with
generally better soils and more favourable rainfall regimes,
imported
been
has
even in the land,
which can be got away with more easily in
practices,
else
is that America and Australia do differ considerably in
Surprisingly the differences,
any
or
seen,
other
forestry
So it is even more with
etc.).
the
which are perhaps harder to see than those in the
1 and.
The differences carry over to differences in social and political theory,
and
differences
significant
unlikely
includes
directions
to
minarchism
arrangements;
Whitehead's
related
generally
in
in American
philosophy and ideology.
34
philosophy , for example,
obtain responsive chords or much following
individualistic,
as
more
(or
right-leaning
competitive
libertarianism),
anti-social
and
in
for
There
are
which
are
Australia.
which
Australian
This
too
is
social
but it also includes religious-based organic philosophies, such
later philosophy (which is scarcely known in
transcendental philosophies of nature,
25
Australia)
which are much too
and
religious
�for secular Australian culture.
3.
Grimy details of the cultural contrast
problem
it
that
hard
is
There is of course the inevitable
that
to say much about culture
qualified and even then still subject to counterexamples.
is
Also it is hard
test hypotheses, and confirm observations, of the type involved.
much
point
in
heavily
not
even such impressionistic accounts and theory as
to
Yet there is
follows, in
particular for the intended social and political applications.
main
The
socioloqy.
method
Though
it
adopted
is
is
what
might
be
marshmallow sociology,
called
like
impression i st i c
marshmallow
it
has
substance. And it is different from and an improvement upon pop sociology. For
firstly
it backed and cross-checked,
tighter data;
anecdotal,
and,
where it can be,
other
secondly, it is assembled into a theory. It is not merely
then, in two major respects. However, it does not pretend to offer
better than tendency or trend statements;
(atypical)
by surveys and
exceptions.
But
to any generalisation there will be
that's alright.
That is the stuff
of
improved
common knowledge. The aim of course is to fit these trend generalisations into
a better story,
To
avoid
contrasts
strictly
such
into a theoretical structure,
repeated
and tiresome qualification
which can then be put to work.
of
claims,
comparisons
are however stated in bolder form than the evidence or their
bases
Often a qualifying functor should be taken as implicit
in
Even then there is constant danger of lapsing into naivety
or
warrant.
claims.
and
mere caricature in this wide and difficult sociological landscape.
34.
(From previous page) Perhaps the more original directions in an imperial
culture not exactly distinguished by its intellectual originality (as
opposed to its technological genius), especially given its resources. For
unless times have changed since the Second Horld Har, there are no
American philosophers of really great stature. Whatever one may think of
Santayana and Hhitehead, they were not really American philosophers, much
of their work being done within a European setting and a good deal in
Europe. Emerson was not strictly a philosopher. James, though clever and
entertaining, was a lightweight (by Greek standards), so presumably was
Dewey. Perhaps the erratic and eccentric Peirce affords the exception
that
proves the rule.
But the salient point is that
American
civilization, like Roman civilization with which it invites comparison,
has
not attained the intellectual heights that might have
been
anticipated, given the colossal material base.
24
�present
The
rests there,
focus
unexpected
in
to
and
these
out
bring
have to go doMn
other
differences
trying
Although
contrast
upon features of environmental
differences,
socio-political
inter 1aced
preferably
some
of
between environmentalism in Australia and North America.
contrasts
one
investigation greM from the discovery
Mel1,
as
and
first,
of environmentalism in Australia by comparison even Mith North
America.
But
at points of deep ideological difference, ue soon and
by beginning elsewhere,
easily diverge into many other - sometimes relevant, sometimes more trifling features of the broader cultures, before returning at the end to environmental
contrasts.
the resulting investigation Manders through and over a Mi de and
Although
no kind of completeness is sought;
varied cultural landscape,
grander
edifices of the built cultural 1andscape
1ibraries,
35
outside.
the
larger
obiiquely,
- art
many
galleries,
of
the
museums,
and so on - are not entered or even glanced at from the
theatres,
as these structures of higher culture are typically clustered
only touch attitudes to
they
cities,
by contrast Mith religion,
Mhich,
the
natural
in
environment
Mhatever main Western form
it
assumes, has tended to dictate and enforce a shalloM human chauvinism.
a.
The influence
and decline of,
religion. There is considerable basis for
the all-important theme that "Australia [is] best understood as a (the
post-Christian
(O"Farrell,
society,
p.3).
in
Although
Mhich religion [is] barely relevant
theme
this
requires
first)
culturally"
qualification,
virtually any cultural generalisation (and gets qualified in its
source),
like
it
is not far from the mark. Australian
religions
suspicious of the Mider culture - and both to a more intense degree
than elseMhere" (p.7).
35.
On the historical place of some of these edifices in Australian culture,
see issues of Australian Cultural History.
27
�Though 'there is much evidence for thinking that Australian
is becoming more secular in character',
The
phenomenon.
decline
Christianity
the weakness of religion is not a new
from a comparatively low level
began
of
popular
commitment;
'Australian churches have never been able to claim the allegiance
36
of more than a minority of the people.
In
basis)
Australia
religious
declined
has
August 3).
Nationwide,
from
attendance (on more than
33Xtol8-19Xover
the
a
merely
past
feu
to Australians
Sundays
religious
USA,
the
in
(a
resident
receding
gospel).
tending
sometimes
(ABC,
feature
The religious
to straight nuttiness,
not only in sizeable
in USA,
of Australian
presence on television (e.g.
10 channels have a
years
In Europe religious attendance is much?higher, 50X or
more, and in North America higher still, sometimes put at 60X.
fervour
occasional
life),
church
is evident
turn-outs
on
but especially in the
in a not atypical major city 3 out of
heavy religious component,
substantial portions of it hot
The born-again Christian movement - a major (and dangerous) movement
in USA involving not merely a shift back to older Christian values but also to
the
far political right - has had comparatively little flow-on in
This
religious
publicity,
these
revivals,
have
Australia.
emphasized
old
36.
The quotations are from Inglis, p.72 and p.73 respectively. The second
quote reports the only thorough study of early religious practice in
Australi a.
37.
figures from William Grey.
Such figures
are
very
Unconfirmed
Part
of
this
is
due
to
'the
reluctance
of
people
to
be
con troversi al
the
census
form,
about
their
indifference
or
hostility
to
candid, on
In
one
study
less
than
SOX
of
those
claiming
affiliation
religion'.
'could give any details at all of what takes place at Church' (Inglis,
Actual fiqures for religious behaviour (e.g. saying
p.45 and p.46).
grace, reading bible, etc.) in Australia are also 'extremely low'.
Regularly, however, there is news of a religious revival in Austra la.
But it like frequent news of the rise in value of the Australian dollar.
Having fallen not so long ago from an exchange value of US$1.12 to, on
occasions, less than $0.60, it has now risen from 63 cents to 65 cents.
'Revivalism ... has been a normal part of Protestant evangelism here for
more than a century: but there has never been any solid evidence that it
shifted for long the boundary between the Church and the world (Inglis,
p.74)
28
�contradictions.
There are serious tensions, to say the least, in the American
(characteristically
religious commitment
combine
Jewish) Mith acquisitive individualism and its trappings.
peaples have Mitnessed the incompatibility (cf.
Melanesi an
Lini).
that conspicuous
at tenders do not have a serious or very deep religious
redistribution
Christian
dedicated minority.
is
the
commitment,
and the like being undertaken only by a very
smal1
But an alternative suggestion Mhich also has some backing
there is a cultural schizophrenia:
that
of
resolution takes the line that most
obvious
or
and
Many colonised
missionised
An
Christian
there are
separate
salvations,
religious and acquisitive economic.
The
religious
differences
between
USA
Australia
and
originate
in
important differences in the May the tMO colonies Mere first settled, the type
their backgrounds and their commitments,
of people,
more
conversion
But there is
The differences have been enhanced Mith the mass 20th
to it than that.
century
and so on.
to
in
science,
Australia
a
doMn-to-earth,
very
naturalistic, evolutionary science, incompatible Mith spiritual elements.
resistance to religion in Austral a is a resistance to
The
general 1y
spirituality
The only religion that has had or made
(including idealism).
much
impact is Christianity (its more recent role being due in considerable part to
practices).
immigration
That
impact moreover is slight compared Mith
North
America: the reborn Christian movement did not roll through Australia, leaving
converts
everyMhere.
Attitudes
to
religion
and
spirituality
Australian society not only from North American but also from
separate
the, in certain
respects more conservative, NeM Zealand society.
Attitudes to spirituality are directly reflected in Australian philosophy
and
in
attitudes to the environment.
A predominant
position
and
research
program, in Australian philosophy is materialism, in a strongly reductionistic
form.
The
that nature.
natural Morld studied by physical science is all;
In fact man is but an advanced
2?
man is part
of
sort of computing system, and so
�at
Hind is effectively identified Mith
bottom a naturally-evolved "machine".
brain,
mental
of
product
Australian
states
being brain states (of
sophisticated
"Miring" and programming.
materialism is opposed,
religiously
or
some
sort),
Even Mhere
crude
this
rival minority positions are
spiritually involved;
a
consciousness
mostly
Mhile they are rather more opposed
not
to
reductionism, they are mostly secular.
dominant materialist reductionist
The
philosophy reflects
touches
and
in
other
several
the
broader sense, and a certain earthiness: the Australian male is a man from and
of
secondari1y.
famous
tie
so to speak,
the earth,
Attitudes to,
and,
in the North (though someMhat unjustly,
only
as Mill become apparent),
the environment.
by
traditional
Western religions;
fortunate
so the
do
chauvinism
human
For
and male chauvinism are analogous phenomena Mith similar sources;
38
They are
attitudes and patterns of domination go Mith them.
supported
figure
for Mhich Australia is
and oppression of Momen,
more directly to attitudes to
Momen
as in much mythology,
similarly
decline
of
is of paramount importance in their demise.
The
direc tion
most important for
more
5"/
environmental
thinking has
taken.
A
contrast
main
American environmental thought is in the
the
betMeen
religious/spiritual
componen t of the latter, but not the former. Deeper environmental positions in
USA
are much
more inclined to find
39
things,
to make room for the sacred,
Buddh i sm
and
spiritual
to
consider
Certainly
other
dimensions
in
natural
sympathetically
Zen
things
not
these
are
absent from the Australian scene, especially from parts of the North
40
scene , but they lack the prominence in Australian
environmentalism
33.
that they attain in North America;
As ecofeminism has stressed.
Earlier cu1tures in the Antipodes, e.g.
Polynesian, also display conspicuous chauvinism, Once again culture is to
be resisted as Mell as used.
30
�regarded as essential.
then,
In many respects,
been
ideas,
and
often
that
is,
Mi th class chauvinisms.
outsiders,
partial
characteristically linked Mith sets of false
have
religions
damaging
the decline of religion is to be Melcomed.
Mi th
For
very
and
nonsubscribers
marked intolerance for
But the decline can
leave
or
a
a place
vacuum,
imported science;
and i t has in Australia.
The vacuum is hardly being filled
in a satisfactory May, as
The
for
areligious
character of Australian life has important
culture and change.
For it means that one of the main
implications
institutions
of
induction (namely church, family, and school), Mhich normally inculcate social
cultural values and Morld vieM,
norms,
many
in
the
of
influence
are largely untouched
Church and religion.
by
the
critical
historically
really
But the situation is
or
missing
seriously
Meakened.
There is no longer
respected elders - except in isolated and specialised areas,
even
such as
that technical or professional field - and
emphasis
on
youth tells against much deference or many concessions to
of
the
sort
made in more traditional or
Coupled Mi th this is the decline of the family,
39.
Third
the
heavy
Horld
of
experts
or
people
more
frameMork
a
this
in
is,
and disturbing. For other traditional components of induction are
remarkable,
also
society
That
is substantially missing.
cultural
older
communities.
Mhich has certainly lost much
(From previous page) Thus, for example, virtually all the books Nash
mentions (in 82) as "defining the emerging field" of environmental
ethics, if not overtly religious, have a heavy religious bias: indeed
Nash mentions "the
tendency to emphasize the religious nature of
man-environment relations".
deep ecology is spiritual in its every essence"; so say, accurately
enough, Capra and Spretnak (p.53) , in the course of reporting on "the
spiri tual aspects of [German] green politics " and continuing their
(pp.53-6)
German
German-Amer i can
this account
comparisons.
On
religiosity
of
American
environmentalism.
environmental ism shares the
40.
(From previous page) Or from Patrick Hhite"s approach.
But he is
inclined to bring God in Mays that leave many thinking Australians
uncomfortable. Hhat there is, Mhich is different, is a groMing link Mith
features of aboriginal culture.
31
�of
former
its
and cohesiveness.
strength
accordingly falls on
education,
The
main
of
burden
such as communicational media,
induction
most notably
But these arrangements are hardly adequate for the purpose (for
41
descriptive-style
reasons).
Nor given their
ideological
messages,
television.
especially
in
the
case
of manipulate popular media
like
television
and
popular song and newspapers, are they desirable means.
This situation, the failure or weakness of main institutions of induction
and the high adjustibility and manipulability of the remainder, has advantages
as
in very different ways,
happen
of
Changes
Australia
fairly
perhaps
But
directly from the top down.
For
culture,
a
example,
can
be
shift
of
to a much more violent society could be pulled off by a combination
conservative
governments
and their police forces
and
friends
few
There is copious evidence however,
control
the
induced
or imposed changes tend to take decidedly undesirable directions
matters
that matter:
main media.
reliance andthe like.
civil liberties,
independence from
New Zealand,
children
against
that
the
Alternatively, change can be achieved at a
level, at least for significant subcultures,
of
it
liberating.
perhaps
damaging,
which have a residual basis in the
this sort,
accomplished
of
society,
change in such a society can be accomplished quite rapidly.
cultural
can
For compared with a traditional more stable
well as drawbacks.
by direct action.
who
top-down
North,
for
self-
grass roots
In the case of
consider the effect of massive withdrawal by parents and schools
from competitive sport,
rugby especially (initially in
racially-implicated rugby policies),
and the immersion
of
protest
children
instead in very different types of games.
It
influence
is around this difference in religiosity,
and its marked decline
in
in Australia, that many other cultural contrasts between mainstream
American and Australian societies revolve. However only so much can be made of
the difference; it is by no means a total explanation of the contrasts, as the
41.
See e.g. Illich, especially Deschoolinq Society.
�with
situation
New Zealand culture helps show.
For mainstream New
Zealand
culture otherwise differs from American'culture in many of the ways Australian
does.
The
b.
benign
Vt
qoverment,
(market)
/v
To North Americans the amount of government, and
superficial
organisation and regulation.
of government,
level
of
role
and state control,
the
State:
Australia (and even more in New
in
Zealand) is very conspicuous, and often irksome. 'Australia has a higher level
of
planning than the United States but less than
state
country
France'
as
(Hi Id,
p.39).
Hild
goes
on
such
of
Australia
- a
government,
they find government much
and
upon
remark
to
pervasiveness of rigid bureaucratic organisation' in Australia.
suspicious
centralised
a
'the
Americans are
too
powerful
feature locals are sometimes prepared to acknowledge,
but
in
do
little about, despite much right-leaning media incitement.
Indeed government and its supporting bureaucracy are increasing in power,
size
and
in Australia.
influence
extent of public inquiries,
the
acclaimed
'Australian talent for
even
Western standards,
procedures,
incompatible
bias is written in,
approaches
objectives.
Nor
There
are
policy-determining
For they
are
top-down
a heavy
with bottom-up democratic control;
value
a conservative bias from the judicial system in the
Royal Commissions;
confrontational
intended
e.g.
For
equivalents
of increasing length and real cost.
not much asked in Australia.
questions
of
organization.
questions about these forms of "fact"-finding and
procedure^,
case
and
are large numbers of Royal Commissions and their
there
serious
bureaucracy'
and
This is part of
Royal Commissions and the like.
example,
by
numbers
So also are the associated
the
and
in
methods
Commissions)
employed
(e.g.
are commonly unsuited
are fundamental questions about
forms and procedures of government,
adversarial,
the
for
the
established
which are often raised in USA, much asked
in Australia.
Australia
was
fortunate
to have determined at
33
time
of
Federation
a
�respresentative democratic system,
Mhich Mas,
by the standards of the times,
very sophisticated, and capable of reflecting minority positions * not that it
been used sufficiently for these purposes by most minorities.
has
of
mass-production
update
electronic computing equipment,
it is
noM
federal and state electoral arrangements,
Australian
the
Mith
feasible
to have a
to
more
direct democracy Mith more pluralistic and responsive representation; but such
a change is politically unlikely, improvements in the directness and pluralism
The only changes
of democracy having obtained little public discussion even.
mooted
have
anachronistic simplifications of electoral arrangements (such
are
occurred
of
direction
Mhere
some
and
reasons,
Mhere
money
minorities
a
plays
little
have
major role in
political
the
federal
impact
determining
or
gets
Mho
(For a catalogue of major deficiency of US capaitalistic
and so on.
democracy,
several
US,
the
representation,
elected,
in
in NeM Zealand) Mhich Mould take Australia
as
valuable suggestions for
electoral
arrangements
improvement,
being
one,
smaller
For
OD).
see
population,
another, government remains much more accessible and responsive (e.g. to small
represenations) in Australia than USA,
group
influenced
by
If the unfortunate American
42
folloMed hoMever, much of that Mill change
Connected
the
attitude
America
seem
Mith differences in attitude to goverment are
servants of the government.
are looked doMn upon:
immediately
to
path
is
differences
in
professional lobbying.
to
admit to having.
The civil servants
it is the sort of job one may not,
By contrast,
more
Mhich by contrast is much
the public servants in
be held in considerable esteem (and some among the
taller
in
North
does
not,
Australia
unlopped
43
poppies)
Mork
One source of the difference lies in the underlying attitudes
and service.
In USA the public sector isn't really considered
to
to
Mork
42.
Occasionally for the better. Australian government has much to learn yet
from American about openness and freedom of information.
43.
Hhat is shared betMeen North America and Australia is the attitude of
middle level people Morking for the government: often these people do not
like Morking for the government (even though it provides them Mith a very
comfortable 1iving).
34
�(because
it is outside the market system),
but constitutes a burden
on
the
private sector Mhich does Mork. Though there have been efforts to import these
of (erroneous) market assumptions into Australia,
sorts
they have not really
thriven.
In seemingly curious contrast Mith the respective attitudes taken to
public service,
there is contempt for specific politicians,
if
even
are the vieMS of the political and judicial systems.
there
is
the
In USA,
considerable
resDect for the political system: the constitution is virtually God-given, and
44
certainly something to be proud of and much superior to anything elseMhere.
In
Australia
is considerable cynicism about
there
it has little or no high authority and backing,
system;
judiciary
political
gerrymandering,
the reputation of
same holds as regards the judicial system:
the
and
the
favouritism, etc., are virtually expected and accepted features.
corruptness,
Huch
hoMever,
is
constantly
being
practice) in the Make of scandals.
propped
up
(Mith
unjustified
the
success
in
Both again contrast Mith attitudes to the
public service, Mhich Australians tend to consider relatively honest, and most
certainly not open to bribery on an Asian scale (thank you!).
There are significant (but significantly different)
both mainstream cultures over government:
all
cover
deeper,
the
branches equally;
then,
in Australia respect for the
of government does not penetrate very deep,
branches
tensions,
and certainly does
in USA respect for the
institutions
in
chief
not
goes
but does not cover the functionaries.
The American situation is the more easily explained, in outline at least.
In USA government is vieMed,
frameMork apparatus,
in principle, as a rather minimal regulating and
Mhich does not itself Mork,
but keeps the market system
Mhere
the real Mork is done Mell-oiled and suitably running,
other
capitalistic
44.
institutions
such
as private
property
and
guarantee^
and
individual
1^ recent decades, 'Americans continued to say that they Mere proud of
our system of goverment.
Their lack of confidence Mas clearly directed
at the people running those institutions' (Lipset and Schneider, p.16?).
35
�freedoms.
social
government has become too large,
But
expensive
services),
functionaries
parasitic
as
take the flack for that situation.
Big expensive
arrangements.
unproductive
government
is invidiously contrasted Mith market
Furthermore,
government
often operates,
and is seen operate in
organisations furthering their OMn interests and profits,
large
in
government
And
burden.
many of them accordingly parasites and seen
and employees,
looking out for themselves,
- a
overextended (specially
favour
of
the
whereas
market system, for all its basis in competitive self interest, does not bestow
great
A
favours.
extraordinary
markets:
in
political
America
mainstream
is
the market system bordering
on
and support systems
are
outside
or
operation
of
supported,
deplored.
The
feM
further
assumptions,
deductively justified through)
commitment to competitive individualism.
the
intimacy of regard and effort,
but
mainstream
American commitment to market arrangements is in turn explained by (and,
but
an
the
in
faith
arrangements taken to accompany free
brief the free-enterprise system is religiously
arrangements
by
explained
suspicion of any political arrangements stepping
a
capitalistic
the
beyond
to
commitment
and
system,
about
deal
Mith
cultural
the
The associated emphasis on Mork, and
Mhich accompany market euphoria,
can
be
explained, historically to some extent, by May of the originally difficult and
predominantly puritan settlement of America.
But such a genetic
explanation
is hardly complete; for largely gone, as no more than relics, are the forms of
early more democratic America,
the toMn meeting places and so on,
largely in
favour odf super-market places.
The American commitment to market procedures, and American enthusiasm for
market
d
lochte
methods,
does
not extend to mainstream
a distressing 'Australian distrust of markets'.
have found, underlying this
individualism,
an
Australia,
endorsement
distrust, a Marranted
Mhere
Americans
But Mhere they
rejection
of
might
competitive
they couple it,
not incorrectly, but more superficially, Mith
45
of egalitarianism'.
For market processes do redistribute
Meal th and Mhat goes Mith it, in very unequal fashion over the course of time,
36
�46
both
theory
allocation
market
and American experience attest.
processes
as
highly
desirable
Americans
given,
and
take
to
tend
to
regard
deviations from or interference in on-going market processes, such as a social
preference for equality, as (economically) asinine and certain irrational, and
as carrying an expensive price tag.
The
predominant American view is that the market i^ fair and
wise,
but
preceding quotes are
(From previous page) As Withers, from Mhom the tMO the emotional and
draMn,
remarks,
'as economists and Americans,
to elude them' ANU
intellectual basis and content of such vieMs seems
Reporter 16(6) (1985) 6.
46.
47.
Beginning in 1820 Mith a much more egalitarian society, USA experienced
many decades of increasingly inegalitarian income distribution; see
Williamson and Lindert.
most
Thus, for example, Caves and Krause, pp.400 1, also p.2, Mho for the
al 1
processes
(it
is
after
part simply assume the superiority of market
,
and
appeal
repeatedly
to
the
efficiency
of
economic conventional Misdom),
..
a
definition
of
market outcomes.
It is loaded efficiency, Mith
For
market
efficiency appropriately adjusted to market proces=e=.
minimize
arrangements are not particularly efficient
or to
on market externalities (such as environmental degradation)
maximize on other objectives (such as income fairness).
1 ou t
Extensions of these points apply against the usual arguments rolledOne of
t
of
market
procedures
everyMhere.
0..
for the imposition or dominance
to be Caves and Krause, namely 'the efficiency of
......................
, and
market and nonmarket allocation is open to empirical
test,
and so the
the
distrust of market outcomes should be subject to modification 1
that
evidence Marrants' (p.400).
The trouble Mith this is not merely
(p.400).
much depends on hoM "efficiency" is assessed; it
i. is
-- that empirical tests
ar" virtually never attempted, are difficult to ca<^ out in real-1 ife
situations (Mhere there are too many uncontrolled parameters , and Mhen
methods.
attempted do not deliver unequivocal results favouring marke
of market
So there is fall back to theoretical argument: the
C._ efficiency
„
That
is
true^
Mith
"efficiency"
given
^39**"
processes can be proved.
That is true, Mith "efficiency
P
but under highly restrictive conditions,
(externalities neglected, etc.)
such as perfect competition, Mhich are virtually never satisfied in
Caves
and Krause do recognise that frequent failure
actual conditions.
1
striking
conditions
of one of the more Sn
------- for
— market efficiency in . Australia
may account for local suspicion of markets, Mhich 'may arise natur
y
a oeographically isolated country in Mhich the actors are too f
ensure efficient Market cuties' (p.2: no doubt yet another
but Minor
econoMic reason for pushing for a larger huMan population
is to get Market actors up to competitive strength!)
However such
reasons "cannot really account for the suspicion of
population substantially unfaMiliar with conditions for Market adequacy.
tt is false then, what economists like Caves and Krause try o suggest
(e.g. p.400), that distrust of Markets has, except in special cases, no
economic foundations.
That May be Mainstream American economic wisdom,
but it hardly passes undisputed in many parts of the Morld.
37
�not the government;
1$?57
and 1977 held
"gives
everyone
a
for example,
... large majorities of national samples in
that the free-enterprise system is "fair and wise"
fair choice" (65/D,
(82Z),
and that it is a "fair and efficient
system" (63X)', whereas 'not only do large majorities (1980) believe that "the
government
is
themselves"
is
pretty
(78X),
much
run by a few
big
intereasts
out
looking
for
but also that "you cannot trust the government to do what
right" most of the time (73X)' (Lane,
p.3).
Lane's summary of
American
public attitudes does not extend to Australia:
the public tends to believe that the market system is a more fair
agent than the political system; people tend to include the problem
cases in the political domain and exclude them from the market; they
ignore many of the public benefits and, with certain exceptions,
prefer market goods to political goods; they prefer the market's
criteria of deserts to the polity's criteria of equality and need;
they believe that market procedures are more fair than political
procedures; and they are satisfied that they receive what they deserve
in the market but much less so in the polity, and by a different
measure, are much more satisfied with the general income distribution
among occupations than with the distribution of influence among social
groups in the polity (Lane p.7).
It is enough to reflect on Australian attitudes to wage determination,
security
and medicine,
and the like.
social
Australians are less inclined to
market rewards as fair returns for hard work,
see
and more inclined to see market
rewards as based on luck and chance as well as on performance in popular areas.
In USA,
Even where the market's methods are thought unfair to certain groups,
such as blacks and women, the intrusion of government into the sacred
precincts is regarded with hostility, for the government's program of
rectification trespasses on the evaluation of persons by the market's
process of "revealed contribution".
Hhere government purposes are
approved their implemtation is stifled, partly, at least, because the
government's
justice
norms
are discounted and
because
such
implementation
violated market justice
norms.
Thus,
minimal
government is assured and people are endowed with more commodities and
fewer collective goods (Lane, p.27).
In
Australia,
support,
active
by contrast,
respect and trust,
opposition.
Hhile
the market system does not enjoy this
level
of
but encounters especially in the area of labour,
small local markets (e.g.
fruit and
vegetables,
trash and trivia) are often well supported, the extension of markets into many
significant
spheres
of working and of moral life is
38
resisted.
Unions
and
�Mith extensive nonmarket social agendas, thrive, to
labour and other parties,
irritation of Northern-schooled economists and political scientists
the
diversion of resources, open-ended
regularly point to rent-seeking behaviour,
costs,
and
the
(Mho
zero-sum nature of governmental
redistribution
equity
and
measures).
a certain market distrust or indiffierence
Since
economic phenomenon in Australia,
government
functioning
and various related
claims
Mhat they notice, in particular,
assemble no evidence;
operations in many places Mhere
organised
important
as Mell as to its historical source.
claim,
is
an
it is Morth inquiring as to the evidence of
this phenomenon of 'pervasive distrust',
competition' (p.400),
appears
markets
could
reflect
('the design and scope of governmental policy and action
This
this distrust'), so they assume government interference or intervention.
is
once
again to assume,
erroneously,
that markets are the natural May
state alternative is
constitutes "interference".
contrived,
"rights"
for
or
instance
In
by
hoMever,
areas,
many
governmental
markets
vouchers or the like trade-Morthy items,
to
of
glimpsed)
have
introducing
regulations
be
function
to
be
special
at
all.
Frequently in Australia the government eventually acted in areas Mhere markets
had failed, e.g. in generating employment, adequate Mages, etc., or else Mhere
there
over
Mere no markets,
for instance in the secularisation of society to take
formerly carried on by religious organisations.
Given the
43
context and evolution , it is decidedly misleading to say that
functions
historical
choose at some cost the seemingly greater control of outcomes
that
government interference promises' (p.2).
(and is uniikely to be),
There Mas strictly no
no cost because there Mere no satisfactory
choice
markets,
and so no such government interference.
Australian Mariness of markets, and distaste for them in various socially
^.significant
areas,
had of course been observed much earlier (though not Mith
3?
�same level of disapproval as the Americans display).
the
It Mas part
a
of
long tradition of (predominantly nonmarxist) socialism, Mhich Mas coupled Mith
an
anti-economic
people.
open-handed
'Australians are a
They dislike refusing favours,
Hancock in a much quoted
(thus
costs'
stance and sentiments.
passage:
counting costs is not economic behaviour;
good-tempered,
and they do
e.g.
Connell
not
count
p.29).
nor are the nonmaximizing,
Not
take-a-
day-off, leisure-oriented features of the older culture.
Explaining
mainstream Australian ambivalence toMards government is
more
Given the anti
difficult than explaining the Mariness of market procedures.
authoritarian elements in the history of the country (e.g.the convict origins,
squatting),
bushranging,
strongly egalitarian attitudes and image presented,
the
given
Mhich are continued in the mainstream culture
government in Australia, and the
glamour
b^en
media figures),
supposed
importance:Each
and
of
ncreasing importance of politicians (Mho are
is someMhat surprising.
to lie in the lack of religiosity.
Firstly,
the poMer
and
Part of an explanation
There are tMO
and puritanism foster
Protestantism
points
has
of
49
individualism
every one of us has to ansMer for him or her-self (before
God,
or
48.
(From previous page) Australian history has arguably' shoMn a strong
preference for collective action, both Mhere there might have been
The early convict
markets to intervene in and Mhere there Mere none.
phase affords clear evidence of this, and the later nineteenth century
has !been characterised (by Butlin) as a period of 'colonial social ism'.
The early tMentieth century Mas the time Mhen the Antipodes served as; a
Hore recently , hoMever, the European
laboratory for social experiments,
II.
especial 1y since Nor Id Nar
industrial Morld has caught up,
(Australian public employment and expenditure Mere much higher than most
Western countries in the early post-Mar years, but to have not increased
nearly as much since: see Aitken).
Glenn Nithers made these points,
Mhich as he remarks gives a modified Brookings' vieM, as presented by
Caves and Krause some historical grounding.
49.
As does even the Catholic Church at times of reformation: perhaps Me are
entering a second reformation, as the Church of the Third Horld gets
transformed.
The same types of individualistic themes are also promoted
by Transcendental Meditation (e.g., the emphasis upon 'individuals taking
responsibility for shaping their OMn lives ', irrespective of their socio
economic circumstances; 'the effect of meditation itself is a strong
affirmation of our OMn poMer to affect our OMn lives and so accept
greater responsibility for our OMn level of Mellness': H. Southern, ANU
Reporter 16(5) ( 1985)).
40
�!.;.i h Qii! 9'-.- er) :
is supposedly responsible for his. or her
each
successes and failures,
own
lives,
their
additions! props and supports, such as welfare
etc.
and an elaborate social security system, are not required (or even desirable).
That religious basis tor individualism has been largely eroded or displaced in
Australia,
but
not
North
in
Rmerica where a
latent
puritanism
persists
(prohibition would never have survived in Australia).
the State serves as a substitute if not for the Maker at least
Secondly,
for organised religion or for the Church (in a society strongly influenced
'The functions and power of the state in Australia have come to
Catholicism).
take
over,
O'Farrell,
bx
and
p.7).
displace,
the
'Reliance
on
social
the
activities of
religion''
state has increased to
the
(to
adapt
extent
of
significant erosion of former religious-oriented areas: in charity, hospital=,
a whole gamut of social and psychological services and counselling work ,
and
above all in education (there are, to take one striking
50
example, no strictly private Australasian universities ).
h-= miqhf hav .idd^d,
But the religious explanation is not entirety plausible.
For one thing,
the substitution argument has been used to explain too many '-lu^ely
phenomena:
patriotism.
UBR,
where
phenomena
50.
not
just
the
Nationalism
power
of government,
but
nationalism
also
and patriotism are however at least very strong
no corresponding substitution is assumed.
supposed 1y
connected
explained
appear
almost
as
And in fact
old
as
the
all
and
in
the
allegoric
features of
The reasons for this are complex;
the
1 ack of a
Australasian society taken up below: anti-intellectualism
lack
of
wealth
philanthropic tradition, egalitarianism, and the relative
and
grant
endowmen
t
,
and super-rich capitalist.
On the philanthrophic,
have
.norm
situation
for culture in Australia (to which norm
things
early
substantially reverted following the high-cultural heydays of the
70s), see McLeod, p.2ff.
4!
�can be.
substituting
extent
In addition,
t
the religous explanation covers
which the State has deliberately extended its power and
to
up
the
displaced
rival social structures, thereby undermining community- and self-reliance.
For these reasons a different two-part hypothesis wi1 } be preferred which
is
State
The hypothesis is that
the religious explanation as one part.
includes
progressively
and
organisation
displacing
society,
and
arrangements,
social
local
that what religious
and
the
community
organisations
had
supplied were many community arrangements; especially in health and education,
'n
fact
m economic and political science
(.especially
other
conflation of the State with society
the
decision
social
arrangements:
arrangements
making
is
nowadays
especially
literature),
compared
are
ubiquitious
wi th
it is virtual!y always the state versus the market,
when
market
Mith other
social arrangements'and mechanisms collapsed into the state.
is much less opposition and resistance to the encroachment of
There
where as emphasized
Australia than in USA,
in
state
an
pathetic) faith m market alternatives persists.
rather
reactive)
state
encroachement
egalitarian measures;
for
welfare
and
but often it is promoted for sectional advantage from a
this reason,
for
cand
Sometimes (typically
supported
state (hence the view of the milch-cow state,
hand-out
Partly
in Australia is
unquestioned
the
remarked by Hancock).
the impression still comes strongly
through
that,
despite the growing power of the State, respect for government and politicians
does not run deep in Australian society,
would
do
distaste
no
harm
and could, easily be
were legendary Australian disrespect
for
dislodged.
It
authority
and
for tall poppies directed against political leaders and
government,
so at least that both are regarded more critically.
The
society
surprisingly
rule-bound
and
uncritical
fits with attitudes to government,
character
of
Australian
and again traces back to colonial
origins. H heavy-handed government was something people got accustomed to, and
also relied upon and reacted against,
42
early on in Australia. For example, 'in
�1/-98
government of New South Hates
th?
authoritative to a high degree' (Within,
was
omnipresent,
centralised,
p.22).
And, owing especially to/the
cost of what is much more evident in USA, ! oca! government).
society
apparent!'/ more rule-bound than North American,
is
and
prolonged strikes are much more common in the antipodes.
But although the
as
things
such
To some extent
this
can be seen as a further reflection of rules: trade union laws are stronger in
the Antipodes and unions less repressed.
on the State has meant (excess) toleration of the State and
Reliance
governments, and hence the condoning of much corruption in
branches (e.g. pot ice and prison systems).
than
European
(except by occasional journalists)
government and its
Australian attitudes are more like
m the way corruption is
umerican
North
of
hidden
and allowed to pass.
from
gaze
This is not to imply
that corruption is more extensive than in USA * it is almost certainly less
-
but that it is viewed and treated differently.
The
ugly
underlying
face of the State,
private property,
capitalism:
laissez fairs,
security and violence.
for
advanced
Despite the minima!,
view of the State prevalent m the USA,
The US State has a very extensive,
different.
and conditions
''?ry
the practice is
and crucial role in providing
the conditions + or advanced capitalism both at home and abroad. At home, there
are two main factors, maintenance of capitalistic institutions such as private
property and ailing big business, and interna! security.
In
USA
contrast,
in
property
are
private property has taken on an almost sacred
Australia,
much
restrictions on (in principle)
more extensive,
accept further restrictions and the "erosion" of private
for
example,
equivalent.
is
built
entirely on leasehold land;
Much
rural
land
important
in
leasehold
categories.
establishing
was
unfettered
and there is much more
leasehold,
parks and reserves,
something
is
which
and a good deal
to
Lanberra,
Ameri_an
no
Nuch "freehold" rural land is under various
43
private
preparedness
property.
there
By
character
has
proved
remains
is
types
of
si^y^
�* a ] [ rfi e s te .-g. police -st n d-pr i s o n * s y-s^omsJ——Fm-str^lian...attitudes are more li-^e
North
than
European
in the way corruption is
American
and allowed to pass.
(except\by occasional journalists)
hidden
gaze
from
to imply
This is n
tainly less
that corrup^ixpn is more extensive than in USf) * it is almost c
that it is viewed and treated differently.
private property,
capitali^m:
laissez
face of the State,
underlying
The
t in the USR,
tensive,
The US State has a v
different.
advanced
Despite the minimal,
security and X'iolence.
view of the^^ate preval
fairs,
for
and conditions
the practice is very
and crucial role in providing
both at home and abroad. Rt home, there
the conditions for advanced capit
are two main factors, maintenance of capitalistic institutions such as private
and internal secur i ty.
property and
!
In
s taken on an al
USR
contrast,
in
property
are
st sacred
restrictions on (in principi^)
ia,
more extensive,
restrictions and the "erosion" of private
ortant
a,*tc,n 1 rl
51.
in
built
entirely on leasehold land;
Much
rural
land
establishing
was
leasehold,
parks and reserves,
there
something
preparedness
rty.
is
catMuch ""Treel)ol*d——r-uraJ—Land—Ls—under various
to
Canberra,
American
proved
which
and a good deal
By
private
unfettered
and there is much m
is
character.51
remai
ty
The origin of the institution is much clearer that its .justification.
French constitutional and cultural influence undoubtedly contributed to
the situation that has arisen; but even the French have observed the
'private affluence and public squalor' of much of US of
Fortunately,
however,
USf^ has retained some zones of public land which on French
perception would be private, e.g. beaches, where in the French world it
may be necessary to rent a spot to sit down.
Hhile the guaranteed accumulation of capital is essential to capitalism
and to acquisitiveness, the accumulation of property and a comprehensive
institution of property is not necessary for competitive (as distinct
from acquisitive) individualism.
The reason is simply that competition
may
be
differently motivated than by acquisitivism or
material
accumulation, e.g. for status, honour, pure perfectionism, etc. However
material accumulation can most certainly foster competition (since
cakes are limited); and the Hestern competitive drive would surely be
much dampened were the ability to accumulate material rewards and
property reduced.
�zoning restraints,
etc.
orders,
And
-tor example, environmental preservation, tree preservation
rural land is regulated by
all
virtually
local
Pasture
Protection Boards, Mhich can authorise removal or destruction of noxious Meeds
or species, by
organisations Mhich
bushfire
require
can
fire
restriction
practices, by Mater and soil conservation authorities, and so on. Fortunately,
some
of
Scandinavian
52
regulation Mhich in effect requires the exploitative use of forested land.
hoM<=ver,
the
have
controls
private, corporate and public, are a very visible
Security arrangements,
and
not taken the direction
feature of American social arrangements. In USA the police
53
is highly conspicuous to Antipodeans.
(In this respect the place
expensive
presence
resembles Eastern block countries much more than less uptight parts of Hestern
Accompanying
Europe.)
precautions.
(Among
the
an extraordinarily high
is
this
most
guarded
places
in
level
Australia
of
security
are
American
installations: take a look at the US embassy in Canberra, or at Pine Gap.)
high level of police,
A
things,
different
for
and associated military presence,
first,
instance,
as
often,
can
reflect
repressive
and
unrepresentative political, regimes, or second, considerable social inequality
alonq Mith dubious legal methods of self-aggrandisement,
or third,
both (as
in Brasil). The USA is usually taken to be a relatively pure case of the
e.g.
second.
The
inequality
level
in
opportunity,
theory
of
the
etc.
a
of
security is presented as
society,
in the distribution
reflecting
of
private
level
of
property,
in
the
But it is not merely this: there is no associated accepted
person's
place,
as
in
class
or
culturally
stratified
societies, Mhich .justifies position in a social hierarchy, or Mhich .justifies,
52.
Of course Australian privatisation in turn leaves much to be desired by
Melanesian and Aboriginal standards.
53.
As a raM NeM Zealander, Mho greM up in a small toMn Mith only a couple of
policemen, I Mas astounded by the level of police activity in Meal thy and
laM-abiding Princeton. There Mere 3 standing sets of police in the toMn:
state, city, and university, and the federal force also had access. All
Mere armed: the situation Mas not merely astonishing, but alarming as
�for instance,
On the contrary, it is all too evident, in
continued poverty.
the
highly individualistic US society,
ha=
b<=*=n largely eroded,
role
Mhere sense of social place and
that there is no very sharp moral division
between
54
and illegal aggrandisement,
"legal"
between police and mafia,
etc.
(The
same phenomenon is developing in Australia, especially in NSH and Queensland.)
There
is
a
major reason Mhy the USA is not
another
pure
and
case,
that
concerns the significant level of repression.
The
security arrangements in USA operate to deal
internal
also
Mith
certain types of political dissent. There are substantial numbers of political
mainly black;
prisoners,
even so the number appears small compared Mi th many
of the Third Horld regimes USA supports (e.g. Indonesia to take a neighbouring
55
example)
. In Australia by comparison there are feM political prisoners
(though there are no doubt some,
some of
the
and have been conspicuous examples); hoMever
requisite legislation to detain such prisoners,
legally, is noM
in place, and should be removed before it can be used.
Hhether
or not the number of political prisoners in USA
of prisoners is not.
number
according
to ABC figures,
is
small,
in
There are huge numbers of prisoners
the
USA:
more than half a million people in gaol.
'As its
prison population increases at record rates, it has been estimated that the Uh
has
already
a larger percentage of its citizens behind bars than
nation except the Soviet Union and South Africa" (OD,
figures by means reflect the extent of the crime.
p.28).
any
other
fet the prison
There is an enormous crime
crime rate Mi th more than 5000 unsolved murders a year.
The
USA is,
Australia is not.
sheer,
54,
55.
increasingly since Horld Har II,
a
militarised
society;
The militarisation of the USA is not simply a matter of the
massive numbers (more than 2 million) of Americans in uniform, at home
As Veblen observed, early in the Century.
For Indonesia,
January l'?85/.
see
Amnesty
International.
Lf
s t r a 1 i an
Society
�and
hold doMn the
to
abroad,
and
enterprise
bureaucracy
business
and keep the Morld free (but
empire
It is a matter also of
interests).
and research devoted to
military
heavily militarised Keynesianism) have
(of
USR,
though
not nearly as many as might be expected;
they
have
mainstream
support,
these
the
critics within
sadly it appears
reflect
and to that extent
Ub
industry,
Certainly
objectives.
arrangements
the
for
that
prevailing
the
cu1ture.
one of
in simple terms,
policy and practice is,
US
abroad,
international
capitalism
under US hegemony and of encouraging or
right-leaning
capitalism
in as many places
practice has worked Mell from
part
significant
Mith
militarily
"information",
installing
and education,
a
channelling
is
US domination
largely political and economic and
propaganda
The
feasible.
an American business viewpoint,
of the Morld surplus value into the USa.
maintained by a mix of methods,
together
as
promoting
military,
heavily backed
by
intelligence, security, and military operations.
like american religion,
US practices abroad thus exhibit,
set
of
double standards:
a rhetoric of freedom and
rights,
a remarkable
given
limited
practical realisation Mithin the USa, coupled Mith activities quite opposed to
those ideals in many Third Horld countries.
The capitalistic and bureaucratic
control of the main media and educational outlets is such,
the
majority
perception
of
Americans
remain
largely
of US support of aggression,
sheltered
violence,
that
furthermore,
from
torture,
inconvenient
suppression
of
rights, and so on, abroad (points Mell documented in Chomsky and Herman.)
56
Hhile australia cannot, by and large, be convicted of such practices,
government
policies
activities.
States
malpractices,
56.
support,
find
it
and
remain
very
uncritical
expedient to turn a largely blind
and even atrocities,
of,
eye
of other "allied" or neighbouring
american
to
the
states
These are small-scale activities Mhich channel "aid" in fact beneficial
to military structures of adjacent countries, rather than to the local
peoples, as Mith aid to the Philippines.
�(witness australia's official approach, and aid packages, to Indonesia and the
Phi!ippines).
The
USa
is a particularly violent society,
directly
(in
several
torture
training),
Mays:
military
violence
and exports
practices,
intelligence
through example,
and also less directly,
both
operations,
through
media
coverage
and
the sooner
the
American
life-style ceases to be one to imitate and becomes one to avoid
and
scorn,
popular culture,
the better.
and so on.
From this angle,
The relative extent of violence in US life is Mell enough
'On the average death by homocide is eight
illustrated by homocide rates:
to
nine times more likely in the US than in other advanced industrial states ^OD,
It is even more strikingly revealed by comparative figures for
57
gun killings Mhere detail:s for 1980 are as folloMs:
hand-
p.27).
In
are
Australi a
UK, Canada
SMi tzer 1 and
USa
in
in
in
in
4
8
24
11,998
USa.,
part this is no doubt due to the vast numbers of hand-guns i n
not
used purely for deterrence :
hand-guns
countries
60 mi 11 ion in 1980.
are not available in the same free
they
to
felt
(presently)
are
ideological
difference:
be
required.
and
and
easy
is
there
Pacific
South
In
an
Mhich
May,
nor
important
Reagan's mainstream American vieM that 'the right to
carry arms shal1 not be infringed' is not shared in the South,
Mhere no
such
laMlessness
and
unqualified right is conceded.
The
differences
.just
in Meapon availability,
are
Australia
as a pioneering society,
the
of
American
vieM
of
in roughly the same position as parts
of
American Mest some (unspecific) time ago,
reasons
toting,
the reasons Mhy the common
violence,
some
gun
is
concern the organisation of the society,
seriously
astray.
Other
the extent of socialisation
and lack of key elements of a coMboy economy.
57.
Figures from a 1984 aBC documentary on violence in USa.
are given in 00, pp.28-'?.
4?
Similar figures
�.
Liberty, equality, fraternity - compared and updated.
Though conditions
of personal liberty in Australasia are rivalled in feM other places,
not,
in
marked
contrast
to
58
appropriate bills of rights.
examples
restricted;
USA,
guaranteed constitutionally
Furthermore,
they remain quite
they are
by
or
any
unnecessarily
are conditions on libel and the right to MithdraM one's
labour in Australia (and in NeM Zealand constraints on sexual freedom).
despite
serious
inadequacies in Australasian legal codification and
recognised poor performance areas as regards civil liberties,
Yet,
certain
it seems
clear
that the record of political repression and infringement of civil liberties in
59
USA is Morse.
There is also notably less tendency to self-censureship,
whether
in the Mork-place or in social life,
than in North America.
in Australia (and NeM
Zealand)
Australians tend to be open and speak their minds
on
things.
in several respects
Australian society is considerably more egalitarian,
(but especially wealth and treatment),
dominated
its
cultural
life.
supported^inequality in Britain.
than the Northern societies that
There is
conspicuous,
and
still
have
socially
There is very conspicuous inequality in USA,
most countries in the primary US "sphere
of
influence",
and
also
58.
In certain respects this lack of state guarantee matters only to the
legally inclined Mho Mant to see everything codified (it certainly
In part the lack of
matters less to the anarchistically inclined),
appropriate codification of rights and freedoms is due to poli t ical
inertia and the reluctance of government to concede rights^1 in part it
can be traced to a different heritage from the American, to
t_ {he British
The
trouble
is that there
system enlarging on an uncodified common laM.
______ _ of
_ common
__
are elements
laM, still having some force, Mhich are inimical
to various freedoms.
59.
Nhile it is difficult to impossible to document claims of this sort, some
quantitative impression can be gained by trying to match temporal1 stages
stages in
of political repression in USA, as assembled by Goldstein, Mith
<
Similarly
corresponding
lists
of
conspicuous
infringements
of
Australia.
civil
liberties
could
be
draMn
up.
But
even
if
this
arduous
recognised
there Mould remain many problems of
task Mere folloMed through,
especially
as
to
Mhat
extent population and concentration of
Mei gh t ing,
should
be
used
to
average
data, etc.
popu1 at i on
60.
This is part (but part only) of the alleged rudeness and crudeness
Australians Mhich repels refined Europeans.
On the self-censorship
American citizens, see Goldstein, p.556ff.
in
e.g.
of
of
�Central and Latin America.
The inequality is obvious to Australians, and even
It is confirmed in varying degrees, by
who visit major US cities.
Europeans,
a ranqe of statistics,
home ownership, extent of
as to wealth differentials,
poverty, etc.
inequality
Gross
is not only present in America,
throuoh the competitive individualism of the
underpinned,
blame:
to
herself
work will remove it.
Protestant
work
(such
approved
as
Poverty
culture.
the opportunities to avoid it are there,
or
individual
and
Thus inequality is justified ideologically in terms of a
strongly
and worth ethic and s
American
American inequality is not,
primarily
ideologically
A person in poverty has only himself
squalor are commonly deserved.
and
but is
and
social
philosophers
political
like that of Europe,
however,
suppl'-*'.
one of class, but
and of opportunities connected with this.
of wealth,
philosophy
individualistic
old
New and
money are equated.
A
it
and the extensive popular support
main source of American inequality,
seems
to enjoy,
widespread support for
is evident
fairly
unfettered
market processes and belief in market justice, and so (with further suppressed
assumpt i ons)
in
capi taiism.
American inegalitarianism is supported,
grossly
unequal
distribution
wealth
under
market-based
at a deeper level then,
—sttppor-fs—marke-t—ar^-angetwnts a&d the like,--- t4+e—the-mcc
individualism.
competitive
1 n ter*!
But
the
endor semen t
is far from clear,
some cur i ou s specu 1 ^Lc-n .
ex amp 1e,
much less egalitarian countrDes
it "Australian nationalism" w
it ha
for
een a matter
^en tied to nationalism; but
e explication circular).
And,
in
concerning the vigorous
= democratic values against an angl'-English themselve
,
and h
of
JSA) appear as nationalistic (to make
par t i a 1 opposi t i on to
ertion of k
source
e upper
These no longer tenable theses a
tw-eg di sp 1 i.ced-by a11-J Lh—an t i ^aut
class,
it is
t *.r i an , ttreme---- eta—th# fac
�h'./
wh.3.t
suppor ts
market
competitive
1 n teres ted
endorsement
arrangements and the 1 ike,
But
individualism.,
of egalitarianism'
some c u r 1 ou s speculation.
the
is far from clear,
For ex ample,
the
source
themes
self-
of
'Australia's
of
and has been a matter
for
it has been tied to nationali am $ but
much less egalitarian countries (such as UBA) appear as nationalistic (to make
And,
it "faustralian nationalism" would render the explication circular).
partial opposition to this,
has been pressed a thesis concerning the vigorous
assertion of Australia's democratic values against an anglophile upper
or against the English themselves.
said,
it
being displaced by another,
with
inconsistent
hierarchial
the
organisations
in
ihese no longer tenable theses are, it is
anti-authoritarian, theme - on the face of
extensive popular
as
class,
government
Antipodean
and
army
- as
for
support
to
such
'Australians
something said to be shown by their
-61
bad relations with the police.
No doubt element* of all these
collective dislike of higher au thor i ty',
undoubtedly
themes have historical relevance, and certainly Australian egalitarianism
So far as
deep historical roots'; but that does not explain why it persisted.
however,
it has persisted,
the
including
controlling
two-way
Australian
elites,
linkage
it appears to be due to a complex mix of factors,
anti-authoritarian
perhaps
causal) with the
orientation of the mainstream society,
Hancock
aptly
has
streak
particularly Northern ones.
(not
has
opposition
to
But more important is
the
and
fraternal
and
socialistic
what was 'colonial socialism
called 'socialism without doctrines' (.though
it
and what
is
not
really devoid of underlying ideas).
Not
convincing
61.
only
is
detail,
this explanation of
Australian
egalitarianism
short
on
but in its course it touches upon an interesting paradox,
These now unlikely explanations are brought together in
Connell z4.
Against
Hancock's
claim 'that egalitarianism and nationalism
are
"interwoven"', was
opposed the view of the 'democratic
masses ...
defining themselves against the Anglophile upper class'
(p.34) and
Phillips' claim that 'allied to this rebellion against the English is a
vigorous asset* tion of democratic values' .
'he anti-authoritarian claim
is advanced by Connell himself.
Bad relations with and clashes with the
police are of course not uncommon elsewhere, including America.
�puzzle of Australian anti-authoritarianism - or authoritarianism
the
continues to vex discussion of the mainstream cutture.
there
there
other,
unnecessar11y
is
evident support for,
authoritarian
reliance upon^and
institutions,
such as
heavy-handed
of group size theory.
resist
the
about
complacency
"self-reliance",
most
But on
Australian
attempt wi11
gover nmen t
to
side,
For on the one
clear evidence of Australian antipathy to authority.
is
ujhich
by a difference
Roughly, individuals and small primary groups Mill tend
imposition by other individuals or small groups or
factions,
counter to large groups or attempt to
Australians Mill not
but
buck
the system.
To say that Australian society is more egalitarian than American, or than
British or French, is not however to say that the local myth of an egalitarian
society is Justified,
and some,
and perhaps extensive, poverty.
than m New Zealand),
appears
or that there are not conspicuous differences in wealth
There are (and on both <-ount= more
and the polarisation of income and wealth in
to be increasing (with inflation).
Even so the differences
the very rich and the poor are not nearly as marked,
63
numerous or ill-assisted as in USA.
In
62.
Australia
there
Australia
between
and the poor are not
is also a recognised cultural
drive
towards
so
more
The evidence is notjmere 1y historical and anecdotal, as Rigby shows. Nhat
Rigby demonstrateshs that English college students are 'significantly
more pro—authority' than Australian, 'with English students fa.V'juring
institutional authorities more strongly (p.41, p.46). Rigby's, results
also suggest that Australian radicals (at least among students) are more
opposed to authority than their English counterparts',
and
that
'attitudes towards the police are not anoma 1 ou s in Australian life ...
but fall consistently into a pattern of attitudes towards institutional
authority genera 11 y' (p.46).
Nh areas 'England has lor had J a tradition
of respect for ths police; in Australia the police are commonly viewed
with contempt, especially by the young
as previous studies have
confirmed (p.46) .
Note that authoritarian' is used throughout in itstandard dictionary senses of 'subservience to authority ,
placing
obedience to authority above persona! liberty' and not in the unfortuante
extensions (discussed by Rigby) made by Adorno in elaboration of the
"authoritarian personality".
Rigby explains the notion he is operating
with as 'the degree of approval or disapproval with which a person views
various institutional authorities' (p.42).
51
�equality,
manifested
poppies"
ta!!
or
striking!;/ in the proverbial procedure of "cutting dc.-jn
"tall timbers".
at
F'eop!e who excel,
in
!east
certain
respects such as intellectual or artistic ways, are strong!;/ disapproved of in
certain traditional social groups,
poms,
are
and,
like know-alls,
cut down to size if it can be done.
But this levelling is b;/ no
for instance in sport,
means general!;/ applied locally to outstanding people,
84
politics, and increasingly nowadays in business.
nowadays-
applied
fellow
sm a Iler
break",
a
63.
in the bigger cities is levelling
Even
up,
less
giving
regularly
the
-mall
though such aid appears to have been accepted practice
c omm u n i t i es,
along with
poufters and
wogs,
and h as con s i der ab1e basis in the
t_ u 1 t u r a 1
sympathy with the underdog' and more broadly in an
in
tradition,
intolerance of
(From previous page) There is much argument about the extent of equa!1ty
data organised by Rubenstein (especially Iable 1,
in Australia. ' But
the
meagre
spread of weal th in lustra! ia compared with d-A
p.26) reveals
Embury
and
Fodder 'conclude that although the distribution
and Britain.
Australia
is
far from egalitarian, it is no less so than a
of income in
as
Japan
and
rather more egalitarian than some of the
country such
world's most industrialised nation , notabty, USA, UK, Canada and Italy
They present as a. common finding in sociology that
the
(p. 122)
inequality of size distribution of family income compares favourably with
(p.l8-f.).
that of other countries' (p.188).
Aitkin, in the course of making
= e^cr'R] points of relevance regarding the equality and social welfare
for more than 70 years
situation in Australia, is less cautiou:
Australia has enjoyed the benefits of a basic-wage system and an arbitral
method of settling industrial disputes which incidentally fixes wage and
salary rates.
Two consequences are that Austral ia (a.) has one of the
most equal distributions of income in the world [further references are
cited], and (b)
that there has been a floor under the wage system
throughout the twentieth century" (.pp.18-'?).
Reliable data pinning down the comparative extent of poverty in Australia
and USA faces further difficulties, in differences in the way poverty
lines are set, and because the Australian government fails to keep any
due records of poverty (%?ot always recognising it as a social problem?).
As a very rough rule of thumb,
however, poverty appears almost tw1cf a =
extensive in USu, in terms of percentage of population, as in Australia.
64.
It remains unclear where levelling down applies and where it is waived,
and perhaps there are no clear principles involved.
The criterion, if
any, is not what Caves and Krause suggest, that 'foreign recognition of
outstanding qualities of certain Australians somehow legitimizes those
persons and makes them acceptable at home (p.?).
'Justified levelling-down is a significant feature of the culture, that
will recur; for example, it is linked toAustalian anti-intellectualism,
and it is said to be motivated by the incompetence and typical corruption
of controlling elites.
�64
n nti).3 rLaj^z.----- Ff)—btrsi He = S .
i rtg 1 y
p.
nowadays
break",
a
up,
"giving
small
the
ce
though such aid appears to hav^
and has considerable basis in the
communities,
ma!I er
1evelling
in the b i ggerco
in
tradi tion,
culture
3 1 nnr^-L^Llhaih\hii th the under dog-—and mare- broad! y --i-rY—M' frYtc 1 oranco
65
oppression'' .
pressures
The
extent
greater equality are shown more
to
objectively
of party and political support for redistributative and like
which would lessen inequality.
in
the
measures
Such support, like the support for socialistic
is much more widespread and respectable
measures it is commonly coupled with,
in Australia than in North America.
The
reluctance
broadened
egalitarian
(nowadays
facade of Australasian life has been propped up by
also
declining,
especially
under
the
impact
the
of
a
immigration practice) of rich people to extravagantly display their
wealth (in vulgar European fashion).
Presumably the forces of egalitarianism,
though in part mythical,
explain this reticence to tout wealth and indulge in
66
conspicuous or wasteful consumption.
64.
It remains unclear where levelling down applies and where it is waived,
and perhaps there are no clear principles involved.
The criterion, if
any, is not what Caves and krause suggest, that foreign recognition of
outstanding qualities of certain Australians somehow legitimizes those
persons and makes them acceptable at home (p.2!) .
Qualified levelling-down is a significant feature of the culture, that
will recur; for example, it is linked to Austalian anti-intellectualism,
and it is said to be motivated by the incompetence and typical corruption
of controlling elites.
65.
These sorts of equality in justice. as they might be called, are
mentioned
in Connell 74,
who reminds us of the importance
of
distinguishing equality determinates, such as treatment, condition,
opportunity, and so on.
All these forms of equality are manifested to
some extent in Australia, whereas in UbA equality is more and more
restricted to a certain (but limited) equality of opportunity, along with
equality (in principle) before the law. The famous Australian equality
in treatment, approach and so on, is regularly illustrated by the
phenomena of tea and taxis, and in the (democratic) slogans that 'no-one
is (feels?) superior' and that 'one man is as good as another'
(cf.
p.2'?ff.) .
�But
males,
Australian
to (potential) mates.
Mhite
male-dominated
Evident blots on Australian egalitarianism
social arrangements.
prevailing in USA,
society.
decade,
doubt
It is little consolation that they are perhaps little Morse
.justified.
Altering
these
in
image
While the
of prevailing social arrangements as sexist and racist is no
criticism
those
Momen
and the situation changed considerably in the last
exaggerated,
are
Indeed Australia has a particularly bad
image in the North as a racist and male chauvinist society.
L-jas
Australian
notorious White Australian policy and the treatment of
former
the
egalitarianism has been restricted to
than
Mhich is also often attacked as a racist and sexist
Antipodean arrangements,
in a
fashion
for
Mhich
however there is little traditional basis in any cultures, offers the prospect
of
major changes in social and political arrangements,
other
matters
as peace and Mar (as feminists have explained,
such
especially
and as
in
opinion
po11s have c1 ear 1y indie a ted).
at
With the comparative male egalitarianism of Australasian societies g% a
lack
of
class
stratified
and
Mell
While
(there are professionals,
so forth),
appropriate
distinctions.
Australasian
society
of various sorts,
the important notion of c1 ass,
to the Antipodes.
undoubtedly
blue-collar Morker=,
like so many
enough in the North or at least in Europe,
is
classificatiun=
does not
extrapolate
There is practically no upper class and the
and Morking classes substantially merge,
middle
and there are virtually none of
the
significant social barriers (discussed^/ in Olson) that go Mith cla=r-, at lea = t
6^
(From previous page) This, and the comparative l ack of Meal th, may also
help to explain the paucity of grand mansions in the Australian
countryside.
Host grander mansions these days are built by fairly
recently arrived immigrants Mho have made their fortunes.
.67.
Similarly Marxist theory does not extrapolate Mell Mithout fundamental
overhaul. It is decidedly misleading to speak, as some do, of the rigid
class structure of rural society'* in Australia, Mhere all those spoken of
are land holders, often large landoMners. There are divisions, farmers
and graziers, poor graziers and rich graziers, and there is a rough
understood social order of landholders based on quality of property,
Mealth origin, time in district, social and political affiliations, etc.
But it is hardly a rigid order, and, more important, does not correspond
to Marxist (or other) classes.
�for sufficiently Mhite male Australians.
society
(another
diversity on conventional indicators than
less
shoM
the strata in Australian
Moreover,
in
USA
partly due to the much
but highly stratified society),
"classless."
those
smaller spread of Meal th and smaller population.
in
The conventional stratification picture leaves out an element of
variety
society Mhich may prove of much importance for social
change,
Australian
namely the growing phenomenon of Alternative Australia;
that is,
Mho
people
have dropped out of or moved out of the mainstream society and its concomitant
commitments to a Mork ethic, to materialism, to maintaining an approved social
standing, etc. (in short, have abandoned key elements of the dominant Northern
It
paradigm).
is not knoMn (and is impossible to estimate exactly) hoM many
people belong to this loose and vaguely defined grouping, but it is sometimes
88
very optimistically' put at several millions.
It certainly takes in the
extensive
netMorks
of
communes and alternative farms in
(Mith a main concentration in coastal northern NSN).
prices
is
(for that matter,
USA
rural
are much higher,
hoMever
takes
in
many in the Aboriginal population,
distinctive ethic grouping.
S3.
The grouping
in the cities;
though
land
Mhere
the squatters and many
beach people and others surviving largely on the dole
probably
Zealand,
and unemployment significantly loMer/^j
but includes
in
It appears unmatched
it is not matched in NeM
by no means rural,
Australia
eastern
they
of
the
and it
form
a
It is people from Alternative Australia Mho have
On the groups involved see Smith and Crossley, Cock and
especially
Sommerlad et.al.
To keep matters in perspective, it is important to
recall that these groups have been much influenced by analogous groups in
For instance,
USA and by a significant literature floMing from USA.
Morking
Capra and Spetnak estimate that the membership of 'groups
is over
Mith means and goals that are consistent Mith Green politics .
2 million'* (p.223);
(p.223) ; ^ith a base of that size (though still only about IX
Even more
of the population)^ Green America is far from negligible.
pr om i s i n g, '15 million adult Americans ... according to recent studies by
the research institute SRI International, are basing their lives fully or
par t i a11y on such values as frugality, human scale, seif-de termi nation,
HoMever partial
ecological aMareness and personal groMth'* (p.i?5) ,
basing on one such value may amount to little more than subscription to a
meditation or encounter group; and so the high figures may only reflect
Californian fashions.
54 5^
�played a major part in protest and action movements right around Australia, in
70
the forests of North Queensland, East Gippsland, and first at Terania Creek ,
by the dam sites in Tasmania,
at the uranium mines in South Australia, at the
American installation in Central Australia, ... ,
Though
points,
they
of
many
have broken Mith the dominant social paradigm
these peoples have tapped into elements of
independent Australian culture.
strongly
at
the
critical
continuing
They represent an important source
and, because of the May they connect Mith the older culture, they
for change,
can carry other parts of the established population Mith them.
As
equality
with
and liberty,
even
so,
more
so,
Mith
fraternity.
Mainstream Australian society certainly surpasses American in fraternity, Mith
fraternity
broadly' and
communi ty,
and
sec t i ons).
But liberty , equality, community , these are important virtues to
construed,
sexistly
elements
socialistic
(as
to
Mill duly
include
Mateship,
in
subsequent
appear
aim for, or even better to have already built into a society or state.
that is the sort of society French revolutionaries long envisaged,
sort
of
only
there
society that some of the founders intended to implant in
it
got
out
of control and
greM
in
different
and
Indeed
it is
the
America
dangerous
71
directions.
Australian
society is lucky to retain a solid
cultural
base
6'?.
(From previous page) The dole is the government-supplied unemployment
alloMance.
The dole undoubtedly finances a good deal of day-to-day
operations of Alternative Australia (as distinct from capital investment
in land and equipment), and to that extent its flourishing depends on a
subsidy from mainstream Australia. But it doesn't folloM that it is
parasitic, any more than infant industries Mhich are subsidised are
parasitic. Furthermore, it can be argued, Mith some justice, that
mainstream Australia has confiscated the main means of production for its
OMn ends and uses, and should pay rent for the resources and facilities.
70.
In the forest occupations,
Zea 1 artd Mere adap t ed.
71.
So it is astonishing that, on the basis of its economic performance,
American society is often presented as some sort of model for Australian
society to try to emulate.
A narroM economism,
Mhich measures
productivity through material goods turned out and, more important here,
quality of life basically through per capita GNP, and neglects liberty,
equality and fraternity, is at Mork here/— as it is at Mork in the ideal
developing nations are encouraged to pursue. It is a false ideal.
direct action methods earlier applied in
NeM
�from Mhich to reorient itself, to steer bac k t OM a r ds these traditional virtues
(as amended).
has diverged from its original ideals in large part because
America
ideological leaders have accepted or bought,
its
and most of the public have been
sold, an economic vieM of the Mor 1 d, Mith advanced man (and contemporary Moman
72
even more so) an economic animal .
The large assumption has been and
remains,
".free"
to repeat it in crude populist
form, that the operation of the
enterprise market system within a suitable democratic
framework
Mill
the other virtues, at least to the extent that they can be desirably
73
obtained,
in much the same (no hands) May that the market system guarantees
ensure
most efficient organisation.
The large assumption is false, as the American
74
experience has shoMn;
and it does not fail simply because of imperfections
in the American application of a perfect economic model.
Despite a massive promotional effort in Australia and NeM
both outside and many felloM-travellers Mithin,
the
.just
Zealand,
the American economic vieM of
Morld has not been Midely bought in Australia or NeM Zealand.
that it has been substantially rejected,
australia, but
cultural
tradition.
individual
that
tradition
it
in
in particular
runs counter to important
australia,
materialism
from
components
despite the earthy
It is not
alternative
by
of
materialism
competitive
the
main
of
that
individualism,
or
fixation on economic gain (as dialectical materialism reveals,
at
For
does not imply
least in theory).
72.
and thereby also a rational animal.
On this modern characterisation of
man, and rationality, see, e.g. abraham, chapter 1.
73.
For of course incentive musn't be removed by too much equality.
equality of opportunity, an important sort of equality, that the
enterprise system is supposed to deliver above all others.
74.
Nhat results is rather a society rich in go-getters, scoundrels and
cheats, many of Mhose main heroes, successful capitalists, remain .just
sufficiently on the right side of bent laMS, if that.
Consider,
seriously, e.q., Mhat is applauded in Heilbroner'*s celebration of the
rise of capitalism, in The Nor Idly F'h i 1 osopher s .
But
free
�Competitive individualism,
JoL
and the pace of life.
immensely individualistic,, and highly competitive.
American society
is
Australasian society
is
sufficiently individualistic, but less competitive and operates more on direct
cooperat i on.
Individualism
even more in economic and political
and
practiced
is a conspicuous feature of American arrangements, both as
theory
reinforces
Mhich
practice.
It is seen in competitive form in the American dream, Mhich has no
Australian
equivalent:
is
the
of
dream
manifestations Morth singling out,
Mi th the emphasis on individual salvation,
not reflected in Australia.
it,
Extreme individualism has
for instance,
and elevation of personages as heroes,
selection
making
individual
the
and so on.
in individual life-style,
financially,
other
it
in high culture
in fundamentalist
the
religion
in survivalism, a "movement" again
In USA the individual aims above all to excel; it
is the individual that is unique, Mho can make a difference on his or her OMn,
Mho succeeds.
things,
Individual reduction is very strong,
make
differences,
achieve.
It is individuals Mho do
support systems
The
make
that
such
achievement realisable, the structure and the other individuals, fade into the
background.
Individualism in North America is accordingly not merely methodological
Mith
reduction
of social and political arrangements
to
"individual" actors
in the form of nuclear families and nuclear firms),
(typically
interrelations, other than market exchange,
as can be managed.
implies that each such individual operates,
in large measure,
OMn ends, in an individual-first or individual-only fashion.
in
implies,
situations
of
limited
resources,
and
opportunities, severe competition betMeen individuals.
America certainly,
indeed
an
Australia),
and seemingly inevitably,
immense emphasis,
on
mechanisms
foster
5
Individuali sm
to his or
her
And that in turn
sought
positions
and
Individualism in North
involves competition.
Mhich is exported Morld Mide (and
that
Mith
competitiveness,
so
There is
includes
especially
those
�entrenched in mainstream economics, such as market competitiveness, and factor
competitiveness
active
environmental
America;
for employment,
(e.g.
movements
etc.).
promotion,
in
there is a difference in approach
is much more competitiveness within the
there
the
Even within
US
North
more
movements,
emphasis on leaders, less cooperation, than in Australasian groups.
resulting American-preferred picture of pure individual
The
competition
has however to be conspicuously qualified - rather more than minimally - since
the competitive mechanisms do not continue to function in optimal fashion,
even
market
system, which is not nearly as self-regulating as is often
requires
to
resources.
and
mechanisms.
As well,
etc.
But
purity
the
the
determine broad functions of
the
capitalist
lands
namely
democratic
within these supposedly necessary and desirable
republican
state,
You outshine
move,
change your friends to get ahead, etc.
sort of competitiveness isn't altogether approved of in Australia,
Zealand,
is
And yet another individualistic-type arrangement is required
or beat down your rivals,
New
and
state
such as private capital and private and state
constraints, competition is the avowed and encouraged objective.
in
free
pretended,
to ensure
defend and police the institutions within which
system operates,
select
to clear markets,
state,
and break coalitions and unions,
to
required
and
(capitalist)
the
competition
market
The
without organisational regulation and intervention.
at all,
or
where
the
American influence
is
weaker
That
still less
Polynesian
and
attitudes increasingly influential.
In
Australasia,
there
You do not do down mates.
mateship.
some of
is more cooperation,
with
fortunately not all extra-
friendships are superficial, and fortunately the rural tradition of
familial
neighbourliness,
net
disappeared
adequately
with
explained through
where
the
self-interest,
the advance of agribusiness (itself
significant cultural phenomenon in Australia).
also
coupled
Of course there is far more cooperation
in USA too than the ideology strictly allows for;
entirely
it
individualistic
ideology
does
a
has
far
not
less
There are many other respects
not
square
with
American
�For instance,
practice.
differs
the many places Mhere advanced corporate capitalism
earlier phases of capitalism,
from
in
demand,
producer-controlled
through organisation people, in burgeoning bureaucracies, and so on.
environmentally
very
significant,
by
dominated
cooperation
because they bear on (Mhat are
to present unsatisfactory socio-environmental
alternatives
society
Antipodean attitudes to competition and
different
The
competition is liable to give quite
are
seen
as)
arrangements.
A
weight
to
undue
competitive mechanisms (like the market system) and goals (such as achiever or
product maximization), and so to support a range of undesirable objectives and
practices,
as those exhibited in capitalist business
practice,
75
failure and so on, exhibited in short in contemporary America.
such
differences in lifestyle floM from the differences in
Hany
cooperative
not
friends,
forth.
neighbours,
Antipodean
In
materialistic
extent
acquaintances, Australasians do
to outstrip them in their consumption,
need
competitive-
Because they are not competing to the same
orientation.
Mith their colleagues,
market
material
success,
cultures there is not quite
so
and
the
same
pressure to consumerism (though there is certainly far more than enough) or to
conspicuous or Masteful consumption.
American
culture
consumption,
conspicuous
estimated
partly
in
acquisitive,
terms
of
especially
The competitive individualism of
explains the high levels
of
North
acquisitiveness,
the
the Mastefulness (the consumption and Maste can
throughput).
of
money.
American
culture
is
particularly
The incentive to obtain money is
more of this is always better, typically Mith no upper limit.
be
high;
Hence too there
is strong resource orientation, since resources can be converted into money.
75.
Theoretically the emphasis on competition shoMS up in the Meight assigned
to games such as the prisoners'' dilemma and tragedy-of-the-commons and
the May they are supposed to be taken.
Note hoM very important
differences in culture are for the treatment of these games; an example
is the corresponding children's game Mhich is played very differently by
American children (Mhere it jis competitive tussle) from Chinese children
(for Mhom cooperation affords a rather trivial solution).
�The relative lack of such enterprise and drive in Australia,
of less competitiveness,
the
and
helps explain the slow speed of technology transfer,
to
resistance, both of business and con*=umer =
76
Australia.
The relative lack of enterprise
comparative
in
technology
Northerners often claim,
to the Australian business
innovations' (Stretton,
Immigration
Department,
Mhich
'Australi an
community.
a special program
has
ex tends,
Such a view has been bougtrF by
p.35).
n ew
risk-averse, and stow to copy
capitalists are accused of being unadventurous,
others'
a corollary
attract
to
btj = in^ = -m^n (including Asian ones) and also businesswomen,
the
northern
because Australian
yy
business is lacking, it is. said, in enterpreneurial skills and drive.
The
pace
of
life is much slower in the Antipodes than
North
There are significant differences in time conceptualisation in the
deriving
Antipodes,
in part from the limited extent of industrialisation (wh i *- h tries to
people to be on t i me) and the weakness of c ompe t i t i on in daily
force
There is not the same pressure to get on,
workplace
much
America.
or to be at work,
on
living.
time.
and daily competition goes a race against the clocks (as overtly in
competitive
sport),
also
and
pace,
stress,
competitiveness goes a marked difference in pace,
etc.
Nith
American
with the most rapid pace in
the industrial East where the competition is most widespread and intense.
one moves south and west in US,
declines.
Zealand
Nith
and west from the centre in Canada,
As
the pace
But in Australia the pace is conspicuously slower still, and in New
78
noticably slower again.
Antipodean people are "laid back" by
American standards,
even if city people still seem in an immense rush, to get
nowhere much, to country visitors.
The slower pace is tied not just with !e==
76.
Features of Australian enterprise developed by the former Minister of
Science and technology, B. Jones, in his Sleepers Awake!. Jones, who i=
all in favour of having Australia convert to Northern business enterprise
and competitiveness, or worse the South Asian parody of it, is inclined
to ascribe Australian "failure" to a supposed separation of technology
and culture.
77.
The sooner this program is halted the better. Much the same applies to
recently renewed immigration programs to import more Europeans: for the
reasons see Birrell et. al.
�competitiveness,
but
standards,
threshold
often
a
with
more easy
going
acceptance
sometimes verging on sloppiness,
and evinced
of
letter
such
in
familiar slogans as "It'll do" or the famous She'll be right". The differences
taken up more theoretically in terms of maximization in
be
can
America,
as
opposed to much more widespread acceptance of "enough does" (of satisizing) in
the Antipodes (for details see MSS).
USA it's keep moving,
In
"commodity"
too
is
hustle.
"wasted"),
the
Time is short (even if much of
best
life
is
in
the
fastest
this
lane.
'I need to get back to the office, to be at my
7?
is what is much more often said than in Australia.
There is a clock
Punctuality
class'
is
important.
in/clock out attitude in North America,
fortunately
hasn't
industrious
and
been
widely
shared with Germany and Japan,
or enthusiastically
industrial Antipodes.
adopted
in
the
Nor has the associated American
which
less
go-
getting taken to any great extent.
The
much
Northern go-getter vanishes into a role.
more readily;
Northerners assume
people identify with their position.
In the
Antipodes
instance
much less role playing, people retain their more dimensions,
30
in their jobs.
This has an important corollary for ethics:
Northern
fashion for trying to explain a person's
there
is
roles
ethical position in
for
the
terms
73.
(From previous page) By New Zealand standards metropolitan Australians
are pushy (as well as commonly vulgar);
and for the New Zealand visitor
the very congested Sydney does, at first, acquaintance, appear to
instantiate the rat-race, especially the aggressive driving on the
narrow, crowded and polluted roads.
Harris gets down some of the other
felt
differences:
'New Zealanders regard Australians as flashy,
effusively patronising, as scruffy urchins playing Big Brother
(The
Austral i an, April 23-2'?, l'?85, Neekend Magazine, 5).
79.
Beinq 10 minutes o^f so late for appointments is common, and acceptable,
in Australia;
but not the hour or more some Latin American countries
allegedly tolerate (cf. Awa, p.3).
30.
Nhy there is less readiness to assume roles in the deep South, like the
reluctance of Australians to take deferential or service roles willingly,
is a bit puzzling.
For in mainstream Australian the society is less
individualistic, more social, and in apparently relevant respects less
conservative than American.
The problem is taken up again in the text.
c
�of
his
her
or
various
roles loses much of its
point
force
and
the
in
antipodes.
Role
is
occupation
actions,
responses,
intimately mith formality
coupled
dress,
and so forth.
of
fixity
and
In these matters a rough spectrum
can be observed, as shomn:-
australian
american
European
typical 1y
informal
typical 1y
formal
a
Such
range,
in
exhibited
both to mork
applies
mhich
such things as responses to
In some of these areas,
dress.
leisure
and
strangers,
such as dress,
is
activities,
customs,
and
manners
american culture displays
a
switching between extreme informality and formality, a
certain schizophrenia,
level
of
informality in mainstream australis has led to memorable sociological talk
of
phenomenon
also
seen
in certain trendier australian cults.
the peculiarly australian "culture of informality".
tells
aoainst
',-jell
in
angloph/ije
The extent of informality
the more artificial parts of higher culture mhich do not
australis,
outside
small
(but
sometimes
government
fare
sponsored)
minorities.
Role-regulation extends to person-to-person relations.
an
The
But here there is
interesting reversal of australian and american positions (on the
diagram
above), mith american relations being more flexible than australian (and these
more relaxed in turn than the more British and role-regulated relation^ in Mem
Zealand).
Hhile american approaches to human relations, as to adolescence and
education,
are increasingly influencing australian practices, ameri<-an= =till
more rapidly reach first name stages,
on;
they
details of their life histories, and =o
regularly converse mith strangers .juxtaposed on
invite m^re acquaintances into their houses,
and
more
friendly than australians,
americans tend to be much more open,
public
transport,
and for the most part are marm^r
Of course mhile both
australians
and
forthcoming, and initially friendly than
�Europeans,
are serious questions about the depth and dependability
there
of
many of these (and their) relationships.
The "easygoinoness" that Americans often find in the Antipodes is in part
due
the considerable informality and in part to
to
pace.
slower
the
The
societies are not after al 1 that easygoing in other respects, such as personal
and
relations, and they are not exactly Mell-knoMn for
race
toleration is increasing in Australia Mith the development of a
(though
and further stratified society,
multicultural
of factors,
climate,
strong
though
dying,
is
mix
as is the more leisurely sense of time. One obvious factor i s the
casual dress,
etc.
(Ireland being the European
1 and
encourages informality,
Mhich
inheritance
Irish
Another i s the
of
"Take
your
less submerged than in USf), is
)*
—f ocus on ttLij^gs-^ittpltasised Ml
pnpular
footbal1
Mork,
6
Irel and:
pol 11 les,
Borse
(as the n eMspaper s daily conf i rm).
pub conversation in Dublin;
Mork,
racialism,
more
The easygoing casual features are perhaps due to a
still far from dead^
topics
tolerance
their
an i sat i on,
so they are in Melbourne.
and socialism.
in
n approached in an
lie Mork and union Mork, Mhich are of
especially p
anitested
The s1OMer pace is
informal and rather casuaj^ May by Northern standards^y)(4 I
attitudes to Mork are par
Americans generally notice a 1 ack o
ervjce in the Ptntipodeans,
through indifference to positive r'.
often
astonished
ascribe
to
by
the service
class difference,
North
y illustrated by attitudes to service.
Correspondingly,
the
ranging doMn
Rntipodeans are
Mhich
North,
they
an ascription that\hardly applies in
often
America.
Part of the reason for,this difference lies in different attitudes to Mork, to
the
relative
source
desines and pressures to serve Mell;
these differences remains someMhat obscure.
On the one hand,
is suggested
don' t
that f^ntipj0c!eans in service can be rude because it's acceptable and
have to prove anything,
in particular to the person they're serving.
.
of
_____
On the
___ -
�popular
Australian
racing,
football
focus on things emphasised in
organisation,
Nork,
politics,
These are the
(as the newspapers daily* confirm).
topics of pub conversation m Dublin:
e.
Ireland:
horse
leading
so they are in He 1 bourne.
and socialism.
in
The slower pace is manifested
especially public work and union work, which are often approached in an
work,
informal
and
downright
rather
casual way by Northern standards,
lazy and sloppy fashion by most industrial
organisations or- "systems",
and sometimes
The
standards.
both public and private,
a
in
large
are regarded as open to
some exploitation (time out, free services, etc.) in a way that mates are not.
Attitudes to work are partly illustrated by attitudes to service.
Americans generally notice a lack of service in the An11podeans,
through mdifference'to positive rudeness.
often
astonished
ascribe
to
by
Correspondingly,
the service rendered in the
class difference,
North,
North
ranging down
Antipodeans are
which
they
an ascription that hardly applies in
often
America.
Part of the reason for this difference lies in different attitudes to work, to
the
relative
desires and pressures to serve well;
these differences remains somewhat obscure.
but the full
source
of
On the one hand, it is suggested
that Antipodeans m service can be rude because it*s acceptable and they don t
have to prove anything,
in particular to the person they're serving.
On the
other hand, it is suggested that there is a need in the Antipodes to emphasize
that
there are no strata differences (when there are),
not need to serve.
to show that they
do
On this less likely view Americans can serve because they
are equal, and see themselves as such.
A further element here is North American identification with the
or
the
thought
ladder.
firm:
the person who serves the firm may still often admit
'I might be president',
In
Australia,
or at least much further up the
by contrast with Japan and America,
appear to be the same "organisational feudalism".
but not vice versa.)
concern
to
the
competitive
there does
not
(In Australia, you owe me,
�siihpr hand, it i.i.snn<^e^t-ed^
a need in t]r= AntipDii^s- to<-emphj^M^-
trata differences (mhen there are) ,
there are no
to shom,^ttlat they
do
likely viem Americans,-can serve because they
see themse1ves as such.
fl \ur ther element here is North American identification mith the
or
concern
the person mho serves the firm may still often admit
the
or at least much further up the
ight be president',
thought
Australia,
1 adder.
appear fo'be t h $
the
to
competitive
there does
by contrast mith Japan and America,
not
,3 " nr nan i sat ion al feudJtJism".____ (In Aust rjJ-1-3-,—yiau—cm - -me,
.
e v?r sa t f
especially
Nork,
are
Britain''
and morking conditions and salaries
to a much greater extent by politically
controlled
Australia
blue collar mork,
in America.
than
(Nild,
p.50).
powerful
'Unionisation is high compared to
unions
and
American
Australian unions are mostly left-oriented
The
in
by
American standards, some of them so far to the left that they are strictly off
the
truncated
socially
American
spectrum.
political
They
are
by contrast mith the generally right-leaning US
committed,
and the US industrial-military complex.
union
situation
can
again
be
traced
Part of the reason for the
to
the
unions,
individual
support that strange advanced capitalistic mixture,
mhich
often
furthermore
ideology
of
values
American
competitive
individualism, but an important part lies in social selection, =tate-supported
repression of left-oriented unions (see Goldstein)..
The
Australian unions are,
politicised,
and,
by morld-standards,
by the same industrial standards,
very active and
extremely strike-prone.
They can serve as an important source of and aid to change.
of
the
Australian
environmental
things
prevent
unions
concerns.
extend
to
social
environmental
matters
For the interest=
and
sometime^
Australian unions have been very important in
as bans on uranium mining and shipments,
and heritage destruction,
highly
as mell as
to
=U'_h
in green ban=> to
patterns not emulated
(and
�mostly not wanted) in North America.
It has been suggested, but on slender grounds and by Americans, that such
as
action
green
undesirable
legal
heritage.
And
environmental or other.
important
redressing
for
like those concerning constitutional rights, in a
Mhile
the
in
difference
of
channels
action is,
to
access
Mithout
the
from
the
courts
doubt,
an
American
and
Australia and in NeM Zealand,
that
it cannot account for the differences.
the approved channels sufficient,
in
as many American failures make
many important cases,
to
extremely
difference betMeen the environmental situation in USA and
end,
Mith
The sources of this evidently
and constitutional inheritance
history
politically-approved
approach,
class action cannot be brought in the public interest
situation lie,
different
the
But the most that rings true in this is that,
minor recent exception,
to prevent vandalism,
of
militancy
and
strength
be accounted for by the relative weakness of 1ega1 means
environmental vandalism.
the
the
Mith
movement in Australia and its often confrontational
environmental
can
along
bans,
in
Nor are
in
plain:
there is no alternative but recourse
to
direct action, to the streets and forests.
Like
most
of the Australian unions and universities,
both Morkers
greenies (those active in environmental movements) remain influenced
sometimes inspired
by,
and
certainly linked by,
socialist
by,
ideals.
and
and
The=e
influences, overt in Australia, have largely been Miped out oygone underground
in USA,
being incompatible Mith advanced capitalism,
the American establishment.
as communistic inspired,
the
communist
politicians
can
folloMing
confusion of communism,
Indeed socialist themes are commonly disposed of
or as,
has been
and seen as inimical by
Mhat they are not, ..iust communism.
kicked,
regularly,
and
hard,
by
leads and encouragement from North America,
state socialism,
Although
Australian
a
simple
democratic socialism, and so on has
been made in Australia in the Midespread and crude May that has occurred
in
North America.
Socialism and a Mel fare state approach Mere adopted
long
ago in NeM Zealand (about the beginning of the Century) and only shortly later
�whereas there is little sign of their gaining much ground
in Australia,
no^.'
in North America.
even
Socialist principles are regarded w i t h suspicion even
except for a small minority.
bv more educated North Americans,
Right-leaning
attitudes have a prominence in US that they (rightly) do not enjoy
81
Australia.
In several respects, then, Reagan and his substitutes are
political
in
representative of the mass of America people.
The
double
(Christianity vs.
standards we have
seen
exhibited
American
in
economism) and foreign policy (rights vs.
religion
domination)
and
could have been displayed in trade policy (free enterprise abroad vs. American
82
subsidies and protection) and elsewhere
— contradictions engendered not by
mere
between
practice
and
ideologies
— extend
to^much acclaimed Amt erican
conflict
incompatib 1 e
pragmatism.
ideology
but
threaten ideological fundamentals are not tolerated;
"dangerous"
elements
of
p1ur a 1ism
and
These operate in an unambivalent way only in a narrow ran%e where
ideological fundamentals are not seriously threatened.
to
through
viens are often excluded,
more difficult times at least,
toleration is hardly remarkable,
Thus parties
thought
and foreigners
nith
while natives nith such views are,
83
suppressed.
While the Australian record
in
on
and the society was until recently mu<-h more
uniform in character than American,
the room for political variety and spread
of political parties is greater.
81.
They are reflected in such small things as. the form of anarchist
movements - always strongly individualistic in North America, but mostly
pluralistic and socialistic, and sometimes communistic in Australia.
Even Alternative American remains staunchly individualistic; only in the
quite minor US commune movement do the contrasts begin to break down a
bit.
The differences are important in political philosophy and theory,
where Americans and Antipodeans tend to operate on different wavelength?.
32.
Thus, for
instance, the
policy, which combines a
substantial subsidies and
produce.
83.
See again Goldstei,
for example.
narrow pluralism of capitalist
chapter of 00.
doubl/ standards of American agricultural
free enterprise image with allowance for
discounts #4, American, but not foreign,
Worthwhile proposals for widening the
democracy may be found in the final
�extent of toleration noM evident in Australia is not simply a result
The
of a strong British heritage (from an England that Mas) but OMes something
appear
markedly
multiple
the level of personal
features as Mell:- Firstly,
indigenous
roots,
in
is
in the industrial North
than
egalitarianism,
and
the
encouraged
by
a strong
to
tendency
of vieMS (an infuriating feature for
relativisation
(a
dielike
in the educational structure,
people,
overassertive
toleration
loMer
assertiveness
that
has
overbearing
and
feature
of
to
and so on).
personal
secondly,
in-group
or
teachers).
Ideological
argument and competition is avoided not so much by general pluralism of vieMS,
but by personal relativisation of positions (Mhich looks foolish at first Mith
questions such as God's existence, though not Mith matters of religious belief
and
political opinion).
action is not required.
as
lonq
But it noM looks (Mith
increasing
reorientation of the society and belated introduction of
cultural
methods into social discussion) as if
other
and
this sort of strategy succeeds only so
To be sure,
advance
to
an
- if
consensual
can
relativism
Australian
intellectually respectable pluralism
multi
Northern
control
perfni ts.
*F.
Leisure time activities, eating, drinking, sport and gambling.
retailing
and consumerism,
culture,
that
Australia is
the
it is here,
Americanisation
of
Apart from
in surface elements of more
significant
features
of
popular
life
in
most conspicuous, especially in food and entertainment, but also
in sport.
Take food, for example. American impact and control occurs primarily Mith
fast
foods (Mhere most of the larger chains are American) and in prepared and
highly
processed foods (Mhere many of the companies involved,
larger
biscuit
and snack food companies,
concerns having been bought out.)
ready
are
ultimately
e.g.
all
American,
Significant features of these products
the
local
are
or immediate gratification from largely already-made or -prepared mass-
produced items,
Mith consumer attractiveness achieved through a high level of
�The technology involved is imported from USA (though
fancy packaging.
may
the patents are American,
be some minor local adaptions),
so
involved,
are
skills
local
cheap
adolescent)
(often
there
and feM or no
labour
can
be
exploited.
This pattern applies of course to American penetration of the food
industry,
and tourist industry, in many countries other than Australia; it is
part
incorporation of the "free Morld" into
the
of
the
flagging
American
^'or Id-system, the American imperium as it is sometimes called.
features are involved in the American influence on entertainment
Similar
again designed to Min acceptance by a mass market,
and sport,
immediate gratification,
or
term
action
(or
bright
or
professionalisation.
containing
Take
the
short
achieved for instance in the form of
violence) for passive audiences,
colourful
namely
and
effect
skilful packaging
many
changes
much
by
achieved
set,
of
and
on Australian cricket - formerly
a
very leisurely and, for spectators, often boring game - of American infusions,
dra'A'n
especially
uniforms
The
baseball.
has
game
become
substantially
there are many one day matches, Mhere the players appear in
professionalised,
gaudy
from
and lots of safety gear (noM necessary Mith the
increase
of
pace and stop-start action), and the game proceeds at a much greater pace Mith
lots of croMd pleasing action.
There
is
an American overlay also to more recent forms of
slot machine gambling and,
Australia,
more important,
overlay exhibits the same surface features,
as
in
sport
gratification
and
food
- and underlying these,
casino gambling.
designed to appeal to
action,
- colour,
gambling
professional
commercialism,
in
The
consumers,
quick
polish,
professional
control,
multinational organisation, and repatriation of profits to the North.
But
plausibly
the
in
each of these cases,
especially sport and gambling,
argued that the American influence is superficial - a
single bricks Mall of the Californian brick veneer,
appearance
of
masonry solidity to Mooden houses,
it can
veneer
be
like
designed to give the
a style noM ubiquitous
in
�building
that is on to a
but grafted onto a ecualypt Mood frame structure,
Australia,
evolved,
that
though
antecedents
Mith
Northern
In the building industry (as to some extent in the
in Australia.
influences,
Northern
from
food industry) the distinctively Australian basic house structure is beginning
to
in
disappear
plantation-groMn
places like Canberra Mith the replacement
pine,
Honterey
of
by
hardMOod
the adoption (again from America) uf
light
timber framing codes, and so on.
It
indeed
is
in the spraMling suburbs of Australia that
veneer is most strikingly exhibited,
American
the
and
not just in the housing and streets
styles of automobiles (all local manufacturing companies being American,
a Japanese exception,
Mith
and the predominantly Japanese imports largely American
copies), but in the shopping centres, their supermarkets (American in style of
and
retailing
lots.
parking
increasingly in oMnership or control) and petrol stations
Nonetheless
Davidson is deliberately
and
Mhen
exaggerating
he
Mrites (Mhile ruminating on the film and entertainment situation) that
... Me need all the cultural consciousness Me can muster to delay - if
only
by
the tactic of infinite postponement
- our
complete
incorporation into the American Mgfld-systenr (p.21).
For
merely is there evidence t^fjt the American imperium has
not
i t-
pa = =ed
zenith, but again the American encroachment and influence is superficial.
Despite
the overlay,
the main structures of institutions such as
and gambling remain basically Australian,
of
Australian
forms.
history,
from European,
local adaptions, evolved
and particularly British and
Iri=h,
=o it
so it is Mith home '-ooking.
These
institutions
Mould
and club gambling;
remain substantially intact even if recent
other overlays Mere entirely removed.
Nhat is more,
and
quality of life not readily available,
The
community
afford good examples.
American
these institutions
and Mith further local adaption could to a much greater extent,
America.
over much
So it is Mith the main forms of football, Mith amateur cricket;
is Mith pub drinking,
style
sport
or available
and club structures of much gambling
and
can,
provide for a
at
and
all,
in
drinking
�cA</iAvf*^tnA%)^nf
r^-v^A/
<**<A —
^to
the
^jA,f
^<?/^
^.f-At^Z/y
d. ^r^,f ^ta^n/ At//^<^y
^-A
viewpoint
of
th<=
p ^9^
^?^e-4t^-^-€.
believe what they se^^- accepted,
regional culture,
^cr/A^,
A4^.
largely uncritically accepted.
among
there
others,
are
From
undoubtedly
but they are problems to which there are known answers.
problems here;
nf
?4s ^A7f /i^c
/njA^^nZiAi^-
</<P^/l<tA</;
VAr<?KyA
/6
JTT, V^/
/ ^-, ^-*<?;/ */A,
longer-term answer lies in education,
Part
much
in the teaching of
more
86
critical attitudes to Mhat is presented through media such as television.
Pi
more
viable in countries like Australia (and even
immediate interim measure,
controlled,
more in New Zealand) Mhere radio and television are heavily state
to
and
remove much of the American fiction from the publicly licensed,
channels.
regulated
That
the short answer is the
is,
nondocumentary material displaying violence,
supported
same
as
Mith
so on;
sexual exploitation, and
given the socially and culturally undesirable results of such public
87
of such material,
it fails to merit purchase and public exhibition (if
namely,
use
people Mant to hire or buy this material for their OMn video systems,
another
matter).
difficulties
in
Certainly
selection
there
difficulties
are
here,
processes for Mhat is broadcast
especially licensed commercial,
tied
on
of
predominantly
drugs,
standover
censorship,
commercial activity,
tactics,
pictography,
selection and purchasing policies,
extent,
up
public,
Mith
and
channels (for there is far less fictionalised
violence on public-corporation than commercial TN in Ptustrali^.
suggested is not any kind of
that is
1'1 hat is being
straightforward social regulation
such as regularly
etc;
in
occurs
Mith
this case regulation
hard
of
of a type already folloMed to some limited
for instance in Psustralian content requirements.
Pt practical problem
85.
Contrary to American philosopher Davidson and his followers, usually
accepting Mhat is presented is not essential to living; but the idea
that it is necessary iWa standard part of the Ptmerican cultural and most
Northern and educational frameworks.
88.
See especially Bonney and Nilson.
87.
'The consensus among most of the research community is that violence on
television does lead to aggressive behaviour by children and teenagers
Mho watch the programs' (.reported in The Chronicle of Higher Education,
Narch 13 1?85, p.8).
Psdults too are liable to be desensitized to
violence through television watching, wi th influence not only ^n values
but sp^ill over to the real world, e.g. they estimate their environment
is more violent.
A
sV<vkcL.<-^44
^7, y>,
g in
�mith such content requirements has been that there is insufficient
But
materia!.
rise
the
tota!
reduced.
domination
other
of the Australian and
there is nom much more regiona! materia!;
industries,
former
mith
and,
of Australian cinemas by American
Australian
regions!
as a result, the
has
films
the variety of television material nom available from
Given
an end to American domination of local television programs,
sources,
fi!m
been
morld
and
of
this part of Australian leisure culture, could also be achieved.
and gambling form a mutually supporting trio of immense
drinking
Sport,
importance in the popular culture of Australasia,
the
to grasp or explain.
outsider
('Much American sociological
gambling deals mith it as a deviant activity":
historical
on-going
influence
population is of Irish descent).
brought
and
activities,
writing
A
p.421.)
in Australia is undoubtedly Irish
(in
on
main
early
nomaday about 17X of
the
Nith their blanketing Catholicism, the Irish
propagated rather successfully a religion liberal
masculine
in
but exceedingly narrom in intersexual
such as those of the trio,
enterprises.
mas out;
Caldmell 77,
one quarter of the population mas Irish;
Australia
for
to an extent difficult
Drinking mas in, contraception mas out; gambling mas in, divorce
sport mas in,
lomer-church
homosexuality mas out ...
Catholicism
and
more
Catholicism mostly men in Australia,
purjit/nical
.
In the play-off betmeen
forms
o^
Protestantism,
mhereas in eastern USA more
puritanica!
forces prevailed, and these mere subsequently reinforced by Judaism.
is a central part of Australian social life and so of
Drinking
(Nhile it is important in Nem Zealand also,
social
momen.
life.)
For
it is a less dominant feature
of
It bears on the connected issues of mateship and attitudes
to
matesh ip
relationship,
and
is
mateship
often based upon,
is
(cobbers) mhich excludes momen.
North
culture.
America,
that to his mife.
or groms
characteristically a
Indeed,
out
of,
relation
a
drinking
betmeen
men
in contrast to the apparent norm in
a man's relations to his mates,
or mate,
may be closer than
�The
mateship
mates, first and foremost, through thick and thin.
A first corollary is a
or less rigorously some ambivalence about, social and career
limitation upon,
because
mobility,
may involve leaving one's mates
any transfer or promotion
or distancing from them.
A related corollary is a restriction on competition
because one does not compete seriously Mith one's mates.
similarly
also
mateship engenders,
The mateship
ethos
because mates are treated
requires local egalitarianism,
Thus
equals.
his
Mith
ethos strict!;/ requires that a man should stick
especially given a
little
as
transitivity,
egalitarian and non-competitive features, also encouraged by other elements of
Accompanying aspects of mateship are that
mainstream culture.
the
identity
success are sought,
and
concerns such as a job or career,
serious
and
energy
in leisure,
Mhere they are,
personal
not in
more
and that often a greater level
interest is di rec ted at leisure ac t iv i t i es and pas t imes
than
Excellence in serious things tends to be deflated or denigrated.
Mork.
of Antipodean socialism.
at
Hates
however are supported, and so by extension are those Mho Mould be mates.
mateship is one of the props
of
Thus
A less expected aspect
of mateship, Mhich is after all a communitarian relation of an important type,
is
diminished involvement Mith social (and also sometimes political)
is because mates afford a secure social framework Mhich
this
Perhaps
issues.
unnecessary to look beyond.
it
is
Hates naturally get together frequently, commonly
for sport, gambling or drinking.
The
main
setting
uncomfortable
and
for
drinking
is
pub
the
degenerate form of the English pub.
important public setting for drinking is the clubs,
as the Australian barbeque.
- though
some
city
The hotel Mas,
pubs
have
occasionally invaded by groups of Momen.
the
development
serves,
not
_urious!y
hotel,
a
But an
increasingly
Mhich also commonly cater
Among private group settings, for drinking are such institutions
for gambling.
haunt
or
only
and remains,
been
liberalised,
essentially a male
and
others
are
Thus the hotel is a main setting for
and continuation of mateship.
to reinforce male chauvinism,
The hotel
has
served,
but also to foster
and
racism.
�Until very recently,
and still in some places,
hotels excluded or segregated
and perhaps other groups such as Orientals uho fall towards
Aboriginals,
the
bottom of the caste ladder.
do the places of drinking differ in significant respects
only
Not
those in USA;
extent it is in USA,
and is not a major form for the drinking bout;
nor are
Beer is the mainstay of
is the main alcoholic drink consumed.
and
hotels,
is not consumed to anyuhere near the
given the same prominence as in USA.
cocktails
Hard liquor,
so do the styles of drinking and uhat is drunk.
uh 1 ch is nou heavily taxed in Australia,
from
drinking
But Australian
patterns have changed markedly in the last twenty years;
the
and nine has become
an everyday drink in the clubs and often for lunch.
the feu older clubs can be exclusive in their membership
Nhile
American country clubs carry exorbitant fees,
or
the neu clubs have very
like
modest
joining fees and represent an improvement on the hotels in many respects;
for
they are not aluays, predominantly drinking establishments and dominantly male
but they are more sociable and comfortable, and they carry a range
preserves,
including commonly gambling (on uhich their
of other programs and activities,
depends)
financing
nonprofit associations)
sort
importance,
and
consumer
greatly
Hales).
golf);
but
there
notably returned servicemen's clubs,
and ethnic clubs,
religious
These
interests.
of the
are several
clubs
(community
types
other
catering
for
uhich function in all respects like
are a major post-Har social
country touns,
of
minority
phenomenon,
uhich
altered leisure patterns in parts of Australia (especially Neu
'In
one
political and labour clubs,
and there are many
neu registered clubs,
cooperatives,
registered
are indeed sporting clubs in origin (football of
bouls,
another,
of
Hany
sport.
and
have
South
clubs have replaced churches as the centres for
sociability and recreation; in the metropolitan areas, they have decentralised
leisure facilities providing nightclub, restaurant, gambling and entertainment
outlets
in
leisure
sophistication'*.
the
suburbs;
and in the coastal touns they
And
in these
very
successful
have
brought
some
gambling-financed
�cooperatives,
'sport,
gambling
and
drinking
of
- the pillars
Australian
leisure culture - have found common ground' (Caldwell 77, pp.424, 425).
Sport is the opiate of the masses in Australasia, a main leisure activity
and entertainment form, a major (male) topic of conversation both socially and
and it takes up a significant chunk of the "news"^newspaper coverage
at work,
it is now relegated to the back pages^with local politics occupying
(but
front
It
pages).
is also a major reservoir of chauvinism,
with
'Sport
competitiveness.
its
long traditions may
the
and
conformism
more
m^ifest
male
chauvinism than many other forms of popular Australian culture' (Caldwell
p.41'7');
racial and cultural.
as
such
j^-also manifests and often encourages other forms of
it
Even in sport reevaluation is
77,
chauvinism
place,
taking
including reassessment of the competitive principle, and there is a shift away
from
bureaucratic
Fortunately,
sport,
controls
however,
to
freer
environmentally
forms,
damaging
especially
sports.
vertigo
machine-dependent forms
have not caught on to the same extent as in America;
or art,
nor
of
do
forms such as hunting enjoy a% similar following or so little criticism.
important component of Antipodean newspaper sport,
An
racing
anima!
distinct
as
"sport",
especially,
from
professional,
predominantly
gambling purposes.
integrally tied to gambling.
is
the
type
younger
people
In the participant sports there is,
other
and
This
participate
and now essentially designed for
North, a heavy outdoor emphasis.
but
horse
form
of
in,
is
spectator
and
in contrast with the
This emphasis is partly a New Norld feature,
partly a matter of extensive open space and a favourable outdoor climate.
Explaining
the
separating
sport
sheer extent of sport is a complex matter, best approached by
into
its
different components
looking
and
at
what
is
distinctive in the new world, and what in the Antipodes (at the same time this
reveals
e.g.
the
that
ritualised
limited applicability of psychological substitutibility
sport,
national
substitute
sport
for war).
especially,
is
a
socially
claims,
acceptable
And one thing that is distinctive
is
the
�and
amount
style of gambling-linked sport.
Explaining that is
inseparable
from explaining gambling itself.
have been several attempts to explain the extent and diversity
There
in Australia as compared Mith that in the North,
gambling
smoothly into the culture.
it
according
Morld,
various
and to incorporate
Australians are the heaviest gamblers in the
88
surveys.
Some of the main explanations
to combine the following elements:
try
suggested
to
of
the
of
influence
Irish
Latholicism in overriding the restrictive puritanism, the comparative Meekness
the
of
ethic
Mork
bother?"),
the
the drive to accumulate
and
entrenched
belief
in
gambling
a
strand
form
of
(Mith
as
a
positional
improvement (Mhich appears to date back, like distinctive Australian
games
as 2!-up,
such
together,
to convict times).
gambling
Not all these elements sit
easily
not all of them, such as the Mork ethic, are relevant on their oMn.
The Mork ethic becomes relevant because it Mas Midely believed by
that gambling damagingly undercut Mork,
improvement,
positional
to Meal th,
Mork
"Mhy
of
Protestants
both because of the popular legend of
that gambling offered an alternative route than hard
and because gambling Mas an absorbing leisure-time
activity
Mhich competed successfully Mith (often alienating) Mork.
Moreover,
acommodated.
gambling,
there
are
some
important
complicating
factors
to
be
One is that Mhat is more extensive in Australia is smaller-scale
social
gambling,
entrepreneurial gambling.
not
heavy
punting,
professional
gambling
or
Australians are, by and large, very security minded
and are not large-scale risk takers: hence one of the reasons for the shortage
8'?
of venture capital in Australia .
Despite the risk-taking image, there is
then a strong emphasis on security,
- the
suburban
both in the (home) OMnership expectations
a-cnd—a-s— hegsr-de--
------------------------ 88. Thus e.g. R/deen.
On the extent of Australian gambling, see also
CaldMell 74. Like drinking, gambling is less extensive in NeM Zealand.
8'?.
The extent of gambling in Australia contrasts sharply Mith risk-taking in
investment.
'Risk aversion seems to be endemic in Australia at least as
far as investment in innovative products is concerned'* (S. Macdonald).
�block, the private home, the car, and as regards defence (whence the appeal of
an
American
second
6
gambling.
Australian
complication
concerns
the
'is marked by a heavy reliance on
It
character
of
and
so
chance
But Caldwell's attempt to explain
on skill'* (Caldwell/^ p.20).
little
this
features of the Australian character which deemphasize excellence
through
less
shield).
partly
satisfactory,
than
from sport,
differently
where,
because
it
as he admits,
involves
treating
'excellence ...
is
gambling
is
[almost]
fact the preferred explanations of the characterisatics and
puzzling
always approved of'*.
In
aspects of Australian gambling are unsatisfactory. In several places, Caldwell
has
appealed
in possible explanation'* 'to features of Australian
specifical 1y
to egalitarianism,
concen trates
on
r e1qu i s i t e
trying
to
what these are,
Fatalism,
explaining.
fatal i sm/
mateship and a sense of
say
for example,
character,
not on
how
they
But
he
do
the
apathy,
is said to involve
putting up with unfavourable conditions, and accepting the outcomes of fortune
but with good fortune attributed to luck,
hardly a fatalistic theme,
fatalism might explain a certain dourness or resignation,
Australian,
unclear
with
along
some more typical Australian
Caldwell
since
really
the
extent
makes no difference to
in
disclose
success
that
by luck.
marginally
what
for
this
the bulk of Australian gambling is social
better
than
fatalism
it
remains
i^
Hhat
fated.
that things
surveys
suggestion,
gambling
in
And mateship and egalitarianism only
in
will
but a ^^rious (nonmarket) optimism, a
Unfortunately
do not expect to succeed.
especially
rather than little
seems to be appealing to is not fatalism,
happen as they are already fated to do,
people
features,
how it is supposed to explain extensive gambling,
gambling,
belief
neither
klhile
their
intended
explanatory
which
fare
roles;
egalitarianism does, as will appear, have a minor role.
8^.
(From previous page) The extent of gambling in Australia contrasts
sharply with risk-taking in investment.
'Risk aversion seems to be
endemic in Australia at least as far as investment in innovative products
is concerned* (8. Macdonald).
^^7
/s*
�By contrast,
Inglis attempts an historical explanation,
he sees as the social sources of gambling.
He claims to uncover the following
speculative character of business in a neM country (but unless
the
factors:
looking to Mhat
specially
difficult and distinctive character of the neM country is also
the
invoked
does not distinguish Australia from the rest of the neM
this
that life Mas a gamble in early Australia (but this does
including USA);
explain Mhy social gambling took off,
Irish
heritage
subsequent
mining
persistence
the
and does not account for
the
of
the
of social gambling in Australia);
the role
Mith heightened discovery and rapid riches (but
again
this
to California Mhere gambling practices are different, and are
e.g.,
not concentrated on social gambling).
particular
not
or the augmentation of gambling);
(but this applied also to USA,
industry
applies,
Morld,
These sorts of factors may explain
inherited forms of gambling in Australia,
for instance the
the
Irish
contribution no doubt helps account for the prominence of horse-racing and its
egalitarian betting patterns in Australia (though horse-racing is as important
in
NeM Zealand Mhich had no comparable influx of Irish catholics).
But they
do not explain the persistence and styles of gambling in Australia, as opposed
to
USA.
to
delegated
the
to
extent that it Mas in Australia,
the
Inglis
favours,
hoM Mas it that gambling Mas integrated into
emerges:
question
order,
up in the historical fashion
set
Nhen
rather
commercial and criminal sector as in
than
USA?
a
the
major
social
substantially
question
The
fetches its OMn complex ansMer - in terms of the differing religious pressures
for
the
suppression
and regulation of gambling,
the
respective
gambling and their possible exploitation by capitalistic methods,
types
of
illegal
or
legate and the comparative commitment to market and commercial methods
- once
the features of Australian gambling are explained.
In trying to explain Australian gambling and its distinctive features, it
is
most
important^first to divide gambling into types.
Australian
pursuit
gambling is social,
of Meal th.
A salient feature is that
for "fun", as opposed for
instance
But professional and heavy (and plunge) gambling
to
appear
�be greater in Australia than elsewhere (and
to
not
gambling
than
less
are
in USA,
investment
the
reflecting again
of non-social
Bayesian theory (i.e.
gambling
be
can
gambling can be explained in the
people).
improvement
remains
it
given a largely psychological explanation,
positional
an undoubted consideration in such forms as lottery
is
to
social gambling.
For example-substantial
A
through
Since compulsive
subjective expected utility theory).
here some divi = i'*sn of types helps.
These
May
standard
explain Mhat _i_s distinctive in the Australian scene, broadly
Even
venture
security-
supposed
mindedness of Australians and the timidity of their business
types
and
art
and
union gambling but not in poker machine gambling.
main
The
forms
of
social
such
gambling,
club
as
rather undemanding leisure-time-fillers of
unintellectual
gambling,
acceptable
More ordinary Australians have a good deal of leisure time to fill;
are
types.
and given
the prevailing relatively uncompetitive ethos and general anti-intellectualism
of
the society,
activities
(e.g.
intellectual
or
this time is not often occupied by additional Mork or
for
positional improvement of one sort or another)
higher cultural activities,
But
by
gregarious
television Matching has to some extent substituted in recent
years.
or
direct
television
does
not
the same
offer
stimulation that gambling affords.
established,
socially
acceptable,
activities (like pip? smoking),
and
neMspapers^,
setting;
offering
iKti.
it
social
opportunities
Still, Mhy gambling rather than other time
It is not simply that it Mas and remains an
fillers and entertainment forms?
social
undemanding
or
For both of these more passive and
activities, such as drinking and gambling.
solitary
but by
hobby
form,
Mell
surrounded
Mith
associated
such as ^11 ec ting .snd reading^ + orm guidey
social
contacts and opportunities or at
also^afforde^
uncompetitive?^ form of stimulation, aec
a/, approved
least
funintellectual
a
and
Mhere^excitement could be directly
exper i encecL
tends
to
be extraverted;
leisure time activity
in
Australia
and Mhen it is not directed toMards the
notorious
the gambling situation reveals,
As
�trie,
it is usually practical or- material,
mainstream Australian culture is,
not educational or artistic.
The
to understate matters, neither cultured nor
intel 1ectual,
communication,
Education,
the intellectual
patterns in Australasia are Northern,
England and Scotland,
imported almost entirely,
from
mainly
As a result
very recently, some local adaption.
significant surface educational differences between Australia
are
(though the differences do not touch the
America
North
Mith,
The
life and practicality.
underlying
and so are not of great ideological depth?.
social paradigm,
and
Northern
surface
These
differences bear directly on the continuation of the cultural traditions.
Austral ia
countries.
t^or st
the
has
There
educational record of any
for example,
are,
the
of
three times as many people going on to
higher science studies proportionally in USA as in Australia.
23
to
this
recorded.
Australia.)
better
including 50 per cent
level,
(There
is
up the ladder,
doubt
to
and
different.
similar
ethnic
of
the
blacks,
differentiation
students at more average American
different,
attitudes
to
lowest
in
Not only
educational
segment
education
universities
reflecting the
but are generally nor-se in quality,
the more generous intake of students.
styles
In USA however 83 percent go
than their Australian counterparts,
drive
levels
a
University
motivated
5
In Australia about 20 per cent leave school at 15, and only
3'? percent proceed to higher school certificate.
on
Nhereas in UbA
in Australia only
percent of science students eventually obtain Ph.Ds,
per cent do, etc.
developed
oning in
are
in
are
social
part
no
educational
institutions
are
In North America universities are much more business, and there is
The details of general intellectual life,
differ material 1y.
extent of reading,
etc., al so
It is in intellectual and educational life, especially in the extent of
book reading, that Ne'.-j Zealand culture differs, perhaps most strikingly,
from Australian.
The anti-intelleptu_al charges regularly hurled at
Australians are not often directed at Neu Zealanders, t^h^je traditions
remain much more British.
�not
the
degree
separation of the university
of
business
commun i t i es
evident in Australia.
Education in Australia encounters, and has to combat, the practicality of
the mass of people, the widespread impatience with theory and ideas, and anti
The impatience with theory,
intellectualism.
theory into action,
blue
the demand for translation
the concentration on the practical,
collar (working-class) people,
of
appear not only with
for instance in adult education
but in groups drawn from virtually all strata of the society,
and
groups,
even,
and
perhaps or especially, in groups concerned with changing social consciousness.
The
anti-intellectualism
feature,
striking
locals.
Thu
to
of
Australia is a
widely
cultural
European visitors^and admitted or even insisted on
'sheep-culture,
agriculture,
by
physical culture have reached
standards in Australia but intellectual culture has
high
remarked
been
neglected* .
'Especially important in affecting the output of govenments and the quality of
our political life ...
[is] a suspicion of debate and reason, combined with a
profound anti-intellectualism'.
13
Rnti-intellectualism has however two levels (like anti-theism):
or,
differently, hostility to things intellectual.
though
the
Both appear in Australia,
neglect is far more widespread than hostility (which
restricted
neglect
appears
to a few older class-differentiated cultural groupings),
vast and amorphous middle class vaguely approving of things
largely
most
of
educational.
Note also the role of private schools in Australia, as in USR, as opposed
to New Zealand, where quality secondary eduction is not so privatised.
The whole style of ranking educational institutions in fact differs from
culture to culture.
Stephenson^s "words ring as true as they did the^' 30
writes Dunlevy (Canberra Times l'?84).
years
ago,
so
The other two 'characteristics [which] infect our public life'*, and also
stand in the way of 'a better society in this country", listed by Aitkin
in his cynical and pessimistic conclusion (p.28) are worth recording
also,
namely
widespread authoritarianism and
majoritarianism
in
government, and primary group loyalty (and therewith partisan and even
confrontational practices) in public affairs, i.e. narrow non-pluralistic
matesh i p.
�this
In
does
Australia
neglect,
not differ
from
situation may be Morse in rural USA than it is in rural
the
highly
other
Indeed there are grounds for supposing
materialist cultures, such as the USA.
that
markedly
Australia,
Mhere people commonly have access to public libraries and a variety of
public
c ommun i c a t i on ne tMorks,
terms
In
furnished
America
relative
of
population
Australia
corresponds
perhaps
is
to community radio stations like Canberra's
could Mell adapt, is different.
better
Nothing in
cultural communication netMorks than USA.
Mith
2XX
North
to
or
The US PSS arrangments, Mhich Australia
ethnic radio in most state capitals.
by
size
For Mhat it is Morth (for they are controlled
capitalist right and carry a heavy Northern ideological message)
the
the
main Australian neMspapers also compare favourably Mith American neMspapers
at least on a circulation-size basis
Many
Americans
have
'America's
for
conservatism'
(p.345).
Mhich,
Australia,
remarked,
in a similar
parochialism,
The
though
- and tend to be less parochial.
fashion
to
anti-intellectualism
Merrill,
sc i en t i sm
ano
smoothly
for
same ingredients do not blend so
certainly
instantiating that
on
initially^_starting
coupling of scientism Mith an t i - i n t e 1 1 ec t u a 1 i sm^s^^Can d n a t i on a 1 i sm)^ i s neither
so
conservative
(especially
politically) nor nearly
as
parochial
(perhaps because much further from the centre of things than USA).
there is some significant overlap,
are,
like
Moreover,
of
'P%.
though
because both mainstream cultures are male-
dominated Mith a heavy practical get-things-done orientation.
Australasian
USA
Nor do the
of Australian anti-intellectualism look the same as American,
sources
as
For example, in
male preserves it is still considered that intellectual pursuits
artistic
endeavours,
for practical men,
unmasculine
and
effeminate
("sissy").
ideas and intellectual activity, except as part
a narroM practically-directed result-oriented science,
are an impediment,
Looked at differently things are not so good.
Australia's capital, for
example, hardly turns out, in the form of the Canberra Times, a product
Mhich compares favourably Mith the Nashing ton Post
�an effete luxury.
in
that
Inhere Australian culturet&e3±±s^diverges from American
anti-intellectualism,
culture and thought, ^deriv
the
connected mediocre standards
and
opportunities
various
furthermore,
to
higher
from egalitarian and levelling down elements
culture (for intellectual activities,
serious
of
to
and
excel,
like high culture,
surpass
is
in
offer too many
There
mates).
are,
connected mediocre-maintaining mechanisms in Australian
for example ''social penalisation of deviance from certain "middling"
society,
intellectual
other
norms'* (Ely),
a lopping off
cultures
do share is a
heavy
and
of
intellectual
tall
poppies.
the
Nhat
as
misrepresented
Americans,
a
practical
practical
utilitarianism.
and unlike most Europeans,
orientation,
Australians
are,
often
like
practical do-it-yourself people, proud
But for the most part,
of their fix-it make-do and improvisational abilities.
Australians have strong group loyalties and do not treat those outside primary
groups
with
sense;
nor
aiming
at
sufficient impartiality to count as utilitarians in
they,
in appropriate utilitarianism
greatest
happiness of the greatest
are
'the
societal maximum.
educational
and
or
number'
strict
maximizers,
any
other
They are utilitarian only in the vulgar sense of utility-
focussed and practical,
experimental
fashion,
any
in the sense that theory,
statistical
work,
gets
and research institutes (as e.g.
a low
as opposed to practice and
even
in
higher
the Research School
of
Social
ranking,
Sciences, Australian National University).
The
practical
capabilities of Australians are by no means
directed but include group and social organisation.
individually
Particularly significant
The utilitarian theme was a hare-meleased by Hancock, in his attempt to
reconcile Australian 'individualism with ... reliance upon Government'
(p.55).
In fact utilitarianism is inessential to the style
of
reconciliation Hancock attempts, several sorts of accounts of collective
poster at the service of integrated individual interests serving as well or better in the Australian case.
Even in the academies utilitarianism
hardly predominates;
and it has had little historical importance in
Australian philosophy, though it has regrettably become a position to be
reckoned with in recent years.
By contrast, pragmatism has almost no
foil owing.
�is
australian
'the
organisations
zest for starting,
joining
of all kinds' (aitkin p.26).
and
maintaining
voluntary
This has proved important for
a
long time in the provision of Melfare services in australis, and more recently
40?% n
in the case of the environment.
The pattern of Melfare^in australia, for long
self-provisioning (as distinct from provided by local
largely
elseMhere
),
a "Mel fare partnership" Mith government
into
merged
espec i al 1 y in brick-and mortar- grants and the like,
and
other
organisations.
environmental
a
The
concerns.
government
similar
pattern
funding,
for voluntary,
is
re! igious
as
emerging
as
regards
size of the nongovernmental Melfare sector
in
Rustralia,
an important part of the informal economy, remains extremely large
(est ima ted
9. S
p.26^/
for
equivalent in unpaid mages alone to 1.5'< of GDP,
de t ai 1s);
the informal economy bound up
and
see
Mith
aitkin,
environmental
issues is no longer negligible though governmental assistance is
siight.
But the success of nongovernmental organisation and the informal
economy
up a latent paradox concerning political organisation in australia
throMS
for Mhat i s
paradoxes tied to the already noticed authoritarianism paradox;
afxa poMer+ul authoritarian government doing in self-reliant communities?)
the
one
hand,
there
political culture',
is
'an important self-reliant
in
strain
(a
On
australian
Mith do-it-themselves groups Mhich substituted for
local
government; it is 'a political culture in Mhich voluntary organistions have an
honoured place' (aitkin,
apathy,
though
populace
Mhich
p.26).
But, on the other hand, there is a political
are not as marked as formerly or as- in the USa;
has
by
and
large 'not sought
profound
there
changes
in
is
problems
a
reliance on government to provide and
(this in complete contrast Mith
america)
to
deal
.
a
Mith
and
political
difference-in-size
In contrast Mith USa, for instance, local government Mas
development in australia, and remains Meak: see aitkin, p.23ff.
?7-
a
their
political or social structure for several generations noM" (aitkin p.23);
there
is
a
late
"So australians faced Mith a political problem learned to respond Mith
"Mhat Mill they (= the government) do about it?", Mhereas americans in a
similar situation could be heard to say "Hhat Mill Me do about it?'"
(aitkin, p.23).
ar
^6
�theory,
both lessons for Australian political decentralisation and^some
Mith
expI anatory
0! son' s
Mould appear to resolve the paradox (a theory
pOMer,
individuals,
action,
collective
of
bogie
but
Mhich
initial
the
groups or factions to Mhom
primary
within Mhich mateship^ bonds operate).
in
but Mith
elements
not
attach
and
loyalties
Nhat holds for the smaller local group
individual is directly involved does not
the
resembling
to
transfer
larger
political arrangements? tsri on the contrary, local loyalties act against larger
groups struggle and compete for their OMn
organisation^
enter ^nto a-v^ricty"'of partisan and rent-seeking behaviour.
Australians
political
are
self- or
problems
they
hardly
and
Similarly Mhile
problems,
group-reliant Mith smaller
appeal to government,
interests
larger
for
surprisingly^ to
authoritarian government (for though authoritarianism is not essential,
an
it is
likely in the circumstances).
.The
1
open
times may be changing Mith the serious attempt to apply
"
methods
secretive
to
large group decision making,
games,
numbers
instead
of
group
'a perversion of the majority principle
old
Mhich
in
HoMever the
of more satisfactory and rational decision making methods into large
organisation and choice practices have a long May to go
political
the
simply
getting the numbers is a surrogate for persuasion'* (Aitkin p.28).
adoption
consensual,
J
life,
in
Australian
in such less anti-intellectual (but still often
even
anti
theory) cloisters as the universities and other educational institutions.
Approaches
to the environment.
the frequent presentation of USA as the heartland
An t i podes, despi te
environmental
movement.
proportionately,
the Morld.
of
There
are,
as
Australian
for
example,
more
paid-up
the
of
members,
environmental groups in Australia than anyMhere else
in
Apparently blest Germany, Northern homeland of green politics, noM
comes second in this sort of statistic,
Mell
Ecological aMareness is greater in the
easily ahead of USA and
Canada.
a quantitative difference there is a qualitative difference
and Northern environmentalism.
The Australian movement
As
betMeen
is
much
A
�and
active
more
ecological
auareness
communities.
The
involved.
not
mi th
permeated
Antipodean culture is
encountered in North America
in
except
an
isolated
These are subjective impressions from informants, but there are
some more objective matters to back them up, such as
The
P
issue
Tasmanian
dam issue,
uhich could not have figured as
election
an
in the same sort of uay in North America (though perhaps it could
have
in Noruay);
level of political commitment on such environmental matters
neu
The
9
the preservation of rainforest in NSH.
as
(For details, and other examples, see
Dunphy).
?
for example,
Responses to questionnaires on rainforest and uoodchipping,
uhich indicate uide community concern in Australia on these issues.
impressions
The
quantitative
can,
uay,
by
moreover,
be
backed
up to some
dividing environmental groups into
(conservative) and neuer (post l'?65, more radical).
extent
in
tuo
types:
more
a
older
The overwhelming majority
of people involved in environmental groups in England, for instance, belong to
organisations of the former type,
National
mostly founded last century, especially the
Trust (see Loue and Goyder).
By contrast the
consists predominantly of more recently formed groups.
Australian
The Australian groups
differ in character from those in USA in important uays;
also
for
and less inclined to compromise. For instance, there has never been a
action,
(such
deal
as
as the Sierra Club
made)
uith. organisations
supporting
there has never been a uorking alliance uith shooters or
pouer,
nuclear
clubs
they are,
more active, more radical, more left-leaning, more inclined to
the most part,
major
movement
is commonplace in USA,
or an easy alliance uith
off-road
gun
vehicle
c1ubs.
USA
can
Emerging),
much
in
be
very
roughly seen,
as dividing into tuo parts,
the
uilderness),
uay
as Callenbach
sees
(in
Ecotopi a
Eastern part, uithout
the Old Norld,
of deeper ecological concerns (or
it
of
national
parks
or
and a Neuer Norld, Nestern part, uhich is much more ecologically
�There
concerned.
is
little
doubt however that
the
metropolitan
eastern
industrial part of USA (the Boston-Neu York-Hashington conglomeration) is Mell
and truly in control of things.
in
the
places
uhere
again roughly,
The division gets reflected,
environmental philosophy or
features in university programs,
equivalent
an
seriously
not at the
namely the south and uest,
more
richly-endoued higher-ranked universities in the east.
Jeuish prominence in eastern American universities has something
The
to
There is a significant Jewish element in
do Mith this educational situation.
contemporary US thinking and philosophy, but not to any extent in Australian
American.
The
evident Jewish influence on American economic and political life extends
into
except
insofar as it (increasingly) serves as a Meak copy of
philosophy
and
Nalzer
political theory,
in
elements.
ideology:
This
long
the Mork of Nozick
for instance,
Mhich is overtly infused
influence
exploitation-disrupted
the
Consider,
has
a
substantial
Mith
Jeuish
effect,
Jeuish record is exceedingly disappointing,
Hebraic
especially
arenas like peace and the natural environment
both in
and
in
- Mhere
practice
and
theory (occasional rebels excepted).
The
features
strength of Australian environmentalism arises from a combination of
of
the
land
and
the culture:
the
presence
pouer
and
of
the
surrounding natural Morld, the conspicuousness and the resilience of many more
familiar
Mhich
close,
parts of the environment,
together
the outdoor barbeque-and-beach lifestyle,
Mith a variety of outdoor activities brings
the secular earthiness of the culture,
the
its naturalism,
environment
the
doMn-to-
earth practical character of the people, the do-it-yourself approach to things
like
housing,
repairs
and
so
forth
Mhich
often
frustrating, details of the natural Morld close again.
brings
the
messy,
if
Nhile Hestern American A.
9^.
There are hoMever some European emigres, Mith right-leaning or even
reactionary political vieMS, Mho have an influence on political thinking
in Australia, especially as regards defence and communism.
NeM Zealand
is, by contrast, relatively free of such immigrants.
%?.
Nain reasons Mhy are in fact nicely explained in SchMarzschild.
�these things it does not share all of
of
many
shares
them
by
means,
any
in particular not the areligious character or the style of naturalism.
Despite Australia's frequent inclusion as an industrialised nation, it is
not
industrialised,
highly
mining,
and
agriculture
and
of
much
the
export
in their different Mays quarrying
both
Other Antipodean countries are even less industrialised.
there
the level of Old Norld
yet
isn't
transformation
industrial
land.
the
the
The
European
still
environment
even in most parts of the largest
reaches through conspicuously,
from
And in the Antipodes
control,
the total inhabitable landscape.
of
comes
wealth
cities.
survey of cultural media such as films Mould shoM this clearly enough.
a
rare
(or NeM Zealand) film that doesn't include
Australian
bushdrop,
many
Mhereas
US
exclude
productions
the
some
A
It is
natural
environment
natural
entirely, and even Mhen sequences are shot outside it's often all concrete and
and
glass,
neon
lights and automobiles and
pools
sMimming
- metropolitan
"cu1ture".
Certainly these sorts of urban effects, taken from noMhere in particular,
could
be achieved in parts of the older Australia state capitals,
becoming
(less
very
freeMay
cities in the American-influenced
much
systems hoMever),
Melbourne,
noisy
and
As a result,
older
mode
structures
the largest, Sydney and
are not .just sprauling and mostly unplanned but heavily congested,
polluted,
Mith
nature blotted out in many of
despite
its impressive monuments,
the
inner
poorer
In this they resemble Hashington,
suburbs by red brick and Mires and asphalt.
Mhich
are
free-enterprise
overlaying and expanding
copied from British provincial cities.
Mhich
has only little
planning,
and
is
mostly the American adaption of the European city - an adaption Mhere the city
is
treated as if at first space didn't matter,
structures,
fortunate
al) being,
to have,
so to say,
by contrast,
nor any unity of
better integrated into and less imposed upon,
(the
Australia is
isolated individual ones).
in Canberra a much more
style
holistic
capita),
/
the environment.
Moreover it
�is
hard
not to see and to some extent appreciate the natural environment
on the hills,
especially
Canberra,
neatly planned and in places so green,
between,
lands
even if the flatter
in
so
exhibit (though as cities normally do)
so much artifice.
The
prospects for the environment look rather brighter in Australia than
in USA,
and
for several reasons,
some physical and structural,
much
smaller proportion firmly
population,
and
agriculture
or to industrialist activities.
matter
possibilities
technological
and
a
of good luck than good management;
America
much
For a similar land area Australia has a
cultural.
have been lacking.
some ideological
human
smaller
committed
to
intensive
In large measure this is more a
for both the time and physical and
for a such colossal business
investment
as
in
But cultural reasons have also made a difference
Mill likely become increasingly important:
contrasts
cultural
already
observed, that is.
In
had
Australians came increasingly godless to a land God
the first place,
supposedly forgotten about;
for them there Mas no mandate or
such as the Americans operated under,
in
Australian
life
not merely to multiply and be fruitful,
and exploit it to their oMn ends.
but to dominate the land,
and
approaches
directive
to
the
environment
Nor is there noM
the
extent
of
religiously-reinforced human chauvinism that operates in the industrial North,
and
Mhich
sciences.
informs
the
Secondly,
precedent-bound
foundations
American adulation of,
of
Northern
social
and ideological commitment
. (From previous page) So it is to be hoped that Griffin's environmental
vision, from Mhich Canberra took shape, can be sustained. H.B. Griffin a naturalised Australian Mho greM up in USA - has a significant place in
the groMth of environmentalism in Australia. His role in this regard has
been largely neglected;
for he is usually portrayed .just as an
arch i tec t.
/P/ . On the May in Mhich human chauvinism is Mritten deep into mainline social
sciences, see EE, pp.183-'?.
About the social theory involved, many
Australians are fortunately sceptical - those that bother Mith theory,
that is.
/%%. The practice of government**assisted capitalism of
differs of course from the ideology.
advanced
capitalism
�to,
market arrangements and market-based minimally-regulated
profit-directed
competition is not shared in Australia,
American commitment to the Big,
and,
to big business,
to put it all more theoretically,
capitalism,
controlled
is substantially opposed.
but
to tall poppies, to genius,
to maximization.
extraordinarily bad neMS for the environment.
general
and
documented,
reasons for their damaging effects are sufficiently
theoretical
the
understood.)
such commitments and themes, though influential enough and
In Australia,
and advertised daily through the commercial media,
pushed
in
are
(The damaging effects of these
in practice are quite evident enough and Mell
3-Bad-lTs
But such minimally-
maximization,
and
markets,
So is
do
not
dominate.
For there is a different mainstream ideology Mith a different agenda - such as
social
social
regulation,
and
intervention,
so
arbitration,
consensus,
group
government
The land and the people are not open
forth.
American-style markets in the same '.jay (though there are increasing
ill-considered
pressures
forces",
dairy
market,
e.g.
expose
farmers
in a subsidized and
also
Morks
in favour of
the
environment.
natural
and
are
entitled to fair treatment,
oppressed or poor Australians,
rather
to a "fair go" and assistance.
growing reluctance to see local environments,
especially
and,
by foreign companies.
Fourthly,
Australian environmental movement itself,
Morld
Australian
Thirdly,
are to an increasing extent considered as honorary or even
Australians,
"market
heavily-controlled
markets).
the
and often
to
population
sectors of the
adolescents in over-supplied labour
egalitarianism
animals
to
to
Native
exemplary
like
other
And there is a
like small people,
ripped off,
there is the live and expanding
some of it manifest in
Alternative
Australia.
5.
Formulating and takinq different directions
The
distinctive
features of Australian culture both point
change and supply main parts of an engine for change.
is,
houever,
the
May
to
The standard complaint
that proposals for radical change noM lack,
Mith the demise of
�revolutionary aspirations in the oppressed c 1 asses, any engine for change.
In
more friendly form, the complainfis elaborated along the foliating lines:-
It is easy enough to formulate different directions for the South Pacific
it is far harder to see how such an appropriately different course
countries;
It is not merely that the main countries in the
can be adopted and followed.
region,
European
transformed
descent.
by Europeans,
There
are
are much influenced by people
inevitably,
then,
strong
recent
of
pressures
for
conformity, for similarity to the North, and for cultural anonymity, and there
is much pressure for increased assimilation within the !JS6 sphere of influence
These Northern pressures comprise a familiar package, notably
and control.
*
Domination
popular
media
Northern,
of main forms of communication and education - especially the
such as T'-.J,
especially
books
- by
features
and
missionaries of Northern culture
and
but also intellectual media such
American
but
also
British,
programs,
as
products.
*
Cultural
propaganda.
travelling
ambassadors,
Surprisingly, these people are almost invariably welcomed, their
loaded messages eagerly sought.
reinforce the missionaries.
from,
On a lesser scale,
North
tourists from the
They see the North, generally the areas they come
as ^zi.tmg the standards,
as providing the sort of cultural ideals the
backward Antipodes should be seeking to attain.
*
Top-down
directives
from
aligned with Northern interests.
local
both
private and public
companies,
metropolitan skylines).
which
are
These include not merely the manaoements of
branches of multinational companies,
insurance
sources
and so on (roughly,
but those of a variety of
banks,
those whose buildings now dominate
Etc.
103
Even the most powerful and populous states in the South Pacific region
are
becoming
increasingly
locked into a dual system
of
Northern
control,
namely through
103. Those which operate their own limited imperialism in lesser states of the
region, e.g., Australia in Papua New Guinea and New Zealand in Samoa.
�The
1.
organisation
American
104
The most important of these arrangements in Australia's case
is
hegemony.
of industrialised capitalist states,
under
perhaps the Pacific rim strategy, masterminded by the USA Mith assistance from
and fitting within the world arrangements envisaged by the
Japan,
Trilateral
Commission.
2.
of the economy by
penetration
The
many of them ultimately American controlled.
Northern,
mostly
corporations,
transnational
of
(For the effects
this framework of control in Australia's case, see Crough and Wheelwright.).
A very significant net result is that local economic control is diminishing or
and therewith,
being lost altogether,
local
control
political
in these economically-dominated times,
is diminishing.
National
economies
increasingly
respond, and are seen as obliged to respond, to so-called international forces
"international market" forces in state-rigged markets with
(or
and highly concentrated participants).
effort,
of
much
(unmarketable)
it
intentional,
At the same time there is a concerted
to
reduce
and
remain,
remove
substantially
cultural differences in the contemporary world,
mass consumer society and worldwide markets.
differences
unequal
very
a
to produce
Notwithstanding, major cultural
even in the more industrialised
With
countries.
some
A
care, some fostering, the differences cou1be accentuated in worthwhile ways,
though
the
especially in the industrial
trend,
main
nations,
in
is
the
opposite direction, to almost complete cultural convergence.
On the other side,
forces,
mainly
local,
there are in the South Pacific some
in
counterbalancing
favour of some distancing of Australian
and
New
Zealand cultures from the USA, and of looser relations, especially, presently,
in
matters of (nuclear) defence.
If change is to occur,
it is important to
encourage worthwhile components of these forces,
particularly those
in regional culture
interconnected ways, through
ideas
that regional
and
action.
grounded
cultures
104. For Third World southern countries, financial arrangements through
US-dominated INF and World Bank loom much larger.
and
the
�their
do
conventionalism
and
important.
shape
a
are
There
culture,
undoubted!;/
pragmatism
as
American lifestyle or Australian naturalism
(and
and
Sydney
However what
Russell
that culture determines the shape of the dominant philosophy,
to think,
qualification.
major
philosophy;
dominant
are
and realism a main strand of Australian.
materialism)
requires
reflect
that
philosophies
came
elements
philosophical
but
Certainly,
conversely,
105
culture affects
philosophical
and
constrains
input
can
affect, or even alter, culture.
Genuine
differences
implementation
(as
of
a few very simple
ideas
could
make
major
the 1884-5 stand of the New Zealand government on visits
of
namely that significant principles (of morality)
or
nuclear ships reveals);
features of local culture or regional environments are not sacrificed,
in
jeopardy,
such things as trading advantages or
for
distributed economic benefits.
economism
narrowly
There is a powerful basis for defeating
in Australian and Antipodean cultures,
egalitarian approaches;
short-term
or put
such
in the shape of anti-market
and these and other complementary cultural features
could serve more widely to halt or subvert Northern incursions.
The
South
uncritical
Pacific
Enlightenment
and
for
uncontrolled extension of European culture
take one lesser instance of
that
world-wide
to
spread
and disease) has been very damaging both to indigenous
the lands and seas,
extinction.
mistakes.
(to
and
the
of
peoples
even pushing some of the former inhabitants
to
Nodern people are supposed to learn, if from anything, from their
Among
mistakes of civilizations,
environmental mistakes
are
as
105. Russell 'connecttsl'* philosophies with the social environments of the
philosophers concerned' p.824). Elsewhere, however, Russell only claims
social influences, not determination (e.g., p.827). His working example
is the connection of Dewey's philosophy 'with American enterprise;
in
particular there is the belief in human power, and an unwillingness to
admit "stubborn facts".'*
'His philosophy is a power philosophy.
Russell then proceeded to consider the very real dangers of human power.
Dewey, for his part, contested the connections Russell alleged, as well
as the dangers.
There is much more, however, to the interrelations of
dominant philosophies with cultures and their environments than Russell
unear thed.
�conspicuous as any (sea e.g,
hanger
no
though
beyond
Hatt) .
the reach of a Northern Mar - to
of Northern civilizations,
mistakes
Thors is sti 1 1 time for* the Antipodes
avoid
the
beginning Mith human overpopulation
many
and
environmental impoverishment (as differently illustrated by Italy and Lhina).
There
that
grounded in regional
are various different directions,
a country or place can attempt to take.
There are,
for
features,
example,
tMO
extremal economic directions a contemporary state or region may try to pursue,
as illustra ted:-
other reliance, e.g. upon
i n ternat i onal economic
forces
al ternative
fort-jard May
present
se 1 freli ance
At
the
one
end
lies local self-reliance
and
control,
substantially excluded Mhen it comes to essentials;
(as Mith the Meather of an island),
regulation
largely controlled from elseMhere,
(but
direction.
dominated)
by
the
is
It
or directed through some
toMards- the
dashed arroM,
points
this
direction
general
economy
and control Mith the
for instance at the mercy of international
Northern dominated) economic forces,
shoMn
outside
the
at the other lies outside
patron (as Mith Australia's, defence or Tibet's economy).
that
Mith
that
poMerful
A typical direction,
latter
(backMards)
international
(American
financial institutions such as the INF and the Horld Bank
try
to
impose on client states.
Unfortunately
bent
on
indicate
Mritten
pursuing
given
all likely governments in countries like Australia
the Mrong direction.
the May poMer,
The reasons are
privilege and influence
into the control of societies - lie.
not
appear
difficult
- Northern
to
features
But it does not have to be
or
�stay that way.
difficulty for all suggestions for extensile
major
A
normal governmental procedures,
through
effect
constraint
for change.
is a
change,
severe
For governmental procedures are st on,
put
into
apparent
time
piecemeal
and
whichever
usually reactive (this is even how successful governmental methods,
these are,
vastly
sages
successful)
and
(among
But time is running out for the present (.not
are supposed to be) .
human experiment it is now everywhere
sound men and women of common sense,
from
crackpots
will
1'lhatever is done for change may have to be done with more rapidity
is customary in grander human affairs,
except with war itself (which is
of the main prob 1ems and a likely outcome of
one
as
from
whose numbers are those most confident that present arrangements
persist).
than
as well
said,
heard
socio-economic
catastrophe
ensuing from other problems).
In the present conditions of uncertainty,
a
strategy relevant to both outcomes,
concentrating
upon
imme^d^ate
paths
it would seem wise to plot out
catastrophic breakdown or
to
change
aimed
avoiding
at
while
not,
socio-
env i r onmen t a 1 break down.
Both the deeper American environmentalists and leading German Greens,
unlike
many
thinkers and leaders take the problems with deadly
hope
for a way out of present massive socio-environmental
main
nuclear impasse particularly,
change will take the form of a
This
spread
like a religious revival,
by way of democratic channels.
the
through a mass change
seriousness,
difficulties,
of
spiritual
who
and
consciousness.
conversion,
and
to alter political decisions and directions
These ideas,
while by no means ridiculous in
fashion of new-born Christians' views about their individualistic
escape
from nuclear Armageddon,
and while offering a clear ray of hope, leave most
106
Australians who have encountered them duly sceptical.
That type of massive
change
a
of consciousness (which may not be politically effective) will require
miracle,
and
miracles are not credible.
More important,
that
sort
of
�conversion i_s ruled out culturally in Australia,
spiritual
according to
the
prev i ous ar gumen t.
A drastic and massive change of consciousness,
or religious
is neither likely nor necessary (nor Mould it be sufficient).
Antipodes,
the
someMhat
Mith
isolated
favourable location in
its
Fortunately in
Southern
the
conversion,
Hemisphere,
there are different and
from the belligerent North,
more
These are social Mays
promising routes to change and regional nuclear escape.
and locally self-reliant Mays deeply rooted in the culture. Instead of seeking
to
change
consciousness,
then,
the
and through elements of,
the culture.
lines of religious conversion,
picture
through
of change.
in
But
many
and
those
involves
rather
is
as amended;
straightforwardness,
aMay
than
from
dominant
It encourages many
so to say).
for example those
as interfering Mith crucial features of
running counter to enterprise,
orderliness,
change
not
re-conditioning
counter-cultural,
deplored features of Australian culture,
culture,
of,
Mhat is being offered is a very different
this
respects the route
acquisitive capitalist virtues.
the
in the form
a
The route is thus cultural, not in this respect counter-cultural.
considered
been
Mith
Instead of the picture of change along
Northern paradigms (counter-Northern-culture,
often
Mork
to
is
The main path to change is through culture,
consciousness;
conversion.
idea
that is already there or in the background,
"consciousness"
the
leading
market
that
capitalism,
selfishness and the
initiative,
have
other
It encourages instead traditional virtues of
for instance Midened
generosity,
egalitarianism,
permissiveness,
pluralism,
unsubtlety,
spontaneity,
authenticity, sociaSbility, reliability, anti-authoritarianism,
group-reli^ance, resourcefulness, moderation, leisure!iness.
The main environmental route aMay from Northern social paradigms has been
10^. (From previous page) Host, but of course, not all.
The change-ofconscicusness idea has its adherents, e.g. Cairns, some in Alternative
Australia. Naturally it is not being denied that change-^f-consciousness
(e.g. in the form of ecological conversion) does occur^aac^is an important h
happening. Hhat is at issue is the likely scale of such change.
�and Mhat it involves indicated (e.g. in RP).
t-lhat is
the extent to Mhich elements of mainstream Australian
culture
reconnoitred elsewhere,
is
remarkable
Indeed in Australasian culture there
fit with that divergence from the North.
is
at
best
dominant
social
There is already in the cultures
paradigm.
for a marked SMing aMay from the dominant Northern
basis
vieMpoint,
demagogic
of
ambivalent subscription to major facets
only
is
it
mainly a matter of tipping
Northern
the
a
substantial
paradigm.
an
From
already
a
poised
balance aMay from Nor them-influenced control.
break-aMay
This
involve
first
control has tMO political facets
arrangements
part
Mhich
of
part
relevant
is breaking free from Northern hegemony, control,
alignment
of
The
and
from the influence of foreign states and the grips of transnational
Some
companies.
recovering
Mays
connected
of the Mays this can be accomplished have
local control of media output and messages,
are knoMn,
e.g.
escheMing a false internationalism,
and,
into line Mith
both
so that political arrangements reflect these parts of culture.
reliance,
e.g.
political
bringing
culture,
from
sMeepingly,
more
dropping
moving to greater
regional
been
indicated,
and many
other
self-reliance,
modifying limited liability of companies,
out
of the
international
abandoning the race to keep up Mith the Singaporian
rat-race
Jones and the
(e.g.
E/i^shoMas,
Host of these Mays could
107
The second
designed to strike resounding chords in mainstream culture.
in demolishinq their oMn and others'* environments).
be
rtA"' ccbLt
subsidizing
transnationals,
A.?
providing
hand-outs and undue
shelter
to
big
business or monopolistic professions, cutting assistance to the disadvantaged,
exposing
local small-actor sectors (in difficulty) to the icy Minds of
Morld
107. And Mhere not it is a matter of removing false beliefs, such as that
Australia is currently threatened militarily by hostile states.
These
sorts of beliefs could be altered, at least for many Mho hold them, by
appropriate
persuasion by credible popular figures on mass media
channels. In fact it has suited both government and opposition, hitherto
committed to an essentially bipartisan defence policy, to let false
beliefs about defence, for instance, stand, or even to encourage and
reinforce them.
�market forces, and so on.
such
Tipping the balance involves both positive measures
promoting the valid features in
as
as^
such
measures,
counteracting
freely flowing in from the North,
Australian
culture,
counter-
and
images
and removing damaging impacts and
e.g.
by cutting doMn the floM,
making
it
more expensive, and introducing rivals.
Governments cannot be relied upon
even
Mhere
motivated to do so (e.g. as Mith defence they may
support, because of false beliefs).
rolehas
never
to make requisite changes on their OMn,
been active
in
lack
popular
Apparently, and surprisingly, the State's
Australia,
but
a 1 Mays
reactive.
State
intervention and regulation is and has alMays been in reaction to Mhat
108
happens.
Since governments can not be relied upon to initiate action, it
is important to move for change,
for
such
possible,
change
early
and Mhere possible to obtain popular support
10?
on in movements.
It is important also, Mhere
to bypass government,
building alternative social arrangements and
enlarging the informal economy (see e.g. Nartin).
There is further a component to be exploited in tipping the balance
from the
mainstream
dominant
Northern paradigm, apart from the
Australian
authoritarianism,
culture
(as
e.g.
components
egalitarianism,
of
anti
anti-marketism, satisization, environmentalism, and so on).
That is anti-Americanism.
There
developed
leading
aMay
The attitude in the Antipodes to USA is ambivalent.
is a love-hate relationship in Australia (e.g.
mutual admiration
from
perceived cultural similarities, gratitude from older Australians for American
108. This major theme is advanced, illustrated, and defended in Gilbert,
p.?ff. One important example concerns squatting, other aspects of social
Melfare.
But the theme is liable to be contested, e.g. by Aitkin, Mho
sees 'nearly tMo centuries of reliance on ... omnicompetent initiating
goverment behind us'
(p.27).
HoMever Gilbert seems to be correct;
Australian governments are hardly omnicompetent or 'omnipresent'*, and
they rarely appear to initiate.
10?. That support may be enlisted from culturally unexpected sources, e.g.
Momen in the case of the peace movement, as opinion polls clearly reveal.
The peace movement has not undertaken sufficient political foot-uork,
e.g. grass roots activity such as door knocks, in increasing and
mobilizing this potential support.
�in Morld Mar II;
action
ugly American abroad).
dislike of American blustering,
the Antipodes.
independence,
trying
to
The distaste for being visibly pushed around is strong in
A striking feature of established Antipodean peoples is their
elements
or to be
unwillingness to put up with nonsense,
their
manipulated^ especially by foreigners.
cultural
There is now much anti-US-
in New Zealand since USA made the tactical error of
New Zealand.
bully
the
There is much anti-Americanism in Australia as well as
widespread opposition to the American government.
governmentism
opposition to
as
pushed*
Ao
Of course, the tactic of appeal ingj^such
practices
opposition to the American political
is
a
dangerous one, owing in part to politicians' dishonest penchant for conflating
opposition to a foreign government with opposition to people that goverment is
supposed
to represent (or perhaps on rare occasions does),
easy
the
by
above).
neutralised.
practice
ambiguity of terms like anti-American (an ambiguity
The tactic opens the way to charges of racism,
and the like.
a
But the charges,
For
it
is
on
national chauvinism,
if they can be got at, are straightforwardly
largely a matter of removing
institutions (and cultures) to their individual members,
institutions devolves,
traded
made
fallaciously, into criticism of
crude
reduction
of
so that criticism of
each and every one of
the members.
no
Richard Sylvan
110. This paper had a long and difficult gestation and growth period, before
ye'idling a result that still leaves its author uneasy most days.
He
cehtainly hopes that those who commented on the paper or assisted on the
labour in its earlier days now only dimly recognise it.
Among those to
be thanked are Brian Hartin, Jean Norman, Louise Syvlan (who was
responsible for the monster in the first place), David Bennett, ... .
�On the notion of culture and cultural pluralism
APPENDIX 1:
unfortunately, with very few exceptions,
Definitions of culture abound;
Hany are too narrow,
are bad.
all
for example chauvinistically restricting
culture to human groups (as Kamenka's appalling motto, 'nothing human is alien
p.7.); some are too broad, for example making any sort of organisation
to me',
as a trade union or a local brass band.) a culture.
such
serve
to
connect
problems:- High
redefinitions
of
cu1ture
with [a peoples'] artistic achievement or, even more
111
with (their) literature.
This is h1 on culture, at least insofar
culture
LaJ
narrowly,
as
the types of
indicate
Pt fen examples will
what is included is class restricted,
to certain class-approved
products
and performances (e.g. opera, ballet, drama as opposed to reggae, punk, etc.).
Hhile high redefinitions let in too little,
So
is with the definition of culture as 'the transfer of
it
behavioural means,
(Bonner
with
low redefinitions admit too much.
p.ltj),
culture.
information
most particularly by the process of teaching and learning*
because that includes much that has nothing especially to
For
by
example,
number of bricks on a site,
relaying a weather forecast or passing on
transfers information by behavioural
means,
do
the
but
information of no particular cultural relevance.
By
contrast,
culture.
For
Herskovits:
most definitions mark out something which roughly overlaps
example,
culture
Awa
'settletsJ
for
the
offered
definition
is "the man-made part of the environment"
...'
by
(p.2'?).
Not only is this inadmissibly anthropocentric, excluding animal cultures (such
as
Bonner
writers
studies)
imagine);
and extraterrestrial cultures (such
but
worse,
as
science-fiction
this twisted definition appears to
render
a
ill. Thus, for example, Stephenson
throughout his iconoclastic book on
Australian culture.
The equation, with literary texts, like that of a
paradigm
with central texts,
is useful in offering a
materia!
representation of a culture. For there is something solid that can be
grasped and presented.
Similary, money, newspapers and motor cars,
afford material artefacts and museum exhibits of wider popular cultures.
�deserted
town or ancient ruins a culture (rather
mining
of
manifestation
a
past culture) while excluding a system
physics!
the
than
and
beliefs
of
values as a culture (.unless an erroneous theory of systems of propositions
In
invoked).
is
latching onto the physical exemplification it is moreover like
Kuhn' s identification of a text-book with a paradigm.
there is much m common between the notion of culture and
Indeed
libera! extension of the notion of paradigm,
one of uh 1 ch gained currency
&ng!o-ffmerican thought about a hundred years Later than the other.
have
in
Both terms
been used to cover an apparently diverse range of things (and criticised
dismissed for doing just that),
or
Kuhn's
and both do this in rather simitar
because both attempt to capture types of conceptual schema.
parallels
suggest
- certainly once the usefu! notion of a
widely adopted in sociology,
Mays,
Nhat is more the
paradigm,
soc1 a 1
been encountered and worked Mith - a common
has
notion.
Mith but little reflection,
from
advantage of this definition,
involved
and
para!tel
in
a rather different account of culture
the run of anthropologies! definitions straightaway emerges:- P) cu!ture,
or more exact!y a pure culture,
BP)
then,
P great
is that the hard
and part of its appeal,
thus
does not have to be repeated;
the
supplied
a
logical sense;
generous
by
but
the
c!ean-up
Mould
that is,
an elaborate interpretation
relational
structure.
it
is
function
Naturally it is
a
contrast
to
a scientific paradigm,
propositional structure delivered,
is
many
that of a social group.
sketched
take
theoretical
on
a
required
f aithfu1 to Mhat (the social forms, activities and so on) it models.
in
in
Recall that a paradigm is explicated as a model,
form for culture.
system, i.e. on
paradigm,
Mork
in rectifying the notion of paradigm has already been done (e.g.
precisely
structure
is a comprehensive socia! paradigm.
is a paradigm
genera!
to
be
6 social
where
the
the political themes and value judgements,
Group cohesiveness in fact is guaranteed in
examples of such social paradigms (several reproduced
in
the
RP)
because actual groups with distinctive cultures are taken; but the theoretical
�explanation
goes
structure.
The
and
deeper
depends on features of
the
of propositions! structure delivered
types
mode!
underlying
in
shoMn,
are
capsule form, in the first table of this paper contrasting parts of mainstream
American and Philippine cultures;
other more detailed examples are reproduced
in theoretical Mork on social paradigms (e.g. RP, CPE, Cotgrove and references
cited therein).
dust
the
as
of
explication
May
by
paradigm
of
enabled
models
a
clarification and unification job to be done on the giant conceptual mess that
the
of paradigm had become,
notion
facilitates a pleasing and simplifying synthesis.
the
hc"-j
complains
diffusion by pointing to the
about
complaint
his
Consider,
about,
in
definitions of culture to similes and metaphors,
desperation,
as
...
a
map,
as a sieve,
resort
cu1ture
illustrate,
to
Kluckholn
Geertz Minds
but in anthropology more generally, can be reduced.
especially,
up
Geertz
diffusion'
'theoretical
of
so the parallel explication
in
attempted
to the analogies 'perhaps in
and as a matrix',
before a
mere
paragraph later, offering his OMn metaphor of culture as a. Meb of significance
or interpretation (and mode 1 too,
its
in metaphor),
roots
though here an exact technical notion,
Prs it happens,
Geertz's account is not too
has
bad
a
picture of the sort of logical model involved, that is of a system, a Meb**l ike
structure, Mith an interpretation
matrix
The other similes are hoMever more exact:
on it.
imposed,
can
function, supplying significance or meaning
models (though not
as
function
usually
both a map and a
social
ones),
a
map
typically modelling a landscape.
take up Kluckholn's elaboration on culture (not
to
Furthermore,
really
^definitions' as Geertz suggests), a model is indeed '(4) "an abstraction from
Mhich,
behaviour"',
feeling
thinking,
hoMever
is
not
prescript i v e 1 y
Mhere
and
it is a social paradigm,
believing"'* in terms of items
merely descriptive,
as,
supplies
'('?)
"a
validated.
but Mill be applied
mechanism
for
the
(3) "a May of
and
normative
can
The
model
be
regulation
read
of
�(ID? "a set of techniques for adjusting both to the externa!
and
behaviour"'
environment and to other men"'. Such a mode!, which does correspond to '(5) "a
the part of the anthropologist about the '..'jay in which a
on
theory
peop!e in fact behave"' and their view of the wor!d,
orientations,
Since the social paradigm evolves over time,
'(11) "a precipitate of history'",
of
certainly affords '(6) a
structure of pooled learning"' and '(7.) "a set of standardized
to recurrent problems" .
group
it is
and it does record '(2) "the social legacy
the individual [in the society] acquires from his group"'.
three parts or levels of a culture that Conga!ton and David
The
*--P*22 ff.) are similar to those Kuhn includes within a paradigm,
readi1y
supplied
by
a model.
They
are,
first,
the
discern
and likewise
genera!
rules
and
procedures characterising and controlling the behaviour of adherents; secondly
the ideas and vatues.behind these beliefs and procedures; thirdly the products
materia!
and
exemplars
resulting,
e.g.
textbooks,
interpretation function validates both themes and ru!es;
domains
as wel! it
including values and ideas (on both see
of objects,
connection with exemplars and artefacts is less direct,
The
The
newspapers.
RP,
delivers
pp.12-16).
and of more than
textbook may present a paradigm or, more likely, part of one; or
112
it may, like an artefact, supply or be a partial modelling of the paradigm.
one kind.
remaining
The
to
order
culture
reflect
has
life-forms
done.
Ihus
to
of
qualifying term comprehensive is
some of the slackness of the
deliberately
notion
of
Abraham,
styles
there are varying degrees to which this
for one,
can
112.
and
be
explains various inclusive levels of culture
(PP* 12-13) before opting for the most inclusive, under which 'culture is
113
common life of the people
and 'includes the whole of the knowledge,
arts,
in
Hhile
culture.
cover a sufficiently comprehensive part of life
a community,
vague
th<=
the
science, technology, religions, morality, ritual, politics, literature,
theory normally has many models, some exact and canonical, some of
which bring out al! that holds in the theory but not only what holds
there;
and, more sweepmgly still, it has partial models, which
accurately depict part of the theory.
�etiquette
even
compr eh ensi ve,
includes
use of t he.t erm hot'je ver
mastery
a
sculpture,
.
of
a
seventeenth
(p. 12) 114
..."
-fashions
Under
a
all
of
process
literature,
Abraham
(p.13).
of
and could knoM (p.13).
history,
culture!,
music,
pauperisation of Mhat
the
culture
and
painting
conjectures that this use evolved
and eighteenth centuries,
! ess
narroMer,
cu 1 ture i s limited to Mhat are called
In this use [that again of "higher"
of the mind.
things
result
and
educated
the age of enlightenment,
man
'as
in
a
the
stood for',
Such a person could reflect the Mhole culture in
the
more comprehensive use.
The European vieM of culture, Mhich tends to concentrate on high culture,
is insufficiently comprehensive,
leaving out a crucial aspect of culture,
so
it has been argued, namely attitudes to and approaches to the environment, and
so natural environments largely devoid of man-made features and influences
particular.
in
fuller picture of environmentally-sensitive culture looks like
this:113. (From previous page) See p.21.
Accounts of culture of this very
inclusive, but still unnecessarily anthropic, form are common in the
literature.
Thus, for example, Harris: 'f) culture is the total socially
acquired life-May or life-style of a group of people'
(p.144), their
patterns of behaviour and thought.
Thus, Mith even less qualification,
the first of Kluckholn'-s eleven definitions of culture (as listed in
Geertz pp.4-5), 'the total May of life of of a people', a definition
repeated in Conga)ton and David, p.22.
The intended model accordingly
provides a complete representation of life-Mays of members of the
c u 1 t u r e.
114. H fuller and better account Mhich gets very close to the model-theoretic
analysis, is Kumer's analogous definition of culture:
The
shared
symbolic system Mhich gives meaning
to
human
interactions in a society.
It refers to a society's May of
perceiving, interpreting and expressing things ... it includes
knoMledqe, belief-systems, values, norms and ideologies Mhich
enable the members of a society to perceive, organise and interpret
reality ... reality is alMays perceived Mi thin an evaluative
frameMork.
Similar too is Tylor's definition of 'culture' in terms of a structure
again: 'Culture or Civilization ... that complex Mhole Mhich includes
knoMledge, belief, art, morals, la.M, customs, and any other capabilities
and habits acquired by man as a member of society'. (Primitive Culture
vol. 7, p.7).
So all human societies have a culture, a generalised
paradigm.
It is better to separate out civi1ization, hoMever, and link
it to its 'root meaning of living in cities'.
�PRIMARY CULTURE DlnGFWl
sense
'culture',
of
and
intellectual
sociology,
in
Mhere
order
culture.
artistic
the
practice
dictionaries,
takes up the primary
namely
Con c i se En q1i sh D i c t i on ary),
consists
in
put]
of
and as presented
culture of a society is said to comprise
a given culture,
state
'the
as it is
lor development,
of
a
in
shared
'the
It is important to separate off -
in
or people Mith,
and the education-derived sense,
the training or discipline in or
group-
particular, the
in Mhich the culture comprises the community,
leading
in Mhich the
to
Evidently the explication, Mhich makes the product primary
a
given
reverses
the culture. like agriculture, viticulture, and
115
Mas first and foremost a process
, a "cultivation" of intellect and
the historical order,
so on,
in
to set aside - some derivative senses,
sharing,
culture
offered
values and beliefs' of the society.
derived sense,
or
as
or people' (cf.
community
norms,
through social paradigms,
explication so far,
The
Mhere
115. Pts Hilliams explains, the ear 1 y meaning of 'culture' Mas as a process;
and the 'culture of the mind' Mas vieMed as a process rather than a
product or achieved state.
In (early) modern use 'culture' became, like
'civilized', a condition. Only Mith the 'fourth modern development did
culture appear as ' the Mho 1e May of life, material, intellectual and
spiritual of a given society' (p.273), i.e., as a comprehensive social
paradigm. The other forms, the first three developments, Mere restricted
versions of this, to respectively the individual, intellectual and moral
parts, and arts and intellectual areas.
To invert the ahistorical explanatory patte^,
so to say, the inherited cu1tures of science?
scientific paradigms are,
�However the reversal makes it easier to qet some grip on
art and technology.
the very rich process-product complex that a culture comprises.
example, goes astray in settling for a process definition of
Bonner,
for
'culture'* allied
to the education-derived sense: 'By culture I mean the transfer of information
by
most
means,
behavioural
by the process
particularly
of
teaching
and
Hhile the definition certainly achieves its intended objective of
learning*.
including animal culture^,
it is, as already remarked, a quite excessively low
redefinition,
such
accounting
things as semaphoring between boy
scouts
as
c u 1 t u r e.
There is a further dimension of complexity so far largely omitted through
restriction
pure
most contemporary states are far from culturally pure, comprising a
cultures,
mixture
1-lhile tribal groups may have relatively
to pure cultures.
of peoples.and cultures.
represented
More generally,
an n-cultural society
by a system of n paradigms adhered to in the society.
6
multi
6
multi
cultural
society
is thus an n-cultural society where n is
cultural
society
may
simply
Australia,
not
include
however be
very
many.
it
pluralistic;
may,
groups of people from different cultures
under some dominant culture which controls
in one region
together
is
as
in
brought
the
main
Much depends then on the type of system of paradigms
political institutions.
involved, on how the paradigms are themselves interrelated and structured.
Ft
society
nil!
function
(cf.
Abraham,
p.lbff.,
incompatible with extreme individualism').
a variety of subcultures.
Mhich
is
not
Characteristically
and
commonly
For culture is the glue of a group;
competing cultures.
integrative
always have a culture,
several
perhaps
it has an important
who remarks that 'culture
is
Ft society wi 1 1 also typically have
f) subculture is a paradigm, included in a culture,
sufficiently
subcultures
comprehensive
to
rank
as
a
share norms and assumptions with some
culture.
larger
culture except where they diverge.
The
dominant
cultures
in countries like Australia and America
can
be
�as having tree structures.
represented
a
is
there
Subcultures
mainstream
century
gentry
Protestant
many
subcultural
long played significant parts in
have
last
example,
Mi th
culture,
differences
the
terms,
116
tributaries.
Transposing to river-network
between
Catholic,
extensive immigration program,
substantial social tolerance,
with
and
chai 1enged.
Alternative
critical
important
an
As a result
assumptions
along
and
that is, the cultural streams remain
of the
mainstream
culture
are
not
those
of
Australia) do however is to criticise and challenge themes of the
accommodate,
These
within
too a pluralistic (a plural paradigm) society
provided the social paradigms present
limits,
no
can
real
to overarching socio-political arrangements and the prevailing type of
threat
structure (if they should however things would have to give or
power
of
complex
permit the relatively easy formation
rival and al ternative social paradigms (such as
Hhat
culture.
dominant
and
Australia now boasts a much more
persistence of subcultures - so long as,
subcu1tures
Protestant
Flexible multi-cultural arrangements,
of ethnic subcultures.
pattern
for
of Australian colonial culture had
streams
bearing on leisure activities such as gambling (see Inglis).
its
history;
Australian
change;
rival river networks are bound to alter the cultural landscape).
like
Cultures,
explaining
illustrated
that
and
paradigms,
social
inducing social change.
explanatory roles.
repudiation
nature',
important
role
on
the
that is,
For example,
in RP).
It is worth
that
it
noticing
to
Philp criticises for Foucault
prevents
him
from
consistent
explaining
in
and
human
culture can replace nature
of the human subject and the denial of a
ground
both
So much has already been shown
as regards social paradigms (e.g.
nature have been supposed mandatory;
'his
an
can also afford explanatory roles in cases where appeal
they
social
have
in
for
human
directed
116. A subculture of a given culture is itself a culture (i.e. a comprehensive
social paradigm) applying to a subgroup of the given wider culture,
which agrees with the wider culture on characterising (paradigmatic)
features but which may diverge, and typically does, by virtue of further
cultural features, i.e. features in its paradigm.
A subculture stands
then technically to a culture as a subalgebra stands to an algebra, etc.
4^
�resistance or social struggle for the better.
explain
a
and justify such resistance 'requires that Me make some commitment to
conception
of the human good and this usually rests on some vieM of
nature and human subjectivity'*.
the
to
social
good
as
human
a.May;
The modifier 'usually' gives the game
route can circuit through culture.
justificatory
directed
Accordingly to Philp t.p.17.!, to
discerned
under
a
The struggle
regional
can
paradigm;
be
the
commitments can be cultural.
The
main real Mork of this paper,
descriptive
some
attempt
of relevant features of the different cultures
at
explanation
has
been
contrasted,
Mith
like much Mork on culture,
of more unexpected features
of
the
cultures,
concerned, some criticism, and some attempt to explain some cultural traits in
terms of others.
enterprise,
cultures
only
This, like the modelling account, points to a more difficult
broached:
investigated,
namely,
the
task of providing theories of
and so perhaps explaining Mhat pulls
them
the
together,
makes them tick, gives them their distinctive shape and grip, and so on.
�APPENDIX 2:
Contemporary scientific redeployment of human nature
attempts of this sort are based on the modern evolutionary synthesis, and
in
appear
extreme
most
form
in
sociobiology.
t'jas
it
However
quickly
recognised that (opportunistic) sociobioligical attempts, such as Nilson's, to
to rule out significant political
117
narrow social alternatives fail.
redeploy
nature
human
underlying characterisation of human nature is
Nilson's
from the main socio-political tradition.
the
[is!
of
set
full
behavioural
possibilities
innate
Li.e.
very
and
different
'In the broader sense, human nature
genetic
or
genetically-determined]
predispositions that characterise the human species;
and in
the
narrower sense, those predispositions that affect social behaviour' t.pp.217-8,
mith
It is not constant or static,
rearrangement).
It is certainly ahistorical,
(sub)species
read
disease
patterns
conjunctively
however the ambiguity in the characterisation of
is resolved.
nature - hardly a set,
disjunctively it
only
n'ill include the full
humans
since genes may mutate.
are liable to
set
suffer;
For if the definition
of
if
is
genetically-determined
read,
those every (normal) human is bound to
less
undergo
plausibly,
at
some
stage.
In any event, such sets are remote from Enlightenment political concerns,
thouph, like health and disease more generally, socially relevant enough;
they
hardly
alternatives.
appear
to
Moreover,
impose
they
significant
offer
constraints
on
no bulwark against racial or
and
political
cultural
and since by no means
118
everything is determined genetically e.g. languages of some cultures.
relativity,
since
races have separate gene subpools,
117. f^s this is a commonplace vie^j,
Singer and especially Pigden.
there is no need to labour it:
see Ruse,
determinism is simply one, and perhaps even the weakest, of
forms of determinism intended to vastly reduce
cultural
variability.
Nilson does not rely on that form exclusively, but helps
himself to other incompatible forms of determinism as suit^: see p.207.
118. Genetic
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On the notion of culture and cultural pluralism
APPENDIX 1:
Definitions of culture abound;
all
unfortunately, with very few exceptions,
Many are too narrow,
are bad.
for example chauvmistica! ly restricting
culture to human groups (as Kamenka's appalling motto, 'nothing human is alien
p.7); some are too broad, for example making any sort of organisation
to me' ,
as a trade union or a local brass band) a culture,
such
to
serve
connect
problems:- High
redefinitions
of
cu1ture
with [a peoples'] artistic achievement or, even more
lil
with (their) literature.
This is nion culture, at least insofar
culture
EaJ
narrowly,
as
the types of
indicate
A few examples w 11 1
what is included is class restricted,
to certain class-approved
products
and performances (e.g. opera, ballet, drama as opposed to reggae, punk, etc.).
Mhile high redefinitions let in too little,
So
is with the definition of culture as 'the transfer of
it
behavioural means,
(Bonner
Mi th
low redefinitions admit too much.
p.l'J),
culture.
information
most particularly by the process of teaching and learning'
because that includes much that has nothing especially to
For
by
example,
number of bricks on a site,
relaying a weather forecast or passing on
transfers information by behavioural
means,
do
the
but
information of no particular cultural relevance. .
By
contrast,
For
culture.
Herskovits:
most definitions mark out something which roughly overlaps
example,
culture
Awa
settleEsJ
for
the
definition
is "the man-made part of the environment"
offered
...'
by
(p.2'?).
Not only is this inadmissibly anthropocentric, excluding animal cultures (such
as
Bonner
writers
studies)
imagine);
and extraterrestrial cultures (such
but
worse,
as
science-fiction
this twisted definition appears to
render
a
ill. Thus, for example, Stephenson
throughout his iconoclastic book on
Australian culture.
The equation, with literary texts, like that of a
paradigm
with central texts,
is useful in offering a
material
representation of a culture. 'For there is something solid that can be
grasped and presented.
Similary, money, newspapers and motor cars,
afford material artefacts and museum exhibits of wider popular cultures.
�deserted
toMn or ancient rums a culture (rather
mining
of
manifestation
a
than
past culture) Mhile excluding a system
the
of
physical
and
beliefs
values as a culture (unless an erroneous theory of systems of propositions
invoked).
In
is
latching onto the physical exemplification it is moreover like
Kuhn's identification of a text-book Mith a paradigm.
there is much in common between the notion of culture and
Indeed
liberal extension of the notion of paradigm,
one of Mhich gamed currency
^nglo-Psmerican thought about a hundred years later than the other.
have
in
Both terms
been used to cover an apparently diverse range of things (and criticised
dismissed for doing just that),
or
Kuhn's
and both do this m rather similar
because both attempt to capture types of conceptual schema.
parallels
suggest
- certainly once the useful notion of a
Midely adopted m sociology,
Mays,
Nhat is more the
social
paradigm,
been encountered and Morked Mith - a common
has
notion.
Nith but little reflection,
from
then,
a rather different account of culture
the run of anthropological definitions straightaMay emerges:- & culture,
or more exactly a pure culture,
advantage of this definition,
is a comprehensive socia! paradigm.
and part of its appeal,
R great
is that the hard
Mork
involved
in rectifying the notion of paradigm has already been done (e.g.
RP)
thus
and
parallel
m
the
supplied
system, i.e. on
a
logical sense;
generous
by
but
the
clean-up
Mould
that is,
an elaborate interpretation
relational
structure.
it
is
function
Naturally it is
a
theoretical
on
a
required
fai thfu1 to Mhat (the social forms, activities and so on) it models.
paradigm,
m
contrast
to
a scientific paradigm,
propositional structure delivered,
is
many
that of a social group.
sketched
take
Recall that a paradigm is explicated as a mode!.
form for culture.
precisely
structure
does not have to be repeated;
m
is a paradigm
general
to
be
Ps social
Mhere
the
the political themes and value judgements,
Group cohesiveness in fact is guaranteed in
examples of such social paradigms (several reproduced
in
the
RP)
because actual groups Mith distinctive cultures are taken; but the theoretical
�explanation
goes
structure.
The
deeper
and
depends on features of
underlying
the
of propositional structure delivered
types
are
model
in
shoMn,
capsule form, in the first table of this paper contrasting parts of mainstream
other more detailed examples are reproduced
American and Philippine cultures;
in theoretical Mork
social paradigms (e.g. PP, CPE, Cotgrove and references
cited therein).
Just
expl 1 cat ion
the
as
of
paradigm
of
May
by
models
enabled
a
clarification and unification .job to be done on the giant conceptual mess that
the
of paradigm had become,
notion
facilitates a pleasing and simplifying synthesis.
how
complaint
his
Geertz
to
Consider,
about,
complains
diffusion by pointing to the
about
in
definitions of culture to similes and metaphors,
desperation,
as
...
map,
a
resort
Kluckholn
Geertz Minds
in
attempted
to the analogies ''perhaps in
mere
before a
and as a matrix'*,
as a sieve,
cu1ture
illustrate,
but in anthropology more generally, can be reduced.
especially,
up
diffusion'*
'theoretical
the
of
so the parallel explication
paragraph later, offering his OMn metaphor of culture as a web of significance
or interpretation (and model too,
its
in metaphor).
roots
though here an exact technical notion,
Rs it happens,
Geertz"'s account is not too
has
bad
a
picture of the sort of logical model involved, that is of a system, a Meb-like
structure, Mith an interpretation
imposed,
matrix
both a map and a
The other similes are hoMever more exact:
on it.
function
can
function, supplying significance or meaning
as
models (though not
usually
social
ones),
map
a
typically modelling a landscape.
Furthermore,
take up Kluckholn'* s elaboration on culture (not
to
really
'definitions' as Geertz suggests), a model is indeed '(4) "an abstraction from
behaviour'"',
thinking,
hoMever
Mhich,
and
feeling
is
not
prescriptively
Mhere
believing'" in terms of items
merely descriptive,
as,
supplies '(3) "a May of
it is a social paradigm,
'*('?)
"a
validated.
but Mill be applied
mechanism
for
the
and
normative
can
The
model
be
regulation
read
of
�and "(10) "a set of techniques -tor- adjusting both to the externa!
behaviour'"'
environment and to other men"''. Such a mode!, which does correspond to '(5) "a
theory
the part of the anthropologist about the way in which a
on
peop!e m fact behave'"' and their view of the world,
orientations,
it is
. Since the social paradigm evolves over time,
'(11) "a precipitate of history'"',
of
certainly affords '(6) a
"structure of pooled learning'"' and '(7) "a set of standardized
to recurrent problems'".
group
and it does record '(2) "the social legacy
the individual Ein the society! acquires from his group"'.
three parts or levels of a culture that Conga!ton and David
The
(p.22 ff.) are similar to those Kuhn includes within a paradigm,
by
supplied
readily
a model.
They
are,
first,
the
discern
and likewise
general
rules
and
procedures characterising and controlling the behaviour of adherents; secondly
the ideas and values behind these beliefs and procedures; thirdly the products
and
exemplars
material
resulting,
e.g.
interpretation function validates both themes and rules;
of objects,
domains
The
The
newspapers.
textbooks,
as well it
including values and ideas (on both see
connection with exemplars and artefacts is less direct,
RP,
delivers
pp.12-16).
and of more than
Pt textbook may present a paradigm or, more likely, part of one; or
112
it may, like an artefact, supply or be a partial mode!ling of the paradigm.
one kind.
The
order
culture
remaining
reflect
to
has
life-forms
done.
Thus
to
of
qualifying term comprehensive is
some of the slackness of the
notion
of
culture.
cover a sufficiently comprehensive part of life
a community,
Abraham,
vague
deliberately
for one,
klhile
styles
there are varying degrees to which this
can
and
be
explains various inclusive levels of culture
(pp.12-13) before opting for the most inclusive, under which 'culture is
113
common life of the people'*
and 'includes the whole of the knowledge,
arts,
in
the
the
science, technology, religions, morality, ritual, politics, literature,
112. 6 theory normally has many models, some exact and canonical, some of
which bring out all that holds m the theory but not only what holds
there;
and, more sweepingly still, it has partial models, which
accurately depict part of the theory.
�even
etiquette
and
of the mind.
includes
le
narroMer,
In this use [that again of "higher"
mastery
a
'*
scu1pture,
a
seventeenth
a
Under
use of the term however ''culture is limited to Mhat are called
comprehensive,
things
(p.12)114
'
-fashions
Abraham
(p.13).
process
of
conjectures that this use evolved
pauperisation of Mhat
and eighteenth centuries,
and could knoM (p.13).
the
educated
the age of enlightenment,
man
'as
in
a
the
stood for',
Such a person could reflect the Mhole culture in
the
more comprehensive use.
The European vieM of culture, Mhich tends to concentrate on high culture,
is insufficiently comprehensive,
leaving out a crucial aspect of culture,
so
it has been argued, namely attitudes to and approaches to the environment, and
so natural environments largely devoid of man-made features and influences
particular.
in
& fuller picture of environmentally-sensitive culture looks like
this:-
113. (From previous page) See p.21.
Accounts of culture of this very
inclusive, but still unnecessarily anthropic, form are common in the
literature.
Thus, for example, Harris: ''Ft culture is the total socially
acquired life-May or life-style of a group of people
(p.144), their
patterns of behaviour and thought.
Thus, Mith even less qualification,
the first of Kluckholn's eleven definitions of culture (as listed in
Geertz pp.4-5), 'the total May of life of of a people', a definition
repeated in Congalton and David, p.22.
The intended model accordingly
provides a complete representation of life-Mays of members of the
culture.
114. Ft fuller and better account Mhich gets very close to the model-theoretic
analysis, is Kumer's analogous definition of culture:
The
shared
symbolic system Mhich gives meaning
to
human
interactions in a society.
It refers to a society's May of
perceiving, interpreting and expressing things ... it includes
knoMledge, belief-systems, values, norms and ideologies Mhich
enable the members of a society to perceive, organise and interpret
reality ... reality is alMays perceived Mithin an evaluative
frameMork.
Similar too is Tylor's definition of 'culture' in terms of a structure
again: 'Culture or Civilization ... that complex Mhole Mhich includes
knoMledge, belief, art, morals, laM, customs, and any other capabilities
and habits acquired by man as a member of society'. (Primitive Culture
vol. 7, p.7).
So all human societies have a culture, a generalised
paradigm.
It is better to separate out civiliza11on, hoMever, and link
it to its 'root meaning of living in cities'.
�PRIORY CULTURE DIRGRRH
sense
of
"culture"',
and
intellectual
where
sociology,
in
order
culture.
artistic
the
practice
takes up the grimary
namely
dictionaries,
Concise English Dictionary),
consists
in
putJ
of
and as presented
culture of a society is said to comprise
a given culture,
state
the
as it is
tor development,
' the
of
a
in
shared
It is important to separate off *
particular, the
in
in which the culture comprises the community,
and the educa11on-der1ved sense,
the training or discipline in or
groun
or people with,
leading
in which the
to
Evidently the explication, which makes the product primary
the historical order,
so on,
in
to set aside - some derivative senses,
sharing,
culture
offered
values and beliefs' of the society.
der ived sense,
or
as
or people' (cf.
community
norms,
through social paradigms,
explication so -far,
The
a
given
reverses
the culture, like agriculture, viticulture, and
115
was first and foremost a process
, a "cultivation" of intellect and
where
115. Rs Williams explains, the early meaning of 'culture'' was as a process;
and the ''culture of the mind' was viewed as a process rather than a
product or achieved state.
In (early) modern use 'culture' became, like
'civilized'', a condition. Only with the 'fourth modern development did
culture appear as 'the whole way of life, material, intellectual and
spiritual of a given society* (p.273), i.e., as a comprehensive social
paradigm. The other forms, the first three developments, were restricted
versions of this, to respectively the individual, intellectual and moral
parts, and arts and intellectual areas.
To invert the ahistorical explanatory patten^
so to say, the inherited cu1tures of science.
scientific paradigms are,
�art and technology.
However the reversal makes it easier to get some grip on
the very rich process-product complex that a culture comprises.
example, goes astray in settling for a process definition of
Bonner,
for
allied
'culture
to the education-derived senses ''By culture I mean the transfer of information
by
behavioural
particularly
most
means,
of
by the process
teaching
and
Nhile the definition certainly achieves its intended objective of
learning*',
it is, as already remarked, a quite excessively low
including animal culture^
accounting
redefinition,
such
things as semaphoring between boy
scouts
as
culture.
There is a further dimension of complexity so far largely omitted through
restriction
pure
most contemporary states are far from culturally pure, comprising a
cultures,
mixture
Mhile tribal groups may have relatively
to pure cultures.
More generally,
of peoples and cultures.
represented
an n-cultural society
by a system of n paradigms adhered to in the society.
&
multi
ft
multi
cultural
society
is thus an n-cultural society where n is
cultural
society
may
simply
Australia,
not
include
however be
very
many.
pluralistic;
it
as
may,
groups of people from different cultures
under some dominant culture which controls
in one region
together
is
in
brought
main
the
Much depends then on the type of system of paradigms
poli tical institutions.
involved, on how the paradigms are themselves interrelated and structured.
Ps
society
will
function
(cf.
Abraham,
p.lbff.,
incompatible with extreme individualism').
a variety of subcultures.
which
is
not
Characteristically
and
commonly
For culture is the glue of a group;
competing cultures.
integrative
always have a culture,
several
perhaps
it has an important
who remarks that
culture
is
society will also typically have
R subculture is a paradigm, included in a culture,
sufficiently
subcultures
comprehensive
to
rank
as
a
share norms and assumptions with some
culture.
larger
culture except where they diverge.
The
dominant
cultures
in countries like Australia and America
can
be
�is
there
Subcultures
with
many
century
gentry
the
differences
terms,
11.S
tributaries.
subculture!
hong played significant parts in
have
last
Protestant
culture,
mainstream
a
example,
Transposing to river-network
as having tree structures.
reoresented
between
Catholic,
extensive immigration program,
pattern
of ethnic subcultures.
important
As a result
complex
accommodate,
and
that is, the cultural streams remain
of the
mainstream
culture
are
not
those
of
These
within
too a pluralistic (a plural paradigm) society
provided the social paradigms present
limits,
can
no
real
to overarching socio-political arrangements and the prevailing type of
threat
structure (if they should however things would have to give or
power
along
permit the relatively easy formation
assumptions
of
Australia) do however is to criticise and challenge themes of the
culture.
dominant
an
rival and alternative social paradigms (such as
k-lhat
chai 1enged.
Al ternative
critical
and
and
Australia now boasts a much more
persistence of subcultures - so long as,
subcultures
Protestant
Flexible multi-cultural arrangements,
substantial social tolerance,
with
for
of Australian colonial culture had
streams
bearing on leisure activities such as gambling (see Inglis),
its
history;
lustra!ian
change;
rival river networks are bound to alter the r*.;Xural landscape).
Cultures,
explaining
and
illustrated
that
like
paradigms,
social
inducing social change.
explanatory roles.
repudiation
nature",
important
role
on
the
that is,
For example,
in RP).
It is worth
that
it
noticing
to
Philp criticises for Foucault
prevents
him
from
consistent
explaining
in
and
human
culture can replace nature
of the human subject and the denial of a
ground
both
So much has already been shown
as regards social paradigms (e.g.
nature have been supposed mandatory;
'his
an
can also afford explanatory roles in cases where appeal
they
social
have
in
for
human
directed
IIS, A subculture of a given culture is itself a culture (i.e. a comprehensive
social paradigm) applying to a subgroup of the given wider culture,
which agrees with the wider culture on characterising (paradigmatic)
features but which may diverge, and typically does, by virtue of further
cultural features, i.e. features in its paradigm.
A subculture stands
then technically to a culture as a subalgebra stands to an algebra, etc.
�resistance or social struggle tor the better,
explain
a
and justify such resistance 'requires that ^e make some commitment to
conception
of the human good and this usually rests on some vie^j of
human
The modifier 'usually* gives the game
a^ay;
nature and human subjectivity'*.
the
route can circuit through culture.
justificatory
directed
accordingly to Philp (p.17), to
to
social
good
as
under
discerned
a
The struggle
can
paradigm^
regional
be
the
c ommitmen t s c an be cultural.
The
main real ^ork of this paper,
descriptive
some
attempt
like much Mork on culture,
of relevant features of the different cultures
at
explanation
of more unexpected features
has
been
contrasted,
^ith
of
the
cultures
concerned, some criticism, and some attempt to explain some cultural traits in
terms of others.
enterprise,
cultures
only
This, like the modelling account, points to a more difficult
broached:
investigated,
namely,
the
task of providing theories of
and so perhaps explaining ^hat pulls
them
the
together,
makes them tick, gives them their distinctive shape and grip, and so on.
�Contemporary scientific redeployment of human nature
APPENDIX 2:
attempts of this sort are based on the modern evolutionary synthesis, and
most
in
appear
extreme
form
in
sociobiology.
However
it
Mas
quickly
recognised that (opportunistic) sociobiol^gical attempts, such as Nilson's, to
nature
human
to rule out significant political
117
narroM social alternatives fail.
redeploy
underlying characterisation of human nature is
Nilson's
from the main socio-political tradition.
[is]
of
set
full
the
possibilities
[i.e,
innate
very
different
'In the broader sense, human nature
genetic
genetically-determinedJ
or
predispositions that characterise the human species;
behavioural
and
and in
the
narrower sense, those predispositions that affect social behaviour'* (pp.217-8,
Mith
It is certainly ahistorical,
read
disjunctively it
disease
hoMever the ambiguity in the characterisation of
nature - hardly a set,
(sub)species
patterns
conjunctively
only
since genes may mutate.
It is not constant or static,
rearrangement).
Mill include the full
humans
For if the definition
is resolved.
are liable to
set
suffer;
of
if
is
genetically-determined
read,
those every (normal) human is bound to
less
undergo
plausibly,
at
some
stage.
In any event, such sets are remote from Enlightenment political concerns,
though, like health and disease more generally, socially relevant enough;
they
hardly
alternatives.
appear
to
Moreover,
impose
they
significant
offer
constraints
on
no bulMark against racial or
and
political
cultural
and since by no means
118
everything is determined genetically e.g. languages of some cultures.
relativity,
since
races have separate gene subpools,
117. Fss this is a commonplace vieM,
Singer^, and especially Pigden.
there is no need to labour it:
see Ruse,
118. Genetic determinism is simply one, and perhaps even the Meakest, of
several
forms of determinism intended to vastly reduce
cultural
variability.
Nilson does not rely on that form exclusively, but helps
himself to other incompatible forms of determinism as suit^: see p.207.
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(1984) 7-18.
Australian Cultural History 3
T.S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revo1utions. Second edition, University
of Chicago Press, 1970.
K. Kumar, The Social and Cultural Impact of Transnational Enterprises, Horking
Paper No. 8, ?tRP, University of Sydney, 1979.
R.E. Lane, "Market .justice, political justice'', Hugo Nolfsen Memorial Lecture,
Melbourne, May, 1985.
N. Lini, Keynote address, Australia and the South Pacific. Proceedings of a
Conference held at the Australian National University, 1982.
//3
�The following has been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions.
Letter, Alan? (Department of Philosophy, University of Alberta) to Richard Sylvan, 9 Jun 1988 re
feedback on paper. (4 pages)
�%/,y
7
Ch
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*1-
7
—
���On the notion of culture and cultural pluralism
APPENDIX 1:
unfortunately, with very + ew exception s,
Definitions of culture abound;
y
all
Many are too narrow,
3re bad.
cu1ture to human groups (as Kamenka's
p.7) ; some are too broad,
,
brass band) a culture.
as a trade union
(such
problems:- High
serve
connect
EaJ
as
redefinitions
with Ea peoples'] artistic achievement
culture
with (their) literature.
narrowly,
A few examples will
of
cu1ture
even
or,
more
This is high culture, at least insofar
what is included is class restricted,
to certain class-approved
products
and performances (e.g. opera, ballet, drama as opposed to reggae, punk, etc.).
low redefinitions admit too much.
"the transfer of
information
by
process of teaching and learning'
(Bonner
p.10),
because that includes much that has nothing especially to
do
the
number of bricks on a site,
transfers information by behavioural
means,
but
information of no particular cultural relevance.
By
contrast,
most definitions mark out something which roughly overlaps
Awa
'settleEsJ
for
the
definition
by
(p.2?).
"the man-made part of the environment"
Herskovi ts:
offered
this inadmissibly anthropocentric, excluding animal cultures (such
Bonner
as
writers
-f&sl
studies)
imagine);
and extraterrestrial cultures (such
but
as
science-fiction
this twisted definition appears to
worse,
LL't.........
render
throughout his iconoclastic book o
L Thus , for t example, Stephenson
Australian culture.
The equation, with literary texts, like that of
paradigm
with central texts,
is useful in offering a
materia
representation of a culture. For there is something solid that can b
grasped and presented.
Similary, money, newspapers and motor cars
afford material artefacts and museum exhibits of wider popular cultures.
?5
a
�deserted
town or ancient ruins a culture (rather
mining
of
manifestation
a
than
past culture) while excluding a system
physical
the
of
beliefs
and
values as a culture (unless an erroneous theory of systems of propositions
invoked).
In
is
latching onto the physical exemplification it is moreover like
Kuhn's identification of a text-book Mith a paradigm.
Indeed
there is much in common between the notion of culture and
Kuhns
one of which'gained currency
Both terms
Rnglo-&merican thought about a hundred years later than the other.
have
or
in
been used to cover an apparently diverse range of things (and criticised
dismissed for doing just that),
and both do this in
Nhat is more the
because both attempt to capture types of conceptual schema.
paradigm,
a common
been encountered and worked Mith
noti on.
then,
from
the run of anthropological definitions straightaway emerges
advan tage of this definition,
i nvo1ved
and
paral1 el
in
and part of its appeal,
is that the hard
work
would
take
in rectifying the notion of paradigm
thus
does not have to be repeated;
form for culture.
precisely
structure
6 great
is a comprehensive social paradigm
or more exactly a pure culture.
RP)
a rather different account of cu1ture
but
c1ean-up
Recal 1 that a paradigm is expli cated as a model,
is
it
the
supplied
the
by
an elaborate interpretation
function
is
a
theoretical
on
required
faithful to what (the social forms, activities and so on) it models,
paradigm,
in
contrast
to
a scientific paradigm,
proposi tional structure delivered,
is
many
that of a social group.
sketched
general
a
is a paradigm
to
be
& social
where
the
the political themes and value .judgements,
Group cohesiveness in fact is guaranteed in
examples of such social paradigms (several reproduced
in
the
RP)
because actual groups with distinctive cultures are taken; but the theoretical
96
�explanation
goes
structure.
The
deeper
depends on features of
and
of propositional structure delivered
types
model
underlying
the
are
in
shoMn,
capsule form, in the first table of this paper contrasting parts of mainstream
other more detailed examples are reproduced
American and Philippine cul bares;
in theoretical Mork on social paradigms (e.g. RP, CPE, Cotgrove^and references
cited therein).
Just
as
the
of
explication
by
paradigm
May
of
models
enabled
a
clarification and unification .job to be done on the giant conceptual mess that
the
of paradigm had become,
notion
so the parallel explication
in
abou t,
but in anthropology more generally, can be reduced.
especially,
up
his
c^.\tu,rg.
Kluckholn
Geertz Minds
attempted
in
resor t
diffusion by pointing to the
about
complaint
of
and^r metaphors, to the analogies 'perhaps in
as
desperation,
a map*,
and as a matrix',
as a sieve,
before
a
mere
paragraph later, offering his OMn metaphor of culture as a Meb of significance
' ' too,
'
, though here an exact technical notion, has
or interpretation (and model
its roots in metaphor]^ Rs it happen^Geertz^/ account is not too bad a picture
of the sort of logical model involved
structure^Mith an interpretation
imposed,
typically
on it.
that is of a system, a Meb-like
function,
supplying signifi'-arn.e -r meaning
The other similes are hoMever more exact:
modelling
a
landscape.
Furthermore,
elaboration of) culture (not really 'definitions
is indeed '(4) "an abstraction from behaviour"',
paradigm,
supplies '(3) "a May of thinking,
of items validated.
to
take
ooth a map and a.
up
as Geertz suggests),
a model
Mhere it is a social
Mhich,
feeling and believing"
The model hoMever is not merely descriptive,
applied and can be read prescriptively as,
Kluckholn s
in rerm=.
but Mill be
('?) "a mechanism for the normative
regulation of behaviour"' and '(10) "a set of techniques for adjusting both to
the
external
environment
and to other
97
men'".
Such
a
model,
Mhich
does
2
�to '(5) "a theory on the part of the anthropologist about the
correspond
in
group of people in fact behave'" and their vieM
a
Mhich
'*(4) a "structure of pooled learning'"' and
affords
certainly
of
standardized orientations, to recurrent problems'"'.
^ay
Morld,
the
(7) "a set
of
Since the social paradigm
it
does
1egacy the individual [in the society] acquires
from
is ''(11) "a precipitate of
history'",
and
his group'"
discern
of a culture that Conga!ton and David
three parts or
The
Kuhn includes
readily
supplied
They
a model.
by
are,
procedures characterising and controlling the behaviour of adherents; secondly
procedures; thirdly the products
and
exemplars
material
resulting,
e.g.
interpretation function validate^! both themes
The
connection Mi th exemplars and artefacts is^e^^ direct,
RP,
The
delivers
as Mel lit
including values and ideas (on both see
of objects,
domains
neMspapers.
textbooks,
pp.12-16).
and of more than
3 textbook may present a paradigm^^or^more likely, part of one; or
on^ kind.
it may, like an artefact, supply or be a partial modelling of the paradigm.
remaining
The
culture
life-forms
done.
to
has
Thus
of
qualifying term comprehensive is
cover a sufficiently comprehensive part of life
a community,
Rbraham,
vague
deliberately
styles
there are varying degrees to Mhich this
for one,
can
and
be
explains various inclusive levels of
7 '
(pp.12-13) before opting for tbe most inclusive, under Mhich 'culture is
If§'
and 'includes the Mhole of the knoMledge,
common life of the people
arts,
in
the
the
science, technology, religions, morali ty, ri tual, politics, literature,
ttTP*. & theory normally has many models, some exact and canonical, some of
__
Mhich bring, out
all that holds in the theory but not only Mhat holds
i s i ngTy stil Impartial models, Mhich ac-e a'-'_urately
there; and, more surpr -----depict part of the theory. )
98
�ULk
etiquette
fashions
...'
of
eighteenth
pauperisation
centuries,
Such
(p.13).
narrower,
a
Under
In this use [that again of "higher"
of the mind.
includes a mastery of all literature,
process
(p.12)
^ess
use of the term however 'culture is limited to Mhat are caned
comprehensive,
things
and
a
of Mhat the educated man in
cou 1 d
culture
history, music, painting and sculpture,
the age of enlightenment ,
person
culture],
reflect
the
the
s even teen th
stood for',
Mho i e
culture
and
and could knoM
in
the
more
c ompr eh en s i ve u se.
The European vieM of culture, Mhich tends to concentrate on high t.u = ture,
is insufficiently comprehensive,
leaving out a crucial aspect of culture,
so
it has been argued, namely attitudes to and approaches to the environment, and
so natural environments largely devoid of man-made features and influences
particular.
in
R fuller picture of environmentally-sensitive culture looks like
this:11^-. (From previous page) See p.21.
Accounts of culture of
.;!i= very
inclusive, but still unnecessarily anthropic, form are common in the
. __ literature.
Thus, for example, Harris: 'A culture is the total socially
acquired life-May or life-style of a group of people*
(p.144), their
patterns of behaviour and thought.
Thus, Mith even less qualification,
the first of Kluckholn's eleven definitions of culture (as listed in
Geertz pp.4-5), 'the total may of life of of a people', a definition
repeated in Congalton and David, p.22.
The intended model accordingly
provides a complete representation of life-Mays of members of the
cul tur-e.
111^ Ft fuller and better account Mhich gets very close to the model-theoretic
analysis, is Kumer's analogous definition of culture:
The
shared
symbolic system Mhich gives meaning
to
human
interactions in a society.
It refers to a society s May of
perceiving, interpreting and expressing things ... it in'„lude=>
knowledge, belief-systems, values, norms and ideologies Mhich
enable the members of a society to perceive, organise and interpret
reality ... reality is always perceived Mithin an evaluative
framework.
Similar too is Tylor's definition of 'culture' in terms of a structure
again: 'Culture or Civilization ... that complex MholeMhich includes
knowledge, belief, art, morals, laM, customs, and any other capabilities
and habits acquired by man as a member of society'. (Primitive Culture
vol. 7, p.7).
So all human societies have a culture, a generalised
paradigm.
It is better to separate out civi1ization, however, and link
it to its 'root meaning of living in cities .
�religions, morality, ritual, politics, literature, even etiquette and fashions
is
'culture
use
limited
to
Mhat
are called
things
of
mind.
the
In
this
[that
history,
con.jec tures
that
music,
this
painting and sculpture,/^..' (p.13),
use
evolved
'as
a
result
of
Rbraham^.
of
a / process
^7 /J
cen turles,
he age of enlightenment, stood for'', and could knoM (p.13).
Such
a per son could reflect the Mhole culture in the more comprehensive use.
The European vieM of culture, Mhich tends to concentrate on high culture,
is insufficiently comprehensive,
it
has been argued,
natural
environments
leaving out a crucial aspect of culture,
namely attitudes to and approaches to
the
largely devoid of man-made features and
so
environment,
influences
in
/Recounts of culture of this very inclusive form but still unnecessari
an thropic form, are common m the literature* ^hus^for example^Harris:
<R culture is the total socially acquired life-May or life-style of
a group of people' (p.144), their patterns of behaviour and
though t.
Thus, Mith even less qualification, the first of Kluckholn's eleven
definitions of culture ^listed m Geertz pp.4-5),
the total May of life
of a peopled a definition repeated in
and David^p.22. lhe
model ^provides a complete representation o+ life-Mays of members of the
R fuller and better account^Mhich gets very ejase to^ the model-theoretic
analysis^ ig Kiernan's analogous definition of jculturq:
The
shared
symbolic system Mhich gives meaning
to
human
interactions in a society.
It refers to a society's May of
perceiving, interpreting and expressing things ... it includes
knoMledge, belief-systems, values, norms and ideologies Mhich
enable the members of a society to perceive, organise and interpret
reality ... reality is alMays perceived Mithin an evaluative
frameMork.
Similar too is
Taylor's definition of 'culture' in terms of a
structure again: 'Culture or Civilization ... that complex Mhole Mhich
includes knoMledge, belief, art, morals, laM, customs, and any other
capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society'.
(Primitive Culture vol. 7, p.7). So al 1 human societies have a culture,
a generalised paradigm.
It is better to separate out c iyi l,i zat 1 on,
hoMever, and i-t—nc-sep%'e/. +<sf? its 'root meaning of living in cities'.
�PRIMARY CULTURE DIAGRAM
sense
of
"'culture'',
intellectual
sociology,
in
and
mhere
order
culture.
artistic
the
,
*
practice
takes up the primary
namely
lor development,
Con c i se English 0 i c t i on ary) ,
in
-state
put]
in
a
in
shared
"the
particular, the
group-
or people mith,
and the education-derived sense,
leading
in mhich the
to
Evidently the explication, mhich makes the product primary
a
given
reverses
like agriculture, viticulture, and
the culture,
mas first and foremost a process
of
It is important to separate off -
the training or discipline in or
mhere
of
and as presented
culture of a society is said to comprise
a given culture,
consists
"the
as it is
in mhich the culture comprises the community,
the historical order,
so on,
dictionaries,
in
to set aside - some derivative senses,
sharing,
culture
offered
values and beliefs"' of the society.
derived sense,
or
as
or people"' (cf.
community
norms,
through social paradigms,
explication so -far,
The
,
a "cultivation" of intellect and
11^ As Mi 11 iams explains, the ear 1 y meaning of "culture"' mas as a process;
and the "culture of the mind" mas viemed as a process rather than a
product or achieved state.
In (early) modern use "culture" became, like
'civilized"', a condition.
Onlp^the "fourth modern development" did
culture appear as "the mhole may of life, material, intellectual and
spiritual of a given society"' (p.273), i.e., as a comprehensive social
paradigm.
The other forms, the first three developments^mere restricted
versions of this, to respectively the individual, intellectual and moral
parts, and arts and intellectual areas.
,
r.
To invent the ahistorical explanatory pattern, scientific paradigms are,
so to say, the inherited cu1tures of science.
100
�However the reversal makes it easier- to get some grip on
art and technology.
the very rich process-product complex that a culture comprises.
example, goes astray in settling for a process definition of
for
Bonner,
allied
'culture
to the education-derived sense: "'By culture I mean the transfer of information
by
means,
behavioural
by the process
particularly
most
of
and
teaching
Hhile the definition certainly achieves its intended objective of
learning'.
including (cultures'^ an7maC^g%p&,
excessively
it is,
as already
remarked,
a
accounting such things as semaphoring
loM redefinition,
quite
between
boy scouts as culture.
There is a further dimension of complexity so far largely omitted through
restriction
pure
most contemporary states are far from culturally pure, comprising a
cultures,
mixture
Nhile tribal groups may have relatively
to pure cultures.
of peoples and cultures.
represented
More generally,
an n-cultural society
by a system of n paradigms adhered to in the society.
&
multi
&
multi
cultural
society
is thus an n-cultural society Mhere n is
cultural
society
may
Australia,
simply
not
include
however be
very
many.
it
pluralistic;
as
may,
in
brought
groups of people from different cultures
under some dominant culture Mhich controls
in one region
together
is
the
main
Much depends then on the type of system of paradigms
political institutions.
involved, on hoM the paradigms are themselves interrelated and structured.
Pt
society
Mill
function
(cf.
Ptbraham,
p.l5ff.,
incompatible Mith extreme individualism ).
a variety of subcultures.
is
Mhich
not
Characteristically
and
commonly
For culture is the glue of a group;
competing cultures.
integrative
alMays have a culture,
several
perhaps
it has an important
Mho remarks that
culture
is
Pt society Mill also typically have
Pt subculture is a paradigm, included in a culture,
sufficiently
subcultures
comprehensive
to
rank
as
a
share norms and assumptions Mith some
culture.
larger
culture except Mhere they diverge.
The
dominant
cultures
in countries like Australia and Ptmerica
101
can
be
�as having tree structures.
represented
a
is
there
Subcultures
century
gentry
Protestant
many
the
between
differences
terms,.
1 1^
tribu.ari!=''=.
subcultural
long played significant parts in
have
last
example,
with
culture,
mainstream
Transposing to river-network
Australian
L-athoXc,
extensive immigration program,
of ethnic subcultures.
pattern
with
critical
challenged.
and
an
o?
As a result
complex
aiong
permit the relatively easy formation
assumptions
and
that is, the cultural streams remain
of the
mainstream
culture
rival and alternative social paradigms (such as
Plhat
important
Australia now boasts a much more
persistence of subcultures - so long as,
and
Protestant
Flexible multi-cultural arrangements,
substantial social tolerance,
subcultures
f'-tr
of Australian colonial culture had
streams
bearing on leisure activities such as gambling (see Inglis?.
its
history;
are
n^t
those
of
the
Al ternative
These
culture.
dominant
accommodate,
within
too a pluralistic (a plural paradigm) society
provided the social paradigms present
limits,
r^m
no
to overarching socio-political arrangements and the prevailing type of
threat
structure (if they should however things would have to give or
P'Ower
tan
t-ha^ge,
rival river networks are bound to alter the cultural landscape).
Cultures,
explaining
and
illustrated
that
like
they
social
paradigms,
inducing social change.
'his
important
role
in RP).
It is worth
can also afford explanatory roles in cases where appeal
explanatory roles.
repudiation
nature',
an
on
the
that is,
For example,
that
it
noticing
to
Philp criticises for Foucault
prevents
him
from
i_on = i = .en.
explaining
in
and
human
culture can replace nature
of the human subject and the denial of a
ground
both
So much has already been shown
as regards social paradigms (e.g.
nature have been supposed mandatory;
social
have
in
for
numaf;
directed
11^). A subculture of a given culture is itself a culture (i.e. a comprehensive
social paradigm) applying to a subgroup of the given wider culture,
which agrees with the wider culture on characterising (paradigma.i'-)
\
features but which may diverge, and typically does, by virtue of further
cultural features, i.e. features in its paradigm.
A subculture stands
102
�resistance or social struggle for the better.
explain
a
and .justify such resistance 'requires that Me make some commitment to
conception
of the human good and this usually rests on some vieM of
human
The modifier "usually"' gives the game
aMay;
nature and human subjectivity"'.
the
Accordingly to Philp tp.i7), to
route can circuit through culture.
justificatory
directed
social
to
as
good
discerned
under
a
The struggle
can
paradigm;
regional
be
the
commitments can be cultural.
has
been
descriptive of relevant fea^f tures of the different cultures
contrasted.
Mi th
some
of
The
attempt
concerned,
in
main
terms
A
Mork
at
this paper,
of
explanation
like much Mork
on
culture,
of more unexpected features
the
cu1tures
some criticism, and some attempt to explain some cu1tural
of others.
This,
like the modelling account,
points to
a
more
difficult enterprise, only broached: namely, the task of providing theories of
the
cultures formufsrfed,
and so perhaps explaining Mhat pulls them together,
makes them tick, gives them their shape and grip, and so on.
A
103
�/ .<
/ /
Contemporary scientific redeployment of human nature
APPENDIX 2:
Attempts
evolutionary
of this sort are based on the moder^tn
synthesis,
and appear in most extreme form in sociobiology.
r
/e cc^"i A r
)
% Sociobioldoical attempts, such as Nilson's, to redeploy human nature to
A
j '
1
a]t I er natives fail.
rule out ^political possibilities and narroM social ajtli,
A
underlying
Wilson's
characterisation of human nature is very different
the main socio-political tradition.
the
full set of innate Ei.e.
those
sense,
and
in
nature.*- hardly
set.'
a
the
hoMever
is
(pp.217-8,
For
the
definition
if
socially
relevant
b5t
subpools,
and
or
since
cultural
relativity,
since
stage.J^ In
any
though, like health more
they hardly
significant constraints on political alternatives.
racial
disease
less plausibly, conjunctively
if read,
enough;
of
read
is
Mill inclue the full set of genetically-determined
it
It is
characterisation
^b^Vare remote from Enlightenment concerns,
against
Mith
the
those every (normal) human is bound to undergo at some
generally,
narrower
ambiguity in
resolved.
patterns humans are liable to suffer;
event,
the
It is not constant or static, since genes may mutate.
ahistorical,
only
behavioural
genetic or genetically-determinedJ
predispositions that affect social behaviour'
rearrangement).
disp^M^tively
'* In the broader- sense, human nature Ei-sJ
characterise the human species;
that
predispositions
from
appear
to
impose
Moreover, i*t—is no bulwark
races
separate
have
by no means everything is determined
gene
genetically^ e.g.
language^of some culture).
there is no need to labour it:
see Ruse,
'*1-
As this is a commonplace vieM,
Singer and especially Pigden.
11^
Genetic determinism is simply one, and perhaps^ the M^kest, of several
forms of determinism intended to vastly reduce cultural variability.
Nilson does not rely on that form exclusively: see p.207.
AtPijol/ /o
)
104
y
*
y
o
�situation of certaintg such as the eLementarg choLce situationi affords,
expectation vaLues drop out. Then, as under the maximaLLtg criteri^, R is the
rat LonaL choLce under this utiLitg criterion; B cannot be^a rat LonaL oho Lee,
it
is^)--------------------
The same argument, Lf correct, ref'ute^Bages^anism. For, as Suppes c La Lms,
the Bayesian posLtLon Leads to the oversLL sLngte prLncLpLe of ra t Lona L i tg, the
principLe of maximizing expected utLLLtg: One action or decision shouLd be
chosen over another Lf^ the expected utLLLtg of the fLrst Ls at L'east as great
as that of the second, ... (p.178).^
_
(p.178)." ((The arguments
aLso eawt&r princ ip Les,
such as that
criter ia^
of
sure
thing,
appeaLed
to
in
derivations
of
maximization
Satisizing, doLng-MLth-enough, counters the orthodox rat LonaLitg axioms;
satisficing, doing-as-Meii-as-can-be-in-the-circumstances, does not. Satisficing
is constrained maximization; the satisficer, organisation man on bimon s
picture, aiMags chooses the maximum from among aLternatLves aireadg enumerated,
and so in the eLementrg diagram chooses R, not B (as satisizers mag), inere is
aLready a Literature at pains to point out that satisficing does not int^ fer^
Mith the rationatitu axioms.— though that it does not Mas^ cLear enough from
Limited rationaiitg^ Thus, for exampLe, Riker and Ordeshook
turn^g
criticisms of the principle of maximizing expected utiLitg on satisficing
qrounds, ^d bu arguing (incorrectLg) that in aLL pr^cticaL cases maximizing snd
satisficing r^^ease identicai^ appeat tMice to Simon s authoritg:
MhLLe some enthusiasts have misinterpreted hLs argument as antiratLonaL, Ln fac*^ Professor Simon does not suppose that, Mhen better
or Morse aLternatives are cieartg avaiiabie to the chooser, ne mag
reject the better for Morse, just because the worse H sat^factory
(pp.21-2). ... CertainLg Professor Simon is not asking for thLs,
because even Ln hLs termf, Lt Ls LrratLonaL to reject better for Morse.
be expected to occur
Os an LrratLonaLLtg satisficing cannot then
(p-23).
Ue need not
the enthusiasts; but Me are supposLng
Mhat S'^mon ded no t.
7
...........................
Various
Ln ./rat LonaL
^9.. Impact on paradoxes and on ratLonaL
behaviour.. L
— ---- paradoxes
]——— r*
A—t------------------------------- - ——----------- ;--------7-7%-------_______________________________
A cases paradox disapp
dLSappearaag
choLce theorg appear Ln a neM Light; in many peases
atftytt7H5etgcr> For the aLr o^ paradox derLves from competLng maximization crLterLa.
R good exampLe is provided bg NeMComb's paradox, Mhich is supposed to arise
in the foLLoMing situation^:
There are tMO boxes before gou: one transparent and one opaque. You
can see that there is $1,000 in the transparent box, and gou knoM that
there is either $1,000,000 or nothing in the opaque box. You must
choose betMeen the foLLoMing tMO acts: take the contents onig of the
opaque box or take the contents of both boxes. Furthermore, there is a
being in Mhose predictive poMers gou have enormous confidence, 3nd gou
knoM that he has aLreadg determined the contents of the opaque box
according to the foLLoMing ruLes: If he predicted that gou Mouid take
-9-
A
��Take the list of characteristics Gilson considers for instance (Mhich forms in
a
curious May part of his attempt to rehabilitate a particular partisan
of humans on the strength of sociobiology:
p.22).
The list
has to be pruned
if"it is to cover the spread of knoMn human races and cultures,
vaguer
and less question-begging (e.g.
removed);
but
then
vieM
and
rendered
Mith reference to relations to numan-=>
it ceases to separate tribes of humans
from
tribes
primates or other nonhumans. [Detail and adjust.]
/f2'
7
o+
�The NeM Zealand comparison:
APPENDIX 3.
Preliminary notes towards
or New
qualitative rating of mainstream New Zealand culture,
A
Zealand
data, as against an Australian (and sometimes other) goes as follows:but still high for Angloceltic world (presumably per capita
less,
Drinking:
patterns similar except for club phenomenon in Australia,
figures available);
and dry areas and prohibition proclivities in New Zealand.
Gambling:
significantly
but
less,
for
patterns similar except
important
matters of clubs and casinos.
Sport:
but less variety in New Zealand, owing to greater
similar addiction,
New Zealand emphasis on tramping,
uniformity of culture.
trail systems, not
matched in Oz.
Permissiveness:
variety.
less,
markedly
especially
concerning
sexual
issues
and
But Polynesian alternative increasingly influential in New Zealand.
Plural ism:
a
less,
more
uniform society,
with few ethnic
groupings
and
strata.
stronger, but still less so than UK.
Authori tarianism:
It is hypothesized by
Sinclair that older authority patterns in New Zealand arise from child rearing
especially
techniques,
in Oz.
counterpart
are,
the
famous
Plunkett
method,
The result was a rather up-tight
the suggestion is, more laid-back, easy-going.
which
no
had
product.
real
Australians
Vet the matter is not =o
simple, as the next items reveal.
Policing
and
opposition among the younger in New Zealand.
increasing
bushrangers,
cultural
Long-standing opposition to police
coercive methods:
etc.,
mythology.
in
New
Zealand,
in
Oz,
But no adulation of
and no Eureka Stockade
Violence perhaps less in New Zealand,
or
associated
though (at home)
neither society is very violent by American standards.
Egali tarianism:
slightly more in New Zealand, despite the Australian image.
In both Jack is as good as his master.
Pace of Life:
slower in New Zealand.
1
�less in NeM
Poverty:
in NeM Zealand.
Distrust of markets
simi1 ar
less than Oz
Fraternity and mateship:
Hale chauvinism:
margina11y less (?)
Unionisation:
Mith
no
environmen tai actions.
Environmen t:
communi ties
mixed
Extensive
NeM Zealand to many i ssues
in
even
sympathy,
public
among
rural
the
An issue breakdoMn is
required
here:
better
Chemicals and Maste management:
Parks and reserves:
National ism:
(Inglis)
margina11y better,
excessively
in
Morse
both places
strong in both
It is taken as validating
consider the many memorials Mith 'they
their country' scattered around small toMns.
national ism
(or stateism)
as
a
means
and
Hi th
by political leaders).
It can be
Mar and sport
of social and national cohesion,
purpose (e.g.
died
It is sometimes suggested
is the neM secular religion
operation in those tMo related enterprises,
death
for
that
seen
in
Both have served
and have been
used
for
that
(Hars Mere a common method of obtaining
maintaining integration of large states,
improved
communications
perhaps fall into disuse)
and propaganda
netMorks,
that
method
Divisive national sport is interesting from
could
this
angle also.
Federalism
and
Australian
idea
federation:
of
adding
No experience in
NeM
NeM Zealand as a further
sympathetic consideration in NeM Zealand.
2
Zealand.
state
The
obtains
frequent
little
There Mas, and is, no loyalty to an
�Australasian nation.
Communications:
Broadcasting less commercialised in Ne^j Zealand.
As a result
less H) violence, etc.
Reading:
more in Neu Zealand.
Education and Research:
opposition to theory.
(HoM much more?)
Little research done in Ne^ Zealand, but less
mixed.
Public school system better.
3
�The following have been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions.
•
•
Letter, Alastair (University of Waikato) to Richard Sylvan, 17 April 1985 re feedback on
paper. (4 pages (2 leaves))
Letter, Tom (Philosophy Department, Massey University) to Richard Sylvan, 10 Jul 1985
re feedback on paper. (3 pages (2 leaves))
�
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HORKING DRAFT
CULTURE AND THE ROOTS OF POLITICAL DIVERGENCE:
a South Pacific perspective
with emphasis on the Australian/American contrast
A ma.ior function of culture is to regulate and control change,1
Political
in the South Pacific,
change
North,
industrial
can,
in
and political
principle then,
the
be grounded in and
powered
by
One organising theme, a corollary of
features of local and regional.culture.
the
from
divergence
argument, facilitates the transition from principle to
practice:- It
is
that the requisite elements are present in regional cultures, the potentiality
is
South Pacific region (and Australia
the
for
there,
in
particular)
to
proceed in a very different social and political direction from the North (and
USA in particular).
th"
from
American arrangements,
Given the radical
unsatisfactoriness of the
2
in many frequently exposed respects , such a different
direction is worth taking - if it can be.
serious problem in the way of
a
But
arrangements,
from outside or from above.
change is imposition of
And,
political
since imposition shades into
this is
only one of the obstacles impeding change in the
South Pacific and elsewhere.
Another^forcing more and more peoples, no longer
political pressure,
sheltered
into the same type
of
socio-political
is supposed to derive from human nature itself.
Free people are
by geographical isolation,
arrangements
economic people,
in pretty much the American mould,
so it
is
claimed.
By
this route, economic imperialism can replace political imperialism.
1.
Nature,
theory
- one
culture,
to
which
A supposedly key question in political
and control.
we are said to have no satisfactory
answer
in
the
absence of a worthwhile theory of human nature (or human natures) - is this:-
1.
Thus Abraham p.29ff.; Awa p.30.
2.
For a recent trenchant expose, see Cohen and Rogers.
1
To
extent does human nature alloM for alternative political
Mhat
arrangements? Or, to turn the question around:-
in
virtue
of
nature
the
of
much-promoted
6nglo-6merican
Enl ightenment,
is
oMn
gain
or
(including
technical knoM-hoM),
from
6
the
taboos
(and
Mill
(properly) concerned Mi th
information
3
free people are basically economic people.
but for their
shortage
of
that is to replace one ideology by another.
ideology is no longer so
Enlightenment
of
range
descended
directly
are essentially
people
that is,
interests;
6 s ought noM to be evident,
the
answer ,
self-centred individuals,
become)
broad
that once freed from systems of myths,
superstition,
from
the
"nature" reduce the organisationa! options?
HoM does that
controls,
on
humans
What restrictions are imposed
evident:
Mhat
But
recommends
it?
Under pressure of this sort, the 6nglo-6merican answer gets transformed to the
that the economic picture of human nature is superior,
theme
and fitting
of
That 'self-appointed West European superiority'' has in
4
the
Romantics.
Fortunately,
turn been disputed, since the time of Herder and
rational
creatures.
hoMever, the extensive ensuing dialectic can be substantially avoided.
For all these questions and ansMers presuppose, to begin
Mi th, a certain
misplaced essential ism, that there is such an invariant nature common to human
beings,
Mhich
exactly
separates humans from other
creatures,
suitably constant and invariant
5
necessary and sufficient conditions , are legion. They are
specify
such
an
essence,
attempts
to
given
by
and
a frequent feature of Enlightenment thought. 611 men are the same
because of universal drives [such as to pleasure and the avoidance of
pain]. These drives mill operate independently of any location.
Chief among those drives Mas that toMards self-preservation - Hol bach,
for instance, stipulates:
Me shall call nature in man the collection of properties and
quali t i es Mhich constitute him Mhat he is, Mhich are inherent to
his species, Mhich distinguish him from other animal species or
every man feels, thinks,
Mhich he has in common Mi th them
3^
These people are also picked out under various alternative (but not
strictly equivalent) descriptions, e.g. as acquisitive individuals,
possessive individuals.
2
acts and seeks his oMn Mell-being at all times;
these are
qualities and properties that constitute human nature ... 6.
But this attempt at essentialist definition of human nature fails,
Fts it stands, the definition is inadequate;
characteristic May.
humans seek just their OMn Mell-being alMays;
hut f?
yoMtc df-e,
other commitments.^
L
to
egoism,
by
HoMever,
replacing
(
'Mell-being'
(such as human vegetables,
definition,
replacing
'every
definition is again inadequate;
example,
in a quite
for not all
some are altruistic,
some have
Ct '
suppose Me avoid such familiar counterinstances
rendering such internal egoism analytic.
examples
the
by
say
'broad
Mell-being',
thus
&nd suppose to avoid other counter-
morons and the like),
man' by 'every normal human'.
Me normalise
the
then
the
But
for it fails to distinguish humans from, for
It applies equally to dolphin nature or, for that matter,
dolphins.
to qori11 a nature.
Of
4.
course
the
definition can again be patched,
by
appealing
to
the
(From previous page) See Berry, p.30ff., from Mhom the quote is taken,
It
is Morth spelling out a little the extent of agreement and
disagreement Mi th Herder. Hhat is applauded is
1. 'Herder's dismissal of the Enlightenment's conception of human nature
as static, acultural and ahistorical' (Berry, p.32), but not.
XI.
Herder's cultural relativism, that 'each culture ... should be
treated on its OMn merits and not judged by some faulty perspective such
_
In the
as la belle_____
nature
' (p.3U), or from any other perspective.
pluralistic framework of the text (Mhich presupposes PPP), a good many
cross-cultural judgements are made and defended.
X2.
Herder's relativisation of human nature to culture, and embodiment
of it in cu1ture; for example, 'it is through language that human nature
Hi th
can be seen to be specifical1y embodied in cu1ture' <p.32).
bu t
relativisation the notion loses its original theoretical point;
Mhile failing in this role, cultural nature is open to many of the same
Nor can language bear the Meigh t
sorts of objections as human nature.
Herder loads upon it.
Herder's human chauvisism: '... it is speech and Mi th that reason
X3.
I1an can choose, man is king'
and freedom, that differentiates man.
Hild animals are free, can choose, communicate, solve puzzles,
(p.36).
carry
out elementary reasoning;
in these respects they surpass
and
and
many
other
humans.
Furthermore,
X3 gets Herder into serious
chi 1dren
not
to
say
inconsistency,
Mi
th
1.
trouble,
5.
6.
Abraham, draMing on Hittgenstein,
essence, p.23ff.
Berry p.17.
presents just these conditions for an
Berry supplies several other similar examples.
3
cluster of -features that separate humans from other mammals or
anatomical
biological specification of homo sapiens.
the
to
normalised
But the resulting
definition,
Mi th its analytical egoism, does little more than such biological
definitions
of
human:
it does not supply a nature,
does
it
deliver
not
superbiological
features of political relevance. The notion of human nature
-a/"!
thus fragments: into the satisfactory enough biological notion of human, and
an
superbiological (or sociobiological)
unsatisfactory
nature or essence.
addition;
What is this further, problematic, nature?
that
of
The Romantics
can be read as arguing that there is none, no nature as distinct from culture,
only local nature (Herder's term) Mhich coincides Mith culture.
excretions and variations in order to reach an essence leaves,
cultural
off
Peeling
like
Wittgenstein's artichoke, nothing.
The notion of human nature is a theoretical item,
amid cultural variability,
stability
a constant bulMark against
but designed as Mell to justify (as natural or, failing that,
of
type
particular
political
provide
introduced to
economy and legislature, and
relativism,
as superior)
its
a
imposition
7
fashion,
fact
and
that
the
is not so easily dissolved,
notion
by one illustration.
is Mritten large in much
political
but is defective,
illustration reveals,
such
a
HoMever the
theory,
does not shoM that it or the embedding theory is sound.
received,
not,
This resilient notion has been Midely applied in
else.
everyMhere
and
is
f)nd it is
and in its socio-political selectivity it is,
as the
virtually of a piece Mith human chauvinism (Mhich Mould
assign an unduly privileged position to human beings in the ecological
scheme
of things).
In
under
7.
fact
the superbiological notion of human nature begins
any attempt to set it doMn,
in much the May that
attempts
to
dissolve
supporting
Hence the Enlightenment program of imposing enlightened Western culture
everyMhere, later emphasised by Bentham.
The Legislator, knoMing that
human nature is ever the same [different countries do not have different
catalogues of pleasure and pain), can reform the laMS and even transplant
them from one society to another' (Berry, p.18).
doMn something ethically
chauvinism
3
disintegrate.
The notion of human nature - a nature
human
there
stable or constant social
some
are
features
humans
about
(some special classes of humans excepted perhaps)
humans
that
special
- presupposes
holding
for
across different cultures, Mhich are furthermore distinctive!/ human
peop!es,
features.
The
presupposition fails,
because once cultural variation between
shared
peoples
characteristics
remain ,
Mhich
furthermore
are
shared
various
by
animal
cu1tures, such as those of primates.
Consider ,
books,
or
first,
such
products or tools of more literary cultures as
Since
of contemporary cultures as telephones and computers.
cultures
lacked
such items,
their
possession
most
distribution
or
obviously cannot figure as part of Mhat marks out human nature. Consider next,
Mhat are commonly taken to be key components of (human) nature, certain
then,
basic human needs,
such as food and shelter.
These requirements are far from
free of cultural and environmental determinants.
as required in the May of shelter,
place to place.
Mays,
common
under
For look at Mhat is regarded
and hoM it varies from cu1ture to culture,
(&nd even Mhat is taken as basic can often be met in a myriad
Mays.)
though acceptably in some cultures only in a feM fixed
The
denominator is the rather trivial requirement of some sort
more extreme conditions - a requirement also of Mombats.
The situation
This claim concerning human chauvinism is argued in detail in EE. But the
claim concerning human nature is only sketchily defended in the text. For
.................................
'
t nature, 1 ike
the alleged social-arrangement-dictating
features of' human
determinism,
are
alleged
features
of
economic
or
technological
simi1 ar
insofar
as
they
to
be
removed
especially
rather major obstacles
supposedly severely and inevitably restrict the character of future
societies - than the main business of the present enterprise.
For tunately then the claim, that the superbiological notion of human
nature is a defective theoretical one Mhich dissolves, is defended
elseMhere: not only,
,, in effect, in Mork of Romantics from Herder on, but
also in significant recent literature. Foucault, for example, can be read
as saying that human nature is an invention of the Enlightenment Mhich
dissolves: ''his much discussed ... dissolution of man is nothing more, or
less, than the claim that the attempt to establish order upon a
scientific understanding of human nature is both profoundly mistaken and
italics added).
food,
Mith
and
sex,
so on,
considerably from race to race,
by
flourish.
Again
the somewhat
conditions,
trivial
lowest
or
more
loosely
Mhere
common
tribal
denominator
Nor are attempts to mark out
by some more complex list of jointly necessary
nature
vary
requirements
Europeans for example being very inefficient
applies also to various groups of animals.
human
Dietary
tribal standards and unable to survive satisfactorily
many
people
is hardly better.
by a cluster of natural
and
features,
the
sufficient
much
more
successful, or of direct political application without the importation of what
is culturally at issue - values. In any case, such vague and general lists as
10
emerge
impose little constraint at all on a political direction, since a
variety of political arrangements is compatible with such listings.
Accordingly,
nature
as such is not. an
important
constraint
on
or a theory of human nature a key ingredient in endeavours
11
work out a political philosophy or political directions .
The reason is
political
to
human
theory,
the reason that determining the conditions for the good life would
like
not
impose a satisfactory constraint on a political theory, namely presupposition
12
failure.
Like the meaning of life , the good life fails to demarcate a
single
thing;
there
are many styles of good lives.
So too there
is
human
*9^
The
converse is seen in the extent to which tribal peoples gain weight
on European diets, At another level, consider the Haori attitude to, and
underlying revulsion by, cooked food: see Alpers, p.7-9.
10.
For one such list, which however requires pruning and adjustment, see
Nilson, p.22. As it happens, Nilson does not make anything much of this
list (which does not supply necessary conditions), immediately presents a
parallel list for insect societies - a list which does considerable
damage to more traditional claims about human nature - and then proceeds
in effect to demolish main criteria that have been used to separate
humans from animals and to restrict cultures to human societies (e.g.
p.39).
For more on contemporary "scientific" efforts to deploy a theory of human
nature for social and political ends, see Appendix 2.
11.
Nhich is perhaps as well, since we still have so little reliable and
unprejudiced information as to what "human nature" amounts to, what its
variational possibilities, in different environments, might be, or of the
possibilities beyond past terrestrial selections of cultures.
12.
On which see Routley and Griffin.
6
and human nature,
nature
depending on the culture or social paradigm and
on
Nature, both human and not, varies uith culture and environment.
the setting.
Because of this tuo-uay dependence,
there is no unique stable superbiological
human nature.
notion of human
is
nature
the
picture of nature as given, as a
stable
across races and tribes,
notion
uith culture as a variable
There is no such culturally invariant division:
The picture is flaued in much the same uay,
as
perception,
top.
on
culture affects local nature.
as the familiar picture of
then,
stable
consisting of given uninterpreted sense data,
across
(normal) perceivers, uith interpretation imposed on the neutral data.
Nor therefore is culture something that can be creamed off the top, so to
find real human features or basic nature
to
speak,
Certainly,
underneath.
be destroyed; however uhat results from removal by destruction of
not something closer to real people,
but people uith a destroyed
it is also uith attempts like Hobbes or Rauls to peel
organisation
off
the the top,
in order to locate in a
political
quasi-analytical
or
quasi-historical uay, a state of nature underneath or preceding some organised
state
or
other,
derived from mistaken
flaued picture,
questionable
or
presuppositions, is assumed.
Hhat uill be found underneath, or in the original (natural) state, is, it
is usually conveniently assumed, a nature that fits the vieu to be developed uith the
explai ned
and
the
culture's
riqht values very fortunately in-built.
is
privileged
image
status quo -
position of some
of itself,
and
elements of the
as uell
dominant
as
a
be
serves
for
economic man,
social
hardly surprisingly, that
for Enlightenment man,
7
dominant
Northern
fully competitive possessive individualism (much the same model,
uhich
to
or justified is something like present socio-political arrangements
paradigm - underlying human nature turns out to be,
of
Given that uhat
for
the
that is,
"rational
etc.)
person",
myths,
to
The myth of unique human nature functions,
perpetuate
other
like many
or instil particular social arrangements
and
special
pr ivi1ege.
Thus too the myth of human nature is linked to other culture-based myths,
myths
the
of
predominantly
self-interested
- to
rational)
(normal)
al 1
bring
humans
maximizer s
no firm starting point in human nature,
myths.
of
myths.
None
aboriginal
peoples
comprised
their
least
and
as
insofar
as
they
are
Mith
the
image
of
up
As there is no underlying hard ground,
so there is none in these
repeated
the
Melanesians,
associated
Polynesians
or
Australian
maximizers;
strongly communal lifestyles and
after
especially,
and
(at
individuals
The South Pacific Mas, and remains, rich in cultures Mhich upset these
associated
indeed
aggressive
some of the myths bound
in
urban-industrial humans.
contemporary
as
preparedness
a loM sufficiency threshold had been reached,
source of criticism from the
European cultures
Mork
stop,
to
Mas a major
that
came
to
dominate the region.
forms and types of
Even
aggressiveness,
and approaches to
Mar,
often
taken to be solid ground, are culture and environment dependent, and vary Mi th
13
both
parameters .
Aggressiveness is often supposed to impose
huge
constraints
on political
arrangements.
But there is little substance to the
claim that humans are naturally aggressive independently of social or cultural
setting.
The most that appears
clear is that circumstances can be
through croMding or provocation or cultural
arranged,
for
instance
TEh
A striking illustration of environmental variation is afforded by the
differences betMeen savannah dMelling and forest dMelling tribes of
baboons.
For a local illustration, consider Maori approaches to Mar
(like Mar conventions, a social phenomenon), before European corruption.
Thus Best reports that 'an individual, or a Mhole clan, might decline to
take part in an engagement on account of some evil omen, and such an
action Mould be approved of (p.15).
There are several, apparently
reliable, stories of Maoris engaged in Mar supplying the opposition Mith
equipment or ammunition, or temporarily abandoning their fighting effort
to help out the other (British) side, so the battle could proceed
proper 1y.
relocation,
Mhere
of
peoples
cultures Mill become aggressive
familiar
more
people of other cultures Mill not,
in the face of immense brutality.
depends
Once
types.
Certainly some arrangements are required to
but these can be of a Mide range of
shortsightedly
again,
Mhat is normally
as fixed:
see
certainly,
such
Mhich
components
nature
human
accounted
varies Mith culture and environment,
and
upon
perhaps
as people often do
but Mill just give up,
cope Mith or suitably isolate aggression,
alternative
- and
often
people
as
selfishness,
cooperativeness, individuality do.
Hhat
is
presently much more important than either culture or nature
determining social arrangements is another factor:
imposition.
social
Whatever
one
from
Mithout,
through
region
and neM arrangements imposed,
Hith long-standing arrangements,
May or another.
invariably
namely, outside control or
arrangements have evolved in a
local nature and culture can be overridden,
imposition
is
and the changes in arrangements typically
especially,
the South Pacific has,
in
almost
involve
either violence in their adaption or mass migration of people or both.
last tMO hundred years,
in
In the
like much of the
been drastically so affected, in a complex May. ^nd the changes,
neMer Morld
still floMing strongly from the North, continue.
He
are
in the last days of the destruction of
old
and
cultures,
economic
destruction is noM to a considerable extent by more subtle cultural,
and
technological
Outside
direct
control can be exercised,
economic sanctions,
film
and
television (i.e.
earlier
times.
in many Mays less blatant
than
such as through introduction
of
etc.,
as
monetary and loan policies,
as through exchange and training programs,
magazines,
14.
or occur,
intervention of one sort or another,
neM technologies,
Mell
means than the cruder methods of slightly
the
textbooks,
through physical
advertising
and
exemplifications of
Hi Ison's argument that humans are innately aggressive involves such an
invalid move: he looks at the behaviour of Semai men Mhen 'taken out of
their nonviolent society' by recruitment in a British colonial army
(p.100)!
^s Mell, Hilson's case rests on a dubious redefinition of
innateness, and a loM redefinition of aggressiveness to take in forms of
mere (nonaggressive) conflict (pp.9?-100).
of
process of cultural conversion and erosion;
this quieter
are
unwittingly, part
European peoples in the South Pacific are often
culture).
rather than,
victims as well as,
now
but many of
perpetrators (cf.
us
and
Crough
Wheelwright).
Human
communities
have been - and many still are
- as
insensitive
to
other human cultures as they are to the natural environment (witness Americans
and their allies in Vietnam).
or
beyond redemption.
pushed
of
creation
Like an ecosystem, a culture can be destroyed,
This is
disaster
areas proceeds
Yet
the
blatant cases
15
by disruption of culture and lifestyle using violence.
There is
typically
political
furthermore,
where
apace
is possible at all,
recovery
a
sometimes of the order of human generations.
perhaps
well-known.
sufficiently
production
of
imperialism,
these politically
e.g.
USA
in
contaminated
Central America,
- in
recovery
long
period,
Yet there is increasing
regions,
Israel in
especially
Lebanon,
through
Russia
in
Afghanistan, Indonesia in East Timor and West Papua, etc.
In the South Pacific, there are many quieter Northern influences at work,
but
the
strongest now is unquestionably the
businessmen,
films
can
academics,
American.
American
companies,
tourists and warships, their technology and patents,
and television programs,
There
are the most evident and
be various motives and aims (and assumptions) behind the
newer
behind endeavours such as the American to
16
Granted it
everywhere.
"free
enterprise"
philosophy
and
practice
their
17
business
and
American
to
American
economic
supremacy,
mostly contributes to
and
economic imperialism,
15.
These disaster areas should perhaps be cordoned off like those
by communicable disease,
but from continuing disruptive,
interference.
infected
outside
What is said about American cultural and politic al imperial ism applies,
with adaption, in a lesser way, to imperialism and col onial ism by other
nation-states such as USSR, Britain, France and Indonesia. USA has no
monopoly on imperialism. US imperialism in the third wor1 dis in part
documented and analysed in Chomsky and Herman.
17.
Though not invariably as the experience with the Japanese motor industry
has indicated.
10
the transfer of substantial regional wealth and surplus value to the
to
But
national economic reasons are not the only sort of reasons such
are
pursued;
apart
t^at many
from the side-issue of integrity,
USA.
policies
Americans
really do believe in the optimality of their local ideals to the exclusion
other
of
arrangements, there are deeper and somewhat more respectable ideological
reasons as wel1.
imperialistic
The
that
assumption
for
nature,
be
underpinned
all human nature is at bottom really
political
(a
technological
means.
can
instance highly economically oriented.
distortions
economic)
endeavours
means,
way:
they
by
like
Thus,
descriptive
a
American
human
but for political
analogue of economic externalities)
and
lack
and
other peoples would choose the American (political
simply have not really been given the
For many peoples this is simply not true;
of
opportunity
or
for most other cultures let
us hope, or pray, that this is not the case. Alternatively, or as well, a more
arrogant
prescriptive assumption may be at work,
that all human nature ought
best, because America not only has the best
18
way of life in the world and mostly the best ways of doing things
, but has
to be like American nature at its
a
special
hold
on rationality.
The free-enterprise
system
(perhaps
representative democracy American-style tacked on) is the rational
18.
with
enterprise
Thus, for example, American agricultural textbooks and agricultural
spokespeople are fond of announcing that American agriculture is the best
in the world;
similarly for environmental
protection,
forestry,
technology, university education, and so on.
But since they are the
best, it is evident that these American ways should be exported, isn't
it? Even granting the large assumptions, No, firstly, because that is to
neglect important regional and local variations and differences, and
secondly because these ways may interfere with other significant features
of regional life or culture.
It' has not passed unremarked that the high standard of material life in
USA depends in part on a very fortunate inheritance (e.g. some of the
best and deepest soils) and in part, as in Europe, on a lower standard of
1 i f e and conditions elsewhere, upon siphoning off wealth and especially
resources (US currently uses about one-fifth of world resources and 30 X
To be sure, economic apologetics
of world energy) from other regions.
proffer other explanations of American transcendence, e.g. ingenious
constructions like that of Olson, built on a sandy logic of economic
actors collectively locked into economically determined arrangements,
substantially independent of the resource base.
11
Certainly the system is sometimes peddled,
embodied.
the
American May,
it.
Mhich Mas often
Mith the same evangelism as Christianity,
and presented as the rational religion,
seen
by genuine believers in
at least before science got
at
science hasn't got at the free-enterprise religion yet, but on the
Hell,
noM has a social division heavily devoted to its justification and
19
furtherance.
HoMever some philosophy has got at the system, sufficiently to
contrary
that it is no unique embodiment of rationality - there is none such
reveal
but
a decidedly irrational practice in many circumstances.
is
irrational if local goals are to preserve local
especially
Thus,
it
environments
is
and
cultures, as much experience helps attest.
is aspects of the false descriptive assumption,
It
Mith
emerge
rejection,that are a main focus in Mhat folloMS (though various
its
the reasons for rejecting the prescriptive assumption
recorded).
broader
and Mhat can
important
An
basic
nor
in
substan t i al 1y
of
Mill also emerge or get
underlying theme Mill continue to be
that
nei ther
varies
human
Mays that are highly political relevant - relevant
to
the
frameMork a society adopts. In
imposed
upon from outside or above, the variation can be
through
cultural
variation
alternative
assumptions,
is part of "nature",
again
"human nature"
variations;
(Mhich
but
in
turn
depends
on
environment,etc)
are then, those of cultural pluralism, that
shaping in particular local human nature. Of course once
can be pared back and back to try to
in this May Mhat are taken to be
important
remove
cultural
superbiological
features of human nature for political theory are also excised (e.g.
that
The
make prisoners' dilemmas and commons' tragedies come out one May
features
rather
than another).
19.
In elaborating on hoM modern societies control their citizens, Foucault
has explained various extensive types of social control exercised and
licensed through received social sciences, by May of approved standards
of normality, health, stability, adequacy, rationality, etc.: see Philp,
p. 15.
12
Just as different cultures can mean different social arrangements,
so in
a larger setting they can imply different political organisation and different
directions.
political
Where
do
requisite differences
not
occur,
because
incongruous arrangements have been imposed, cultural differences can be a
"A
powerful force for change. Likewise developing elements of cultural difference
can
a potent base for social change - or resistance to imposed
be
(especially) in communities where other more orthodox
as economic incentives or penalties,
have
change
bases for change,
become inoperative or
-
such
failed,
or
used,
but
are not available.
Culture is however a double-edged instrument,
resisted.
example,
For
though
not only to be
indigenous
leading
features of
Pacific cultures are to be reactivated, as forces for change, some
these cultures are to be resisted (such as male domination),
features
Features of culture are thus
modern Western cu1tures.
of
along with
and confront undesirable (implanted or imported) sources
resist
many
used
to
culture;
of
excessive consumerism, persuasive
such as, inequitable political arrangements,
advertising
media and loaded news systems,
structures,
etc.
for
sol id foundation - but also
This
reasons
is as true for American culture as Antipodean.
Mhy
job
forth,
is
to
antagonistic
One
of
the
so
mainstream American culture
so
encouraging
prime sources of
up resistance against,
and
culture.
alienating
It is important not only to build and design alternatives -
which elements of
di sman tie,
chief
holloa suburbia,
that
movements
offering
or
and
alternatives have been repressed by the dominant corporations
the state apparatus (see especially Goldstein).
2
The
Why
work with such an unfavourable contrast case as Australian—society
regional and environmental orientation.'
in defence of themes
concerning
1*'
'yV
4"
cultural variation and their force for change,
contrast
US
it would no doubt be easier to
culture with some other culture which diverges
13
more
strikingly
Mith some Pacific society poised for revolutionary change, such as perhaps the
Then there are conspicuous differences,
Philippines.
as the following
table
begins to reveal:-
SOME WESTERN CULTURAL THEMES CONTRASTED HITH THIRD HORLD
Fi1i pi no [Melanesian J
North American [AustralianJ
Individual autonomy encouraged;
Mithin paradigm, individual should
individualize, solve oMn problems,
develop OMn opinions
Dependence encouraged; point of
reference is authority, older kin folk
Competition [aJ primarymethod
of motivation
Community reduces or excludes incentive
to excel over others
Relations Mith others informal
and direct
Relations Mith others more formal;
social interactions more structured
Clear distinction betMeen public
and private property
Public property divertable unguililty
into private [Much "property", e.g.
1 and, is communal J
Materialism a dominant value
Spiritual, religious things matter as
much or more than material.
Evident trouble
culture
Mith
the choice of Australia as contrast is that
is not only much influenced (like all
Australian
accessible cultures) by
parts
of American culture, but is very similar in many respects, including evolution
and
comparative
stability.
similarities are often sought,
to
that
in broad outline,
explanations
of
the
and it is debated Mhether the similarities are
by imitation or through similar evolution.
explained
debate is,
is so similar
It
simple:
namely,
The ansMer
to
the
as Mill appear, both types of
mechanism have played a role.
There are,
as
a
main
contentions
so
hoMever,
contrasting
several reasons for Morking Mith Australian culture
case Mith American.
A lesser one is
that
if
regarding differences can be made good in =uch a case it Mill
much the easier Mhere more conspicuous differences occur.
But the aim
the
be
is
not to make a difficult argumentative task more difficult. Rather it is to try
207
This table, adapted from AMa
more discussion is given.
p.30,
14
is draMn from SteMart,
Mhere
much
to
clear the May for a different philosophy and different political positions
in
Australia,
and
Pacific,
more comprehensively in the South
than
those
slavishly adopted from the North, to clear the May for political arrangements,
grounded in the elements of local culture, Mhich are more benign, both to
the
environment and to other cultures, than those imported from the North.
in several respects,
Australia is,
named from Europe the
Antipodes,
a
(bordered
the north by the Hallace line).
There is some prospect that this region
21
a meaningful sense.
That in turn encourages the
Mill become nuclear-free,in
or be induced in the
faint hope that other socio-political changes may occur,
- a
region
notably
moving
aMay from the dangerous and
nuclear
poMer
and nuclear Meapons.
independence comes from the USA.
Antipodean
exploitative
main
The
damaging pattern,
(and
significant
and
perhaps
this
The USA Mould impose significant
generally it aims to include the region under its
that
to
opposition
components of its Mar system, including nuclear Meapons,
more
attitudes
so Mell exemplified in technological things nuclear,
of the North,
practices
If
includes
Mhich
biological and geophysical region of the South Pacific
distinctive
in
region
inexact
rather
the most important component of that
capitalist
is
already Mell established,
the main) resistance
upon the region; and
to
broken,
be
eventually
must
hegemony.
come
from
Australia.
countries
Smaller
have
resisted
Marships;
first Vanuatu and recently,
genuinely
nuclear-free
suit.
And
politically
21.
if
and
the
the imposition
environmentally
American
initiative is
deeper,
to
Australia
broaden
tied to a more
nuclear
NeM Zealand. If a
more significantly,
South Pacific is to emerge,
nuclear-free
of
must
into
profound
folloM
something
regional
This is just one reason Mhy the recent fashion of trying to count
Australia as part of Asia, Mhich it is not, or as Mithin the (excessively
large) Asian-Pacific region, Mhich it analytically is, should be
resisted.
No doubt looking at the larger region is convenient for
economic and some defence purposes, for trade and aid;
but it is narroM
economically-focussed,
nation-state thinking,
Mhich discounts huge
geographical, biological and cultural differences.
15
independence
and
then
militarism,
leaders.
Australia
the
Hence
free
self-reliance,
from
of
components
the
must not merely follow,
but be there
interest in American/Australian
cultural
American
Mith
the
differences,
especially those relevant to socio-political divergence.
The
main
cultural groupings of the Antipodean region can
be
developed
from the following diagram:
Aboriginal peoples
Australian
Polynesian
Melanesi an
Anglophi1e
Main
Colonial
Powers
/////
Francophi1e
poli tical1y
entirely
dominated
Poli tical1y
subordinate
Largely
independent
politically*
The independence struggle continues in NeM Caledonia Cohere it Mill
probably succeed soon) and in West Papua (Mhere there appears little
prospect of success against the Javanese without outside support).
The
situation in Fiji is complicated as a result of the colonially-organised
immigration of East Indians (so typical a legacy of British control).
%
Apart from the Indonesian intrusion, there is American penetration
Samoa, and the French remain, most notably in Society Islands.
There
are
Antipodes,
Zealand).
tMO
essentially
major
independent
Melanesian and Anglo-Australasian (i.e. White
in
the
Australian and
NeM
groupings
The latter is the important group from the point of vieM of present
for the usual politico-economic reasons: comparative
change in the Antipodes,
numbers, poMer, influence, Meal th, resources, etc.
cultural features matter,
be
cultural
in
obtained
significantly,
in
such
a
It is Mi th this group that
and Mill make a difference, assuming difference can
May.
For
Melanesian
culture
for the most part in the right sorts of Mays,
American culture.
16
already
differs,
from mainstream
Though
culture.
already
features
distinctive
language suggests).
with
in
Antipodean
origins and attitudes can be enhanced,
varying
carefully
and
from
and extended to change
away
can
(like
continuing
those of sweet
powerful
Northern
Perhaps
by
directions
of
insensitivity.
intellectual and educational factors,
evolution
influenced,
away
Perhaps that movement
Northern barbarism and socio-environmental
cultural
observable
European
Cultural evolution is proceeding, perhaps with considerable pace (as
situation
European
from
are
there
stock,
the
the peoples of Australasia now consist predominantly of
pea
the
evolution)
forces,
now
suitably
be
predominantly
and multinationalisation, not merely resisted but turned to
22
advantaoe.
Among the questions which immediately arise, but which
Americanisation
local
remain insufficiently
investigated,
life.
are those concerning the interaction
How do
intellectual
cultural
and
culture?
Conversely, what impact do the cultural shifts
intellectual
elements
of
influence
- whatever they are,
a fundamental matter * have on intellectual life, especially in areas that lie
23
at the heart of such life, namely ideological orientation and philosophy?
A
special case,
from which this exercise began, is that where the philosophy is
environmental philosophy,
and
to
the
environment.
where the orientation concerns attitudes to
An
initial question resulting
differential effect of Antipodean culture,
or of the
is:
what
nature
is
the
distinctive elements in
22.
Often these Northern forces are presented as those of internationalism,
which is taken to be desirable. But ask what African, or Latin American,
or even Russian components these forces reflect, and what centres these
forces emanate from, and the extent of internationalism and mix of
nations and companies involved, will become clearer. Certainly there are
desirable qualities in internationalism, but these seem to be displayed
on the faces of internationalism least often observed or paraded.
23.
It is difficult to gauge how much philosophical and speculative concerns
matter to more ordinary people.
In a direct way, not very much, one is
inclined to say; yet ideological themes, like technological changes
deriving from the advance of science, heavily influence them and even perhaps
control the main structure of their lives.
As Keynes wrote in a much
quoted passage, 'Practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt
from any intellectual influences, are usually slaves of some defunct
economist' - or more likely philosopher or shaman (for the fuller quotation,
see Heilbroner, p.12).
17
24
it, upon attitudes and approach to the environment?
Answers
relations
Mill
be prised out by contrasting differences in attitudes
so far as they can be
to the environment,
Antipodeans Mith those of Northerners.
of attitudes,
set
still
a
discerned,
clearly
even among dominant cultural groups,
in the North.
After
there
Asia,
contrast in attitudes to the natural Morld betMeen
marked
of
there is not a uniform
firstly,
in the usual May the immense complication of
aside
setting
But,
and
the
is
Old
Horld and the NeM Horld. In the Old Horld there Mas and still is comparatively
and practically none for
little feel for the natural environment,
or the need for it or the desirability of it.
Milderness
Unsurprisingly, these attitudes
are ideologically underpinned, in particular by ancient chauvinistic themes as
to
the locus of all value in humans (and,
by more modern,
equally defective,
formerly,
in Mhat they image) and
themes forged in the Enlightenment,
that
superiority is manifested through independence of the natural Morld,
cultural
especially independence of the vagaries of climate and natural plant
25
groMth.
It is not that Europe, by contrast Mith the Antipodes, is entirely
and
devoid
of natural environment,
that there is no natural environment left
in
USSR, say, but that most of it is remote and that the culturally dominant part
of
the
primarily
Soviet
in
community does not live anyMhere near,
the
vicinity
of HoscoM,
environment as of any value for itself,
The
elements
and
does
not
but in
the
cities,
regard
the
natural
but only as a means,
of deeper ecological approaches,
instrumentally.
like the hazards
of
tobacco
smoking and industrial pollution, are not Mell knoMn or Midely advertised in
26
USSR
or the Eastern European block generally - though Eastern European
countries contain much of the least ecologically disturbed of European lands.
24.
And the converse is equally important:
the impact of local environments
on the cultures?
Approaches to the environment are an important
component of culture, more so than such obvious manifestations of culture
as literature (see beloM).
25.
For details of such Enlightenment tests of cultural
intimately
bound
to
the overarching
ideals
Perfectibility, see Berry p.14.
18
superiority, tests
of
Progress
and
Of course the Old Horld cannot,
environmentally.
European-based
some
Environmental
IUCN
environmentalism.
And
be entirely set
organisations
(such
aside
as
the
and the British National Trust) have been operating
for
time,
considerable
and could never,
and
movements
and
have
influence
an
had
on
Australasian
people in Europe concerned
there have long been
Mi th
happenings in the NeMer Horld, especially the nearest part of it, Africa. But
27
for
the
most part the spirit of European culture
remains
antienvironmental:
there Mas,
and for the most part still is (though things
changing Mi th green movements and parties),
for,
the
natural
environment,
as
little interest in,
gardening
and
more recently plantation forestry.
cultures''
other
exploitation,
such
and
opposed to the managed
environment in Mhich the Mealthier took an interest,
they
e.g.
little
through
for
feel
manipulated
landscape
As for other places'
fit
are
and
plunder
and
at least Mas the dominant attitude and the practice
(and
environments,
Mell
the practice persists at best thinly disguised,
Mere
though no longer uncontested:
Japanese enterprise in the Pacific).
So in Mhat folloMs Old Norld,
28
European approaches
are mostly left out of vieM: the spotlight shifts to the
consider
neMer-fangled North American attitudes, Mhich are hoMever intertMined Mi th Old
Norld sentiments.
The
most
substantial,
most
articulate,
and still
by
far
the
best
26.
(From previous page) In the period folloMing the Russian revolution until
the rise of Stalin, there Mas considerable, if shalloM, concern among
Russian scientists as to the environment (see Neiner). Like much else in
Russian society this rather elitist concern Mas actively discouraged. At
a more popular level environmental concern noM loses out to elements of
economism.
''In a country Mhere the glory of technology and the glitter
of economic groMth still radiate so seductively, radical environmental
protection does not have much of a chance even Mi th the best of
intentions'' (Haren-Grisebach, quoted in Capra and Spretnak, p.78).
27.
Exceptions such as Hill's life-style, for one, represents are exceptions,
and very conspicuous as a result.
28.
These approaches form, of course, the main stock of the disastrous
environmental heritage that Mas sloMly adapted and is still being adapted
in the NeM Morld. The stronger environmental components emerged from the
Northern
European heritage,
not the Latin or Southern
European
inheritance. This is evident too from the Meakness of environmentalism in
Latin America.
19
documented
past and
And it is uith the situation in North America,
America.
environment
contrast
America
movements are those,
environmental
there
the
adopted,
This is a further major
the other end of the cultural contrast being
as
North
the attitudes to the
that ue best look for contrasts,
Antipodean scene.
of
present,
ue
that
reason
for
developed,
best
taking
and
as
select representative of the industrial North.
ue dig doun to the details of the cultural differences that
Before
to
differing
attitudes in the Antipodes - difference that could
accentuated - there are,
should
come first,
and then junked,
determinism.
rubbish).
are those that some uill think
since they could render much of uhat follous
the issues surrounding determinism,
be
differences
have been brought out (issues uhich can then be throun out uith the
Among the issues postponed,
readily
preliminary issues to be dealt uith, and
as aluays,
issues to be postponed until the substantive cultural
other
yet
lead
of technological,
irrelevant:
economic, and cultural
for example, uere correct,
If Marx's technological determinism,
multitude of productive forces accessible to men determines the
29
nature of society',
then there uould be little scope for a distinct culture
'the
that
or distinctive attitudes to the environment in
the
Antipodes,
the productive forces accessible are supplied from the
can only remain,
of
as it mainly is,
North.
since most of
The Antipodes
predominantly derivative. But the evidence
cultural divergence from the North assembled in uhat follous uill afford a
base on uhich to argue that such deterministic themes are false, that cultural
30
divergence is occurring (and could be accelerated).
And this is happening
though
much,
the economic life by uhich such cultural things are supported is
too
much,
under the influence of the North;
though (under present governments) the
prospects
indeed it is
very
happening
of economic and much higher
cultural independence are bleak (unless, e.g., nuclear disaster befalls us).
2?.
Seiected Horks 1:
31 d.
20
In
free
some parts of intellectual life,
it is comparatively easy
the heavy influence of the North,
of
for regional intellectual life to
One of these areas is philosophy, especially more narrowly
prosper.
(the
philosophy
sort
break
to
of thing that tends to go
in
on
somewhat
academic
insulated
academies). Academic philosophy is easy, because a few people can do that. For
cultural differentiation, by contrast, ideas have to affect whole communities,
Philosophical ideas can be
to be absorbed and acted upon and in accord with.
like
bubbles
one
community life.
and
positions
with in an office
plays
In any case,
on-going
or
cell,
not
affecting
wider
there undoubtedly are distinctive philosophical
philosophical research projects
in
Australia
(see
For other academic areas, especially those with an empirical base
Prospects).
relying on high technology,
it is more difficult to obtain such independence.
For different reasons, there is also, as with high technology, little prospect
of
This
attaining a full distinctive or independent high culture in the Antipodes.
is partly because the human
people,
deal
at less than 20
million
is (fortunately) too small and widely distributed to support a
in
comprises.
30.
population base,
the
way
of such artifice as parts of
high
It is also because such high culture is,
culture
and
great
substantially
remains,
primarily
(From previous page) Determinism may be pushed into one or other of these
forms: i) it asserts some sort of necessity. Then it is falsified by the
real possibility of alternative technological choices, for instance. Or
ii) it is only contingently true. Then the phenomena of sub-cultures and
rival social cultures refutes it: see Cotgrove.
Technological determinism neglects major causative factors in change,
such as environmental factors. The land or resource base is almost as
important as the technology available, in lower technology societies more
important, so land determinism is at least as plausible as technological
determinism - which helps to show that neither are plausible. But both
can be combined into a broader economic determinism, which is much more
difficult to refute. However even if economics is very broadly construed,
such determinism is false. Economics operates within a framework of moral
and legal and other constraints; many choices - moral, legal and other which affect change significantly fall outside that framework.
Technological determinism and other forms of determinism are important in
bolstering the uniformity of human nature and culture assumptions, or at
least the theme of the convergence of culture with the spread of Hestern
technology and mainstream economics. So its falsity is also important.
21
31
a European product.
attitudes to the environment, though definitely an important -feature of a
are not part of high culture. Nor do they fit easily into
culture,
but
culture":
"loiter
the
most
been
part,
HoMever
differentiation.
of
the
Mhere attitudes to the environment have not,
for
again is largely because the
that
cultures is a European one,
as
regarded
Mherever
a
significant
division
feature
of
cultural
such attitudes fit - it Mill probably
harm to see them as part of a broader loMer culture,
little
so-called
and at the
same
time help to erode the erroneous idea that interest in natural environment
an
elitist class concern - they tie directly Mith elements of culture at
do
is
the
loMer end.
At the loMer cultural level there are very distinctive features - some of
admittedly
them
features
are
can
gambling,
common
found in many colonies,
and
just
perhaps
be
in the different attitudes of Antipodeans to the
included such things - and attitudes
environment.
- as
them
these
religion,
time, service, etc. Nearer the grass-roots level there is a
Momen,
culture
to
colonial
Some of
- Mhich separate Australasian from Northern culture.
reflected
Here
those
in
Australia
snd
NeM
Zealand
Mith
distinctive
feature^
reflected in folk lore, folksong and myth (not all of them admirable, e.g. the
treatment
of indigenous people,
organised
sports.
Yet
Antipodean cultures,
authoritarianism,
that
there
and of Momen),
are also differences betMeen
differences in pace,
these
tMo
main
religious orientation, ethnic mix,
conservatism, political organisation, values
are sometimes hard to pin doMn precisely.
all-important fact that part of Australia,
31.
and in the mania for similar
There is,
- differences
for instance,
by contrast Mith NeM Zealand
the
(but
It can be argued that philosophy and other intellectual enterprises are
also. This is not so. Philosophy in Asia - from Mhere indigenous
Antipodean people apparently originated - predates that in the Nest.
There are, moreover, grounds for suspecting that the roots of
philosophy Mere imported into the Nest, to Ancient Greece, from India.
AnyMay, every full culture includes an ideology and some rudiments at
least of philosophy.
22
in Eastern USA),
places
like
Mas settled as a penal
appear to colour many of the differential features of the
origins
culture.
On
the
other
Islanders
is
noM
introducing Polynesian
language,
concepts and attitudes) into NeM Zealand culture,
quite
The
colony.
corresponds
in
side,
increasing presence of
the
strands
Though
Australia.
Australian
Maori
and
elements
of
the
(especially
convict
to Mhich nothing
concentrates
Mhat. folloMS
on
mainstream Australian culture and its contrast Mith American,
much of Mhat is
observed for Australia can be seen to extend to NeM Zealand.
But not all
more conspicuous differences at least Mill be remarked.
any means:
One major difference,
rest
the
of
by
Antipodes,
in
Australia,
hard to miss,
concerns
Mhich separates Australia from
of
the nature
the
environment
itself.
contrast Mith the islands of the remainder of
striking
the
the
Antipodes, is in the first place, vast - approximately the size of continental
USA
or
again
paradigmatically
of
Europe
(including
contrasted Northern
Eastern
Europe),
i.e.
It is also,
regions.
not a geologically neMer mountainous country.
flat land,
from the eastern seaboard and a feM other favoured areas,
of
the
main
an old Morn-doMn
And it
apart
is,
a dry to arid land,
predominantly treeless, a Mide red and grey land, Mith unusual inhabitants. It
is
still seen by Northerners as a harsh and difficult land,
alien and
often
ugly (formerly it Mas also an incomplete and Godless land); and this is hoM it
is
frequently vieMed also by NeM Zealanders.
landscape
and
is,
much
more
to superficial appearance,
congenial
to
from
people
NeM
The much modified
Zealand
much more like the European North,
the
North.
Correlatively,
population of NeM Zealand tends to look
32
more to the North, to England in particular, than that of Australia.
established
European-descended
Australians are often imagined to partake of the land,
earthiness.
promoted
32^
Certainly
image
of the
the
much
its harshness and
corresponding features have been assigned to the muchAustralian-Man-of-the-Land,
Thus, for example, the
ansMers back to London.
tough,
legal appeal frameMorks in NeM
23
tall
and
slim,
Zealand
still
bronzed, sun and time lined, a stockman or at least a horseman. But so far the
is not so different from that of the Texan (if they spoke,
image
Nor of course is this image of the people at all accurate.
distinguish them).
are mainly (almost 90X) suburban,
Australians
would
that
them 1iving
more than half of
in one of the two huge urban conglomerates , centred on Sydney and Melbourne,
33
The men are often soft, if brown in summer,
on the milder east coast.
increasingly resemble counterparts
in
Hhile there are certainly important features
of
and they
the western American cities.
convergence
technological-economic
for
of
features
the
land
here
determinism
and
pattern,
Thus,
is of some importance in helping
the history
of
its
the
also
network.
communication
and
transport
i t has much 1 ess relevance for
the convergence;
there is
deriving from a similar or common settlement
and
framework
economic
North America to bring out,
from
divergence
(
and Mi th little experience of the
from excess beer consumption,
overweight
account
divergence,
settlement
where
land-based
(a
determinism, so to misleadingly say) are much more important.
overlapping history,
An
part
of
especially of California and the
south-eastern
transforms
(regions which can easily be seen as ecological
of
one
in the convergence:
another),
analogous
frontier
experience,
only
there is not
but there are the miners who
came
in
the
from
there are
major differences:-
of
from
the
Australasia had no Spanish experience,
and the conf 1ic ts
American settlers with the natives were very different
the
compar i son
hostilities
in
Australia or
wars
in
New
Zealand.
character
in
Still,
the
with California avoids complicating features of US history with no
substan ti al analogue in Australia, e.g. the puritanical religious settlements,
the
slave experience and the civil war.
33.
In New Zealand the compact countryside is much more densely settled than
most of Australia, but the population is again mostly suburban (a perfect
target for television) and small town, and is (at about 86X) more urban
than USA.
24
However California is
not
entirely
but often regarded even in America as something of an anomaly
typical of USA,
(and certainly as much more experimental, cult-ridden, etc., than say the more
conformist Midwest or South).
there are significant cultural differences between
While
especially eastern USA,
USA,
there are also, then,
Australia
and
powerful forces at work
eroding those differences. The differences are already such that extrapolation
Australia of US experience and experiments in socio-political areas can be
to
unreliable, and is strictly illegitimate. For it is evident enough that, where
cultures differ sufficiently, transfer or extrapolation from one to the
may
be
unjustified.
conveniently ignored,
cultural respects.
been
seen
with
What
often
has
not
been
so that damaging
clarity,
have not
agricultural
forestry
to
cutting,
control
Australia.
Examples
burning,
differences
in the people,
have been simply
(clear
and intensive agricultural methods
(heavy
extensive use of herbicides,
machinery,
its
practices
are intensive
etc.)
and
North America with
generally better soils and more favourable rainfall regimes,
imported
been
has
even in the land,
which can be got away with more easily in
practices,
else
is that America and Australia do differ considerably in
Surprisingly the differences,
any
or
seen,
other
forestry
So it is even more with
etc.).
the
which are perhaps harder to see than those in the
1 and.
The differences carry over to differences in social and political theory,
and
differences
significant
unlikely
includes
directions
to
minarchism
arrangements;
Whitehead's
related
generally
in
in American
philosophy and ideology.
34
philosophy , for example,
obtain responsive chords or much following
individualistic,
as
more
(or
right-leaning
competitive
libertarianism),
anti-social
and
in
for
There
are
which
are
Australia.
which
Australian
This
too
is
social
but it also includes religious-based organic philosophies, such
later philosophy (which is scarcely known in
transcendental philosophies of nature,
25
Australia)
which are much too
and
religious
for secular Australian culture.
3.
Grimy details of the cultural contrast
problem
it
that
hard
is
There is of course the inevitable
that
to say much about culture
qualified and even then still subject to counterexamples.
is
Also it is hard
test hypotheses, and confirm observations, of the type involved.
much
point
in
heavily
not
even such impressionistic accounts and theory as
to
Yet there is
follows, in
particular for the intended social and political applications.
main
The
socioloqy.
method
Though
it
adopted
is
is
what
might
be
marshmallow sociology,
called
like
impression i st i c
marshmallow
it
has
substance. And it is different from and an improvement upon pop sociology. For
firstly
it backed and cross-checked,
tighter data;
anecdotal,
and,
where it can be,
other
secondly, it is assembled into a theory. It is not merely
then, in two major respects. However, it does not pretend to offer
better than tendency or trend statements;
(atypical)
by surveys and
exceptions.
But
to any generalisation there will be
that's alright.
That is the stuff
of
improved
common knowledge. The aim of course is to fit these trend generalisations into
a better story,
To
avoid
contrasts
strictly
such
into a theoretical structure,
repeated
and tiresome qualification
which can then be put to work.
of
claims,
comparisons
are however stated in bolder form than the evidence or their
bases
Often a qualifying functor should be taken as implicit
in
Even then there is constant danger of lapsing into naivety
or
warrant.
claims.
and
mere caricature in this wide and difficult sociological landscape.
34.
(From previous page) Perhaps the more original directions in an imperial
culture not exactly distinguished by its intellectual originality (as
opposed to its technological genius), especially given its resources. For
unless times have changed since the Second Horld Har, there are no
American philosophers of really great stature. Whatever one may think of
Santayana and Hhitehead, they were not really American philosophers, much
of their work being done within a European setting and a good deal in
Europe. Emerson was not strictly a philosopher. James, though clever and
entertaining, was a lightweight (by Greek standards), so presumably was
Dewey. Perhaps the erratic and eccentric Peirce affords the exception
that
proves the rule.
But the salient point is that
American
civilization, like Roman civilization with which it invites comparison,
has
not attained the intellectual heights that might have
been
anticipated, given the colossal material base.
24
present
The
rests there,
focus
unexpected
in
to
and
these
out
bring
have to go doMn
other
differences
trying
Although
contrast
upon features of environmental
differences,
socio-political
inter 1aced
preferably
some
of
between environmentalism in Australia and North America.
contrasts
one
investigation greM from the discovery
Mel1,
as
and
first,
of environmentalism in Australia by comparison even Mith North
America.
But
at points of deep ideological difference, ue soon and
by beginning elsewhere,
easily diverge into many other - sometimes relevant, sometimes more trifling features of the broader cultures, before returning at the end to environmental
contrasts.
the resulting investigation Manders through and over a Mi de and
Although
no kind of completeness is sought;
varied cultural landscape,
grander
edifices of the built cultural 1andscape
1ibraries,
35
outside.
the
larger
obiiquely,
- art
many
galleries,
of
the
museums,
and so on - are not entered or even glanced at from the
theatres,
as these structures of higher culture are typically clustered
only touch attitudes to
they
cities,
by contrast Mith religion,
Mhich,
the
natural
in
environment
Mhatever main Western form
it
assumes, has tended to dictate and enforce a shalloM human chauvinism.
a.
The influence
and decline of,
religion. There is considerable basis for
the all-important theme that "Australia [is] best understood as a (the
post-Christian
(O"Farrell,
society,
p.3).
in
Although
Mhich religion [is] barely relevant
theme
this
requires
first)
culturally"
qualification,
virtually any cultural generalisation (and gets qualified in its
source),
like
it
is not far from the mark. Australian
religions
suspicious of the Mider culture - and both to a more intense degree
than elseMhere" (p.7).
35.
On the historical place of some of these edifices in Australian culture,
see issues of Australian Cultural History.
27
Though 'there is much evidence for thinking that Australian
is becoming more secular in character',
The
phenomenon.
decline
Christianity
the weakness of religion is not a new
from a comparatively low level
began
of
popular
commitment;
'Australian churches have never been able to claim the allegiance
36
of more than a minority of the people.
In
basis)
Australia
religious
declined
has
August 3).
Nationwide,
from
attendance (on more than
33Xtol8-19Xover
the
a
merely
past
feu
to Australians
Sundays
religious
USA,
the
in
(a
resident
receding
gospel).
tending
sometimes
(ABC,
feature
The religious
to straight nuttiness,
not only in sizeable
in USA,
of Australian
presence on television (e.g.
10 channels have a
years
In Europe religious attendance is much?higher, 50X or
more, and in North America higher still, sometimes put at 60X.
fervour
occasional
life),
church
is evident
turn-outs
on
but especially in the
in a not atypical major city 3 out of
heavy religious component,
substantial portions of it hot
The born-again Christian movement - a major (and dangerous) movement
in USA involving not merely a shift back to older Christian values but also to
the
far political right - has had comparatively little flow-on in
This
religious
publicity,
these
revivals,
have
Australia.
emphasized
old
36.
The quotations are from Inglis, p.72 and p.73 respectively. The second
quote reports the only thorough study of early religious practice in
Australi a.
37.
figures from William Grey.
Such figures
are
very
Unconfirmed
Part
of
this
is
due
to
'the
reluctance
of
people
to
be
con troversi al
the
census
form,
about
their
indifference
or
hostility
to
candid, on
In
one
study
less
than
SOX
of
those
claiming
affiliation
religion'.
'could give any details at all of what takes place at Church' (Inglis,
Actual fiqures for religious behaviour (e.g. saying
p.45 and p.46).
grace, reading bible, etc.) in Australia are also 'extremely low'.
Regularly, however, there is news of a religious revival in Austra la.
But it like frequent news of the rise in value of the Australian dollar.
Having fallen not so long ago from an exchange value of US$1.12 to, on
occasions, less than $0.60, it has now risen from 63 cents to 65 cents.
'Revivalism ... has been a normal part of Protestant evangelism here for
more than a century: but there has never been any solid evidence that it
shifted for long the boundary between the Church and the world (Inglis,
p.74)
28
contradictions.
There are serious tensions, to say the least, in the American
(characteristically
religious commitment
combine
Jewish) Mith acquisitive individualism and its trappings.
peaples have Mitnessed the incompatibility (cf.
Melanesi an
Lini).
that conspicuous
at tenders do not have a serious or very deep religious
redistribution
Christian
dedicated minority.
is
the
commitment,
and the like being undertaken only by a very
smal1
But an alternative suggestion Mhich also has some backing
there is a cultural schizophrenia:
that
of
resolution takes the line that most
obvious
or
and
Many colonised
missionised
An
Christian
there are
separate
salvations,
religious and acquisitive economic.
The
religious
differences
between
USA
Australia
and
originate
in
important differences in the May the tMO colonies Mere first settled, the type
their backgrounds and their commitments,
of people,
more
conversion
But there is
The differences have been enhanced Mith the mass 20th
to it than that.
century
and so on.
to
in
science,
Australia
a
doMn-to-earth,
very
naturalistic, evolutionary science, incompatible Mith spiritual elements.
resistance to religion in Austral a is a resistance to
The
general 1y
spirituality
The only religion that has had or made
(including idealism).
much
impact is Christianity (its more recent role being due in considerable part to
practices).
immigration
That
impact moreover is slight compared Mith
North
America: the reborn Christian movement did not roll through Australia, leaving
converts
everyMhere.
Attitudes
to
religion
and
spirituality
Australian society not only from North American but also from
separate
the, in certain
respects more conservative, NeM Zealand society.
Attitudes to spirituality are directly reflected in Australian philosophy
and
in
attitudes to the environment.
A predominant
position
and
research
program, in Australian philosophy is materialism, in a strongly reductionistic
form.
The
that nature.
natural Morld studied by physical science is all;
In fact man is but an advanced
2?
man is part
of
sort of computing system, and so
at
Hind is effectively identified Mith
bottom a naturally-evolved "machine".
brain,
mental
of
product
Australian
states
being brain states (of
sophisticated
"Miring" and programming.
materialism is opposed,
religiously
or
some
sort),
Even Mhere
crude
this
rival minority positions are
spiritually involved;
a
consciousness
mostly
Mhile they are rather more opposed
not
to
reductionism, they are mostly secular.
dominant materialist reductionist
The
philosophy reflects
touches
and
in
other
several
the
broader sense, and a certain earthiness: the Australian male is a man from and
of
secondari1y.
famous
tie
so to speak,
the earth,
Attitudes to,
and,
in the North (though someMhat unjustly,
only
as Mill become apparent),
the environment.
by
traditional
Western religions;
fortunate
so the
do
chauvinism
human
For
and male chauvinism are analogous phenomena Mith similar sources;
38
They are
attitudes and patterns of domination go Mith them.
supported
figure
for Mhich Australia is
and oppression of Momen,
more directly to attitudes to
Momen
as in much mythology,
similarly
decline
of
is of paramount importance in their demise.
The
direc tion
most important for
more
5"/
environmental
thinking has
taken.
A
contrast
main
American environmental thought is in the
the
betMeen
religious/spiritual
componen t of the latter, but not the former. Deeper environmental positions in
USA
are much
more inclined to find
39
things,
to make room for the sacred,
Buddh i sm
and
spiritual
to
consider
Certainly
other
dimensions
in
natural
sympathetically
Zen
things
not
these
are
absent from the Australian scene, especially from parts of the North
40
scene , but they lack the prominence in Australian
environmentalism
33.
that they attain in North America;
As ecofeminism has stressed.
Earlier cu1tures in the Antipodes, e.g.
Polynesian, also display conspicuous chauvinism, Once again culture is to
be resisted as Mell as used.
30
regarded as essential.
then,
In many respects,
been
ideas,
and
often
that
is,
Mi th class chauvinisms.
outsiders,
partial
characteristically linked Mith sets of false
have
religions
damaging
the decline of religion is to be Melcomed.
Mi th
For
very
and
nonsubscribers
marked intolerance for
But the decline can
leave
or
a
a place
vacuum,
imported science;
and i t has in Australia.
The vacuum is hardly being filled
in a satisfactory May, as
The
for
areligious
character of Australian life has important
culture and change.
For it means that one of the main
implications
institutions
of
induction (namely church, family, and school), Mhich normally inculcate social
cultural values and Morld vieM,
norms,
many
in
the
of
influence
are largely untouched
Church and religion.
by
the
critical
historically
really
But the situation is
or
missing
seriously
Meakened.
There is no longer
respected elders - except in isolated and specialised areas,
even
such as
that technical or professional field - and
emphasis
on
youth tells against much deference or many concessions to
of
the
sort
made in more traditional or
Coupled Mi th this is the decline of the family,
39.
Third
the
heavy
Horld
of
experts
or
people
more
frameMork
a
this
in
is,
and disturbing. For other traditional components of induction are
remarkable,
also
society
That
is substantially missing.
cultural
older
communities.
Mhich has certainly lost much
(From previous page) Thus, for example, virtually all the books Nash
mentions (in 82) as "defining the emerging field" of environmental
ethics, if not overtly religious, have a heavy religious bias: indeed
Nash mentions "the
tendency to emphasize the religious nature of
man-environment relations".
deep ecology is spiritual in its every essence"; so say, accurately
enough, Capra and Spretnak (p.53) , in the course of reporting on "the
spiri tual aspects of [German] green politics " and continuing their
(pp.53-6)
German
German-Amer i can
this account
comparisons.
On
religiosity
of
American
environmentalism.
environmental ism shares the
40.
(From previous page) Or from Patrick Hhite"s approach.
But he is
inclined to bring God in Mays that leave many thinking Australians
uncomfortable. Hhat there is, Mhich is different, is a groMing link Mith
features of aboriginal culture.
31
of
former
its
and cohesiveness.
strength
accordingly falls on
education,
The
main
of
burden
such as communicational media,
induction
most notably
But these arrangements are hardly adequate for the purpose (for
41
descriptive-style
reasons).
Nor given their
ideological
messages,
television.
especially
in
the
case
of manipulate popular media
like
television
and
popular song and newspapers, are they desirable means.
This situation, the failure or weakness of main institutions of induction
and the high adjustibility and manipulability of the remainder, has advantages
as
in very different ways,
happen
of
Changes
Australia
fairly
perhaps
But
directly from the top down.
For
culture,
a
example,
can
be
shift
of
to a much more violent society could be pulled off by a combination
conservative
governments
and their police forces
and
friends
few
There is copious evidence however,
control
the
induced
or imposed changes tend to take decidedly undesirable directions
matters
that matter:
main media.
reliance andthe like.
civil liberties,
independence from
New Zealand,
children
against
that
the
Alternatively, change can be achieved at a
level, at least for significant subcultures,
of
it
liberating.
perhaps
damaging,
which have a residual basis in the
this sort,
accomplished
of
society,
change in such a society can be accomplished quite rapidly.
cultural
can
For compared with a traditional more stable
well as drawbacks.
by direct action.
who
top-down
North,
for
self-
grass roots
In the case of
consider the effect of massive withdrawal by parents and schools
from competitive sport,
rugby especially (initially in
racially-implicated rugby policies),
and the immersion
of
protest
children
instead in very different types of games.
It
influence
is around this difference in religiosity,
and its marked decline
in
in Australia, that many other cultural contrasts between mainstream
American and Australian societies revolve. However only so much can be made of
the difference; it is by no means a total explanation of the contrasts, as the
41.
See e.g. Illich, especially Deschoolinq Society.
with
situation
New Zealand culture helps show.
For mainstream New
Zealand
culture otherwise differs from American'culture in many of the ways Australian
does.
The
b.
benign
Vt
qoverment,
(market)
/v
To North Americans the amount of government, and
superficial
organisation and regulation.
of government,
level
of
role
and state control,
the
State:
Australia (and even more in New
in
Zealand) is very conspicuous, and often irksome. 'Australia has a higher level
of
planning than the United States but less than
state
country
France'
as
(Hi Id,
p.39).
Hild
goes
on
such
of
Australia
- a
government,
they find government much
and
upon
remark
to
pervasiveness of rigid bureaucratic organisation' in Australia.
suspicious
centralised
a
'the
Americans are
too
powerful
feature locals are sometimes prepared to acknowledge,
but
in
do
little about, despite much right-leaning media incitement.
Indeed government and its supporting bureaucracy are increasing in power,
size
and
in Australia.
influence
extent of public inquiries,
the
acclaimed
'Australian talent for
even
Western standards,
procedures,
incompatible
bias is written in,
approaches
objectives.
Nor
There
are
policy-determining
For they
are
top-down
a heavy
with bottom-up democratic control;
value
a conservative bias from the judicial system in the
Royal Commissions;
confrontational
intended
e.g.
For
equivalents
of increasing length and real cost.
not much asked in Australia.
questions
of
organization.
questions about these forms of "fact"-finding and
procedure^,
case
and
are large numbers of Royal Commissions and their
there
serious
bureaucracy'
and
This is part of
Royal Commissions and the like.
example,
by
numbers
So also are the associated
the
and
in
methods
Commissions)
employed
(e.g.
are commonly unsuited
are fundamental questions about
forms and procedures of government,
adversarial,
the
for
the
established
which are often raised in USA, much asked
in Australia.
Australia
was
fortunate
to have determined at
33
time
of
Federation
a
respresentative democratic system,
Mhich Mas,
by the standards of the times,
very sophisticated, and capable of reflecting minority positions * not that it
been used sufficiently for these purposes by most minorities.
has
of
mass-production
update
electronic computing equipment,
it is
noM
federal and state electoral arrangements,
Australian
the
Mith
feasible
to have a
to
more
direct democracy Mith more pluralistic and responsive representation; but such
a change is politically unlikely, improvements in the directness and pluralism
The only changes
of democracy having obtained little public discussion even.
mooted
have
anachronistic simplifications of electoral arrangements (such
are
occurred
of
direction
Mhere
some
and
reasons,
Mhere
money
minorities
a
plays
little
have
major role in
political
the
federal
impact
determining
or
gets
Mho
(For a catalogue of major deficiency of US capaitalistic
and so on.
democracy,
several
US,
the
representation,
elected,
in
in NeM Zealand) Mhich Mould take Australia
as
valuable suggestions for
electoral
arrangements
improvement,
being
one,
smaller
For
OD).
see
population,
another, government remains much more accessible and responsive (e.g. to small
represenations) in Australia than USA,
group
influenced
by
If the unfortunate American
42
folloMed hoMever, much of that Mill change
Connected
the
attitude
America
seem
Mith differences in attitude to goverment are
servants of the government.
are looked doMn upon:
immediately
to
path
is
differences
in
professional lobbying.
to
admit to having.
The civil servants
it is the sort of job one may not,
By contrast,
more
Mhich by contrast is much
the public servants in
be held in considerable esteem (and some among the
taller
in
North
does
not,
Australia
unlopped
43
poppies)
Mork
One source of the difference lies in the underlying attitudes
and service.
In USA the public sector isn't really considered
to
to
Mork
42.
Occasionally for the better. Australian government has much to learn yet
from American about openness and freedom of information.
43.
Hhat is shared betMeen North America and Australia is the attitude of
middle level people Morking for the government: often these people do not
like Morking for the government (even though it provides them Mith a very
comfortable 1iving).
34
(because
it is outside the market system),
but constitutes a burden
on
the
private sector Mhich does Mork. Though there have been efforts to import these
of (erroneous) market assumptions into Australia,
sorts
they have not really
thriven.
In seemingly curious contrast Mith the respective attitudes taken to
public service,
there is contempt for specific politicians,
if
even
are the vieMS of the political and judicial systems.
there
is
the
In USA,
considerable
resDect for the political system: the constitution is virtually God-given, and
44
certainly something to be proud of and much superior to anything elseMhere.
In
Australia
is considerable cynicism about
there
it has little or no high authority and backing,
system;
judiciary
political
gerrymandering,
the reputation of
same holds as regards the judicial system:
the
and
the
favouritism, etc., are virtually expected and accepted features.
corruptness,
Huch
hoMever,
is
constantly
being
practice) in the Make of scandals.
propped
up
(Mith
unjustified
the
success
in
Both again contrast Mith attitudes to the
public service, Mhich Australians tend to consider relatively honest, and most
certainly not open to bribery on an Asian scale (thank you!).
There are significant (but significantly different)
both mainstream cultures over government:
all
cover
deeper,
the
branches equally;
then,
in Australia respect for the
of government does not penetrate very deep,
branches
tensions,
and certainly does
in USA respect for the
institutions
in
chief
not
goes
but does not cover the functionaries.
The American situation is the more easily explained, in outline at least.
In USA government is vieMed,
frameMork apparatus,
in principle, as a rather minimal regulating and
Mhich does not itself Mork,
but keeps the market system
Mhere
the real Mork is done Mell-oiled and suitably running,
other
capitalistic
44.
institutions
such
as private
property
and
guarantee^
and
individual
1^ recent decades, 'Americans continued to say that they Mere proud of
our system of goverment.
Their lack of confidence Mas clearly directed
at the people running those institutions' (Lipset and Schneider, p.16?).
35
freedoms.
social
government has become too large,
But
expensive
services),
functionaries
parasitic
as
take the flack for that situation.
Big expensive
arrangements.
unproductive
government
is invidiously contrasted Mith market
Furthermore,
government
often operates,
and is seen operate in
organisations furthering their OMn interests and profits,
large
in
government
And
burden.
many of them accordingly parasites and seen
and employees,
looking out for themselves,
- a
overextended (specially
favour
of
the
whereas
market system, for all its basis in competitive self interest, does not bestow
great
A
favours.
extraordinary
markets:
in
political
America
mainstream
is
the market system bordering
on
and support systems
are
outside
or
operation
of
supported,
deplored.
The
feM
further
assumptions,
deductively justified through)
commitment to competitive individualism.
the
intimacy of regard and effort,
but
mainstream
American commitment to market arrangements is in turn explained by (and,
but
an
the
in
faith
arrangements taken to accompany free
brief the free-enterprise system is religiously
arrangements
by
explained
suspicion of any political arrangements stepping
a
capitalistic
the
beyond
to
commitment
and
system,
about
deal
Mith
cultural
the
The associated emphasis on Mork, and
Mhich accompany market euphoria,
can
be
explained, historically to some extent, by May of the originally difficult and
predominantly puritan settlement of America.
But such a genetic
explanation
is hardly complete; for largely gone, as no more than relics, are the forms of
early more democratic America,
the toMn meeting places and so on,
largely in
favour odf super-market places.
The American commitment to market procedures, and American enthusiasm for
market
d
lochte
methods,
does
not extend to mainstream
a distressing 'Australian distrust of markets'.
have found, underlying this
individualism,
an
Australia,
endorsement
distrust, a Marranted
Mhere
Americans
But Mhere they
rejection
of
might
competitive
they couple it,
not incorrectly, but more superficially, Mith
45
of egalitarianism'.
For market processes do redistribute
Meal th and Mhat goes Mith it, in very unequal fashion over the course of time,
36
46
both
theory
allocation
market
and American experience attest.
processes
as
highly
desirable
Americans
given,
and
take
to
tend
to
regard
deviations from or interference in on-going market processes, such as a social
preference for equality, as (economically) asinine and certain irrational, and
as carrying an expensive price tag.
The
predominant American view is that the market i^ fair and
wise,
but
preceding quotes are
(From previous page) As Withers, from Mhom the tMO the emotional and
draMn,
remarks,
'as economists and Americans,
to elude them' ANU
intellectual basis and content of such vieMs seems
Reporter 16(6) (1985) 6.
46.
47.
Beginning in 1820 Mith a much more egalitarian society, USA experienced
many decades of increasingly inegalitarian income distribution; see
Williamson and Lindert.
most
Thus, for example, Caves and Krause, pp.400 1, also p.2, Mho for the
al 1
processes
(it
is
after
part simply assume the superiority of market
,
and
appeal
repeatedly
to
the
efficiency
of
economic conventional Misdom),
..
a
definition
of
market outcomes.
It is loaded efficiency, Mith
For
market
efficiency appropriately adjusted to market proces=e=.
minimize
arrangements are not particularly efficient
or to
on market externalities (such as environmental degradation)
maximize on other objectives (such as income fairness).
1 ou t
Extensions of these points apply against the usual arguments rolledOne of
t
of
market
procedures
everyMhere.
0..
for the imposition or dominance
to be Caves and Krause, namely 'the efficiency of
......................
, and
market and nonmarket allocation is open to empirical
test,
and so the
the
distrust of market outcomes should be subject to modification 1
that
evidence Marrants' (p.400).
The trouble Mith this is not merely
(p.400).
much depends on hoM "efficiency" is assessed; it
i. is
-- that empirical tests
ar" virtually never attempted, are difficult to ca<^ out in real-1 ife
situations (Mhere there are too many uncontrolled parameters , and Mhen
methods.
attempted do not deliver unequivocal results favouring marke
of market
So there is fall back to theoretical argument: the
C._ efficiency
„
That
is
true^
Mith
"efficiency"
given
^39**"
processes can be proved.
That is true, Mith "efficiency
P
but under highly restrictive conditions,
(externalities neglected, etc.)
such as perfect competition, Mhich are virtually never satisfied in
Caves
and Krause do recognise that frequent failure
actual conditions.
1
striking
conditions
of one of the more Sn
------- for
— market efficiency in . Australia
may account for local suspicion of markets, Mhich 'may arise natur
y
a oeographically isolated country in Mhich the actors are too f
ensure efficient Market cuties' (p.2: no doubt yet another
but Minor
econoMic reason for pushing for a larger huMan population
is to get Market actors up to competitive strength!)
However such
reasons "cannot really account for the suspicion of
population substantially unfaMiliar with conditions for Market adequacy.
tt is false then, what economists like Caves and Krause try o suggest
(e.g. p.400), that distrust of Markets has, except in special cases, no
economic foundations.
That May be Mainstream American economic wisdom,
but it hardly passes undisputed in many parts of the Morld.
37
not the government;
1$?57
and 1977 held
"gives
everyone
a
for example,
... large majorities of national samples in
that the free-enterprise system is "fair and wise"
fair choice" (65/D,
(82Z),
and that it is a "fair and efficient
system" (63X)', whereas 'not only do large majorities (1980) believe that "the
government
is
themselves"
is
pretty
(78X),
much
run by a few
big
intereasts
out
looking
for
but also that "you cannot trust the government to do what
right" most of the time (73X)' (Lane,
p.3).
Lane's summary of
American
public attitudes does not extend to Australia:
the public tends to believe that the market system is a more fair
agent than the political system; people tend to include the problem
cases in the political domain and exclude them from the market; they
ignore many of the public benefits and, with certain exceptions,
prefer market goods to political goods; they prefer the market's
criteria of deserts to the polity's criteria of equality and need;
they believe that market procedures are more fair than political
procedures; and they are satisfied that they receive what they deserve
in the market but much less so in the polity, and by a different
measure, are much more satisfied with the general income distribution
among occupations than with the distribution of influence among social
groups in the polity (Lane p.7).
It is enough to reflect on Australian attitudes to wage determination,
security
and medicine,
and the like.
social
Australians are less inclined to
market rewards as fair returns for hard work,
see
and more inclined to see market
rewards as based on luck and chance as well as on performance in popular areas.
In USA,
Even where the market's methods are thought unfair to certain groups,
such as blacks and women, the intrusion of government into the sacred
precincts is regarded with hostility, for the government's program of
rectification trespasses on the evaluation of persons by the market's
process of "revealed contribution".
Hhere government purposes are
approved their implemtation is stifled, partly, at least, because the
government's
justice
norms
are discounted and
because
such
implementation
violated market justice
norms.
Thus,
minimal
government is assured and people are endowed with more commodities and
fewer collective goods (Lane, p.27).
In
Australia,
support,
active
by contrast,
respect and trust,
opposition.
Hhile
the market system does not enjoy this
level
of
but encounters especially in the area of labour,
small local markets (e.g.
fruit and
vegetables,
trash and trivia) are often well supported, the extension of markets into many
significant
spheres
of working and of moral life is
38
resisted.
Unions
and
Mith extensive nonmarket social agendas, thrive, to
labour and other parties,
irritation of Northern-schooled economists and political scientists
the
diversion of resources, open-ended
regularly point to rent-seeking behaviour,
costs,
and
the
(Mho
zero-sum nature of governmental
redistribution
equity
and
measures).
a certain market distrust or indiffierence
Since
economic phenomenon in Australia,
government
functioning
and various related
claims
Mhat they notice, in particular,
assemble no evidence;
operations in many places Mhere
organised
important
as Mell as to its historical source.
claim,
is
an
it is Morth inquiring as to the evidence of
this phenomenon of 'pervasive distrust',
competition' (p.400),
appears
markets
could
reflect
('the design and scope of governmental policy and action
This
this distrust'), so they assume government interference or intervention.
is
once
again to assume,
erroneously,
that markets are the natural May
state alternative is
constitutes "interference".
contrived,
"rights"
for
or
instance
In
by
hoMever,
areas,
many
governmental
markets
vouchers or the like trade-Morthy items,
to
of
glimpsed)
have
introducing
regulations
be
function
to
be
special
at
all.
Frequently in Australia the government eventually acted in areas Mhere markets
had failed, e.g. in generating employment, adequate Mages, etc., or else Mhere
there
over
Mere no markets,
for instance in the secularisation of society to take
formerly carried on by religious organisations.
Given the
43
context and evolution , it is decidedly misleading to say that
functions
historical
choose at some cost the seemingly greater control of outcomes
that
government interference promises' (p.2).
(and is uniikely to be),
There Mas strictly no
no cost because there Mere no satisfactory
choice
markets,
and so no such government interference.
Australian Mariness of markets, and distaste for them in various socially
^.significant
areas,
had of course been observed much earlier (though not Mith
3?
same level of disapproval as the Americans display).
the
It Mas part
a
of
long tradition of (predominantly nonmarxist) socialism, Mhich Mas coupled Mith
an
anti-economic
people.
open-handed
'Australians are a
They dislike refusing favours,
Hancock in a much quoted
(thus
costs'
stance and sentiments.
passage:
counting costs is not economic behaviour;
good-tempered,
and they do
e.g.
Connell
not
count
p.29).
nor are the nonmaximizing,
Not
take-a-
day-off, leisure-oriented features of the older culture.
Explaining
mainstream Australian ambivalence toMards government is
more
Given the anti
difficult than explaining the Mariness of market procedures.
authoritarian elements in the history of the country (e.g.the convict origins,
squatting),
bushranging,
strongly egalitarian attitudes and image presented,
the
given
Mhich are continued in the mainstream culture
government in Australia, and the
glamour
b^en
media figures),
supposed
importance:Each
and
of
ncreasing importance of politicians (Mho are
is someMhat surprising.
to lie in the lack of religiosity.
Firstly,
the poMer
and
Part of an explanation
There are tMO
and puritanism foster
Protestantism
points
has
of
49
individualism
every one of us has to ansMer for him or her-self (before
God,
or
48.
(From previous page) Australian history has arguably' shoMn a strong
preference for collective action, both Mhere there might have been
The early convict
markets to intervene in and Mhere there Mere none.
phase affords clear evidence of this, and the later nineteenth century
has !been characterised (by Butlin) as a period of 'colonial social ism'.
The early tMentieth century Mas the time Mhen the Antipodes served as; a
Hore recently , hoMever, the European
laboratory for social experiments,
II.
especial 1y since Nor Id Nar
industrial Morld has caught up,
(Australian public employment and expenditure Mere much higher than most
Western countries in the early post-Mar years, but to have not increased
nearly as much since: see Aitken).
Glenn Nithers made these points,
Mhich as he remarks gives a modified Brookings' vieM, as presented by
Caves and Krause some historical grounding.
49.
As does even the Catholic Church at times of reformation: perhaps Me are
entering a second reformation, as the Church of the Third Horld gets
transformed.
The same types of individualistic themes are also promoted
by Transcendental Meditation (e.g., the emphasis upon 'individuals taking
responsibility for shaping their OMn lives ', irrespective of their socio
economic circumstances; 'the effect of meditation itself is a strong
affirmation of our OMn poMer to affect our OMn lives and so accept
greater responsibility for our OMn level of Mellness': H. Southern, ANU
Reporter 16(5) ( 1985)).
40
!.;.i h Qii! 9'-.- er) :
is supposedly responsible for his. or her
each
successes and failures,
own
lives,
their
additions! props and supports, such as welfare
etc.
and an elaborate social security system, are not required (or even desirable).
That religious basis tor individualism has been largely eroded or displaced in
Australia,
but
not
North
in
Rmerica where a
latent
puritanism
persists
(prohibition would never have survived in Australia).
the State serves as a substitute if not for the Maker at least
Secondly,
for organised religion or for the Church (in a society strongly influenced
'The functions and power of the state in Australia have come to
Catholicism).
take
over,
O'Farrell,
bx
and
p.7).
displace,
the
'Reliance
on
social
the
activities of
religion''
state has increased to
the
(to
adapt
extent
of
significant erosion of former religious-oriented areas: in charity, hospital=,
a whole gamut of social and psychological services and counselling work ,
and
above all in education (there are, to take one striking
50
example, no strictly private Australasian universities ).
h-= miqhf hav .idd^d,
But the religious explanation is not entirety plausible.
For one thing,
the substitution argument has been used to explain too many '-lu^ely
phenomena:
patriotism.
UBR,
where
phenomena
50.
not
just
the
Nationalism
power
of government,
but
nationalism
also
and patriotism are however at least very strong
no corresponding substitution is assumed.
supposed 1y
connected
explained
appear
almost
as
And in fact
old
as
the
all
and
in
the
allegoric
features of
The reasons for this are complex;
the
1 ack of a
Australasian society taken up below: anti-intellectualism
lack
of
wealth
philanthropic tradition, egalitarianism, and the relative
and
grant
endowmen
t
,
and super-rich capitalist.
On the philanthrophic,
have
.norm
situation
for culture in Australia (to which norm
things
early
substantially reverted following the high-cultural heydays of the
70s), see McLeod, p.2ff.
4!
can be.
substituting
extent
In addition,
t
the religous explanation covers
which the State has deliberately extended its power and
to
up
the
displaced
rival social structures, thereby undermining community- and self-reliance.
For these reasons a different two-part hypothesis wi1 } be preferred which
is
State
The hypothesis is that
the religious explanation as one part.
includes
progressively
and
organisation
displacing
society,
and
arrangements,
social
local
that what religious
and
the
community
organisations
had
supplied were many community arrangements; especially in health and education,
'n
fact
m economic and political science
(.especially
other
conflation of the State with society
the
decision
social
arrangements:
arrangements
making
is
nowadays
especially
literature),
compared
are
ubiquitious
wi th
it is virtual!y always the state versus the market,
when
market
Mith other
social arrangements'and mechanisms collapsed into the state.
is much less opposition and resistance to the encroachment of
There
where as emphasized
Australia than in USA,
in
state
an
pathetic) faith m market alternatives persists.
rather
reactive)
state
encroachement
egalitarian measures;
for
welfare
and
but often it is promoted for sectional advantage from a
this reason,
for
cand
Sometimes (typically
supported
state (hence the view of the milch-cow state,
hand-out
Partly
in Australia is
unquestioned
the
remarked by Hancock).
the impression still comes strongly
through
that,
despite the growing power of the State, respect for government and politicians
does not run deep in Australian society,
would
do
distaste
no
harm
and could, easily be
were legendary Australian disrespect
for
dislodged.
It
authority
and
for tall poppies directed against political leaders and
government,
so at least that both are regarded more critically.
The
society
surprisingly
rule-bound
and
uncritical
fits with attitudes to government,
character
of
Australian
and again traces back to colonial
origins. H heavy-handed government was something people got accustomed to, and
also relied upon and reacted against,
42
early on in Australia. For example, 'in
1/-98
government of New South Hates
th?
authoritative to a high degree' (Within,
was
omnipresent,
centralised,
p.22).
And, owing especially to/the
cost of what is much more evident in USA, ! oca! government).
society
apparent!'/ more rule-bound than North American,
is
and
prolonged strikes are much more common in the antipodes.
But although the
as
things
such
To some extent
this
can be seen as a further reflection of rules: trade union laws are stronger in
the Antipodes and unions less repressed.
on the State has meant (excess) toleration of the State and
Reliance
governments, and hence the condoning of much corruption in
branches (e.g. pot ice and prison systems).
than
European
(except by occasional journalists)
government and its
Australian attitudes are more like
m the way corruption is
umerican
North
of
hidden
and allowed to pass.
from
gaze
This is not to imply
that corruption is more extensive than in USA * it is almost certainly less
-
but that it is viewed and treated differently.
The
ugly
underlying
face of the State,
private property,
capitalism:
laissez fairs,
security and violence.
for
advanced
Despite the minima!,
view of the State prevalent m the USA,
The US State has a very extensive,
different.
and conditions
''?ry
the practice is
and crucial role in providing
the conditions + or advanced capitalism both at home and abroad. At home, there
are two main factors, maintenance of capitalistic institutions such as private
property and ailing big business, and interna! security.
In
USA
contrast,
in
property
are
private property has taken on an almost sacred
Australia,
much
restrictions on (in principle)
more extensive,
accept further restrictions and the "erosion" of private
for
example,
equivalent.
is
built
entirely on leasehold land;
Much
rural
land
important
in
leasehold
categories.
establishing
was
unfettered
and there is much more
leasehold,
parks and reserves,
something
is
which
and a good deal
to
Lanberra,
Ameri_an
no
Nuch "freehold" rural land is under various
43
private
preparedness
property.
there
By
character
has
proved
remains
is
types
of
si^y^
* a ] [ rfi e s te .-g. police -st n d-pr i s o n * s y-s^omsJ——Fm-str^lian...attitudes are more li-^e
North
than
European
in the way corruption is
American
and allowed to pass.
(except\by occasional journalists)
hidden
gaze
from
to imply
This is n
tainly less
that corrup^ixpn is more extensive than in USf) * it is almost c
that it is viewed and treated differently.
private property,
capitali^m:
laissez
face of the State,
underlying
The
t in the USR,
tensive,
The US State has a v
different.
advanced
Despite the minimal,
security and X'iolence.
view of the^^ate preval
fairs,
for
and conditions
the practice is very
and crucial role in providing
both at home and abroad. Rt home, there
the conditions for advanced capit
are two main factors, maintenance of capitalistic institutions such as private
and internal secur i ty.
property and
!
In
s taken on an al
USR
contrast,
in
property
are
st sacred
restrictions on (in principi^)
ia,
more extensive,
restrictions and the "erosion" of private
ortant
a,*tc,n 1 rl
51.
in
built
entirely on leasehold land;
Much
rural
land
establishing
was
leasehold,
parks and reserves,
there
something
preparedness
rty.
is
catMuch ""Treel)ol*d——r-uraJ—Land—Ls—under various
to
Canberra,
American
proved
which
and a good deal
By
private
unfettered
and there is much m
is
character.51
remai
ty
The origin of the institution is much clearer that its .justification.
French constitutional and cultural influence undoubtedly contributed to
the situation that has arisen; but even the French have observed the
'private affluence and public squalor' of much of US of
Fortunately,
however,
USf^ has retained some zones of public land which on French
perception would be private, e.g. beaches, where in the French world it
may be necessary to rent a spot to sit down.
Hhile the guaranteed accumulation of capital is essential to capitalism
and to acquisitiveness, the accumulation of property and a comprehensive
institution of property is not necessary for competitive (as distinct
from acquisitive) individualism.
The reason is simply that competition
may
be
differently motivated than by acquisitivism or
material
accumulation, e.g. for status, honour, pure perfectionism, etc. However
material accumulation can most certainly foster competition (since
cakes are limited); and the Hestern competitive drive would surely be
much dampened were the ability to accumulate material rewards and
property reduced.
zoning restraints,
etc.
orders,
And
-tor example, environmental preservation, tree preservation
rural land is regulated by
all
virtually
local
Pasture
Protection Boards, Mhich can authorise removal or destruction of noxious Meeds
or species, by
organisations Mhich
bushfire
require
can
fire
restriction
practices, by Mater and soil conservation authorities, and so on. Fortunately,
some
of
Scandinavian
52
regulation Mhich in effect requires the exploitative use of forested land.
hoM<=ver,
the
have
controls
private, corporate and public, are a very visible
Security arrangements,
and
not taken the direction
feature of American social arrangements. In USA the police
53
is highly conspicuous to Antipodeans.
(In this respect the place
expensive
presence
resembles Eastern block countries much more than less uptight parts of Hestern
Accompanying
Europe.)
precautions.
(Among
the
an extraordinarily high
is
this
most
guarded
places
in
level
Australia
of
security
are
American
installations: take a look at the US embassy in Canberra, or at Pine Gap.)
high level of police,
A
things,
different
for
and associated military presence,
first,
instance,
as
often,
can
reflect
repressive
and
unrepresentative political, regimes, or second, considerable social inequality
alonq Mith dubious legal methods of self-aggrandisement,
or third,
both (as
in Brasil). The USA is usually taken to be a relatively pure case of the
e.g.
second.
The
inequality
level
in
opportunity,
theory
of
the
etc.
a
of
security is presented as
society,
in the distribution
reflecting
of
private
level
of
property,
in
the
But it is not merely this: there is no associated accepted
person's
place,
as
in
class
or
culturally
stratified
societies, Mhich .justifies position in a social hierarchy, or Mhich .justifies,
52.
Of course Australian privatisation in turn leaves much to be desired by
Melanesian and Aboriginal standards.
53.
As a raM NeM Zealander, Mho greM up in a small toMn Mith only a couple of
policemen, I Mas astounded by the level of police activity in Meal thy and
laM-abiding Princeton. There Mere 3 standing sets of police in the toMn:
state, city, and university, and the federal force also had access. All
Mere armed: the situation Mas not merely astonishing, but alarming as
for instance,
On the contrary, it is all too evident, in
continued poverty.
the
highly individualistic US society,
ha=
b<=*=n largely eroded,
role
Mhere sense of social place and
that there is no very sharp moral division
between
54
and illegal aggrandisement,
"legal"
between police and mafia,
etc.
(The
same phenomenon is developing in Australia, especially in NSH and Queensland.)
There
is
a
major reason Mhy the USA is not
another
pure
and
case,
that
concerns the significant level of repression.
The
security arrangements in USA operate to deal
internal
also
Mith
certain types of political dissent. There are substantial numbers of political
mainly black;
prisoners,
even so the number appears small compared Mi th many
of the Third Horld regimes USA supports (e.g. Indonesia to take a neighbouring
55
example)
. In Australia by comparison there are feM political prisoners
(though there are no doubt some,
some of
the
and have been conspicuous examples); hoMever
requisite legislation to detain such prisoners,
legally, is noM
in place, and should be removed before it can be used.
Hhether
or not the number of political prisoners in USA
of prisoners is not.
number
according
to ABC figures,
is
small,
in
There are huge numbers of prisoners
the
USA:
more than half a million people in gaol.
'As its
prison population increases at record rates, it has been estimated that the Uh
has
already
a larger percentage of its citizens behind bars than
nation except the Soviet Union and South Africa" (OD,
figures by means reflect the extent of the crime.
p.28).
any
other
fet the prison
There is an enormous crime
crime rate Mi th more than 5000 unsolved murders a year.
The
USA is,
Australia is not.
sheer,
54,
55.
increasingly since Horld Har II,
a
militarised
society;
The militarisation of the USA is not simply a matter of the
massive numbers (more than 2 million) of Americans in uniform, at home
As Veblen observed, early in the Century.
For Indonesia,
January l'?85/.
see
Amnesty
International.
Lf
s t r a 1 i an
Society
and
hold doMn the
to
abroad,
and
enterprise
bureaucracy
business
and keep the Morld free (but
empire
It is a matter also of
interests).
and research devoted to
military
heavily militarised Keynesianism) have
(of
USR,
though
not nearly as many as might be expected;
they
have
mainstream
support,
these
the
critics within
sadly it appears
reflect
and to that extent
Ub
industry,
Certainly
objectives.
arrangements
the
for
that
prevailing
the
cu1ture.
one of
in simple terms,
policy and practice is,
US
abroad,
international
capitalism
under US hegemony and of encouraging or
right-leaning
capitalism
in as many places
practice has worked Mell from
part
significant
Mith
militarily
"information",
installing
and education,
a
channelling
is
US domination
largely political and economic and
propaganda
The
feasible.
an American business viewpoint,
of the Morld surplus value into the USa.
maintained by a mix of methods,
together
as
promoting
military,
heavily backed
by
intelligence, security, and military operations.
like american religion,
US practices abroad thus exhibit,
set
of
double standards:
a rhetoric of freedom and
rights,
a remarkable
given
limited
practical realisation Mithin the USa, coupled Mith activities quite opposed to
those ideals in many Third Horld countries.
The capitalistic and bureaucratic
control of the main media and educational outlets is such,
the
majority
perception
of
Americans
remain
largely
of US support of aggression,
sheltered
violence,
that
furthermore,
from
torture,
inconvenient
suppression
of
rights, and so on, abroad (points Mell documented in Chomsky and Herman.)
56
Hhile australia cannot, by and large, be convicted of such practices,
government
policies
activities.
States
malpractices,
56.
support,
find
it
and
remain
very
uncritical
expedient to turn a largely blind
and even atrocities,
of,
eye
of other "allied" or neighbouring
american
to
the
states
These are small-scale activities Mhich channel "aid" in fact beneficial
to military structures of adjacent countries, rather than to the local
peoples, as Mith aid to the Philippines.
(witness australia's official approach, and aid packages, to Indonesia and the
Phi!ippines).
The
USa
is a particularly violent society,
directly
(in
several
torture
training),
Mays:
military
violence
and exports
practices,
intelligence
through example,
and also less directly,
both
operations,
through
media
coverage
and
the sooner
the
American
life-style ceases to be one to imitate and becomes one to avoid
and
scorn,
popular culture,
the better.
and so on.
From this angle,
The relative extent of violence in US life is Mell enough
'On the average death by homocide is eight
illustrated by homocide rates:
to
nine times more likely in the US than in other advanced industrial states ^OD,
It is even more strikingly revealed by comparative figures for
57
gun killings Mhere detail:s for 1980 are as folloMs:
hand-
p.27).
In
are
Australi a
UK, Canada
SMi tzer 1 and
USa
in
in
in
in
4
8
24
11,998
USa.,
part this is no doubt due to the vast numbers of hand-guns i n
not
used purely for deterrence :
hand-guns
countries
60 mi 11 ion in 1980.
are not available in the same free
they
to
felt
(presently)
are
ideological
difference:
be
required.
and
and
easy
is
there
Pacific
South
In
an
Mhich
May,
nor
important
Reagan's mainstream American vieM that 'the right to
carry arms shal1 not be infringed' is not shared in the South,
Mhere no
such
laMlessness
and
unqualified right is conceded.
The
differences
.just
in Meapon availability,
are
Australia
as a pioneering society,
the
of
American
vieM
of
in roughly the same position as parts
of
American Mest some (unspecific) time ago,
reasons
toting,
the reasons Mhy the common
violence,
some
gun
is
concern the organisation of the society,
seriously
astray.
Other
the extent of socialisation
and lack of key elements of a coMboy economy.
57.
Figures from a 1984 aBC documentary on violence in USa.
are given in 00, pp.28-'?.
4?
Similar figures
.
Liberty, equality, fraternity - compared and updated.
Though conditions
of personal liberty in Australasia are rivalled in feM other places,
not,
in
marked
contrast
to
58
appropriate bills of rights.
examples
restricted;
USA,
guaranteed constitutionally
Furthermore,
they remain quite
they are
by
or
any
unnecessarily
are conditions on libel and the right to MithdraM one's
labour in Australia (and in NeM Zealand constraints on sexual freedom).
despite
serious
inadequacies in Australasian legal codification and
recognised poor performance areas as regards civil liberties,
Yet,
certain
it seems
clear
that the record of political repression and infringement of civil liberties in
59
USA is Morse.
There is also notably less tendency to self-censureship,
whether
in the Mork-place or in social life,
than in North America.
in Australia (and NeM
Zealand)
Australians tend to be open and speak their minds
on
things.
in several respects
Australian society is considerably more egalitarian,
(but especially wealth and treatment),
dominated
its
cultural
life.
supported^inequality in Britain.
than the Northern societies that
There is
conspicuous,
and
still
have
socially
There is very conspicuous inequality in USA,
most countries in the primary US "sphere
of
influence",
and
also
58.
In certain respects this lack of state guarantee matters only to the
legally inclined Mho Mant to see everything codified (it certainly
In part the lack of
matters less to the anarchistically inclined),
appropriate codification of rights and freedoms is due to poli t ical
inertia and the reluctance of government to concede rights^1 in part it
can be traced to a different heritage from the American, to
t_ {he British
The
trouble
is that there
system enlarging on an uncodified common laM.
______ _ of
_ common
__
are elements
laM, still having some force, Mhich are inimical
to various freedoms.
59.
Nhile it is difficult to impossible to document claims of this sort, some
quantitative impression can be gained by trying to match temporal1 stages
stages in
of political repression in USA, as assembled by Goldstein, Mith
<
Similarly
corresponding
lists
of
conspicuous
infringements
of
Australia.
civil
liberties
could
be
draMn
up.
But
even
if
this
arduous
recognised
there Mould remain many problems of
task Mere folloMed through,
especially
as
to
Mhat
extent population and concentration of
Mei gh t ing,
should
be
used
to
average
data, etc.
popu1 at i on
60.
This is part (but part only) of the alleged rudeness and crudeness
Australians Mhich repels refined Europeans.
On the self-censorship
American citizens, see Goldstein, p.556ff.
in
e.g.
of
of
Central and Latin America.
The inequality is obvious to Australians, and even
It is confirmed in varying degrees, by
who visit major US cities.
Europeans,
a ranqe of statistics,
home ownership, extent of
as to wealth differentials,
poverty, etc.
inequality
Gross
is not only present in America,
throuoh the competitive individualism of the
underpinned,
blame:
to
herself
work will remove it.
Protestant
work
(such
approved
as
Poverty
culture.
the opportunities to avoid it are there,
or
individual
and
Thus inequality is justified ideologically in terms of a
strongly
and worth ethic and s
American
American inequality is not,
primarily
ideologically
A person in poverty has only himself
squalor are commonly deserved.
and
but is
and
social
philosophers
political
like that of Europe,
however,
suppl'-*'.
one of class, but
and of opportunities connected with this.
of wealth,
philosophy
individualistic
old
New and
money are equated.
A
it
and the extensive popular support
main source of American inequality,
seems
to enjoy,
widespread support for
is evident
fairly
unfettered
market processes and belief in market justice, and so (with further suppressed
assumpt i ons)
in
capi taiism.
American inegalitarianism is supported,
grossly
unequal
distribution
wealth
under
market-based
at a deeper level then,
—sttppor-fs—marke-t—ar^-angetwnts a&d the like,--- t4+e—the-mcc
individualism.
competitive
1 n ter*!
But
the
endor semen t
is far from clear,
some cur i ou s specu 1 ^Lc-n .
ex amp 1e,
much less egalitarian countrDes
it "Australian nationalism" w
it ha
for
een a matter
^en tied to nationalism; but
e explication circular).
And,
in
concerning the vigorous
= democratic values against an angl'-English themselve
,
and h
of
JSA) appear as nationalistic (to make
par t i a 1 opposi t i on to
ertion of k
source
e upper
These no longer tenable theses a
tw-eg di sp 1 i.ced-by a11-J Lh—an t i ^aut
class,
it is
t *.r i an , ttreme---- eta—th# fac
h'./
wh.3.t
suppor ts
market
competitive
1 n teres ted
endorsement
arrangements and the 1 ike,
But
individualism.,
of egalitarianism'
some c u r 1 ou s speculation.
the
is far from clear,
For ex ample,
the
source
themes
self-
of
'Australia's
of
and has been a matter
for
it has been tied to nationali am $ but
much less egalitarian countries (such as UBA) appear as nationalistic (to make
And,
it "faustralian nationalism" would render the explication circular).
partial opposition to this,
has been pressed a thesis concerning the vigorous
assertion of Australia's democratic values against an anglophile upper
or against the English themselves.
said,
it
being displaced by another,
with
inconsistent
hierarchial
the
organisations
in
ihese no longer tenable theses are, it is
anti-authoritarian, theme - on the face of
extensive popular
as
class,
government
Antipodean
and
army
- as
for
support
to
such
'Australians
something said to be shown by their
-61
bad relations with the police.
No doubt element* of all these
collective dislike of higher au thor i ty',
undoubtedly
themes have historical relevance, and certainly Australian egalitarianism
So far as
deep historical roots'; but that does not explain why it persisted.
however,
it has persisted,
the
including
controlling
two-way
Australian
elites,
linkage
it appears to be due to a complex mix of factors,
anti-authoritarian
perhaps
causal) with the
orientation of the mainstream society,
Hancock
aptly
has
streak
particularly Northern ones.
(not
has
opposition
to
But more important is
the
and
fraternal
and
socialistic
what was 'colonial socialism
called 'socialism without doctrines' (.though
it
and what
is
not
really devoid of underlying ideas).
Not
convincing
61.
only
is
detail,
this explanation of
Australian
egalitarianism
short
on
but in its course it touches upon an interesting paradox,
These now unlikely explanations are brought together in
Connell z4.
Against
Hancock's
claim 'that egalitarianism and nationalism
are
"interwoven"', was
opposed the view of the 'democratic
masses ...
defining themselves against the Anglophile upper class'
(p.34) and
Phillips' claim that 'allied to this rebellion against the English is a
vigorous asset* tion of democratic values' .
'he anti-authoritarian claim
is advanced by Connell himself.
Bad relations with and clashes with the
police are of course not uncommon elsewhere, including America.
puzzle of Australian anti-authoritarianism - or authoritarianism
the
continues to vex discussion of the mainstream cutture.
there
there
other,
unnecessar11y
is
evident support for,
authoritarian
reliance upon^and
institutions,
such as
heavy-handed
of group size theory.
resist
the
about
complacency
"self-reliance",
most
But on
Australian
attempt wi11
gover nmen t
to
side,
For on the one
clear evidence of Australian antipathy to authority.
is
ujhich
by a difference
Roughly, individuals and small primary groups Mill tend
imposition by other individuals or small groups or
factions,
counter to large groups or attempt to
Australians Mill not
but
buck
the system.
To say that Australian society is more egalitarian than American, or than
British or French, is not however to say that the local myth of an egalitarian
society is Justified,
and some,
and perhaps extensive, poverty.
than m New Zealand),
appears
or that there are not conspicuous differences in wealth
There are (and on both <-ount= more
and the polarisation of income and wealth in
to be increasing (with inflation).
Even so the differences
the very rich and the poor are not nearly as marked,
63
numerous or ill-assisted as in USA.
In
62.
Australia
there
Australia
between
and the poor are not
is also a recognised cultural
drive
towards
so
more
The evidence is notjmere 1y historical and anecdotal, as Rigby shows. Nhat
Rigby demonstrateshs that English college students are 'significantly
more pro—authority' than Australian, 'with English students fa.V'juring
institutional authorities more strongly (p.41, p.46). Rigby's, results
also suggest that Australian radicals (at least among students) are more
opposed to authority than their English counterparts',
and
that
'attitudes towards the police are not anoma 1 ou s in Australian life ...
but fall consistently into a pattern of attitudes towards institutional
authority genera 11 y' (p.46).
Nh areas 'England has lor had J a tradition
of respect for ths police; in Australia the police are commonly viewed
with contempt, especially by the young
as previous studies have
confirmed (p.46) .
Note that authoritarian' is used throughout in itstandard dictionary senses of 'subservience to authority ,
placing
obedience to authority above persona! liberty' and not in the unfortuante
extensions (discussed by Rigby) made by Adorno in elaboration of the
"authoritarian personality".
Rigby explains the notion he is operating
with as 'the degree of approval or disapproval with which a person views
various institutional authorities' (p.42).
51
equality,
manifested
poppies"
ta!!
or
striking!;/ in the proverbial procedure of "cutting dc.-jn
"tall timbers".
at
F'eop!e who excel,
in
!east
certain
respects such as intellectual or artistic ways, are strong!;/ disapproved of in
certain traditional social groups,
poms,
are
and,
like know-alls,
cut down to size if it can be done.
But this levelling is b;/ no
for instance in sport,
means general!;/ applied locally to outstanding people,
84
politics, and increasingly nowadays in business.
nowadays-
applied
fellow
sm a Iler
break",
a
63.
in the bigger cities is levelling
Even
up,
less
giving
regularly
the
-mall
though such aid appears to have been accepted practice
c omm u n i t i es,
along with
poufters and
wogs,
and h as con s i der ab1e basis in the
t_ u 1 t u r a 1
sympathy with the underdog' and more broadly in an
in
tradition,
intolerance of
(From previous page) There is much argument about the extent of equa!1ty
data organised by Rubenstein (especially Iable 1,
in Australia. ' But
the
meagre
spread of weal th in lustra! ia compared with d-A
p.26) reveals
Embury
and
Fodder 'conclude that although the distribution
and Britain.
Australia
is
far from egalitarian, it is no less so than a
of income in
as
Japan
and
rather more egalitarian than some of the
country such
world's most industrialised nation , notabty, USA, UK, Canada and Italy
They present as a. common finding in sociology that
the
(p. 122)
inequality of size distribution of family income compares favourably with
(p.l8-f.).
that of other countries' (p.188).
Aitkin, in the course of making
= e^cr'R] points of relevance regarding the equality and social welfare
for more than 70 years
situation in Australia, is less cautiou:
Australia has enjoyed the benefits of a basic-wage system and an arbitral
method of settling industrial disputes which incidentally fixes wage and
salary rates.
Two consequences are that Austral ia (a.) has one of the
most equal distributions of income in the world [further references are
cited], and (b)
that there has been a floor under the wage system
throughout the twentieth century" (.pp.18-'?).
Reliable data pinning down the comparative extent of poverty in Australia
and USA faces further difficulties, in differences in the way poverty
lines are set, and because the Australian government fails to keep any
due records of poverty (%?ot always recognising it as a social problem?).
As a very rough rule of thumb,
however, poverty appears almost tw1cf a =
extensive in USu, in terms of percentage of population, as in Australia.
64.
It remains unclear where levelling down applies and where it is waived,
and perhaps there are no clear principles involved.
The criterion, if
any, is not what Caves and Krause suggest, that 'foreign recognition of
outstanding qualities of certain Australians somehow legitimizes those
persons and makes them acceptable at home (p.?).
'Justified levelling-down is a significant feature of the culture, that
will recur; for example, it is linked toAustalian anti-intellectualism,
and it is said to be motivated by the incompetence and typical corruption
of controlling elites.
64
n nti).3 rLaj^z.----- Ff)—btrsi He = S .
i rtg 1 y
p.
nowadays
break",
a
up,
"giving
small
the
ce
though such aid appears to hav^
and has considerable basis in the
communities,
ma!I er
1evelling
in the b i ggerco
in
tradi tion,
culture
3 1 nnr^-L^Llhaih\hii th the under dog-—and mare- broad! y --i-rY—M' frYtc 1 oranco
65
oppression'' .
pressures
The
extent
greater equality are shown more
to
objectively
of party and political support for redistributative and like
which would lessen inequality.
in
the
measures
Such support, like the support for socialistic
is much more widespread and respectable
measures it is commonly coupled with,
in Australia than in North America.
The
reluctance
broadened
egalitarian
(nowadays
facade of Australasian life has been propped up by
also
declining,
especially
under
the
impact
the
of
a
immigration practice) of rich people to extravagantly display their
wealth (in vulgar European fashion).
Presumably the forces of egalitarianism,
though in part mythical,
explain this reticence to tout wealth and indulge in
66
conspicuous or wasteful consumption.
64.
It remains unclear where levelling down applies and where it is waived,
and perhaps there are no clear principles involved.
The criterion, if
any, is not what Caves and krause suggest, that foreign recognition of
outstanding qualities of certain Australians somehow legitimizes those
persons and makes them acceptable at home (p.2!) .
Qualified levelling-down is a significant feature of the culture, that
will recur; for example, it is linked to Austalian anti-intellectualism,
and it is said to be motivated by the incompetence and typical corruption
of controlling elites.
65.
These sorts of equality in justice. as they might be called, are
mentioned
in Connell 74,
who reminds us of the importance
of
distinguishing equality determinates, such as treatment, condition,
opportunity, and so on.
All these forms of equality are manifested to
some extent in Australia, whereas in UbA equality is more and more
restricted to a certain (but limited) equality of opportunity, along with
equality (in principle) before the law. The famous Australian equality
in treatment, approach and so on, is regularly illustrated by the
phenomena of tea and taxis, and in the (democratic) slogans that 'no-one
is (feels?) superior' and that 'one man is as good as another'
(cf.
p.2'?ff.) .
But
males,
Australian
to (potential) mates.
Mhite
male-dominated
Evident blots on Australian egalitarianism
social arrangements.
prevailing in USA,
society.
decade,
doubt
It is little consolation that they are perhaps little Morse
.justified.
Altering
these
in
image
While the
of prevailing social arrangements as sexist and racist is no
criticism
those
Momen
and the situation changed considerably in the last
exaggerated,
are
Indeed Australia has a particularly bad
image in the North as a racist and male chauvinist society.
L-jas
Australian
notorious White Australian policy and the treatment of
former
the
egalitarianism has been restricted to
than
Mhich is also often attacked as a racist and sexist
Antipodean arrangements,
in a
fashion
for
Mhich
however there is little traditional basis in any cultures, offers the prospect
of
major changes in social and political arrangements,
other
matters
as peace and Mar (as feminists have explained,
such
especially
and as
in
opinion
po11s have c1 ear 1y indie a ted).
at
With the comparative male egalitarianism of Australasian societies g% a
lack
of
class
stratified
and
Mell
While
(there are professionals,
so forth),
appropriate
distinctions.
Australasian
society
of various sorts,
the important notion of c1 ass,
to the Antipodes.
undoubtedly
blue-collar Morker=,
like so many
enough in the North or at least in Europe,
is
classificatiun=
does not
extrapolate
There is practically no upper class and the
and Morking classes substantially merge,
middle
and there are virtually none of
the
significant social barriers (discussed^/ in Olson) that go Mith cla=r-, at lea = t
6^
(From previous page) This, and the comparative l ack of Meal th, may also
help to explain the paucity of grand mansions in the Australian
countryside.
Host grander mansions these days are built by fairly
recently arrived immigrants Mho have made their fortunes.
.67.
Similarly Marxist theory does not extrapolate Mell Mithout fundamental
overhaul. It is decidedly misleading to speak, as some do, of the rigid
class structure of rural society'* in Australia, Mhere all those spoken of
are land holders, often large landoMners. There are divisions, farmers
and graziers, poor graziers and rich graziers, and there is a rough
understood social order of landholders based on quality of property,
Mealth origin, time in district, social and political affiliations, etc.
But it is hardly a rigid order, and, more important, does not correspond
to Marxist (or other) classes.
for sufficiently Mhite male Australians.
society
(another
diversity on conventional indicators than
less
shoM
the strata in Australian
Moreover,
in
USA
partly due to the much
but highly stratified society),
"classless."
those
smaller spread of Meal th and smaller population.
in
The conventional stratification picture leaves out an element of
variety
society Mhich may prove of much importance for social
change,
Australian
namely the growing phenomenon of Alternative Australia;
that is,
Mho
people
have dropped out of or moved out of the mainstream society and its concomitant
commitments to a Mork ethic, to materialism, to maintaining an approved social
standing, etc. (in short, have abandoned key elements of the dominant Northern
It
paradigm).
is not knoMn (and is impossible to estimate exactly) hoM many
people belong to this loose and vaguely defined grouping, but it is sometimes
88
very optimistically' put at several millions.
It certainly takes in the
extensive
netMorks
of
communes and alternative farms in
(Mith a main concentration in coastal northern NSN).
prices
is
(for that matter,
USA
rural
are much higher,
hoMever
takes
in
many in the Aboriginal population,
distinctive ethic grouping.
S3.
The grouping
in the cities;
though
land
Mhere
the squatters and many
beach people and others surviving largely on the dole
probably
Zealand,
and unemployment significantly loMer/^j
but includes
in
It appears unmatched
it is not matched in NeM
by no means rural,
Australia
eastern
they
of
the
and it
form
a
It is people from Alternative Australia Mho have
On the groups involved see Smith and Crossley, Cock and
especially
Sommerlad et.al.
To keep matters in perspective, it is important to
recall that these groups have been much influenced by analogous groups in
For instance,
USA and by a significant literature floMing from USA.
Morking
Capra and Spetnak estimate that the membership of 'groups
is over
Mith means and goals that are consistent Mith Green politics .
2 million'* (p.223);
(p.223) ; ^ith a base of that size (though still only about IX
Even more
of the population)^ Green America is far from negligible.
pr om i s i n g, '15 million adult Americans ... according to recent studies by
the research institute SRI International, are basing their lives fully or
par t i a11y on such values as frugality, human scale, seif-de termi nation,
HoMever partial
ecological aMareness and personal groMth'* (p.i?5) ,
basing on one such value may amount to little more than subscription to a
meditation or encounter group; and so the high figures may only reflect
Californian fashions.
54 5^
played a major part in protest and action movements right around Australia, in
70
the forests of North Queensland, East Gippsland, and first at Terania Creek ,
by the dam sites in Tasmania,
at the uranium mines in South Australia, at the
American installation in Central Australia, ... ,
Though
points,
they
of
many
have broken Mith the dominant social paradigm
these peoples have tapped into elements of
independent Australian culture.
strongly
at
the
critical
continuing
They represent an important source
and, because of the May they connect Mith the older culture, they
for change,
can carry other parts of the established population Mith them.
As
equality
with
and liberty,
even
so,
more
so,
Mith
fraternity.
Mainstream Australian society certainly surpasses American in fraternity, Mith
fraternity
broadly' and
communi ty,
and
sec t i ons).
But liberty , equality, community , these are important virtues to
construed,
sexistly
elements
socialistic
(as
to
Mill duly
include
Mateship,
in
subsequent
appear
aim for, or even better to have already built into a society or state.
that is the sort of society French revolutionaries long envisaged,
sort
of
only
there
society that some of the founders intended to implant in
it
got
out
of control and
greM
in
different
and
Indeed
it is
the
America
dangerous
71
directions.
Australian
society is lucky to retain a solid
cultural
base
6'?.
(From previous page) The dole is the government-supplied unemployment
alloMance.
The dole undoubtedly finances a good deal of day-to-day
operations of Alternative Australia (as distinct from capital investment
in land and equipment), and to that extent its flourishing depends on a
subsidy from mainstream Australia. But it doesn't folloM that it is
parasitic, any more than infant industries Mhich are subsidised are
parasitic. Furthermore, it can be argued, Mith some justice, that
mainstream Australia has confiscated the main means of production for its
OMn ends and uses, and should pay rent for the resources and facilities.
70.
In the forest occupations,
Zea 1 artd Mere adap t ed.
71.
So it is astonishing that, on the basis of its economic performance,
American society is often presented as some sort of model for Australian
society to try to emulate.
A narroM economism,
Mhich measures
productivity through material goods turned out and, more important here,
quality of life basically through per capita GNP, and neglects liberty,
equality and fraternity, is at Mork here/— as it is at Mork in the ideal
developing nations are encouraged to pursue. It is a false ideal.
direct action methods earlier applied in
NeM
from Mhich to reorient itself, to steer bac k t OM a r ds these traditional virtues
(as amended).
has diverged from its original ideals in large part because
America
ideological leaders have accepted or bought,
its
and most of the public have been
sold, an economic vieM of the Mor 1 d, Mith advanced man (and contemporary Moman
72
even more so) an economic animal .
The large assumption has been and
remains,
".free"
to repeat it in crude populist
form, that the operation of the
enterprise market system within a suitable democratic
framework
Mill
the other virtues, at least to the extent that they can be desirably
73
obtained,
in much the same (no hands) May that the market system guarantees
ensure
most efficient organisation.
The large assumption is false, as the American
74
experience has shoMn;
and it does not fail simply because of imperfections
in the American application of a perfect economic model.
Despite a massive promotional effort in Australia and NeM
both outside and many felloM-travellers Mithin,
the
.just
Zealand,
the American economic vieM of
Morld has not been Midely bought in Australia or NeM Zealand.
that it has been substantially rejected,
australia, but
cultural
tradition.
individual
that
tradition
it
in
in particular
runs counter to important
australia,
materialism
from
components
despite the earthy
It is not
alternative
by
of
materialism
competitive
the
main
of
that
individualism,
or
fixation on economic gain (as dialectical materialism reveals,
at
For
does not imply
least in theory).
72.
and thereby also a rational animal.
On this modern characterisation of
man, and rationality, see, e.g. abraham, chapter 1.
73.
For of course incentive musn't be removed by too much equality.
equality of opportunity, an important sort of equality, that the
enterprise system is supposed to deliver above all others.
74.
Nhat results is rather a society rich in go-getters, scoundrels and
cheats, many of Mhose main heroes, successful capitalists, remain .just
sufficiently on the right side of bent laMS, if that.
Consider,
seriously, e.q., Mhat is applauded in Heilbroner'*s celebration of the
rise of capitalism, in The Nor Idly F'h i 1 osopher s .
But
free
Competitive individualism,
JoL
and the pace of life.
immensely individualistic,, and highly competitive.
American society
is
Australasian society
is
sufficiently individualistic, but less competitive and operates more on direct
cooperat i on.
Individualism
even more in economic and political
and
practiced
is a conspicuous feature of American arrangements, both as
theory
reinforces
Mhich
practice.
It is seen in competitive form in the American dream, Mhich has no
Australian
equivalent:
is
the
of
dream
manifestations Morth singling out,
Mi th the emphasis on individual salvation,
not reflected in Australia.
it,
Extreme individualism has
for instance,
and elevation of personages as heroes,
selection
making
individual
the
and so on.
in individual life-style,
financially,
other
it
in high culture
in fundamentalist
the
religion
in survivalism, a "movement" again
In USA the individual aims above all to excel; it
is the individual that is unique, Mho can make a difference on his or her OMn,
Mho succeeds.
things,
Individual reduction is very strong,
make
differences,
achieve.
It is individuals Mho do
support systems
The
make
that
such
achievement realisable, the structure and the other individuals, fade into the
background.
Individualism in North America is accordingly not merely methodological
Mith
reduction
of social and political arrangements
to
"individual" actors
in the form of nuclear families and nuclear firms),
(typically
interrelations, other than market exchange,
as can be managed.
implies that each such individual operates,
in large measure,
OMn ends, in an individual-first or individual-only fashion.
in
implies,
situations
of
limited
resources,
and
opportunities, severe competition betMeen individuals.
America certainly,
indeed
an
Australia),
and seemingly inevitably,
immense emphasis,
on
mechanisms
foster
5
Individuali sm
to his or
her
And that in turn
sought
positions
and
Individualism in North
involves competition.
Mhich is exported Morld Mide (and
that
Mith
competitiveness,
so
There is
includes
especially
those
entrenched in mainstream economics, such as market competitiveness, and factor
competitiveness
active
environmental
America;
for employment,
(e.g.
movements
etc.).
promotion,
in
there is a difference in approach
is much more competitiveness within the
there
the
Even within
US
North
more
movements,
emphasis on leaders, less cooperation, than in Australasian groups.
resulting American-preferred picture of pure individual
The
competition
has however to be conspicuously qualified - rather more than minimally - since
the competitive mechanisms do not continue to function in optimal fashion,
even
market
system, which is not nearly as self-regulating as is often
requires
to
resources.
and
mechanisms.
As well,
etc.
But
purity
the
the
determine broad functions of
the
capitalist
lands
namely
democratic
within these supposedly necessary and desirable
republican
state,
You outshine
move,
change your friends to get ahead, etc.
sort of competitiveness isn't altogether approved of in Australia,
Zealand,
is
And yet another individualistic-type arrangement is required
or beat down your rivals,
New
and
state
such as private capital and private and state
constraints, competition is the avowed and encouraged objective.
in
free
pretended,
to ensure
defend and police the institutions within which
system operates,
select
to clear markets,
state,
and break coalitions and unions,
to
required
and
(capitalist)
the
competition
market
The
without organisational regulation and intervention.
at all,
or
where
the
American influence
is
weaker
That
still less
Polynesian
and
attitudes increasingly influential.
In
Australasia,
there
You do not do down mates.
mateship.
some of
is more cooperation,
with
fortunately not all extra-
friendships are superficial, and fortunately the rural tradition of
familial
neighbourliness,
net
disappeared
adequately
with
explained through
where
the
self-interest,
the advance of agribusiness (itself
significant cultural phenomenon in Australia).
also
coupled
Of course there is far more cooperation
in USA too than the ideology strictly allows for;
entirely
it
individualistic
ideology
does
a
has
far
not
less
There are many other respects
not
square
with
American
For instance,
practice.
differs
the many places Mhere advanced corporate capitalism
earlier phases of capitalism,
from
in
demand,
producer-controlled
through organisation people, in burgeoning bureaucracies, and so on.
environmentally
very
significant,
by
dominated
cooperation
because they bear on (Mhat are
to present unsatisfactory socio-environmental
alternatives
society
Antipodean attitudes to competition and
different
The
competition is liable to give quite
are
seen
as)
arrangements.
A
weight
to
undue
competitive mechanisms (like the market system) and goals (such as achiever or
product maximization), and so to support a range of undesirable objectives and
practices,
as those exhibited in capitalist business
practice,
75
failure and so on, exhibited in short in contemporary America.
such
differences in lifestyle floM from the differences in
Hany
cooperative
not
friends,
forth.
neighbours,
Antipodean
In
materialistic
extent
acquaintances, Australasians do
to outstrip them in their consumption,
need
competitive-
Because they are not competing to the same
orientation.
Mith their colleagues,
market
material
success,
cultures there is not quite
so
and
the
same
pressure to consumerism (though there is certainly far more than enough) or to
conspicuous or Masteful consumption.
American
culture
consumption,
conspicuous
estimated
partly
in
acquisitive,
terms
of
especially
The competitive individualism of
explains the high levels
of
North
acquisitiveness,
the
the Mastefulness (the consumption and Maste can
throughput).
of
money.
American
culture
is
particularly
The incentive to obtain money is
more of this is always better, typically Mith no upper limit.
be
high;
Hence too there
is strong resource orientation, since resources can be converted into money.
75.
Theoretically the emphasis on competition shoMS up in the Meight assigned
to games such as the prisoners'' dilemma and tragedy-of-the-commons and
the May they are supposed to be taken.
Note hoM very important
differences in culture are for the treatment of these games; an example
is the corresponding children's game Mhich is played very differently by
American children (Mhere it jis competitive tussle) from Chinese children
(for Mhom cooperation affords a rather trivial solution).
The relative lack of such enterprise and drive in Australia,
of less competitiveness,
the
and
helps explain the slow speed of technology transfer,
to
resistance, both of business and con*=umer =
76
Australia.
The relative lack of enterprise
comparative
in
technology
Northerners often claim,
to the Australian business
innovations' (Stretton,
Immigration
Department,
Mhich
'Australi an
community.
a special program
has
ex tends,
Such a view has been bougtrF by
p.35).
n ew
risk-averse, and stow to copy
capitalists are accused of being unadventurous,
others'
a corollary
attract
to
btj = in^ = -m^n (including Asian ones) and also businesswomen,
the
northern
because Australian
yy
business is lacking, it is. said, in enterpreneurial skills and drive.
The
pace
of
life is much slower in the Antipodes than
North
There are significant differences in time conceptualisation in the
deriving
Antipodes,
in part from the limited extent of industrialisation (wh i *- h tries to
people to be on t i me) and the weakness of c ompe t i t i on in daily
force
There is not the same pressure to get on,
workplace
much
America.
or to be at work,
on
living.
time.
and daily competition goes a race against the clocks (as overtly in
competitive
sport),
also
and
pace,
stress,
competitiveness goes a marked difference in pace,
etc.
Nith
American
with the most rapid pace in
the industrial East where the competition is most widespread and intense.
one moves south and west in US,
declines.
Zealand
Nith
and west from the centre in Canada,
As
the pace
But in Australia the pace is conspicuously slower still, and in New
78
noticably slower again.
Antipodean people are "laid back" by
American standards,
even if city people still seem in an immense rush, to get
nowhere much, to country visitors.
The slower pace is tied not just with !e==
76.
Features of Australian enterprise developed by the former Minister of
Science and technology, B. Jones, in his Sleepers Awake!. Jones, who i=
all in favour of having Australia convert to Northern business enterprise
and competitiveness, or worse the South Asian parody of it, is inclined
to ascribe Australian "failure" to a supposed separation of technology
and culture.
77.
The sooner this program is halted the better. Much the same applies to
recently renewed immigration programs to import more Europeans: for the
reasons see Birrell et. al.
competitiveness,
but
standards,
threshold
often
a
with
more easy
going
acceptance
sometimes verging on sloppiness,
and evinced
of
letter
such
in
familiar slogans as "It'll do" or the famous She'll be right". The differences
taken up more theoretically in terms of maximization in
be
can
America,
as
opposed to much more widespread acceptance of "enough does" (of satisizing) in
the Antipodes (for details see MSS).
USA it's keep moving,
In
"commodity"
too
is
hustle.
"wasted"),
the
Time is short (even if much of
best
life
is
in
the
fastest
this
lane.
'I need to get back to the office, to be at my
7?
is what is much more often said than in Australia.
There is a clock
Punctuality
class'
is
important.
in/clock out attitude in North America,
fortunately
hasn't
industrious
and
been
widely
shared with Germany and Japan,
or enthusiastically
industrial Antipodes.
adopted
in
the
Nor has the associated American
which
less
go-
getting taken to any great extent.
The
much
Northern go-getter vanishes into a role.
more readily;
Northerners assume
people identify with their position.
In the
Antipodes
instance
much less role playing, people retain their more dimensions,
30
in their jobs.
This has an important corollary for ethics:
Northern
fashion for trying to explain a person's
there
is
roles
ethical position in
for
the
terms
73.
(From previous page) By New Zealand standards metropolitan Australians
are pushy (as well as commonly vulgar);
and for the New Zealand visitor
the very congested Sydney does, at first, acquaintance, appear to
instantiate the rat-race, especially the aggressive driving on the
narrow, crowded and polluted roads.
Harris gets down some of the other
felt
differences:
'New Zealanders regard Australians as flashy,
effusively patronising, as scruffy urchins playing Big Brother
(The
Austral i an, April 23-2'?, l'?85, Neekend Magazine, 5).
79.
Beinq 10 minutes o^f so late for appointments is common, and acceptable,
in Australia;
but not the hour or more some Latin American countries
allegedly tolerate (cf. Awa, p.3).
30.
Nhy there is less readiness to assume roles in the deep South, like the
reluctance of Australians to take deferential or service roles willingly,
is a bit puzzling.
For in mainstream Australian the society is less
individualistic, more social, and in apparently relevant respects less
conservative than American.
The problem is taken up again in the text.
c
of
his
her
or
various
roles loses much of its
point
force
and
the
in
antipodes.
Role
is
occupation
actions,
responses,
intimately mith formality
coupled
dress,
and so forth.
of
fixity
and
In these matters a rough spectrum
can be observed, as shomn:-
australian
american
European
typical 1y
informal
typical 1y
formal
a
Such
range,
in
exhibited
both to mork
applies
mhich
such things as responses to
In some of these areas,
dress.
leisure
and
strangers,
such as dress,
is
activities,
customs,
and
manners
american culture displays
a
switching between extreme informality and formality, a
certain schizophrenia,
level
of
informality in mainstream australis has led to memorable sociological talk
of
phenomenon
also
seen
in certain trendier australian cults.
the peculiarly australian "culture of informality".
tells
aoainst
',-jell
in
angloph/ije
The extent of informality
the more artificial parts of higher culture mhich do not
australis,
outside
small
(but
sometimes
government
fare
sponsored)
minorities.
Role-regulation extends to person-to-person relations.
an
The
But here there is
interesting reversal of australian and american positions (on the
diagram
above), mith american relations being more flexible than australian (and these
more relaxed in turn than the more British and role-regulated relation^ in Mem
Zealand).
Hhile american approaches to human relations, as to adolescence and
education,
are increasingly influencing australian practices, ameri<-an= =till
more rapidly reach first name stages,
on;
they
details of their life histories, and =o
regularly converse mith strangers .juxtaposed on
invite m^re acquaintances into their houses,
and
more
friendly than australians,
americans tend to be much more open,
public
transport,
and for the most part are marm^r
Of course mhile both
australians
and
forthcoming, and initially friendly than
Europeans,
are serious questions about the depth and dependability
there
of
many of these (and their) relationships.
The "easygoinoness" that Americans often find in the Antipodes is in part
due
the considerable informality and in part to
to
pace.
slower
the
The
societies are not after al 1 that easygoing in other respects, such as personal
and
relations, and they are not exactly Mell-knoMn for
race
toleration is increasing in Australia Mith the development of a
(though
and further stratified society,
multicultural
of factors,
climate,
strong
though
dying,
is
mix
as is the more leisurely sense of time. One obvious factor i s the
casual dress,
etc.
(Ireland being the European
1 and
encourages informality,
Mhich
inheritance
Irish
Another i s the
of
"Take
your
less submerged than in USf), is
)*
—f ocus on ttLij^gs-^ittpltasised Ml
pnpular
footbal1
Mork,
6
Irel and:
pol 11 les,
Borse
(as the n eMspaper s daily conf i rm).
pub conversation in Dublin;
Mork,
racialism,
more
The easygoing casual features are perhaps due to a
still far from dead^
topics
tolerance
their
an i sat i on,
so they are in Melbourne.
and socialism.
in
n approached in an
lie Mork and union Mork, Mhich are of
especially p
anitested
The s1OMer pace is
informal and rather casuaj^ May by Northern standards^y)(4 I
attitudes to Mork are par
Americans generally notice a 1 ack o
ervjce in the Ptntipodeans,
through indifference to positive r'.
often
astonished
ascribe
to
by
the service
class difference,
North
y illustrated by attitudes to service.
Correspondingly,
the
ranging doMn
Rntipodeans are
Mhich
North,
they
an ascription that\hardly applies in
often
America.
Part of the reason for,this difference lies in different attitudes to Mork, to
the
relative
source
desines and pressures to serve Mell;
these differences remains someMhat obscure.
On the one hand,
is suggested
don' t
that f^ntipj0c!eans in service can be rude because it's acceptable and
have to prove anything,
in particular to the person they're serving.
.
of
_____
On the
___ -
popular
Australian
racing,
football
focus on things emphasised in
organisation,
Nork,
politics,
These are the
(as the newspapers daily* confirm).
topics of pub conversation m Dublin:
e.
Ireland:
horse
leading
so they are in He 1 bourne.
and socialism.
in
The slower pace is manifested
especially public work and union work, which are often approached in an
work,
informal
and
downright
rather
casual way by Northern standards,
lazy and sloppy fashion by most industrial
organisations or- "systems",
and sometimes
The
standards.
both public and private,
a
in
large
are regarded as open to
some exploitation (time out, free services, etc.) in a way that mates are not.
Attitudes to work are partly illustrated by attitudes to service.
Americans generally notice a lack of service in the An11podeans,
through mdifference'to positive rudeness.
often
astonished
ascribe
to
by
Correspondingly,
the service rendered in the
class difference,
North,
North
ranging down
Antipodeans are
which
they
an ascription that hardly applies in
often
America.
Part of the reason for this difference lies in different attitudes to work, to
the
relative
desires and pressures to serve well;
these differences remains somewhat obscure.
but the full
source
of
On the one hand, it is suggested
that Antipodeans m service can be rude because it*s acceptable and they don t
have to prove anything,
in particular to the person they're serving.
On the
other hand, it is suggested that there is a need in the Antipodes to emphasize
that
there are no strata differences (when there are),
not need to serve.
to show that they
do
On this less likely view Americans can serve because they
are equal, and see themselves as such.
A further element here is North American identification with the
or
the
thought
ladder.
firm:
the person who serves the firm may still often admit
'I might be president',
In
Australia,
or at least much further up the
by contrast with Japan and America,
appear to be the same "organisational feudalism".
but not vice versa.)
concern
to
the
competitive
there does
not
(In Australia, you owe me,
siihpr hand, it i.i.snn<^e^t-ed^
a need in t]r= AntipDii^s- to<-emphj^M^-
trata differences (mhen there are) ,
there are no
to shom,^ttlat they
do
likely viem Americans,-can serve because they
see themse1ves as such.
fl \ur ther element here is North American identification mith the
or
concern
the person mho serves the firm may still often admit
the
or at least much further up the
ight be president',
thought
Australia,
1 adder.
appear fo'be t h $
the
to
competitive
there does
by contrast mith Japan and America,
not
,3 " nr nan i sat ion al feudJtJism".____ (In Aust rjJ-1-3-,—yiau—cm - -me,
.
e v?r sa t f
especially
Nork,
are
Britain''
and morking conditions and salaries
to a much greater extent by politically
controlled
Australia
blue collar mork,
in America.
than
(Nild,
p.50).
powerful
'Unionisation is high compared to
unions
and
American
Australian unions are mostly left-oriented
The
in
by
American standards, some of them so far to the left that they are strictly off
the
truncated
socially
American
spectrum.
political
They
are
by contrast mith the generally right-leaning US
committed,
and the US industrial-military complex.
union
situation
can
again
be
traced
Part of the reason for the
to
the
unions,
individual
support that strange advanced capitalistic mixture,
mhich
often
furthermore
ideology
of
values
American
competitive
individualism, but an important part lies in social selection, =tate-supported
repression of left-oriented unions (see Goldstein)..
The
Australian unions are,
politicised,
and,
by morld-standards,
by the same industrial standards,
very active and
extremely strike-prone.
They can serve as an important source of and aid to change.
of
the
Australian
environmental
things
prevent
unions
concerns.
extend
to
social
environmental
matters
For the interest=
and
sometime^
Australian unions have been very important in
as bans on uranium mining and shipments,
and heritage destruction,
highly
as mell as
to
=U'_h
in green ban=> to
patterns not emulated
(and
mostly not wanted) in North America.
It has been suggested, but on slender grounds and by Americans, that such
as
action
green
undesirable
legal
heritage.
And
environmental or other.
important
redressing
for
like those concerning constitutional rights, in a
Mhile
the
in
difference
of
channels
action is,
to
access
Mithout
the
from
the
courts
doubt,
an
American
and
Australia and in NeM Zealand,
that
it cannot account for the differences.
the approved channels sufficient,
in
as many American failures make
many important cases,
to
extremely
difference betMeen the environmental situation in USA and
end,
Mith
The sources of this evidently
and constitutional inheritance
history
politically-approved
approach,
class action cannot be brought in the public interest
situation lie,
different
the
But the most that rings true in this is that,
minor recent exception,
to prevent vandalism,
of
militancy
and
strength
be accounted for by the relative weakness of 1ega1 means
environmental vandalism.
the
the
Mith
movement in Australia and its often confrontational
environmental
can
along
bans,
in
Nor are
in
plain:
there is no alternative but recourse
to
direct action, to the streets and forests.
Like
most
of the Australian unions and universities,
both Morkers
greenies (those active in environmental movements) remain influenced
sometimes inspired
by,
and
certainly linked by,
socialist
by,
ideals.
and
and
The=e
influences, overt in Australia, have largely been Miped out oygone underground
in USA,
being incompatible Mith advanced capitalism,
the American establishment.
as communistic inspired,
the
communist
politicians
can
folloMing
confusion of communism,
Indeed socialist themes are commonly disposed of
or as,
has been
and seen as inimical by
Mhat they are not, ..iust communism.
kicked,
regularly,
and
hard,
by
leads and encouragement from North America,
state socialism,
Although
Australian
a
simple
democratic socialism, and so on has
been made in Australia in the Midespread and crude May that has occurred
in
North America.
Socialism and a Mel fare state approach Mere adopted
long
ago in NeM Zealand (about the beginning of the Century) and only shortly later
whereas there is little sign of their gaining much ground
in Australia,
no^.'
in North America.
even
Socialist principles are regarded w i t h suspicion even
except for a small minority.
bv more educated North Americans,
Right-leaning
attitudes have a prominence in US that they (rightly) do not enjoy
81
Australia.
In several respects, then, Reagan and his substitutes are
political
in
representative of the mass of America people.
The
double
(Christianity vs.
standards we have
seen
exhibited
American
in
economism) and foreign policy (rights vs.
religion
domination)
and
could have been displayed in trade policy (free enterprise abroad vs. American
82
subsidies and protection) and elsewhere
— contradictions engendered not by
mere
between
practice
and
ideologies
— extend
to^much acclaimed Amt erican
conflict
incompatib 1 e
pragmatism.
ideology
but
threaten ideological fundamentals are not tolerated;
"dangerous"
elements
of
p1ur a 1ism
and
These operate in an unambivalent way only in a narrow ran%e where
ideological fundamentals are not seriously threatened.
to
through
viens are often excluded,
more difficult times at least,
toleration is hardly remarkable,
Thus parties
thought
and foreigners
nith
while natives nith such views are,
83
suppressed.
While the Australian record
in
on
and the society was until recently mu<-h more
uniform in character than American,
the room for political variety and spread
of political parties is greater.
81.
They are reflected in such small things as. the form of anarchist
movements - always strongly individualistic in North America, but mostly
pluralistic and socialistic, and sometimes communistic in Australia.
Even Alternative American remains staunchly individualistic; only in the
quite minor US commune movement do the contrasts begin to break down a
bit.
The differences are important in political philosophy and theory,
where Americans and Antipodeans tend to operate on different wavelength?.
32.
Thus, for
instance, the
policy, which combines a
substantial subsidies and
produce.
83.
See again Goldstei,
for example.
narrow pluralism of capitalist
chapter of 00.
doubl/ standards of American agricultural
free enterprise image with allowance for
discounts #4, American, but not foreign,
Worthwhile proposals for widening the
democracy may be found in the final
extent of toleration noM evident in Australia is not simply a result
The
of a strong British heritage (from an England that Mas) but OMes something
appear
markedly
multiple
the level of personal
features as Mell:- Firstly,
indigenous
roots,
in
is
in the industrial North
than
egalitarianism,
and
the
encouraged
by
a strong
to
tendency
of vieMS (an infuriating feature for
relativisation
(a
dielike
in the educational structure,
people,
overassertive
toleration
loMer
assertiveness
that
has
overbearing
and
feature
of
to
and so on).
personal
secondly,
in-group
or
teachers).
Ideological
argument and competition is avoided not so much by general pluralism of vieMS,
but by personal relativisation of positions (Mhich looks foolish at first Mith
questions such as God's existence, though not Mith matters of religious belief
and
political opinion).
action is not required.
as
lonq
But it noM looks (Mith
increasing
reorientation of the society and belated introduction of
cultural
methods into social discussion) as if
other
and
this sort of strategy succeeds only so
To be sure,
advance
to
an
- if
consensual
can
relativism
Australian
intellectually respectable pluralism
multi
Northern
control
perfni ts.
*F.
Leisure time activities, eating, drinking, sport and gambling.
retailing
and consumerism,
culture,
that
Australia is
the
it is here,
Americanisation
of
Apart from
in surface elements of more
significant
features
of
popular
life
in
most conspicuous, especially in food and entertainment, but also
in sport.
Take food, for example. American impact and control occurs primarily Mith
fast
foods (Mhere most of the larger chains are American) and in prepared and
highly
processed foods (Mhere many of the companies involved,
larger
biscuit
and snack food companies,
concerns having been bought out.)
ready
are
ultimately
e.g.
all
American,
Significant features of these products
the
local
are
or immediate gratification from largely already-made or -prepared mass-
produced items,
Mith consumer attractiveness achieved through a high level of
The technology involved is imported from USA (though
fancy packaging.
may
the patents are American,
be some minor local adaptions),
so
involved,
are
skills
local
cheap
adolescent)
(often
there
and feM or no
labour
can
be
exploited.
This pattern applies of course to American penetration of the food
industry,
and tourist industry, in many countries other than Australia; it is
part
incorporation of the "free Morld" into
the
of
the
flagging
American
^'or Id-system, the American imperium as it is sometimes called.
features are involved in the American influence on entertainment
Similar
again designed to Min acceptance by a mass market,
and sport,
immediate gratification,
or
term
action
(or
bright
or
professionalisation.
containing
Take
the
short
achieved for instance in the form of
violence) for passive audiences,
colourful
namely
and
effect
skilful packaging
many
changes
much
by
achieved
set,
of
and
on Australian cricket - formerly
a
very leisurely and, for spectators, often boring game - of American infusions,
dra'A'n
especially
uniforms
The
baseball.
has
game
become
substantially
there are many one day matches, Mhere the players appear in
professionalised,
gaudy
from
and lots of safety gear (noM necessary Mith the
increase
of
pace and stop-start action), and the game proceeds at a much greater pace Mith
lots of croMd pleasing action.
There
is
an American overlay also to more recent forms of
slot machine gambling and,
Australia,
more important,
overlay exhibits the same surface features,
as
in
sport
gratification
and
food
- and underlying these,
casino gambling.
designed to appeal to
action,
- colour,
gambling
professional
commercialism,
in
The
consumers,
quick
polish,
professional
control,
multinational organisation, and repatriation of profits to the North.
But
plausibly
the
in
each of these cases,
especially sport and gambling,
argued that the American influence is superficial - a
single bricks Mall of the Californian brick veneer,
appearance
of
masonry solidity to Mooden houses,
it can
veneer
be
like
designed to give the
a style noM ubiquitous
in
building
that is on to a
but grafted onto a ecualypt Mood frame structure,
Australia,
evolved,
that
though
antecedents
Mith
Northern
In the building industry (as to some extent in the
in Australia.
influences,
Northern
from
food industry) the distinctively Australian basic house structure is beginning
to
in
disappear
plantation-groMn
places like Canberra Mith the replacement
pine,
Honterey
of
by
hardMOod
the adoption (again from America) uf
light
timber framing codes, and so on.
It
indeed
is
in the spraMling suburbs of Australia that
veneer is most strikingly exhibited,
American
the
and
not just in the housing and streets
styles of automobiles (all local manufacturing companies being American,
a Japanese exception,
Mith
and the predominantly Japanese imports largely American
copies), but in the shopping centres, their supermarkets (American in style of
and
retailing
lots.
parking
increasingly in oMnership or control) and petrol stations
Nonetheless
Davidson is deliberately
and
Mhen
exaggerating
he
Mrites (Mhile ruminating on the film and entertainment situation) that
... Me need all the cultural consciousness Me can muster to delay - if
only
by
the tactic of infinite postponement
- our
complete
incorporation into the American Mgfld-systenr (p.21).
For
merely is there evidence t^fjt the American imperium has
not
i t-
pa = =ed
zenith, but again the American encroachment and influence is superficial.
Despite
the overlay,
the main structures of institutions such as
and gambling remain basically Australian,
of
Australian
forms.
history,
from European,
local adaptions, evolved
and particularly British and
Iri=h,
=o it
so it is Mith home '-ooking.
These
institutions
Mould
and club gambling;
remain substantially intact even if recent
other overlays Mere entirely removed.
Nhat is more,
and
quality of life not readily available,
The
community
afford good examples.
American
these institutions
and Mith further local adaption could to a much greater extent,
America.
over much
So it is Mith the main forms of football, Mith amateur cricket;
is Mith pub drinking,
style
sport
or available
and club structures of much gambling
and
can,
provide for a
at
and
all,
in
drinking
cA</iAvf*^tnA%)^nf
r^-v^A/
<**<A —
^to
the
^jA,f
^<?/^
^.f-At^Z/y
d. ^r^,f ^ta^n/ At//^<^y
^-A
viewpoint
of
th<=
p ^9^
^?^e-4t^-^-€.
believe what they se^^- accepted,
regional culture,
^cr/A^,
A4^.
largely uncritically accepted.
among
there
others,
are
From
undoubtedly
but they are problems to which there are known answers.
problems here;
nf
?4s ^A7f /i^c
/njA^^nZiAi^-
</<P^/l<tA</;
VAr<?KyA
/6
JTT, V^/
/ ^-, ^-*<?;/ */A,
longer-term answer lies in education,
Part
much
in the teaching of
more
86
critical attitudes to Mhat is presented through media such as television.
Pi
more
viable in countries like Australia (and even
immediate interim measure,
controlled,
more in New Zealand) Mhere radio and television are heavily state
to
and
remove much of the American fiction from the publicly licensed,
channels.
regulated
That
the short answer is the
is,
nondocumentary material displaying violence,
supported
same
as
Mith
so on;
sexual exploitation, and
given the socially and culturally undesirable results of such public
87
of such material,
it fails to merit purchase and public exhibition (if
namely,
use
people Mant to hire or buy this material for their OMn video systems,
another
matter).
difficulties
in
Certainly
selection
there
difficulties
are
here,
processes for Mhat is broadcast
especially licensed commercial,
tied
on
of
predominantly
drugs,
standover
censorship,
commercial activity,
tactics,
pictography,
selection and purchasing policies,
extent,
up
public,
Mith
and
channels (for there is far less fictionalised
violence on public-corporation than commercial TN in Ptustrali^.
suggested is not any kind of
that is
1'1 hat is being
straightforward social regulation
such as regularly
etc;
in
occurs
Mith
this case regulation
hard
of
of a type already folloMed to some limited
for instance in Psustralian content requirements.
Pt practical problem
85.
Contrary to American philosopher Davidson and his followers, usually
accepting Mhat is presented is not essential to living; but the idea
that it is necessary iWa standard part of the Ptmerican cultural and most
Northern and educational frameworks.
88.
See especially Bonney and Nilson.
87.
'The consensus among most of the research community is that violence on
television does lead to aggressive behaviour by children and teenagers
Mho watch the programs' (.reported in The Chronicle of Higher Education,
Narch 13 1?85, p.8).
Psdults too are liable to be desensitized to
violence through television watching, wi th influence not only ^n values
but sp^ill over to the real world, e.g. they estimate their environment
is more violent.
A
sV<vkcL.<-^44
^7, y>,
g in
mith such content requirements has been that there is insufficient
But
materia!.
rise
the
tota!
reduced.
domination
other
of the Australian and
there is nom much more regiona! materia!;
industries,
former
mith
and,
of Australian cinemas by American
Australian
regions!
as a result, the
has
films
the variety of television material nom available from
Given
an end to American domination of local television programs,
sources,
fi!m
been
morld
and
of
this part of Australian leisure culture, could also be achieved.
and gambling form a mutually supporting trio of immense
drinking
Sport,
importance in the popular culture of Australasia,
the
to grasp or explain.
outsider
('Much American sociological
gambling deals mith it as a deviant activity":
historical
on-going
influence
population is of Irish descent).
brought
and
activities,
writing
A
p.421.)
in Australia is undoubtedly Irish
(in
on
main
early
nomaday about 17X of
the
Nith their blanketing Catholicism, the Irish
propagated rather successfully a religion liberal
masculine
in
but exceedingly narrom in intersexual
such as those of the trio,
enterprises.
mas out;
Caldmell 77,
one quarter of the population mas Irish;
Australia
for
to an extent difficult
Drinking mas in, contraception mas out; gambling mas in, divorce
sport mas in,
lomer-church
homosexuality mas out ...
Catholicism
and
more
Catholicism mostly men in Australia,
purjit/nical
.
In the play-off betmeen
forms
o^
Protestantism,
mhereas in eastern USA more
puritanica!
forces prevailed, and these mere subsequently reinforced by Judaism.
is a central part of Australian social life and so of
Drinking
(Nhile it is important in Nem Zealand also,
social
momen.
life.)
For
it is a less dominant feature
of
It bears on the connected issues of mateship and attitudes
to
matesh ip
relationship,
and
is
mateship
often based upon,
is
(cobbers) mhich excludes momen.
North
culture.
America,
that to his mife.
or groms
characteristically a
Indeed,
out
of,
relation
a
drinking
betmeen
men
in contrast to the apparent norm in
a man's relations to his mates,
or mate,
may be closer than
The
mateship
mates, first and foremost, through thick and thin.
A first corollary is a
or less rigorously some ambivalence about, social and career
limitation upon,
because
mobility,
may involve leaving one's mates
any transfer or promotion
or distancing from them.
A related corollary is a restriction on competition
because one does not compete seriously Mith one's mates.
similarly
also
mateship engenders,
The mateship
ethos
because mates are treated
requires local egalitarianism,
Thus
equals.
his
Mith
ethos strict!;/ requires that a man should stick
especially given a
little
as
transitivity,
egalitarian and non-competitive features, also encouraged by other elements of
Accompanying aspects of mateship are that
mainstream culture.
the
identity
success are sought,
and
concerns such as a job or career,
serious
and
energy
in leisure,
Mhere they are,
personal
not in
more
and that often a greater level
interest is di rec ted at leisure ac t iv i t i es and pas t imes
than
Excellence in serious things tends to be deflated or denigrated.
Mork.
of Antipodean socialism.
at
Hates
however are supported, and so by extension are those Mho Mould be mates.
mateship is one of the props
of
Thus
A less expected aspect
of mateship, Mhich is after all a communitarian relation of an important type,
is
diminished involvement Mith social (and also sometimes political)
is because mates afford a secure social framework Mhich
this
Perhaps
issues.
unnecessary to look beyond.
it
is
Hates naturally get together frequently, commonly
for sport, gambling or drinking.
The
main
setting
uncomfortable
and
for
drinking
is
pub
the
degenerate form of the English pub.
important public setting for drinking is the clubs,
as the Australian barbeque.
- though
some
city
The hotel Mas,
pubs
have
occasionally invaded by groups of Momen.
the
development
serves,
not
_urious!y
hotel,
a
But an
increasingly
Mhich also commonly cater
Among private group settings, for drinking are such institutions
for gambling.
haunt
or
only
and remains,
been
liberalised,
essentially a male
and
others
are
Thus the hotel is a main setting for
and continuation of mateship.
to reinforce male chauvinism,
The hotel
has
served,
but also to foster
and
racism.
Until very recently,
and still in some places,
hotels excluded or segregated
and perhaps other groups such as Orientals uho fall towards
Aboriginals,
the
bottom of the caste ladder.
do the places of drinking differ in significant respects
only
Not
those in USA;
extent it is in USA,
and is not a major form for the drinking bout;
nor are
Beer is the mainstay of
is the main alcoholic drink consumed.
and
hotels,
is not consumed to anyuhere near the
given the same prominence as in USA.
cocktails
Hard liquor,
so do the styles of drinking and uhat is drunk.
uh 1 ch is nou heavily taxed in Australia,
from
drinking
But Australian
patterns have changed markedly in the last twenty years;
the
and nine has become
an everyday drink in the clubs and often for lunch.
the feu older clubs can be exclusive in their membership
Nhile
American country clubs carry exorbitant fees,
or
the neu clubs have very
like
modest
joining fees and represent an improvement on the hotels in many respects;
for
they are not aluays, predominantly drinking establishments and dominantly male
but they are more sociable and comfortable, and they carry a range
preserves,
including commonly gambling (on uhich their
of other programs and activities,
depends)
financing
nonprofit associations)
sort
importance,
and
consumer
greatly
Hales).
golf);
but
there
notably returned servicemen's clubs,
and ethnic clubs,
religious
These
interests.
of the
are several
clubs
(community
types
other
catering
for
uhich function in all respects like
are a major post-Har social
country touns,
of
minority
phenomenon,
uhich
altered leisure patterns in parts of Australia (especially Neu
'In
one
political and labour clubs,
and there are many
neu registered clubs,
cooperatives,
registered
are indeed sporting clubs in origin (football of
bouls,
another,
of
Hany
sport.
and
have
South
clubs have replaced churches as the centres for
sociability and recreation; in the metropolitan areas, they have decentralised
leisure facilities providing nightclub, restaurant, gambling and entertainment
outlets
in
leisure
sophistication'*.
the
suburbs;
and in the coastal touns they
And
in these
very
successful
have
brought
some
gambling-financed
cooperatives,
'sport,
gambling
and
drinking
of
- the pillars
Australian
leisure culture - have found common ground' (Caldwell 77, pp.424, 425).
Sport is the opiate of the masses in Australasia, a main leisure activity
and entertainment form, a major (male) topic of conversation both socially and
and it takes up a significant chunk of the "news"^newspaper coverage
at work,
it is now relegated to the back pages^with local politics occupying
(but
front
It
pages).
is also a major reservoir of chauvinism,
with
'Sport
competitiveness.
its
long traditions may
the
and
conformism
more
m^ifest
male
chauvinism than many other forms of popular Australian culture' (Caldwell
p.41'7');
racial and cultural.
as
such
j^-also manifests and often encourages other forms of
it
Even in sport reevaluation is
77,
chauvinism
place,
taking
including reassessment of the competitive principle, and there is a shift away
from
bureaucratic
Fortunately,
sport,
controls
however,
to
freer
environmentally
forms,
damaging
especially
sports.
vertigo
machine-dependent forms
have not caught on to the same extent as in America;
or art,
nor
of
do
forms such as hunting enjoy a% similar following or so little criticism.
important component of Antipodean newspaper sport,
An
racing
anima!
distinct
as
"sport",
especially,
from
professional,
predominantly
gambling purposes.
integrally tied to gambling.
is
the
type
younger
people
In the participant sports there is,
other
and
This
participate
and now essentially designed for
North, a heavy outdoor emphasis.
but
horse
form
of
in,
is
spectator
and
in contrast with the
This emphasis is partly a New Norld feature,
partly a matter of extensive open space and a favourable outdoor climate.
Explaining
the
separating
sport
sheer extent of sport is a complex matter, best approached by
into
its
different components
looking
and
at
what
is
distinctive in the new world, and what in the Antipodes (at the same time this
reveals
e.g.
the
that
ritualised
limited applicability of psychological substitutibility
sport,
national
substitute
sport
for war).
especially,
is
a
socially
claims,
acceptable
And one thing that is distinctive
is
the
and
amount
style of gambling-linked sport.
Explaining that is
inseparable
from explaining gambling itself.
have been several attempts to explain the extent and diversity
There
in Australia as compared Mith that in the North,
gambling
smoothly into the culture.
it
according
Morld,
various
and to incorporate
Australians are the heaviest gamblers in the
88
surveys.
Some of the main explanations
to combine the following elements:
try
suggested
to
of
the
of
influence
Irish
Latholicism in overriding the restrictive puritanism, the comparative Meekness
the
of
ethic
Mork
bother?"),
the
the drive to accumulate
and
entrenched
belief
in
gambling
a
strand
form
of
(Mith
as
a
positional
improvement (Mhich appears to date back, like distinctive Australian
games
as 2!-up,
such
together,
to convict times).
gambling
Not all these elements sit
easily
not all of them, such as the Mork ethic, are relevant on their oMn.
The Mork ethic becomes relevant because it Mas Midely believed by
that gambling damagingly undercut Mork,
improvement,
positional
to Meal th,
Mork
"Mhy
of
Protestants
both because of the popular legend of
that gambling offered an alternative route than hard
and because gambling Mas an absorbing leisure-time
activity
Mhich competed successfully Mith (often alienating) Mork.
Moreover,
acommodated.
gambling,
there
are
some
important
complicating
factors
to
be
One is that Mhat is more extensive in Australia is smaller-scale
social
gambling,
entrepreneurial gambling.
not
heavy
punting,
professional
gambling
or
Australians are, by and large, very security minded
and are not large-scale risk takers: hence one of the reasons for the shortage
8'?
of venture capital in Australia .
Despite the risk-taking image, there is
then a strong emphasis on security,
- the
suburban
both in the (home) OMnership expectations
a-cnd—a-s— hegsr-de--
------------------------ 88. Thus e.g. R/deen.
On the extent of Australian gambling, see also
CaldMell 74. Like drinking, gambling is less extensive in NeM Zealand.
8'?.
The extent of gambling in Australia contrasts sharply Mith risk-taking in
investment.
'Risk aversion seems to be endemic in Australia at least as
far as investment in innovative products is concerned'* (S. Macdonald).
block, the private home, the car, and as regards defence (whence the appeal of
an
American
second
6
gambling.
Australian
complication
concerns
the
'is marked by a heavy reliance on
It
character
of
and
so
chance
But Caldwell's attempt to explain
on skill'* (Caldwell/^ p.20).
little
this
features of the Australian character which deemphasize excellence
through
less
shield).
partly
satisfactory,
than
from sport,
differently
where,
because
it
as he admits,
involves
treating
'excellence ...
is
gambling
is
[almost]
fact the preferred explanations of the characterisatics and
puzzling
always approved of'*.
In
aspects of Australian gambling are unsatisfactory. In several places, Caldwell
has
appealed
in possible explanation'* 'to features of Australian
specifical 1y
to egalitarianism,
concen trates
on
r e1qu i s i t e
trying
to
what these are,
Fatalism,
explaining.
fatal i sm/
mateship and a sense of
say
for example,
character,
not on
how
they
But
he
do
the
apathy,
is said to involve
putting up with unfavourable conditions, and accepting the outcomes of fortune
but with good fortune attributed to luck,
hardly a fatalistic theme,
fatalism might explain a certain dourness or resignation,
Australian,
unclear
with
along
some more typical Australian
Caldwell
since
really
the
extent
makes no difference to
in
disclose
success
that
by luck.
marginally
what
for
this
the bulk of Australian gambling is social
better
than
fatalism
it
remains
i^
Hhat
fated.
that things
surveys
suggestion,
gambling
in
And mateship and egalitarianism only
in
will
but a ^^rious (nonmarket) optimism, a
Unfortunately
do not expect to succeed.
especially
rather than little
seems to be appealing to is not fatalism,
happen as they are already fated to do,
people
features,
how it is supposed to explain extensive gambling,
gambling,
belief
neither
klhile
their
intended
explanatory
which
fare
roles;
egalitarianism does, as will appear, have a minor role.
8^.
(From previous page) The extent of gambling in Australia contrasts
sharply with risk-taking in investment.
'Risk aversion seems to be
endemic in Australia at least as far as investment in innovative products
is concerned* (8. Macdonald).
^^7
/s*
By contrast,
Inglis attempts an historical explanation,
he sees as the social sources of gambling.
He claims to uncover the following
speculative character of business in a neM country (but unless
the
factors:
looking to Mhat
specially
difficult and distinctive character of the neM country is also
the
invoked
does not distinguish Australia from the rest of the neM
this
that life Mas a gamble in early Australia (but this does
including USA);
explain Mhy social gambling took off,
Irish
heritage
subsequent
mining
persistence
the
and does not account for
the
of
the
of social gambling in Australia);
the role
Mith heightened discovery and rapid riches (but
again
this
to California Mhere gambling practices are different, and are
e.g.,
not concentrated on social gambling).
particular
not
or the augmentation of gambling);
(but this applied also to USA,
industry
applies,
Morld,
These sorts of factors may explain
inherited forms of gambling in Australia,
for instance the
the
Irish
contribution no doubt helps account for the prominence of horse-racing and its
egalitarian betting patterns in Australia (though horse-racing is as important
in
NeM Zealand Mhich had no comparable influx of Irish catholics).
But they
do not explain the persistence and styles of gambling in Australia, as opposed
to
USA.
to
delegated
the
to
extent that it Mas in Australia,
the
Inglis
favours,
hoM Mas it that gambling Mas integrated into
emerges:
question
order,
up in the historical fashion
set
Nhen
rather
commercial and criminal sector as in
than
USA?
a
the
major
social
substantially
question
The
fetches its OMn complex ansMer - in terms of the differing religious pressures
for
the
suppression
and regulation of gambling,
the
respective
gambling and their possible exploitation by capitalistic methods,
types
of
illegal
or
legate and the comparative commitment to market and commercial methods
- once
the features of Australian gambling are explained.
In trying to explain Australian gambling and its distinctive features, it
is
most
important^first to divide gambling into types.
Australian
pursuit
gambling is social,
of Meal th.
A salient feature is that
for "fun", as opposed for
instance
But professional and heavy (and plunge) gambling
to
appear
be greater in Australia than elsewhere (and
to
not
gambling
than
less
are
in USA,
investment
the
reflecting again
of non-social
Bayesian theory (i.e.
gambling
be
can
gambling can be explained in the
people).
improvement
remains
it
given a largely psychological explanation,
positional
an undoubted consideration in such forms as lottery
is
to
social gambling.
For example-substantial
A
through
Since compulsive
subjective expected utility theory).
here some divi = i'*sn of types helps.
These
May
standard
explain Mhat _i_s distinctive in the Australian scene, broadly
Even
venture
security-
supposed
mindedness of Australians and the timidity of their business
types
and
art
and
union gambling but not in poker machine gambling.
main
The
forms
of
social
such
gambling,
club
as
rather undemanding leisure-time-fillers of
unintellectual
gambling,
acceptable
More ordinary Australians have a good deal of leisure time to fill;
are
types.
and given
the prevailing relatively uncompetitive ethos and general anti-intellectualism
of
the society,
activities
(e.g.
intellectual
or
this time is not often occupied by additional Mork or
for
positional improvement of one sort or another)
higher cultural activities,
But
by
gregarious
television Matching has to some extent substituted in recent
years.
or
direct
television
does
not
the same
offer
stimulation that gambling affords.
established,
socially
acceptable,
activities (like pip? smoking),
and
neMspapers^,
setting;
offering
iKti.
it
social
opportunities
Still, Mhy gambling rather than other time
It is not simply that it Mas and remains an
fillers and entertainment forms?
social
undemanding
or
For both of these more passive and
activities, such as drinking and gambling.
solitary
but by
hobby
form,
Mell
surrounded
Mith
associated
such as ^11 ec ting .snd reading^ + orm guidey
social
contacts and opportunities or at
also^afforde^
uncompetitive?^ form of stimulation, aec
a/, approved
least
funintellectual
a
and
Mhere^excitement could be directly
exper i encecL
tends
to
be extraverted;
leisure time activity
in
Australia
and Mhen it is not directed toMards the
notorious
the gambling situation reveals,
As
trie,
it is usually practical or- material,
mainstream Australian culture is,
not educational or artistic.
The
to understate matters, neither cultured nor
intel 1ectual,
communication,
Education,
the intellectual
patterns in Australasia are Northern,
England and Scotland,
imported almost entirely,
from
mainly
As a result
very recently, some local adaption.
significant surface educational differences between Australia
are
(though the differences do not touch the
America
North
Mith,
The
life and practicality.
underlying
and so are not of great ideological depth?.
social paradigm,
and
Northern
surface
These
differences bear directly on the continuation of the cultural traditions.
Austral ia
countries.
t^or st
the
has
There
educational record of any
for example,
are,
the
of
three times as many people going on to
higher science studies proportionally in USA as in Australia.
23
to
this
recorded.
Australia.)
better
including 50 per cent
level,
(There
is
up the ladder,
doubt
to
and
different.
similar
ethnic
of
the
blacks,
differentiation
students at more average American
different,
attitudes
to
lowest
in
Not only
educational
segment
education
universities
reflecting the
but are generally nor-se in quality,
the more generous intake of students.
styles
In USA however 83 percent go
than their Australian counterparts,
drive
levels
a
University
motivated
5
In Australia about 20 per cent leave school at 15, and only
3'? percent proceed to higher school certificate.
on
Nhereas in UbA
in Australia only
percent of science students eventually obtain Ph.Ds,
per cent do, etc.
developed
oning in
are
in
are
social
part
no
educational
institutions
are
In North America universities are much more business, and there is
The details of general intellectual life,
differ material 1y.
extent of reading,
etc., al so
It is in intellectual and educational life, especially in the extent of
book reading, that Ne'.-j Zealand culture differs, perhaps most strikingly,
from Australian.
The anti-intelleptu_al charges regularly hurled at
Australians are not often directed at Neu Zealanders, t^h^je traditions
remain much more British.
not
the
degree
separation of the university
of
business
commun i t i es
evident in Australia.
Education in Australia encounters, and has to combat, the practicality of
the mass of people, the widespread impatience with theory and ideas, and anti
The impatience with theory,
intellectualism.
theory into action,
blue
the demand for translation
the concentration on the practical,
collar (working-class) people,
of
appear not only with
for instance in adult education
but in groups drawn from virtually all strata of the society,
and
groups,
even,
and
perhaps or especially, in groups concerned with changing social consciousness.
The
anti-intellectualism
feature,
striking
locals.
Thu
to
of
Australia is a
widely
cultural
European visitors^and admitted or even insisted on
'sheep-culture,
agriculture,
by
physical culture have reached
standards in Australia but intellectual culture has
high
remarked
been
neglected* .
'Especially important in affecting the output of govenments and the quality of
our political life ...
[is] a suspicion of debate and reason, combined with a
profound anti-intellectualism'.
13
Rnti-intellectualism has however two levels (like anti-theism):
or,
differently, hostility to things intellectual.
though
the
Both appear in Australia,
neglect is far more widespread than hostility (which
restricted
neglect
appears
to a few older class-differentiated cultural groupings),
vast and amorphous middle class vaguely approving of things
largely
most
of
educational.
Note also the role of private schools in Australia, as in USR, as opposed
to New Zealand, where quality secondary eduction is not so privatised.
The whole style of ranking educational institutions in fact differs from
culture to culture.
Stephenson^s "words ring as true as they did the^' 30
writes Dunlevy (Canberra Times l'?84).
years
ago,
so
The other two 'characteristics [which] infect our public life'*, and also
stand in the way of 'a better society in this country", listed by Aitkin
in his cynical and pessimistic conclusion (p.28) are worth recording
also,
namely
widespread authoritarianism and
majoritarianism
in
government, and primary group loyalty (and therewith partisan and even
confrontational practices) in public affairs, i.e. narrow non-pluralistic
matesh i p.
this
In
does
Australia
neglect,
not differ
from
situation may be Morse in rural USA than it is in rural
the
highly
other
Indeed there are grounds for supposing
materialist cultures, such as the USA.
that
markedly
Australia,
Mhere people commonly have access to public libraries and a variety of
public
c ommun i c a t i on ne tMorks,
terms
In
furnished
America
relative
of
population
Australia
corresponds
perhaps
is
to community radio stations like Canberra's
could Mell adapt, is different.
better
Nothing in
cultural communication netMorks than USA.
Mith
2XX
North
to
or
The US PSS arrangments, Mhich Australia
ethnic radio in most state capitals.
by
size
For Mhat it is Morth (for they are controlled
capitalist right and carry a heavy Northern ideological message)
the
the
main Australian neMspapers also compare favourably Mith American neMspapers
at least on a circulation-size basis
Many
Americans
have
'America's
for
conservatism'
(p.345).
Mhich,
Australia,
remarked,
in a similar
parochialism,
The
though
- and tend to be less parochial.
fashion
to
anti-intellectualism
Merrill,
sc i en t i sm
ano
smoothly
for
same ingredients do not blend so
certainly
instantiating that
on
initially^_starting
coupling of scientism Mith an t i - i n t e 1 1 ec t u a 1 i sm^s^^Can d n a t i on a 1 i sm)^ i s neither
so
conservative
(especially
politically) nor nearly
as
parochial
(perhaps because much further from the centre of things than USA).
there is some significant overlap,
are,
like
Moreover,
of
'P%.
though
because both mainstream cultures are male-
dominated Mith a heavy practical get-things-done orientation.
Australasian
USA
Nor do the
of Australian anti-intellectualism look the same as American,
sources
as
For example, in
male preserves it is still considered that intellectual pursuits
artistic
endeavours,
for practical men,
unmasculine
and
effeminate
("sissy").
ideas and intellectual activity, except as part
a narroM practically-directed result-oriented science,
are an impediment,
Looked at differently things are not so good.
Australia's capital, for
example, hardly turns out, in the form of the Canberra Times, a product
Mhich compares favourably Mith the Nashing ton Post
an effete luxury.
in
that
Inhere Australian culturet&e3±±s^diverges from American
anti-intellectualism,
culture and thought, ^deriv
the
connected mediocre standards
and
opportunities
various
furthermore,
to
higher
from egalitarian and levelling down elements
culture (for intellectual activities,
serious
of
to
and
excel,
like high culture,
surpass
is
in
offer too many
There
mates).
are,
connected mediocre-maintaining mechanisms in Australian
for example ''social penalisation of deviance from certain "middling"
society,
intellectual
other
norms'* (Ely),
a lopping off
cultures
do share is a
heavy
and
of
intellectual
tall
poppies.
the
Nhat
as
misrepresented
Americans,
a
practical
practical
utilitarianism.
and unlike most Europeans,
orientation,
Australians
are,
often
like
practical do-it-yourself people, proud
But for the most part,
of their fix-it make-do and improvisational abilities.
Australians have strong group loyalties and do not treat those outside primary
groups
with
sense;
nor
aiming
at
sufficient impartiality to count as utilitarians in
they,
in appropriate utilitarianism
greatest
happiness of the greatest
are
'the
societal maximum.
educational
and
or
number'
strict
maximizers,
any
other
They are utilitarian only in the vulgar sense of utility-
focussed and practical,
experimental
fashion,
any
in the sense that theory,
statistical
work,
gets
and research institutes (as e.g.
a low
as opposed to practice and
even
in
higher
the Research School
of
Social
ranking,
Sciences, Australian National University).
The
practical
capabilities of Australians are by no means
directed but include group and social organisation.
individually
Particularly significant
The utilitarian theme was a hare-meleased by Hancock, in his attempt to
reconcile Australian 'individualism with ... reliance upon Government'
(p.55).
In fact utilitarianism is inessential to the style
of
reconciliation Hancock attempts, several sorts of accounts of collective
poster at the service of integrated individual interests serving as well or better in the Australian case.
Even in the academies utilitarianism
hardly predominates;
and it has had little historical importance in
Australian philosophy, though it has regrettably become a position to be
reckoned with in recent years.
By contrast, pragmatism has almost no
foil owing.
is
australian
'the
organisations
zest for starting,
joining
of all kinds' (aitkin p.26).
and
maintaining
voluntary
This has proved important for
a
long time in the provision of Melfare services in australis, and more recently
40?% n
in the case of the environment.
The pattern of Melfare^in australia, for long
self-provisioning (as distinct from provided by local
largely
elseMhere
),
a "Mel fare partnership" Mith government
into
merged
espec i al 1 y in brick-and mortar- grants and the like,
and
other
organisations.
environmental
a
The
concerns.
government
similar
pattern
funding,
for voluntary,
is
re! igious
as
emerging
as
regards
size of the nongovernmental Melfare sector
in
Rustralia,
an important part of the informal economy, remains extremely large
(est ima ted
9. S
p.26^/
for
equivalent in unpaid mages alone to 1.5'< of GDP,
de t ai 1s);
the informal economy bound up
and
see
Mith
aitkin,
environmental
issues is no longer negligible though governmental assistance is
siight.
But the success of nongovernmental organisation and the informal
economy
up a latent paradox concerning political organisation in australia
throMS
for Mhat i s
paradoxes tied to the already noticed authoritarianism paradox;
afxa poMer+ul authoritarian government doing in self-reliant communities?)
the
one
hand,
there
political culture',
is
'an important self-reliant
in
strain
(a
On
australian
Mith do-it-themselves groups Mhich substituted for
local
government; it is 'a political culture in Mhich voluntary organistions have an
honoured place' (aitkin,
apathy,
though
populace
Mhich
p.26).
But, on the other hand, there is a political
are not as marked as formerly or as- in the USa;
has
by
and
large 'not sought
profound
there
changes
in
is
problems
a
reliance on government to provide and
(this in complete contrast Mith
america)
to
deal
.
a
Mith
and
political
difference-in-size
In contrast Mith USa, for instance, local government Mas
development in australia, and remains Meak: see aitkin, p.23ff.
?7-
a
their
political or social structure for several generations noM" (aitkin p.23);
there
is
a
late
"So australians faced Mith a political problem learned to respond Mith
"Mhat Mill they (= the government) do about it?", Mhereas americans in a
similar situation could be heard to say "Hhat Mill Me do about it?'"
(aitkin, p.23).
ar
^6
theory,
both lessons for Australian political decentralisation and^some
Mith
expI anatory
0! son' s
Mould appear to resolve the paradox (a theory
pOMer,
individuals,
action,
collective
of
bogie
but
Mhich
initial
the
groups or factions to Mhom
primary
within Mhich mateship^ bonds operate).
in
but Mith
elements
not
attach
and
loyalties
Nhat holds for the smaller local group
individual is directly involved does not
the
resembling
to
transfer
larger
political arrangements? tsri on the contrary, local loyalties act against larger
groups struggle and compete for their OMn
organisation^
enter ^nto a-v^ricty"'of partisan and rent-seeking behaviour.
Australians
political
are
self- or
problems
they
hardly
and
Similarly Mhile
problems,
group-reliant Mith smaller
appeal to government,
interests
larger
for
surprisingly^ to
authoritarian government (for though authoritarianism is not essential,
an
it is
likely in the circumstances).
.The
1
open
times may be changing Mith the serious attempt to apply
"
methods
secretive
to
large group decision making,
games,
numbers
instead
of
group
'a perversion of the majority principle
old
Mhich
in
HoMever the
of more satisfactory and rational decision making methods into large
organisation and choice practices have a long May to go
political
the
simply
getting the numbers is a surrogate for persuasion'* (Aitkin p.28).
adoption
consensual,
J
life,
in
Australian
in such less anti-intellectual (but still often
even
anti
theory) cloisters as the universities and other educational institutions.
Approaches
to the environment.
the frequent presentation of USA as the heartland
An t i podes, despi te
environmental
movement.
proportionately,
the Morld.
of
There
are,
as
Australian
for
example,
more
paid-up
the
of
members,
environmental groups in Australia than anyMhere else
in
Apparently blest Germany, Northern homeland of green politics, noM
comes second in this sort of statistic,
Mell
Ecological aMareness is greater in the
easily ahead of USA and
Canada.
a quantitative difference there is a qualitative difference
and Northern environmentalism.
The Australian movement
As
betMeen
is
much
A
and
active
more
ecological
auareness
communities.
The
involved.
not
mi th
permeated
Antipodean culture is
encountered in North America
in
except
an
isolated
These are subjective impressions from informants, but there are
some more objective matters to back them up, such as
The
P
issue
Tasmanian
dam issue,
uhich could not have figured as
election
an
in the same sort of uay in North America (though perhaps it could
have
in Noruay);
level of political commitment on such environmental matters
neu
The
9
the preservation of rainforest in NSH.
as
(For details, and other examples, see
Dunphy).
?
for example,
Responses to questionnaires on rainforest and uoodchipping,
uhich indicate uide community concern in Australia on these issues.
impressions
The
quantitative
can,
uay,
by
moreover,
be
backed
up to some
dividing environmental groups into
(conservative) and neuer (post l'?65, more radical).
extent
in
tuo
types:
more
a
older
The overwhelming majority
of people involved in environmental groups in England, for instance, belong to
organisations of the former type,
National
mostly founded last century, especially the
Trust (see Loue and Goyder).
By contrast the
consists predominantly of more recently formed groups.
Australian
The Australian groups
differ in character from those in USA in important uays;
also
for
and less inclined to compromise. For instance, there has never been a
action,
(such
deal
as
as the Sierra Club
made)
uith. organisations
supporting
there has never been a uorking alliance uith shooters or
pouer,
nuclear
clubs
they are,
more active, more radical, more left-leaning, more inclined to
the most part,
major
movement
is commonplace in USA,
or an easy alliance uith
off-road
gun
vehicle
c1ubs.
USA
can
Emerging),
much
in
be
very
roughly seen,
as dividing into tuo parts,
the
uilderness),
uay
as Callenbach
sees
(in
Ecotopi a
Eastern part, uithout
the Old Norld,
of deeper ecological concerns (or
it
of
national
parks
or
and a Neuer Norld, Nestern part, uhich is much more ecologically
There
concerned.
is
little
doubt however that
the
metropolitan
eastern
industrial part of USA (the Boston-Neu York-Hashington conglomeration) is Mell
and truly in control of things.
in
the
places
uhere
again roughly,
The division gets reflected,
environmental philosophy or
features in university programs,
equivalent
an
seriously
not at the
namely the south and uest,
more
richly-endoued higher-ranked universities in the east.
Jeuish prominence in eastern American universities has something
The
to
There is a significant Jewish element in
do Mith this educational situation.
contemporary US thinking and philosophy, but not to any extent in Australian
American.
The
evident Jewish influence on American economic and political life extends
into
except
insofar as it (increasingly) serves as a Meak copy of
philosophy
and
Nalzer
political theory,
in
elements.
ideology:
This
long
the Mork of Nozick
for instance,
Mhich is overtly infused
influence
exploitation-disrupted
the
Consider,
has
a
substantial
Mith
Jeuish
effect,
Jeuish record is exceedingly disappointing,
Hebraic
especially
arenas like peace and the natural environment
both in
and
in
- Mhere
practice
and
theory (occasional rebels excepted).
The
features
strength of Australian environmentalism arises from a combination of
of
the
land
and
the culture:
the
presence
pouer
and
of
the
surrounding natural Morld, the conspicuousness and the resilience of many more
familiar
Mhich
close,
parts of the environment,
together
the outdoor barbeque-and-beach lifestyle,
Mith a variety of outdoor activities brings
the secular earthiness of the culture,
the
its naturalism,
environment
the
doMn-to-
earth practical character of the people, the do-it-yourself approach to things
like
housing,
repairs
and
so
forth
Mhich
often
frustrating, details of the natural Morld close again.
brings
the
messy,
if
Nhile Hestern American A.
9^.
There are hoMever some European emigres, Mith right-leaning or even
reactionary political vieMS, Mho have an influence on political thinking
in Australia, especially as regards defence and communism.
NeM Zealand
is, by contrast, relatively free of such immigrants.
%?.
Nain reasons Mhy are in fact nicely explained in SchMarzschild.
these things it does not share all of
of
many
shares
them
by
means,
any
in particular not the areligious character or the style of naturalism.
Despite Australia's frequent inclusion as an industrialised nation, it is
not
industrialised,
highly
mining,
and
agriculture
and
of
much
the
export
in their different Mays quarrying
both
Other Antipodean countries are even less industrialised.
there
the level of Old Norld
yet
isn't
transformation
industrial
land.
the
the
The
European
still
environment
even in most parts of the largest
reaches through conspicuously,
from
And in the Antipodes
control,
the total inhabitable landscape.
of
comes
wealth
cities.
survey of cultural media such as films Mould shoM this clearly enough.
a
rare
(or NeM Zealand) film that doesn't include
Australian
bushdrop,
many
Mhereas
US
exclude
productions
the
some
A
It is
natural
environment
natural
entirely, and even Mhen sequences are shot outside it's often all concrete and
and
glass,
neon
lights and automobiles and
pools
sMimming
- metropolitan
"cu1ture".
Certainly these sorts of urban effects, taken from noMhere in particular,
could
be achieved in parts of the older Australia state capitals,
becoming
(less
very
freeMay
cities in the American-influenced
much
systems hoMever),
Melbourne,
noisy
and
As a result,
older
mode
structures
the largest, Sydney and
are not .just sprauling and mostly unplanned but heavily congested,
polluted,
Mith
nature blotted out in many of
despite
its impressive monuments,
the
inner
poorer
In this they resemble Hashington,
suburbs by red brick and Mires and asphalt.
Mhich
are
free-enterprise
overlaying and expanding
copied from British provincial cities.
Mhich
has only little
planning,
and
is
mostly the American adaption of the European city - an adaption Mhere the city
is
treated as if at first space didn't matter,
structures,
fortunate
al) being,
to have,
so to say,
by contrast,
nor any unity of
better integrated into and less imposed upon,
(the
Australia is
isolated individual ones).
in Canberra a much more
style
holistic
capita),
/
the environment.
Moreover it
is
hard
not to see and to some extent appreciate the natural environment
on the hills,
especially
Canberra,
neatly planned and in places so green,
between,
lands
even if the flatter
in
so
exhibit (though as cities normally do)
so much artifice.
The
prospects for the environment look rather brighter in Australia than
in USA,
and
for several reasons,
some physical and structural,
much
smaller proportion firmly
population,
and
agriculture
or to industrialist activities.
matter
possibilities
technological
and
a
of good luck than good management;
America
much
For a similar land area Australia has a
cultural.
have been lacking.
some ideological
human
smaller
committed
to
intensive
In large measure this is more a
for both the time and physical and
for a such colossal business
investment
as
in
But cultural reasons have also made a difference
Mill likely become increasingly important:
contrasts
cultural
already
observed, that is.
In
had
Australians came increasingly godless to a land God
the first place,
supposedly forgotten about;
for them there Mas no mandate or
such as the Americans operated under,
in
Australian
life
not merely to multiply and be fruitful,
and exploit it to their oMn ends.
but to dominate the land,
and
approaches
directive
to
the
environment
Nor is there noM
the
extent
of
religiously-reinforced human chauvinism that operates in the industrial North,
and
Mhich
sciences.
informs
the
Secondly,
precedent-bound
foundations
American adulation of,
of
Northern
social
and ideological commitment
. (From previous page) So it is to be hoped that Griffin's environmental
vision, from Mhich Canberra took shape, can be sustained. H.B. Griffin a naturalised Australian Mho greM up in USA - has a significant place in
the groMth of environmentalism in Australia. His role in this regard has
been largely neglected;
for he is usually portrayed .just as an
arch i tec t.
/P/ . On the May in Mhich human chauvinism is Mritten deep into mainline social
sciences, see EE, pp.183-'?.
About the social theory involved, many
Australians are fortunately sceptical - those that bother Mith theory,
that is.
/%%. The practice of government**assisted capitalism of
differs of course from the ideology.
advanced
capitalism
to,
market arrangements and market-based minimally-regulated
profit-directed
competition is not shared in Australia,
American commitment to the Big,
and,
to big business,
to put it all more theoretically,
capitalism,
controlled
is substantially opposed.
but
to tall poppies, to genius,
to maximization.
extraordinarily bad neMS for the environment.
general
and
documented,
reasons for their damaging effects are sufficiently
theoretical
the
understood.)
such commitments and themes, though influential enough and
In Australia,
and advertised daily through the commercial media,
pushed
in
are
(The damaging effects of these
in practice are quite evident enough and Mell
3-Bad-lTs
But such minimally-
maximization,
and
markets,
So is
do
not
dominate.
For there is a different mainstream ideology Mith a different agenda - such as
social
social
regulation,
and
intervention,
so
arbitration,
consensus,
group
government
The land and the people are not open
forth.
American-style markets in the same '.jay (though there are increasing
ill-considered
pressures
forces",
dairy
market,
e.g.
expose
farmers
in a subsidized and
also
Morks
in favour of
the
environment.
natural
and
are
entitled to fair treatment,
oppressed or poor Australians,
rather
to a "fair go" and assistance.
growing reluctance to see local environments,
especially
and,
by foreign companies.
Fourthly,
Australian environmental movement itself,
Morld
Australian
Thirdly,
are to an increasing extent considered as honorary or even
Australians,
"market
heavily-controlled
markets).
the
and often
to
population
sectors of the
adolescents in over-supplied labour
egalitarianism
animals
to
to
Native
exemplary
like
other
And there is a
like small people,
ripped off,
there is the live and expanding
some of it manifest in
Alternative
Australia.
5.
Formulating and takinq different directions
The
distinctive
features of Australian culture both point
change and supply main parts of an engine for change.
is,
houever,
the
May
to
The standard complaint
that proposals for radical change noM lack,
Mith the demise of
revolutionary aspirations in the oppressed c 1 asses, any engine for change.
In
more friendly form, the complainfis elaborated along the foliating lines:-
It is easy enough to formulate different directions for the South Pacific
it is far harder to see how such an appropriately different course
countries;
It is not merely that the main countries in the
can be adopted and followed.
region,
European
transformed
descent.
by Europeans,
There
are
are much influenced by people
inevitably,
then,
strong
recent
of
pressures
for
conformity, for similarity to the North, and for cultural anonymity, and there
is much pressure for increased assimilation within the !JS6 sphere of influence
These Northern pressures comprise a familiar package, notably
and control.
*
Domination
popular
media
Northern,
of main forms of communication and education - especially the
such as T'-.J,
especially
books
- by
features
and
missionaries of Northern culture
and
but also intellectual media such
American
but
also
British,
programs,
as
products.
*
Cultural
propaganda.
travelling
ambassadors,
Surprisingly, these people are almost invariably welcomed, their
loaded messages eagerly sought.
reinforce the missionaries.
from,
On a lesser scale,
North
tourists from the
They see the North, generally the areas they come
as ^zi.tmg the standards,
as providing the sort of cultural ideals the
backward Antipodes should be seeking to attain.
*
Top-down
directives
from
aligned with Northern interests.
local
both
private and public
companies,
metropolitan skylines).
which
are
These include not merely the manaoements of
branches of multinational companies,
insurance
sources
and so on (roughly,
but those of a variety of
banks,
those whose buildings now dominate
Etc.
103
Even the most powerful and populous states in the South Pacific region
are
becoming
increasingly
locked into a dual system
of
Northern
control,
namely through
103. Those which operate their own limited imperialism in lesser states of the
region, e.g., Australia in Papua New Guinea and New Zealand in Samoa.
The
1.
organisation
American
104
The most important of these arrangements in Australia's case
is
hegemony.
of industrialised capitalist states,
under
perhaps the Pacific rim strategy, masterminded by the USA Mith assistance from
and fitting within the world arrangements envisaged by the
Japan,
Trilateral
Commission.
2.
of the economy by
penetration
The
many of them ultimately American controlled.
Northern,
mostly
corporations,
transnational
of
(For the effects
this framework of control in Australia's case, see Crough and Wheelwright.).
A very significant net result is that local economic control is diminishing or
and therewith,
being lost altogether,
local
control
political
in these economically-dominated times,
is diminishing.
National
economies
increasingly
respond, and are seen as obliged to respond, to so-called international forces
"international market" forces in state-rigged markets with
(or
and highly concentrated participants).
effort,
of
much
(unmarketable)
it
intentional,
At the same time there is a concerted
to
reduce
and
remain,
remove
substantially
cultural differences in the contemporary world,
mass consumer society and worldwide markets.
differences
unequal
very
a
to produce
Notwithstanding, major cultural
even in the more industrialised
With
countries.
some
A
care, some fostering, the differences cou1be accentuated in worthwhile ways,
though
the
especially in the industrial
trend,
main
nations,
in
is
the
opposite direction, to almost complete cultural convergence.
On the other side,
forces,
mainly
local,
there are in the South Pacific some
in
counterbalancing
favour of some distancing of Australian
and
New
Zealand cultures from the USA, and of looser relations, especially, presently,
in
matters of (nuclear) defence.
If change is to occur,
it is important to
encourage worthwhile components of these forces,
particularly those
in regional culture
interconnected ways, through
ideas
that regional
and
action.
grounded
cultures
104. For Third World southern countries, financial arrangements through
US-dominated INF and World Bank loom much larger.
and
the
their
do
conventionalism
and
important.
shape
a
are
There
culture,
undoubted!;/
pragmatism
as
American lifestyle or Australian naturalism
(and
and
Sydney
However what
Russell
that culture determines the shape of the dominant philosophy,
to think,
qualification.
major
philosophy;
dominant
are
and realism a main strand of Australian.
materialism)
requires
reflect
that
philosophies
came
elements
philosophical
but
Certainly,
conversely,
105
culture affects
philosophical
and
constrains
input
can
affect, or even alter, culture.
Genuine
differences
implementation
(as
of
a few very simple
ideas
could
make
major
the 1884-5 stand of the New Zealand government on visits
of
namely that significant principles (of morality)
or
nuclear ships reveals);
features of local culture or regional environments are not sacrificed,
in
jeopardy,
such things as trading advantages or
for
distributed economic benefits.
economism
narrowly
There is a powerful basis for defeating
in Australian and Antipodean cultures,
egalitarian approaches;
short-term
or put
such
in the shape of anti-market
and these and other complementary cultural features
could serve more widely to halt or subvert Northern incursions.
The
South
uncritical
Pacific
Enlightenment
and
for
uncontrolled extension of European culture
take one lesser instance of
that
world-wide
to
spread
and disease) has been very damaging both to indigenous
the lands and seas,
extinction.
mistakes.
(to
and
the
of
peoples
even pushing some of the former inhabitants
to
Nodern people are supposed to learn, if from anything, from their
Among
mistakes of civilizations,
environmental mistakes
are
as
105. Russell 'connecttsl'* philosophies with the social environments of the
philosophers concerned' p.824). Elsewhere, however, Russell only claims
social influences, not determination (e.g., p.827). His working example
is the connection of Dewey's philosophy 'with American enterprise;
in
particular there is the belief in human power, and an unwillingness to
admit "stubborn facts".'*
'His philosophy is a power philosophy.
Russell then proceeded to consider the very real dangers of human power.
Dewey, for his part, contested the connections Russell alleged, as well
as the dangers.
There is much more, however, to the interrelations of
dominant philosophies with cultures and their environments than Russell
unear thed.
conspicuous as any (sea e.g,
hanger
no
though
beyond
Hatt) .
the reach of a Northern Mar - to
of Northern civilizations,
mistakes
Thors is sti 1 1 time for* the Antipodes
avoid
the
beginning Mith human overpopulation
many
and
environmental impoverishment (as differently illustrated by Italy and Lhina).
There
that
grounded in regional
are various different directions,
a country or place can attempt to take.
There are,
for
features,
example,
tMO
extremal economic directions a contemporary state or region may try to pursue,
as illustra ted:-
other reliance, e.g. upon
i n ternat i onal economic
forces
al ternative
fort-jard May
present
se 1 freli ance
At
the
one
end
lies local self-reliance
and
control,
substantially excluded Mhen it comes to essentials;
(as Mith the Meather of an island),
regulation
largely controlled from elseMhere,
(but
direction.
dominated)
by
the
is
It
or directed through some
toMards- the
dashed arroM,
points
this
direction
general
economy
and control Mith the
for instance at the mercy of international
Northern dominated) economic forces,
shoMn
outside
the
at the other lies outside
patron (as Mith Australia's, defence or Tibet's economy).
that
Mith
that
poMerful
A typical direction,
latter
(backMards)
international
(American
financial institutions such as the INF and the Horld Bank
try
to
impose on client states.
Unfortunately
bent
on
indicate
Mritten
pursuing
given
all likely governments in countries like Australia
the Mrong direction.
the May poMer,
The reasons are
privilege and influence
into the control of societies - lie.
not
appear
difficult
- Northern
to
features
But it does not have to be
or
stay that way.
difficulty for all suggestions for extensile
major
A
normal governmental procedures,
through
effect
constraint
for change.
is a
change,
severe
For governmental procedures are st on,
put
into
apparent
time
piecemeal
and
whichever
usually reactive (this is even how successful governmental methods,
these are,
vastly
sages
successful)
and
(among
But time is running out for the present (.not
are supposed to be) .
human experiment it is now everywhere
sound men and women of common sense,
from
crackpots
will
1'lhatever is done for change may have to be done with more rapidity
is customary in grander human affairs,
except with war itself (which is
of the main prob 1ems and a likely outcome of
one
as
from
whose numbers are those most confident that present arrangements
persist).
than
as well
said,
heard
socio-economic
catastrophe
ensuing from other problems).
In the present conditions of uncertainty,
a
strategy relevant to both outcomes,
concentrating
upon
imme^d^ate
paths
it would seem wise to plot out
catastrophic breakdown or
to
change
aimed
avoiding
at
while
not,
socio-
env i r onmen t a 1 break down.
Both the deeper American environmentalists and leading German Greens,
unlike
many
thinkers and leaders take the problems with deadly
hope
for a way out of present massive socio-environmental
main
nuclear impasse particularly,
change will take the form of a
This
spread
like a religious revival,
by way of democratic channels.
the
through a mass change
seriousness,
difficulties,
of
spiritual
who
and
consciousness.
conversion,
and
to alter political decisions and directions
These ideas,
while by no means ridiculous in
fashion of new-born Christians' views about their individualistic
escape
from nuclear Armageddon,
and while offering a clear ray of hope, leave most
106
Australians who have encountered them duly sceptical.
That type of massive
change
a
of consciousness (which may not be politically effective) will require
miracle,
and
miracles are not credible.
More important,
that
sort
of
conversion i_s ruled out culturally in Australia,
spiritual
according to
the
prev i ous ar gumen t.
A drastic and massive change of consciousness,
or religious
is neither likely nor necessary (nor Mould it be sufficient).
Antipodes,
the
someMhat
Mith
isolated
favourable location in
its
Fortunately in
Southern
the
conversion,
Hemisphere,
there are different and
from the belligerent North,
more
These are social Mays
promising routes to change and regional nuclear escape.
and locally self-reliant Mays deeply rooted in the culture. Instead of seeking
to
change
consciousness,
then,
the
and through elements of,
the culture.
lines of religious conversion,
picture
through
of change.
in
But
many
and
those
involves
rather
is
as amended;
straightforwardness,
aMay
than
from
dominant
It encourages many
so to say).
for example those
as interfering Mith crucial features of
running counter to enterprise,
orderliness,
change
not
re-conditioning
counter-cultural,
deplored features of Australian culture,
culture,
of,
Mhat is being offered is a very different
this
respects the route
acquisitive capitalist virtues.
the
in the form
a
The route is thus cultural, not in this respect counter-cultural.
considered
been
Mith
Instead of the picture of change along
Northern paradigms (counter-Northern-culture,
often
Mork
to
is
The main path to change is through culture,
consciousness;
conversion.
idea
that is already there or in the background,
"consciousness"
the
leading
market
that
capitalism,
selfishness and the
initiative,
have
other
It encourages instead traditional virtues of
for instance Midened
generosity,
egalitarianism,
permissiveness,
pluralism,
unsubtlety,
spontaneity,
authenticity, sociaSbility, reliability, anti-authoritarianism,
group-reli^ance, resourcefulness, moderation, leisure!iness.
The main environmental route aMay from Northern social paradigms has been
10^. (From previous page) Host, but of course, not all.
The change-ofconscicusness idea has its adherents, e.g. Cairns, some in Alternative
Australia. Naturally it is not being denied that change-^f-consciousness
(e.g. in the form of ecological conversion) does occur^aac^is an important h
happening. Hhat is at issue is the likely scale of such change.
and Mhat it involves indicated (e.g. in RP).
t-lhat is
the extent to Mhich elements of mainstream Australian
culture
reconnoitred elsewhere,
is
remarkable
Indeed in Australasian culture there
fit with that divergence from the North.
is
at
best
dominant
social
There is already in the cultures
paradigm.
for a marked SMing aMay from the dominant Northern
basis
vieMpoint,
demagogic
of
ambivalent subscription to major facets
only
is
it
mainly a matter of tipping
Northern
the
a
substantial
paradigm.
an
From
already
a
poised
balance aMay from Nor them-influenced control.
break-aMay
This
involve
first
control has tMO political facets
arrangements
part
Mhich
of
part
relevant
is breaking free from Northern hegemony, control,
alignment
of
The
and
from the influence of foreign states and the grips of transnational
Some
companies.
recovering
Mays
connected
of the Mays this can be accomplished have
local control of media output and messages,
are knoMn,
e.g.
escheMing a false internationalism,
and,
into line Mith
both
so that political arrangements reflect these parts of culture.
reliance,
e.g.
political
bringing
culture,
from
sMeepingly,
more
dropping
moving to greater
regional
been
indicated,
and many
other
self-reliance,
modifying limited liability of companies,
out
of the
international
abandoning the race to keep up Mith the Singaporian
rat-race
Jones and the
(e.g.
E/i^shoMas,
Host of these Mays could
107
The second
designed to strike resounding chords in mainstream culture.
in demolishinq their oMn and others'* environments).
be
rtA"' ccbLt
subsidizing
transnationals,
A.?
providing
hand-outs and undue
shelter
to
big
business or monopolistic professions, cutting assistance to the disadvantaged,
exposing
local small-actor sectors (in difficulty) to the icy Minds of
Morld
107. And Mhere not it is a matter of removing false beliefs, such as that
Australia is currently threatened militarily by hostile states.
These
sorts of beliefs could be altered, at least for many Mho hold them, by
appropriate
persuasion by credible popular figures on mass media
channels. In fact it has suited both government and opposition, hitherto
committed to an essentially bipartisan defence policy, to let false
beliefs about defence, for instance, stand, or even to encourage and
reinforce them.
market forces, and so on.
such
Tipping the balance involves both positive measures
promoting the valid features in
as
as^
such
measures,
counteracting
freely flowing in from the North,
Australian
culture,
counter-
and
images
and removing damaging impacts and
e.g.
by cutting doMn the floM,
making
it
more expensive, and introducing rivals.
Governments cannot be relied upon
even
Mhere
motivated to do so (e.g. as Mith defence they may
support, because of false beliefs).
rolehas
never
to make requisite changes on their OMn,
been active
in
lack
popular
Apparently, and surprisingly, the State's
Australia,
but
a 1 Mays
reactive.
State
intervention and regulation is and has alMays been in reaction to Mhat
108
happens.
Since governments can not be relied upon to initiate action, it
is important to move for change,
for
such
possible,
change
early
and Mhere possible to obtain popular support
10?
on in movements.
It is important also, Mhere
to bypass government,
building alternative social arrangements and
enlarging the informal economy (see e.g. Nartin).
There is further a component to be exploited in tipping the balance
from the
mainstream
dominant
Northern paradigm, apart from the
Australian
authoritarianism,
culture
(as
e.g.
components
egalitarianism,
of
anti
anti-marketism, satisization, environmentalism, and so on).
That is anti-Americanism.
There
developed
leading
aMay
The attitude in the Antipodes to USA is ambivalent.
is a love-hate relationship in Australia (e.g.
mutual admiration
from
perceived cultural similarities, gratitude from older Australians for American
108. This major theme is advanced, illustrated, and defended in Gilbert,
p.?ff. One important example concerns squatting, other aspects of social
Melfare.
But the theme is liable to be contested, e.g. by Aitkin, Mho
sees 'nearly tMo centuries of reliance on ... omnicompetent initiating
goverment behind us'
(p.27).
HoMever Gilbert seems to be correct;
Australian governments are hardly omnicompetent or 'omnipresent'*, and
they rarely appear to initiate.
10?. That support may be enlisted from culturally unexpected sources, e.g.
Momen in the case of the peace movement, as opinion polls clearly reveal.
The peace movement has not undertaken sufficient political foot-uork,
e.g. grass roots activity such as door knocks, in increasing and
mobilizing this potential support.
in Morld Mar II;
action
ugly American abroad).
dislike of American blustering,
the Antipodes.
independence,
trying
to
The distaste for being visibly pushed around is strong in
A striking feature of established Antipodean peoples is their
elements
or to be
unwillingness to put up with nonsense,
their
manipulated^ especially by foreigners.
cultural
There is now much anti-US-
in New Zealand since USA made the tactical error of
New Zealand.
bully
the
There is much anti-Americanism in Australia as well as
widespread opposition to the American government.
governmentism
opposition to
as
pushed*
Ao
Of course, the tactic of appeal ingj^such
practices
opposition to the American political
is
a
dangerous one, owing in part to politicians' dishonest penchant for conflating
opposition to a foreign government with opposition to people that goverment is
supposed
to represent (or perhaps on rare occasions does),
easy
the
by
above).
neutralised.
practice
ambiguity of terms like anti-American (an ambiguity
The tactic opens the way to charges of racism,
and the like.
a
But the charges,
For
it
is
on
national chauvinism,
if they can be got at, are straightforwardly
largely a matter of removing
institutions (and cultures) to their individual members,
institutions devolves,
traded
made
fallaciously, into criticism of
crude
reduction
of
so that criticism of
each and every one of
the members.
no
Richard Sylvan
110. This paper had a long and difficult gestation and growth period, before
ye'idling a result that still leaves its author uneasy most days.
He
cehtainly hopes that those who commented on the paper or assisted on the
labour in its earlier days now only dimly recognise it.
Among those to
be thanked are Brian Hartin, Jean Norman, Louise Syvlan (who was
responsible for the monster in the first place), David Bennett, ... .
On the notion of culture and cultural pluralism
APPENDIX 1:
unfortunately, with very few exceptions,
Definitions of culture abound;
Hany are too narrow,
are bad.
all
for example chauvinistically restricting
culture to human groups (as Kamenka's appalling motto, 'nothing human is alien
p.7.); some are too broad, for example making any sort of organisation
to me',
as a trade union or a local brass band.) a culture.
such
serve
to
connect
problems:- High
redefinitions
of
cu1ture
with [a peoples'] artistic achievement or, even more
111
with (their) literature.
This is h1 on culture, at least insofar
culture
LaJ
narrowly,
as
the types of
indicate
Pt fen examples will
what is included is class restricted,
to certain class-approved
products
and performances (e.g. opera, ballet, drama as opposed to reggae, punk, etc.).
Hhile high redefinitions let in too little,
So
is with the definition of culture as 'the transfer of
it
behavioural means,
(Bonner
with
low redefinitions admit too much.
p.ltj),
culture.
information
most particularly by the process of teaching and learning*
because that includes much that has nothing especially to
For
by
example,
number of bricks on a site,
relaying a weather forecast or passing on
transfers information by behavioural
means,
do
the
but
information of no particular cultural relevance.
By
contrast,
culture.
For
Herskovits:
most definitions mark out something which roughly overlaps
example,
culture
Awa
'settletsJ
for
the
offered
definition
is "the man-made part of the environment"
...'
by
(p.2'?).
Not only is this inadmissibly anthropocentric, excluding animal cultures (such
as
Bonner
writers
studies)
imagine);
and extraterrestrial cultures (such
but
worse,
as
science-fiction
this twisted definition appears to
render
a
ill. Thus, for example, Stephenson
throughout his iconoclastic book on
Australian culture.
The equation, with literary texts, like that of a
paradigm
with central texts,
is useful in offering a
materia!
representation of a culture. For there is something solid that can be
grasped and presented.
Similary, money, newspapers and motor cars,
afford material artefacts and museum exhibits of wider popular cultures.
deserted
town or ancient ruins a culture (rather
mining
of
manifestation
a
past culture) while excluding a system
physics!
the
than
and
beliefs
of
values as a culture (.unless an erroneous theory of systems of propositions
In
invoked).
is
latching onto the physical exemplification it is moreover like
Kuhn' s identification of a text-book with a paradigm.
there is much m common between the notion of culture and
Indeed
libera! extension of the notion of paradigm,
one of uh 1 ch gained currency
&ng!o-ffmerican thought about a hundred years Later than the other.
have
in
Both terms
been used to cover an apparently diverse range of things (and criticised
dismissed for doing just that),
or
Kuhn's
and both do this in rather simitar
because both attempt to capture types of conceptual schema.
parallels
suggest
- certainly once the usefu! notion of a
widely adopted in sociology,
Mays,
Nhat is more the
paradigm,
soc1 a 1
been encountered and worked Mith - a common
has
notion.
Mith but little reflection,
from
advantage of this definition,
involved
and
para!tel
in
a rather different account of culture
the run of anthropologies! definitions straightaway emerges:- P) cu!ture,
or more exact!y a pure culture,
BP)
then,
P great
is that the hard
and part of its appeal,
thus
does not have to be repeated;
the
supplied
a
logical sense;
generous
by
but
the
c!ean-up
Mould
that is,
an elaborate interpretation
relational
structure.
it
is
function
Naturally it is
a
contrast
to
a scientific paradigm,
propositional structure delivered,
is
many
that of a social group.
sketched
take
theoretical
on
a
required
f aithfu1 to Mhat (the social forms, activities and so on) it models.
in
in
Recall that a paradigm is explicated as a model,
form for culture.
system, i.e. on
paradigm,
Mork
in rectifying the notion of paradigm has already been done (e.g.
precisely
structure
is a comprehensive socia! paradigm.
is a paradigm
genera!
to
be
6 social
where
the
the political themes and value judgements,
Group cohesiveness in fact is guaranteed in
examples of such social paradigms (several reproduced
in
the
RP)
because actual groups with distinctive cultures are taken; but the theoretical
explanation
goes
structure.
The
and
deeper
depends on features of
the
of propositions! structure delivered
types
mode!
underlying
in
shoMn,
are
capsule form, in the first table of this paper contrasting parts of mainstream
American and Philippine cultures;
other more detailed examples are reproduced
in theoretical Mork on social paradigms (e.g. RP, CPE, Cotgrove and references
cited therein).
dust
the
as
of
explication
May
by
paradigm
of
enabled
models
a
clarification and unification job to be done on the giant conceptual mess that
the
of paradigm had become,
notion
facilitates a pleasing and simplifying synthesis.
the
hc"-j
complains
diffusion by pointing to the
about
complaint
his
Consider,
about,
in
definitions of culture to similes and metaphors,
desperation,
as
...
a
map,
as a sieve,
resort
cu1ture
illustrate,
to
Kluckholn
Geertz Minds
but in anthropology more generally, can be reduced.
especially,
up
Geertz
diffusion'
'theoretical
of
so the parallel explication
in
attempted
to the analogies 'perhaps in
and as a matrix',
before a
mere
paragraph later, offering his OMn metaphor of culture as a. Meb of significance
or interpretation (and mode 1 too,
its
in metaphor),
roots
though here an exact technical notion,
Prs it happens,
Geertz's account is not too
has
bad
a
picture of the sort of logical model involved, that is of a system, a Meb**l ike
structure, Mith an interpretation
matrix
The other similes are hoMever more exact:
on it.
imposed,
can
function, supplying significance or meaning
models (though not
as
function
usually
both a map and a
social
ones),
a
map
typically modelling a landscape.
take up Kluckholn's elaboration on culture (not
to
Furthermore,
really
^definitions' as Geertz suggests), a model is indeed '(4) "an abstraction from
Mhich,
behaviour"',
feeling
thinking,
hoMever
is
not
prescript i v e 1 y
Mhere
and
it is a social paradigm,
believing"'* in terms of items
merely descriptive,
as,
supplies
'('?)
"a
validated.
but Mill be applied
mechanism
for
the
(3) "a May of
and
normative
can
The
model
be
regulation
read
of
(ID? "a set of techniques for adjusting both to the externa!
and
behaviour"'
environment and to other men"'. Such a mode!, which does correspond to '(5) "a
the part of the anthropologist about the '..'jay in which a
on
theory
peop!e in fact behave"' and their view of the wor!d,
orientations,
Since the social paradigm evolves over time,
'(11) "a precipitate of history'",
of
certainly affords '(6) a
structure of pooled learning"' and '(7.) "a set of standardized
to recurrent problems" .
group
it is
and it does record '(2) "the social legacy
the individual [in the society] acquires from his group"'.
three parts or levels of a culture that Conga!ton and David
The
*--P*22 ff.) are similar to those Kuhn includes within a paradigm,
readi1y
supplied
by
a model.
They
are,
first,
the
discern
and likewise
genera!
rules
and
procedures characterising and controlling the behaviour of adherents; secondly
the ideas and vatues.behind these beliefs and procedures; thirdly the products
materia!
and
exemplars
resulting,
e.g.
textbooks,
interpretation function validates both themes and ru!es;
domains
as wel! it
including values and ideas (on both see
of objects,
connection with exemplars and artefacts is less direct,
The
The
newspapers.
RP,
delivers
pp.12-16).
and of more than
textbook may present a paradigm or, more likely, part of one; or
112
it may, like an artefact, supply or be a partial modelling of the paradigm.
one kind.
remaining
The
to
order
culture
reflect
has
life-forms
done.
Ihus
to
of
qualifying term comprehensive is
some of the slackness of the
deliberately
notion
of
Abraham,
styles
there are varying degrees to which this
for one,
can
112.
and
be
explains various inclusive levels of culture
(PP* 12-13) before opting for the most inclusive, under which 'culture is
113
common life of the people
and 'includes the whole of the knowledge,
arts,
in
Hhile
culture.
cover a sufficiently comprehensive part of life
a community,
vague
th<=
the
science, technology, religions, morality, ritual, politics, literature,
theory normally has many models, some exact and canonical, some of
which bring out al! that holds in the theory but not only what holds
there;
and, more sweepmgly still, it has partial models, which
accurately depict part of the theory.
etiquette
even
compr eh ensi ve,
includes
use of t he.t erm hot'je ver
mastery
a
sculpture,
.
of
a
seventeenth
(p. 12) 114
..."
-fashions
Under
a
all
of
process
literature,
Abraham
(p.13).
of
and could knoM (p.13).
history,
culture!,
music,
pauperisation of Mhat
the
culture
and
painting
conjectures that this use evolved
and eighteenth centuries,
! ess
narroMer,
cu 1 ture i s limited to Mhat are called
In this use [that again of "higher"
of the mind.
things
result
and
educated
the age of enlightenment,
man
'as
in
a
the
stood for',
Such a person could reflect the Mhole culture in
the
more comprehensive use.
The European vieM of culture, Mhich tends to concentrate on high culture,
is insufficiently comprehensive,
leaving out a crucial aspect of culture,
so
it has been argued, namely attitudes to and approaches to the environment, and
so natural environments largely devoid of man-made features and influences
particular.
in
fuller picture of environmentally-sensitive culture looks like
this:113. (From previous page) See p.21.
Accounts of culture of this very
inclusive, but still unnecessarily anthropic, form are common in the
literature.
Thus, for example, Harris: 'f) culture is the total socially
acquired life-May or life-style of a group of people'
(p.144), their
patterns of behaviour and thought.
Thus, Mith even less qualification,
the first of Kluckholn'-s eleven definitions of culture (as listed in
Geertz pp.4-5), 'the total May of life of of a people', a definition
repeated in Conga)ton and David, p.22.
The intended model accordingly
provides a complete representation of life-Mays of members of the
c u 1 t u r e.
114. H fuller and better account Mhich gets very close to the model-theoretic
analysis, is Kumer's analogous definition of culture:
The
shared
symbolic system Mhich gives meaning
to
human
interactions in a society.
It refers to a society's May of
perceiving, interpreting and expressing things ... it includes
knoMledqe, belief-systems, values, norms and ideologies Mhich
enable the members of a society to perceive, organise and interpret
reality ... reality is alMays perceived Mi thin an evaluative
frameMork.
Similar too is Tylor's definition of 'culture' in terms of a structure
again: 'Culture or Civilization ... that complex Mhole Mhich includes
knoMledge, belief, art, morals, la.M, customs, and any other capabilities
and habits acquired by man as a member of society'. (Primitive Culture
vol. 7, p.7).
So all human societies have a culture, a generalised
paradigm.
It is better to separate out civi1ization, hoMever, and link
it to its 'root meaning of living in cities'.
PRIMARY CULTURE DlnGFWl
sense
'culture',
of
and
intellectual
sociology,
in
Mhere
order
culture.
artistic
the
practice
dictionaries,
takes up the primary
namely
Con c i se En q1i sh D i c t i on ary),
consists
in
put]
of
and as presented
culture of a society is said to comprise
a given culture,
state
'the
as it is
lor development,
of
a
in
shared
'the
It is important to separate off -
in
or people Mith,
and the education-derived sense,
the training or discipline in or
group-
particular, the
in Mhich the culture comprises the community,
leading
in Mhich the
to
Evidently the explication, Mhich makes the product primary
a
given
reverses
the culture. like agriculture, viticulture, and
115
Mas first and foremost a process
, a "cultivation" of intellect and
the historical order,
so on,
in
to set aside - some derivative senses,
sharing,
culture
offered
values and beliefs' of the society.
derived sense,
or
as
or people' (cf.
community
norms,
through social paradigms,
explication so far,
The
Mhere
115. Pts Hilliams explains, the ear 1 y meaning of 'culture' Mas as a process;
and the 'culture of the mind' Mas vieMed as a process rather than a
product or achieved state.
In (early) modern use 'culture' became, like
'civilized', a condition. Only Mith the 'fourth modern development did
culture appear as ' the Mho 1e May of life, material, intellectual and
spiritual of a given society' (p.273), i.e., as a comprehensive social
paradigm. The other forms, the first three developments, Mere restricted
versions of this, to respectively the individual, intellectual and moral
parts, and arts and intellectual areas.
To invert the ahistorical explanatory patte^,
so to say, the inherited cu1tures of science?
scientific paradigms are,
However the reversal makes it easier to qet some grip on
art and technology.
the very rich process-product complex that a culture comprises.
example, goes astray in settling for a process definition of
Bonner,
for
'culture'* allied
to the education-derived sense: 'By culture I mean the transfer of information
by
most
means,
behavioural
by the process
particularly
of
teaching
and
Hhile the definition certainly achieves its intended objective of
learning*.
including animal culture^,
it is, as already remarked, a quite excessively low
redefinition,
such
accounting
things as semaphoring between boy
scouts
as
c u 1 t u r e.
There is a further dimension of complexity so far largely omitted through
restriction
pure
most contemporary states are far from culturally pure, comprising a
cultures,
mixture
1-lhile tribal groups may have relatively
to pure cultures.
of peoples.and cultures.
represented
More generally,
an n-cultural society
by a system of n paradigms adhered to in the society.
6
multi
6
multi
cultural
society
is thus an n-cultural society where n is
cultural
society
may
simply
Australia,
not
include
however be
very
many.
it
pluralistic;
may,
groups of people from different cultures
under some dominant culture which controls
in one region
together
is
as
in
brought
the
main
Much depends then on the type of system of paradigms
political institutions.
involved, on how the paradigms are themselves interrelated and structured.
Ft
society
nil!
function
(cf.
Abraham,
p.lbff.,
incompatible with extreme individualism').
a variety of subcultures.
Mhich
is
not
Characteristically
and
commonly
For culture is the glue of a group;
competing cultures.
integrative
always have a culture,
several
perhaps
it has an important
who remarks that 'culture
is
Ft society wi 1 1 also typically have
f) subculture is a paradigm, included in a culture,
sufficiently
subcultures
comprehensive
to
rank
as
a
share norms and assumptions with some
culture.
larger
culture except where they diverge.
The
dominant
cultures
in countries like Australia and America
can
be
as having tree structures.
represented
a
is
there
Subcultures
mainstream
century
gentry
Protestant
many
subcultural
long played significant parts in
have
last
example,
Mi th
culture,
differences
the
terms,
116
tributaries.
Transposing to river-network
between
Catholic,
extensive immigration program,
substantial social tolerance,
with
and
chai 1enged.
Alternative
critical
important
an
As a result
assumptions
along
and
that is, the cultural streams remain
of the
mainstream
culture
are
not
those
of
Australia) do however is to criticise and challenge themes of the
accommodate,
These
within
too a pluralistic (a plural paradigm) society
provided the social paradigms present
limits,
no
can
real
to overarching socio-political arrangements and the prevailing type of
threat
structure (if they should however things would have to give or
power
of
complex
permit the relatively easy formation
rival and al ternative social paradigms (such as
Hhat
culture.
dominant
and
Australia now boasts a much more
persistence of subcultures - so long as,
subcu1tures
Protestant
Flexible multi-cultural arrangements,
of ethnic subcultures.
pattern
for
of Australian colonial culture had
streams
bearing on leisure activities such as gambling (see Inglis).
its
history;
Australian
change;
rival river networks are bound to alter the cultural landscape).
like
Cultures,
explaining
illustrated
that
and
paradigms,
social
inducing social change.
explanatory roles.
repudiation
nature',
important
role
on
the
that is,
For example,
in RP).
It is worth
that
it
noticing
to
Philp criticises for Foucault
prevents
him
from
consistent
explaining
in
and
human
culture can replace nature
of the human subject and the denial of a
ground
both
So much has already been shown
as regards social paradigms (e.g.
nature have been supposed mandatory;
'his
an
can also afford explanatory roles in cases where appeal
they
social
have
in
for
human
directed
116. A subculture of a given culture is itself a culture (i.e. a comprehensive
social paradigm) applying to a subgroup of the given wider culture,
which agrees with the wider culture on characterising (paradigmatic)
features but which may diverge, and typically does, by virtue of further
cultural features, i.e. features in its paradigm.
A subculture stands
then technically to a culture as a subalgebra stands to an algebra, etc.
4^
resistance or social struggle for the better.
explain
a
and justify such resistance 'requires that Me make some commitment to
conception
of the human good and this usually rests on some vieM of
nature and human subjectivity'*.
the
to
social
good
as
human
a.May;
The modifier 'usually' gives the game
route can circuit through culture.
justificatory
directed
Accordingly to Philp t.p.17.!, to
discerned
under
a
The struggle
regional
can
paradigm;
be
the
commitments can be cultural.
The
main real Mork of this paper,
descriptive
some
attempt
of relevant features of the different cultures
at
explanation
has
been
contrasted,
Mith
like much Mork on culture,
of more unexpected features
of
the
cultures,
concerned, some criticism, and some attempt to explain some cultural traits in
terms of others.
enterprise,
cultures
only
This, like the modelling account, points to a more difficult
broached:
investigated,
namely,
the
task of providing theories of
and so perhaps explaining Mhat pulls
them
the
together,
makes them tick, gives them their distinctive shape and grip, and so on.
APPENDIX 2:
Contemporary scientific redeployment of human nature
attempts of this sort are based on the modern evolutionary synthesis, and
in
appear
extreme
most
form
in
sociobiology.
t'jas
it
However
quickly
recognised that (opportunistic) sociobioligical attempts, such as Nilson's, to
to rule out significant political
117
narrow social alternatives fail.
redeploy
nature
human
underlying characterisation of human nature is
Nilson's
from the main socio-political tradition.
the
[is!
of
set
full
behavioural
possibilities
innate
Li.e.
very
and
different
'In the broader sense, human nature
genetic
or
genetically-determined]
predispositions that characterise the human species;
and in
the
narrower sense, those predispositions that affect social behaviour' t.pp.217-8,
mith
It is not constant or static,
rearrangement).
It is certainly ahistorical,
(sub)species
read
disease
patterns
conjunctively
however the ambiguity in the characterisation of
is resolved.
nature - hardly a set,
disjunctively it
only
n'ill include the full
humans
since genes may mutate.
are liable to
set
suffer;
For if the definition
of
if
is
genetically-determined
read,
those every (normal) human is bound to
less
undergo
plausibly,
at
some
stage.
In any event, such sets are remote from Enlightenment political concerns,
thouph, like health and disease more generally, socially relevant enough;
they
hardly
alternatives.
appear
to
Moreover,
impose
they
significant
offer
constraints
on
no bulwark against racial or
and
political
cultural
and since by no means
118
everything is determined genetically e.g. languages of some cultures.
relativity,
since
races have separate gene subpools,
117. f^s this is a commonplace vie^j,
Singer and especially Pigden.
there is no need to labour it:
see Ruse,
determinism is simply one, and perhaps even the weakest, of
forms of determinism intended to vastly reduce
cultural
variability.
Nilson does not rely on that form exclusively, but helps
himself to other incompatible forms of determinism as suit^: see p.207.
118. Genetic
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1
On the notion of culture and cultural pluralism
APPENDIX 1:
Definitions of culture abound;
all
unfortunately, with very few exceptions,
Many are too narrow,
are bad.
for example chauvmistica! ly restricting
culture to human groups (as Kamenka's appalling motto, 'nothing human is alien
p.7); some are too broad, for example making any sort of organisation
to me' ,
as a trade union or a local brass band) a culture,
such
to
serve
connect
problems:- High
redefinitions
of
cu1ture
with [a peoples'] artistic achievement or, even more
lil
with (their) literature.
This is nion culture, at least insofar
culture
EaJ
narrowly,
as
the types of
indicate
A few examples w 11 1
what is included is class restricted,
to certain class-approved
products
and performances (e.g. opera, ballet, drama as opposed to reggae, punk, etc.).
Mhile high redefinitions let in too little,
So
is with the definition of culture as 'the transfer of
it
behavioural means,
(Bonner
Mi th
low redefinitions admit too much.
p.l'J),
culture.
information
most particularly by the process of teaching and learning'
because that includes much that has nothing especially to
For
by
example,
number of bricks on a site,
relaying a weather forecast or passing on
transfers information by behavioural
means,
do
the
but
information of no particular cultural relevance. .
By
contrast,
For
culture.
Herskovits:
most definitions mark out something which roughly overlaps
example,
culture
Awa
settleEsJ
for
the
definition
is "the man-made part of the environment"
offered
...'
by
(p.2'?).
Not only is this inadmissibly anthropocentric, excluding animal cultures (such
as
Bonner
writers
studies)
imagine);
and extraterrestrial cultures (such
but
worse,
as
science-fiction
this twisted definition appears to
render
a
ill. Thus, for example, Stephenson
throughout his iconoclastic book on
Australian culture.
The equation, with literary texts, like that of a
paradigm
with central texts,
is useful in offering a
material
representation of a culture. 'For there is something solid that can be
grasped and presented.
Similary, money, newspapers and motor cars,
afford material artefacts and museum exhibits of wider popular cultures.
deserted
toMn or ancient rums a culture (rather
mining
of
manifestation
a
than
past culture) Mhile excluding a system
the
of
physical
and
beliefs
values as a culture (unless an erroneous theory of systems of propositions
invoked).
In
is
latching onto the physical exemplification it is moreover like
Kuhn's identification of a text-book Mith a paradigm.
there is much in common between the notion of culture and
Indeed
liberal extension of the notion of paradigm,
one of Mhich gamed currency
^nglo-Psmerican thought about a hundred years later than the other.
have
in
Both terms
been used to cover an apparently diverse range of things (and criticised
dismissed for doing just that),
or
Kuhn's
and both do this m rather similar
because both attempt to capture types of conceptual schema.
parallels
suggest
- certainly once the useful notion of a
Midely adopted m sociology,
Mays,
Nhat is more the
social
paradigm,
been encountered and Morked Mith - a common
has
notion.
Nith but little reflection,
from
then,
a rather different account of culture
the run of anthropological definitions straightaMay emerges:- & culture,
or more exactly a pure culture,
advantage of this definition,
is a comprehensive socia! paradigm.
and part of its appeal,
R great
is that the hard
Mork
involved
in rectifying the notion of paradigm has already been done (e.g.
RP)
thus
and
parallel
m
the
supplied
system, i.e. on
a
logical sense;
generous
by
but
the
clean-up
Mould
that is,
an elaborate interpretation
relational
structure.
it
is
function
Naturally it is
a
theoretical
on
a
required
fai thfu1 to Mhat (the social forms, activities and so on) it models.
paradigm,
m
contrast
to
a scientific paradigm,
propositional structure delivered,
is
many
that of a social group.
sketched
take
Recall that a paradigm is explicated as a mode!.
form for culture.
precisely
structure
does not have to be repeated;
m
is a paradigm
general
to
be
Ps social
Mhere
the
the political themes and value judgements,
Group cohesiveness in fact is guaranteed in
examples of such social paradigms (several reproduced
in
the
RP)
because actual groups Mith distinctive cultures are taken; but the theoretical
explanation
goes
structure.
The
deeper
and
depends on features of
underlying
the
of propositional structure delivered
types
are
model
in
shoMn,
capsule form, in the first table of this paper contrasting parts of mainstream
other more detailed examples are reproduced
American and Philippine cultures;
in theoretical Mork
social paradigms (e.g. PP, CPE, Cotgrove and references
cited therein).
Just
expl 1 cat ion
the
as
of
paradigm
of
May
by
models
enabled
a
clarification and unification .job to be done on the giant conceptual mess that
the
of paradigm had become,
notion
facilitates a pleasing and simplifying synthesis.
how
complaint
his
Geertz
to
Consider,
about,
complains
diffusion by pointing to the
about
in
definitions of culture to similes and metaphors,
desperation,
as
...
map,
a
resort
Kluckholn
Geertz Minds
in
attempted
to the analogies ''perhaps in
mere
before a
and as a matrix'*,
as a sieve,
cu1ture
illustrate,
but in anthropology more generally, can be reduced.
especially,
up
diffusion'*
'theoretical
the
of
so the parallel explication
paragraph later, offering his OMn metaphor of culture as a web of significance
or interpretation (and model too,
its
in metaphor).
roots
though here an exact technical notion,
Rs it happens,
Geertz"'s account is not too
has
bad
a
picture of the sort of logical model involved, that is of a system, a Meb-like
structure, Mith an interpretation
imposed,
matrix
both a map and a
The other similes are hoMever more exact:
on it.
function
can
function, supplying significance or meaning
as
models (though not
usually
social
ones),
map
a
typically modelling a landscape.
Furthermore,
take up Kluckholn'* s elaboration on culture (not
to
really
'definitions' as Geertz suggests), a model is indeed '(4) "an abstraction from
behaviour'"',
thinking,
hoMever
Mhich,
and
feeling
is
not
prescriptively
Mhere
believing'" in terms of items
merely descriptive,
as,
supplies '(3) "a May of
it is a social paradigm,
'*('?)
"a
validated.
but Mill be applied
mechanism
for
the
and
normative
can
The
model
be
regulation
read
of
and "(10) "a set of techniques -tor- adjusting both to the externa!
behaviour'"'
environment and to other men"''. Such a mode!, which does correspond to '(5) "a
theory
the part of the anthropologist about the way in which a
on
peop!e m fact behave'"' and their view of the world,
orientations,
it is
. Since the social paradigm evolves over time,
'(11) "a precipitate of history'"',
of
certainly affords '(6) a
"structure of pooled learning'"' and '(7) "a set of standardized
to recurrent problems'".
group
and it does record '(2) "the social legacy
the individual Ein the society! acquires from his group"'.
three parts or levels of a culture that Conga!ton and David
The
(p.22 ff.) are similar to those Kuhn includes within a paradigm,
by
supplied
readily
a model.
They
are,
first,
the
discern
and likewise
general
rules
and
procedures characterising and controlling the behaviour of adherents; secondly
the ideas and values behind these beliefs and procedures; thirdly the products
and
exemplars
material
resulting,
e.g.
interpretation function validates both themes and rules;
of objects,
domains
The
The
newspapers.
textbooks,
as well it
including values and ideas (on both see
connection with exemplars and artefacts is less direct,
RP,
delivers
pp.12-16).
and of more than
Pt textbook may present a paradigm or, more likely, part of one; or
112
it may, like an artefact, supply or be a partial mode!ling of the paradigm.
one kind.
The
order
culture
remaining
reflect
to
has
life-forms
done.
Thus
to
of
qualifying term comprehensive is
some of the slackness of the
notion
of
culture.
cover a sufficiently comprehensive part of life
a community,
Abraham,
vague
deliberately
for one,
klhile
styles
there are varying degrees to which this
can
and
be
explains various inclusive levels of culture
(pp.12-13) before opting for the most inclusive, under which 'culture is
113
common life of the people'*
and 'includes the whole of the knowledge,
arts,
in
the
the
science, technology, religions, morality, ritual, politics, literature,
112. 6 theory normally has many models, some exact and canonical, some of
which bring out all that holds m the theory but not only what holds
there;
and, more sweepingly still, it has partial models, which
accurately depict part of the theory.
even
etiquette
and
of the mind.
includes
le
narroMer,
In this use [that again of "higher"
mastery
a
'*
scu1pture,
a
seventeenth
a
Under
use of the term however ''culture is limited to Mhat are called
comprehensive,
things
(p.12)114
'
-fashions
Abraham
(p.13).
process
of
conjectures that this use evolved
pauperisation of Mhat
and eighteenth centuries,
and could knoM (p.13).
the
educated
the age of enlightenment,
man
'as
in
a
the
stood for',
Such a person could reflect the Mhole culture in
the
more comprehensive use.
The European vieM of culture, Mhich tends to concentrate on high culture,
is insufficiently comprehensive,
leaving out a crucial aspect of culture,
so
it has been argued, namely attitudes to and approaches to the environment, and
so natural environments largely devoid of man-made features and influences
particular.
in
& fuller picture of environmentally-sensitive culture looks like
this:-
113. (From previous page) See p.21.
Accounts of culture of this very
inclusive, but still unnecessarily anthropic, form are common in the
literature.
Thus, for example, Harris: ''Ft culture is the total socially
acquired life-May or life-style of a group of people
(p.144), their
patterns of behaviour and thought.
Thus, Mith even less qualification,
the first of Kluckholn's eleven definitions of culture (as listed in
Geertz pp.4-5), 'the total May of life of of a people', a definition
repeated in Congalton and David, p.22.
The intended model accordingly
provides a complete representation of life-Mays of members of the
culture.
114. Ft fuller and better account Mhich gets very close to the model-theoretic
analysis, is Kumer's analogous definition of culture:
The
shared
symbolic system Mhich gives meaning
to
human
interactions in a society.
It refers to a society's May of
perceiving, interpreting and expressing things ... it includes
knoMledge, belief-systems, values, norms and ideologies Mhich
enable the members of a society to perceive, organise and interpret
reality ... reality is alMays perceived Mithin an evaluative
frameMork.
Similar too is Tylor's definition of 'culture' in terms of a structure
again: 'Culture or Civilization ... that complex Mhole Mhich includes
knoMledge, belief, art, morals, laM, customs, and any other capabilities
and habits acquired by man as a member of society'. (Primitive Culture
vol. 7, p.7).
So all human societies have a culture, a generalised
paradigm.
It is better to separate out civiliza11on, hoMever, and link
it to its 'root meaning of living in cities'.
PRIORY CULTURE DIRGRRH
sense
of
"culture"',
and
intellectual
where
sociology,
in
order
culture.
artistic
the
practice
takes up the grimary
namely
dictionaries,
Concise English Dictionary),
consists
in
putJ
of
and as presented
culture of a society is said to comprise
a given culture,
state
the
as it is
tor development,
' the
of
a
in
shared
It is important to separate off *
particular, the
in
in which the culture comprises the community,
and the educa11on-der1ved sense,
the training or discipline in or
groun
or people with,
leading
in which the
to
Evidently the explication, which makes the product primary
the historical order,
so on,
in
to set aside - some derivative senses,
sharing,
culture
offered
values and beliefs' of the society.
der ived sense,
or
as
or people' (cf.
community
norms,
through social paradigms,
explication so -far,
The
a
given
reverses
the culture, like agriculture, viticulture, and
115
was first and foremost a process
, a "cultivation" of intellect and
where
115. Rs Williams explains, the early meaning of 'culture'' was as a process;
and the ''culture of the mind' was viewed as a process rather than a
product or achieved state.
In (early) modern use 'culture' became, like
'civilized'', a condition. Only with the 'fourth modern development did
culture appear as 'the whole way of life, material, intellectual and
spiritual of a given society* (p.273), i.e., as a comprehensive social
paradigm. The other forms, the first three developments, were restricted
versions of this, to respectively the individual, intellectual and moral
parts, and arts and intellectual areas.
To invert the ahistorical explanatory patten^
so to say, the inherited cu1tures of science.
scientific paradigms are,
art and technology.
However the reversal makes it easier to get some grip on
the very rich process-product complex that a culture comprises.
example, goes astray in settling for a process definition of
Bonner,
for
allied
'culture
to the education-derived senses ''By culture I mean the transfer of information
by
behavioural
particularly
most
means,
of
by the process
teaching
and
Nhile the definition certainly achieves its intended objective of
learning*',
it is, as already remarked, a quite excessively low
including animal culture^
accounting
redefinition,
such
things as semaphoring between boy
scouts
as
culture.
There is a further dimension of complexity so far largely omitted through
restriction
pure
most contemporary states are far from culturally pure, comprising a
cultures,
mixture
Mhile tribal groups may have relatively
to pure cultures.
More generally,
of peoples and cultures.
represented
an n-cultural society
by a system of n paradigms adhered to in the society.
&
multi
ft
multi
cultural
society
is thus an n-cultural society where n is
cultural
society
may
simply
Australia,
not
include
however be
very
many.
pluralistic;
it
as
may,
groups of people from different cultures
under some dominant culture which controls
in one region
together
is
in
brought
main
the
Much depends then on the type of system of paradigms
poli tical institutions.
involved, on how the paradigms are themselves interrelated and structured.
Ps
society
will
function
(cf.
Abraham,
p.lbff.,
incompatible with extreme individualism').
a variety of subcultures.
which
is
not
Characteristically
and
commonly
For culture is the glue of a group;
competing cultures.
integrative
always have a culture,
several
perhaps
it has an important
who remarks that
culture
is
society will also typically have
R subculture is a paradigm, included in a culture,
sufficiently
subcultures
comprehensive
to
rank
as
a
share norms and assumptions with some
culture.
larger
culture except where they diverge.
The
dominant
cultures
in countries like Australia and America
can
be
is
there
Subcultures
with
many
century
gentry
the
differences
terms,
11.S
tributaries.
subculture!
hong played significant parts in
have
last
Protestant
culture,
mainstream
a
example,
Transposing to river-network
as having tree structures.
reoresented
between
Catholic,
extensive immigration program,
pattern
of ethnic subcultures.
important
As a result
complex
accommodate,
and
that is, the cultural streams remain
of the
mainstream
culture
are
not
those
of
These
within
too a pluralistic (a plural paradigm) society
provided the social paradigms present
limits,
can
no
real
to overarching socio-political arrangements and the prevailing type of
threat
structure (if they should however things would have to give or
power
along
permit the relatively easy formation
assumptions
of
Australia) do however is to criticise and challenge themes of the
culture.
dominant
an
rival and alternative social paradigms (such as
k-lhat
chai 1enged.
Al ternative
critical
and
and
Australia now boasts a much more
persistence of subcultures - so long as,
subcultures
Protestant
Flexible multi-cultural arrangements,
substantial social tolerance,
with
for
of Australian colonial culture had
streams
bearing on leisure activities such as gambling (see Inglis),
its
history;
lustra!ian
change;
rival river networks are bound to alter the r*.;Xural landscape).
Cultures,
explaining
and
illustrated
that
like
paradigms,
social
inducing social change.
explanatory roles.
repudiation
nature",
important
role
on
the
that is,
For example,
in RP).
It is worth
that
it
noticing
to
Philp criticises for Foucault
prevents
him
from
consistent
explaining
in
and
human
culture can replace nature
of the human subject and the denial of a
ground
both
So much has already been shown
as regards social paradigms (e.g.
nature have been supposed mandatory;
'his
an
can also afford explanatory roles in cases where appeal
they
social
have
in
for
human
directed
IIS, A subculture of a given culture is itself a culture (i.e. a comprehensive
social paradigm) applying to a subgroup of the given wider culture,
which agrees with the wider culture on characterising (paradigmatic)
features but which may diverge, and typically does, by virtue of further
cultural features, i.e. features in its paradigm.
A subculture stands
then technically to a culture as a subalgebra stands to an algebra, etc.
resistance or social struggle tor the better,
explain
a
and justify such resistance 'requires that ^e make some commitment to
conception
of the human good and this usually rests on some vie^j of
human
The modifier 'usually* gives the game
a^ay;
nature and human subjectivity'*.
the
route can circuit through culture.
justificatory
directed
accordingly to Philp (p.17), to
to
social
good
as
under
discerned
a
The struggle
can
paradigm^
regional
be
the
c ommitmen t s c an be cultural.
The
main real ^ork of this paper,
descriptive
some
attempt
like much Mork on culture,
of relevant features of the different cultures
at
explanation
of more unexpected features
has
been
contrasted,
^ith
of
the
cultures
concerned, some criticism, and some attempt to explain some cultural traits in
terms of others.
enterprise,
cultures
only
This, like the modelling account, points to a more difficult
broached:
investigated,
namely,
the
task of providing theories of
and so perhaps explaining ^hat pulls
them
the
together,
makes them tick, gives them their distinctive shape and grip, and so on.
Contemporary scientific redeployment of human nature
APPENDIX 2:
attempts of this sort are based on the modern evolutionary synthesis, and
most
in
appear
extreme
form
in
sociobiology.
However
it
Mas
quickly
recognised that (opportunistic) sociobiol^gical attempts, such as Nilson's, to
nature
human
to rule out significant political
117
narroM social alternatives fail.
redeploy
underlying characterisation of human nature is
Nilson's
from the main socio-political tradition.
[is]
of
set
full
the
possibilities
[i.e,
innate
very
different
'In the broader sense, human nature
genetic
genetically-determinedJ
or
predispositions that characterise the human species;
behavioural
and
and in
the
narrower sense, those predispositions that affect social behaviour'* (pp.217-8,
Mith
It is certainly ahistorical,
read
disjunctively it
disease
hoMever the ambiguity in the characterisation of
nature - hardly a set,
(sub)species
patterns
conjunctively
only
since genes may mutate.
It is not constant or static,
rearrangement).
Mill include the full
humans
For if the definition
is resolved.
are liable to
set
suffer;
of
if
is
genetically-determined
read,
those every (normal) human is bound to
less
undergo
plausibly,
at
some
stage.
In any event, such sets are remote from Enlightenment political concerns,
though, like health and disease more generally, socially relevant enough;
they
hardly
alternatives.
appear
to
Moreover,
impose
they
significant
offer
constraints
on
no bulMark against racial or
and
political
cultural
and since by no means
118
everything is determined genetically e.g. languages of some cultures.
relativity,
since
races have separate gene subpools,
117. Fss this is a commonplace vieM,
Singer^, and especially Pigden.
there is no need to labour it:
see Ruse,
118. Genetic determinism is simply one, and perhaps even the Meakest, of
several
forms of determinism intended to vastly reduce
cultural
variability.
Nilson does not rely on that form exclusively, but helps
himself to other incompatible forms of determinism as suit^: see p.207.
REFERENCES
W.E. Abraham, Ths Mind of Africa, University of lilinois
ess, Litica^o, i-S2.
D, A. Aitkin, ''Mhere does Australia stand?', in Withers, pp.18-31.
Pipers, Maori Myths and Tri ba' Legends, Longman Pau], Auckland, 1984.
N.E. Awa, '"Culture and credibility'", Ceres 16 (5) (1983) 28-38,
E. Best, The Maori, Vol, 1, Tombs, Wellington, 1924,
R. Birrell, D. HiH
Sydney, 1984.
J.T. Bonner,
1980.
.^nd J,
Neville,
Populate and
Perish?,
Fontana/AFC,
The Evolution of Culture in animals, Princeton University Press,
B. Bonney and H.
1983.
Australia's Commercial Media, Macmillan, Melbourne,
Wilson,
8.J. Berry, Human, Hegel and Human Nature, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1982.
J. Cairns, The Quiet Revolution. Widescop^e.^Camberw.elJ^J-Jiotg^^a. 1975^.
8.T, jCald/wel.l., '"The gambling AustraTian.'L^_in Change in Australia (ed.
Edgar), Cheshire, Melbourne, 1974.
D.L.
G.T. Caldwell, '"Leisure', in Davies et.al., pp.410-439.
G.T. Caldwell, '"Some historical and sociological characteristics of Australian
gambling', in Caldwell et.al.
G.T. Caldwell, M. Dickerson, B. Haig and L.
Australia, Croom Helm, Sydney, 1985.
Sylvan (eds.),
Camb' ing—ijl
F. Capra and C. Spretnak, Green Poli tics, Hutchinson, London, 1984.
R.E. Caves and L.8. Krause, The Australian Economy:
George Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1984.
N. Chomsky and E. Herman,
Press, Boston, 1979.
A M1ew from the North,
The Political Economy of Human Rights,
South c.nd
P. Cock, Alternative Australia, Quartet Books, Melbourne, 19/9.
J. Cohen and J. Rogers, On Democracy, Penguin, New York, 1984.
David,
The Individual in the Making, Wiley, Sydney,
A.A.
Congalton andA.E.
1976.
R.W.
Connell, 'Images of Australia in Social Change in Australia
Edgar), Cheshire, Melbourne, 1974.
(ed.
R. W. Connell, Ruling fl ass, Ruling Culture,
S. Cotgrove, Catastrophe or Cornucopia, Wiley, New <ork, 1?87.
G. Crough and T. Wheelwright, Australia: A Client State, Penguin, Australia,
D.
1982.
E. C^llenbach, Ecotopia Emerprng,
A.F. Davies
1985.
and S.
Encel (eds.),
lustra Han Society.,
Melbourne,
Cheshire,
A.F. Davies, S. Encel and M. Berry (eds.), lustra!!an Soci e t y. Third Edition,
Longman Cheshire, Melbourne, 19777.
M.J. Dunphy, Alternative Thoughts, Total Environment Centre, Sydney, 1984.
R. Ely, 'Australian Historians on "Tall
Cultural History 3 (1984) 104-128.
Poppies":
a
survey'',
Austra - i an
B.L. Embury and N. Fodder, ''Economic Welfare in Australia' in Austral i an
Social Issues of the 70"s, (ed. P.R. Nilson), Butterworths, Sydney, 1972.
G. Gaus, The Modern Liberal Theory of 'Man. Croom Helm, London, 1983.
A. Gilbert, 'The state and nature in Australia, Australian Cultural History
1981, (eds. S. Goldberg and F.&Smith), Canberra, 1982, pp.9-28.
R.J. Goldstein,
1978.
Political Repression in Modern America,
N.K. Hancock, Austra! ia. E. 3^.^^
G.K.
Hall,
Boston,
, London, 1930.
M. Harris, Culture, People, Nature. Second edition, Cromwell, 1975.
Hays,
Conservation
and the Gospel of Efficiency:
Conservation Movement. 1390-1920. Cambridge, MA, 1959.
R. Heilbroner,
The Worldly Philosophers.
Schuster, New York, 1987.
3rd
revised
The
Progressive
edit.,
Simon
and
T. Hobbes, Levi athan( ed. M. Oakeshot^, Oxford, 1948.
I. Illich, Des-z h co ling Soc i e t y, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1971.
K.S. Inglis, 'Religious behaviour'*, in A.F. Davies and S.
Australian Society. Cheshire, Melbourne, 1985, pp.43-75.
Encel
(eds.),
K.S. Inglis, 'Gambling and culture^ in Australia'' in Caldwell et.al,
B. Jones, SIeepers Awake'. Oxford University Press, 1982.
E.
Kamenka. 'Culture and Australian culture',
(1984) 7-18.
Australian Cultural History 3
T.S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revo1utions. Second edition, University
of Chicago Press, 1970.
K. Kumar, The Social and Cultural Impact of Transnational Enterprises, Horking
Paper No. 8, ?tRP, University of Sydney, 1979.
R.E. Lane, "Market .justice, political justice'', Hugo Nolfsen Memorial Lecture,
Melbourne, May, 1985.
N. Lini, Keynote address, Australia and the South Pacific. Proceedings of a
Conference held at the Australian National University, 1982.
//3
The following has been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions.
Letter, Alan? (Department of Philosophy, University of Alberta) to Richard Sylvan, 9 Jun 1988 re
feedback on paper. (4 pages)
%/,y
7
Ch
/
<^/
'
C2<
*1-
7
—
On the notion of culture and cultural pluralism
APPENDIX 1:
unfortunately, with very + ew exception s,
Definitions of culture abound;
y
all
Many are too narrow,
3re bad.
cu1ture to human groups (as Kamenka's
p.7) ; some are too broad,
,
brass band) a culture.
as a trade union
(such
problems:- High
serve
connect
EaJ
as
redefinitions
with Ea peoples'] artistic achievement
culture
with (their) literature.
narrowly,
A few examples will
of
cu1ture
even
or,
more
This is high culture, at least insofar
what is included is class restricted,
to certain class-approved
products
and performances (e.g. opera, ballet, drama as opposed to reggae, punk, etc.).
low redefinitions admit too much.
"the transfer of
information
by
process of teaching and learning'
(Bonner
p.10),
because that includes much that has nothing especially to
do
the
number of bricks on a site,
transfers information by behavioural
means,
but
information of no particular cultural relevance.
By
contrast,
most definitions mark out something which roughly overlaps
Awa
'settleEsJ
for
the
definition
by
(p.2?).
"the man-made part of the environment"
Herskovi ts:
offered
this inadmissibly anthropocentric, excluding animal cultures (such
Bonner
as
writers
-f&sl
studies)
imagine);
and extraterrestrial cultures (such
but
as
science-fiction
this twisted definition appears to
worse,
LL't.........
render
throughout his iconoclastic book o
L Thus , for t example, Stephenson
Australian culture.
The equation, with literary texts, like that of
paradigm
with central texts,
is useful in offering a
materia
representation of a culture. For there is something solid that can b
grasped and presented.
Similary, money, newspapers and motor cars
afford material artefacts and museum exhibits of wider popular cultures.
?5
a
deserted
town or ancient ruins a culture (rather
mining
of
manifestation
a
than
past culture) while excluding a system
physical
the
of
beliefs
and
values as a culture (unless an erroneous theory of systems of propositions
invoked).
In
is
latching onto the physical exemplification it is moreover like
Kuhn's identification of a text-book Mith a paradigm.
Indeed
there is much in common between the notion of culture and
Kuhns
one of which'gained currency
Both terms
Rnglo-&merican thought about a hundred years later than the other.
have
or
in
been used to cover an apparently diverse range of things (and criticised
dismissed for doing just that),
and both do this in
Nhat is more the
because both attempt to capture types of conceptual schema.
paradigm,
a common
been encountered and worked Mith
noti on.
then,
from
the run of anthropological definitions straightaway emerges
advan tage of this definition,
i nvo1ved
and
paral1 el
in
and part of its appeal,
is that the hard
work
would
take
in rectifying the notion of paradigm
thus
does not have to be repeated;
form for culture.
precisely
structure
6 great
is a comprehensive social paradigm
or more exactly a pure culture.
RP)
a rather different account of cu1ture
but
c1ean-up
Recal 1 that a paradigm is expli cated as a model,
is
it
the
supplied
the
by
an elaborate interpretation
function
is
a
theoretical
on
required
faithful to what (the social forms, activities and so on) it models,
paradigm,
in
contrast
to
a scientific paradigm,
proposi tional structure delivered,
is
many
that of a social group.
sketched
general
a
is a paradigm
to
be
& social
where
the
the political themes and value .judgements,
Group cohesiveness in fact is guaranteed in
examples of such social paradigms (several reproduced
in
the
RP)
because actual groups with distinctive cultures are taken; but the theoretical
96
explanation
goes
structure.
The
deeper
depends on features of
and
of propositional structure delivered
types
model
underlying
the
are
in
shoMn,
capsule form, in the first table of this paper contrasting parts of mainstream
other more detailed examples are reproduced
American and Philippine cul bares;
in theoretical Mork on social paradigms (e.g. RP, CPE, Cotgrove^and references
cited therein).
Just
as
the
of
explication
by
paradigm
May
of
models
enabled
a
clarification and unification .job to be done on the giant conceptual mess that
the
of paradigm had become,
notion
so the parallel explication
in
abou t,
but in anthropology more generally, can be reduced.
especially,
up
his
c^.\tu,rg.
Kluckholn
Geertz Minds
attempted
in
resor t
diffusion by pointing to the
about
complaint
of
and^r metaphors, to the analogies 'perhaps in
as
desperation,
a map*,
and as a matrix',
as a sieve,
before
a
mere
paragraph later, offering his OMn metaphor of culture as a Meb of significance
' ' too,
'
, though here an exact technical notion, has
or interpretation (and model
its roots in metaphor]^ Rs it happen^Geertz^/ account is not too bad a picture
of the sort of logical model involved
structure^Mith an interpretation
imposed,
typically
on it.
that is of a system, a Meb-like
function,
supplying signifi'-arn.e -r meaning
The other similes are hoMever more exact:
modelling
a
landscape.
Furthermore,
elaboration of) culture (not really 'definitions
is indeed '(4) "an abstraction from behaviour"',
paradigm,
supplies '(3) "a May of thinking,
of items validated.
to
take
ooth a map and a.
up
as Geertz suggests),
a model
Mhere it is a social
Mhich,
feeling and believing"
The model hoMever is not merely descriptive,
applied and can be read prescriptively as,
Kluckholn s
in rerm=.
but Mill be
('?) "a mechanism for the normative
regulation of behaviour"' and '(10) "a set of techniques for adjusting both to
the
external
environment
and to other
97
men'".
Such
a
model,
Mhich
does
2
to '(5) "a theory on the part of the anthropologist about the
correspond
in
group of people in fact behave'" and their vieM
a
Mhich
'*(4) a "structure of pooled learning'"' and
affords
certainly
of
standardized orientations, to recurrent problems'"'.
^ay
Morld,
the
(7) "a set
of
Since the social paradigm
it
does
1egacy the individual [in the society] acquires
from
is ''(11) "a precipitate of
history'",
and
his group'"
discern
of a culture that Conga!ton and David
three parts or
The
Kuhn includes
readily
supplied
They
a model.
by
are,
procedures characterising and controlling the behaviour of adherents; secondly
procedures; thirdly the products
and
exemplars
material
resulting,
e.g.
interpretation function validate^! both themes
The
connection Mi th exemplars and artefacts is^e^^ direct,
RP,
The
delivers
as Mel lit
including values and ideas (on both see
of objects,
domains
neMspapers.
textbooks,
pp.12-16).
and of more than
3 textbook may present a paradigm^^or^more likely, part of one; or
on^ kind.
it may, like an artefact, supply or be a partial modelling of the paradigm.
remaining
The
culture
life-forms
done.
to
has
Thus
of
qualifying term comprehensive is
cover a sufficiently comprehensive part of life
a community,
Rbraham,
vague
deliberately
styles
there are varying degrees to Mhich this
for one,
can
and
be
explains various inclusive levels of
7 '
(pp.12-13) before opting for tbe most inclusive, under Mhich 'culture is
If§'
and 'includes the Mhole of the knoMledge,
common life of the people
arts,
in
the
the
science, technology, religions, morali ty, ri tual, politics, literature,
ttTP*. & theory normally has many models, some exact and canonical, some of
__
Mhich bring, out
all that holds in the theory but not only Mhat holds
i s i ngTy stil Impartial models, Mhich ac-e a'-'_urately
there; and, more surpr -----depict part of the theory. )
98
ULk
etiquette
fashions
...'
of
eighteenth
pauperisation
centuries,
Such
(p.13).
narrower,
a
Under
In this use [that again of "higher"
of the mind.
includes a mastery of all literature,
process
(p.12)
^ess
use of the term however 'culture is limited to Mhat are caned
comprehensive,
things
and
a
of Mhat the educated man in
cou 1 d
culture
history, music, painting and sculpture,
the age of enlightenment ,
person
culture],
reflect
the
the
s even teen th
stood for',
Mho i e
culture
and
and could knoM
in
the
more
c ompr eh en s i ve u se.
The European vieM of culture, Mhich tends to concentrate on high t.u = ture,
is insufficiently comprehensive,
leaving out a crucial aspect of culture,
so
it has been argued, namely attitudes to and approaches to the environment, and
so natural environments largely devoid of man-made features and influences
particular.
in
R fuller picture of environmentally-sensitive culture looks like
this:11^-. (From previous page) See p.21.
Accounts of culture of
.;!i= very
inclusive, but still unnecessarily anthropic, form are common in the
. __ literature.
Thus, for example, Harris: 'A culture is the total socially
acquired life-May or life-style of a group of people*
(p.144), their
patterns of behaviour and thought.
Thus, Mith even less qualification,
the first of Kluckholn's eleven definitions of culture (as listed in
Geertz pp.4-5), 'the total may of life of of a people', a definition
repeated in Congalton and David, p.22.
The intended model accordingly
provides a complete representation of life-Mays of members of the
cul tur-e.
111^ Ft fuller and better account Mhich gets very close to the model-theoretic
analysis, is Kumer's analogous definition of culture:
The
shared
symbolic system Mhich gives meaning
to
human
interactions in a society.
It refers to a society s May of
perceiving, interpreting and expressing things ... it in'„lude=>
knowledge, belief-systems, values, norms and ideologies Mhich
enable the members of a society to perceive, organise and interpret
reality ... reality is always perceived Mithin an evaluative
framework.
Similar too is Tylor's definition of 'culture' in terms of a structure
again: 'Culture or Civilization ... that complex MholeMhich includes
knowledge, belief, art, morals, laM, customs, and any other capabilities
and habits acquired by man as a member of society'. (Primitive Culture
vol. 7, p.7).
So all human societies have a culture, a generalised
paradigm.
It is better to separate out civi1ization, however, and link
it to its 'root meaning of living in cities .
religions, morality, ritual, politics, literature, even etiquette and fashions
is
'culture
use
limited
to
Mhat
are called
things
of
mind.
the
In
this
[that
history,
con.jec tures
that
music,
this
painting and sculpture,/^..' (p.13),
use
evolved
'as
a
result
of
Rbraham^.
of
a / process
^7 /J
cen turles,
he age of enlightenment, stood for'', and could knoM (p.13).
Such
a per son could reflect the Mhole culture in the more comprehensive use.
The European vieM of culture, Mhich tends to concentrate on high culture,
is insufficiently comprehensive,
it
has been argued,
natural
environments
leaving out a crucial aspect of culture,
namely attitudes to and approaches to
the
largely devoid of man-made features and
so
environment,
influences
in
/Recounts of culture of this very inclusive form but still unnecessari
an thropic form, are common m the literature* ^hus^for example^Harris:
<R culture is the total socially acquired life-May or life-style of
a group of people' (p.144), their patterns of behaviour and
though t.
Thus, Mith even less qualification, the first of Kluckholn's eleven
definitions of culture ^listed m Geertz pp.4-5),
the total May of life
of a peopled a definition repeated in
and David^p.22. lhe
model ^provides a complete representation o+ life-Mays of members of the
R fuller and better account^Mhich gets very ejase to^ the model-theoretic
analysis^ ig Kiernan's analogous definition of jculturq:
The
shared
symbolic system Mhich gives meaning
to
human
interactions in a society.
It refers to a society's May of
perceiving, interpreting and expressing things ... it includes
knoMledge, belief-systems, values, norms and ideologies Mhich
enable the members of a society to perceive, organise and interpret
reality ... reality is alMays perceived Mithin an evaluative
frameMork.
Similar too is
Taylor's definition of 'culture' in terms of a
structure again: 'Culture or Civilization ... that complex Mhole Mhich
includes knoMledge, belief, art, morals, laM, customs, and any other
capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society'.
(Primitive Culture vol. 7, p.7). So al 1 human societies have a culture,
a generalised paradigm.
It is better to separate out c iyi l,i zat 1 on,
hoMever, and i-t—nc-sep%'e/. +<sf? its 'root meaning of living in cities'.
PRIMARY CULTURE DIAGRAM
sense
of
"'culture'',
intellectual
sociology,
in
and
mhere
order
culture.
artistic
the
,
*
practice
takes up the primary
namely
lor development,
Con c i se English 0 i c t i on ary) ,
in
-state
put]
in
a
in
shared
"the
particular, the
group-
or people mith,
and the education-derived sense,
leading
in mhich the
to
Evidently the explication, mhich makes the product primary
a
given
reverses
like agriculture, viticulture, and
the culture,
mas first and foremost a process
of
It is important to separate off -
the training or discipline in or
mhere
of
and as presented
culture of a society is said to comprise
a given culture,
consists
"the
as it is
in mhich the culture comprises the community,
the historical order,
so on,
dictionaries,
in
to set aside - some derivative senses,
sharing,
culture
offered
values and beliefs"' of the society.
derived sense,
or
as
or people"' (cf.
community
norms,
through social paradigms,
explication so -far,
The
,
a "cultivation" of intellect and
11^ As Mi 11 iams explains, the ear 1 y meaning of "culture"' mas as a process;
and the "culture of the mind" mas viemed as a process rather than a
product or achieved state.
In (early) modern use "culture" became, like
'civilized"', a condition.
Onlp^the "fourth modern development" did
culture appear as "the mhole may of life, material, intellectual and
spiritual of a given society"' (p.273), i.e., as a comprehensive social
paradigm.
The other forms, the first three developments^mere restricted
versions of this, to respectively the individual, intellectual and moral
parts, and arts and intellectual areas.
,
r.
To invent the ahistorical explanatory pattern, scientific paradigms are,
so to say, the inherited cu1tures of science.
100
However the reversal makes it easier- to get some grip on
art and technology.
the very rich process-product complex that a culture comprises.
example, goes astray in settling for a process definition of
for
Bonner,
allied
'culture
to the education-derived sense: "'By culture I mean the transfer of information
by
means,
behavioural
by the process
particularly
most
of
and
teaching
Hhile the definition certainly achieves its intended objective of
learning'.
including (cultures'^ an7maC^g%p&,
excessively
it is,
as already
remarked,
a
accounting such things as semaphoring
loM redefinition,
quite
between
boy scouts as culture.
There is a further dimension of complexity so far largely omitted through
restriction
pure
most contemporary states are far from culturally pure, comprising a
cultures,
mixture
Nhile tribal groups may have relatively
to pure cultures.
of peoples and cultures.
represented
More generally,
an n-cultural society
by a system of n paradigms adhered to in the society.
&
multi
&
multi
cultural
society
is thus an n-cultural society Mhere n is
cultural
society
may
Australia,
simply
not
include
however be
very
many.
it
pluralistic;
as
may,
in
brought
groups of people from different cultures
under some dominant culture Mhich controls
in one region
together
is
the
main
Much depends then on the type of system of paradigms
political institutions.
involved, on hoM the paradigms are themselves interrelated and structured.
Pt
society
Mill
function
(cf.
Ptbraham,
p.l5ff.,
incompatible Mith extreme individualism ).
a variety of subcultures.
is
Mhich
not
Characteristically
and
commonly
For culture is the glue of a group;
competing cultures.
integrative
alMays have a culture,
several
perhaps
it has an important
Mho remarks that
culture
is
Pt society Mill also typically have
Pt subculture is a paradigm, included in a culture,
sufficiently
subcultures
comprehensive
to
rank
as
a
share norms and assumptions Mith some
culture.
larger
culture except Mhere they diverge.
The
dominant
cultures
in countries like Australia and Ptmerica
101
can
be
as having tree structures.
represented
a
is
there
Subcultures
century
gentry
Protestant
many
the
between
differences
terms,.
1 1^
tribu.ari!=''=.
subcultural
long played significant parts in
have
last
example,
with
culture,
mainstream
Transposing to river-network
Australian
L-athoXc,
extensive immigration program,
of ethnic subcultures.
pattern
with
critical
challenged.
and
an
o?
As a result
complex
aiong
permit the relatively easy formation
assumptions
and
that is, the cultural streams remain
of the
mainstream
culture
rival and alternative social paradigms (such as
Plhat
important
Australia now boasts a much more
persistence of subcultures - so long as,
and
Protestant
Flexible multi-cultural arrangements,
substantial social tolerance,
subcultures
f'-tr
of Australian colonial culture had
streams
bearing on leisure activities such as gambling (see Inglis?.
its
history;
are
n^t
those
of
the
Al ternative
These
culture.
dominant
accommodate,
within
too a pluralistic (a plural paradigm) society
provided the social paradigms present
limits,
r^m
no
to overarching socio-political arrangements and the prevailing type of
threat
structure (if they should however things would have to give or
P'Ower
tan
t-ha^ge,
rival river networks are bound to alter the cultural landscape).
Cultures,
explaining
and
illustrated
that
like
they
social
paradigms,
inducing social change.
'his
important
role
in RP).
It is worth
can also afford explanatory roles in cases where appeal
explanatory roles.
repudiation
nature',
an
on
the
that is,
For example,
that
it
noticing
to
Philp criticises for Foucault
prevents
him
from
i_on = i = .en.
explaining
in
and
human
culture can replace nature
of the human subject and the denial of a
ground
both
So much has already been shown
as regards social paradigms (e.g.
nature have been supposed mandatory;
social
have
in
for
numaf;
directed
11^). A subculture of a given culture is itself a culture (i.e. a comprehensive
social paradigm) applying to a subgroup of the given wider culture,
which agrees with the wider culture on characterising (paradigma.i'-)
\
features but which may diverge, and typically does, by virtue of further
cultural features, i.e. features in its paradigm.
A subculture stands
102
resistance or social struggle for the better.
explain
a
and .justify such resistance 'requires that Me make some commitment to
conception
of the human good and this usually rests on some vieM of
human
The modifier "usually"' gives the game
aMay;
nature and human subjectivity"'.
the
Accordingly to Philp tp.i7), to
route can circuit through culture.
justificatory
directed
social
to
as
good
discerned
under
a
The struggle
can
paradigm;
regional
be
the
commitments can be cultural.
has
been
descriptive of relevant fea^f tures of the different cultures
contrasted.
Mi th
some
of
The
attempt
concerned,
in
main
terms
A
Mork
at
this paper,
of
explanation
like much Mork
on
culture,
of more unexpected features
the
cu1tures
some criticism, and some attempt to explain some cu1tural
of others.
This,
like the modelling account,
points to
a
more
difficult enterprise, only broached: namely, the task of providing theories of
the
cultures formufsrfed,
and so perhaps explaining Mhat pulls them together,
makes them tick, gives them their shape and grip, and so on.
A
103
/ .<
/ /
Contemporary scientific redeployment of human nature
APPENDIX 2:
Attempts
evolutionary
of this sort are based on the moder^tn
synthesis,
and appear in most extreme form in sociobiology.
r
/e cc^"i A r
)
% Sociobioldoical attempts, such as Nilson's, to redeploy human nature to
A
j '
1
a]t I er natives fail.
rule out ^political possibilities and narroM social ajtli,
A
underlying
Wilson's
characterisation of human nature is very different
the main socio-political tradition.
the
full set of innate Ei.e.
those
sense,
and
in
nature.*- hardly
set.'
a
the
hoMever
is
(pp.217-8,
For
the
definition
if
socially
relevant
b5t
subpools,
and
or
since
cultural
relativity,
since
stage.J^ In
any
though, like health more
they hardly
significant constraints on political alternatives.
racial
disease
less plausibly, conjunctively
if read,
enough;
of
read
is
Mill inclue the full set of genetically-determined
it
It is
characterisation
^b^Vare remote from Enlightenment concerns,
against
Mith
the
those every (normal) human is bound to undergo at some
generally,
narrower
ambiguity in
resolved.
patterns humans are liable to suffer;
event,
the
It is not constant or static, since genes may mutate.
ahistorical,
only
behavioural
genetic or genetically-determinedJ
predispositions that affect social behaviour'
rearrangement).
disp^M^tively
'* In the broader- sense, human nature Ei-sJ
characterise the human species;
that
predispositions
from
appear
to
impose
Moreover, i*t—is no bulwark
races
separate
have
by no means everything is determined
gene
genetically^ e.g.
language^of some culture).
there is no need to labour it:
see Ruse,
'*1-
As this is a commonplace vieM,
Singer and especially Pigden.
11^
Genetic determinism is simply one, and perhaps^ the M^kest, of several
forms of determinism intended to vastly reduce cultural variability.
Nilson does not rely on that form exclusively: see p.207.
AtPijol/ /o
)
104
y
*
y
o
situation of certaintg such as the eLementarg choLce situationi affords,
expectation vaLues drop out. Then, as under the maximaLLtg criteri^, R is the
rat LonaL choLce under this utiLitg criterion; B cannot be^a rat LonaL oho Lee,
it
is^)--------------------
The same argument, Lf correct, ref'ute^Bages^anism. For, as Suppes c La Lms,
the Bayesian posLtLon Leads to the oversLL sLngte prLncLpLe of ra t Lona L i tg, the
principLe of maximizing expected utLLLtg: One action or decision shouLd be
chosen over another Lf^ the expected utLLLtg of the fLrst Ls at L'east as great
as that of the second, ... (p.178).^
_
(p.178)." ((The arguments
aLso eawt&r princ ip Les,
such as that
criter ia^
of
sure
thing,
appeaLed
to
in
derivations
of
maximization
Satisizing, doLng-MLth-enough, counters the orthodox rat LonaLitg axioms;
satisficing, doing-as-Meii-as-can-be-in-the-circumstances, does not. Satisficing
is constrained maximization; the satisficer, organisation man on bimon s
picture, aiMags chooses the maximum from among aLternatLves aireadg enumerated,
and so in the eLementrg diagram chooses R, not B (as satisizers mag), inere is
aLready a Literature at pains to point out that satisficing does not int^ fer^
Mith the rationatitu axioms.— though that it does not Mas^ cLear enough from
Limited rationaiitg^ Thus, for exampLe, Riker and Ordeshook
turn^g
criticisms of the principle of maximizing expected utiLitg on satisficing
qrounds, ^d bu arguing (incorrectLg) that in aLL pr^cticaL cases maximizing snd
satisficing r^^ease identicai^ appeat tMice to Simon s authoritg:
MhLLe some enthusiasts have misinterpreted hLs argument as antiratLonaL, Ln fac*^ Professor Simon does not suppose that, Mhen better
or Morse aLternatives are cieartg avaiiabie to the chooser, ne mag
reject the better for Morse, just because the worse H sat^factory
(pp.21-2). ... CertainLg Professor Simon is not asking for thLs,
because even Ln hLs termf, Lt Ls LrratLonaL to reject better for Morse.
be expected to occur
Os an LrratLonaLLtg satisficing cannot then
(p-23).
Ue need not
the enthusiasts; but Me are supposLng
Mhat S'^mon ded no t.
7
...........................
Various
Ln ./rat LonaL
^9.. Impact on paradoxes and on ratLonaL
behaviour.. L
— ---- paradoxes
]——— r*
A—t------------------------------- - ——----------- ;--------7-7%-------_______________________________
A cases paradox disapp
dLSappearaag
choLce theorg appear Ln a neM Light; in many peases
atftytt7H5etgcr> For the aLr o^ paradox derLves from competLng maximization crLterLa.
R good exampLe is provided bg NeMComb's paradox, Mhich is supposed to arise
in the foLLoMing situation^:
There are tMO boxes before gou: one transparent and one opaque. You
can see that there is $1,000 in the transparent box, and gou knoM that
there is either $1,000,000 or nothing in the opaque box. You must
choose betMeen the foLLoMing tMO acts: take the contents onig of the
opaque box or take the contents of both boxes. Furthermore, there is a
being in Mhose predictive poMers gou have enormous confidence, 3nd gou
knoM that he has aLreadg determined the contents of the opaque box
according to the foLLoMing ruLes: If he predicted that gou Mouid take
-9-
A
Take the list of characteristics Gilson considers for instance (Mhich forms in
a
curious May part of his attempt to rehabilitate a particular partisan
of humans on the strength of sociobiology:
p.22).
The list
has to be pruned
if"it is to cover the spread of knoMn human races and cultures,
vaguer
and less question-begging (e.g.
removed);
but
then
vieM
and
rendered
Mith reference to relations to numan-=>
it ceases to separate tribes of humans
from
tribes
primates or other nonhumans. [Detail and adjust.]
/f2'
7
o+
The NeM Zealand comparison:
APPENDIX 3.
Preliminary notes towards
or New
qualitative rating of mainstream New Zealand culture,
A
Zealand
data, as against an Australian (and sometimes other) goes as follows:but still high for Angloceltic world (presumably per capita
less,
Drinking:
patterns similar except for club phenomenon in Australia,
figures available);
and dry areas and prohibition proclivities in New Zealand.
Gambling:
significantly
but
less,
for
patterns similar except
important
matters of clubs and casinos.
Sport:
but less variety in New Zealand, owing to greater
similar addiction,
New Zealand emphasis on tramping,
uniformity of culture.
trail systems, not
matched in Oz.
Permissiveness:
variety.
less,
markedly
especially
concerning
sexual
issues
and
But Polynesian alternative increasingly influential in New Zealand.
Plural ism:
a
less,
more
uniform society,
with few ethnic
groupings
and
strata.
stronger, but still less so than UK.
Authori tarianism:
It is hypothesized by
Sinclair that older authority patterns in New Zealand arise from child rearing
especially
techniques,
in Oz.
counterpart
are,
the
famous
Plunkett
method,
The result was a rather up-tight
the suggestion is, more laid-back, easy-going.
which
no
had
product.
real
Australians
Vet the matter is not =o
simple, as the next items reveal.
Policing
and
opposition among the younger in New Zealand.
increasing
bushrangers,
cultural
Long-standing opposition to police
coercive methods:
etc.,
mythology.
in
New
Zealand,
in
Oz,
But no adulation of
and no Eureka Stockade
Violence perhaps less in New Zealand,
or
associated
though (at home)
neither society is very violent by American standards.
Egali tarianism:
slightly more in New Zealand, despite the Australian image.
In both Jack is as good as his master.
Pace of Life:
slower in New Zealand.
1
less in NeM
Poverty:
in NeM Zealand.
Distrust of markets
simi1 ar
less than Oz
Fraternity and mateship:
Hale chauvinism:
margina11y less (?)
Unionisation:
Mith
no
environmen tai actions.
Environmen t:
communi ties
mixed
Extensive
NeM Zealand to many i ssues
in
even
sympathy,
public
among
rural
the
An issue breakdoMn is
required
here:
better
Chemicals and Maste management:
Parks and reserves:
National ism:
(Inglis)
margina11y better,
excessively
in
Morse
both places
strong in both
It is taken as validating
consider the many memorials Mith 'they
their country' scattered around small toMns.
national ism
(or stateism)
as
a
means
and
Hi th
by political leaders).
It can be
Mar and sport
of social and national cohesion,
purpose (e.g.
died
It is sometimes suggested
is the neM secular religion
operation in those tMo related enterprises,
death
for
that
seen
in
Both have served
and have been
used
for
that
(Hars Mere a common method of obtaining
maintaining integration of large states,
improved
communications
perhaps fall into disuse)
and propaganda
netMorks,
that
method
Divisive national sport is interesting from
could
this
angle also.
Federalism
and
Australian
idea
federation:
of
adding
No experience in
NeM
NeM Zealand as a further
sympathetic consideration in NeM Zealand.
2
Zealand.
state
The
obtains
frequent
little
There Mas, and is, no loyalty to an
Australasian nation.
Communications:
Broadcasting less commercialised in Ne^j Zealand.
As a result
less H) violence, etc.
Reading:
more in Neu Zealand.
Education and Research:
opposition to theory.
(HoM much more?)
Little research done in Ne^ Zealand, but less
mixed.
Public school system better.
3
The following have been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions.
•
•
Letter, Alastair (University of Waikato) to Richard Sylvan, 17 April 1985 re feedback on
paper. (4 pages (2 leaves))
Letter, Tom (Philosophy Department, Massey University) to Richard Sylvan, 10 Jul 1985
re feedback on paper. (3 pages (2 leaves))
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Box 103: Culture, Politics, Environment, Economics
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Styles of Environmental Philosophy: Eastern and Western Modes, Values and
Sources
In a provocative article, Holmes Rolston III challenges those trying to develop an
environmental philosophy from traditional Eastern sources to put up or shut up. Rolston's
challenge (the precise details of which we'll get to) matters, because it sets down what many
have thought but few have dared to say so publicly. It gets t-he dispute out in the open.
Eastern philosophy, like Continental philosophy, is largely garbage, and not worth bothering
about: that is what many in the Anlgo-American scientistic line of philosophical business
really think.
Styles of Philosophizing:
Philosophy
Contrasting Features of Different
Styles of
Historicality. Continental philosophy is characteristically attempted in an evident
historical setting. It is not sharply separated from history of ideas. Analyticaly philosophy is
typically ahistorical.
This historicality posture is one of several that pushes analytic philosophy in a scientific
direction, so that it is carried on like a modern science; continental philosophy is much more
in the humanities tradition, and thus lies on the other side of the "two cultures" divide.
Systematicness. Continental philosophy is much concerned with system building, mainly
varying the traditions, e.g. Kantianism. Analytic philosophy attacks small problems in a
piecemeal way. (It is not without a background systematic framework, this is an unquestioned
framework).
The "speculative"
character of continental
philosophy derives from its
systematicness; from its attempt to cover a very broad sweep, e.g.. eventually all
philosophical ground. A result is that it is often very up in the air, not so often getting down
to concrete details, and the "hard" work analytical philosophy prides itself upon (but doesn't
that often do).
Pontifical philosophy, pronouncements from on high by elevated established figures, is a
____I
variety of continental philosophy in the speculative mode.
It is a variety presently well
practiced in the Soviet Union.
Triviality of analytic and language philosophies as seen from article, continental
Erudition/educati"on.
analytic philosophies are not educatted in the traditions, only a bit
- - - - - --- ---
�2
more than essentials. Erudition matters in continental philosphy, not in analytic. Analytic
can be a young person's game, part of the youth culture of the dominent Western paradigm.
[Thus analytic philosophy seems almost a dilett':1-nte's sport, indulged in by glib young men
with quickness of wit rather than solidness of foundational knowledge. This is not to say that
analytic philosophy does not clarify concepts and solve ancient philosophical chestnuts, but
once the concepts have been clarified and the chestnuts cracked, there is no place for them.
They do not fit into a system or even form a piece of a larger conundrum or add to
philosophic wisdom (for wisdom is not part of the analytic method or a purpose for its results.
On the other hand, Eastern philosophies, for instance Tao, does not c1arify the concepts nor
solve the puzzles, instead it sketches a system. Tao outlines, but does not fill in the picture as
continental philosophies would do. If these three systems were compared to art, painting or
drawing, then analytic philosophy is a clever and detailed thumbnail sketch. It is the
preparatory drawing. It is the student's exercise. It serves a purpose, but it is not fulfilling,
nor satisfactorily revealing. Continental philosophy is the grand masterpiece never finished.
The large picture is begun, but not completed. More and more is constantly added to the
canvas, but the canvas is too large or too complex to finish. Eastern philosophy, Tao, is the
working sketch. It is gives the master plan without giving the detail or the finished product. It
is like a pencil sketch awaiting each individual to fill in the colour. The positions of things are
given but not their significance to the overall work nor their fulness revealed. Yet it must be
kept in mind that Eastern philosophy cannot be represented by a single branch or example.]
No monolithic contrast exists between Eastern and Western styles. Chinese philosophy
differs from Indian philosophy as much as continental philosophy does from analytic
philosophy.
INSERT: In contrast to the mass of fiddly, piecemeal arguments of analytic philosophy,
Tao, for instance, presents little or no argument and little logic. Instead it presents an array
of paradoxes. These form a broad picture on a large scale, that in a fashion similar to
continental philosophy is an almost complete philosophy, but in contrast to continental
philosophy there is no mass of detail. There is almost no detail at all. It is left to the reader
to fill out the picture.
Like continental philosophy Tao requires participant involvement.
---------------
�3
Thus the object is not to fill in all the spaces but to give the broad picture so that the
individual can fil] in the details as appropriate. It is a pluralistic framework which allows
scope for expansion and within which the individual can deal with the paradoxes of life.
Unlike Western philosophies that emphasize various sorts of atomistic approaches,
Taoism works from the whole down rather than the atomic up.
Various sorts of atomistic
Western philosophies have a subject-object distinction or division (ontology); instead Tao has
a different metaphysics based on process or events. If a dynamic system is not determined by
individual processes, then it is better if you descend.
-------------- The opening gambit about language makes a point, but the real point is that
unless an idea adopted from another culture is both desirable for and compatible with the
adopting culture, then it is senseless in the first case and useless in the second case to adopt
the idea. However, centuries of ideological imperialism have shown that an idea can be forced
upon another culture, even if only in a corrupted form, whether or not it is desirable for or
compatible with the 'adopting' culture.
As for the evaluating of scientific description, HR III has made the point that it is an
embarrassment to science that it .cannot teach us to value. Thus it may in some sense be the
wrong approach to attempt to make Taoist thought compatible with scientific description. It
is obvious from the work of Capra that Eastern and Western metaphysics can be made
compatible. Of course, Western science has a 'loaded metaphysical agenda', and it seems to
be a misconception about the nature of that loading that causes so many problems in
accepting value judgments. Here is the old problem that science is supposedly 'value-free' and
'objective' coming to mean that scientific interpretation is merely descriptive and 'value-free'.
However, what is happening is that the hypothetico-reductive paradigm is replacing less
'rigorous' paradigms. etc. etc.
As for the reverence. for life, is it that there are no reasons for revering or respecting life
in biology or is it that biologists are not looking for reasons to revere or respect life? When an
ability like tool use is found in a creature like an assassin bug, the bug is not promoted up
some scale of moral regard, but tool use is dropped from the the list of items warranting
moral regard.
�4
Also there is the point that reverence for life can be directed towards either the abstract
concept of life or towards particular holders of life. To save a species from extinction is to
save the individuals of that species from death, but there is a difference between saying that
life is sacred {in some manner morally considerable) and anything possessing life should be
entitled to respect or regard or not killed. In the way that life is treated in most Western
societies, it is wrong to kill humans in most cases, but it is alright to kill a bull for food unless
that bull is a prize breeding bull or a child's pet or for some other such reason. That is, life is
not revered but the lives of certain creatures are valued because of other constraints. Life in
these latter cases takes on value for instrumental reasons that have nothing to do with
reverence for life in the abstract. Thus if science finds that the cacto-blastis is good for ·
destroying prickly pear, then regard for the life of this caterpiller goes up. A reason is found
for respecting its life. Yet the individual cacto-blastis is still of no consequence and the regard
for the species is coterminous with the need for the species.
---------------Eastern thought is in direct conflict with the dominant social paradigm and lends
substance to various alternatives.
Holmes Rolston III has confused Tao with binary opposition theory. He states, and
correctly so, that the "mystic force binding opposites" will not take you very far. But other
elements will. Tao has many facets and is not limited to binary opposition. It is a relatively
late import to Tao.
While binary opposition is useful concept and has some explanary
purposes, its powers of explanation should not be called upon to bear loads that it was never
meant to carry. Binary opposition is doing too much work in Holmes Rolston III's
understanding. It is like tryijng to base all science on Newton's third law. It is a confusion
between Tao and Yany /Yin. Because Tao is much more than something like the Third Law
means that much of what Rolston has said is irrelevant.
{Richard, these notes are still in a rough and ready form.}
There is a monolithic tendency in the treatment of Eastern philosophy that is very like
the United States' attitude towards nuclear disarmament.
On the one side you have the
West, i.e. the US, and on the other side you have the East, i.e. USSR. Although these two
�5
nations are prominent in the debates they are not the be all, end all of nuclear disarmament
or the sole viewpoint for each side, even if there were only two sides, which there are not.
Eastern philosophy can be broken into Indian philosophy, Chinese philosophy, etc. In turn,
Indian philosophy can be broken into three brands: 1) net-diamond image or candle image; 2)
Buddhism; 3) Hinduism.
Holmes Rolston III is demanding that Eastern philosophy provide a complete value
inventory, and unless it can meet this requirement then it is not acceptable. This requirement
is too stringent. In looking at the history of philosophy and the history of ideas this stringent
a condition is not demanded. Rolston is unwi11ing to look at an idea or theory unless it gives
a complete account and a formal decision theory, but other ideas have been accepted into our
culture in a piecemeal fashion (indeed the most fashionable philosophical style in our culture
is piecemeal).
Holmes Rolston III spends most of his time setting up paper people or straw tigers. For
example, binary opposition is a peripheral feature of Tao and certainly not as central as
Rolston would have us believe.
�
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Styles of Environmental Philosophy: Eastern and Western Modes, Values and
Sources
In a provocative article, Holmes Rolston III challenges those trying to develop an
environmental philosophy from traditional Eastern sources to put up or shut up. Rolston's
challenge (the precise details of which we'll get to) matters, because it sets down what many
have thought but few have dared to say so publicly. It gets t-he dispute out in the open.
Eastern philosophy, like Continental philosophy, is largely garbage, and not worth bothering
about: that is what many in the Anlgo-American scientistic line of philosophical business
really think.
Styles of Philosophizing:
Philosophy
Contrasting Features of Different
Styles of
Historicality. Continental philosophy is characteristically attempted in an evident
historical setting. It is not sharply separated from history of ideas. Analyticaly philosophy is
typically ahistorical.
This historicality posture is one of several that pushes analytic philosophy in a scientific
direction, so that it is carried on like a modern science; continental philosophy is much more
in the humanities tradition, and thus lies on the other side of the "two cultures" divide.
Systematicness. Continental philosophy is much concerned with system building, mainly
varying the traditions, e.g. Kantianism. Analytic philosophy attacks small problems in a
piecemeal way. (It is not without a background systematic framework, this is an unquestioned
framework).
The "speculative"
character of continental
philosophy derives from its
systematicness; from its attempt to cover a very broad sweep, e.g.. eventually all
philosophical ground. A result is that it is often very up in the air, not so often getting down
to concrete details, and the "hard" work analytical philosophy prides itself upon (but doesn't
that often do).
Pontifical philosophy, pronouncements from on high by elevated established figures, is a
____I
variety of continental philosophy in the speculative mode.
It is a variety presently well
practiced in the Soviet Union.
Triviality of analytic and language philosophies as seen from article, continental
Erudition/educati"on.
analytic philosophies are not educatted in the traditions, only a bit
- - - - - --- ---
2
more than essentials. Erudition matters in continental philosphy, not in analytic. Analytic
can be a young person's game, part of the youth culture of the dominent Western paradigm.
[Thus analytic philosophy seems almost a dilett':1-nte's sport, indulged in by glib young men
with quickness of wit rather than solidness of foundational knowledge. This is not to say that
analytic philosophy does not clarify concepts and solve ancient philosophical chestnuts, but
once the concepts have been clarified and the chestnuts cracked, there is no place for them.
They do not fit into a system or even form a piece of a larger conundrum or add to
philosophic wisdom (for wisdom is not part of the analytic method or a purpose for its results.
On the other hand, Eastern philosophies, for instance Tao, does not c1arify the concepts nor
solve the puzzles, instead it sketches a system. Tao outlines, but does not fill in the picture as
continental philosophies would do. If these three systems were compared to art, painting or
drawing, then analytic philosophy is a clever and detailed thumbnail sketch. It is the
preparatory drawing. It is the student's exercise. It serves a purpose, but it is not fulfilling,
nor satisfactorily revealing. Continental philosophy is the grand masterpiece never finished.
The large picture is begun, but not completed. More and more is constantly added to the
canvas, but the canvas is too large or too complex to finish. Eastern philosophy, Tao, is the
working sketch. It is gives the master plan without giving the detail or the finished product. It
is like a pencil sketch awaiting each individual to fill in the colour. The positions of things are
given but not their significance to the overall work nor their fulness revealed. Yet it must be
kept in mind that Eastern philosophy cannot be represented by a single branch or example.]
No monolithic contrast exists between Eastern and Western styles. Chinese philosophy
differs from Indian philosophy as much as continental philosophy does from analytic
philosophy.
INSERT: In contrast to the mass of fiddly, piecemeal arguments of analytic philosophy,
Tao, for instance, presents little or no argument and little logic. Instead it presents an array
of paradoxes. These form a broad picture on a large scale, that in a fashion similar to
continental philosophy is an almost complete philosophy, but in contrast to continental
philosophy there is no mass of detail. There is almost no detail at all. It is left to the reader
to fill out the picture.
Like continental philosophy Tao requires participant involvement.
---------------
3
Thus the object is not to fill in all the spaces but to give the broad picture so that the
individual can fil] in the details as appropriate. It is a pluralistic framework which allows
scope for expansion and within which the individual can deal with the paradoxes of life.
Unlike Western philosophies that emphasize various sorts of atomistic approaches,
Taoism works from the whole down rather than the atomic up.
Various sorts of atomistic
Western philosophies have a subject-object distinction or division (ontology); instead Tao has
a different metaphysics based on process or events. If a dynamic system is not determined by
individual processes, then it is better if you descend.
-------------- The opening gambit about language makes a point, but the real point is that
unless an idea adopted from another culture is both desirable for and compatible with the
adopting culture, then it is senseless in the first case and useless in the second case to adopt
the idea. However, centuries of ideological imperialism have shown that an idea can be forced
upon another culture, even if only in a corrupted form, whether or not it is desirable for or
compatible with the 'adopting' culture.
As for the evaluating of scientific description, HR III has made the point that it is an
embarrassment to science that it .cannot teach us to value. Thus it may in some sense be the
wrong approach to attempt to make Taoist thought compatible with scientific description. It
is obvious from the work of Capra that Eastern and Western metaphysics can be made
compatible. Of course, Western science has a 'loaded metaphysical agenda', and it seems to
be a misconception about the nature of that loading that causes so many problems in
accepting value judgments. Here is the old problem that science is supposedly 'value-free' and
'objective' coming to mean that scientific interpretation is merely descriptive and 'value-free'.
However, what is happening is that the hypothetico-reductive paradigm is replacing less
'rigorous' paradigms. etc. etc.
As for the reverence. for life, is it that there are no reasons for revering or respecting life
in biology or is it that biologists are not looking for reasons to revere or respect life? When an
ability like tool use is found in a creature like an assassin bug, the bug is not promoted up
some scale of moral regard, but tool use is dropped from the the list of items warranting
moral regard.
4
Also there is the point that reverence for life can be directed towards either the abstract
concept of life or towards particular holders of life. To save a species from extinction is to
save the individuals of that species from death, but there is a difference between saying that
life is sacred {in some manner morally considerable) and anything possessing life should be
entitled to respect or regard or not killed. In the way that life is treated in most Western
societies, it is wrong to kill humans in most cases, but it is alright to kill a bull for food unless
that bull is a prize breeding bull or a child's pet or for some other such reason. That is, life is
not revered but the lives of certain creatures are valued because of other constraints. Life in
these latter cases takes on value for instrumental reasons that have nothing to do with
reverence for life in the abstract. Thus if science finds that the cacto-blastis is good for ·
destroying prickly pear, then regard for the life of this caterpiller goes up. A reason is found
for respecting its life. Yet the individual cacto-blastis is still of no consequence and the regard
for the species is coterminous with the need for the species.
---------------Eastern thought is in direct conflict with the dominant social paradigm and lends
substance to various alternatives.
Holmes Rolston III has confused Tao with binary opposition theory. He states, and
correctly so, that the "mystic force binding opposites" will not take you very far. But other
elements will. Tao has many facets and is not limited to binary opposition. It is a relatively
late import to Tao.
While binary opposition is useful concept and has some explanary
purposes, its powers of explanation should not be called upon to bear loads that it was never
meant to carry. Binary opposition is doing too much work in Holmes Rolston III's
understanding. It is like tryijng to base all science on Newton's third law. It is a confusion
between Tao and Yany /Yin. Because Tao is much more than something like the Third Law
means that much of what Rolston has said is irrelevant.
{Richard, these notes are still in a rough and ready form.}
There is a monolithic tendency in the treatment of Eastern philosophy that is very like
the United States' attitude towards nuclear disarmament.
On the one side you have the
West, i.e. the US, and on the other side you have the East, i.e. USSR. Although these two
5
nations are prominent in the debates they are not the be all, end all of nuclear disarmament
or the sole viewpoint for each side, even if there were only two sides, which there are not.
Eastern philosophy can be broken into Indian philosophy, Chinese philosophy, etc. In turn,
Indian philosophy can be broken into three brands: 1) net-diamond image or candle image; 2)
Buddhism; 3) Hinduism.
Holmes Rolston III is demanding that Eastern philosophy provide a complete value
inventory, and unless it can meet this requirement then it is not acceptable. This requirement
is too stringent. In looking at the history of philosophy and the history of ideas this stringent
a condition is not demanded. Rolston is unwi11ing to look at an idea or theory unless it gives
a complete account and a formal decision theory, but other ideas have been accepted into our
culture in a piecemeal fashion (indeed the most fashionable philosophical style in our culture
is piecemeal).
Holmes Rolston III spends most of his time setting up paper people or straw tigers. For
example, binary opposition is a peripheral feature of Tao and certainly not as central as
Rolston would have us believe.
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Box 79: Logic
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PDF Text
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Cutting (photocopy), two pages (title page and page 125) from Weisskopf WA (1971) Alienation
and economics, Dutton. (2 leaves)
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�THE AGE OF [THE REALISATION OF] LIMITS?
1.
Growth versus Limits.
A phenomenon of the contemporary ags. is increasing
awareness of limits, espeO^ally material limits, due to resource and energy
limitations.
Hence, in part, the limits to growth (in part because there are
other major elements in models which reveal limits to growth:
pollution, etc.).
population,
The awareness is not a new one - the ancient Greeks put con
siderable emphasis on limits - but was largely lost sight of in modern times
until recently.
Although some material limitations are now widely reetrgjinised, in Europe and
/
North America^ at any rate, social limits are far from widely acknowledged, and
there is the idea that in the spiriual sphere there are no limitations.
Thus, for
example, Perelman:
The traditional social sphere is ... transcendental and spiritual.
i _• x..-
-- i -----~
‘-v- -ewards
the physical and social limits of the economic world (p.394)."
---- A similar open-fredte«ee-«Mte^e<-'in-the-spiritual sphere thenyls presented by
T. Haydon (Social Alternatives ~1980).
2.
The failure to realist, limits is a basic fault common to Marxism (Barman
p.150) and capitalism.
further down, p.399, >6 relies on false dichotomy between ’religious influence
and secular economic power’ which are said to be * complementary, when one grows,
the other declines. Also the suggestion that the£e are
social limits^the
’soft paradigm’ is not explained p.415?
to
W2- -M
�/
Disappearing species and vanishing rainforests:
philosophical roots of the problem. *
wrong directions, and the
Both rainforests and species are
disappearing at an unprecedented and accelerating rate.
becoming
a vastly poorer place ecologically.
of great value is being lost or destroyed.
The world is fast
Which is really bad:
for much
Thus far there is substantial
agreement among a wide range of groups and organisations seriously concerned
about vanishing rainforests, disappearing species, and the ecological impover
ishment of the earth.
But penetrate a little further - ask for the causes of
this situation, for what should be done about it, why value is being diminished
in this way, and why there is any cause for concern - and the agreement begins
to evaporate.
Probe a little more widely, bringing in assessment of economists,
foresters, and politicians, and spokesmen for the elites of ’’developing nations ,
and agreement ceases, and substantial disagreement sets in.
The phenomena of disappearing life, animal and plant, creature and
species and ecosystem, are well-enough documented (if not well-enough knowin,
in several senses) for a sketch of the background to serve.
§2.
Background:
the rates of loss of species and disappearance of rainforest.
First, plants:the extinction of each species of plant is, on the average,
accompanied by a ten-|to thirty-fold loss amongst other organisms.
Therefore, the diversity of plants i£ the underlying factor
controlling the diversity of other organisms and thus the
stability of the world ecosystem ... nearly two-thirds of the
world’s plant species (at least 150,000species of flowering
plants) appear to be tropical in distribution.
... Considering
that there will be no undisturbed tropical lowland forest any
where in the world within twenty-five years, except for relatively
small reserves,
... it is certain that many of them will become
extinct during our lifetime.
To illustrate this point we need
only mention that the FAO estimates that about ten million
The paper was first sketched for Earthday 1980.
The topic is of considerable
relevance to Earthday X, for it concerns the ecological impoverishment of the
earth (which - despite Earthday - continues to accelerate) and reasons for it
especially the underlying philosophical and ideological grounds. (In the
latter connection the US has, despite its prominence in ecological concern
and in implementing things environmental, much to answer for.)
�2.
hectares [1979 estimates are 16 million hectares] of tropical
forest are being felled annually.
... One supposes ... that
at least a third of [tropical plant species] will be threatened
or extinct by the end of the century, with the first major wave
of extinction in South-east Asia and New Guine^ ...
(Raven 1976).
Second, animals:It has been estimated that if current Saends in massive forest
clearing continue, about one-third of the species now found in
humid tropical forests - perhaps 15 to 20Z of all species on
earth - will be extinct only 20 years from now, and many more
in the ensuing decades.
This would be one of the greatest
impoverishments ever suffered.
|x----- —Third, rainforests:Every minute 30 hectares (about 75 acres) of the world s rain—
^forests are being destroyed.
The issue can be sharply p^roc^ssed by considering the world’s tropical
rainforests, where major Looweo are occurring.
The tropical moist forests are believed to contain between 2
and 5 million species from 2/5ths to ^planet’s total .
Thus i£ 1 million species are lost by the end of the twentieth century, the
I result would be the extinction of more than - perhaps much more than - l/5th
of the world’s
.
(Myers, p.4 & p.113).
Other estimates differ somewhat, but all serve to make the main point;
staggering ecological and biological losses and impoverishment.
§2.
Reasons and causes^ actdon and fataldsm (ineu^'i/Lity).
be disentangled.
There is much to
There are reasons for and against destroying rain-forests
and their dependent species, reasons which divide into shallower reasons and
deeper reasons.
The familiar shallow reasons against are those that answer back in one
way or another to human interests, and concern the pros and cons of rain
forests as
sources of genetic diversity and gene pools, as natural biological
sources for medicines, as
uftkt
catchment protection areas, and to prevent
and stop flooding, as buffer and quarantine zones, as refuges for
plants and animals.
The inadequacy of these sorts of reasons is not difficult to discern;
and the strategies they lead to would only sewe- bits and pieces here and
there.
,
-i -i
_
a_i_
_
Furthermore the onus is^wrong way round too, as well as the jacamng j
not reaching to any social depth.
What needs to say here is:
Why is all
�3.
this happening?
What justifies it?
The onus is on those who try to proceed,
who are doing the doing, interfering destruction and demise.
The shallower reasons for tend to rely on the character of humans,
their attitudes and aspirations and now rather inevitable dominance.
causes fail.
Ini^t^l shallow explanatory theses to be critically
assessed and rejected include these:
1.
The overpopulation argument:
’unless the population explosion can be
damped down, wildlife will not survive’
2.
Economistic arguments:
(Webb, 1979).
forest destruction will alleviate poverty and
provides jobs and foreign revenue.
Rather, as forester Westoby recently explained,
’the unpalatable fact, for
foresters, is that forest industries have done very little to raise the
welfare of the urban and rural masses in developing countries;
instead
resources and wealth have been transferred to the rich industrialised
countries’
(or at least certain parts of their populations).
Westoby, who perhaps optimistically sees elements of change in the
world, went on to explain, colourfully, somewhat deeper issues:
of policies of self-reliance,
’The growth
the struggles on every continent by the
dispossessed and hungry millions to win a fair and decent life, to break out
of the power of landlords, of moneylenders, of the agents of foreign capital
will be decisive in the future ... foresters ... have historically supported
power, landed property, and the status quo, and acted as the gendarme of the
landed proprietor’
(emphasis added).
[Even where the people originally held
the land, it has been removed from them by military power in such places as
Indonesia.]
Although this begins to bring out how it is that major forest destruct
ion, for example, is not being undertaken by local people themselves,but by
large foreign companies (with the co-operation of a ruling ’’western" elite
in countries involved, elites characteristically propped up in turn by
"western" capital and armsj), it does not explain why "western"—style com
panies (Japanese as well as American and British) are, with considerable
government support, engaged in these activities.
Again, there are shallow
economic reasons, e.g. growth of GNP, consumer demand, etc.
But in fact the
bulk of tropical forest goes into pulp and paper most of which is used for
packaging, which most people do
not, in any good sense, choose to purchase,
but find it "thrust upon them" and difficult to avoid.
§4.
Getting to the roots, historical and ideological.
And so on.
The deeper reasons are
the underlying attitudes to the natural world that are held by western exploit
ing powers, attitudes such as human chauvinism, which have a very long history,
�and which were shaped and enforced first by the Renaissance, then the Enlight
enment, and more recently by both positivism and Marxism.
The main object of
the paper is to show how these attitudes figure in such practical matters as
forest destruction and its justification, to outline [again]
criticism of
them, and to indicate a long minority criticism of them, running from the
Germanic Sturm und Drang movement through classical anarchism to the counter
culture
§5.
the modern deeper environmental movement.
Wrong strategic directions:
the potiticaZ thrust.
WORLD (ECOLOGICAL) IMPOVERISHMENT:
IDEOLOGICAL BASES AND EXCUSES.
World ecological impoverishment is world impoverishment, because much
of great value is being lost without due value recompense.
at rapidly accelerating rate:
It is occurring
there is little cause for celebration of
^arthday X.
1.
The mounting ecological losses.
The phenomenon is well enough documented
within the limits of our rather abysmal knowledge awd of the systems^ species
and individuals being lost.
78).
(For a carefully referenced survey see Eckholm
�REFERENCES
E. Eckholm,
Disappearing Species:
The Social Challenge_>Worldwatch Paper 22
July 1978.
•
A. and A. Erhlich, Extinction;
$fJLc pc<Tf
/iouLi-ty
A/Cm/
Ho(-
P.H. Raven, ’Ethics and attitudes" in Conservation of Threatened Plants3
J.B. Simmons et aL) , Plenum, New York, 1976.
(ed
�/UoT^l
f
(
/
Schematic c
;)t>^e
of
TWO paradigms*
perspn-PJ. unetary
1.
2»
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
—-5 16 ■>
17.
r 18.
' 19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
Z 25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
394. «
Machine metaphor " ---Reductionist
linear
--------------- Nature as instrumental ------ “* *"
Observer spirt from nature Causal ®odels-®achanisticZ------- /
Consciousness as epiphenomena1 Dead matter
Growth
Z
Quantitative
Non-Dialectical z
Discrete things
Knowledge as power
™—
No Spiritual dimensions Z-———
Technology as power
——
Having
——
Machine paradigms y-—------ ~
Mastery of nature fro© outside -Z
External relations ---- *-----Subject-object separation -Z-—
Centralization
Design &» technique ---------- ~~
Specialism Z
.—
Training - skills alone ‘Z
—-—~
Anthropocentric —-----Corporation </
— Competition y
——------ Uniformity Z
--------- —**“
Machine planet x
----------Science vs. Religion Z-——~—•
Limited perspective Z^—------Captive of its own mythology X—
organic metaphor
holistic
z
mult1-dimensiona1 (Hi erarchial)
intrinsic value in things
Participator-Agent
scausal-etochastic '
consciousness irreduciable
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Title
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Notes, Correspondences and Marginalia
Description
An account of the resource
In one obituary, Sylvan's handwriting was said to have "looked like the oscilloscope for a patient in intensive care", and thus "not for the timid".
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A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
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The following has been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions.
Cutting (photocopy), two pages (title page and page 125) from Weisskopf WA (1971) Alienation
and economics, Dutton. (2 leaves)
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THE AGE OF [THE REALISATION OF] LIMITS?
1.
Growth versus Limits.
A phenomenon of the contemporary ags. is increasing
awareness of limits, espeO^ally material limits, due to resource and energy
limitations.
Hence, in part, the limits to growth (in part because there are
other major elements in models which reveal limits to growth:
pollution, etc.).
population,
The awareness is not a new one - the ancient Greeks put con
siderable emphasis on limits - but was largely lost sight of in modern times
until recently.
Although some material limitations are now widely reetrgjinised, in Europe and
/
North America^ at any rate, social limits are far from widely acknowledged, and
there is the idea that in the spiriual sphere there are no limitations.
Thus, for
example, Perelman:
The traditional social sphere is ... transcendental and spiritual.
i _• x..-
-- i -----~
‘-v- -ewards
the physical and social limits of the economic world (p.394)."
---- A similar open-fredte«ee-«Mte^e<-'in-the-spiritual sphere thenyls presented by
T. Haydon (Social Alternatives ~1980).
2.
The failure to realist, limits is a basic fault common to Marxism (Barman
p.150) and capitalism.
further down, p.399, >6 relies on false dichotomy between ’religious influence
and secular economic power’ which are said to be * complementary, when one grows,
the other declines. Also the suggestion that the£e are
social limits^the
’soft paradigm’ is not explained p.415?
to
W2- -M
/
Disappearing species and vanishing rainforests:
philosophical roots of the problem. *
wrong directions, and the
Both rainforests and species are
disappearing at an unprecedented and accelerating rate.
becoming
a vastly poorer place ecologically.
of great value is being lost or destroyed.
The world is fast
Which is really bad:
for much
Thus far there is substantial
agreement among a wide range of groups and organisations seriously concerned
about vanishing rainforests, disappearing species, and the ecological impover
ishment of the earth.
But penetrate a little further - ask for the causes of
this situation, for what should be done about it, why value is being diminished
in this way, and why there is any cause for concern - and the agreement begins
to evaporate.
Probe a little more widely, bringing in assessment of economists,
foresters, and politicians, and spokesmen for the elites of ’’developing nations ,
and agreement ceases, and substantial disagreement sets in.
The phenomena of disappearing life, animal and plant, creature and
species and ecosystem, are well-enough documented (if not well-enough knowin,
in several senses) for a sketch of the background to serve.
§2.
Background:
the rates of loss of species and disappearance of rainforest.
First, plants:the extinction of each species of plant is, on the average,
accompanied by a ten-|to thirty-fold loss amongst other organisms.
Therefore, the diversity of plants i£ the underlying factor
controlling the diversity of other organisms and thus the
stability of the world ecosystem ... nearly two-thirds of the
world’s plant species (at least 150,000species of flowering
plants) appear to be tropical in distribution.
... Considering
that there will be no undisturbed tropical lowland forest any
where in the world within twenty-five years, except for relatively
small reserves,
... it is certain that many of them will become
extinct during our lifetime.
To illustrate this point we need
only mention that the FAO estimates that about ten million
The paper was first sketched for Earthday 1980.
The topic is of considerable
relevance to Earthday X, for it concerns the ecological impoverishment of the
earth (which - despite Earthday - continues to accelerate) and reasons for it
especially the underlying philosophical and ideological grounds. (In the
latter connection the US has, despite its prominence in ecological concern
and in implementing things environmental, much to answer for.)
2.
hectares [1979 estimates are 16 million hectares] of tropical
forest are being felled annually.
... One supposes ... that
at least a third of [tropical plant species] will be threatened
or extinct by the end of the century, with the first major wave
of extinction in South-east Asia and New Guine^ ...
(Raven 1976).
Second, animals:It has been estimated that if current Saends in massive forest
clearing continue, about one-third of the species now found in
humid tropical forests - perhaps 15 to 20Z of all species on
earth - will be extinct only 20 years from now, and many more
in the ensuing decades.
This would be one of the greatest
impoverishments ever suffered.
|x----- —Third, rainforests:Every minute 30 hectares (about 75 acres) of the world s rain—
^forests are being destroyed.
The issue can be sharply p^roc^ssed by considering the world’s tropical
rainforests, where major Looweo are occurring.
The tropical moist forests are believed to contain between 2
and 5 million species from 2/5ths to ^planet’s total .
Thus i£ 1 million species are lost by the end of the twentieth century, the
I result would be the extinction of more than - perhaps much more than - l/5th
of the world’s
.
(Myers, p.4 & p.113).
Other estimates differ somewhat, but all serve to make the main point;
staggering ecological and biological losses and impoverishment.
§2.
Reasons and causes^ actdon and fataldsm (ineu^'i/Lity).
be disentangled.
There is much to
There are reasons for and against destroying rain-forests
and their dependent species, reasons which divide into shallower reasons and
deeper reasons.
The familiar shallow reasons against are those that answer back in one
way or another to human interests, and concern the pros and cons of rain
forests as
sources of genetic diversity and gene pools, as natural biological
sources for medicines, as
uftkt
catchment protection areas, and to prevent
and stop flooding, as buffer and quarantine zones, as refuges for
plants and animals.
The inadequacy of these sorts of reasons is not difficult to discern;
and the strategies they lead to would only sewe- bits and pieces here and
there.
,
-i -i
_
a_i_
_
Furthermore the onus is^wrong way round too, as well as the jacamng j
not reaching to any social depth.
What needs to say here is:
Why is all
3.
this happening?
What justifies it?
The onus is on those who try to proceed,
who are doing the doing, interfering destruction and demise.
The shallower reasons for tend to rely on the character of humans,
their attitudes and aspirations and now rather inevitable dominance.
causes fail.
Ini^t^l shallow explanatory theses to be critically
assessed and rejected include these:
1.
The overpopulation argument:
’unless the population explosion can be
damped down, wildlife will not survive’
2.
Economistic arguments:
(Webb, 1979).
forest destruction will alleviate poverty and
provides jobs and foreign revenue.
Rather, as forester Westoby recently explained,
’the unpalatable fact, for
foresters, is that forest industries have done very little to raise the
welfare of the urban and rural masses in developing countries;
instead
resources and wealth have been transferred to the rich industrialised
countries’
(or at least certain parts of their populations).
Westoby, who perhaps optimistically sees elements of change in the
world, went on to explain, colourfully, somewhat deeper issues:
of policies of self-reliance,
’The growth
the struggles on every continent by the
dispossessed and hungry millions to win a fair and decent life, to break out
of the power of landlords, of moneylenders, of the agents of foreign capital
will be decisive in the future ... foresters ... have historically supported
power, landed property, and the status quo, and acted as the gendarme of the
landed proprietor’
(emphasis added).
[Even where the people originally held
the land, it has been removed from them by military power in such places as
Indonesia.]
Although this begins to bring out how it is that major forest destruct
ion, for example, is not being undertaken by local people themselves,but by
large foreign companies (with the co-operation of a ruling ’’western" elite
in countries involved, elites characteristically propped up in turn by
"western" capital and armsj), it does not explain why "western"—style com
panies (Japanese as well as American and British) are, with considerable
government support, engaged in these activities.
Again, there are shallow
economic reasons, e.g. growth of GNP, consumer demand, etc.
But in fact the
bulk of tropical forest goes into pulp and paper most of which is used for
packaging, which most people do
not, in any good sense, choose to purchase,
but find it "thrust upon them" and difficult to avoid.
§4.
Getting to the roots, historical and ideological.
And so on.
The deeper reasons are
the underlying attitudes to the natural world that are held by western exploit
ing powers, attitudes such as human chauvinism, which have a very long history,
and which were shaped and enforced first by the Renaissance, then the Enlight
enment, and more recently by both positivism and Marxism.
The main object of
the paper is to show how these attitudes figure in such practical matters as
forest destruction and its justification, to outline [again]
criticism of
them, and to indicate a long minority criticism of them, running from the
Germanic Sturm und Drang movement through classical anarchism to the counter
culture
§5.
the modern deeper environmental movement.
Wrong strategic directions:
the potiticaZ thrust.
WORLD (ECOLOGICAL) IMPOVERISHMENT:
IDEOLOGICAL BASES AND EXCUSES.
World ecological impoverishment is world impoverishment, because much
of great value is being lost without due value recompense.
at rapidly accelerating rate:
It is occurring
there is little cause for celebration of
^arthday X.
1.
The mounting ecological losses.
The phenomenon is well enough documented
within the limits of our rather abysmal knowledge awd of the systems^ species
and individuals being lost.
78).
(For a carefully referenced survey see Eckholm
REFERENCES
E. Eckholm,
Disappearing Species:
The Social Challenge_>Worldwatch Paper 22
July 1978.
•
A. and A. Erhlich, Extinction;
$fJLc pc<Tf
/iouLi-ty
A/Cm/
Ho(-
P.H. Raven, ’Ethics and attitudes" in Conservation of Threatened Plants3
J.B. Simmons et aL) , Plenum, New York, 1976.
(ed
/UoT^l
f
(
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20.
21.
22.
23.
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26.
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31.
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Machine metaphor " ---Reductionist
linear
--------------- Nature as instrumental ------ “* *"
Observer spirt from nature Causal ®odels-®achanisticZ------- /
Consciousness as epiphenomena1 Dead matter
Growth
Z
Quantitative
Non-Dialectical z
Discrete things
Knowledge as power
™—
No Spiritual dimensions Z-———
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——
Having
——
Machine paradigms y-—------ ~
Mastery of nature fro© outside -Z
External relations ---- *-----Subject-object separation -Z-—
Centralization
Design &» technique ---------- ~~
Specialism Z
.—
Training - skills alone ‘Z
—-—~
Anthropocentric —-----Corporation </
— Competition y
——------ Uniformity Z
--------- —**“
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Limited perspective Z^—------Captive of its own mythology X—
organic metaphor
holistic
z
mult1-dimensiona1 (Hi erarchial)
intrinsic value in things
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consciousness irreduciable
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Development
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Dialectical Z
.
Fields and processes Z
Coderst&nding and wisdom
Spiritual dimensions Z
Appropriate technology Z
Being
r.y
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Mastery of self
v'
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Subject-object reciprocity z""
Decentralisation 1
Design as art ^Z
Cultivation of whole person
. education - balanced Z
Transpersonal Z
Community Z
cooperation Z
diversity and symbiosis Z
Gaia Hypothesis (Living Planet)
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Box 61, Item 1781: Notes and cutting on environment ; Draft of The age of (the realisation of) limits?
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Various handwritten notes on scrap paper, and cutting from Weisskopf WA (1971) Alienation and economics, Dutton. Includes typescript draft of The age of (the realisation of) limits? by Richard Sylvan, with handwritten emendations, undated.
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Verso of scrap paper not digitised. Cutting redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions.
Title in collection finding aid: Writings of RS & VP on environment.
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<a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&range=&collection=&type=&user=&tags=&public=&featured=&exhibit=&geolocation-mapped=&geolocation-address=&geolocation-latitude=&geolocation-longitude=&geolocation-radius=10&submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a>
<a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Val+Plumwood&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&range=&collection=&type=&user=&tags=&public=&featured=&exhibit=&geolocation-mapped=&geolocation-address=&geolocation-latitude=&geolocation-longitude=&geolocation-radius=10&submit_search=Search+for+items">Val Plumwood</a>
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Australian National Univeristy - Second Bookcase - Bottom Shelf
Australian National University Office
Australian National University Office > Second Bookcase > Bottom Shelf
Box 61: Ethics and Theoretical Ethics
-
https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/75fc64a2f672780af3de8a71e4e815bb.pdf
cc1ffac27c9576ab7491fb57f389143a
PDF Text
Text
SOME ETHICAL ASPECTS OF ENERGY OPTIONS.
R. and V. Routley
Plumwood Mountain
Box 37 Braidwood, NSW. 2622.
Major ethical issues intrude conspicuously into the question
For example, the Kantian question:
of energy choice.
what ought
we to do (or try to do) in the awkward circumstances that will shortly
face us on the energy-front?
And Aristotle’s question:
What is a
a question transposed these days into questions as
good life like?
to quality of life and the extent to which quality genuinely depends
on quantity of energy (Aristotle thought, by the way, that a good
life required only a modicum of material goods.)
questions such as:
And traditional
What are we morally entitled to do to others,
and with respect to nature?
a question extended to include future
others and now asked seriously as regards wild nature.
modern questions such as:
And more
which sorts of consumer demand —
especially of energy-intensive goods - should be met?
It is evident enough then, without going into details , that
ethical questions have an important bearing on main issues on
energy choice and that a pure social engineering
approach to
the problem is bound to write in much that calls for examination
or rejection.
But it is often supposed - mistakenly - that the
ethical issues are adequately taken care of in the structures we
already have, e.g. through internal political and legal structures
and by international legal arrangements.
Suppose, it is said, the question of replacement of burners in
a Japanese electricity station arises, and the Japanese decide to
replace the burners by nuclear ones.
routine political way.
wider morality?
for the Japanese.
The matter is approved in a
Who are we to say that the matter is one of
It is a matter of internal pclitical arrangements
Suppose, to begin to see that this is not so,
that a nation decides to install(or replace in the course of modern
�2.
isation) the burners in a concentration camp, and that the matter
is approved in a routine political fashion and meets all internal
legal requirements.
We are almost all going to say that the matter
is one of wider morality.
And so also is taking choices on the life,
health and well being of future people in a nuclear adventure.
More
generally, pollution, and especially non-local types of pollution
such as nuclear pollution, raises ethical issues which transcend
conventional national and political boundaries.
For the effects of
pollution are often not locally contained, polluted air or water may
move far afield to affect even features of the world, such as climate
and ocean levels.
The idea that the ethics of such matters is satisfactorily
regulated by international legal arrangements - agreements, pacts,
contracts and the like or international regulatory agencies (where
they operate) - is likewise unsound.
For the arrangements commonly
bear little relation to what is considered right or just:
they
may have been arrived at by expediency or, at best, through moral
compromise, and they may reflect immediate self-interest rather
than morality.
Just as legal principles are in general neither
necessary nor sufficient as moral principles, so international
legal arrangements are no substitute for morality, and usually do
not even offer, a poor reflection of ethical arrangements.
More difficult to dispose of, and more insidious, are
engineering approaches to morality built into models of an economic
cast, e.g. benefit-cost balance sheets, risk assessment models, etc.
§1.
It is a commonplace nowadays that there is no method of pro
viding for future energy needs which will not involve substantial
costs to someone, and that these costs must just be accepted as
part of the price we pay for our advanced technological society and
our high living standard.
"If you want the benefits you must be
prepared to pay the costs" is part of the new conventional wisdom
�3.
on energy.
The model is that of a simple economic transaction, for
example someone going into a shop and buying paper towels — she
wants the paper so she must be prepared to pay over the money
representing the equivalent of the cost of the paper in unpleasant
labour, forest destruction, etc.
But here, on energy, as in so many other places, the conventional
wisdom is not to be trusted.
For the transaction model suggests
that the costs and benefits are evenly distributed, that those who
benefit pay the costs and vice versa.
is very often
But with energy options this
not so, and in fact this is one of the more important
ways in which the ethical aspects of the energy issue arise.
The
conventional transaction model is an attempt to gloss over crucial
ethical aspects of the problem.
Again, the energy issue raises
questions about the goals (ends) and values of society, and is not
just a disagreement about the best means of achieving unquestioned
or accepted goals, and it has an important bearing too on the
distribution of power both economic and political between various
groups.
Thus are involved then crucial political as well as ethical
aspects, and these too the simple transaction model attempts to sweep
under the carpet.
The simple transaction model, despite its appeal
to the technological mind, and to those who are anxious to maintain
the myth of the political and value freedomness of science and
technology, is quite inadequate, for it does not reflect significant
distributional features of the energy problem.
It is in fact an
attempt to ignore, deny or gloss over the crucial political and
ethical aspects of the energy issue, and to avoid facing the social
and ethical choices involved.
A more sophisticated relative of the transaction model is
now called risk assessment, which purports to provide a comparison
between the relative risks attached to different energy options which
settles their ethical status.
The following lines of argument are
�4.
encountered in risk assessment as applied to energy options:
(i)
if option a imposes costs on fewer people than option b
then option a is preferable to option b;
(ii)
option a involves a total net cost in terms of cost to
people (e.g. deaths, injuries, etc.) which is less than of option b,
3
which is already accepted; therefore option a is acceptable.
For example, the number likely to be killed by nuclear power stations
is less than the likely number killed by cigarette smoking, which is
accepted:
So nuclear power stations are acceptable.
A little
reflection reveals that this sort of risk assessment argument involves
the same kind of fallacy as the transaction model.
It is far too
simple-minded, and it ignores distributional and other relevant
aspects of the context.
In order to obtain an ethical assessment
we should need a much fuller picture and we should need to know at
least these things:-
do the costs and benefits go to the same parties;
and is the person who undertakes the risks also the person who
receives the benefits or primarily, as in driving or cigarette smoking,
or are costs imposed on other parties who do not benefit?
It is
only if the parties are the same in the case of the options compared,
and there are no such distributional problems, that a comparison on
such a basis would be valid.4
This is rarely the case, and it is
not so in the case of risk assessments of energy options.
Secondly,
does the person incur the risk as a result of an activity which he
knowingly undertakes in a situation where he has a reasonable choice,
knowing it entails the risk, etc., and is the level of risk in
proportion to the level of the relevant activity, e.g. as in smoking?
Thirdly, for what reason is the risk imposed:
or a relatively trivial reason?
is it for a serious
A risk that is ethically acceptable
for a serious reason may not be ethically acceptably for a trivial
reason.
Both the arguments (i) and (ii) are often
trying to justify nuclear power.
employed in
The second argument (ii) involves
�5.
the fallacies of the first (i) and an additional set, namely that
of forgetting that the health risks in the nuclear sense are
cumulative, and in the eyes of many people already high if not too
high.
Despite a certain superficial plausibility, so-called risk
assessment as a method of comparing the ethical status of energy
options is little more than a bundle of fallacies deceptively
packaged in pseudo-scientific wrappings.
It purports to give a
simple apparently precise and scientific method of evaluating the
ethical status of energy options, but in fact it depends on a number
of hidden assumptions about which factors are relevant and which can
be ignored in an ethical assessment, which when brought out for
examination can be seen to be guite unacceptable.
§2. The maxim "If you want the benefits you have to accept the
costs" is one thing and the maxim "If I want the benefits then you
have to accept the costs (or some of them at least)" is another
and very different thing.
It is a widely accepted moral principle
that one is not, in general, entitled to simply transfer costs of a
significant kind arising from an activity which benefits oneself
onto other parties who are not involved in the activity and are not
beneficiaries.
This transfer principle
is especially clear in
cases where the significant costs include an effect on life or
health or a risk thereof, and where the benefit to the benefitting
party is of a noncrucial or dispensible nature.
(Thus one is not
usually entitled to harm, or risk harming, another in the process of
benefitting oneself.)
Suppose, for example, we consider a village
which produces, as a result of the industrial process by which it
lives, a noxious waste material which is expensive and difficult
to dispose/ye^t creates a risk to life and health if undisposed of.
Instead of giving up their industrial process and turning to some
other way of making a living such as farming the surrounding
�6.
countryside, they persist with this way of life but ship their
problem on a one-way delivery service to the next village.
The
inhabitants of this village are then forced to face the problem
either of undertaking the expensive and difficult disposal process
or of sustaining risks to their own lives and health.
Most of us
would see this kind of transfer of costs as morally unacceptable.
From this arises a necessary condition for energy options:
that to be morally acceptable they should not involve the transfer
of significant costs or risks of harm onto parties who are not
involved, do not use the energy source or do not benefit corres
pondingly from its use.
Included in the scope of this condition
are future people, i.e. not merely people living at the present time
7
but also future generations (those of the next villages).
The
distribution of costs and damage in such a fashion, i.e. onto non
beneficiaries is a characteristic of certain widespread and serious
forms of pollution, and is one of its most objectionable morel
features.
It is a corollary of the condition that we should not hand the
world on to our successors in substantially worse shape than we
received it - the transmission principle.
For if we did then that
would be a significant transfer of costs.
(The corollary can be
independently argued for on the basis of certain ethical theories,
in particular contract theories such as Rawls’.)
Some philosophers8 have attempted to undercut the trans
mission principle, arguing that we are not morally obligated to
make sacrifices for the future.
Making sacrifices is however signifi
cantly different from refraining from passing on costs, and it is
the latter which is mainly at issue.
We might be making sacrifices,
for example, if we made ourselves worse off than future people might
be normally expected to be in order that they might be better off
than us.
We are passing on our costs when we make them worse off
�7.
than they would normally be because of some activity which benefits
us.
We may not be morally obliged to make sacrifices for future
people, but we do have a moral obligation not to pass on our costs,
and our obligations in this respect do not just apply to the next
generation, but to any set of people who could be affected.
In terms of the necessary condition we can undertake some
limited comparison of energy options from an ethical standpoint.
It is very doubtful that the main options that are being seriously
considered meet this condition for moral acceptibility ;
in particular
it is extremely doubtful that nuclear energy options do so.
Nuclear
energy appears to represent a classic case of passing on costs and
risks to nonbeneficiaries, especially future people, because of the
way in which nuclear waste created now produces risks and problems
for future people.
Unless a rigorously safe method of storage is
employed, as many as 40,000
generations of people have to face costs
in the shape of risks to health and life arising from the energy
consumption of at most perhaps 10 generations.
even worse when
The situation is
one reflects on the fact that many of the purposes
for which this energy will be required are of a dispensible and
unnecessary (and even undesirable) nature, and energy use of an
extravagant and needless kind would undoubtedly be involved in order
for the big increases in per capita energy consumption which justify
much of the nuclear expansion program in the industrialised world
to be reached.
Not only would costs be passed on to people in the
distant future to whom no benefits seem to accrue but his is done
9
for reasons that cannot be seen as pressing or needful.
The waste
disposal aspect of nuclear power production is not the only way in
which the nuclear option may pass on problems and costs to nonbene
ficiaries:
unless an unrealistic perfection in the handling, mining,
transport and processing and reprocessing of nuclear fuels and waste
�8.
is assumed, various forms of widespread radioactive pollution could
occur which would affect not only those who use and benefit from
the energy source but also very many who do not, especially m the
third world.10
We have heard a good deal recently from some local quarters
(the PR machinery of the Australian National University) about how
the nuclear waste disposal problem has been solved, and the objections
on the grounds of waste disposal eleminated.
Of course a number
of similar claims have been made in the past, and there never
was a problem according to hard-line nuclear advocates of nuclear
power.
There are good reasons for treating these claims with some
scepticism, and not merely because of disagreement among the parties,
but because what we have in effect with the final "solution
is
yet another proposal for a possible method of treating waste with
significant gaps in the arguments, a considerable lack of experimental
and practical support, and so on.11
We must be satisfied beyond
reasonable doubt that there is a completely safe procedure
before claims can be responsibily made that a problem of such
seriousness has been technically solved.
It is irresponsible,
especially on the part of university authorities, to give the
impression that such a problem is solved or eliminated when so much
remains to be done and when reasonable doubts may still be raised
as they may in this case.
An even more important reason why the
claims that the problem has been eliminated have to be rejected is
that even if a method of disposal can be experimentally (or even
commercially) demonstrated beyond reasonable doubt to be completely
safe, it is not the technical possibility of safe disposal that is
important from an ethical standpoint but the actual practical
likelihood of such a method being used.
Firstly, it is worth
�9.
bearing in mind that the new miracle method was immediately
rejected by some of the pronuclear establishment as both expensive
(despite optimistic cost estimates) and unnecessary, which does
not give a very hopeful prognosis for its use.
There are moreover
reasons for thinking that governments may not want or favour
permanent irretrievable disposal methods.
They may want to keep
open their options for employing waste either for military purposes
or for use in breeder reactors or elsewhere.
There is in fact
little reason to believe that nuclear pollution will be treated
in a different fashion from other forms of pollution, where the mere
fact that there are satisfactory methods of control is by no means
sufficient to guarantee their effective employment, especially if
they are expensive.
It would be methodologically unsound to ignore
these risk elements arising from social and political factors and
to regard the problem as a purely technological one which can be
classed as eliminated the moment someone puts forward a promising
looking technical proposal.
The practical likelihood, even with a
disposal method proven safe beyond reasonable doubt, remains - that
nuclear power will impose costs on future people who do not benefit,
that future people will either be forced to go to great expense and
trouble to dispose safely of the nuclear wastes generated by our
consumption, or that they will have to pay the price in their own
lives and health for inadequate disposal or storage of the wastes
generated by us.
For these reasons, we belive that the nuclear
energy option remains morally unacceptable!
and unacceptable not
merely from a particular ethical standpoint, but in terms of common
ground from a range of ethical positions.
§3.
One cannot pretend that the future energy option that is
frequently contrasted with nuclear, namely coal, is particularly
attractive - because of the likelihood of really serious (air)
�10.
pollution and associated phenomena such as acid rain and atmosphere
heating not to mention the despoliation caused by extensive strip
mining all of which will result from its use in meeting very high
Such an option would also fail,
projected consumption figures.
it seems, to meet the necessary condition, because it would impose
widespread costs on nonbeneficiaries for some concentrated benefits
to some profit takers and to some users who do not pay the full costs
x. 13
of production and replacement.
These are the conventional options and a third is often added
which emphasizes soft or benign technologies, such as those of
solar energy.
The fundamental choice, such options tend to neglect,
is not technological but social, and involves both the restructuring
of production away from energy intensive uses:
at a more basic level
there is a choice between consumeristic and nonconsumeristic futures.
These more fundamental choices between social alternatives, con
ventional technologically-oriented discussion tends to obscure.
It
is not just a matter of deciding in which way to meet unexamined goals
but also a matter of examining the goals.
That is, we are not just
faced with the question of comparing different technologies or
substitute ways of meeting some fixed or given demand or level of
consumption, and of trying to see whether we can meet this with
soft rather than hard technologies;
we are also faced, and primarily,
with the matter of examing those alleged needs and the cost of
society that creates them.
It is not just a question of devising
less damaging ways to meet these alleged needs conceived of us
inevitable and unchangeable.
(Hence there are solar ways of
producing unnecessary trivia no one really wants, as opposed to
nuclear ways).
Of course one does not want to deny that these
softer options are superior to the clearly ethically unacceptable
features of the others.
�lie
But it is doubtful that any technology however benign in
principle will be likely to leave a tolerable world for future
people if it is expected to meet limitless and uncontrolled energy
consumption and demands.
Even the more benign technologies such
as solar technology could be used in a way which creates costs for
future people and are likely to result in a deteriorated world
being handed on to them.
Consider, for example, the effect on the
world's forests, which are commonly counted as a solar resource, of
use for production of methonal or of electricity by woodchipping,
as already planned by forest authorities in California and contem
plated by many other energy organisations.
Few would object to the
use of genuine waste material for energy production, but the un
restricted exploitation of forests - whether it goes under the name
of "solar energy" or not - to meet ever increasing energy demands
could well be the last nail in the coffin of the world's already
hard pressed natural forests.
The effects of such additional demands on the maintenance of the
forests are often discounted, even by soft technologicalists, by
the simple expedient of waving around the label 'renewable resource'.
Most forests are in principle renewable, it is a true, given a
certain (low) rate and kind of exploitation, but in fact there are
now very few forestry operations anywhere in the world where the
forests are treated as completely renewable in the sense of the
renewal of all their values.in many regions too the rate of
exploitation which would enable renewal has already been exceeded,
so that a total decline is widely thought to be immanent if not
already well advanced.
It certainly has begun in some regions,
and for some forest types (such as rainforest types) which are being
lost for the future.
The addition of a major further demand source
that for energy— and especially one which shows every sign of being
not readily limitable,
on top of the present sources is one which
�12.
anyone with a realistic appreciation of the conduct of forestry
operations, who is also concerned with longterm conservation of
the forests and remaining natural communities, must regard with
alarm.
The result of massive deforestation for energy purposes,
resembling the deforestation of England at the beginning of the
Industrial Revolution, again for energy purposes, could be extensive
and devastating erosion in steeper lands and tropical areas,
desertification in more arid regions, possible climatic change, and
massive impoverishment of natural ecosystems.
Some of us do not
want to pass on - we are not entitled to pass on - a deforested world
to the future, any more than we want to pass on one poisoned by
nuclear products or polluted by coal products.
In short, a mere
switch to a more benign technology - important though this is - with
out any more basic structural and social change is not enough.
The deeper social options involve challenging and trying to
change a social structure which promotes consumerism and an economic
structure which encourages the use of highly energy-intensive modes
of production.
This means, for instance, trying to change a social
structure in which those who are lucky enough to make it into the
work force are cogs in a production machine over which they have
very little real control and in which most people do unpleasant or
boring work from which they derive very little real satisfaction in
order to obtain the reward of consumer goods and services.
A society
in which social rewards are obtained primarily from products rather
than processes, from consumption, rather than from satisfaction in work
and in social relations and other activities, is bound to be one which
generates a vast amount of unnecessary consumption.
(A production
system that produces goods not to meet genuine needs but for created
and non-genuine needs is virtually bound to overproduce.)
Consumption
frequently becomes a substitute for satisfaction in other areas.
�13.
§4. Conclusions.
The social change option is a hard option, but
it seems the only way to avoid passing on serious costs to the
future - and there are other sorts of reasons than such ethical
ones for taking it.15
The ethical conditions thus lead
us into
political issues, but this is not very surprising, as there is no
sharp division between the areas (and political theories always
presuppose an ethics).
This kind of social change option tends
to be obscured in most discussions of energy options and how to
meet our energy needs, in part because it questions underlying
values of current social arrangements.
The conventional discussion
proceeds by taking alleged demand (often restated as wants or needs)
as unchallengeable,16 and the issue to be one of which technology
can be most profitably employed to meet them.
This effectively
presents a false choice, and is the result of taking needs and demand
as lacking a social context so that the social structure which
produces the needs is similarly taken as unchallengable and unchange
able.
The social changes that the option requires will be strongly
resisted because they mean changes in current social organisation
and power structure, and to the extent that the option represents
some kind of threat to parts of present political and economic
arrangements it is not surprising that official energy option
discussion proceeds by misrepresenting and often obscuring it.
�FOOTNOTES
(1)
A more detailed case would look at what is involved in
decision methods for choosing between options on energy
and would show that general decision modellings, e.g.
optimisation modellings for best choice, necessarily involve
evaluative factors, some of them of a>n ethical kind.
The ethical components are particularly conspicuous in
elementary decision theory where the assessment of each
outcome is obtained by multiplying the probability of
the outcome by its desirability, the desirability being
an overtly evaluative question often involving ethical
components.
Any idea that decision theory is somehow a
value-free way of reaching decisions is thoroughly wrong.
The pure theory may be a logico—mathematical one, but its
significant applications are not.
(2)
The pernicious underlying assumption - that major ethical issues
are not really a matter of individual concern and can, and
perhaps should, be left to elected government_or appointed
bureaucrats - can be despatched in a rather similar way.
(3)
Even then relevant environmental factors may have been
neglected.
(4)
There are variations on (i) and (ii) which multiply costs
In this way risks,
against numbers such as probabilities.
construed as probable costs, can be taken into account in
the assessment. (Alternatively, risks may be assessed through
such familiar methods as insurance).
A principle varying (ii), and formulated as follows:
(ii') a is ethically acceptable if (for some b) a includes
no more risks than b and b is socially accepted,
was the basic ethical principle in terms of which the Cluff
Lake Board of Inquiry recently decided that nuclear power
development in Saskatchewan
is ethically acceptable:
see Cluff Lake Board of Inquiry Final Report, Department of
Environment, Government of Saskatchewan,
1978, p.305 and
p.288.
In this report, a is nuclear power and b is either
activities clearly accepted by society as alternative power
sources. In other applications b has been taken as cigarette
smoking, motoring, mining and even the Vietnam war(’)
The points made in the text do not exhaust the objections to
principles (i)-(ii’). The principles are certainly ethically
substantive, since an ethical consequence cannot be deduced.from
nonethical premisses, but they have an inadmissible conventional
character. For look at the origin of b: b may be socially
accepted though it is no longer socially acceptable, or though
its social acceptibility is no longer so clearcut and it would
not have been socially accepted if as much as is.now known.had
been known when it was introduced. What is required in (ii’),
for instance, for the argument to begin to look convincing is
then 'ethically acceptable1 rather than ’socially accepted'.
But even with the amendments the principles are invalid, for the
reasons given in the text.
It is not disconcerting that these arguments do not work.
It
would be sad to see yet another area lost to the experts/ namely
ethics to actuaries.
�2.
(5)
A main part of the trouble with the models is that they are
narrowly utilitarian, and like utilitarianism they neglect
distributional features, involve naturalistic fallacies, etc.
Really they try to treat as an unconstrained optimisation what
is a deontically constrained optimisation: see R. and V. Routley
'An expensive repair kit for utilitariansim'.
(6)
Apparent exceptions to the principle such as taxation (and
redistribution of income generally) vanish when wealth is
construed (as it has to be if taxation is to be properly
justified) as at least partly a social asset unfairly monopo
lised by a minority of the population.
Examples such as that of motoring dangerously do not constitute
counterexamples to the principle;
for one is not morally entitled
to so motor.
(7)
As we have argued in detail in R. and V. Routley 'Nuclear energy
and obligations to the future \ Inquiry 21 (1978), pp. 133-179 .
(8)
For example, Passmore in Man's Responsibility for Nature,
Duckworth, London, 1974, chapter 4.
(9)
A further problem of a less obvious kind is also created for
future people; the postponement of the switch away from energyintensive economies, which nuclear power is designed to effect,
creates a situation of increasing and critical dependence upon
energy-intensive uses at a time when there is eve.ry prospect that
Nevertheless
they cannot be sustained for more than a short time.
the growth of energy-intensive societies and lifestyles is encouraged
and fostered.
The switch is accordingly made far more difficult
than it is at present, and thus we may well be placing future
people in very difficult positions, with a real energy crisis.
Continuance on a high energy path in the present circumstances
seems then to violate the commonly recognised principle that we
have an obligation to hand on to the next generation a society
that is not conspicuously worse than that which we received.
(10)
A few nuclear plant accidents, for example, would significantly
increase background levels of radiation, so that millions of
people who are not involved might have to carry risks or costs
because of the energy consumption of a few wealthy nations or
wealthy elites. The increased risk of nuclear war is another
way in which global risks are imposed because of the determination
of industrial nations to maintain and increase lavish energy
consumption levels.
(11)
For an excellent discussion of the limitations of the proposed
disposal method see B. Martin, 'Radioactive waste disposal:
is Synroc the solution?'
(12)
For the reason that the consequences of failure are so serious:
see R. and V. Routley, op. cit. footnote 1.
(13)
Certainly practical transitional programs may involve temporary
and limited use of unacceptable long term commodities such as
coal, but in presenting such practical details one should not
lose sight of the more basic social and structural changes, and
the problem is really one of making those.
Similarly practical transitional strategies should make use of
such measures as environmental (or replacement) pricing of energy,
i.e. so that the price of some energy unit includes the full cost
�3.
footnote 13 continued.
of replacing it by an equivalent unit taking account
of environmental cost of production. Other (sometimes
coootive)
strategies towards more satisfactory alter
natives should also, of course, be adopted, in particular
the removal of institutional barriers to energy conser
vation and alternative technology (e.g. local government
regulations blocking these), and the removal of state
assistance to fuel and power industries.
(14)
Symptomatic of the fact that is it not treated as renewable
is that forest economics do not generally allow for full
renewability - if they did the losses and deficits on
forestry operations would be much more striking than they
already are often enough.
It is doubtful, furthermore, that energy cropping of
forests can be a fully renewable operation if net energy.
production is to be worthwhile; see, e.g. the argument m
L.R.B. Mann ’Some difficulties with energy farming for
portable fuels', and add in the costs of ecosystem maintenance.
(15)
Certainly it is the only sort of option open to one who takes
a deeper ecological perspective.
(16)
Thus it is argued by representatives of such industries as
transportation and petroleum, as for example by McGrowth of
the XS Consumption Co., that people want deep freezers, air
conditioners, power boats,- It would be authoritarian to stop them
satisfying these wants. The argument conveniently ignores
the social framework in which such needs and wants arise or
are produced. To point to the determination of many such
wants at the framework level is not hower to accept a Marxist
approach according to which they are entirely determined at
the framework level (e.g. by industrial organisation) an .
there is no such thing as individual choice or determination
at all. It is to see the social framework as a major factor
in determining certain kinds of choices such as those for
travel and infrastructure and to see apparently individual
choices made in such matters as being channelled.and directed
by a social framework determined largely in the interests o
private profit and advantage. See R.,and V. Routlev,
'Towards a social theory for ecotopia'.
�
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SOME ETHICAL ASPECTS OF ENERGY OPTIONS.
R. and V. Routley
Plumwood Mountain
Box 37 Braidwood, NSW. 2622.
Major ethical issues intrude conspicuously into the question
For example, the Kantian question:
of energy choice.
what ought
we to do (or try to do) in the awkward circumstances that will shortly
face us on the energy-front?
And Aristotle’s question:
What is a
a question transposed these days into questions as
good life like?
to quality of life and the extent to which quality genuinely depends
on quantity of energy (Aristotle thought, by the way, that a good
life required only a modicum of material goods.)
questions such as:
And traditional
What are we morally entitled to do to others,
and with respect to nature?
a question extended to include future
others and now asked seriously as regards wild nature.
modern questions such as:
And more
which sorts of consumer demand —
especially of energy-intensive goods - should be met?
It is evident enough then, without going into details , that
ethical questions have an important bearing on main issues on
energy choice and that a pure social engineering
approach to
the problem is bound to write in much that calls for examination
or rejection.
But it is often supposed - mistakenly - that the
ethical issues are adequately taken care of in the structures we
already have, e.g. through internal political and legal structures
and by international legal arrangements.
Suppose, it is said, the question of replacement of burners in
a Japanese electricity station arises, and the Japanese decide to
replace the burners by nuclear ones.
routine political way.
wider morality?
for the Japanese.
The matter is approved in a
Who are we to say that the matter is one of
It is a matter of internal pclitical arrangements
Suppose, to begin to see that this is not so,
that a nation decides to install(or replace in the course of modern
2.
isation) the burners in a concentration camp, and that the matter
is approved in a routine political fashion and meets all internal
legal requirements.
We are almost all going to say that the matter
is one of wider morality.
And so also is taking choices on the life,
health and well being of future people in a nuclear adventure.
More
generally, pollution, and especially non-local types of pollution
such as nuclear pollution, raises ethical issues which transcend
conventional national and political boundaries.
For the effects of
pollution are often not locally contained, polluted air or water may
move far afield to affect even features of the world, such as climate
and ocean levels.
The idea that the ethics of such matters is satisfactorily
regulated by international legal arrangements - agreements, pacts,
contracts and the like or international regulatory agencies (where
they operate) - is likewise unsound.
For the arrangements commonly
bear little relation to what is considered right or just:
they
may have been arrived at by expediency or, at best, through moral
compromise, and they may reflect immediate self-interest rather
than morality.
Just as legal principles are in general neither
necessary nor sufficient as moral principles, so international
legal arrangements are no substitute for morality, and usually do
not even offer, a poor reflection of ethical arrangements.
More difficult to dispose of, and more insidious, are
engineering approaches to morality built into models of an economic
cast, e.g. benefit-cost balance sheets, risk assessment models, etc.
§1.
It is a commonplace nowadays that there is no method of pro
viding for future energy needs which will not involve substantial
costs to someone, and that these costs must just be accepted as
part of the price we pay for our advanced technological society and
our high living standard.
"If you want the benefits you must be
prepared to pay the costs" is part of the new conventional wisdom
3.
on energy.
The model is that of a simple economic transaction, for
example someone going into a shop and buying paper towels — she
wants the paper so she must be prepared to pay over the money
representing the equivalent of the cost of the paper in unpleasant
labour, forest destruction, etc.
But here, on energy, as in so many other places, the conventional
wisdom is not to be trusted.
For the transaction model suggests
that the costs and benefits are evenly distributed, that those who
benefit pay the costs and vice versa.
is very often
But with energy options this
not so, and in fact this is one of the more important
ways in which the ethical aspects of the energy issue arise.
The
conventional transaction model is an attempt to gloss over crucial
ethical aspects of the problem.
Again, the energy issue raises
questions about the goals (ends) and values of society, and is not
just a disagreement about the best means of achieving unquestioned
or accepted goals, and it has an important bearing too on the
distribution of power both economic and political between various
groups.
Thus are involved then crucial political as well as ethical
aspects, and these too the simple transaction model attempts to sweep
under the carpet.
The simple transaction model, despite its appeal
to the technological mind, and to those who are anxious to maintain
the myth of the political and value freedomness of science and
technology, is quite inadequate, for it does not reflect significant
distributional features of the energy problem.
It is in fact an
attempt to ignore, deny or gloss over the crucial political and
ethical aspects of the energy issue, and to avoid facing the social
and ethical choices involved.
A more sophisticated relative of the transaction model is
now called risk assessment, which purports to provide a comparison
between the relative risks attached to different energy options which
settles their ethical status.
The following lines of argument are
4.
encountered in risk assessment as applied to energy options:
(i)
if option a imposes costs on fewer people than option b
then option a is preferable to option b;
(ii)
option a involves a total net cost in terms of cost to
people (e.g. deaths, injuries, etc.) which is less than of option b,
3
which is already accepted; therefore option a is acceptable.
For example, the number likely to be killed by nuclear power stations
is less than the likely number killed by cigarette smoking, which is
accepted:
So nuclear power stations are acceptable.
A little
reflection reveals that this sort of risk assessment argument involves
the same kind of fallacy as the transaction model.
It is far too
simple-minded, and it ignores distributional and other relevant
aspects of the context.
In order to obtain an ethical assessment
we should need a much fuller picture and we should need to know at
least these things:-
do the costs and benefits go to the same parties;
and is the person who undertakes the risks also the person who
receives the benefits or primarily, as in driving or cigarette smoking,
or are costs imposed on other parties who do not benefit?
It is
only if the parties are the same in the case of the options compared,
and there are no such distributional problems, that a comparison on
such a basis would be valid.4
This is rarely the case, and it is
not so in the case of risk assessments of energy options.
Secondly,
does the person incur the risk as a result of an activity which he
knowingly undertakes in a situation where he has a reasonable choice,
knowing it entails the risk, etc., and is the level of risk in
proportion to the level of the relevant activity, e.g. as in smoking?
Thirdly, for what reason is the risk imposed:
or a relatively trivial reason?
is it for a serious
A risk that is ethically acceptable
for a serious reason may not be ethically acceptably for a trivial
reason.
Both the arguments (i) and (ii) are often
trying to justify nuclear power.
employed in
The second argument (ii) involves
5.
the fallacies of the first (i) and an additional set, namely that
of forgetting that the health risks in the nuclear sense are
cumulative, and in the eyes of many people already high if not too
high.
Despite a certain superficial plausibility, so-called risk
assessment as a method of comparing the ethical status of energy
options is little more than a bundle of fallacies deceptively
packaged in pseudo-scientific wrappings.
It purports to give a
simple apparently precise and scientific method of evaluating the
ethical status of energy options, but in fact it depends on a number
of hidden assumptions about which factors are relevant and which can
be ignored in an ethical assessment, which when brought out for
examination can be seen to be guite unacceptable.
§2. The maxim "If you want the benefits you have to accept the
costs" is one thing and the maxim "If I want the benefits then you
have to accept the costs (or some of them at least)" is another
and very different thing.
It is a widely accepted moral principle
that one is not, in general, entitled to simply transfer costs of a
significant kind arising from an activity which benefits oneself
onto other parties who are not involved in the activity and are not
beneficiaries.
This transfer principle
is especially clear in
cases where the significant costs include an effect on life or
health or a risk thereof, and where the benefit to the benefitting
party is of a noncrucial or dispensible nature.
(Thus one is not
usually entitled to harm, or risk harming, another in the process of
benefitting oneself.)
Suppose, for example, we consider a village
which produces, as a result of the industrial process by which it
lives, a noxious waste material which is expensive and difficult
to dispose/ye^t creates a risk to life and health if undisposed of.
Instead of giving up their industrial process and turning to some
other way of making a living such as farming the surrounding
6.
countryside, they persist with this way of life but ship their
problem on a one-way delivery service to the next village.
The
inhabitants of this village are then forced to face the problem
either of undertaking the expensive and difficult disposal process
or of sustaining risks to their own lives and health.
Most of us
would see this kind of transfer of costs as morally unacceptable.
From this arises a necessary condition for energy options:
that to be morally acceptable they should not involve the transfer
of significant costs or risks of harm onto parties who are not
involved, do not use the energy source or do not benefit corres
pondingly from its use.
Included in the scope of this condition
are future people, i.e. not merely people living at the present time
7
but also future generations (those of the next villages).
The
distribution of costs and damage in such a fashion, i.e. onto non
beneficiaries is a characteristic of certain widespread and serious
forms of pollution, and is one of its most objectionable morel
features.
It is a corollary of the condition that we should not hand the
world on to our successors in substantially worse shape than we
received it - the transmission principle.
For if we did then that
would be a significant transfer of costs.
(The corollary can be
independently argued for on the basis of certain ethical theories,
in particular contract theories such as Rawls’.)
Some philosophers8 have attempted to undercut the trans
mission principle, arguing that we are not morally obligated to
make sacrifices for the future.
Making sacrifices is however signifi
cantly different from refraining from passing on costs, and it is
the latter which is mainly at issue.
We might be making sacrifices,
for example, if we made ourselves worse off than future people might
be normally expected to be in order that they might be better off
than us.
We are passing on our costs when we make them worse off
7.
than they would normally be because of some activity which benefits
us.
We may not be morally obliged to make sacrifices for future
people, but we do have a moral obligation not to pass on our costs,
and our obligations in this respect do not just apply to the next
generation, but to any set of people who could be affected.
In terms of the necessary condition we can undertake some
limited comparison of energy options from an ethical standpoint.
It is very doubtful that the main options that are being seriously
considered meet this condition for moral acceptibility ;
in particular
it is extremely doubtful that nuclear energy options do so.
Nuclear
energy appears to represent a classic case of passing on costs and
risks to nonbeneficiaries, especially future people, because of the
way in which nuclear waste created now produces risks and problems
for future people.
Unless a rigorously safe method of storage is
employed, as many as 40,000
generations of people have to face costs
in the shape of risks to health and life arising from the energy
consumption of at most perhaps 10 generations.
even worse when
The situation is
one reflects on the fact that many of the purposes
for which this energy will be required are of a dispensible and
unnecessary (and even undesirable) nature, and energy use of an
extravagant and needless kind would undoubtedly be involved in order
for the big increases in per capita energy consumption which justify
much of the nuclear expansion program in the industrialised world
to be reached.
Not only would costs be passed on to people in the
distant future to whom no benefits seem to accrue but his is done
9
for reasons that cannot be seen as pressing or needful.
The waste
disposal aspect of nuclear power production is not the only way in
which the nuclear option may pass on problems and costs to nonbene
ficiaries:
unless an unrealistic perfection in the handling, mining,
transport and processing and reprocessing of nuclear fuels and waste
8.
is assumed, various forms of widespread radioactive pollution could
occur which would affect not only those who use and benefit from
the energy source but also very many who do not, especially m the
third world.10
We have heard a good deal recently from some local quarters
(the PR machinery of the Australian National University) about how
the nuclear waste disposal problem has been solved, and the objections
on the grounds of waste disposal eleminated.
Of course a number
of similar claims have been made in the past, and there never
was a problem according to hard-line nuclear advocates of nuclear
power.
There are good reasons for treating these claims with some
scepticism, and not merely because of disagreement among the parties,
but because what we have in effect with the final "solution
is
yet another proposal for a possible method of treating waste with
significant gaps in the arguments, a considerable lack of experimental
and practical support, and so on.11
We must be satisfied beyond
reasonable doubt that there is a completely safe procedure
before claims can be responsibily made that a problem of such
seriousness has been technically solved.
It is irresponsible,
especially on the part of university authorities, to give the
impression that such a problem is solved or eliminated when so much
remains to be done and when reasonable doubts may still be raised
as they may in this case.
An even more important reason why the
claims that the problem has been eliminated have to be rejected is
that even if a method of disposal can be experimentally (or even
commercially) demonstrated beyond reasonable doubt to be completely
safe, it is not the technical possibility of safe disposal that is
important from an ethical standpoint but the actual practical
likelihood of such a method being used.
Firstly, it is worth
9.
bearing in mind that the new miracle method was immediately
rejected by some of the pronuclear establishment as both expensive
(despite optimistic cost estimates) and unnecessary, which does
not give a very hopeful prognosis for its use.
There are moreover
reasons for thinking that governments may not want or favour
permanent irretrievable disposal methods.
They may want to keep
open their options for employing waste either for military purposes
or for use in breeder reactors or elsewhere.
There is in fact
little reason to believe that nuclear pollution will be treated
in a different fashion from other forms of pollution, where the mere
fact that there are satisfactory methods of control is by no means
sufficient to guarantee their effective employment, especially if
they are expensive.
It would be methodologically unsound to ignore
these risk elements arising from social and political factors and
to regard the problem as a purely technological one which can be
classed as eliminated the moment someone puts forward a promising
looking technical proposal.
The practical likelihood, even with a
disposal method proven safe beyond reasonable doubt, remains - that
nuclear power will impose costs on future people who do not benefit,
that future people will either be forced to go to great expense and
trouble to dispose safely of the nuclear wastes generated by our
consumption, or that they will have to pay the price in their own
lives and health for inadequate disposal or storage of the wastes
generated by us.
For these reasons, we belive that the nuclear
energy option remains morally unacceptable!
and unacceptable not
merely from a particular ethical standpoint, but in terms of common
ground from a range of ethical positions.
§3.
One cannot pretend that the future energy option that is
frequently contrasted with nuclear, namely coal, is particularly
attractive - because of the likelihood of really serious (air)
10.
pollution and associated phenomena such as acid rain and atmosphere
heating not to mention the despoliation caused by extensive strip
mining all of which will result from its use in meeting very high
Such an option would also fail,
projected consumption figures.
it seems, to meet the necessary condition, because it would impose
widespread costs on nonbeneficiaries for some concentrated benefits
to some profit takers and to some users who do not pay the full costs
x. 13
of production and replacement.
These are the conventional options and a third is often added
which emphasizes soft or benign technologies, such as those of
solar energy.
The fundamental choice, such options tend to neglect,
is not technological but social, and involves both the restructuring
of production away from energy intensive uses:
at a more basic level
there is a choice between consumeristic and nonconsumeristic futures.
These more fundamental choices between social alternatives, con
ventional technologically-oriented discussion tends to obscure.
It
is not just a matter of deciding in which way to meet unexamined goals
but also a matter of examining the goals.
That is, we are not just
faced with the question of comparing different technologies or
substitute ways of meeting some fixed or given demand or level of
consumption, and of trying to see whether we can meet this with
soft rather than hard technologies;
we are also faced, and primarily,
with the matter of examing those alleged needs and the cost of
society that creates them.
It is not just a question of devising
less damaging ways to meet these alleged needs conceived of us
inevitable and unchangeable.
(Hence there are solar ways of
producing unnecessary trivia no one really wants, as opposed to
nuclear ways).
Of course one does not want to deny that these
softer options are superior to the clearly ethically unacceptable
features of the others.
lie
But it is doubtful that any technology however benign in
principle will be likely to leave a tolerable world for future
people if it is expected to meet limitless and uncontrolled energy
consumption and demands.
Even the more benign technologies such
as solar technology could be used in a way which creates costs for
future people and are likely to result in a deteriorated world
being handed on to them.
Consider, for example, the effect on the
world's forests, which are commonly counted as a solar resource, of
use for production of methonal or of electricity by woodchipping,
as already planned by forest authorities in California and contem
plated by many other energy organisations.
Few would object to the
use of genuine waste material for energy production, but the un
restricted exploitation of forests - whether it goes under the name
of "solar energy" or not - to meet ever increasing energy demands
could well be the last nail in the coffin of the world's already
hard pressed natural forests.
The effects of such additional demands on the maintenance of the
forests are often discounted, even by soft technologicalists, by
the simple expedient of waving around the label 'renewable resource'.
Most forests are in principle renewable, it is a true, given a
certain (low) rate and kind of exploitation, but in fact there are
now very few forestry operations anywhere in the world where the
forests are treated as completely renewable in the sense of the
renewal of all their values.in many regions too the rate of
exploitation which would enable renewal has already been exceeded,
so that a total decline is widely thought to be immanent if not
already well advanced.
It certainly has begun in some regions,
and for some forest types (such as rainforest types) which are being
lost for the future.
The addition of a major further demand source
that for energy— and especially one which shows every sign of being
not readily limitable,
on top of the present sources is one which
12.
anyone with a realistic appreciation of the conduct of forestry
operations, who is also concerned with longterm conservation of
the forests and remaining natural communities, must regard with
alarm.
The result of massive deforestation for energy purposes,
resembling the deforestation of England at the beginning of the
Industrial Revolution, again for energy purposes, could be extensive
and devastating erosion in steeper lands and tropical areas,
desertification in more arid regions, possible climatic change, and
massive impoverishment of natural ecosystems.
Some of us do not
want to pass on - we are not entitled to pass on - a deforested world
to the future, any more than we want to pass on one poisoned by
nuclear products or polluted by coal products.
In short, a mere
switch to a more benign technology - important though this is - with
out any more basic structural and social change is not enough.
The deeper social options involve challenging and trying to
change a social structure which promotes consumerism and an economic
structure which encourages the use of highly energy-intensive modes
of production.
This means, for instance, trying to change a social
structure in which those who are lucky enough to make it into the
work force are cogs in a production machine over which they have
very little real control and in which most people do unpleasant or
boring work from which they derive very little real satisfaction in
order to obtain the reward of consumer goods and services.
A society
in which social rewards are obtained primarily from products rather
than processes, from consumption, rather than from satisfaction in work
and in social relations and other activities, is bound to be one which
generates a vast amount of unnecessary consumption.
(A production
system that produces goods not to meet genuine needs but for created
and non-genuine needs is virtually bound to overproduce.)
Consumption
frequently becomes a substitute for satisfaction in other areas.
13.
§4. Conclusions.
The social change option is a hard option, but
it seems the only way to avoid passing on serious costs to the
future - and there are other sorts of reasons than such ethical
ones for taking it.15
The ethical conditions thus lead
us into
political issues, but this is not very surprising, as there is no
sharp division between the areas (and political theories always
presuppose an ethics).
This kind of social change option tends
to be obscured in most discussions of energy options and how to
meet our energy needs, in part because it questions underlying
values of current social arrangements.
The conventional discussion
proceeds by taking alleged demand (often restated as wants or needs)
as unchallengeable,16 and the issue to be one of which technology
can be most profitably employed to meet them.
This effectively
presents a false choice, and is the result of taking needs and demand
as lacking a social context so that the social structure which
produces the needs is similarly taken as unchallengable and unchange
able.
The social changes that the option requires will be strongly
resisted because they mean changes in current social organisation
and power structure, and to the extent that the option represents
some kind of threat to parts of present political and economic
arrangements it is not surprising that official energy option
discussion proceeds by misrepresenting and often obscuring it.
FOOTNOTES
(1)
A more detailed case would look at what is involved in
decision methods for choosing between options on energy
and would show that general decision modellings, e.g.
optimisation modellings for best choice, necessarily involve
evaluative factors, some of them of a>n ethical kind.
The ethical components are particularly conspicuous in
elementary decision theory where the assessment of each
outcome is obtained by multiplying the probability of
the outcome by its desirability, the desirability being
an overtly evaluative question often involving ethical
components.
Any idea that decision theory is somehow a
value-free way of reaching decisions is thoroughly wrong.
The pure theory may be a logico—mathematical one, but its
significant applications are not.
(2)
The pernicious underlying assumption - that major ethical issues
are not really a matter of individual concern and can, and
perhaps should, be left to elected government_or appointed
bureaucrats - can be despatched in a rather similar way.
(3)
Even then relevant environmental factors may have been
neglected.
(4)
There are variations on (i) and (ii) which multiply costs
In this way risks,
against numbers such as probabilities.
construed as probable costs, can be taken into account in
the assessment. (Alternatively, risks may be assessed through
such familiar methods as insurance).
A principle varying (ii), and formulated as follows:
(ii') a is ethically acceptable if (for some b) a includes
no more risks than b and b is socially accepted,
was the basic ethical principle in terms of which the Cluff
Lake Board of Inquiry recently decided that nuclear power
development in Saskatchewan
is ethically acceptable:
see Cluff Lake Board of Inquiry Final Report, Department of
Environment, Government of Saskatchewan,
1978, p.305 and
p.288.
In this report, a is nuclear power and b is either
activities clearly accepted by society as alternative power
sources. In other applications b has been taken as cigarette
smoking, motoring, mining and even the Vietnam war(’)
The points made in the text do not exhaust the objections to
principles (i)-(ii’). The principles are certainly ethically
substantive, since an ethical consequence cannot be deduced.from
nonethical premisses, but they have an inadmissible conventional
character. For look at the origin of b: b may be socially
accepted though it is no longer socially acceptable, or though
its social acceptibility is no longer so clearcut and it would
not have been socially accepted if as much as is.now known.had
been known when it was introduced. What is required in (ii’),
for instance, for the argument to begin to look convincing is
then 'ethically acceptable1 rather than ’socially accepted'.
But even with the amendments the principles are invalid, for the
reasons given in the text.
It is not disconcerting that these arguments do not work.
It
would be sad to see yet another area lost to the experts/ namely
ethics to actuaries.
2.
(5)
A main part of the trouble with the models is that they are
narrowly utilitarian, and like utilitarianism they neglect
distributional features, involve naturalistic fallacies, etc.
Really they try to treat as an unconstrained optimisation what
is a deontically constrained optimisation: see R. and V. Routley
'An expensive repair kit for utilitariansim'.
(6)
Apparent exceptions to the principle such as taxation (and
redistribution of income generally) vanish when wealth is
construed (as it has to be if taxation is to be properly
justified) as at least partly a social asset unfairly monopo
lised by a minority of the population.
Examples such as that of motoring dangerously do not constitute
counterexamples to the principle;
for one is not morally entitled
to so motor.
(7)
As we have argued in detail in R. and V. Routley 'Nuclear energy
and obligations to the future \ Inquiry 21 (1978), pp. 133-179 .
(8)
For example, Passmore in Man's Responsibility for Nature,
Duckworth, London, 1974, chapter 4.
(9)
A further problem of a less obvious kind is also created for
future people; the postponement of the switch away from energyintensive economies, which nuclear power is designed to effect,
creates a situation of increasing and critical dependence upon
energy-intensive uses at a time when there is eve.ry prospect that
Nevertheless
they cannot be sustained for more than a short time.
the growth of energy-intensive societies and lifestyles is encouraged
and fostered.
The switch is accordingly made far more difficult
than it is at present, and thus we may well be placing future
people in very difficult positions, with a real energy crisis.
Continuance on a high energy path in the present circumstances
seems then to violate the commonly recognised principle that we
have an obligation to hand on to the next generation a society
that is not conspicuously worse than that which we received.
(10)
A few nuclear plant accidents, for example, would significantly
increase background levels of radiation, so that millions of
people who are not involved might have to carry risks or costs
because of the energy consumption of a few wealthy nations or
wealthy elites. The increased risk of nuclear war is another
way in which global risks are imposed because of the determination
of industrial nations to maintain and increase lavish energy
consumption levels.
(11)
For an excellent discussion of the limitations of the proposed
disposal method see B. Martin, 'Radioactive waste disposal:
is Synroc the solution?'
(12)
For the reason that the consequences of failure are so serious:
see R. and V. Routley, op. cit. footnote 1.
(13)
Certainly practical transitional programs may involve temporary
and limited use of unacceptable long term commodities such as
coal, but in presenting such practical details one should not
lose sight of the more basic social and structural changes, and
the problem is really one of making those.
Similarly practical transitional strategies should make use of
such measures as environmental (or replacement) pricing of energy,
i.e. so that the price of some energy unit includes the full cost
3.
footnote 13 continued.
of replacing it by an equivalent unit taking account
of environmental cost of production. Other (sometimes
coootive)
strategies towards more satisfactory alter
natives should also, of course, be adopted, in particular
the removal of institutional barriers to energy conser
vation and alternative technology (e.g. local government
regulations blocking these), and the removal of state
assistance to fuel and power industries.
(14)
Symptomatic of the fact that is it not treated as renewable
is that forest economics do not generally allow for full
renewability - if they did the losses and deficits on
forestry operations would be much more striking than they
already are often enough.
It is doubtful, furthermore, that energy cropping of
forests can be a fully renewable operation if net energy.
production is to be worthwhile; see, e.g. the argument m
L.R.B. Mann ’Some difficulties with energy farming for
portable fuels', and add in the costs of ecosystem maintenance.
(15)
Certainly it is the only sort of option open to one who takes
a deeper ecological perspective.
(16)
Thus it is argued by representatives of such industries as
transportation and petroleum, as for example by McGrowth of
the XS Consumption Co., that people want deep freezers, air
conditioners, power boats,- It would be authoritarian to stop them
satisfying these wants. The argument conveniently ignores
the social framework in which such needs and wants arise or
are produced. To point to the determination of many such
wants at the framework level is not hower to accept a Marxist
approach according to which they are entirely determined at
the framework level (e.g. by industrial organisation) an .
there is no such thing as individual choice or determination
at all. It is to see the social framework as a major factor
in determining certain kinds of choices such as those for
travel and infrastructure and to see apparently individual
choices made in such matters as being channelled.and directed
by a social framework determined largely in the interests o
private profit and advantage. See R.,and V. Routlev,
'Towards a social theory for ecotopia'.
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�Nuclear energy and obligations to the future.
.. .discussion of values and goods may seem
fuzzy and unscientific, but it is the beginning
and end of any energy policy ... . (Lovins, 75, xxii).
Important ethical issues concerning obligations to the
future and evaluative issues as to what sort of world we want
to see are raised by proposed nuclear development, but have been
largely neglected in current technologically oriented discussion
of the development.
The first part of the paper considers the
arguments of a number of philosophers
philosophical positions
(e.g.
obligations to the future
we do have practical,
(e.g. Passmore)
and
c
social contract theories)
and rejects them.
concerning
It concludes that
and not merely theoretical, moral obligations
to the non-immediate future, and that these are not made void
by temporal remoteness or some degree of uncertainty about the
effects of our nations.
The second part of the paper considers
a number of examples of crimes against the future and sets the
more comp ex nuclear energy case against this background.
One
philosophical corollary which emerges is the falsity of the still
common view that philosophical analysis of moral concepts,
meta-ethics,
or
is neutral with respect to practical moral issues.
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���A more fundamental challenge to the poverty argument appears
in I.
Illich, Energy and Equity, Calder and Boyers, London,
1974,
where it is argued that the sort of development nuclear energy
represents is exactly the opposite of what the poor need.
The
main thesis seems to be that a society heavily dependent for basic
needs on capital demanding, commercially or centrally controllable
energy forms
(especially for transport), will inevitably create
energy hierachies and en/l ance poverty and inequalities in contrast
to a society employing low capital energy sources which people
control themselves,
fairly convincing,
such as bicycles or feet.
The main thesis is
given that there is unequal access to capital
and centralised power,
even if the argument for it leaves something
to be desired and the emphasis on speed as the critical factor
seems mistaken
(would the invention of a cheap 60 m.p.h.
bicycle
thereby convert the bicycle to an instrument of hierarchy?)
If
the thesis is correct the common economic assumption that the
solution to poverty lies in more and more massive inputs of costly
energy is mistaken in a quite fundamental way.
�Elaboration of
'Nuclear energy and obligations to the future, :
A note on expertise and methodology.
Some people may ask why philosophers, who know nothing about
nuclear physics,
should be dealing with this area, which surely
should be left to the province of the real experts in the area,
nuclear physicists and those with direct experience and authority
in the area of nuclear power.
One of the most irritating things in this area for a
philosopher is the sight of such people constantly presented, by
themselves and others,
as experts and authorities whose pronounce
ments on the issue should be accepted without question by laymen
(see e.g. articles
[15]
and
[16]), when in fact the issues involve
quite crucially issues of and assumptions about values and morality^
matters concerning which the so-called "authorities'
and
experts
commonly know less than the average first year student in philosophy.
Value issues and moral issues and issues of social and political
theory are probably more crucially concerned in the nuclear issues
than are issues of fact concerning nuclear power, and certainly
they are just as important.
Few philosophers nowadays would want to claim to be
experts
or "authorities" on matters of value or morality in the way nuclear
experts claim to be authorities on matters of nuclear power, who
can tell people what to do in way which is authoritative or
which must be uncritically accepted by the non-experts/non
philosophers .
Rejection of the argument from authority is basic
in proper philosophical method, going back to Plato and beyond,
and forming a basic position without which the subject,
as critical
inquiry into basic assumptions, could not operate as it does and
traditionally has.
Indeed rejection of the argument from
authority is one feature which distinguishes philosophy proper
from closely related areas such as theology,
casuistry,
some
�2.
areas of legal thought and various types of apology.
But a form
of the argument from authority-the claim to entitlement to have
one’s word or views accepted, not on the basis of what one says
and how sound it is,
but of who one is - appears however to be
an important element in the modern cult of the "scientific expert"
which has played such a large part in the contempory Australian
discussion of the nuclear issue.
While most philosophers would
reject the view that they were "experts"
or moral issues,
in this sense on values
philosophers can fairly lay claim to a number of
special skills which enable them to bring out explicit assumptions
about values or morality,
and expose defects in arguments.
philosophers also have moral views,
Most
that is, they believe some
things to be morally acceptable and others morally unacceptable,
although some might prefer to express similar attitudes without
use of explicit moral terminology.
In writing this paper then we don't hope to be accepted as
'authorities' or
'experts'
on moral questions, but only to have
skills which may throw light on some areas.
bring out value and moral assumptions,
We have tried to
expose logical defects and
inconsistencies in the structure of some of the arguments and in
certain sorts of argument concerning the future,
and to argue that
if one accepts a certain moral judgment
(which we accept and which
we believe would be widely agreed on*),
one should,
going to be consistent,
principles,
non-arbitrary ,
accept a certain other one.
if one is
and follow through one's
This seems to us a proper
area for philosophical work.
The non-philosophical or background factual assumptions which
are essential for discussing the issue are not large, and are in
substance only those of the Fox Report
(p.110,
in particular).
* We are sure that philosophers can be found who will disagree with
virtually every statement we make.
�Nuclear Power
Ethical and Social Dimensions
The issue of nuclear power raises many basic issues in ethics.
By means of an example, we argue for the illegitimacy of certain
sorts of transfers of costs,
transfers from one party who obtains
benefits from a given course of action,
onto other parties who do
The inadequate methods currently available for storing nuclear
not.
wastes mean that nuclear power could permit such an illegitimate
transfer of serious costs and risks onto future people.
Many of
the arguments for the acceptability of imposing such risks on the
future ignore these crucial ethical transfer issues.
We argue that
the mot'Q 1 constraints on action such transfer principles give rise
to are not removed by the fact that those affected are future and
not present people.
The nuclear issue and associated arguments also raise in a
highly topical wSy
really
many basic issues in social theory.
Do people
’need' all the consumer items nuclear power is supposed to
allow for,
and is it authoritarian or wrong to frustrate such needs,
or are such needs in part imposed by a particular, alterable social
framework?
Are existing democratic mechanisms for control over
the social framework adequate, or do they give inadequate control
and permit excessive concentrations of power?
If the answer to the
last question is affirmative, what kinds of social changes would
prevent such>concentrations of power and allow for more adequate
control by people over the social framework and over their own
lives?
The approach to all these questions depends crucially on
how the underlying elements of social interaction are conceived are these basic elements pure individuals, are they social wholes,
or do we need to assume both, distinct and irreducible, as we shall
argue ?
R. and V,. Rout ley
�t.
;
/
%
//
C
.
f
« ^7
£C—e
Z'
fe
c*
—
fl
AUStrOl/LCt'S
I£ nuclear energy is unacceptable on moral grounds, what of
Australia s role in cooperating in its development overseas?
Is its development
inevitable, as some say, so that others would sell if we didn’t and Australia
would simply profit from the folly and immorality of others?
assumption is false.
This inevitability
Most countries considering nuclear energy are not yet
irreversibly committed to it, and have other options.
Australia has a good
percentage of the world’s high-grade reserves of uranium and is regarded by western
powers as a stable and reliable energy source.
In so far as there is an economic
case for nuclear energy development, the relative cheapness of its fuel and
reliability of its source is a major part of it.
It seems likely that by with'
�holding its uranium Australia could shake this assumption and thus be influential
in directing attention to alternatives.
Nuclear energy development is not
inevitable, but even if it were, inevitability does not cancel moral responsibility.
Few would accept the argument of the hired assassin that if he did not do the job
someone else would be found who would perhaps make a messier job of it.
Australia
does not evade moral responsibility by arguing in a similar way, that other, possibly
even less responsible, suppliers would emerge.
Other arguments are presented to excuse Australia’s collaboration in nuclear
development, that by selling its uranium Australia will help prevent nuclear
proliferation and the development of the breeder reactor.
The argument that widely
exporting the basic means of making nuclear weapons is the best means of preventing
nuclear proliferation compares, in its twisted logic, with the all too familiar
6,,-vvA
claims that war is the best means of promoting peace, that the best way to assist
the poor is to increase the power of the wealthy^and so on.
help prevent development of the breeder reactor?
Will uranium export
That seems, at least, unlikely,
since the most important potential customers, in Europe, have already announced
their determination to proceed with it, while the other most important customer,
Japan, has made no secret of its interest in it.
faulty too.
But such an argument is logically
The fact that the breeder creates even worse problems, for present
people, than conventional fission reators hardly shows that conventional fission
A
is acceptable or ought not also to be opposed.
These are not exhaustive options,
and the case against even conventional fission energy is a sufficiently strong one.
The strategy of the argument here is to suggest that rather than opposing or
resisting something immoral, one should collaborate in it in order to use one’s
influence to secure improvements;
this would justify, for example, assisting in
fabricating evidence against an innocent man in order to use one’s influence to
ensure minimum suffering, a speedy trial and humane execution.
These arguments to excuse Australia’s participation are sad and threadbare,
exhibiting the morality of the market.
There seems little doubt that Australia’s
collaboration will assist and encourage the development of nuclear energy as
opposed to alternatives.
Thus Australia’s uranium export policy makes it an
important accomplice in this crime against the future.
�The following have been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions.
•
•
•
Cutting (photocopy), 'Letters' (24 November 1978), Science, 202: 818, 820-821. (3 leaves)
Cutting (photocopy), 'The World: Europe' (13 November 1976), The Economist, 261: 6364. (2 leaves)
Cutting (photocopy), 'Nuclear man at bay' (19 March 1977), The Economist, 292(2): 12-13.
(2 leaves)
�9
/vuclem
9
7 7/A
»
■«■
r«v<-Z
>
^4
Jr
X
(7
6s *'t
Ai
cr *
7
C T~
<7^
��The following has been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions.
Typescript (photocopy), Embargoed Advance material for release at 0200 GMT January 15 1981
of Jimmy Cater, 39th President of the United States: 1977 ‐ 1981, Farewell Address to the
Nation. (5 leaves)
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Notes, Correspondences and Marginalia
Description
An account of the resource
In one obituary, Sylvan's handwriting was said to have "looked like the oscilloscope for a patient in intensive care", and thus "not for the timid".
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Text
Any textual data included in the document
<%///# /(V?fac/
’
Nuclear energy and obligations to the future.
.. .discussion of values and goods may seem
fuzzy and unscientific, but it is the beginning
and end of any energy policy ... . (Lovins, 75, xxii).
Important ethical issues concerning obligations to the
future and evaluative issues as to what sort of world we want
to see are raised by proposed nuclear development, but have been
largely neglected in current technologically oriented discussion
of the development.
The first part of the paper considers the
arguments of a number of philosophers
philosophical positions
(e.g.
obligations to the future
we do have practical,
(e.g. Passmore)
and
c
social contract theories)
and rejects them.
concerning
It concludes that
and not merely theoretical, moral obligations
to the non-immediate future, and that these are not made void
by temporal remoteness or some degree of uncertainty about the
effects of our nations.
The second part of the paper considers
a number of examples of crimes against the future and sets the
more comp ex nuclear energy case against this background.
One
philosophical corollary which emerges is the falsity of the still
common view that philosophical analysis of moral concepts,
meta-ethics,
or
is neutral with respect to practical moral issues.
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A more fundamental challenge to the poverty argument appears
in I.
Illich, Energy and Equity, Calder and Boyers, London,
1974,
where it is argued that the sort of development nuclear energy
represents is exactly the opposite of what the poor need.
The
main thesis seems to be that a society heavily dependent for basic
needs on capital demanding, commercially or centrally controllable
energy forms
(especially for transport), will inevitably create
energy hierachies and en/l ance poverty and inequalities in contrast
to a society employing low capital energy sources which people
control themselves,
fairly convincing,
such as bicycles or feet.
The main thesis is
given that there is unequal access to capital
and centralised power,
even if the argument for it leaves something
to be desired and the emphasis on speed as the critical factor
seems mistaken
(would the invention of a cheap 60 m.p.h.
bicycle
thereby convert the bicycle to an instrument of hierarchy?)
If
the thesis is correct the common economic assumption that the
solution to poverty lies in more and more massive inputs of costly
energy is mistaken in a quite fundamental way.
Elaboration of
'Nuclear energy and obligations to the future, :
A note on expertise and methodology.
Some people may ask why philosophers, who know nothing about
nuclear physics,
should be dealing with this area, which surely
should be left to the province of the real experts in the area,
nuclear physicists and those with direct experience and authority
in the area of nuclear power.
One of the most irritating things in this area for a
philosopher is the sight of such people constantly presented, by
themselves and others,
as experts and authorities whose pronounce
ments on the issue should be accepted without question by laymen
(see e.g. articles
[15]
and
[16]), when in fact the issues involve
quite crucially issues of and assumptions about values and morality^
matters concerning which the so-called "authorities'
and
experts
commonly know less than the average first year student in philosophy.
Value issues and moral issues and issues of social and political
theory are probably more crucially concerned in the nuclear issues
than are issues of fact concerning nuclear power, and certainly
they are just as important.
Few philosophers nowadays would want to claim to be
experts
or "authorities" on matters of value or morality in the way nuclear
experts claim to be authorities on matters of nuclear power, who
can tell people what to do in way which is authoritative or
which must be uncritically accepted by the non-experts/non
philosophers .
Rejection of the argument from authority is basic
in proper philosophical method, going back to Plato and beyond,
and forming a basic position without which the subject,
as critical
inquiry into basic assumptions, could not operate as it does and
traditionally has.
Indeed rejection of the argument from
authority is one feature which distinguishes philosophy proper
from closely related areas such as theology,
casuistry,
some
2.
areas of legal thought and various types of apology.
But a form
of the argument from authority-the claim to entitlement to have
one’s word or views accepted, not on the basis of what one says
and how sound it is,
but of who one is - appears however to be
an important element in the modern cult of the "scientific expert"
which has played such a large part in the contempory Australian
discussion of the nuclear issue.
While most philosophers would
reject the view that they were "experts"
or moral issues,
in this sense on values
philosophers can fairly lay claim to a number of
special skills which enable them to bring out explicit assumptions
about values or morality,
and expose defects in arguments.
philosophers also have moral views,
Most
that is, they believe some
things to be morally acceptable and others morally unacceptable,
although some might prefer to express similar attitudes without
use of explicit moral terminology.
In writing this paper then we don't hope to be accepted as
'authorities' or
'experts'
on moral questions, but only to have
skills which may throw light on some areas.
bring out value and moral assumptions,
We have tried to
expose logical defects and
inconsistencies in the structure of some of the arguments and in
certain sorts of argument concerning the future,
and to argue that
if one accepts a certain moral judgment
(which we accept and which
we believe would be widely agreed on*),
one should,
going to be consistent,
principles,
non-arbitrary ,
accept a certain other one.
if one is
and follow through one's
This seems to us a proper
area for philosophical work.
The non-philosophical or background factual assumptions which
are essential for discussing the issue are not large, and are in
substance only those of the Fox Report
(p.110,
in particular).
* We are sure that philosophers can be found who will disagree with
virtually every statement we make.
Nuclear Power
Ethical and Social Dimensions
The issue of nuclear power raises many basic issues in ethics.
By means of an example, we argue for the illegitimacy of certain
sorts of transfers of costs,
transfers from one party who obtains
benefits from a given course of action,
onto other parties who do
The inadequate methods currently available for storing nuclear
not.
wastes mean that nuclear power could permit such an illegitimate
transfer of serious costs and risks onto future people.
Many of
the arguments for the acceptability of imposing such risks on the
future ignore these crucial ethical transfer issues.
We argue that
the mot'Q 1 constraints on action such transfer principles give rise
to are not removed by the fact that those affected are future and
not present people.
The nuclear issue and associated arguments also raise in a
highly topical wSy
really
many basic issues in social theory.
Do people
’need' all the consumer items nuclear power is supposed to
allow for,
and is it authoritarian or wrong to frustrate such needs,
or are such needs in part imposed by a particular, alterable social
framework?
Are existing democratic mechanisms for control over
the social framework adequate, or do they give inadequate control
and permit excessive concentrations of power?
If the answer to the
last question is affirmative, what kinds of social changes would
prevent such>concentrations of power and allow for more adequate
control by people over the social framework and over their own
lives?
The approach to all these questions depends crucially on
how the underlying elements of social interaction are conceived are these basic elements pure individuals, are they social wholes,
or do we need to assume both, distinct and irreducible, as we shall
argue ?
R. and V,. Rout ley
t.
;
/
%
//
C
.
f
« ^7
£C—e
Z'
fe
c*
—
fl
AUStrOl/LCt'S
I£ nuclear energy is unacceptable on moral grounds, what of
Australia s role in cooperating in its development overseas?
Is its development
inevitable, as some say, so that others would sell if we didn’t and Australia
would simply profit from the folly and immorality of others?
assumption is false.
This inevitability
Most countries considering nuclear energy are not yet
irreversibly committed to it, and have other options.
Australia has a good
percentage of the world’s high-grade reserves of uranium and is regarded by western
powers as a stable and reliable energy source.
In so far as there is an economic
case for nuclear energy development, the relative cheapness of its fuel and
reliability of its source is a major part of it.
It seems likely that by with'
holding its uranium Australia could shake this assumption and thus be influential
in directing attention to alternatives.
Nuclear energy development is not
inevitable, but even if it were, inevitability does not cancel moral responsibility.
Few would accept the argument of the hired assassin that if he did not do the job
someone else would be found who would perhaps make a messier job of it.
Australia
does not evade moral responsibility by arguing in a similar way, that other, possibly
even less responsible, suppliers would emerge.
Other arguments are presented to excuse Australia’s collaboration in nuclear
development, that by selling its uranium Australia will help prevent nuclear
proliferation and the development of the breeder reactor.
The argument that widely
exporting the basic means of making nuclear weapons is the best means of preventing
nuclear proliferation compares, in its twisted logic, with the all too familiar
6,,-vvA
claims that war is the best means of promoting peace, that the best way to assist
the poor is to increase the power of the wealthy^and so on.
help prevent development of the breeder reactor?
Will uranium export
That seems, at least, unlikely,
since the most important potential customers, in Europe, have already announced
their determination to proceed with it, while the other most important customer,
Japan, has made no secret of its interest in it.
faulty too.
But such an argument is logically
The fact that the breeder creates even worse problems, for present
people, than conventional fission reators hardly shows that conventional fission
A
is acceptable or ought not also to be opposed.
These are not exhaustive options,
and the case against even conventional fission energy is a sufficiently strong one.
The strategy of the argument here is to suggest that rather than opposing or
resisting something immoral, one should collaborate in it in order to use one’s
influence to secure improvements;
this would justify, for example, assisting in
fabricating evidence against an innocent man in order to use one’s influence to
ensure minimum suffering, a speedy trial and humane execution.
These arguments to excuse Australia’s participation are sad and threadbare,
exhibiting the morality of the market.
There seems little doubt that Australia’s
collaboration will assist and encourage the development of nuclear energy as
opposed to alternatives.
Thus Australia’s uranium export policy makes it an
important accomplice in this crime against the future.
The following have been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions.
•
•
•
Cutting (photocopy), 'Letters' (24 November 1978), Science, 202: 818, 820-821. (3 leaves)
Cutting (photocopy), 'The World: Europe' (13 November 1976), The Economist, 261: 6364. (2 leaves)
Cutting (photocopy), 'Nuclear man at bay' (19 March 1977), The Economist, 292(2): 12-13.
(2 leaves)
9
/vuclem
9
7 7/A
»
■«■
r«v<-Z
>
^4
Jr
X
(7
6s *'t
Ai
cr *
7
C T~
<7^
The following has been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions.
Typescript (photocopy), Embargoed Advance material for release at 0200 GMT January 15 1981
of Jimmy Cater, 39th President of the United States: 1977 ‐ 1981, Farewell Address to the
Nation. (5 leaves)
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
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Box 106, Item 3: Early drafts, notes and cuttings on big nuclear
Subject
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Various typescript and handwritten early drafts and notes on big nuclear, undated. Includes cuttings on nuclear power and photocopy of Embargoed Advance material for release at 0200 GMT January 15 1981 of Jimmy Cater, 39th President of the United States: 1977 ? 1981, Farewell Address to the Nation.
Description
An account of the resource
Verso of scrap papers not digitised. Cutting redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions.
Papers housed in unnumbered folder marked Australia's Defence. Item number assigned by library staff. One of four papers digitised from item 2.
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<a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&range=&collection=&type=&user=&tags=&public=&featured=&exhibit=&geolocation-mapped=&geolocation-address=&geolocation-latitude=&geolocation-longitude=&geolocation-radius=10&submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a>
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<span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&pageSize=20&sortBy=score&sortDirection=Desc&searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span>, Box 106, Item 3
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<a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a>
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This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>.
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Box 106: Culture, Politics, Environment, Economics [War and Peace]
-
https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/403a5bad32513aec7b1fe527b51f07f8.pdf
282dfe629ac7145e12fea896a7354838
PDF Text
Text
I
NUCLEAR POWER - ETHICAL,
I.
SOCIAL AND POLITICAL DIMENSIONS
COMPETING PARADIGMS AND THE NUCLEAR DEBATE.
One hardly needs initiation into the dark mysteries of
nuclear physics to contribute usefully to the debate now
widely ranging over nuclear power. While many important
empirical questions are still unresolved, these do not really
lie at the centre of the controversy.
Instead, it is a
debate about values ...
many of the questions which arise are social and ethical ones.
Sociological investigations have confirmed that the nuclear debate is primarily
one over what is worth having or pursuing and over what we are entitled to do
They have also confirmed that the debate is polarised along the
2
lines of competing paradigms.
According to the entrenched paradigm discerned,
to others.
that constellation of values, attitudes and beliefs often called the Dominant
Social Paradigm (hereafter the Old Paradigm),
economic criteria become the benchmark by which a wide range of
individual and social action is judged ahd evaluated. And belief
in the market and market mechanisms is quite central. Clustering
around this core belief is the conviction that enterprise flourishes
best in a system of risks and rewards, that differentials are
necessary ..., and in the necessity for some form of division of
labour, and a hierarchy of skills and expertise. In particular,
there is a belief in the competence of experts in general and of
scientists in particular. ... there is an emphasis on quantification.
The rival world view, sometimes called the Alternative Environmental Paradigm
(the New Paradigm) differs on almost every point, and, according to sociologists
m ways summarised in the following table
Dominant Social Paradigm
CORE VALUES
Material (economic growth, progress and development)
Natural environment valued as resource
Alternative Environmental
Paradigm
Domination over nature
Non-material (self-realisation)
Natural environment intrinsically
valued
Harmony with nature
*
ECONOMY
Market forces
Risk and reward
Rewards for achievement
Differentials
Individual self-help
Public interest
Safety
Incomes related to need
Egalitarian
Collective/social provision
POLITY
Authoritative structures (experts influential)
Hierarchical
Law and order
Action through official institutions
Participative structures (citizen/
worker involvement)
Non-hierarchical
Liberation
Direct action
SOCIETY
Centralised
Large-scale
Associational
Ordered
Decentralised
Small-scale
Communal
Flexible
NATURE
Ample reserves
Nature hostile/neutral
Environment controllable
Earth’s resources limited
Nature benign
Nature delicately balanced
KNOWLEDGE
Confidence in science and technology
Rationality of means (only)
Limits to science
Rationality of ends
State socialism, as practised in most of the "Eastern bloc", differs
as to economic organisation, the market in particular being replaced
system by a command system)^ But since there is virtually no debate
confines of state socialism, that minor variant on the Old Paradigm
from the Old Paradigm really only
by central planning (a market
over a nuclear future within the
need not be delineated here.
�No doubt the competing paradigm picture is a trifle simple
(and
subsequently it is important to disentangle a Modified Old Paradigm, which
softens the old economic assumptions with social welfare requirements:
really
and
instead of a New Paradigm there are rather counterparadigms, a
cluster of not very well worked out positions that diverge from the cluster
marked out as the Old Paradigm).
Nonetheless it is empirically investigable,
and, most important, it enables the nuclear debate to be focussed.
Large-
scale nuclear development, of the sort now occurring in much of the world,
runs counter to leading tenets (such as societal features) of the New Paradigm.
Indeed to introduce ethical and social dimensions into the assessment of nuclear
power, instead of or in addition to merely economic factors such as cost and
efficiency, is already to move somewhat beyond the received paradigm.
For
under the Old Paradigm, strictly construed, the nuclear debate is confined to
the terms of the narrow utilitarianism upon which contemporary economic
practice is premissed, the issues to questions of economic means (to assumed
economistic ends) along with technological, social engineering and other
instrumental details:
whatever falls outside these terms is (dismissed as)
irrational.
Furthermore, nuclear development receives its support from adherents
of the Old Paradigm.
Virtually all the arguments in favour of it are set
within the assumption framework of the Old Paradigm, and without these
assumptions the case for the nuclear future the world is presently committed
to fails.
But in fact the argument for a nuclear future from the Old Paradigm
is itself broken-backed and ultimately fails, unless the free enterprise
pronomic assumptions are replaced by the ethically unacceptable assumptions of
advanced (corporate) capitalism.
The two paradigm picture also enables our case against a nuclear future
(a case written from outside the Old Paradigm) to be structured.
main parts?:-
There are two
It is argued, firstly, from without the Old Paradigm, that
nuclear development is ethically unjustifiable; but that, secondly, even from
within the framework of the ethically dubious Old Paradigm, such development
is unacceptable, since significant features of nuclear development conflict
with indispensible features of the Paradigm (e.g. costs of project development
and state subsidization with market independence and criteria for project
selection).
It has appeared acceptable from within the dominant paradigm only
because ideals do not square with practice, only because the assumptions of the
Old Paradigm are but very rarely applied in contemporary political practice,
�3
the place of pure (or mixed) capitalism having been usurped by corporate
capitalism.
It is because the nuclear debate can be carried on within the
framework of the Old Paradigm that the debate - although it is a debate about
values, because of the conflicting values of the competing paradigms - is not
just a debate about values; it is also a debate within a paradigm as to means
to already assumed (economistic) ends, and of rational choice as to energy
options within a predetermined framework of values. (In this corner belong,
as explained in section VIII, most decision theory arguments, arguments often
considered as encompassing all the nuclear debate is ethically about, best
utilitarian means to predetermined ends.)
For another leading characteristic
of the nuclear debate is the attempt, under the dominant paradigm to remove it
from the ethical and social sphere, and to divert it into specialist issues -
whether over minutiae and contingencies of present technology or over medical
O
or legal or mathematical details.
The double approach can be applied as regards each of the main problems
nuclear development poses.
There are many interrelated problems, and the
argument is further structured in terms of these.
For in the advancement and
promotion of nuclear power we encounter a remarkable combination of factors, never
before assembled:
establishment, on a massive scale, of an industry which
involves at each stage of its processing serious risks and at some stages of
production possible catastrophe, which delivers as a by-product radioactive
wastes which require up to a million years’ storage but for which no sound and
economic storage methods are known, which grew up as part of the war industry
and which is easily subverted to deliver nuclear weapons, which requires for
its operation considerable secrecy, limitations on the flow of information and
restrictions on civil liberties, which depends for its economics, and in order
to generate expected profits, on substantial state subsidization, support, and
intervention.
with problems.
It is, in short, a very high techological development, beset
A first important problem, which serves also to exemplify
ethical issues and principles involved in other nuclear power questions, is
the unresolved matter of disposal of nuclear wastes.
II. THE NUCLEAR WASTE DISPOSAL PROBLEM, AND THE TRAIN PARABLE.
A long distance country train has just pulled out.
crowded carries both passengers and freight.
The train which is
At an early stop in the journey
someone consigns as freight, to a far distant destination, a package which
contains a highly toxic and explosive gas.
This is packaged in a very thin
container which, as the consigner is aware, may not contain the gas for the
�4
full distance for which it is consigned, and certainly will not do so if the train
should strike any real trouble, for example if there is a breakdown and the
interior of the train becomes very hot, if the train should be derailed or
involved in a collision, or if some passenger should interefere inadvertently
or deliberately with the freight, perhaps trying to steal some of it.
All of
these sorts of contingencies have occurred on some previous journeys.
If the
container should break the resulting disaster would probably kill at least some
of the people on the train in adjacent carriages, while others could be maimed
or incur serious diseases.
Most of us would roundly condemn such an action.
consigner of the parcel say to try to justify it?
What might the
He might say that it is not
certain that the gas will escape and that it is mere speculation to suppose it
will, that the world needs his product and it is
his duty to supply it, and
that in any case he is not responsible for the train or the people on it.
These
sorts of excuses however would normally be seen as ludicrous when set in this
context.
What is worth remarking is that similar excuses are not always so seen
when the consigner, again a "responsible” businessman, puts his workers’ health
or other peoples’ welfare at risk.
Suppose he ways that it is his own and others’ pressing needs which
justify his action.
The company he controls, which produces the material as a
by-product, is in bad financial straits, and could not afford to produce a
better container even if it knew how to make one.
If the company fails, he and
his family will suffer, his employees will lose their jobs and have to look
for others, and the whole company town, through loss of spending and the
cancellation of the Multiplier Effect, will be worse off.
The poor and unemployed
of the town, whom he would otherwise have been able to help, will suffer
especially.
Few people would accept such a story, even if correct, as justification.
Even where there are serious risks and costs to oneself or some group for whom
one is concerned one is usually considered not to be entitled to simply transfer
the heavy burden of those risks and costs onto
other uninvolved parties,
especially where they arise from one’s own, or one’s group’s, chosen life-style.
The matter of nuclear waste disposal has many moral features which resemble
the train case.
progresses.
How fitting the
analogy is will become apparent as the argument
There is no known proven safe way to package the highly toxic
wastes generated by the nuclear plants that will be spread around the world as
9
large-scale nuclear development goes ahead.
The waste problem will be much
more serious than that generated by the 50 or so reactors in use at present, with
�5.
each one of the 2000 or so reactors envisaged by the end of the century producing,
on average, annual wastes containing 1000 times the radioactivity of the
Hiroshima bomb.
Much of this waste is extremely toxic.
For example, a
millionth of a gramme of plutonium is enough to induce a lung cancer.
Wastes
will include the reactors themselves, which will have to be abandoned after
their expected life times of perhaps 40 years,
and which, some have estimated,
may require 1^ million years to reach safe levels of radioactivity.
Nuclear wastes must be kept suitably isolated from the environment for
their entire active lifetime.
For fission products the required storage period
averages a thousand years or so, and for transuranic elements, which include
plutonium, there is a half to a million year storage problem.
Serious problems
have arisen with both short-term and proposed long-term methods of storage,
even with the comparatively small quantities of waste produced over the last
twenty years.10 Short-term methods of storage require continued human inter
vention, while proposed longer term methods are subject to both human inter
ference and risk of leakage through non-human factors.
No one with even a slight knowledge of the geological and climatic
history of the earth over the last million years, a period whose fluctuations
in climate we are only just beginning to guage and which has seen four Ice
Ages, could be confident that a rigorous guarantee of safe storage could be
provided for the vast period of time involved.
Nor does the history of human
affairs over the last 3000 years give ground for confidence in safe storage by
methods requiring human intervention over perhaps a million years.
Proposed
long-term storage methods such as storage in granite formations or in salt mines,
are largely speculative and relatively untested, and have already proved to
involve difficulties with attempts made to put them into practice.
Even as
regards expensive recent proposals for first embedding concentrated wastes in
glass and encapsulating the result in multilayered metal containers before rock
deposit, simulation models reveal that radioactive material may not remain
suitably isolated from human environment.In short, the best present storage
proposals carry very real possibilities of irradiating future people and
11a
damaging their environment.
Given the heavy costs which could be involved for the future, and given
the known limits of technology, it is methodologically unsound to bet, as
nuclear nations have, on the discovery of safe procedures for storage of wastes.
Any new procedures (required before 2000) will probably be but variations on
present proposals, and subject to the same inadequacies.
For instance, none of
the proposed methods for safe storage has been properly tested, and they may
�6.
well prove to involve unforeseen difficulties and risks when an attempt is made
to put them into practice on a commercial scale.
provide a rigorous guarantee of
Only a method that could
safety over the storage period, that placed
safety beyond reasonable doubt, would be acceptable.
It is difficult to see
how such rigorous guarantees could be given concerning either the geological
or future human factors.
But even if an economically viable, rigorously safe
long term storage method could be devised, there is the problem of guaranteeing
that it would be universally and invariably used.
The assumption that it
would be (especially if, as appears likely, such a method proved expensive
economically and politically) seems to presuppose a level of efficiency,
perfection and concern for the future which has not previously been encountered
in human affairs, and has certainly not been conspicuous in the nuclear industry.
12
Again, unless we assume continuous and faultless guarding of long term storage
sites through perhaps a million years of possible future human activity, weapons-
grade radioactive material will be accessible, over much of the million year
storage period, to any party who is in a position to retrieve it.
The assumption that a way will nonetheless be found, before 2000,
which gets around the waste storage problem (no longer a nere disposal problem)
is accordingly not rationally based, but is rather like many assumptions of ways,
an article of faith.
It is an assumption supplied by the Old Paradigm, a no
limitations assumption, that there are really no (development) problems that
cannot be solved technologically (if not in a fashion that is always
immediately economically feasible).
The assumption has played
an important
part in development plans and practice.
It has not only encouraged an unwarranted
13
technological optimism (not to say hubris ), that there are no limits to what
humans can accomplish, especially through science; it has led to the embarcation
on projects before crucial problems have been satisfactorily solved or a solution
is even in sight, and it has led to the idea that technology can always be suitably
controlled.
It has also led, not surprisingly, to disasters.
There are severe
limits on what technology can achieve (some of which are becoming known in the
14
form of limitation theorems ); and in addition there are human limitations
which modern technological developments often fail to take due account of (risk
analysis of the likelihood of reactor accidents is a relevant example, discussed
below).
The original nuclear technology dream was that nuclear fission would
provide unlimited energy (a ’clean unlimited supply of power’).
shattered.
and nuclear
That dream soon
The nuclear industry apparently remains a net consumer of power,
fission will be but a quite short-term supplier of power.
�7.
The risks imposed on the future by proceeding with nuclear development
are, then, significant.
Nuclear fission creates wastes which may remain toxic for
a million years, but even with the (suspect) breeder reactor it could be an
energy source for only perhaps 150 years.
It will do nothing for the energy
problems of the people of the distant future whose lives could be seriously
affected by the wastes.
Thus perhaps 40,000 generations of future people could
be forced to bear significant risks resulting from the provision of the
(extravagant) energy use of only a small proportion of the people of 10 generations.
Nor is the risk of direct harm from the escape or misuse of radioactive
materials the only burden the nuclear solution imposes on the future.
Because
the energy provided by nuclear fission is merely a stop gap, it seems probable
that in due course the same problem, that of making a transition to renewable
sources of energy, will have to be faced again by a future population which will
probably, again as a result of our actions, be very much worse placed to cope
For they may well have to face the change to renewable resources in an
with it.
over-populated world
not only burdened with the legacy of our nuclear wastes,
but also in a world in which, if the nuclear proponents’ dreams of global
industrialisation are realised, more and more of the global population will have
become dependent on high energy consumption and associated technology and heavy
resource use and will have lost or reduced its ability to survive without it.
It will, moreover, probably be a world which is largely depleted of non-renewable
resources, and in which such renewable resources as forests and soils as remain,
resources which will have to form a very important part of the basis of life,
15a
are in a run-down condition. Such points
tell against the idea that future
people must be, if not direct beneficiaries of nuclear fission energy, at least
indirect beneficiaries.
It is for such reasons that the train parable cannot
be turned around to work in favour of nuclear power, with for example, the
nuclear train bringing relief as well as wastes to a remote town powered (only)
by nuclear power.
The 'Solution” then is to buy time for contemporary industrial society
at a price which not only creates serious problems for future people but which
reduces their ability to cope with those problems.
Like the consigner in the train
parable, contemporary industrial society proposes, in order to get itself out of a
mess arising from its chosen life style - the creation of economies dependent on
an abundance of non-renewable energy, which is limited in supply - to pass on
costs and risks of serious harm to others who will obtain no corresponding
benefits.
The "solution" may enable the avoidance of some uncomfortable changes
�8.
in the lifetime of those now living and their immediate descendants, just as
the consigner’s action avoids uncomfortable changes for him and his immediate
surroundings, but at the expense of passing heavy burdens to other uninvolved
parties, whose opportunity to lead decent lives may be seriously jeopardised.
I
Industrial society has - under each paradigm, so it
will be argued -
clear alternatives to this action, which is taken essentially to avoid changing
corporately-controlled patterns of consumption and protect the interest of
those comparatively few who benefit from them.
If we apply to the nuclear situation, so perceived, the standards of
behaviour and moral principles generally acknowledged (in principle if perhaps
often not in fact) in the contemporary world, it is not easy to avoid the
conclusion that nuclear development involves gross injustice with respect to
the future.^3 There appear to be only two plausible moves that might enable
the avoidance of such a conclusion.
First, it might be argued that the moral
principles and obligations which we acknowledge for the contemporary world and
the immediate future do not apply because the recipients of the nuclear parcel
are in the non-immediate future.
Secondly, an attempt might be made to appeal
to overriding circumstances, for to teject the consigner’s action in the circum
stances outlined is not of course to imply that there are no circumstances in
which such an action might be justifiable, or at least where the matter is less
clearcut.
It is the same with the nuclear case.
Just as in the case of the
consigner of the package there is a need to consider what these justifying
circumstances might be, and whether they apply in the present case.
We consider
these possible escape routes for the proponent of nuclear development in turn,
beginning with the question of our obligations to the future.
Resolution of
this question casts light on other ethical questions concerning nuclear develop
ment.
It is only when these have been considered that the matter of whether
there are overriding circumstances is taken up again (in section VII).
Ill
OBLIGATIONS TO THE (DISTANT) FUTURE.
The especially problematic area
is that of the distant (i.e. non-immediate) future, the future with which
people alive today will have no direct contact: by comparison, the immediate
future gives fewer problems for most ethical theories.
In fact the question of
obligations to future people presents tests which a number of ethical theories
fail to pass, and also has serious repercussions in political philosophy as
regards the adequacy of accepted (democratic and other) institutions which do
not take due account of the interests of future creatures.
�9.
Moral philosophers have, predictably, differed on the issue.
A good
many of the philosophers who have explicitly considered the question have come down
in favour of the same considerations being given to the rights and interests of
future people as to those of contemporary or immediately future people.
Other
philosophers have tended to fall into three categories - those who acknowledge
obligations to the future but who do not take them seriously or who assign them
a lesser weight, those who deny or who are committed by their general moral
position to denying that there are moral obligations beyond the immediate
future, and those who come down with admirable philosophical caution, on both
sides of the issue, but with the weight of the argument favouring the view
underlying prevailing economic and political institutions, that there are no
moral obligations to the future beyond perhaps those to the next generation.
According to the most extreme of these positions against moral obligations
to the future, our behaviour with respect to the future is morally unconstrained,
there are no moral restrictions on acting or failing to act deriving from the
effect of our actions on
future people.
Of those philosophers who say, or
whose views imply that we do not have obligations to the (non-immediate)
future, who have opted for the unconstrained position, many have based this view
on accounts of moral obligation which are built on relations which presuppose
some temporal or spatial contiguity.
Thus moral obligation is seen as grounded
on or as presupposing various relations which could not hold between people
widely separated in time (or sometimes in space).
For example, obligation is
seen as grounded in relations which are proximate or of short duration and also
non-transitive.
Among such suggested bases or grounds of moral obligation, or
requirements on moral obligation, which would rule out obligations to the nonimmediate future are these:-
Firstly there are those accounts which require that
someone to whom a moral obligation is held be able to claim his rights or
entitlement.
People in the distant future will not be able to claim rights and
entitlements as against us, and of course they can do nothing effective to
enforce any claims they might have for their rights against us.
Secondly, there
are those accounts which base moral obligations on social or legal convention,
for example a convention which would require punishment of offenders or at least
some kind of social enforcement.
But plainly these and other conventions will
not hold invariant over change in society and amendment of legal conventions and
so will not be invariant over time.
Also future people have no way of enforcing
their interests or punishing offenders, and there could be no guarantee that any
contemporary institutions would do it for them.
�10.
Both the view that moral obligation requires the context of a moral
community and the view that it is contractually based appear to rule out the
distant future as a field of moral obligation as they not only require a
commonality or some sort of common basis which cannot be guaranteed in the case
of the distant future, but also a possibility of interchange or reciprocity
of action which cannot apply to the future.
Where the basis of moral obligation
is seen as mutual exchange the interests of future people must be set aside
because they cannot change the past and cannot be parties to any mutual contract.
The exclusion of moral obligations to the distant future also follows from
those views which attempt to ground moral obligations in non-transitive relations
of short duration such as sympathy and love.
As well there are difficulties
about love and sympathy for (non-existent) people in the far distant future about
whose personal qualities and characteristics one must know very little and who
may well be committed to a life-style for which one has little or no sympathy.
On the current showing in the case of nuclear energy it would be easy to
conclude that contemporary society lacks both love and sympathy for future
people; and it would appear to follow from this that contemporary people had
no obligations concerning future people and could damage them as it suited them.
What all these views have in common is a picture of obligation as
something acquired, either individually or institutionally, something which
is conditional on doing something or failing to do something (e.g. participating
in the moral community, contracting), or having some characteristic one can
16
fail to have (e.g. love, sympathy, empathy).
Because obligation therefore
becomes conditional, features usually (and correctly) thought to characterise
obligation such as universality of application and necessitation (i.e. the binding
features) are lost, especially where there is a choice whether or not to do the
thing required to acquire the obligation, and so as to whether to acquire it.
The criteria for acquisition suggested are such as to exclude people in the
distant future.
The view that there are no moral constraints with respect to future
people, that one is free to act however one likes with respect to them, is not
however sustainable.
Consider, for example, a scientific group which, for no
particular reason other than to test a particular piece of technology, places
in orbit a cobalt bomb set off by a triggering device designed to go off several
hundred years from the time of its despatch.
No presently living person and
none of their immediate descendants would be affected, but the population of
�11.
the earth in the distant future would be wiped out as a
result of the action.
direct and predictable
The unconstrained position clearly implies that this is
an acceptable moral enterprise, that whatever else we might legitimately
criticize in the scientists’ experiment, perhaps its being over-expensive or
badly designed, we cannot lodge a moral protest about the damage it will do
to future people.
the following sort
The unconstrained position also endorses as morally acceptable
of policy:-
A firm discovers it can make a handsome profit
from mining, processing and manufacturing a new type of material which, although
it causes no problem for present people or their immediate descendants,
will
over a period of hundreds of years decay into a substance which will cause an
enormous epidemic of cancer among the inhabitants of the earth at that time.
According to the unconstrained view the firm is free to act in its own interests,
without any consideration for the harm it does remote future people.
Such counterexamples to the unconstrained view, which are easily varied
and multiplied, might seem childishly obvious.
Yet the unconstrained position
concerning the future from which they follow is far from being a straw man; not
only have several philosophers endorsed this position, but it is a clear
implication of many currently popular views of the basis of moral obligation, as
well as of prevailing economic theory.
It seems that those who opt for the
unconstrained position have not considered such examples, despite their being
clearly implied by their position.
We suspect that - we would certainly hope
that - when it is brought out that the unconstrained position admits such
counterexamples, that being free to act implies among other things being free to
inflict pointless harm for example, most of those who opted for the unconstrained
position would want to assert that it was not what they intended.
What many
of those who have put forward the unconstrained position seem to have had in
mind in denying moral obligation is rather that future people can look after
themselves, that we are not responsible for their lives.
The popular view that
the future can take care of itself also seems to assume a future causally
independent of the present.
But it is not.
It is not as if, in the counter
example cases or in the nuclear case, the future is simply being left alone
to take care of itself.
Present people are influencing it, and in doing so
thereby acquire many Of the same sorts of moral responsibilities as they do in
causally affecting the present and immediate future, namely the obligation to
take account in what they do of people affected and their interests, to be
careful in their actions, to take account of the genuine probability of their
actions causing harm, and to see that they do not act so as to rob future
people of the chance of a good life.
�12.
Furthermore, to say that we are not responsible for the lives of future
people does not amount to the same thing as saying that we are free to do as we
like with respect to them, that there are no moral constraints on our action
involving them.
In just the same way, the fact that one does not have or has not
acquired an obligation to some stranger with whom one has never been involved, that
one has no responsibility for his life, does not imply that one is free to do
what one likes with respect to him, for example to rob him or to pursue some
course of action of advantage to oneself which could seriously harm him.
These difficulties for the unconstrained position arise in part from the
(sometimes deliberate) failure to make an important distinction between acquired
or assumed obligation toward somebody, for which some act of acquisition or
assumption is required as a qualifying condition, and moral constraints, which
require, for example, that one should not act so as to damage or harm someone,
and for which no act of acquisition is required.
There is a considerable
difference in the level and kind of responsibility involved.
In the first case
one must do something or be something which one can fail to do or be, e.g.
have loves, sympathy, be contracted.
In the second case responsibility arises
as a result of being a causal agent who is aware of the consequences or probable
consequences of his action, and thus does not have to be especially acquired or
Assiiipp.fl.
Thus there is no problem about how the latter class, moral constraints,
can apply to the distant future in cases where it may be difficult or impossible
for acquisition or assumption conditiohs to be satisfied.
They apply as a result
of the ability to produce causal effects on the distant future of a reasonably
predictable nature.
Thus also moral constraints can apply to what does not
(yet) exist, just as actions can cause results that do not (yet) exist.
While
it may perhaps be the case that there would need to be an acquired or assumed
obligation in order for it to be claimed that contemporary people must make
special sacrifices for future people of an heroic kind, or even to help them
especially, only moral constraints are needed in order for us to be constrained
from harming them.
Thus, to return to the train parable, the consigner cannot
argue in justification of his action that he has never assumed or acquired
responsibility for the passengers, that he does not know them and therefore has no
love or sympathy for them and that they are not part of his moral community, in
short that he has no special obligations to help them.
All that one needs to
argue concerning the train, and the nuclear case, is that there are moral
constraints against harming, not that there are specially acquired obligations
to take responsibility for the lives of people involved.
There has been an attempt to represent all obligations to the distant
future in terms of heroic self-sacrifice, something which cannot of course be
morally required.
But in view of the distinctions between constraints and
acquired obligation and between obligation and supererogation this is just
�13.
to misrepresent the position of these obligations.
For example, one is no more
engaging in heroic self-sacrifice by not forcing future people into an unviable
life position or by refraining from causing then direct harm than the consigner
is resorting to heroic self-sacrifice in refraining from placing his dangerous
package on the train.
The conflation of moral restraints with acquired obligation, and the
attempt therewith to view all constraints as acquired and to write off nonacquired
constraints, is facilitated through the use of the term ’moral obligation’ both
to signify any type of deontic constraints and also to indicate rather something
which has to be assumed or required.
The conflation is encouraged by reductionist
positions which, in attempting to account for obligation in general, mistakenly
endeavour to collapse all obligations.
Hence the equation, and some main roots
of the unconstrained position, of the erroneous belief that there are no moral
constraints concerning the distant future.
The unconstrained view tends to give way, under the weight of counter
examples, to more qualified, and sometimes ambivalent, positions, for example
the position that
our obligations are to immediate posterity, we ought to try to
improve the world so that we shall be able to hand it over to
our immediate successors in a better condition, and that is all;^
there are in practice no obligations to the distant future.
A main argument
in favour of the latter theme is that such obligations would in practice be
otiose.
Everything that needs to be accounted for can be encompassed through
the chain picture of obligation as linking successive generations, under which
each generation has obligations, based on loves or sympathy, only to the
succeeding generation.
account.
There are at least three objections to this chain
First, it is inadequate to treat constraints concerning the future
as if they applied only between generations, as if there were no question of
constraints on individuals as opposed to whole generations, since individuals
can create causal effects, e.g. harm, on the future in a way which may create
individual responsibility, and which often cannot be sheeted home to an entire
generation.
Nuclear power and its wastes, for example, are strictly the
responsibility of small groups of power-holders, not a generational responsibility.
Secondly, such chains, since non-transitive, cannot yield direct obligations to
the distant future.
But for this very reason the chain picture cannot be
adequate, as examples again show.
For the picture is unable to explain several
of the cases that have to be dealt with, e.g. the examples already discussed
which show that we can have a direct effect on the distant future without
affecting the next generation, who may not even be able to influence matters.
�14.
Thirdly, improvements for immediate successors may be achieved at the expense of
disadvantages to people of the more distant future.
Improving the world for
immediate successors is quite compatible with, and may even in some circumstances
be most easily achieved by, ruining it for less immediate successors.
Such
cases can hardly be written off as "never-never land" examples since many cases
of environmental exploitation might be seen as of just this type. e.g. not just
the nuclear case but also the exhaustion of non-renewable resources and the
long-term depletion of renewable resources such as soils and forests through
overuse.
If then such obvious injustices to future people arising from the
favouring or exclusive concern with immediate successors are to be avoided,
obligations to the future will have to be seen as in some way fairly
distributed over time, and not merely as accruing to particular generations in
the way the chain picture suggests.
IV. ATTEMPTS TO QUALIFY OBLIGATIONS TO THE FUTURE : ECONOMISTIC UNCERTAINTY
AND INDETERMINACY ARGUMENTS.
While there are grave difficulties for the
unconstrained position, qualification leads to a more defensible position.
According to the main qualified position we are not entirely unconstrained
with respect to the distant future, there are obligations, but these are not so
important as those to the present, and the interests of distant future people
cannot weigh very much in the scale against those of the present and immediate
future.
The interests of future people then, except in unusual cases, count for
very much less than the interests of present people.
Hence such things as nuclear
development and various exploitative activities which benefit present people should
proceed, even if people of the distant future are (somewhat) disadvantaged by them.
The qualified position appears to be widely held and is implicit in
prevailing economic theories, where the position of a decrease in weight of future
costs and benefits (and so of future interests) is obtained by application over
time of a discount rate, so discounting costs and risks to future people.
The
attempt to apply economics as a moral theory, something that is becoming
increasingly common, can lead then to the qualified position.
objectionable in such an approach is that
What is
economics should operate within the
bounds of moral (deontic) constraints, just as in practice it operates within
legal constraints, not determine what those constraints are.
There are moreover
alternative economic theories and simply to adopt, without further ado, one
which discounts the future is to beg many questions at issue.
�15.
Among the arguments that economists offer for generally discounting
the future, the most threadbare is based on the assumption that future
generations will be better off than present ones, and so better placed to handle
18
the waste problem.
Since there is mounting evidence that future generations
may well not
be better off than present ones, especially in things that matter,
no argument for discounting the interests of future generations on this basis
can carry much weight.
Nor is that all that is wrong with the argument.
For
it depends at base on the assumption that poorer contemporaries would be making
sacrifices to richer successors in foregoing such (allegedly beneficial)
developments as nuclear power.
sacrifice argument.
That is, it depends on the already scotched
In any case, for the waste disposal problem to be
legitimately bequeathed to the future generations, it would have to be shown,
what recent economic progress hardly justifies, that future generations will
be, not just better off, but so much better off and more capable that they
can duly absorb the nuclear waste burden.
A more plausible argument for discounting is directly in terms of
opportunity costs.
It is argued, from the fact that a dollar gained now is worth
much more than a dollar received in the non-immediate future (because the first
dollar could meanwhile be invested at compound interest), that discounting is
required to obtain equivalent monetary values, and so for efficient allocation
of resources.
Similarly it is argued, by virtue again of equalization of monetary
value, that compensation - which is what the waste problem is taken to come to
economically - costs much less now than later.
Thus a few pennies set aside
(e.g. in a trust fund) now or in the future, if need be, will suffice to
compensate eventually for any victims of remote radioactive waste leakage.
There are, presently at least, insurmountable practical difficulties about
applying such discounting, e.g. how to determine appropriate future discount rates.
A more serious objection is that applied generally, the argument presupposes,
what is false, that compensation, like value, can always be converted into
monetary equivalents, that people (including those outside market frameworks)
can be monetarily compensated for a variety of damages, including cancer and loss
of life.
There is no compensating a dead man, or for a lost species.
In fact
the argument presupposes a double reduction neither part of which can succeed:
it is not just that value cannot in general be represented at all adequately
19
monetarily,
but (as against utilitarianism, for example) that constraints and
obligations can not be somehow reduced to matters of value.
It is also
presupposed that all decision methods, suitable for requisite nuclear choices,
�16.
are bound to apply discounting.
This is far from so : indeed Goodin argues that,
on the contrary, more appropriate decision rules do not allow discounting, and
discounting only works in practice with expected utility rules (such as underlie
cost-benefit and benefit-risk analyses), which are, he contends strictly
inapplicable for nuclear choices (since not all outcomes can be duly determined
and assigned probabilities, in the way that application of the rules requires.).
20
As the preceding arguments reveal, the discounting move often has the same
result as the unconstrained position.
If, for instance, we consider the cancer
example and reduce costs to payable compensation, it is evident that over a
sufficiently long period of time discounting at current prices would lead to the
conclusion that there are no recoverable damages and so, in economic terms, no
constraints.
In short, even certain damage to future people could be written off.
One way to achieve the bias against future people is by the application of
discount rates which are set in accord with the current economic horizons of no
21
more than about 15 years,
and application of such rates would simply beg
the question against the interests and rights of future people.
Where there is
certain future damage of a morally forbidden type, for example, the whole method
of discounting is simply inapplicable, and its use would violate moral
constraints.
Another argument for the qualified position, which avoids the objections
from cases of certain damage, comes from probability considerations.
The distant
future, it is argued, is much more uncertain than the present and immediate
future, so that probabilities are consequently lower, perhaps even approaching
or coinciding with zero for any hypothesis concerning the distant future.
But
then if we take account of probabilities in the obvious way, by simply multiplying
them against costs and benefits , it is evident that the interests of future
people, except in cases where there is an unusually high degree of certainty,
must count for (very much) less than those of present and neighbouring people
where (much) higher probabilities are attached.
So in the case of conflict
between the present and the future where it is a question of weighing certain
benefits to the people of the present and the immediate future against a much
lower probability of indeterminate costs to an indeterminate number of distant
future people, the issue would normally be decided in favour of the present,
assuming anything like similar costs and benefits were involved.
But of course
it cannot be assumed that anything like similarly weighted costs and benefits
are involved in the nuclear case, especially if it is a question of risking
poisoning some of the earth for half a million or so years, with consequent
risk of serious harm to thousands of generations of future people, in order to
obtain doubtful benefits for some present people, in the shape of the opportunity
to maintain corporation profitability or to continue unnecessarily high energy
use.
And even if the costs and benefits were comparable or
evenly weighted,
�17.
such an argument would be defective, since an analogous argument would show
that the consigner’s action is acceptable provided the benefit, e.g. the
profit he stood to gain from imposing significant risks on other people, was
sufficiently large.
Such a cost-benefit or risk-benefit approach to moral and decision
problems, with or without the probability frills, is quite inadequate where
different parties are concerned or to deal with cases of conflict of interest
or moral problems where deontic constraints are involved, and commonly
yields counterintuitive results.
For example, it would follow on such principles
that it is permissible for a firm to injure, or very likely injure, some
innocent party provided the firm stands to make a sufficiently large gain from
it.
But the costs and benefits involved are not transferable in any simple or
general way from one party to another .
Transfers of this kind, of costs
and benefits involving different parties, commonly raise moral issues - e.g.
is x entitled to benefit himself by imposing costs on y - which are not
susceptible to a simple cost-benefit approach of the sort adopted in promotion
of nuclear energy, where costs to future people are sometimes dismissed with
the soothing remark that any development involves costs as well as benefits.
The limitations of transfer point is enough to invalidate the comparison,
heavily relied on in building a case for the acceptability of the nuclear
risk, between nuclear risks and those from such activities as airplane travel
or cigarette smoking.
In the latter case those who supposedly benefit from the
activity are also, to an overwhelming extent, those who bear the serious health
costs and risks involved.
In contrast the users and supposed beneficiaries
of nuclear energy will be risking not only, or even primarily, their own lives
and health, but also that of others who may be non-beneficiaries and who may be
spatially or temporally removed, and these risks will not be in any direct way
related to a person’s extent of use.
The transfer objection is essentially the same as that to the utilitarian’s
(happiness) sums as a way of solving moral conflict between different parties,
and the introduction of probability considerations - as in utilitarian decision
methods such as expected utility rules - does not change the principles involved
but merely complicates the analysis. One might further object to the probability
argument that probabilities involving distant future situations are not always
less than those concerning the immediate future in the way the argument supposes,
and that the outcomes of some moral problems do not depend on a high level of
probability anyway.
In some sorts of cases it is enough, as the train parable
reveals, that a significant risk is created; such cases do not depend critically
on high probability assignments.
�18.
Uncertainty arguments in various forms are the most common and important
ones used by philosophers, economists and others to argue for the position that we
cannot be expected to
distant future.
take serious account of the effects of our actions on the
There are two strands to the uncertainty argument, capable of
separation, but frequently tangled up.
Both arguments are mistaken, the first
on a priori grounds, the second on a posteriori grounds.
The first argument
is a generalised uncertainty argument which runs as follows:-
In contrast to
the exact information we can obtain about the present, the information we can
obtain about the effects of our actions on the distant future is unreliable,
fuzzy and highly speculative.
But we cannot base assessments of how we should
act on information of this kind, especially when accurate information is obtain
able about the present which would indicate different action.
Therefore we must
regretfully ignore the uncertain effects of our actions on the distant future.
More formally and
crudely:
One only has obligations to the future if these
obligations are based on reliable information at present as regards the
distant future.
Therefore one has no obligations to the distant future.
This
first argument is essentially a variant on a sceptical argument in epistemology
concerning our knowledge of the future (formally, replace ’obligations’ by
’knowledge’ in the crude statement of the argument above).
The main ploy is to
considerably overestimate and overstate the degree of certainty available with
respect to the present and immediate future, and the degree of certainty which
is required as the basis for moral consideration with respect to the present
Associated with this is the attempt to suggest
and with respect to the future.
a sharp division as regards certainty between the present and immediate future
on the one hand and the distant future on the other.
We shall not find, we
suggest, that there is any such sharp or simple division between the distant
future and the adjacent future and the present, at least with respect to those
things in the present which are normally subject to moral constraints.
We can
and constantly do act on the basis of such ’’unreliable” information, as the
sceptic as regards the future conveniently labels "uncertainty”; for sceptic
proof certainty is rarely, or never, available with respect to much of the
present and immediate future.
In moral situations in the present, action
often takes account of risk and probability, even quite low probabilities.
Consider again the train example.
We do not need to know for certain that the
container will break and the lethal gas escape.
In fact it does not even have
to be probable, in the relevant sense of more probable than not, in order for
us to condemn the consigner’s action.
risk of harm in this sort of case.
It is enough that there is a significant
It does not matter if the decreased well
being of the consigner is certain and that the prospects of the passengers
quite uncertain, the resolution of the problem is nevertheless clearly in favour
of the so-called ’’speculative" and "unreliable”.
But if we do not require
certainty of action to apply moral constraints in contemporary affairs, why
v
�19.
should we require a much higher standard of certainty in the future?
Why should
we require for the future, epistemic standards which the more familiar sphere of
moral action concerning the present and adjacent future does not need to meet?
The insistence on certainty as a necessary condition before moral consideration
can be given to the distant future, then, amounts to an eipstemic double standard.
But such an epistemic double standard, proposed in explaining the difference
between the present and the future and to justify ignoring future peoples’
interests, in fact cannot itself provide an explanation of the differences,
since it already presupposes different standards of certainty appropriate to
each class, which difference is in turn in need of justification.
The second uncertainty argument is a practical uncertainty argument,
that whatever our theoretical obligations to the future, we cannot in practice
take the interests of future people into account because uncertainty about
the distant future is so gross that we canmot determine what the likely
consequences of actions on it will be and therefore, however good our intentions
to the people of the distant future are, in practice we have no choice but to
ignore their interests.
Uncertainty is gross where certain incompatible
hypotheses are as good as one another and there is no rational ground for
choosing between them.
this way:-
The second uncertainty argument can be put alternatively
If moral principles are. like other principles, implicational in form,
that is of such forms as "if x has character h then x is wrong, for every
(action) x”, then what the argument claims is that we cannot ever obtain the
information about future actions which would enable us to detach the
antecedent of the implication.
So even if moral principles theoretically
apply to future people, in practice they cannot be applied to obtain clear
conclusions or directions concerning contemporary action action of the "It is
wrong to do x" type.
Many of the assumptions of the second argument can be conceded.
If
the distant future really is so grossly uncertain that in every case it is
impossible to determine in any way that is better than chance what the effects of
present action will be, and whether any given action will help or hinder future
people, then moral principles, although they may apply theoretically to the
future, will in practice not be applicable to obtain any clear conclusions about
how to act.
on action.
Hence the distant future will impose no practical moral constraints
However the argument is factually incorrect in assuming that the
future always is so grossly uncertain or indeterminate.
Admittedly there is often
a high degree of uncertainty concerning the distant future, but as a matter of
(contingent) fact it is not always so gross or sweeping as the
�20.
argument has to assume.
There are some areas where uncertainty is not so great as
to exclude constraints on action, especially when account is taken of the point,
which was noticed in connection with the first argument, that complete certainty
is commonly not required for moral constraints and that all that may be needed in
Again there is considerable
some cases is the creation of a significant risk.
uncertainty about many factors which are not highly, or at all, morally relevant,
but this does not extend to many factors which are of much greater importance
to moral issues.
For example, we may not have any idea what the fashions will be
in a hundred years in names or footwear, or what flavours of ice cream people
will be eating if any, but we do have excellent reason to believe, especially
if we consider 3000 years of history, that what people there are in a hundred
years are likely to have material and psychic needs not entirely unlike our own,
that they will need a healthy biosphere for a good life; that like us they will
not be immune to radiation; that their welfare will not be enhanced by a high
incidence of cancer or genetic defects, by the destruction of resources, or the
elimination from the earth of that wonderful variety of non-human life which at
present makes it such a rich and interesting place.
For this sort of reason,
the second uncertainty argument should be rejected.
The case of nuclear waste
storage, and of uncertainty of the effects of it on future people, is one area
where uncertainty in morally relevant respects is not so great as to preclude
moral constraints on action, where we can ascertain if not absolute certainties
£1
at least probabilities of the same sort of order as are considered sufficient for
the application of moral principles in parallel contemporary cases, especially
where spatially remote people are involved.
In particular there is not gross
indeterminacy or uncertainty; it is simply not true that incompatible hypotheses
about what may happen are as good as each other.
It is plain that nuclear waste
storage does impose significant risks of harm on future people, and, as is
evident from the train example, the significant risk of harm is enough in cases
of this type to make moral constraints applicable.
In terms of the defects of the preceding uncertainty arguments, we can
see the defects in a number of widely employed uncertainty arguments used to
write off probable or possible harm to future people as outside the scope of
proper consideration.
Most of these popular moves employ both of the uncertainty
arguments as suits the case, switching from one to the other in a way that is again
reminiscent of sceptical moves.
For example, we may be told that we cannot really
take account of future people because we cannot be sure that they will exist or
that their tastes and wants will not be completely different from our own, to the
point where they will not suffer from our exhaustion of resources or from the
�21.
things that would affect us.
But this is to insist upon complete certainty of a
sort beyond what is required for the present and immediate future, where there
is also commonly no guarantee that some disaster will not overtake those we are
morally committed to.
Again we may be told that there is no guarantee that
future people will be worthy of any efforts on our part, because they may be
morons or forever plugged into enjoyment or other machines.
prepared to accept the elitist approach presupposed -
Even if one is
according to which
only those who meet certain properly civilized or intellectual standards are
eligible for moral consideration - what we are being handed in such arguments
as a serious defeating consideration is again a mere outside possibility -
like the sceptic who says that solid-looking desk in front of us is perhaps only a
facade, not because he has any particular reason for doing so, but because he
hasn’t looked around the back, drilled holes in it, etc. etc.
Neither the
contemporary nor the historical situation gives any positive reason for supposing
that a lapse into universal moronity or universal-pleasure-machine escapism is
a serious possibility, as opposed to a logical possibility.
We can contrast with
these mere logical possibilities the very real historically supportable risks
of escape of nuclear waste or decline
of a civilisation through destruction
of its resource base.
The possibilities just considered in these uncertainty arguments of
sceptical character are not real possibilities.
Another argument which may
consider a real possibility, but still does not succeed in showing that it is
acceptable to proceed with an action which would appear to be harmful to future
people, is often introduced in the nuclear waste case.
This is the argument that
future people may discover a rigorously safe and permanent storage method for
nuclear wastes before they are damaged by escaped waste material.
Let us grant
for the sake of the argument that this is a real possibility (though physical
arguments may show that it is not).
This still does not affect the fact that there
is a significant risk of serious damage and that the creation of a significant
risk is enough to rule out an action of this type as morally impermissible.
In just
the same way, future people may discover a cure for cancer: that this appears to
be a live possibility, and not merely a logical possibility, does not make the
action of the firm earlier discussed, of producing a substance likely to cause
cancer in future people, morally admissible.
The fact that there was a real
possibility of future people avoiding the harm would show
that actions of these
sorts were admissible only if what was required for inadmissibility was certainty
of harm or a very high probability of it.
In such cases before such actions could
�22.
be considered admissible what would be required is far more than a possibility,
real or not
- it is at least the availability of an applicable, safe, and
rigorously tested, not merely speculative, technique for achieving it, something
that future people could reasonably be expected to apply to protect themselves.
The strategy of these and other uncertainty arguments is fairly clear then,
and may be brought out by looking yet again at the train example where the consigner
says that he cannot be expected to take account of the effect of his actions on
the passengers because they may find an effective way to deal with his parcel or
some lucky or unlucky accident may occur, e.g. the train may break down and they
may all change to a different transport leaving the parcel behind, or the train
may crash killing all the passengers before the container gets a chance to leak.
These are all possibilities of course, but there is no positive reason to believe
that they are any more than that, that is they are not live possibilities.
The
strategy is to stress such remote possibilities in order to create the false
impression that there is gross uncertainty about the future, that the real
possibility that the container will break should be treated in the same way as
these mere logical possibilities, that uncertainty about the future is so great
as to preclude the consigner’s taking account of the passengers’ welfare and the
real possibility of harm from his parcel and thereby to excuse his action.
A
related strategy is to stress a real possibility, such as finding a cure for
cancer, and thereby imply that this removes the case for applying moral constraints.
This move implicitly makes the assumptions of the first argument, that certainty
of harm, or at least a very high probability of harm is required before an action
can be judged morally inadmissible, and the point of stressing the real possibility
of avoidance of damage is to show that this allegedly required high degree of
certainty or probability cannot be attained.
That is, the strategy draws
attention to some real uncertainty implying that this is sufficient to defeat the
application of moral constraints.
But, as we have seen, this is often not so.
Closely related to uncertainty arguments are arguments premissed on the
indeterminacy of the future.
In particular it is argued that the indeterminacy,
for example, with respect to the number and exact character of people at future
times, would at least prevent the interest of future people being taken into
account where there is a conflict with the present.
Since their numbers are
indeterminate and their interests unknown how, it is asked, can we weigh their
competing claims against those of the present and immediate future where this
information is available in a more or less accurate form?
The question is raised
particularly by problems of sharing fixed quantities of resources among present
and future people, for example oil, when the numbers of the latter are indeterminate.
Such problems are indeed difficult, but they are not resolved by ignoring the
claims of the future, any more than the problems raised by the need to take
account in decision-making of factors difficult to quantify are resolved by
�23.
ignoring such factors.
Nor are distributional problems as large and
representative of a class of moral problems concerning the future as the tendency
to focus on them would suggest.
It can be conceded that there will be cases
where the indeterminacy of aspects of the future will make conflicts very
difficult to resolve
or indeed irresoluble - a realistic ethical theory will
not deliver a decision procedure - but there will equally be other conflict
cases where the level of indeterminacy does not hinder resolution of the issue,
e.g. the train example which is a conflict case of a type.
In particular,
there will be many cases which are not solved by weighing numbers, numbers of
interests, or whatever, cases for which one needs to know only the most general
probable characteristics of future people.
The crucial question which emerges is then:
are there any features of
future people which would disqualify them from full moral consideration or
reduce their claims to such below those of present people?
principle None.
The answer is :
in
Prima facie, moral principles are universalisable, and lawlike,
in that they apply independently of position in space or in time, for example.
But universalisability of principles is an outcome of those ethical theories
which are capable of dealing satisfactorily with the present:
in other words, a
theory that did not allow properly for the future would be found to have defects
as regards the present, to deal unjustly or unfairly with some present people,
e.g. those remotely located, those outside some select subgroup, such as (white
skinned) humans, etc.
The only candidates for characteristics that would fairly
rule out future people are the logical features we have been looking at, such
as uncertainty and indeterminacy; but, as we have argued, it would be far too
sweeping to see these features as affecting the moral claims of future people in a
general way.
These special features only affect certain sorts of cases (e.g.
the determination of best probable or practical course of action given only
present information) .
In particular, they do not affect cases of the sort
being considered, nuclear development, where highly determinate or certain
information about the numbers and characteristics of the class likely to be
harmed is not required, nor is certainty of damage.
To establish obligations to the future a full universalizability
principle is not required : it is enough that the temporal position of a person
cannot affect his entitlement to just and fair treatment, to full moral
24
consideration;
inversely, that it is without basis to discriminate morally
against a person in virtue of his temporal position.
As a result of this
�23a.
universalizab ili ty, there are the same general obligations to future people as
to the present;
and thus there is the same obligation to take account of them
and their interests in what we do, to be careful in our actions, to take
account of the probability (and not just the certainty) of our actions causing
harm or damage, and to see, other things being equal, that we do not act so
as to rob them of what is necessary for the chance of a good life.
and indeterminacy do not relieve us of these obligations.
Uncertainty
If in a closely
comparable case concerning the present the creation of a significant risk is
enough to rule out an action as immoral, and there are no independent grounds
for requiring greater certainty of
�23a.
universalizability, there are the same general obligations to future people as
to the present;
and thus there is the same obligation to take account of them
and their interests in what we do, to be careful in our actions, to take
account of the probability (and not just the certainty) of our actions causing
harm or damage, and to see, other things being equal, that we do not act so
as to rob them of what is necessary for the chance of a good life.
and indeterminacy do not relieve us of these obligations.
Uncertainty
If in a closely
comparable case concerning the present the creation of a significant risk is
enough to rule out an action as immoral, and there are no independent grounds
for requiring greater certainty of
�24.
harm in the future case under consideration, then futurity alone will not
provide adequate grounds for proceeding with the action, thus discriminating
against future people.
Accordingly we cannot escape, through appeal to
futurity, the conclusion already tentatively reached, that proposals for nuclear
development in the present and likely future state of technology and practices
for future waste disposal are immoral.
Before we consider (in section VII) the remaining escape route from this
conclusion, through appeal to overriding circumstances, it is important to
pick up the further case (which heavily reinforces the tentative conclusion)
against nuclear development, since much of it relies on ethical principles
similar to those that underlie obligations to the future, and since it too
is commonly met by similar appeal to extenuating circumstances.
V. PROBLEMS OF SAFE NUCLEAR OPERATION: REACTOR EMISSIONS, AND CORE MELTDOWN. The
ethical problems with nuclear power are by no means confined to future creatures.
Just as remoteness in time does not erode obligations or entitlements to just
treatment, neither does location in space, or a particular geographical position.
First of all, the problem of nuclear waste disposal raises serious questions of
distributive justice not only across time, across generations, but also across
space.
Is one state or region entitled to dump its radioactive pollution in
another state’s or region’s yard or waters?
When that region receives no due
compensation (whatever that would amount to, in such a case), and the people
do not agree (though the leaders imposed upon them might)?
The answer, and the
arguments underpinning the answer, are both like those already given in arguing
to the tentative conclusion concerning the injustice of imposing radioactive
wastes upon future people.
But the cases are not exactly the same: USA and Japan
cannot endeavour to discount peoples of the Pacific in whose regions they propose
to drop some of their radioactive pollution in quite the same way they can
discount people of two centuries hence.
(But what this consideration really
reveals is yet another flaw in the idea that entitlement to just treatment can
be discounted over time . )
Ethical issues of distributive justice, as to equity, concern not only
the spatio-temporal location of nuclear waste, but also arise elsewhere in the
assessment of nuclear development; in particular, as regards the treatment of
those in the neighbourhood of reactors, and, differently, as regards the
distribution of (alleged) benefits and costs from nuclear power across nations.
People living or working in the vicinity of a nuclear reactor are subject to
special costs and risks: firstly, radioactive pollution, due to the fact that
reactors discharge radioactive materials into the air and water near the plant,
25
�25.
and secondly catastrophic accidents, such as (steam) explosion of a reactor.
An
immediate question is whether such costs and risks can be imposed, with any
ethical legitimacy, on these people, who frequently have little or no say in
their imposition, and who have mostly not been informed of any choices regarding
the "risk/benefit tradeoffs" of nuclear technology.
That they are so imposed,
without local participation, indeed often without local input or awareness as
with local opposition, reveals one part of the antidemocratic face of nuclear
development, a part that nuclear development shares however with other large-
scale polluting industry, where local participation and questions, fundamental
to a genuine democracy of regional determination and popular sovereignty, are
commonly ignored or avoided.
The "normal" emission, during plant operation, of low level radiation
carries carcinogenic and mutagenic costs.
While there are undoubtedly costs,
there remains, however, substantial disagreement over the likely number of cancers
and precise extent of genetic damage induced by exposure to such radiation, over
the local health costs involved.
Under the Old Paradigm, which (illegitimately)
permits free transfer of costs and risks from one person to another, the ethical
issue directly raised is said to be: what extent of cancer and genetic damage,
if any, is permissibly traded for the advantages of nuclear power, and under
what conditions?
Under the Old Paradigm the issue is then translated into
decision-theoretic questions, such as to ’how to employ risk/benefit analysis
as a prelude to government regulation’ and ’how to determine what is an
26
acceptable level of risk/safety for the public.
The Old Paradigm attitude, reflected in the public policy of some countries
that have such policies, is that the economic benefits conferred by allowing
radiation emissions outweigh the costs of an increase in cancer and genetic
damage.
An example will reveal that such evaluations, which rely for what
appeal they have on a dubious utilitarianism, will not pass muster.
It is a
pity about Aunt Ethyl getting cancer, but it’s nice to have this air conditioner
working in summer.
Such frequently trivial and rather inessential benefits,
which may be obtained alternatively, e.g. by modification of houses, in no way
27
compensate for the agony of cancer.
The point is that the costs to one party
are not justified, especially when such benefits to other parties can be
alternatively obtained without such awful costs, and morally indefensible, being
imposed.
People, minorities, whose position is particularly compromised are those
who live within 50 miles of a nuclear plant.
(Children, for example, are in a
�26.
particularly vulnerable position, since they are several times more likely to
contract cancer through exposure than normal adults).
In USA, such people bear
a risk of cancer and genetic damage of as much as 50 times that borne by the
population at large.
A non-negligible percentage (in excess of 3% of those
exposed for 30 years) of people in the area will die, allegedly for the sake
of the majority who are benefitted by nuclear power production (allegedly,
for the real reasons for nuclear development do not concern this silent
majority).
Whatever
charm the argument from overriding benefits had, even
under the Old Paradigm, vanishes once it is seen that there are alternative,
and in several respects less expensive, ways of delivering the real benefits
involved.
There are several other tricks used in showing that the imposition of
radiation on minorities, most of whom have little or no genuine voice in the
location of reactors in their environment and cannot move away without serious
losses, is quite (morally) acceptable. One cheaper trick, deployed by the US
28
Atomic Energy Commission,
is to suppose that it is permissible to double,
through nuclear technology, the level of (natural) radiation that a population
has
received with apparently negligible consequences, the argument being that
the additional amount (being equivalent to the "natural” level) is also likely
to have negligible consequences.
The increased amounts of radiation - with
their large man-made component - are then accounted normal, and, of course,
so it is then claimed, what is normal is morally acceptable.
in this argument is sound.
None of the steps
Drinking one bottle of wine a day may have no ill-
effects, whereas drinking two a day certainly may affect a person’s well-being;
and while the smaller intake may have become normal for the person, the larger
one will, under such conditions, not be.
Finally, what is or has become normal,
e.g. two murders or twenty cancers a day in a given city, may be far from acceptable.
In fact, even the USA, which has strict standards by comparison with most
other countries with planned nuclear reactors, permits radiation emissions very
substantially in excess of the standards laid down; so the emission situation is
worse than mere consideration of the standards would disclose.
Furthermore, the
monitoring of the standards "imposed" is entrusted to the nuclear operators
themselves, scarcely disinterested parties.
Public policy is determined not so
as to guarantee public health, but rather to serve as a ’public pacifier’ while
29
private nuclear operations proceed relatively unhampered.
�27.
While radioactive emissions are an ordinary feature of reactor operation,
breakdown is, hopefully, not: an accident of magnitude is accounted, by official
definition, an ’extraordinary nuclear occurrence’.
But such accidents can happen,
and almost have on several occasions (the most notorious being Three Mile Island).~
If the cooling and emergency core cooling systems fail in American (light water)
30a
reactors,
then the core melts and ’containment failure’ is likely, with the
result that an area of 40,000 square miles could be radioactively contaminated.
In the event of the worst type of accident in a very small reactor, a steam
explosion in the reactor vessel, about 45,000 people would be killed instantly
and at least 100,000 would die as a result of the accident, property damages
would exceed $17 billion and an area the size of Pennsylvania would be destroyed.
Modern nuclear reactors are about five times the size of the reactor for which
31
these conservative US government figures are given :
the consequences of a
similar accident with a modern reactor would accordingly be much greater still.
The consigner in risking the lives, well-being and property of the
passengers on the train has acted inadmissibly.
Does a government-sponsored
private utility act in a way that is anything other than much less responsible
in siting a nuclear reactor in a community, in planting such a dangerous package
on the community train.
The answer will be No, if the analogy holds good and the
£1
consigners’ action is, as we would ordinarily
sible.
suppose, inadmissible and irrespon
The proponents of nuclear power have in effect argued to the contrary,
while at the same time endeavouring to shift the dispute out of the ethical arena
and into a technological dispute as to means (in accordance with the Old Paradigm) .
It has been contended, firstly, what contrasts with the train example, that
there is no real possibility of a catastrophic nuclear accident.
Indeed in the
32
influential Rassmussen report
- which was extensively used to support public
confidence in US nuclear fission technology - an even stronger, an incredibly
strong, improbability claim was stated: namely, the likelihood of a catastrophic
nuclear accident is so remote as to be (almost) impossible.
The main argument for
this claim derives from the assumptions and estimates of the report itself.
These
assumptions like the claim are undercut by nuclear incidents that came very close
to accidents, incidents which reflect what happens in a reactor rather better than
mathematical models.
As with the storage of nuclear wastes, so with the operation of nuclear
reactors, it is important to look at what happens in the actual world of
technological limitatioms and human error, of waste leakage and reactor incidents
and quite possibly accidents, not in an ideal world far removed from the actual,
a technological dream world where there is no real possibility of a nuclear
�28.
catastrophe.
In such an ideal nuclear world, where waste disposal were fool-proof
and reactors were accident-proof, things would no doubt be morally different.
But we do not live in such a world.
According to the Rasmussen report its calculation of extremely low accident
probabilities is based upon reasonable mathematical and technological assumptions
and is methodologically sound.
This is very far from being the case.
The under
lying mathematical methods, variously called "fault tree analysis" and
"reliability estimating techniques", are unsound, because they exclude as "not
credible" possibilities or as "not significant" branches that are real
possibilities, which may well be realised in the real world.
It is the
In fact the methodology and data of the report
33
has been soundly and decisively criticized.
And it has been shown that there
eliminations that are otherworldly.
is a real possibility, a non-negligible probability, of a serious accident.
It is contended, secondly, that even if there is a non-negligible
probability of a reactor accident, still it is acceptable, being of no greater
order than risks of accidents that are already socially accepted.
Here we
encounter again that insidious engineering approach to morality built into
models of an economic cast, e.g. benefit-cost balance sheets, risk assessment
models, etc.
Risk assessment, a sophistication of transaction or trade-off
models, purports to provide a comparison between the relative risks attached to
different options, e.g. energy options, which settles their ethical status.
The following lines of argument are encountered in a risk assessment as applied
to energy options:
(i)
if option a imposes costs on fewer people than option b then option a is
preferable to option b;
(ii)
option a involves a total net cost in terms of cost to people (e.g. deaths,
injuries, etc.) which is less than that of option b, which is already accepted;
34
therefore option a is acceptable.
For example, the number likely to be killed by nuclear power stations is less than
the likely number killed by cigarette smoking or in road accidents, which are
accepted: so nuclear power stations are acceptable.
A little reflection reveals
that this sort of risk assessment argument involves the same kind of fallacy
as transaction models.
It is far too simple-minded, and it ignores distributional
and other relevant aspects of the context.
In order to obtain an ethical
assessment we should need a much fuller picture and we should need to know at
least these things:- do the costs and benefits go to the same parties; and is
the person who undertakes the risks also the person who receives the benefits or
�29.
primarily, as in driving or cigarette smoking, or are the costs imposed on other
parties who do not benefit?
It is only if the parties are the same in the case of
the options compared, and there are no such distributional problems, that a
35
comparison on such a basis would be valid.
This is rarely the case, and it is
not so in the case of risk assessments of energy options.
Secondly, does the
person incur the risk as a result of an activity which he knowingly undertakes
in a situation where he has a reasonable choice, knowing it entails the risk,
etc., and is the level of risk in proportion to the level of the relevant
activity, e.g. as in smoking?
Thirdly, for what reason is the risk imposed:
is it for a serious or a relatively trivial reason?
A risk that is ethically
acceptable for a serious reason may not be ethically acceptable for a trivial
reason.
Both the arguments (i) and (ii) are often employed in trying to justify
nuclear power. The second argument (ii) involves the fallacies of the first (i)
and an additional set, namely that of forgetting that the health risks in the
36
nuclear sense are cumulative, and already high if not, some say, too high.
The maxim "If you want the benefits you have to accept the costs" is
one thing and the maxim "If I want the benefits then you have to accept the
costs (or some of them at least)" is another and very different thing.
It is
a widely accepted moral principle, already argued for by way of examples and
already invoked, that one is not, in general, entitled to simply transfer costs
of a significant kind arising fron an activity which benefits oneself onto other
37
parties who are not involved in the activity and are not beneficiaries.
This
transfer principle is especially clear in cases where the significant costs
include an effect on life or health or a risk thereof, and where the benefit to
the benefitting party is of a noncrucial or dispensible nature, because, e.g.
it can be substituted for or done without.
Thus, for instance, one is not
usually entitled to harm, or risk harming, another in the process of benefitting
oneself.
Suppose, for another example, we consider a village which produces, as a
result of an industrial process by which it lives , a noxious waste material which
is expensive and difficult to dispose of and yet creates a risk to life and health
if undisposed of.
Instead of giving up their industrial process and turning to
some other way of making a living such as farming the surrounding countryside,
they persist with this way of life but ship their problem on a one-way delivery
service, on the train, to the next village.
The inhabitants of this village are
then forced to face the problem either of undertaking the expensive and difficult
disposal process oor of sustaining risks to their own lives and health or else
leaving the village and their livelihoods.
transfer of costs as morally unacceptable.
Most of us would see this kind of
�30.
From this arises a necessary condition for energy options: that to be
morally acceptable they should not involve the transfer of significant costs or
risks of harm onto parties who are not involved, do not use the energy source or
do not benefit correspondingly from its use.
Included in the scope of this
condition are not only future people and future generations (those of the next
villages) but neighbours of nuclear reactors, especially, as in third world
countries, neighbours who are not nuclear power users.
The distribution of
costs and damage in such a fashion, i.e. on to non-beneficiaries is a
characteristic of certain widespread and serious forms of pollution, and is one
of its most objectionable moral features.
It is a corollary of the condition that we should not hand the world on to
our successors in substantially worse shape than we received it - the tramsmission
principle.
For if we did then that would be a significant transfer of costs.
(The corollary can be independeritly argued for on the basis of certain ethical
theories).
VI. OTHER SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS AND COSTS OF NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENT,
ESPECIALLY NUCLEAR WAR.
The problems already discussed by no means exhaust the
environmental, health and safety risks and costs in, or arising from, the nuclear
fuel cycle.
The full fuel cycle includes many stages both before and after
reactor operation, apart from waste disposal, namely mining, milling, conversion,
enrichment and preparation, reprocessing spent fuel, and transportation of
materials.
Several of these stages involve hazards.
Unlike the special risks
in the nuclear cycle — of sabotage of plants, of theft of fissionable material,
and of the further proliferation of nuclear armaments - these hazards have
parallels, if not exact equivalents, in other very polluting methods of generating
power, e.g. "workers in the uranium mining industry sustain ’the same risk’ of
n 38
,
,
fatal and nonfatal injury as workers in the coal industry .
Furthermore, the
various (often serious) hazards encountered in working in some sectors of
uranium fabrication should be differently viewed from those resulting from location,
for instance from already living where a reactor is built or wastes are dumped.
For an occupation is, in principle at
any rate, chosen (as is occupational
relocation), and many types of hazards incurred in working with radioactive
material are now known in advance of choice of such an occupation: with where
one already lives things are very different.
The uranium miner’s choice of
occupation can be compared with the airline pilot’s choice, whereas the Pacific
Islander’s "fact" of location cannot be.
The social issue of arrangements that
contract occupational choices and opportunities and often at least ease people
into hazardous occupations such as uranium or tin or coal mining (where the
risks, in contrast to airline piloting, are mostly not duly compensated), while
very important, is not an issue newly produced by nuclear associated occupations.
�31.
Other social and environmental problems - though endemic where large-scale
industry operates in societies that are highly inegalitarian and include sectors
that are far from affluent - are more intimately linked with the nuclear power
cycle.
Though pollution is a common and generally undesirable component of
large-scale industrial operation, radioactive pollution, such as uranium mining
for instance produces, is especially a legacy of nuclear development, and a
specially undesirable one, as enormous rectification estimates for dead radio
active lands and waterways reveal.
Though sabotage is a threat to many large
industries, so that modern factory complexes are often guarded like concentration
camps (but from us on the outside), sabotage of a nuclear reactor can have dire
consequences, of a different order of magnitude from most industrial sabotage
(consider again the effects of core meltdown).
Though theft of material from more
dubious enterprises such as munitions works can pose threats to populations at
large and can assist terrorism, no thefts for allegedly peaceful enterprises
pose problems of the same order as theft of fissionable material.
No other
industry produces materials which so readily permit of fabrication into such
massive explosives.
No other industry is, to sum it up, so vulnerable on so
many fronts.
In part to reduce its vulnerability, in part because of its long and
continuing association with military activities, the nuclear industry is subject
to, and encourages, several practices which (certainly given their scale) run
counter to basic features of free and open societies, crucial features such as
personal liberty, freedom of association and of expression, and free access to
information.
These practices include secrecy, restriction of information,
formation of special police and guard forces, espionage, curtailment of civil
liberties.
Already operators of nuclear installations are given extraordinary
powers, in vetting employees, to investigate the background and
activities not only of employees but also of their families and
sometimes even of their friends. The installations themselves
become armed camps, which especially offends British sensibilities.
The U.K. Atomic Energy (Special Constables) Act of 1976 created a
special armed force to guard nuclear installations and made it
answerable ... to the U.K. Atomic Energy Authority.39
In West Germany the ’politics of nuclear repression is even more evident and
more advanced:
Behind what must be one of the most impregnable fortifications
this side of the East-West German border, work has just begun
on building West Germany’s latest nuclear power station. Much
�31.1
of the perimeter of the 75-acre site, at Brokdorf in the
marshlands of the lower Elbe, is screened by a concrete
wall 10 feet high, surmounted by coils of barbed wire.
The rest, regarded as ’strategically observable’, is girdled
by a ditch 10 feet wide and filled with water. Approach
roads to the site are patrolled by dozens of policemen
and the compound itself is guarded by 600 men from a
private security organization and by 30 dogs.
Such developments presage along with nuclear development increasingly
authoritarian and anti-democratic
societies.
That nuclear development
appears to force such political consequences tells heavily against it.
�32.
Nuclear development is further indicted politically by the direct
connection of nuclear power with nuclear war.
It is fortunately true that
ethical questions concerning nuclear war - for example, whether a nuclear war
is justified, or just, under any circumstances, and if so what circumstances are distinguishable from those concerning nuclear power.
Undoubtedly, however,
the spread of nuclear power is substantially increasing the technical means
for engaging in nuclear war and so, to that extent, the opportunity for, and
chances of, nuclear engagement.
Since nuclear wars are never accountable
positive goods, but are at best the lesser of major evils, nuclear wars are
always highly ethically undesirable.
The spread
of nuclear power accordingly
expands the opportunity for, and chances of, highly undesirable consequences.
Finally the latter, so increasing these chances and opportunities, is itself
undesirable, and therefore what leads to it, nuclear development, is also
undesirable.
The details and considerations that fill out this argument,
from nuclear war against nuclear development, are many.
They are firstly
technical, that it is a relatively straightforward and inexpensive matter to
make nuclear explosives given access to a nuclear power plant, secondly : political,
that nuclear engagements once instituted
likely to escalate and that those
who control (or differently are likely to force access to) nuclear power plants
do not shrink from nuclear confrontation and are certainly prepared to toy with
nuclear engagement (up to "strategic nuclear strikes" at least), and thirdly :
ethical, that wars invariably have immoral consequences, such as massive
damage to involved parties, however high sounding their justification is.
Nuclear wars are certain to be considerably worse as regards damage inflicted
than any previous wars (they are likely to be much worse than all previous
wars put together), because of the enormous destructive power of nuclear
weapons, and the extent of spread of their radioactive effects, and because
of the expected rapidity and irreversibility of any such confrontations.
The supporting considerations are, fourthly, drawn from decision theory, and
are designed to show that the chances of such undesirable outcomes is itself
undesirable.
The core argument is in brief this (the argument will be
elaborated in section VIII):- Energy choice between alternative options is
a case of decision making under uncertainty, because in particular of the gross
uncertainties involved in nuclear development.
In cases of this type the
appropriate rational procedure is to compare worst consequences of each
alternative, to reject those alternatives with the worst of these worst
consequences (this is a pretty uncontroversial part of the maximin rule which
enjoins selection of the alternative with the best worst consequences).
The
nuclear alternative has, in particular because of the real possibility of a nuclear
war, the worst worst consequences and is accordingly a particularly undesirable
alternative.
�33.
VII. CONFLICT ARGUMENTS, AND UNCOVERING THE IDEOLOGICAL BASES OF NUCLEAR
DEVELOPMENT.
As with nuclear war, so given the cumulative case against nuclear
development, only one justificatory route remains open, that of appeal to
important overriding circumstances.
That appeal, to be ethically acceptable,
must go far beyond merely economic considerations.
For, as already observed,
the consigner’s action cannot be justified by purely economistic arguments,
such as that his profits would rise, the firm or the village would be more
prosperous, or by appealing to the fact that some possibly uncomfortable
changes would otherwise be needed.
The transfer principle on which this
assessment was based, that one was not usually entitled to create a serious
risk to others for these sorts of reasons, applied more generally and, in
particular, applied to the nuclear case.
For this reason the economistic
arguments which are those most commonly advanced under the Old Paradigm to promote
nuclear development — e.g. cheapness, efficiency, profitability for electricity
utilities, and the need otherwise for uncomfortable changes such as restructuring
of employment, investment and consumption - do not even begin to show that the
nuclear alternative is an acceptable one.
Even if these economistic assumptions
about benefits to present people were correct - it will be contended that most of
them are not - the arguments would fail because economics (like the utilitarianism
from which it characteristically derives) has to operate within the framework of
moral constraints, and not vice versa.
What do have to be considered are however moral conflict arguments, that is
arguments to the effect that, unless the prima facie unacceptable (nuclear)
alternative is taken, some even more unacceptable alternative is the only
possible outcome, and
will ensue.
For example, in the train parable, the
consigner may argue that his action is justified because unless it is taken his
village will starve.
It is by no means clear that even such a justification
as this would be sufficient, especially where the risk to the passengers is
high, as the case seems to become one of transfer of costs and risks onto others;
but such a moral situation would no longer be so clearcut, and one would perhaps
hesitate to condemn any action taken in such circumstances.
Some of the arguments advanced to show moral conflict are based on competing
commitments to present people, and others on competing obligations to future people,
both of which are taken to override the obligations not to impose on the future
significant risk of serious harm.
The structure of such moral conflict arguments
is based crucially on the presentation of a genuine and exhaustive set of
alternatives (or at least practical alternatives) and upon showing that the only
alternatives to admittedly morally undesirable actions are even more undesirable
ones.
If some practical alternative which is not morally worse than the action to
be justified is overlooked, suppressed, or neglected in the argument - for
example, if in the village case it turns out that the villagers have another option
�34.
to starving or to the sending off of the parcel, namely earning a living in some
other way - then the argument is defective and cannot readily be patched.
Just
such a suppression of practicable alternatives has occurred in the argument
designed to show that the alternatives to the nuclear option are even worse than
the option itself, and that there are other factual defects in these arguments
as well.
In short, the arguments depend essentially on the presentation of
false dichotomies.
A first argument, the poverty argument, is that there is an overriding
obligation to the poor, both the poor of the third world and the poor of
industrialised countries.
Failure to develop nuclear energy, it is often claimed,
would amount to denying them the opportunity to reach the standard of affluence
we currently enjoy and would create unemployment and poverty in the industrialised
nations.
The unemployment and poverty argument does not stand up to examination
either for the poor of the industrial countries or for those of the third world.
There is good evidence that large-scale nuclear energy will help to increase
unemployment and poverty in the industrial world, through the diversion of very
much available
capital into an industry which is not only an exceptionally
poor provider of direct employment, but also helps to reduce available jobs through
40
encouraging substitution of energy use for labour use.
The argument that nuclear
energy is needed for the third world is even less convincing.
Nuclear energy is
both politically and economically inappropriate for the third world, since it
requires massive amounts of capital, requires numbers of imported scientists
and engineers, but creates negligible local employment, and depends for its
feasibility upon, what is largely lacking, established electricity transmission
systems and back-up facilities and sufficient electrical appliances to plug into
the system.
Politically it increases foreign dependence, adds to centralised
entrenched power and reduces the chance for change in the oppressive political
41
structures which are a large part of the problem.
The fact that nuclear energy
is not in the interests of the people of the third world does not of course
mean that it is not in the interests of, and wanted by, their rulers, the
westernised and often military elites in whose interests the economies of these
countries are usually organised, and wanted often for military purposes.
It
is not paternalistic to examine critically the demands these ruling elites may
make in the name of the poor.
�35.
The poverty argument is then a fraud.
help the poor.
Nuclear energy will not be used to
Both for the third world and for the industrialised countries
there are well-known energy-conserving alternatives and the practical option of
developing other energy sources, alternatives some of which offer far better
prospects for helping the poor.
It can no longer be pretended that there is no alternative to nuclear
development: indeed nuclear development is itself but a bridging, or stop-gap,
procedure on route to solar or perhaps fusion development.
And there are various
alternatives: coal and other fossil fuels, geothermal, and a range of solar
options (including as well as narrowly solar, wind, water, tidal and plant power),
42
each possibly in combination with conservation measures;
Despite the availability
of alternatives, it may still be pretended that nuclear development is necessary
for affluence (what will emerge is that it is advantageous for the power and
affluence of certain select groups).
Such an assumption really underlies part
of the poverty argument, which thus amounts to an elaboration of the trickledown argument (much favoured within the Old Paradigm setting).
runs:-
For the argument
Nuclear development is necessary for (continuing and increasing)
affluence.
Affluence inevitably trickles down to the poor.
Therefore nuclear
First, the argument does not on its own show
development benefits the poor.
anything specific about nuclear power: for it works equally well if ’energy’
is substituted for ’nuclear’.
It has also to be shown, what the next major
argument will try to claim, that nuclear development is unique among energy
alternatives in increasing affluence.
The second assumption, that affluence
inevitably trickles down, has now been roundly refuted, both by recent historical
data, which show increasing affluence (e.g. in terms of GNP averaged per capita)
coupled with increasing poverty in several countries, both developing and
developed, and through economic models which reveal how "affluence” can increase
without redistribution occurring.
Another major argument advanced to show moral conflict appeals to a set
of supposedly overriding and competing obligations to future people.
We have,
it is said, a duty to pass on the immensely valuable things and institutions
which our culture has developed.
Unless our high-technology, high energy
industrial society is continued and fostered, our valuable institutions and
traditions will fall into decay or be swept away.
The argument is essentially
that without nuclear power, without the continued level of material wealth
it alone is assumed to make possible, the lights of our civilization will go out.
Future people will be the losers.
4;
�36.
The lights-going-out argument does raise questions as to what is valuable
in our society, and of what characteristics are necessary for a good society.
But for the most part these large questions, which deserve much fuller
examination, can be avoided.
The reason is that the argument adopts an extremely
uncritical position with respect to present high-technology societies, apparently
assuming that they are uniformly and uniquely valuable.
It assumes that technological
society is unmodifiable, that it cannot be changed in the direction of energy
conservation or alternative (perhaps high technology) energy sources without
collapse.
It has to be accepted and assessed as a whole, and virtually unlimited
supplies of energy - such as nuclear and only nuclear power is alleged to furnish -
are essential to maintain this whole.
These assumptions are hard to accept.
The assumption that technological
society’s energy patterns are unmodifiable is especially so - after all it has
survived events such as world wars which have required major social and technological
restructuring and consumption modification.
If western society’s demands for energy
are totally unmodifiable without collapse, not only would it be committed to a
program of increasing destruction, but one might ask what use its culture could
be to future people who would very likely, as a consequence of this destruction,
lack the resource base which the argument assumes to be essential in the case of
contemporary society.
There is also difficulty with the assumption of uniform valuableness;
but if this is rejected the question becomes not: what is necessary to maintain
existing high-technological society and its political institutions, but rather:
what is necessary to maintain what is valuable in that society and the political
institutions which are needed to maintain those valuable things.
While it may be
easy to argue that high energy consumption centrally controlled is necessary to
maintain the political and economic status quo, it is not so easy to argue that it
is essential to maintain what is valuable, and it is what is valuable, presumably
that we have a duty to pass on to the future.
The evidence, for instance from history, is that no very high level of
material affluence or energy consumption is needed to maintain what is valuable.
There is good reason in fact to believe that a society with much lower energy and
resource consumption would better foster what is valuable than our own.
But even
if a radical change in these directions is independently desirable, as we should
argue, it is not necessary to presuppose such a change, in the short term at least,
in order to see that the assumptions of the lights-going-out argument are wrong.
No enormous reduction of well-being is required to consume less energy than at
�37.
present, and certainly far less than the large increase over present levels of
44
consumption which is assumed in the usual economic case for nuclear energy.
What the nuclear strategy is really designed to do then is not to prevent the
lights going out in western civilisation, but to enable the lights to go on
burning all the time - to maintain and even increase the wattage output of
the Energy Extravaganza.
In fact there is good reason to think that, far from the high energy
consumption society fostering what is valuable, it will, especially if energy
is obtained by nuclear fission means, be positively inimical to it.
A society
which has become heavily dependent upon an extremely high centralised, controlled
and garrisoned, capital-
and expertise-intensive energy source, must be one
which is highly susceptible to entrenchment of power, and one in which the forces
which control this energy source, whether capitalist or bureaucratic, can exert
enormous power over the political system and over people’s lives, even more
than they do at present.
Such a society would, almost inevitably tend to become
authoritarian and increasingly anti-democratic, as an outcome, among other
things, of its response to the threat posed by dissident groups in the nuclear
...
45
situation.
Nuclear development may thus help in passing on to future generations
some of the worst aspects of our society - the consumerism, alienation,
destruction of nature, and latent authoritarianism - while many valuable
aspects, such as the degree of political freedom and those opportunities for
personal and collective autonomy which exist, would be lost or diminished:
political freedom, for example, is a high price to pay for consumerism and
energy extravagance.
But it is not the status quo, but what is valuable in
our society, presumably, that we have some obligation to pass on to the future,
and if possible enhance.
Again, as in the case of the poverty arguments, clear alternatives,
alternative social, economic and political choices, which do not involve such
unacceptable consequences, are available.
The alternative to the high technology-
nuclear option is not a return to the cave, the loss of all that is valuable,
but either the adoption of an available alternative such as coal for power or,
rather, the development of alternative technologies and lifestyles which offer
far greater scope for the maintenance and further development of what is
valuable in our society than the highly centralised nuclear option.
The lights-
going-out argument, as a moral conflict argument, accordingly fails, because it
also is based on a false dichotomy.
�38.
Thus the further escape route, the appeal to moral conflict, is, like the
If then we apply - as we have argued we should -
appeal to futurity, closed.
the same standards of morality to the future as we ought to acknowledge for the
present, the conclusion that large-scale nuclear development is a crime against
the future is inevitable.
Closed also, in the same way, are the escape routes
to other arguments - from reactor melt-down, radiation emissions, and so on -
for rejecting nuclear development as morally unacceptable, for saying that it is
not only a moral crime against the distant future but also a crime against the
present and immediate future.
In sum, nuclear development is morally
unacceptable on several grounds.
A corollary is that only political arrangements
that are morally unacceptable will support the impending nuclear future.
VIII. A NUCLEAR FUTURE IS NOT A RATIONAL CHOICE, EVEN IN OLD PARADIGM TERMS.
The argument thus far, to anti-nuclear conclusions, has relied upon, and
defended premisses that would be rejected under the Old Paradigm; for example,
such theses as that the interests and utilities of future people are not
discounted (in contrast to the temporally-limited utilitarianism of marketcentred economic theory), and that serious costs and risks to health and life
cannot admissibly be simply transferred to uninvolved parties (in contrast
to the transfer and limited compensation assumptions of mainstream economic
theory).
To close the case, arguments will now be outlined which are designed
to show that even within the confines of the Old Paradigm, choosing the nuclear
future is not a rational choice.
Large-scale nuclear development is not just something that happens, it
requires, on a continuing basis, an immense input of capital and energy.
Such
investment calls for substantial reasons; for the investment should be, on
Old Paradigm assumptions, the best among feasible alternatives to given economic
ends.
Admittedly so much capital has already been invested in nuclear fission
research and development, in marked contrast to other newer rival sources of
power, that there is strong political incentive to proceed - as distinct from
requisite reasons for further capital and energy inputs.
The reasons can be
divided roughly into two groups, front reasons, which are the reasons given
(out), and which are, in accordance with Old Paradigm percepts, publicly
economic (in that they are approved for public consumption), and the real
reasons, which involve private economic factors and matters of power and social
control.
�39.
The main argument put up, an economic growth argument, upon which
variations are played, is the following version of the lights-going-out argument
(with economic growth duly standing in for material wealth, and even for what is
valuable!):-
Nuclear power is necessary to sustain economic growth.
Economic
growth is desirable (for all the usual reasons, e.g. to increase the size of
the pie, to avoid or postpone redistribution problems, and connected social
unrest, etc.).
Therefore nuclear power is desirable.
part of US energy policy,
economics textbooks.
The first premiss is
and the second premiss is supplied by standard
But both premisses are defective, the second because
what is valuable in economic growth can be achieved by selective economic growth,
which jettisons the heavy social and environmental costs carried by unqualified
47
economic growth.
More to the point, since the second premiss is an assumption
of the dominant paradigm, the first premiss (or rather an appropriate and less
vulnerable restatement of it) fails even on Old Paradigm standards.
For of course
nuclear power is not necessary given that there are other, perhaps costlier
alternatives.
The premiss usually defended is some elaboration of the premiss :
Nuclear power is the economically best way to sustain economic growth, ’economically
best’ being filled out as ’most efficient’, ’cheapest’,
benefit-cost ratio’, etc.
’having most favourable
Unfortunately for the argument, and for nuclear
development schemes, nuclear power is none of these things
a good deal of economic cheating (easy to do) is done.
the cancellation of nuclear plant orders, can
decisively, unless
Much data, beginning with
be assembled to show as much.
Yet
the argument requires a true premiss, not an uncertain or merely possible one, if
it is to succeed and detachment is to be permitted at all, and evidently true
premisses
if the argument is to be decisive.
The data to be summarised splits into two parts, public (governmental)
analyses, and private (utility) assessments.
Virtually all available data
concerns the USA; in Europe, West and East, true costs of uniformly "publicly^
controlled” nuclear power
are generally not divulged.
Firstly, the capital costs of nuclear plants, which have been rising much
more rapidly than inflation, now exceed those of coal-fired plants.
Komanoff
has estimated that capital costs of a nuclear generator (of optimal capacity)
49
will exceed comparable costs of a coal-fired unit by about 26% in 1985.
And
capital costs are only one part of the equation that now tell
against private utility purchase of new nuclear plants.
rather decisively
Another main factor
is the poor performance and low reliability of nuclear generators.
Coney showed
that nuclear plants can only generate about half the electricity they were
designed to produce, and that when Atomic Energy Commission estimates of relative
costs of nuclear and coal power, which assumed that both operated at 80% of design
capacity, were adjusted accordingly, nuclear generated power proved to be far more
�40.
expensive than estimated.50
The discrepancy between actual and estimated
capacity
is especially important because a plant with an actual capacity factor of 55%
produced electricity at a cost about 25% higher than if the plant had performed
at the manufacturers ’ projected capacity rate of 70-75%.
The low reliability
of nuclear plants (per kilowatt output) as compared with the superior
reliability of smaller coal-fired plants adds to the case, on conventional economic
grounds of efficiency and product production costs, against nuclear power.
These unfavourable assessments are from a private (utility) perspective,
before the very extensive public subsidization of nuclear power is duly taken
into account.
The main subsidies are through research and development, by way
of insurance (under the important but doubtfully constitutional Price-Anderson
Act5'1'), in enrichment, and in waste management.
It has been estimated that
charging such costs to the electricity consumer would increase electricity bills
for nuclear power by at least 25% (and probably much more).
When official US cost/benefit analyses favouring nuclear power over
coal are examined, it is found that they inadmissibly omit several of the public
costs involved in producing nuclear power.
For example, the analyses ignore
waste costs on the quite inadmissible ground that it is not known currently
what the costs involved are.
But even using actual waste handling costs (while
wastes await storage) is enough to show that coal power is preferable to nuclear.
When further public costs, such as insurance against accident and for radiation
damage, are duly taken into account, the balance is swung still further in
favour of alternatives to nuclear and
against nuclear power.
In short, even on
proper Old Paradigm accounting, the nuclear alternative should be rejected.
Nuclear development is not economical, it certainly seems; it has been
kept going not through its clear economic viability, but by massive public
subsidization, of several types.
In USA, to take a main example where
information is available, nuclear development is publicly supported through
heavily subsidized or sometimes free research and development, under
Price-Anderson Act
the
which sharply limits both private and public liability,
i.e. which in effect provided the insurance subsidy making corporate nuclear
development economically feasible, and through government agreement to handle all
radioactive wastes.
While the Old Paradigm strictly construed cannot support uneconomical
developments, contemporary liberalisation of the Paradigm does allow for
uneconomic projects, seen as operated in the public interest, in such fields as
social welfare.
Duly admitting social welfare and some
equity
principles
�41.
in the distribution of wealth (not necessarily of pollution) leads
version of the Old Paradigm, called the Modified Old Paradigm.
to the modern
The main
changes from the Old Paradigm are (as with state socialism) as emphasis of
economic factors, e.g. individual self-help is down-played, wealth is to a
small extent redistributed, e.g. through taxation, market forces are regulated
or displaced (not in principle eliminated, as with state socialism).
Now it
has been contended - outrageous though it should now seem - that nuclear power
is in the public interest as a means to various sought public ends, for example,
as well as those already mentioned such as energy for growth and cheap
electricity, and such as plentiful power for heating and cooking and appliance
brown-outs and the like.
use, avoidance of shortages, rationing,
Since
alternative power sources, such as coal, could serve the same ends given power was
supplied with suitable extravagance, the
argument has again to show that the
choice of nuclear power over other alternatives is best in the requisite
respects, in serving the public interest.
Such an argument is a matter for
decision theory, under which head cost-benefit analyses which rank alternatives
also fall as special cases.
Decision theory purports to cover theoretically the field of choice
between alternatives; it is presented as the
theory which ’deals with the
53
problem of choosing one course of action among several possible courses’.
Thus the choice of alternative modes of energy production, the energy choice
problem, becomes an exercise
in decision theory; and the nuclear choice is
often'justified” in Old Paradigm terms through appeal to decision theory.
But though decision theory is in principle comprehensive, as soon as it is put
to work in such practical cases as energy choice,
it is very considerably
contracted in scope, several major assumptions are surreptitiously imported,
and what one is confronted with is a
depauperate
theory drastically
pruned down to conform with the narrow utilitarianism of mainstream economic
theory.
The extent of reduction can be glimpsed by comparing, to take one
important example, a general optimisation model for decision (where
uncertainty is not gross) with comparable decision theory methods, such as the
expected utility model.
The general model for best choice among alternatives
specifies maximisation of expected value subject to constraints, which may
include
ethical constraints excluding certain alternatives under given
conditions.
Expected utility
models demote value to utility, assuming thereby
measurability and transference properties that may not obtain, and eliminate
constraints altogether (absorbing what is forbidden, for example, as having a
high disutility, but one that can be compensated for nonetheless).
Thus, in
�42.
particular,
ethical constraints against nuclear development are replaced, in
Old Paradigm fashion, by allowance in principle for compensation for damage
sustained.
Still it is with decision making in Old Paradigm terms that we
are now embroiled, so no longer at issue are the defective (neo-classical)
economic
assumptions made in the theory, for example as to the assessment of
everything to be taken into account through utility (which comes down to
monetary terms : everything worth accounting has a price), and as to the legitimacy
of transferring with limited compensation risks and costs to involved parties.
The energy choice problem is, so it has commonly been argued in the
assumed Old Paradigm framework, a case of decision under uncertainty.
It is not a
case of decision under risk (and so expected utility models are not applicable),
because some possible outcomes are so uncertain that, in contrast to the case of
risk, no (suitably objective) quantifiable probabilities can be assigned to them.
Items that are so uncertain are taken to include nuclear war and core meltdown
54
of a reactor, possible outcomes of nuclear development :
widespread radio
active pollution is, by contrast, not uncertain.
The correct rule for decision under uncertainty is, in the case of energy
choice, maximin, to maximize the minimum payoff, so it is sometimes contended.
In fact, once again, it is unnecessary for present purposes to decide which
energy option is selected, but only whether the nuclear option is rejected.
Since competing selection rules tend to deliver the same
rejections for
options early rejected as the nuclear options, a convergence in the rejection of
the nuclear option can be effected.
All rational roads lead, not to Rome,
but to rejection of the nuclear option.
A further convergence can be effected
also, because the best possible (economic) outcomes of such leading options as
coal and a hydroelectric mix are very roughly of the same order as the nuclear
option (so Elster contends, and his argument can be elaborated).
conditions complex decision rules
(such as the Arrow-Horowicz rule) which take
account of both best possible and worst possible outcomes under
reduce to the maximin
rule.
Under these
each option
Whichever energy option is selected under the
maximin rule, the nuclear option is certainly rejected since there are options
where worst outcomes are
substantially better
than that of the nuclear
option (just consider the scenario if the nuclear nightmare, not the nuclear
dream, is realised).
Further application of the rejection rule will reject
the fossil fuel (predominantly coal) option, on the basis of estimated effects
on the earth’s climate from burning massive quantities of such fuels.
�43.
Although the rejection rule coupled with
position several rivals to maximin
proposed,
maximin
enjoys a privileged
for decision under uncertainty have been
of which has associated rejection rules.
each
rules, such as the risk- added
Some of these
reasoning criticised by Goodin (pp.507-8),
the riskiness of a policy in terms of the increment of
which ’assesses
risk it adds to those pre-existing in the status quo, rather than in terms of
the absolute value of the risk associated with the policy’ are decidedly
and rather than offering a
dubious,
rational
decision procedure appears to
afford protection of the (nuclear) status quo.
What will be argued, or rather
what Goodin has in effect argued for us, is that wherever one of these rival
rules is applicable, and not dubious, it leads to rejection of the nuclear
option.
For example, the keep-options-open or allow-for-reversibility
(not an entirely unquestionable rule
rule
’of strictly limited applicability’)
excludes the nuclear option because ’nuclear plants and their by-products have
an air of irreversibility ... ’’One cannot
the
way one can abandon
alternatives rule
*
simply abandon
a coal-fired plant’”
(p.506).
a nuclear reactor
The compare-the-
in ordinary application, leads back to the cost-benefit
assessments, which,
as already observed, tell decisively against a nuclear
option when costing is done properly.
The maximise-sustainable—benefits rule,
which ’directs us to opt for the policy producing the highest level of net
benefits which can be sustained indefinitely’, ’decisively favours renewable
Other lesser rules Goodin discusses,
sources’, ruling out the nuclear option.
which have not really been applied in the nuclear debate, and which lead yet
further from the Old Paradigm framework,
vulnerable, also yield
harm-avoidance and protecting-the-
the same nuclear-excluding results.
Harm-avoidance,
in particular, points ’decisively in favour of ’’alternative" and "renewable"
energy sources ... combined with strenuous efforts at energy conservation’
The upshot is evident: whatever reasonable decision rule is adopted
(p.442).
the result is the same, a
standards.
nuclear choice is rejected, even by Old Paradigm
Nor would reversion to an expected utility analysis alter this
conclusion; for such analyses are but glorified cost-benefit analyses, with
probabilities duly multiplied in, and the
conclusion
is as before from
cost-benefit considerations, against a nuclear choice.
The Old Paradigm does not, it thus appears, sustain the nuclear
juggernaut: nor does its Modification.
The real reasons for the continuing
development program and the heavy commitment to the program have to be sought
elsewhere, outside the Old Paradigm, at least as preached.
It is, in any case,
sufficiently evident that contemporary economic behaviour does not accord with
Old Paradigm percepts, practice does not accord with neo-classical economic
�theory nor, to consider the main modification, with social
theory.
democratic
There are, firstly, reasons of previous commitment, when nuclear
power, cleverly promoted at least, looked a rather cheaper and safer deal,
and certainly profitable one:
corporations so committed are understandably
keen to realise returns on capital already invested.
There are also typical
self-interest reasons for commitment to the program, that advantages accrue to
some, like those whose field happens to be nuclear engineering, that profits
accrue to some, like giant corporations, that are influential in political
affairs, and as a spin-off profits accrue to others, and so on.
There are
just as important, ideological reasons, such as a belief in the control of
both political and physical power by technocratic-entreprenial elite, a belief
in social control from above, control which nuclear power offers far more than
alternatives, some of which (vaguely) threaten to alter the power base, a faith
in the unlimitedness of technological enterprise, and nuclear in particular,
so that any real problems that arise will be solved as development proceeds.
Such beliefs are especially conspicuous in the British scene, among the
governing and technocratic classes.
Within contemporary corporate capitalism,
these sorts of reasons for nuclear development are intimately linked, because
those whose types of enterprise benefit substantially from nuclear development
are commonly those who hold the requisite beliefs.
It is then, contemporary corporate capitalism, along with its state
enterprise image, that fuels the nuclear juggernaut.
To be sure, corporate
capitalism, which is the political economy largely thrust upon us in western
nations, is not necessary for a nuclear future; a totalitarian state of the
type such capitalism often supports in the third world will suffice.
But,
unlike a hypothetical state that does conform to precepts of the Old Paradigm,
it is sufficient for a nuclear future - evidently, since we are well embarked
on such a future.
The historical route by which the world reached its present advanced
threshold to a nuclear future confirms this diagnosis.
split into two main cases, the national
This diagnosis can be
development of nuclear power in the
US, and the international spread of nuclear technology for which the US has been
largely responsible.
the
Eastern bloc is
which had in 1977 only
nuclear plants.
By comparison with the West, nuclear power production in
small
and is largely confined to the Soviet Union
about
one-sixth
the wattage output of
US
Nuclear development in USSR has been, of course, a state
controlled and subsidized venture, in which there has been virtually
no public
participation or discussion; but Russian technology has not been exported else
where to any great extent.
American technology has.
�45.
The 60s were, because of the growth in electricity demand, a period of
These companies were
great expansion of the electrical utilities in the US.
encouraged to build nuclear plants, rather than coal or oil burning plants,
for several state controlled or influenced reasons:-
Firstly, owing to
governmental regulation procedures the utilities could (it then seemed) earn
a higher rate of profit on a nuclear plant than a fossil fuel one.
Secondly,
the US government arranged to meet crucial costs and risks of nuclear operation,
and in this way, and more directly through its federal agencies, actively
encouraged a nuclear choice and nuclear development.
In particular, state
limitation of liability and shouldering of part of insurance for nuclear
accidents and state arrangements to handle nuclear wastes were what made
profitable private utility operation appear feasible and resulting in nuclear
investment.
In the 70s, though the state subsidization
continued, the private
picture changed : ’high costs of construction combined with low capacity
factors and poor reliability have wiped out the
cost advantage that nuclear power’
had enjoyed in the US.
Much as the domestic nuclear market in the US is controlled by a few
corporations, so the world market is dominated by a few countries, predominantly
and first of all the US, which through its two leading nuclear companies,
Westinghouse and General Electric, has been the major exporter of nuclear
55
technology.
These companies were enabled to gain entry into European and
subsequently world markets by US foreign policies, basically the "Atoms for
Peace" program supplemented by bilateral agreements providing for US technology,
research, enriched uranium and financial capital.
’The US offered a Estate
subsidized J nuclear package that Europe could not refuse and with which the
British could not compete’.
In the 70s the picture of US domination of Common
Market nuclear technology had given way to subtler influence: American companies
with relevant governments) substantial interests in European
held (usually along
and Japanese nuclear companies and held licences on the technology which remained
largely American.
Meanwhile in the 60s and 70s the US entered into bilateral
agreements for civilian use of atomic energy with many other countries, for
example, Argentina, Brasil, Columbia, India, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Israel,
Pakistan, Philippines, South Korea, Portugal, South Africa,
Taiwan, Turkey, Venezuela, South Vietnam.
The US proceeded,
Spain,
in this way, to ship
nuclear technology and nuclear materials in great quantities round the world.
It also proceeded to spread nuclear technology through the International Atomic
Energy Agency, originally designed to control and safeguard nuclear operations,
but most of whose *
budget
activities’.
and activities ... have gone to promote nuclear
�46.
A main reason for the promotion and sales pressure on Third World
countries has been the failure of US domestic market and industrial world
markets for reactors.
Less developed countries
offer a new frontier where reactors can be built with
easy public financing, where health and safety regulations
are loose and enforcement rare, where public opposition
is not permitted and where weak and corrupt regimes offer
easy sales.
[For]
... the US has considerable leverage
with many of these countries. We know from painful
experience that many of the worst dictatorships in the planet
would not be able to stand without overt and covert US support.
Many of those same regimes
are n°w^ pursuing
the
nuclear path, for all the worst reasons.
It is evident from this sketch of the ways and means of reactor
proliferation that not only have practices departed far from the framework
of the Old Paradigm and its social Modification, but that the practices (of
corporate capitalism and associated third world imperialism) involve much
that is ethically unacceptable, whether
percepts;for principles such as
by older, modified, or alternative
those
assembled under fairness
and self-determination are grossly violated.
IX. SOCIAL OPTIONS ; SHALLOWER AND DEEPER ALTERNATIVES .
The future energy
option that is most often contrasted with nuclear power, namely coal power,
while no doubt preferable to nuclear power, is hardly acceptable.
For it
carries with it the likelihood of serious (air) pollution and associated
phenomena such as acid rain and atmospheric heating, not to mention the
despoliation caused by extensive strip mining, all of which result from its use
in meeting very high projected consumption figures.
Such an option would also
fail, it seems, to meet the necessary transfer condition, because it would
impose widespread costs on nonbeneficiaries for some concentrated benefits to
some profit takers and to some users who do not pay the full costs of production
i
58
and replacement.
To these conventional main options a third is often added which emphasizes
softer and more benign technologies, such as those of solar energy and, in
Northern Europe, hydroelectricity.
The deeper choice, which even softer paths
tend to neglect, is not technological but social, and involves both
conservation measures and the restructuring of production away from energy
intensive uses: at a more basic level there is a choice between consumeristic
and nonconsumeristic futures.
These more fundamental choices between social
alternatives, conventional technologically-oriented discussion of energy options
tends to be obscure.
It is not just a matter of deciding in which way to meet
�given and unexamined goals (as the Old Paradigm would imply), but also a matter
of examining the goals.
That is, we are not merely faced with the question of
comparing different technologies or substitute ways of meeting some fixed or given
demand or level of consumption, and of trying to see whether we can meet this
with soft rather than hard technologies; we are also faced, and primarily, with the
matter of examining those alleged needs and the cost of a society that creates
them.
It is not just a question of devising less damaging ways to meet these
alleged needs conceived of as inevitable and unchangeable.
(Hence there are
solar ways of producing unnecessary trivia no one really wants, as opposed to
nuclear ways.)
Naturally this is not to deny that these softer options are
superior because of the ethically unacceptable features of the harder options.
But it is doubtful that any technology, however benign in principle, will
be likely to leave a tolerable world for the future if it is expected to meet
unbounded and uncontrolled energy consumption and demands.
Even the more benign
technologies such as solar technology could be used in a way which creates costs
for future people and are likely to result in a deteriorated world being handed
on to them.
Consider, for example, the effect on the world’s forests, which are
commonly counted as a solar resource, of use for production of methanol or of
electricity by woodchipping (as already planned by forest authorities and
contemplated by many other energy organisations).
While few would object to the
use of genuine waste material for energy production, the unrestricted exploitation
of forests - whether it goes under the name of "solar energy" or not - to meet
ever increasing energy demands could well be the final indignity for the world’s
already hard-pressed natural forests.
The effects of such additional demands on the maintenance of the
forests are often dismissed, even by soft technologicalists, by the simple
expedient of waving around the label ’renewable resources’.
Many forests are
in principle renewable, it is a true, given a certain (low) rate and kind of
exploitation, but in fact there are now very few forestry operations anywhere
in the world where the forests are treated as completely renewable in the sense
59
of the renewal of all their values.
In many regions too the rate of
exploitation which would enable renewal has already been exceeded, so that a total
decline is widely thought to be imminent if not already well advanced.
It certainly
has begun in many regions, and for many forest types (such as rainforest types)
which are now, and very rapidly, being lost for the future.
The addition of a
major further and not readily limitable demand pressure, that for energy,
on top of present pressures is one which anyone with a realistic appreciation
of the conduct of contemporary forestry operations, who is also concerned with
long-term conservation of the forests and remaining natural communities, must
regard with alarm.
The result of massive deforestation for energy purposes,
�48.
resembling the deforestation of England at the beginning of the Industrial
Revolution, again for energy purposes, would be extensive and devastating
erosion in steeper lands and tropical areas, desertification in more arid
regions, possible climatic change, and massive impoverishment of natural
ecosystems.
Some of us do not want to pass on - we are not entitled to pass
on - a deforested world to the future, any more than we want to pass on one
poisoned by nuclear products or polluted by coal products.
In short, a mere
switch to a more benign technology - important though this is - without any
more basic structural and social change is inadequate.
Nor is such a simple technological switch likely to be achieved.
It is
not as if political pressure could oblige the US government to stop its nuclear
program (and that of the countries it influences, much of the world), in the
to succeed in halting the Vietnam war.
way pressure appeared
While without
doubt it would be good if this could be accomplished, it is very unlikely
given the integration of political powerholders with those sponsoring
nuclear
development.
The deeper social options involve challenging and trying to change a social
structure which promotes consumerism, consumption far beyond genuine needs, and
an economic structure which encourages increasing use of highly energy-intensive
modes of production.
This means, for instance, trying to change a social
structure in which those who are lucky enough to make it into the work force
are cogs in a production machine over which they have very little real control
and in which most people do unpleasant or boring work from which they derive
very little real satisfaction in order to obtain the reward of consumer goods
and services.
A society in which social rewards are obtained primarily from
products rather than processes, from consumption, rather than from satisfaction
in work and in social relations and other activities, is virtually bound to be
one which generates a vast amount of unnecessary consumption.
(A production
system that produces goods not to meet genuine needs but for created and non-
genuine needs is virtually bound to overproduce.)
Consumption frequently
becomes a substitute for satisfaction in other areas.
The adjustments focussed upon are only parts of the larger set of
adjustments involved in socially implementing the New Paradigm, the
move away
from consumerism is for example part of the more general shift from materialism
and materialist values.
The social change option tends to be obscured in most discussions of
energy options and of how to meet energy needs, in part because it does
question underlying values of current social arrangements.
The conventional
discussion proceeds by taking alleged demand (often conflated with wants or
61
needs
) as unchallengeable, and the issue to be one of which technology can
�48.
resembling the deforestation of England at the beginning of the Industrial
Revolution, again for energy purposes, would be extensive and devastating
erosion in steeper lands and tropical areas, desertification in more arid
regions, possible climatic change, and massive impoverishment of natural
ecosystems.
Some of us do not want to pass on - we are not entitled to pass
on - a deforested world to the future, any more than we want to pass on one
poisoned by nuclear products or polluted by coal products.
In short, a mere
switch to a more benign technology - important though this is - without any
more basic structural and social change is inadequate.
Nor is such a simple technological switch likely to be achieved.
It is
not as if political pressure could oblige the US government to stop its nuclear
program (and that of the countries it influences, much of the world), in the
to succeed in halting the Vietnam war.
way pressure appeared
While without
doubt it would be good if this could be accomplished, it is very unlikely
given the integration of political powerholders with those sponsoring
nuclear
development.
The deeper social options involve challenging and trying to change a social
structure which promotes consumerism, consumption far beyond genuine needs, and
an economic structure which encourages increasing use of highly energy-intensive
modes of production.
This means, for instance, trying to change a social
structure in which those who are lucky enough to make it into the work force
are cogs in a production machine over which they have very little real control
and in which most people do unpleasant or boring work from which they derive
very little real satisfaction in order to obtain the reward of consumer goods
and services.
A society in which social rewards are obtained primarily from
products rather than processes, from consumption, rather than from satisfaction
in work and in social relations and other activities, is virtually bound to be
one which generates a vast amount of unnecessary consumption.
(A production
system that produces goods not to meet genuine needs but for created and non-
genuine needs is virtually bound to overproduce.)
Consumption frequently
becomes a substitute for satisfaction in other areas.
The adjustments focussed upon are only parts of the larger set of
adjustments involved in socially implementing the New Paradigm, the
move away
from consumerism is for example part of the more general shift from materialism
and materialist values.
The social change option tends to be obscured in most discussions of
energy options and of how to meet energy needs, in part because it does
question underlying values of current social arrangements.
The conventional
discussion proceeds by taking alleged demand (often conflated with wants or
61
needs
) as unchallengeable, and the issue to be one of which technology can
�49.
be most profitably employed to meet them.
This effectively presents a false
choice, and is the result of taking needs and demand as lacking a social
context so that the social structure which produces the needs is similarly
taken as unchallengeable and unchangeable.
It is commonly argued by representatives
The point is readily illustrated.
of such industries as transportation and petroleum, as for example by McGrowth
of the XS Consumption Co., that people want deep freezers, air conditioners,
power boats, ... It would be authoritarian to prevent them from satisfying
these wants.
Such an argument conveniently ignores the social framework in
which such needs and wants arise or are produced.
To point to the determination
of many such wants at the framework level is not however to accept a Marxist
approach according to which they are entirely determined at the framework level
(e.g. by industrial organisation) and there is no such thing as individual
choice or determination at all.
It is to see the social framework as a major
factor in determining certain kinds of choices, such as those for travel,
and to see apparently individual choices made in such matters as being channelled
and directed by a social framework determined largely in the interests of
corporate and private profit and advantage.
The social change option is a hard option - at least it will be difficult
to obtain politically - but it is the only way, so it has been argued, of avoiding
passing on serious costs to the future.
And there are other sorts of reasons than
such ethical ones for taking it: it is the main, indeed the only sort of option
62
open to those who take a deeper ecological perspective , a perspective integral
with the New Paradigm but not essential to radical departure from the dominant
paradigm.
The ethical transmission requirement defended accordingly requires,
hardly surprisingly, social and political adjustment.
The social and political changes that the deeper alternative requires will
be strongly resisted because they
and power structure.
mean changes in current social organisation
To the extent that the option represents some kind of
threat to parts of present political and economic arrangements it is not surprising
that official energy option discussion proceeds by misrepresenting and often
obscuring it.
But difficult though a change will be, especially one with such
far-reaching effects on the prevailing power structure, is to obtain, it is
imperative to try : we are all on the nuclear train.
�FOOTNOTES
1.
All but the last line of the quote is drawn from Goodin, p. 417;
the last line is from the Fox Report, p. 6.
While it is unnecessary to know much about the nuclear fuel cycle
in order to consider ethical and social dimensions of nuclear power, it
helps to know a little.
& Abbotts, Gyorgy.
The basics are presented in many texts, e.g. Nader
Of course in order to assess fully reports as to such
important background and stage-setting matters as the likelihood of a
core meltdown of a (lightwater) reactor, much more information is required.
For many assessment purposes however, some knowledge of economic fallacies
and decision theory is at least as important as knowledge of nuclear technology.
2.
As to the first, see references cited in Goodin, p. 417, footnote 1.
As regards the second see Cotgrove and Duff, and some of the references
given therein.
3.
Cotgrove and Duff, p. 339.
4.
The table is adapted from Cotgrove and Duff, p. 341;
compare also
Catton and Dunlap, especially p. 34.
5.
See, e.g., Gyorgy, pp. 357-8.
6.
For one illustration, see the conclusions of Mr Justice Parker at
the Windscale inquiry (The Windscale Inquiry Vol. 1., Her Majesty’s
Stationery Office, London, 1978), discussed in both Cotgrove and
Duff, p. 347 and in Goodin, p. 501 ff.
7.
Much as with the argument of one theory or position against another.
One can argue both from one’s own position against the other, and in the
other’s own terms against the other.
8.
As well as screening the debate from the public such manoeuvres
favour the (pro-)nuclear establishment, since they (those of the
alliance of military, large industry, and government) control much of the
information and (subject to minor qualifications) can release what, and only
what, suits them.
9.
This is a conclusion of several governmental inquiries and is
conceded by some leading proponents of nuclear development; for requisite
details up to 1977 see Routley (a).
The same conclusion has been reached in
some, but not all, more recent official reports, see, e.g.,
�2
10.
For some details see Gyorgy, p. 60 ff.
11.
See the papers, and simulations, discussed in Goodin, p. 428.
11a.
Naturally the effect on humans is not the only factor that has to be
taken into account in arriving at moral assessments.
Nuclear radiation, unlike
most ethical theories, does not confine its scope to human life and welfare.
But since the harm nuclear development may afflict on non-human life, for
example, can hardly improve its case, it suffices if the case against it can
be made out solely in terms of its effects on human life in the conventional
(Old Paradigm) way.
12.
On the pollution and waste disposal record of the nuclear industry,
see Nader and Abbotts, Lovins and Price, and Gyorgy.
On the more general
problem of effective pollution controls, see also, Routley (a), footnote 7.
13.
Back of thus Humanity Unlimited assumption is the idea of Man
replacing God.
First God had unlimited power, e.g. over nature, then when
during the Enlightenment Man replaced God, Man was to have unlimited
power.
Science and technology were the tools which were to put Man into the
position of unlimitedness.
More recently nuclear power is seen as providing
man at least with unlimited physical power, power obtained through technology,
[ability to manage technology represents the past]
14.
On such limitation theorems, which go back to Finsler and Godel on one
side and to Arrow on the other, see, e.g. Routley 80.
All these theorems mimic
paradoxes, semantical "paradoxes” on one side and voting "paradoxes" on the
other.
Other different limitation results are presented in Routley 81.
It
follows that there are many problems that have no solution and much that is
necessarily unknowable.
Limitative results put a serious dent in the progress picture.
According
the Dominant Western Worldview,
the history of humanity is one of progress; for every problem
there is a solution, and thus progress need never cease (Catton
and Dunlap, p. 34).
15.
See Lovins and Price.
15a.
The points also suggest a variant argument against a nuclear future,
namely
.
A nuclear future narrows the range of opportunities
open to future generations.
.
’What justice requires ... is that the overall range
of opportunities open to successor generations should not be
narrowed’
(Barry, p.243).
Therefore, a nuclear future contravenes requirements of justice.
�3
16.
For examples, and for some details of the history of philosophers ’
positions on obligations to the future, see Routley (a).
17.
Passmore, p. 91.
Passmore’s position is ambivalent and, to
all appearances, inconsistent.
It is considered in detail in Routley (a),
as also is Rawls’ position.
18.
For related criticisms of the economists’ arguments for discounting,
and for citation of the often eminent economists who sponsor them, see
Goodin, pp. 429-30.
19.
The reasons (not elaborated here) are that the properties are different
e.g. a monetary reduction of value imposes a linear ordering on values to which
value rankings, being only partial orderings, do not conform.
20.
Goodin however puts his case against those rules in a less than
satisfactory fashion.
What he claims is that we cannot list all the
possible outcomes in the way that such rules as expected utility maximization
presupposes, e.g. Goodin suggests that we cannot list all the things that can
go wrong with a nuclear power plant or with waste storage procedures.
But
outstanding alternatives can always be comprehended logically, at worst by
saying "all the rest” (e.g. ~p covers everything except p).
For example,
outcomes Goodin says cannot be listed, can be comprehended along such lines
as "plant breakdown through human error".
Furthermore the different
more appropriate rules Goodin subsequently considers also require listing of
"possible" outcomes.
are really two points.
Goodin’s point can be alternatively stated however.
There
The first trouble is that such ragbag alternatives
cannot in general be assigned required quantitative probabilities, and it is
at that point that applications of the models breaks down.
The breakdown is
just what separates decision making under uncertainty from decision making
under risk.
Secondly, many influential applications of decision theory methods,
the Rasmussen Report is a good example, do, illegitimately, delete possible
alternatives from their modellings.
21.
Discount, or bank, rates in the economists’ sense are usually set to
follow the market, cf. P.A. Samuelson, Economics, 7th Edition, McGraw-Hill,
New York, 1967, p.351.
22.
A real possibility is one which there is evidence for believing could
eventuate,
A real possibility requires producible evidence for its
consideration.
23.
Thus the rates have little moral relevance.
The contrast is with mere logical possibility.
�4
24.
Such a principle is explicit both in classical utilitarianism (e.g.
Sidgwick p. 414), and in a range of contract and other theories from Kant and
Rousseau to Rawls (p.293).
How
the principle is argued for will depend
heavily, however, on the underlying theory; and we do not want to make our use
depend heavily on particular ethical theories.
25.
The latter question is taken up in section VII; see especially, the
Poverty argument.
26.
SF, p. 27.
Shrader-Frechette is herself somewhat critical of the
carte blanche adoption of these methods, suggesting that ’whoever affirms ov'
denies the desirability of ... [such] standards is, to some degree,
symbollically assenting to a number of American value patterns and cultural
norms’
27.
(p. 28).
The example parallels the sorts of counterexamples often advanced to
utilitarianism, e.g. the admissible
lynching
of pleasure given to the large lynching party.
of an innocent person because
For the more general case
against utilitarianism, see ...
28.
US Atomic Energy Commission, Comparative Risk-Cost-Benefit Study of
Alternative sources of Electrical Energy (WASH-1224), US Government Printing
Office, Washington, D.C., December 1974, p.4-7 and p. 1-16.
29.
As SF points out, p.37-44., in some detail.
As she remarks,
... since standards need not be met, so long as the
NRC [Nuclear Regulatory commission] judges that the
licence shows ’a reasonable effort’ at meeting them,
current policy allows government regulators to trade
human health and welfare for the [apparent] good
intentions of the promotors of technology.
[Such]
good intentions have never been known to be sufficient
for the morality of an act (p. 39).
The failure of state regulation, even where the standards are as mostly not very
demanding, and
the alliance of regulators with those they are supposed to be
regulating, are conspicuous features of modern environmental control, not just
of (nuclear) pollution control.
30.
�r
31.
The figures are those from the original Brookhaven Report:
possibilities and consequences of major
’Theoretical
accidents in large nuclear plants’,
USAEC Report WASH-740, Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1957.
This report was requested in the first place because the Commission
on Atomic Energy
wanted positive safety conclusions "to reassure the
private insurance companies” so that they would provide
coverage for the nuclear industry.
Since even the
conservative statistics of the report were alarming it
was
suppressed and its data were not made public until
almost 20 years later, after a suit was brought as a result of
the Freedom of Information Act (Shrader-Frechette, pp. 78-9).
32.
Atomic Energy Commission, Reactor Safety Study: An Assessment of
Accident Risks in US Commercial Nuclear Power Plants, Government Printing Office,
Washington, D.C., 1975.
This report, the only allegedly complete study,
concluded that fission reactors presented only a minimal health risk to the
public.
Early in 1979, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the relevant
organisation that superseded the troubled Atomic Energy Commission) withdrew
its support for the report, with the result that there is now no comprehensive
analysis of nuclear power approved by the1 US Government.
32a.
Most present and planned reactors are of this type: see Gyorgy.
33.
34.
Even then relevant environment factors may have been neglected.
35.
There are variations on (i) and (ii) which multiply costs against
numbers such as probabilities.
In this way risks, construed as probable
costs, can be taken into account in
the assessment.
(Alternatively, risks may
be assessed through such familiar methods as insurance.)
A principle varying (ii), and formulated as follows:
(ii3) a is ethically acceptable if (for some b) a includes no more risks than b
and b is socially accepted,
was the basic ethical principle in terms of which
the Cluff Lake Board of Inquiry recently decided that nuclear power development
�in Saskatchewan is ethically acceptable:
see Cluff Lake Board of Inquiry Final
Report, Department of Environment, Government of Saskatchewan, 1978, p. 305 and
In this report, a is nuclear power and b is either activities clearly
p. 288.
accepted by society as alternative power sources.
In other applications b has
been taken as cigarette smoking, motoring, mining and even the Vietnam War (!)
The points made in the text do not exhaust the objections to principles
(i) - (ii
).
*
The principles are certainly ethically substantive, since an
ethical consequence cannot be deduced from nonethical premisses, but they have an
inadmissible conventional character.
For look at the origin of b: b may be
socially accepted though it is no longer socially acceptable, or though its
social acceptibility is no longer so clearcut and it would not have been socially
accepted if as much as is now known had been known when it was introduced.
What
is required in (ii’), for instance, for the argument to begin to look convincing
is then ’ethically acceptable’ rather than ’socially accepted’.
But even with
the amendments the principles are invalid, for the reasons given in the text.
It is not disconcerting that these arguments do not work.
It would be
sad to see yet another area lost to the experts, namely ethics to actuaries.
36.
A main part of the trouble with the models is that they are narrowly
utilitarian, and like utilitarianism they neglect distributional features,
involve naturalistic fallacies, etc.
Really they try to treat as an uncon
strained optimisation what is a deontically constrained optimisation:
see R. and
V. Routley ’An expensive repair kit for utilitarianism’.
37.
Apparent exceptions to the principle such as taxation (and redistribution
of income generally) vanish when wealth is construed (as it has to be if taxation
is to be properly justified) as at least partly a social asset unfairly
monopolised by a minority of the population.
Examples such as that of motoring
dangerously do not constitute counterexamples to the principle; for one is not
morally entitled to so motor.
38.
SF, p. 15, where references are also cited.
39.
Goodin, p. 433.
40.
On all these points see R. Grossman and G. Daneker, Guide to Jots and
Energy3 Environmentalists for Full Employment, Washington DC, 1977, pp.1-7,
and also the details supplied in substantiating the interesting case of Commoner,
fx------ On the absorption of available capital by the nuclear industry, see as
well
p. 23.
A. Roberts,
’The politics of nuclear power’, Arena No. 41 (1976) 22-47,
On the employment issues, see too Daly, in Commoner and others, p. 149.
�7
A more fundamental challenge to the poverty argument appears in I. Illich,
Energy and Equality3 Calden and Boyars, London 1974, where it is argued that
the sort of development nuclear energy represents is exactly the opposite of
what the poor need.
41.
For much more detail on the inappropriateness see E.F. Schumacher,
Small is Beautiful3 Blond and Briggs, London, 1973.
As to the capital and
other requirements, see Fox Report, p.48, and also Commoner, and Commoner and others.
For an illuminating look at the sort of development high-energy
technology will tend to promote in the so-called underdeveloped countries see
the paper of Waiko and other papers in TTze Melanesian Environment (edited
J.H. Winslow), Australian National University Press, Canberra, 1977.
42.
A useful survey is given in A. Lovins, Energy Strategy: The Road Not
Taken3 Friends of the Earth Australia, 1977 (reprinted from Foreign Affairs3
October 1976); see a|so Nader & Abbotts, p.233 ff., Lovins and Price, Commoner,
and Schumacher, op.czt.
43.
An argument like this is suggested in Passmore, Chapters 4 and 7,
with respect to the question of saving resources.
In Passmore this argument
for the overriding importance of passing on contemporary culture is underpinned
by what appears to be a future-directed ethical version of the Hidden Hand
argument of economics - that, by a coincidence which if correct would indeed be
fortunate, the best way to take care of the future (and perhaps even the only
way to do so, since do-good intervention is almost certain to go wrong) is to
take proper care of the present and immediate future.
The argument has all
the defects of the related Chain Argument discussed above and others.
44.
See Nader and Abbotts, p. 66, p. 191, and also Commoner.
45.
Very persuasive arguments to this effect have been advanced by civil
liberties groups and others in a number of countries: see especially M. Flood
and R. Grove-White,
Nuclear Prospects.
A comment on the individual3 the State
and Nuclear Power3 Friends of the Earth, Council for the Protection of Rural
England and National Council for Civil Liberties, London, 1976.
46.
’US energy policy, for example, since the passage of the 1954 Atomic
Energy Act, has been that nuclear power is necessary to provide "an economical
and reliable basis"
needed "to sustain economic growth" (SF, p.lll, and
references there cited).
�47.
There are now a great many criticisms of the second premiss in the
literature.
For our criticism, and a reformulation of the premiss in terms
of selective economic growth (which would exclude nuclear development), see
Routley (b), and also Berkley and Seckier.
To simple-mindedly contrast economic growth with no-growth, in the fashion
of some discussions of nuclear power, c.f. Elster, is to leave out
alternatives; the contraction
crucial
of course much simplifies the otherwise faulty
case for unalleged growth.
48.
In UK and USSR nuclear development is explicitly in the public domain,
in such countries as France and West Germany the government has very substantial
interests in main nuclear
involved companies.
Even as regards nuclear plant
operation in the US,
it is difficult to obtain comprehensive data.
Estimates of cost very dramtically according to the
sample of plants chosen and the assumptions made
concerning the measurement of plant performance
(Gyorgy, p. 173).
49.
See Kalmanoff, p.
50.
See Comey.
51.
Ref. to what it has to say about Price Anderson Act.
52.
Full ref to SF onargument
from ignorance etc.
On decision theory see also,
53.
These e.g. Elster, p. 377.
54.
A recent theme in much economic literature is that Bayesian decision
theory and risk analysis can be universally applied.
The theme is upset as
soon as one steps outside of select Old Paradigm confines.
In any case, even
within these confines there is no consensus at all on, and few (and
widely diverging) figures for; the probability of a reactor core meltdown,
and no reliable estimates as to the likelihood of a nuclear confrontation.
Thus Goodin argues (in 78) that ’such uncertainties plague energy theories’
as to ’render expected utility calculations impossible’.
55.
For details see Gyorgy, p. 398 ff., from which presentation of the
international story is adapted.
�7
56.
Gyorgy, p. 307, and p. 308.
points, see Chomsky
For elaboration of some of the important
and Hermann.
Whatever one thinks of the ethical principles underlying the Old
57.
Paradigm or its Modification - and they do form a coherent set that many
can
people
respect - these are not the principles underlying contemporary
corporate capitalism and associated third-world imperialism.
Certainly practical transitional programs may involve temporary and
58.
limited use of unacceptable long term commodities such as coal, but in
presenting such practical details one should not lose sight of the more basic
social and structural changes, and the problem is really one of making those.
Similarly practical transitional strategies should make use of such
measures as environmental (or replacement) pricing of energy i.e. so that the
price of some energy unit includes the full cost of replacing it by an
equivalent unit taking account of environmental cost of production.
Other
(sometimes cooptive) strategies towards more satisfactory alternatives should
also, of course, be adopted, in particular the removal of institutional barriers
to energy conservation and alternative technology (e.g. local government
regulations blocking these), and the removal of state assistance to fuel and
power industries.
59.
Symptomatic of the fact that it is not treated as renewable is that
forest economics do not generally allow for full renewability - if they did
the losses and deficits on forestry operations would be much more striking than
they already are often enough.
It is doubtful, furthermore, that energy cropping of forests can be a
fully renewable operation if net energy production is to be worthwhile; see, e.g.
the argument in L.R.B. Mann ’Some difficulties with energy farming for portable
fuels’, and add in the costs of ecosystem maintenance.
60.
For an outline and explanation of this phenomena see Gyorgy,
and also Woodmansee.
61.
The requisite distinction is made in several places, e.g. Routley (b),
and (to take one example from the real Marxist literature), Baran and
Sweezy.
62.
The distinction between shallow and deep ecology was first emphasised
by Naess.
For its environmental importance see Routley (c) (where
further references are cited).
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�REFERENCES USED
Works especially useful for further investigation of the ethical issues
raised by nuclear development are indicated with an asterisk (*
).
t
I
/S. Congrove and A. Duff,
’Environmentalism, middle-class radicalism and
politics’, Sociological Review
28(2) (1980), 333-51.
A.
R. Cotton, Jr. , and R. E. Dunlj/p, ’A new ecological paradigm for post
f /
exuberant sociology’ American Behavioural Scientist 24 (1980).
15-47.
v/r
Report :
Vr
Ranger Uranium En/ynmental Inquiry First Report,
Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1977.
E. Goodin, ’No moral ni^k^S
’, Ethics 90 (1980), 417-49.
Gyorgy and friends, No /Juk^
:
everyone’s guide to nuclear power,
South End Press, Boston, Mass., 1979
/ R. Nader and J. Abbotts, The Menace of Atomic Energy,
Melbourne, 1977.
/
/
D.
*
Mannison, M. McRobbie and R. Routley (editors), Environmental Philosophy,
RSSS, Australian National University, 1980.
!
N. Myers, The Sinking Ark,
x.
&
Outback Press,
/
K.
*
Pergamon Press, Oxford, 1979.
S. Shrader-Frechette, Nuclear Power and Public Policy, Reid^l, Dordrecht,
1980 (referred to as SF).
R. and V. Routley,
’Nuclear energy and obligations to the future’, Inquiry
21 (1978), 133-79.
�
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I
NUCLEAR POWER - ETHICAL,
I.
SOCIAL AND POLITICAL DIMENSIONS
COMPETING PARADIGMS AND THE NUCLEAR DEBATE.
One hardly needs initiation into the dark mysteries of
nuclear physics to contribute usefully to the debate now
widely ranging over nuclear power. While many important
empirical questions are still unresolved, these do not really
lie at the centre of the controversy.
Instead, it is a
debate about values ...
many of the questions which arise are social and ethical ones.
Sociological investigations have confirmed that the nuclear debate is primarily
one over what is worth having or pursuing and over what we are entitled to do
They have also confirmed that the debate is polarised along the
2
lines of competing paradigms.
According to the entrenched paradigm discerned,
to others.
that constellation of values, attitudes and beliefs often called the Dominant
Social Paradigm (hereafter the Old Paradigm),
economic criteria become the benchmark by which a wide range of
individual and social action is judged ahd evaluated. And belief
in the market and market mechanisms is quite central. Clustering
around this core belief is the conviction that enterprise flourishes
best in a system of risks and rewards, that differentials are
necessary ..., and in the necessity for some form of division of
labour, and a hierarchy of skills and expertise. In particular,
there is a belief in the competence of experts in general and of
scientists in particular. ... there is an emphasis on quantification.
The rival world view, sometimes called the Alternative Environmental Paradigm
(the New Paradigm) differs on almost every point, and, according to sociologists
m ways summarised in the following table
Dominant Social Paradigm
CORE VALUES
Material (economic growth, progress and development)
Natural environment valued as resource
Alternative Environmental
Paradigm
Domination over nature
Non-material (self-realisation)
Natural environment intrinsically
valued
Harmony with nature
*
ECONOMY
Market forces
Risk and reward
Rewards for achievement
Differentials
Individual self-help
Public interest
Safety
Incomes related to need
Egalitarian
Collective/social provision
POLITY
Authoritative structures (experts influential)
Hierarchical
Law and order
Action through official institutions
Participative structures (citizen/
worker involvement)
Non-hierarchical
Liberation
Direct action
SOCIETY
Centralised
Large-scale
Associational
Ordered
Decentralised
Small-scale
Communal
Flexible
NATURE
Ample reserves
Nature hostile/neutral
Environment controllable
Earth’s resources limited
Nature benign
Nature delicately balanced
KNOWLEDGE
Confidence in science and technology
Rationality of means (only)
Limits to science
Rationality of ends
State socialism, as practised in most of the "Eastern bloc", differs
as to economic organisation, the market in particular being replaced
system by a command system)^ But since there is virtually no debate
confines of state socialism, that minor variant on the Old Paradigm
from the Old Paradigm really only
by central planning (a market
over a nuclear future within the
need not be delineated here.
No doubt the competing paradigm picture is a trifle simple
(and
subsequently it is important to disentangle a Modified Old Paradigm, which
softens the old economic assumptions with social welfare requirements:
really
and
instead of a New Paradigm there are rather counterparadigms, a
cluster of not very well worked out positions that diverge from the cluster
marked out as the Old Paradigm).
Nonetheless it is empirically investigable,
and, most important, it enables the nuclear debate to be focussed.
Large-
scale nuclear development, of the sort now occurring in much of the world,
runs counter to leading tenets (such as societal features) of the New Paradigm.
Indeed to introduce ethical and social dimensions into the assessment of nuclear
power, instead of or in addition to merely economic factors such as cost and
efficiency, is already to move somewhat beyond the received paradigm.
For
under the Old Paradigm, strictly construed, the nuclear debate is confined to
the terms of the narrow utilitarianism upon which contemporary economic
practice is premissed, the issues to questions of economic means (to assumed
economistic ends) along with technological, social engineering and other
instrumental details:
whatever falls outside these terms is (dismissed as)
irrational.
Furthermore, nuclear development receives its support from adherents
of the Old Paradigm.
Virtually all the arguments in favour of it are set
within the assumption framework of the Old Paradigm, and without these
assumptions the case for the nuclear future the world is presently committed
to fails.
But in fact the argument for a nuclear future from the Old Paradigm
is itself broken-backed and ultimately fails, unless the free enterprise
pronomic assumptions are replaced by the ethically unacceptable assumptions of
advanced (corporate) capitalism.
The two paradigm picture also enables our case against a nuclear future
(a case written from outside the Old Paradigm) to be structured.
main parts?:-
There are two
It is argued, firstly, from without the Old Paradigm, that
nuclear development is ethically unjustifiable; but that, secondly, even from
within the framework of the ethically dubious Old Paradigm, such development
is unacceptable, since significant features of nuclear development conflict
with indispensible features of the Paradigm (e.g. costs of project development
and state subsidization with market independence and criteria for project
selection).
It has appeared acceptable from within the dominant paradigm only
because ideals do not square with practice, only because the assumptions of the
Old Paradigm are but very rarely applied in contemporary political practice,
3
the place of pure (or mixed) capitalism having been usurped by corporate
capitalism.
It is because the nuclear debate can be carried on within the
framework of the Old Paradigm that the debate - although it is a debate about
values, because of the conflicting values of the competing paradigms - is not
just a debate about values; it is also a debate within a paradigm as to means
to already assumed (economistic) ends, and of rational choice as to energy
options within a predetermined framework of values. (In this corner belong,
as explained in section VIII, most decision theory arguments, arguments often
considered as encompassing all the nuclear debate is ethically about, best
utilitarian means to predetermined ends.)
For another leading characteristic
of the nuclear debate is the attempt, under the dominant paradigm to remove it
from the ethical and social sphere, and to divert it into specialist issues -
whether over minutiae and contingencies of present technology or over medical
O
or legal or mathematical details.
The double approach can be applied as regards each of the main problems
nuclear development poses.
There are many interrelated problems, and the
argument is further structured in terms of these.
For in the advancement and
promotion of nuclear power we encounter a remarkable combination of factors, never
before assembled:
establishment, on a massive scale, of an industry which
involves at each stage of its processing serious risks and at some stages of
production possible catastrophe, which delivers as a by-product radioactive
wastes which require up to a million years’ storage but for which no sound and
economic storage methods are known, which grew up as part of the war industry
and which is easily subverted to deliver nuclear weapons, which requires for
its operation considerable secrecy, limitations on the flow of information and
restrictions on civil liberties, which depends for its economics, and in order
to generate expected profits, on substantial state subsidization, support, and
intervention.
with problems.
It is, in short, a very high techological development, beset
A first important problem, which serves also to exemplify
ethical issues and principles involved in other nuclear power questions, is
the unresolved matter of disposal of nuclear wastes.
II. THE NUCLEAR WASTE DISPOSAL PROBLEM, AND THE TRAIN PARABLE.
A long distance country train has just pulled out.
crowded carries both passengers and freight.
The train which is
At an early stop in the journey
someone consigns as freight, to a far distant destination, a package which
contains a highly toxic and explosive gas.
This is packaged in a very thin
container which, as the consigner is aware, may not contain the gas for the
4
full distance for which it is consigned, and certainly will not do so if the train
should strike any real trouble, for example if there is a breakdown and the
interior of the train becomes very hot, if the train should be derailed or
involved in a collision, or if some passenger should interefere inadvertently
or deliberately with the freight, perhaps trying to steal some of it.
All of
these sorts of contingencies have occurred on some previous journeys.
If the
container should break the resulting disaster would probably kill at least some
of the people on the train in adjacent carriages, while others could be maimed
or incur serious diseases.
Most of us would roundly condemn such an action.
consigner of the parcel say to try to justify it?
What might the
He might say that it is not
certain that the gas will escape and that it is mere speculation to suppose it
will, that the world needs his product and it is
his duty to supply it, and
that in any case he is not responsible for the train or the people on it.
These
sorts of excuses however would normally be seen as ludicrous when set in this
context.
What is worth remarking is that similar excuses are not always so seen
when the consigner, again a "responsible” businessman, puts his workers’ health
or other peoples’ welfare at risk.
Suppose he ways that it is his own and others’ pressing needs which
justify his action.
The company he controls, which produces the material as a
by-product, is in bad financial straits, and could not afford to produce a
better container even if it knew how to make one.
If the company fails, he and
his family will suffer, his employees will lose their jobs and have to look
for others, and the whole company town, through loss of spending and the
cancellation of the Multiplier Effect, will be worse off.
The poor and unemployed
of the town, whom he would otherwise have been able to help, will suffer
especially.
Few people would accept such a story, even if correct, as justification.
Even where there are serious risks and costs to oneself or some group for whom
one is concerned one is usually considered not to be entitled to simply transfer
the heavy burden of those risks and costs onto
other uninvolved parties,
especially where they arise from one’s own, or one’s group’s, chosen life-style.
The matter of nuclear waste disposal has many moral features which resemble
the train case.
progresses.
How fitting the
analogy is will become apparent as the argument
There is no known proven safe way to package the highly toxic
wastes generated by the nuclear plants that will be spread around the world as
9
large-scale nuclear development goes ahead.
The waste problem will be much
more serious than that generated by the 50 or so reactors in use at present, with
5.
each one of the 2000 or so reactors envisaged by the end of the century producing,
on average, annual wastes containing 1000 times the radioactivity of the
Hiroshima bomb.
Much of this waste is extremely toxic.
For example, a
millionth of a gramme of plutonium is enough to induce a lung cancer.
Wastes
will include the reactors themselves, which will have to be abandoned after
their expected life times of perhaps 40 years,
and which, some have estimated,
may require 1^ million years to reach safe levels of radioactivity.
Nuclear wastes must be kept suitably isolated from the environment for
their entire active lifetime.
For fission products the required storage period
averages a thousand years or so, and for transuranic elements, which include
plutonium, there is a half to a million year storage problem.
Serious problems
have arisen with both short-term and proposed long-term methods of storage,
even with the comparatively small quantities of waste produced over the last
twenty years.10 Short-term methods of storage require continued human inter
vention, while proposed longer term methods are subject to both human inter
ference and risk of leakage through non-human factors.
No one with even a slight knowledge of the geological and climatic
history of the earth over the last million years, a period whose fluctuations
in climate we are only just beginning to guage and which has seen four Ice
Ages, could be confident that a rigorous guarantee of safe storage could be
provided for the vast period of time involved.
Nor does the history of human
affairs over the last 3000 years give ground for confidence in safe storage by
methods requiring human intervention over perhaps a million years.
Proposed
long-term storage methods such as storage in granite formations or in salt mines,
are largely speculative and relatively untested, and have already proved to
involve difficulties with attempts made to put them into practice.
Even as
regards expensive recent proposals for first embedding concentrated wastes in
glass and encapsulating the result in multilayered metal containers before rock
deposit, simulation models reveal that radioactive material may not remain
suitably isolated from human environment.In short, the best present storage
proposals carry very real possibilities of irradiating future people and
11a
damaging their environment.
Given the heavy costs which could be involved for the future, and given
the known limits of technology, it is methodologically unsound to bet, as
nuclear nations have, on the discovery of safe procedures for storage of wastes.
Any new procedures (required before 2000) will probably be but variations on
present proposals, and subject to the same inadequacies.
For instance, none of
the proposed methods for safe storage has been properly tested, and they may
6.
well prove to involve unforeseen difficulties and risks when an attempt is made
to put them into practice on a commercial scale.
provide a rigorous guarantee of
Only a method that could
safety over the storage period, that placed
safety beyond reasonable doubt, would be acceptable.
It is difficult to see
how such rigorous guarantees could be given concerning either the geological
or future human factors.
But even if an economically viable, rigorously safe
long term storage method could be devised, there is the problem of guaranteeing
that it would be universally and invariably used.
The assumption that it
would be (especially if, as appears likely, such a method proved expensive
economically and politically) seems to presuppose a level of efficiency,
perfection and concern for the future which has not previously been encountered
in human affairs, and has certainly not been conspicuous in the nuclear industry.
12
Again, unless we assume continuous and faultless guarding of long term storage
sites through perhaps a million years of possible future human activity, weapons-
grade radioactive material will be accessible, over much of the million year
storage period, to any party who is in a position to retrieve it.
The assumption that a way will nonetheless be found, before 2000,
which gets around the waste storage problem (no longer a nere disposal problem)
is accordingly not rationally based, but is rather like many assumptions of ways,
an article of faith.
It is an assumption supplied by the Old Paradigm, a no
limitations assumption, that there are really no (development) problems that
cannot be solved technologically (if not in a fashion that is always
immediately economically feasible).
The assumption has played
an important
part in development plans and practice.
It has not only encouraged an unwarranted
13
technological optimism (not to say hubris ), that there are no limits to what
humans can accomplish, especially through science; it has led to the embarcation
on projects before crucial problems have been satisfactorily solved or a solution
is even in sight, and it has led to the idea that technology can always be suitably
controlled.
It has also led, not surprisingly, to disasters.
There are severe
limits on what technology can achieve (some of which are becoming known in the
14
form of limitation theorems ); and in addition there are human limitations
which modern technological developments often fail to take due account of (risk
analysis of the likelihood of reactor accidents is a relevant example, discussed
below).
The original nuclear technology dream was that nuclear fission would
provide unlimited energy (a ’clean unlimited supply of power’).
shattered.
and nuclear
That dream soon
The nuclear industry apparently remains a net consumer of power,
fission will be but a quite short-term supplier of power.
7.
The risks imposed on the future by proceeding with nuclear development
are, then, significant.
Nuclear fission creates wastes which may remain toxic for
a million years, but even with the (suspect) breeder reactor it could be an
energy source for only perhaps 150 years.
It will do nothing for the energy
problems of the people of the distant future whose lives could be seriously
affected by the wastes.
Thus perhaps 40,000 generations of future people could
be forced to bear significant risks resulting from the provision of the
(extravagant) energy use of only a small proportion of the people of 10 generations.
Nor is the risk of direct harm from the escape or misuse of radioactive
materials the only burden the nuclear solution imposes on the future.
Because
the energy provided by nuclear fission is merely a stop gap, it seems probable
that in due course the same problem, that of making a transition to renewable
sources of energy, will have to be faced again by a future population which will
probably, again as a result of our actions, be very much worse placed to cope
For they may well have to face the change to renewable resources in an
with it.
over-populated world
not only burdened with the legacy of our nuclear wastes,
but also in a world in which, if the nuclear proponents’ dreams of global
industrialisation are realised, more and more of the global population will have
become dependent on high energy consumption and associated technology and heavy
resource use and will have lost or reduced its ability to survive without it.
It will, moreover, probably be a world which is largely depleted of non-renewable
resources, and in which such renewable resources as forests and soils as remain,
resources which will have to form a very important part of the basis of life,
15a
are in a run-down condition. Such points
tell against the idea that future
people must be, if not direct beneficiaries of nuclear fission energy, at least
indirect beneficiaries.
It is for such reasons that the train parable cannot
be turned around to work in favour of nuclear power, with for example, the
nuclear train bringing relief as well as wastes to a remote town powered (only)
by nuclear power.
The 'Solution” then is to buy time for contemporary industrial society
at a price which not only creates serious problems for future people but which
reduces their ability to cope with those problems.
Like the consigner in the train
parable, contemporary industrial society proposes, in order to get itself out of a
mess arising from its chosen life style - the creation of economies dependent on
an abundance of non-renewable energy, which is limited in supply - to pass on
costs and risks of serious harm to others who will obtain no corresponding
benefits.
The "solution" may enable the avoidance of some uncomfortable changes
8.
in the lifetime of those now living and their immediate descendants, just as
the consigner’s action avoids uncomfortable changes for him and his immediate
surroundings, but at the expense of passing heavy burdens to other uninvolved
parties, whose opportunity to lead decent lives may be seriously jeopardised.
I
Industrial society has - under each paradigm, so it
will be argued -
clear alternatives to this action, which is taken essentially to avoid changing
corporately-controlled patterns of consumption and protect the interest of
those comparatively few who benefit from them.
If we apply to the nuclear situation, so perceived, the standards of
behaviour and moral principles generally acknowledged (in principle if perhaps
often not in fact) in the contemporary world, it is not easy to avoid the
conclusion that nuclear development involves gross injustice with respect to
the future.^3 There appear to be only two plausible moves that might enable
the avoidance of such a conclusion.
First, it might be argued that the moral
principles and obligations which we acknowledge for the contemporary world and
the immediate future do not apply because the recipients of the nuclear parcel
are in the non-immediate future.
Secondly, an attempt might be made to appeal
to overriding circumstances, for to teject the consigner’s action in the circum
stances outlined is not of course to imply that there are no circumstances in
which such an action might be justifiable, or at least where the matter is less
clearcut.
It is the same with the nuclear case.
Just as in the case of the
consigner of the package there is a need to consider what these justifying
circumstances might be, and whether they apply in the present case.
We consider
these possible escape routes for the proponent of nuclear development in turn,
beginning with the question of our obligations to the future.
Resolution of
this question casts light on other ethical questions concerning nuclear develop
ment.
It is only when these have been considered that the matter of whether
there are overriding circumstances is taken up again (in section VII).
Ill
OBLIGATIONS TO THE (DISTANT) FUTURE.
The especially problematic area
is that of the distant (i.e. non-immediate) future, the future with which
people alive today will have no direct contact: by comparison, the immediate
future gives fewer problems for most ethical theories.
In fact the question of
obligations to future people presents tests which a number of ethical theories
fail to pass, and also has serious repercussions in political philosophy as
regards the adequacy of accepted (democratic and other) institutions which do
not take due account of the interests of future creatures.
9.
Moral philosophers have, predictably, differed on the issue.
A good
many of the philosophers who have explicitly considered the question have come down
in favour of the same considerations being given to the rights and interests of
future people as to those of contemporary or immediately future people.
Other
philosophers have tended to fall into three categories - those who acknowledge
obligations to the future but who do not take them seriously or who assign them
a lesser weight, those who deny or who are committed by their general moral
position to denying that there are moral obligations beyond the immediate
future, and those who come down with admirable philosophical caution, on both
sides of the issue, but with the weight of the argument favouring the view
underlying prevailing economic and political institutions, that there are no
moral obligations to the future beyond perhaps those to the next generation.
According to the most extreme of these positions against moral obligations
to the future, our behaviour with respect to the future is morally unconstrained,
there are no moral restrictions on acting or failing to act deriving from the
effect of our actions on
future people.
Of those philosophers who say, or
whose views imply that we do not have obligations to the (non-immediate)
future, who have opted for the unconstrained position, many have based this view
on accounts of moral obligation which are built on relations which presuppose
some temporal or spatial contiguity.
Thus moral obligation is seen as grounded
on or as presupposing various relations which could not hold between people
widely separated in time (or sometimes in space).
For example, obligation is
seen as grounded in relations which are proximate or of short duration and also
non-transitive.
Among such suggested bases or grounds of moral obligation, or
requirements on moral obligation, which would rule out obligations to the nonimmediate future are these:-
Firstly there are those accounts which require that
someone to whom a moral obligation is held be able to claim his rights or
entitlement.
People in the distant future will not be able to claim rights and
entitlements as against us, and of course they can do nothing effective to
enforce any claims they might have for their rights against us.
Secondly, there
are those accounts which base moral obligations on social or legal convention,
for example a convention which would require punishment of offenders or at least
some kind of social enforcement.
But plainly these and other conventions will
not hold invariant over change in society and amendment of legal conventions and
so will not be invariant over time.
Also future people have no way of enforcing
their interests or punishing offenders, and there could be no guarantee that any
contemporary institutions would do it for them.
10.
Both the view that moral obligation requires the context of a moral
community and the view that it is contractually based appear to rule out the
distant future as a field of moral obligation as they not only require a
commonality or some sort of common basis which cannot be guaranteed in the case
of the distant future, but also a possibility of interchange or reciprocity
of action which cannot apply to the future.
Where the basis of moral obligation
is seen as mutual exchange the interests of future people must be set aside
because they cannot change the past and cannot be parties to any mutual contract.
The exclusion of moral obligations to the distant future also follows from
those views which attempt to ground moral obligations in non-transitive relations
of short duration such as sympathy and love.
As well there are difficulties
about love and sympathy for (non-existent) people in the far distant future about
whose personal qualities and characteristics one must know very little and who
may well be committed to a life-style for which one has little or no sympathy.
On the current showing in the case of nuclear energy it would be easy to
conclude that contemporary society lacks both love and sympathy for future
people; and it would appear to follow from this that contemporary people had
no obligations concerning future people and could damage them as it suited them.
What all these views have in common is a picture of obligation as
something acquired, either individually or institutionally, something which
is conditional on doing something or failing to do something (e.g. participating
in the moral community, contracting), or having some characteristic one can
16
fail to have (e.g. love, sympathy, empathy).
Because obligation therefore
becomes conditional, features usually (and correctly) thought to characterise
obligation such as universality of application and necessitation (i.e. the binding
features) are lost, especially where there is a choice whether or not to do the
thing required to acquire the obligation, and so as to whether to acquire it.
The criteria for acquisition suggested are such as to exclude people in the
distant future.
The view that there are no moral constraints with respect to future
people, that one is free to act however one likes with respect to them, is not
however sustainable.
Consider, for example, a scientific group which, for no
particular reason other than to test a particular piece of technology, places
in orbit a cobalt bomb set off by a triggering device designed to go off several
hundred years from the time of its despatch.
No presently living person and
none of their immediate descendants would be affected, but the population of
11.
the earth in the distant future would be wiped out as a
result of the action.
direct and predictable
The unconstrained position clearly implies that this is
an acceptable moral enterprise, that whatever else we might legitimately
criticize in the scientists’ experiment, perhaps its being over-expensive or
badly designed, we cannot lodge a moral protest about the damage it will do
to future people.
the following sort
The unconstrained position also endorses as morally acceptable
of policy:-
A firm discovers it can make a handsome profit
from mining, processing and manufacturing a new type of material which, although
it causes no problem for present people or their immediate descendants,
will
over a period of hundreds of years decay into a substance which will cause an
enormous epidemic of cancer among the inhabitants of the earth at that time.
According to the unconstrained view the firm is free to act in its own interests,
without any consideration for the harm it does remote future people.
Such counterexamples to the unconstrained view, which are easily varied
and multiplied, might seem childishly obvious.
Yet the unconstrained position
concerning the future from which they follow is far from being a straw man; not
only have several philosophers endorsed this position, but it is a clear
implication of many currently popular views of the basis of moral obligation, as
well as of prevailing economic theory.
It seems that those who opt for the
unconstrained position have not considered such examples, despite their being
clearly implied by their position.
We suspect that - we would certainly hope
that - when it is brought out that the unconstrained position admits such
counterexamples, that being free to act implies among other things being free to
inflict pointless harm for example, most of those who opted for the unconstrained
position would want to assert that it was not what they intended.
What many
of those who have put forward the unconstrained position seem to have had in
mind in denying moral obligation is rather that future people can look after
themselves, that we are not responsible for their lives.
The popular view that
the future can take care of itself also seems to assume a future causally
independent of the present.
But it is not.
It is not as if, in the counter
example cases or in the nuclear case, the future is simply being left alone
to take care of itself.
Present people are influencing it, and in doing so
thereby acquire many Of the same sorts of moral responsibilities as they do in
causally affecting the present and immediate future, namely the obligation to
take account in what they do of people affected and their interests, to be
careful in their actions, to take account of the genuine probability of their
actions causing harm, and to see that they do not act so as to rob future
people of the chance of a good life.
12.
Furthermore, to say that we are not responsible for the lives of future
people does not amount to the same thing as saying that we are free to do as we
like with respect to them, that there are no moral constraints on our action
involving them.
In just the same way, the fact that one does not have or has not
acquired an obligation to some stranger with whom one has never been involved, that
one has no responsibility for his life, does not imply that one is free to do
what one likes with respect to him, for example to rob him or to pursue some
course of action of advantage to oneself which could seriously harm him.
These difficulties for the unconstrained position arise in part from the
(sometimes deliberate) failure to make an important distinction between acquired
or assumed obligation toward somebody, for which some act of acquisition or
assumption is required as a qualifying condition, and moral constraints, which
require, for example, that one should not act so as to damage or harm someone,
and for which no act of acquisition is required.
There is a considerable
difference in the level and kind of responsibility involved.
In the first case
one must do something or be something which one can fail to do or be, e.g.
have loves, sympathy, be contracted.
In the second case responsibility arises
as a result of being a causal agent who is aware of the consequences or probable
consequences of his action, and thus does not have to be especially acquired or
Assiiipp.fl.
Thus there is no problem about how the latter class, moral constraints,
can apply to the distant future in cases where it may be difficult or impossible
for acquisition or assumption conditiohs to be satisfied.
They apply as a result
of the ability to produce causal effects on the distant future of a reasonably
predictable nature.
Thus also moral constraints can apply to what does not
(yet) exist, just as actions can cause results that do not (yet) exist.
While
it may perhaps be the case that there would need to be an acquired or assumed
obligation in order for it to be claimed that contemporary people must make
special sacrifices for future people of an heroic kind, or even to help them
especially, only moral constraints are needed in order for us to be constrained
from harming them.
Thus, to return to the train parable, the consigner cannot
argue in justification of his action that he has never assumed or acquired
responsibility for the passengers, that he does not know them and therefore has no
love or sympathy for them and that they are not part of his moral community, in
short that he has no special obligations to help them.
All that one needs to
argue concerning the train, and the nuclear case, is that there are moral
constraints against harming, not that there are specially acquired obligations
to take responsibility for the lives of people involved.
There has been an attempt to represent all obligations to the distant
future in terms of heroic self-sacrifice, something which cannot of course be
morally required.
But in view of the distinctions between constraints and
acquired obligation and between obligation and supererogation this is just
13.
to misrepresent the position of these obligations.
For example, one is no more
engaging in heroic self-sacrifice by not forcing future people into an unviable
life position or by refraining from causing then direct harm than the consigner
is resorting to heroic self-sacrifice in refraining from placing his dangerous
package on the train.
The conflation of moral restraints with acquired obligation, and the
attempt therewith to view all constraints as acquired and to write off nonacquired
constraints, is facilitated through the use of the term ’moral obligation’ both
to signify any type of deontic constraints and also to indicate rather something
which has to be assumed or required.
The conflation is encouraged by reductionist
positions which, in attempting to account for obligation in general, mistakenly
endeavour to collapse all obligations.
Hence the equation, and some main roots
of the unconstrained position, of the erroneous belief that there are no moral
constraints concerning the distant future.
The unconstrained view tends to give way, under the weight of counter
examples, to more qualified, and sometimes ambivalent, positions, for example
the position that
our obligations are to immediate posterity, we ought to try to
improve the world so that we shall be able to hand it over to
our immediate successors in a better condition, and that is all;^
there are in practice no obligations to the distant future.
A main argument
in favour of the latter theme is that such obligations would in practice be
otiose.
Everything that needs to be accounted for can be encompassed through
the chain picture of obligation as linking successive generations, under which
each generation has obligations, based on loves or sympathy, only to the
succeeding generation.
account.
There are at least three objections to this chain
First, it is inadequate to treat constraints concerning the future
as if they applied only between generations, as if there were no question of
constraints on individuals as opposed to whole generations, since individuals
can create causal effects, e.g. harm, on the future in a way which may create
individual responsibility, and which often cannot be sheeted home to an entire
generation.
Nuclear power and its wastes, for example, are strictly the
responsibility of small groups of power-holders, not a generational responsibility.
Secondly, such chains, since non-transitive, cannot yield direct obligations to
the distant future.
But for this very reason the chain picture cannot be
adequate, as examples again show.
For the picture is unable to explain several
of the cases that have to be dealt with, e.g. the examples already discussed
which show that we can have a direct effect on the distant future without
affecting the next generation, who may not even be able to influence matters.
14.
Thirdly, improvements for immediate successors may be achieved at the expense of
disadvantages to people of the more distant future.
Improving the world for
immediate successors is quite compatible with, and may even in some circumstances
be most easily achieved by, ruining it for less immediate successors.
Such
cases can hardly be written off as "never-never land" examples since many cases
of environmental exploitation might be seen as of just this type. e.g. not just
the nuclear case but also the exhaustion of non-renewable resources and the
long-term depletion of renewable resources such as soils and forests through
overuse.
If then such obvious injustices to future people arising from the
favouring or exclusive concern with immediate successors are to be avoided,
obligations to the future will have to be seen as in some way fairly
distributed over time, and not merely as accruing to particular generations in
the way the chain picture suggests.
IV. ATTEMPTS TO QUALIFY OBLIGATIONS TO THE FUTURE : ECONOMISTIC UNCERTAINTY
AND INDETERMINACY ARGUMENTS.
While there are grave difficulties for the
unconstrained position, qualification leads to a more defensible position.
According to the main qualified position we are not entirely unconstrained
with respect to the distant future, there are obligations, but these are not so
important as those to the present, and the interests of distant future people
cannot weigh very much in the scale against those of the present and immediate
future.
The interests of future people then, except in unusual cases, count for
very much less than the interests of present people.
Hence such things as nuclear
development and various exploitative activities which benefit present people should
proceed, even if people of the distant future are (somewhat) disadvantaged by them.
The qualified position appears to be widely held and is implicit in
prevailing economic theories, where the position of a decrease in weight of future
costs and benefits (and so of future interests) is obtained by application over
time of a discount rate, so discounting costs and risks to future people.
The
attempt to apply economics as a moral theory, something that is becoming
increasingly common, can lead then to the qualified position.
objectionable in such an approach is that
What is
economics should operate within the
bounds of moral (deontic) constraints, just as in practice it operates within
legal constraints, not determine what those constraints are.
There are moreover
alternative economic theories and simply to adopt, without further ado, one
which discounts the future is to beg many questions at issue.
15.
Among the arguments that economists offer for generally discounting
the future, the most threadbare is based on the assumption that future
generations will be better off than present ones, and so better placed to handle
18
the waste problem.
Since there is mounting evidence that future generations
may well not
be better off than present ones, especially in things that matter,
no argument for discounting the interests of future generations on this basis
can carry much weight.
Nor is that all that is wrong with the argument.
For
it depends at base on the assumption that poorer contemporaries would be making
sacrifices to richer successors in foregoing such (allegedly beneficial)
developments as nuclear power.
sacrifice argument.
That is, it depends on the already scotched
In any case, for the waste disposal problem to be
legitimately bequeathed to the future generations, it would have to be shown,
what recent economic progress hardly justifies, that future generations will
be, not just better off, but so much better off and more capable that they
can duly absorb the nuclear waste burden.
A more plausible argument for discounting is directly in terms of
opportunity costs.
It is argued, from the fact that a dollar gained now is worth
much more than a dollar received in the non-immediate future (because the first
dollar could meanwhile be invested at compound interest), that discounting is
required to obtain equivalent monetary values, and so for efficient allocation
of resources.
Similarly it is argued, by virtue again of equalization of monetary
value, that compensation - which is what the waste problem is taken to come to
economically - costs much less now than later.
Thus a few pennies set aside
(e.g. in a trust fund) now or in the future, if need be, will suffice to
compensate eventually for any victims of remote radioactive waste leakage.
There are, presently at least, insurmountable practical difficulties about
applying such discounting, e.g. how to determine appropriate future discount rates.
A more serious objection is that applied generally, the argument presupposes,
what is false, that compensation, like value, can always be converted into
monetary equivalents, that people (including those outside market frameworks)
can be monetarily compensated for a variety of damages, including cancer and loss
of life.
There is no compensating a dead man, or for a lost species.
In fact
the argument presupposes a double reduction neither part of which can succeed:
it is not just that value cannot in general be represented at all adequately
19
monetarily,
but (as against utilitarianism, for example) that constraints and
obligations can not be somehow reduced to matters of value.
It is also
presupposed that all decision methods, suitable for requisite nuclear choices,
16.
are bound to apply discounting.
This is far from so : indeed Goodin argues that,
on the contrary, more appropriate decision rules do not allow discounting, and
discounting only works in practice with expected utility rules (such as underlie
cost-benefit and benefit-risk analyses), which are, he contends strictly
inapplicable for nuclear choices (since not all outcomes can be duly determined
and assigned probabilities, in the way that application of the rules requires.).
20
As the preceding arguments reveal, the discounting move often has the same
result as the unconstrained position.
If, for instance, we consider the cancer
example and reduce costs to payable compensation, it is evident that over a
sufficiently long period of time discounting at current prices would lead to the
conclusion that there are no recoverable damages and so, in economic terms, no
constraints.
In short, even certain damage to future people could be written off.
One way to achieve the bias against future people is by the application of
discount rates which are set in accord with the current economic horizons of no
21
more than about 15 years,
and application of such rates would simply beg
the question against the interests and rights of future people.
Where there is
certain future damage of a morally forbidden type, for example, the whole method
of discounting is simply inapplicable, and its use would violate moral
constraints.
Another argument for the qualified position, which avoids the objections
from cases of certain damage, comes from probability considerations.
The distant
future, it is argued, is much more uncertain than the present and immediate
future, so that probabilities are consequently lower, perhaps even approaching
or coinciding with zero for any hypothesis concerning the distant future.
But
then if we take account of probabilities in the obvious way, by simply multiplying
them against costs and benefits , it is evident that the interests of future
people, except in cases where there is an unusually high degree of certainty,
must count for (very much) less than those of present and neighbouring people
where (much) higher probabilities are attached.
So in the case of conflict
between the present and the future where it is a question of weighing certain
benefits to the people of the present and the immediate future against a much
lower probability of indeterminate costs to an indeterminate number of distant
future people, the issue would normally be decided in favour of the present,
assuming anything like similar costs and benefits were involved.
But of course
it cannot be assumed that anything like similarly weighted costs and benefits
are involved in the nuclear case, especially if it is a question of risking
poisoning some of the earth for half a million or so years, with consequent
risk of serious harm to thousands of generations of future people, in order to
obtain doubtful benefits for some present people, in the shape of the opportunity
to maintain corporation profitability or to continue unnecessarily high energy
use.
And even if the costs and benefits were comparable or
evenly weighted,
17.
such an argument would be defective, since an analogous argument would show
that the consigner’s action is acceptable provided the benefit, e.g. the
profit he stood to gain from imposing significant risks on other people, was
sufficiently large.
Such a cost-benefit or risk-benefit approach to moral and decision
problems, with or without the probability frills, is quite inadequate where
different parties are concerned or to deal with cases of conflict of interest
or moral problems where deontic constraints are involved, and commonly
yields counterintuitive results.
For example, it would follow on such principles
that it is permissible for a firm to injure, or very likely injure, some
innocent party provided the firm stands to make a sufficiently large gain from
it.
But the costs and benefits involved are not transferable in any simple or
general way from one party to another .
Transfers of this kind, of costs
and benefits involving different parties, commonly raise moral issues - e.g.
is x entitled to benefit himself by imposing costs on y - which are not
susceptible to a simple cost-benefit approach of the sort adopted in promotion
of nuclear energy, where costs to future people are sometimes dismissed with
the soothing remark that any development involves costs as well as benefits.
The limitations of transfer point is enough to invalidate the comparison,
heavily relied on in building a case for the acceptability of the nuclear
risk, between nuclear risks and those from such activities as airplane travel
or cigarette smoking.
In the latter case those who supposedly benefit from the
activity are also, to an overwhelming extent, those who bear the serious health
costs and risks involved.
In contrast the users and supposed beneficiaries
of nuclear energy will be risking not only, or even primarily, their own lives
and health, but also that of others who may be non-beneficiaries and who may be
spatially or temporally removed, and these risks will not be in any direct way
related to a person’s extent of use.
The transfer objection is essentially the same as that to the utilitarian’s
(happiness) sums as a way of solving moral conflict between different parties,
and the introduction of probability considerations - as in utilitarian decision
methods such as expected utility rules - does not change the principles involved
but merely complicates the analysis. One might further object to the probability
argument that probabilities involving distant future situations are not always
less than those concerning the immediate future in the way the argument supposes,
and that the outcomes of some moral problems do not depend on a high level of
probability anyway.
In some sorts of cases it is enough, as the train parable
reveals, that a significant risk is created; such cases do not depend critically
on high probability assignments.
18.
Uncertainty arguments in various forms are the most common and important
ones used by philosophers, economists and others to argue for the position that we
cannot be expected to
distant future.
take serious account of the effects of our actions on the
There are two strands to the uncertainty argument, capable of
separation, but frequently tangled up.
Both arguments are mistaken, the first
on a priori grounds, the second on a posteriori grounds.
The first argument
is a generalised uncertainty argument which runs as follows:-
In contrast to
the exact information we can obtain about the present, the information we can
obtain about the effects of our actions on the distant future is unreliable,
fuzzy and highly speculative.
But we cannot base assessments of how we should
act on information of this kind, especially when accurate information is obtain
able about the present which would indicate different action.
Therefore we must
regretfully ignore the uncertain effects of our actions on the distant future.
More formally and
crudely:
One only has obligations to the future if these
obligations are based on reliable information at present as regards the
distant future.
Therefore one has no obligations to the distant future.
This
first argument is essentially a variant on a sceptical argument in epistemology
concerning our knowledge of the future (formally, replace ’obligations’ by
’knowledge’ in the crude statement of the argument above).
The main ploy is to
considerably overestimate and overstate the degree of certainty available with
respect to the present and immediate future, and the degree of certainty which
is required as the basis for moral consideration with respect to the present
Associated with this is the attempt to suggest
and with respect to the future.
a sharp division as regards certainty between the present and immediate future
on the one hand and the distant future on the other.
We shall not find, we
suggest, that there is any such sharp or simple division between the distant
future and the adjacent future and the present, at least with respect to those
things in the present which are normally subject to moral constraints.
We can
and constantly do act on the basis of such ’’unreliable” information, as the
sceptic as regards the future conveniently labels "uncertainty”; for sceptic
proof certainty is rarely, or never, available with respect to much of the
present and immediate future.
In moral situations in the present, action
often takes account of risk and probability, even quite low probabilities.
Consider again the train example.
We do not need to know for certain that the
container will break and the lethal gas escape.
In fact it does not even have
to be probable, in the relevant sense of more probable than not, in order for
us to condemn the consigner’s action.
risk of harm in this sort of case.
It is enough that there is a significant
It does not matter if the decreased well
being of the consigner is certain and that the prospects of the passengers
quite uncertain, the resolution of the problem is nevertheless clearly in favour
of the so-called ’’speculative" and "unreliable”.
But if we do not require
certainty of action to apply moral constraints in contemporary affairs, why
v
19.
should we require a much higher standard of certainty in the future?
Why should
we require for the future, epistemic standards which the more familiar sphere of
moral action concerning the present and adjacent future does not need to meet?
The insistence on certainty as a necessary condition before moral consideration
can be given to the distant future, then, amounts to an eipstemic double standard.
But such an epistemic double standard, proposed in explaining the difference
between the present and the future and to justify ignoring future peoples’
interests, in fact cannot itself provide an explanation of the differences,
since it already presupposes different standards of certainty appropriate to
each class, which difference is in turn in need of justification.
The second uncertainty argument is a practical uncertainty argument,
that whatever our theoretical obligations to the future, we cannot in practice
take the interests of future people into account because uncertainty about
the distant future is so gross that we canmot determine what the likely
consequences of actions on it will be and therefore, however good our intentions
to the people of the distant future are, in practice we have no choice but to
ignore their interests.
Uncertainty is gross where certain incompatible
hypotheses are as good as one another and there is no rational ground for
choosing between them.
this way:-
The second uncertainty argument can be put alternatively
If moral principles are. like other principles, implicational in form,
that is of such forms as "if x has character h then x is wrong, for every
(action) x”, then what the argument claims is that we cannot ever obtain the
information about future actions which would enable us to detach the
antecedent of the implication.
So even if moral principles theoretically
apply to future people, in practice they cannot be applied to obtain clear
conclusions or directions concerning contemporary action action of the "It is
wrong to do x" type.
Many of the assumptions of the second argument can be conceded.
If
the distant future really is so grossly uncertain that in every case it is
impossible to determine in any way that is better than chance what the effects of
present action will be, and whether any given action will help or hinder future
people, then moral principles, although they may apply theoretically to the
future, will in practice not be applicable to obtain any clear conclusions about
how to act.
on action.
Hence the distant future will impose no practical moral constraints
However the argument is factually incorrect in assuming that the
future always is so grossly uncertain or indeterminate.
Admittedly there is often
a high degree of uncertainty concerning the distant future, but as a matter of
(contingent) fact it is not always so gross or sweeping as the
20.
argument has to assume.
There are some areas where uncertainty is not so great as
to exclude constraints on action, especially when account is taken of the point,
which was noticed in connection with the first argument, that complete certainty
is commonly not required for moral constraints and that all that may be needed in
Again there is considerable
some cases is the creation of a significant risk.
uncertainty about many factors which are not highly, or at all, morally relevant,
but this does not extend to many factors which are of much greater importance
to moral issues.
For example, we may not have any idea what the fashions will be
in a hundred years in names or footwear, or what flavours of ice cream people
will be eating if any, but we do have excellent reason to believe, especially
if we consider 3000 years of history, that what people there are in a hundred
years are likely to have material and psychic needs not entirely unlike our own,
that they will need a healthy biosphere for a good life; that like us they will
not be immune to radiation; that their welfare will not be enhanced by a high
incidence of cancer or genetic defects, by the destruction of resources, or the
elimination from the earth of that wonderful variety of non-human life which at
present makes it such a rich and interesting place.
For this sort of reason,
the second uncertainty argument should be rejected.
The case of nuclear waste
storage, and of uncertainty of the effects of it on future people, is one area
where uncertainty in morally relevant respects is not so great as to preclude
moral constraints on action, where we can ascertain if not absolute certainties
£1
at least probabilities of the same sort of order as are considered sufficient for
the application of moral principles in parallel contemporary cases, especially
where spatially remote people are involved.
In particular there is not gross
indeterminacy or uncertainty; it is simply not true that incompatible hypotheses
about what may happen are as good as each other.
It is plain that nuclear waste
storage does impose significant risks of harm on future people, and, as is
evident from the train example, the significant risk of harm is enough in cases
of this type to make moral constraints applicable.
In terms of the defects of the preceding uncertainty arguments, we can
see the defects in a number of widely employed uncertainty arguments used to
write off probable or possible harm to future people as outside the scope of
proper consideration.
Most of these popular moves employ both of the uncertainty
arguments as suits the case, switching from one to the other in a way that is again
reminiscent of sceptical moves.
For example, we may be told that we cannot really
take account of future people because we cannot be sure that they will exist or
that their tastes and wants will not be completely different from our own, to the
point where they will not suffer from our exhaustion of resources or from the
21.
things that would affect us.
But this is to insist upon complete certainty of a
sort beyond what is required for the present and immediate future, where there
is also commonly no guarantee that some disaster will not overtake those we are
morally committed to.
Again we may be told that there is no guarantee that
future people will be worthy of any efforts on our part, because they may be
morons or forever plugged into enjoyment or other machines.
prepared to accept the elitist approach presupposed -
Even if one is
according to which
only those who meet certain properly civilized or intellectual standards are
eligible for moral consideration - what we are being handed in such arguments
as a serious defeating consideration is again a mere outside possibility -
like the sceptic who says that solid-looking desk in front of us is perhaps only a
facade, not because he has any particular reason for doing so, but because he
hasn’t looked around the back, drilled holes in it, etc. etc.
Neither the
contemporary nor the historical situation gives any positive reason for supposing
that a lapse into universal moronity or universal-pleasure-machine escapism is
a serious possibility, as opposed to a logical possibility.
We can contrast with
these mere logical possibilities the very real historically supportable risks
of escape of nuclear waste or decline
of a civilisation through destruction
of its resource base.
The possibilities just considered in these uncertainty arguments of
sceptical character are not real possibilities.
Another argument which may
consider a real possibility, but still does not succeed in showing that it is
acceptable to proceed with an action which would appear to be harmful to future
people, is often introduced in the nuclear waste case.
This is the argument that
future people may discover a rigorously safe and permanent storage method for
nuclear wastes before they are damaged by escaped waste material.
Let us grant
for the sake of the argument that this is a real possibility (though physical
arguments may show that it is not).
This still does not affect the fact that there
is a significant risk of serious damage and that the creation of a significant
risk is enough to rule out an action of this type as morally impermissible.
In just
the same way, future people may discover a cure for cancer: that this appears to
be a live possibility, and not merely a logical possibility, does not make the
action of the firm earlier discussed, of producing a substance likely to cause
cancer in future people, morally admissible.
The fact that there was a real
possibility of future people avoiding the harm would show
that actions of these
sorts were admissible only if what was required for inadmissibility was certainty
of harm or a very high probability of it.
In such cases before such actions could
22.
be considered admissible what would be required is far more than a possibility,
real or not
- it is at least the availability of an applicable, safe, and
rigorously tested, not merely speculative, technique for achieving it, something
that future people could reasonably be expected to apply to protect themselves.
The strategy of these and other uncertainty arguments is fairly clear then,
and may be brought out by looking yet again at the train example where the consigner
says that he cannot be expected to take account of the effect of his actions on
the passengers because they may find an effective way to deal with his parcel or
some lucky or unlucky accident may occur, e.g. the train may break down and they
may all change to a different transport leaving the parcel behind, or the train
may crash killing all the passengers before the container gets a chance to leak.
These are all possibilities of course, but there is no positive reason to believe
that they are any more than that, that is they are not live possibilities.
The
strategy is to stress such remote possibilities in order to create the false
impression that there is gross uncertainty about the future, that the real
possibility that the container will break should be treated in the same way as
these mere logical possibilities, that uncertainty about the future is so great
as to preclude the consigner’s taking account of the passengers’ welfare and the
real possibility of harm from his parcel and thereby to excuse his action.
A
related strategy is to stress a real possibility, such as finding a cure for
cancer, and thereby imply that this removes the case for applying moral constraints.
This move implicitly makes the assumptions of the first argument, that certainty
of harm, or at least a very high probability of harm is required before an action
can be judged morally inadmissible, and the point of stressing the real possibility
of avoidance of damage is to show that this allegedly required high degree of
certainty or probability cannot be attained.
That is, the strategy draws
attention to some real uncertainty implying that this is sufficient to defeat the
application of moral constraints.
But, as we have seen, this is often not so.
Closely related to uncertainty arguments are arguments premissed on the
indeterminacy of the future.
In particular it is argued that the indeterminacy,
for example, with respect to the number and exact character of people at future
times, would at least prevent the interest of future people being taken into
account where there is a conflict with the present.
Since their numbers are
indeterminate and their interests unknown how, it is asked, can we weigh their
competing claims against those of the present and immediate future where this
information is available in a more or less accurate form?
The question is raised
particularly by problems of sharing fixed quantities of resources among present
and future people, for example oil, when the numbers of the latter are indeterminate.
Such problems are indeed difficult, but they are not resolved by ignoring the
claims of the future, any more than the problems raised by the need to take
account in decision-making of factors difficult to quantify are resolved by
23.
ignoring such factors.
Nor are distributional problems as large and
representative of a class of moral problems concerning the future as the tendency
to focus on them would suggest.
It can be conceded that there will be cases
where the indeterminacy of aspects of the future will make conflicts very
difficult to resolve
or indeed irresoluble - a realistic ethical theory will
not deliver a decision procedure - but there will equally be other conflict
cases where the level of indeterminacy does not hinder resolution of the issue,
e.g. the train example which is a conflict case of a type.
In particular,
there will be many cases which are not solved by weighing numbers, numbers of
interests, or whatever, cases for which one needs to know only the most general
probable characteristics of future people.
The crucial question which emerges is then:
are there any features of
future people which would disqualify them from full moral consideration or
reduce their claims to such below those of present people?
principle None.
The answer is :
in
Prima facie, moral principles are universalisable, and lawlike,
in that they apply independently of position in space or in time, for example.
But universalisability of principles is an outcome of those ethical theories
which are capable of dealing satisfactorily with the present:
in other words, a
theory that did not allow properly for the future would be found to have defects
as regards the present, to deal unjustly or unfairly with some present people,
e.g. those remotely located, those outside some select subgroup, such as (white
skinned) humans, etc.
The only candidates for characteristics that would fairly
rule out future people are the logical features we have been looking at, such
as uncertainty and indeterminacy; but, as we have argued, it would be far too
sweeping to see these features as affecting the moral claims of future people in a
general way.
These special features only affect certain sorts of cases (e.g.
the determination of best probable or practical course of action given only
present information) .
In particular, they do not affect cases of the sort
being considered, nuclear development, where highly determinate or certain
information about the numbers and characteristics of the class likely to be
harmed is not required, nor is certainty of damage.
To establish obligations to the future a full universalizability
principle is not required : it is enough that the temporal position of a person
cannot affect his entitlement to just and fair treatment, to full moral
24
consideration;
inversely, that it is without basis to discriminate morally
against a person in virtue of his temporal position.
As a result of this
23a.
universalizab ili ty, there are the same general obligations to future people as
to the present;
and thus there is the same obligation to take account of them
and their interests in what we do, to be careful in our actions, to take
account of the probability (and not just the certainty) of our actions causing
harm or damage, and to see, other things being equal, that we do not act so
as to rob them of what is necessary for the chance of a good life.
and indeterminacy do not relieve us of these obligations.
Uncertainty
If in a closely
comparable case concerning the present the creation of a significant risk is
enough to rule out an action as immoral, and there are no independent grounds
for requiring greater certainty of
23a.
universalizability, there are the same general obligations to future people as
to the present;
and thus there is the same obligation to take account of them
and their interests in what we do, to be careful in our actions, to take
account of the probability (and not just the certainty) of our actions causing
harm or damage, and to see, other things being equal, that we do not act so
as to rob them of what is necessary for the chance of a good life.
and indeterminacy do not relieve us of these obligations.
Uncertainty
If in a closely
comparable case concerning the present the creation of a significant risk is
enough to rule out an action as immoral, and there are no independent grounds
for requiring greater certainty of
24.
harm in the future case under consideration, then futurity alone will not
provide adequate grounds for proceeding with the action, thus discriminating
against future people.
Accordingly we cannot escape, through appeal to
futurity, the conclusion already tentatively reached, that proposals for nuclear
development in the present and likely future state of technology and practices
for future waste disposal are immoral.
Before we consider (in section VII) the remaining escape route from this
conclusion, through appeal to overriding circumstances, it is important to
pick up the further case (which heavily reinforces the tentative conclusion)
against nuclear development, since much of it relies on ethical principles
similar to those that underlie obligations to the future, and since it too
is commonly met by similar appeal to extenuating circumstances.
V. PROBLEMS OF SAFE NUCLEAR OPERATION: REACTOR EMISSIONS, AND CORE MELTDOWN. The
ethical problems with nuclear power are by no means confined to future creatures.
Just as remoteness in time does not erode obligations or entitlements to just
treatment, neither does location in space, or a particular geographical position.
First of all, the problem of nuclear waste disposal raises serious questions of
distributive justice not only across time, across generations, but also across
space.
Is one state or region entitled to dump its radioactive pollution in
another state’s or region’s yard or waters?
When that region receives no due
compensation (whatever that would amount to, in such a case), and the people
do not agree (though the leaders imposed upon them might)?
The answer, and the
arguments underpinning the answer, are both like those already given in arguing
to the tentative conclusion concerning the injustice of imposing radioactive
wastes upon future people.
But the cases are not exactly the same: USA and Japan
cannot endeavour to discount peoples of the Pacific in whose regions they propose
to drop some of their radioactive pollution in quite the same way they can
discount people of two centuries hence.
(But what this consideration really
reveals is yet another flaw in the idea that entitlement to just treatment can
be discounted over time . )
Ethical issues of distributive justice, as to equity, concern not only
the spatio-temporal location of nuclear waste, but also arise elsewhere in the
assessment of nuclear development; in particular, as regards the treatment of
those in the neighbourhood of reactors, and, differently, as regards the
distribution of (alleged) benefits and costs from nuclear power across nations.
People living or working in the vicinity of a nuclear reactor are subject to
special costs and risks: firstly, radioactive pollution, due to the fact that
reactors discharge radioactive materials into the air and water near the plant,
25
25.
and secondly catastrophic accidents, such as (steam) explosion of a reactor.
An
immediate question is whether such costs and risks can be imposed, with any
ethical legitimacy, on these people, who frequently have little or no say in
their imposition, and who have mostly not been informed of any choices regarding
the "risk/benefit tradeoffs" of nuclear technology.
That they are so imposed,
without local participation, indeed often without local input or awareness as
with local opposition, reveals one part of the antidemocratic face of nuclear
development, a part that nuclear development shares however with other large-
scale polluting industry, where local participation and questions, fundamental
to a genuine democracy of regional determination and popular sovereignty, are
commonly ignored or avoided.
The "normal" emission, during plant operation, of low level radiation
carries carcinogenic and mutagenic costs.
While there are undoubtedly costs,
there remains, however, substantial disagreement over the likely number of cancers
and precise extent of genetic damage induced by exposure to such radiation, over
the local health costs involved.
Under the Old Paradigm, which (illegitimately)
permits free transfer of costs and risks from one person to another, the ethical
issue directly raised is said to be: what extent of cancer and genetic damage,
if any, is permissibly traded for the advantages of nuclear power, and under
what conditions?
Under the Old Paradigm the issue is then translated into
decision-theoretic questions, such as to ’how to employ risk/benefit analysis
as a prelude to government regulation’ and ’how to determine what is an
26
acceptable level of risk/safety for the public.
The Old Paradigm attitude, reflected in the public policy of some countries
that have such policies, is that the economic benefits conferred by allowing
radiation emissions outweigh the costs of an increase in cancer and genetic
damage.
An example will reveal that such evaluations, which rely for what
appeal they have on a dubious utilitarianism, will not pass muster.
It is a
pity about Aunt Ethyl getting cancer, but it’s nice to have this air conditioner
working in summer.
Such frequently trivial and rather inessential benefits,
which may be obtained alternatively, e.g. by modification of houses, in no way
27
compensate for the agony of cancer.
The point is that the costs to one party
are not justified, especially when such benefits to other parties can be
alternatively obtained without such awful costs, and morally indefensible, being
imposed.
People, minorities, whose position is particularly compromised are those
who live within 50 miles of a nuclear plant.
(Children, for example, are in a
26.
particularly vulnerable position, since they are several times more likely to
contract cancer through exposure than normal adults).
In USA, such people bear
a risk of cancer and genetic damage of as much as 50 times that borne by the
population at large.
A non-negligible percentage (in excess of 3% of those
exposed for 30 years) of people in the area will die, allegedly for the sake
of the majority who are benefitted by nuclear power production (allegedly,
for the real reasons for nuclear development do not concern this silent
majority).
Whatever
charm the argument from overriding benefits had, even
under the Old Paradigm, vanishes once it is seen that there are alternative,
and in several respects less expensive, ways of delivering the real benefits
involved.
There are several other tricks used in showing that the imposition of
radiation on minorities, most of whom have little or no genuine voice in the
location of reactors in their environment and cannot move away without serious
losses, is quite (morally) acceptable. One cheaper trick, deployed by the US
28
Atomic Energy Commission,
is to suppose that it is permissible to double,
through nuclear technology, the level of (natural) radiation that a population
has
received with apparently negligible consequences, the argument being that
the additional amount (being equivalent to the "natural” level) is also likely
to have negligible consequences.
The increased amounts of radiation - with
their large man-made component - are then accounted normal, and, of course,
so it is then claimed, what is normal is morally acceptable.
in this argument is sound.
None of the steps
Drinking one bottle of wine a day may have no ill-
effects, whereas drinking two a day certainly may affect a person’s well-being;
and while the smaller intake may have become normal for the person, the larger
one will, under such conditions, not be.
Finally, what is or has become normal,
e.g. two murders or twenty cancers a day in a given city, may be far from acceptable.
In fact, even the USA, which has strict standards by comparison with most
other countries with planned nuclear reactors, permits radiation emissions very
substantially in excess of the standards laid down; so the emission situation is
worse than mere consideration of the standards would disclose.
Furthermore, the
monitoring of the standards "imposed" is entrusted to the nuclear operators
themselves, scarcely disinterested parties.
Public policy is determined not so
as to guarantee public health, but rather to serve as a ’public pacifier’ while
29
private nuclear operations proceed relatively unhampered.
27.
While radioactive emissions are an ordinary feature of reactor operation,
breakdown is, hopefully, not: an accident of magnitude is accounted, by official
definition, an ’extraordinary nuclear occurrence’.
But such accidents can happen,
and almost have on several occasions (the most notorious being Three Mile Island).~
If the cooling and emergency core cooling systems fail in American (light water)
30a
reactors,
then the core melts and ’containment failure’ is likely, with the
result that an area of 40,000 square miles could be radioactively contaminated.
In the event of the worst type of accident in a very small reactor, a steam
explosion in the reactor vessel, about 45,000 people would be killed instantly
and at least 100,000 would die as a result of the accident, property damages
would exceed $17 billion and an area the size of Pennsylvania would be destroyed.
Modern nuclear reactors are about five times the size of the reactor for which
31
these conservative US government figures are given :
the consequences of a
similar accident with a modern reactor would accordingly be much greater still.
The consigner in risking the lives, well-being and property of the
passengers on the train has acted inadmissibly.
Does a government-sponsored
private utility act in a way that is anything other than much less responsible
in siting a nuclear reactor in a community, in planting such a dangerous package
on the community train.
The answer will be No, if the analogy holds good and the
£1
consigners’ action is, as we would ordinarily
sible.
suppose, inadmissible and irrespon
The proponents of nuclear power have in effect argued to the contrary,
while at the same time endeavouring to shift the dispute out of the ethical arena
and into a technological dispute as to means (in accordance with the Old Paradigm) .
It has been contended, firstly, what contrasts with the train example, that
there is no real possibility of a catastrophic nuclear accident.
Indeed in the
32
influential Rassmussen report
- which was extensively used to support public
confidence in US nuclear fission technology - an even stronger, an incredibly
strong, improbability claim was stated: namely, the likelihood of a catastrophic
nuclear accident is so remote as to be (almost) impossible.
The main argument for
this claim derives from the assumptions and estimates of the report itself.
These
assumptions like the claim are undercut by nuclear incidents that came very close
to accidents, incidents which reflect what happens in a reactor rather better than
mathematical models.
As with the storage of nuclear wastes, so with the operation of nuclear
reactors, it is important to look at what happens in the actual world of
technological limitatioms and human error, of waste leakage and reactor incidents
and quite possibly accidents, not in an ideal world far removed from the actual,
a technological dream world where there is no real possibility of a nuclear
28.
catastrophe.
In such an ideal nuclear world, where waste disposal were fool-proof
and reactors were accident-proof, things would no doubt be morally different.
But we do not live in such a world.
According to the Rasmussen report its calculation of extremely low accident
probabilities is based upon reasonable mathematical and technological assumptions
and is methodologically sound.
This is very far from being the case.
The under
lying mathematical methods, variously called "fault tree analysis" and
"reliability estimating techniques", are unsound, because they exclude as "not
credible" possibilities or as "not significant" branches that are real
possibilities, which may well be realised in the real world.
It is the
In fact the methodology and data of the report
33
has been soundly and decisively criticized.
And it has been shown that there
eliminations that are otherworldly.
is a real possibility, a non-negligible probability, of a serious accident.
It is contended, secondly, that even if there is a non-negligible
probability of a reactor accident, still it is acceptable, being of no greater
order than risks of accidents that are already socially accepted.
Here we
encounter again that insidious engineering approach to morality built into
models of an economic cast, e.g. benefit-cost balance sheets, risk assessment
models, etc.
Risk assessment, a sophistication of transaction or trade-off
models, purports to provide a comparison between the relative risks attached to
different options, e.g. energy options, which settles their ethical status.
The following lines of argument are encountered in a risk assessment as applied
to energy options:
(i)
if option a imposes costs on fewer people than option b then option a is
preferable to option b;
(ii)
option a involves a total net cost in terms of cost to people (e.g. deaths,
injuries, etc.) which is less than that of option b, which is already accepted;
34
therefore option a is acceptable.
For example, the number likely to be killed by nuclear power stations is less than
the likely number killed by cigarette smoking or in road accidents, which are
accepted: so nuclear power stations are acceptable.
A little reflection reveals
that this sort of risk assessment argument involves the same kind of fallacy
as transaction models.
It is far too simple-minded, and it ignores distributional
and other relevant aspects of the context.
In order to obtain an ethical
assessment we should need a much fuller picture and we should need to know at
least these things:- do the costs and benefits go to the same parties; and is
the person who undertakes the risks also the person who receives the benefits or
29.
primarily, as in driving or cigarette smoking, or are the costs imposed on other
parties who do not benefit?
It is only if the parties are the same in the case of
the options compared, and there are no such distributional problems, that a
35
comparison on such a basis would be valid.
This is rarely the case, and it is
not so in the case of risk assessments of energy options.
Secondly, does the
person incur the risk as a result of an activity which he knowingly undertakes
in a situation where he has a reasonable choice, knowing it entails the risk,
etc., and is the level of risk in proportion to the level of the relevant
activity, e.g. as in smoking?
Thirdly, for what reason is the risk imposed:
is it for a serious or a relatively trivial reason?
A risk that is ethically
acceptable for a serious reason may not be ethically acceptable for a trivial
reason.
Both the arguments (i) and (ii) are often employed in trying to justify
nuclear power. The second argument (ii) involves the fallacies of the first (i)
and an additional set, namely that of forgetting that the health risks in the
36
nuclear sense are cumulative, and already high if not, some say, too high.
The maxim "If you want the benefits you have to accept the costs" is
one thing and the maxim "If I want the benefits then you have to accept the
costs (or some of them at least)" is another and very different thing.
It is
a widely accepted moral principle, already argued for by way of examples and
already invoked, that one is not, in general, entitled to simply transfer costs
of a significant kind arising fron an activity which benefits oneself onto other
37
parties who are not involved in the activity and are not beneficiaries.
This
transfer principle is especially clear in cases where the significant costs
include an effect on life or health or a risk thereof, and where the benefit to
the benefitting party is of a noncrucial or dispensible nature, because, e.g.
it can be substituted for or done without.
Thus, for instance, one is not
usually entitled to harm, or risk harming, another in the process of benefitting
oneself.
Suppose, for another example, we consider a village which produces, as a
result of an industrial process by which it lives , a noxious waste material which
is expensive and difficult to dispose of and yet creates a risk to life and health
if undisposed of.
Instead of giving up their industrial process and turning to
some other way of making a living such as farming the surrounding countryside,
they persist with this way of life but ship their problem on a one-way delivery
service, on the train, to the next village.
The inhabitants of this village are
then forced to face the problem either of undertaking the expensive and difficult
disposal process oor of sustaining risks to their own lives and health or else
leaving the village and their livelihoods.
transfer of costs as morally unacceptable.
Most of us would see this kind of
30.
From this arises a necessary condition for energy options: that to be
morally acceptable they should not involve the transfer of significant costs or
risks of harm onto parties who are not involved, do not use the energy source or
do not benefit correspondingly from its use.
Included in the scope of this
condition are not only future people and future generations (those of the next
villages) but neighbours of nuclear reactors, especially, as in third world
countries, neighbours who are not nuclear power users.
The distribution of
costs and damage in such a fashion, i.e. on to non-beneficiaries is a
characteristic of certain widespread and serious forms of pollution, and is one
of its most objectionable moral features.
It is a corollary of the condition that we should not hand the world on to
our successors in substantially worse shape than we received it - the tramsmission
principle.
For if we did then that would be a significant transfer of costs.
(The corollary can be independeritly argued for on the basis of certain ethical
theories).
VI. OTHER SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS AND COSTS OF NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENT,
ESPECIALLY NUCLEAR WAR.
The problems already discussed by no means exhaust the
environmental, health and safety risks and costs in, or arising from, the nuclear
fuel cycle.
The full fuel cycle includes many stages both before and after
reactor operation, apart from waste disposal, namely mining, milling, conversion,
enrichment and preparation, reprocessing spent fuel, and transportation of
materials.
Several of these stages involve hazards.
Unlike the special risks
in the nuclear cycle — of sabotage of plants, of theft of fissionable material,
and of the further proliferation of nuclear armaments - these hazards have
parallels, if not exact equivalents, in other very polluting methods of generating
power, e.g. "workers in the uranium mining industry sustain ’the same risk’ of
n 38
,
,
fatal and nonfatal injury as workers in the coal industry .
Furthermore, the
various (often serious) hazards encountered in working in some sectors of
uranium fabrication should be differently viewed from those resulting from location,
for instance from already living where a reactor is built or wastes are dumped.
For an occupation is, in principle at
any rate, chosen (as is occupational
relocation), and many types of hazards incurred in working with radioactive
material are now known in advance of choice of such an occupation: with where
one already lives things are very different.
The uranium miner’s choice of
occupation can be compared with the airline pilot’s choice, whereas the Pacific
Islander’s "fact" of location cannot be.
The social issue of arrangements that
contract occupational choices and opportunities and often at least ease people
into hazardous occupations such as uranium or tin or coal mining (where the
risks, in contrast to airline piloting, are mostly not duly compensated), while
very important, is not an issue newly produced by nuclear associated occupations.
31.
Other social and environmental problems - though endemic where large-scale
industry operates in societies that are highly inegalitarian and include sectors
that are far from affluent - are more intimately linked with the nuclear power
cycle.
Though pollution is a common and generally undesirable component of
large-scale industrial operation, radioactive pollution, such as uranium mining
for instance produces, is especially a legacy of nuclear development, and a
specially undesirable one, as enormous rectification estimates for dead radio
active lands and waterways reveal.
Though sabotage is a threat to many large
industries, so that modern factory complexes are often guarded like concentration
camps (but from us on the outside), sabotage of a nuclear reactor can have dire
consequences, of a different order of magnitude from most industrial sabotage
(consider again the effects of core meltdown).
Though theft of material from more
dubious enterprises such as munitions works can pose threats to populations at
large and can assist terrorism, no thefts for allegedly peaceful enterprises
pose problems of the same order as theft of fissionable material.
No other
industry produces materials which so readily permit of fabrication into such
massive explosives.
No other industry is, to sum it up, so vulnerable on so
many fronts.
In part to reduce its vulnerability, in part because of its long and
continuing association with military activities, the nuclear industry is subject
to, and encourages, several practices which (certainly given their scale) run
counter to basic features of free and open societies, crucial features such as
personal liberty, freedom of association and of expression, and free access to
information.
These practices include secrecy, restriction of information,
formation of special police and guard forces, espionage, curtailment of civil
liberties.
Already operators of nuclear installations are given extraordinary
powers, in vetting employees, to investigate the background and
activities not only of employees but also of their families and
sometimes even of their friends. The installations themselves
become armed camps, which especially offends British sensibilities.
The U.K. Atomic Energy (Special Constables) Act of 1976 created a
special armed force to guard nuclear installations and made it
answerable ... to the U.K. Atomic Energy Authority.39
In West Germany the ’politics of nuclear repression is even more evident and
more advanced:
Behind what must be one of the most impregnable fortifications
this side of the East-West German border, work has just begun
on building West Germany’s latest nuclear power station. Much
31.1
of the perimeter of the 75-acre site, at Brokdorf in the
marshlands of the lower Elbe, is screened by a concrete
wall 10 feet high, surmounted by coils of barbed wire.
The rest, regarded as ’strategically observable’, is girdled
by a ditch 10 feet wide and filled with water. Approach
roads to the site are patrolled by dozens of policemen
and the compound itself is guarded by 600 men from a
private security organization and by 30 dogs.
Such developments presage along with nuclear development increasingly
authoritarian and anti-democratic
societies.
That nuclear development
appears to force such political consequences tells heavily against it.
32.
Nuclear development is further indicted politically by the direct
connection of nuclear power with nuclear war.
It is fortunately true that
ethical questions concerning nuclear war - for example, whether a nuclear war
is justified, or just, under any circumstances, and if so what circumstances are distinguishable from those concerning nuclear power.
Undoubtedly, however,
the spread of nuclear power is substantially increasing the technical means
for engaging in nuclear war and so, to that extent, the opportunity for, and
chances of, nuclear engagement.
Since nuclear wars are never accountable
positive goods, but are at best the lesser of major evils, nuclear wars are
always highly ethically undesirable.
The spread
of nuclear power accordingly
expands the opportunity for, and chances of, highly undesirable consequences.
Finally the latter, so increasing these chances and opportunities, is itself
undesirable, and therefore what leads to it, nuclear development, is also
undesirable.
The details and considerations that fill out this argument,
from nuclear war against nuclear development, are many.
They are firstly
technical, that it is a relatively straightforward and inexpensive matter to
make nuclear explosives given access to a nuclear power plant, secondly : political,
that nuclear engagements once instituted
likely to escalate and that those
who control (or differently are likely to force access to) nuclear power plants
do not shrink from nuclear confrontation and are certainly prepared to toy with
nuclear engagement (up to "strategic nuclear strikes" at least), and thirdly :
ethical, that wars invariably have immoral consequences, such as massive
damage to involved parties, however high sounding their justification is.
Nuclear wars are certain to be considerably worse as regards damage inflicted
than any previous wars (they are likely to be much worse than all previous
wars put together), because of the enormous destructive power of nuclear
weapons, and the extent of spread of their radioactive effects, and because
of the expected rapidity and irreversibility of any such confrontations.
The supporting considerations are, fourthly, drawn from decision theory, and
are designed to show that the chances of such undesirable outcomes is itself
undesirable.
The core argument is in brief this (the argument will be
elaborated in section VIII):- Energy choice between alternative options is
a case of decision making under uncertainty, because in particular of the gross
uncertainties involved in nuclear development.
In cases of this type the
appropriate rational procedure is to compare worst consequences of each
alternative, to reject those alternatives with the worst of these worst
consequences (this is a pretty uncontroversial part of the maximin rule which
enjoins selection of the alternative with the best worst consequences).
The
nuclear alternative has, in particular because of the real possibility of a nuclear
war, the worst worst consequences and is accordingly a particularly undesirable
alternative.
33.
VII. CONFLICT ARGUMENTS, AND UNCOVERING THE IDEOLOGICAL BASES OF NUCLEAR
DEVELOPMENT.
As with nuclear war, so given the cumulative case against nuclear
development, only one justificatory route remains open, that of appeal to
important overriding circumstances.
That appeal, to be ethically acceptable,
must go far beyond merely economic considerations.
For, as already observed,
the consigner’s action cannot be justified by purely economistic arguments,
such as that his profits would rise, the firm or the village would be more
prosperous, or by appealing to the fact that some possibly uncomfortable
changes would otherwise be needed.
The transfer principle on which this
assessment was based, that one was not usually entitled to create a serious
risk to others for these sorts of reasons, applied more generally and, in
particular, applied to the nuclear case.
For this reason the economistic
arguments which are those most commonly advanced under the Old Paradigm to promote
nuclear development — e.g. cheapness, efficiency, profitability for electricity
utilities, and the need otherwise for uncomfortable changes such as restructuring
of employment, investment and consumption - do not even begin to show that the
nuclear alternative is an acceptable one.
Even if these economistic assumptions
about benefits to present people were correct - it will be contended that most of
them are not - the arguments would fail because economics (like the utilitarianism
from which it characteristically derives) has to operate within the framework of
moral constraints, and not vice versa.
What do have to be considered are however moral conflict arguments, that is
arguments to the effect that, unless the prima facie unacceptable (nuclear)
alternative is taken, some even more unacceptable alternative is the only
possible outcome, and
will ensue.
For example, in the train parable, the
consigner may argue that his action is justified because unless it is taken his
village will starve.
It is by no means clear that even such a justification
as this would be sufficient, especially where the risk to the passengers is
high, as the case seems to become one of transfer of costs and risks onto others;
but such a moral situation would no longer be so clearcut, and one would perhaps
hesitate to condemn any action taken in such circumstances.
Some of the arguments advanced to show moral conflict are based on competing
commitments to present people, and others on competing obligations to future people,
both of which are taken to override the obligations not to impose on the future
significant risk of serious harm.
The structure of such moral conflict arguments
is based crucially on the presentation of a genuine and exhaustive set of
alternatives (or at least practical alternatives) and upon showing that the only
alternatives to admittedly morally undesirable actions are even more undesirable
ones.
If some practical alternative which is not morally worse than the action to
be justified is overlooked, suppressed, or neglected in the argument - for
example, if in the village case it turns out that the villagers have another option
34.
to starving or to the sending off of the parcel, namely earning a living in some
other way - then the argument is defective and cannot readily be patched.
Just
such a suppression of practicable alternatives has occurred in the argument
designed to show that the alternatives to the nuclear option are even worse than
the option itself, and that there are other factual defects in these arguments
as well.
In short, the arguments depend essentially on the presentation of
false dichotomies.
A first argument, the poverty argument, is that there is an overriding
obligation to the poor, both the poor of the third world and the poor of
industrialised countries.
Failure to develop nuclear energy, it is often claimed,
would amount to denying them the opportunity to reach the standard of affluence
we currently enjoy and would create unemployment and poverty in the industrialised
nations.
The unemployment and poverty argument does not stand up to examination
either for the poor of the industrial countries or for those of the third world.
There is good evidence that large-scale nuclear energy will help to increase
unemployment and poverty in the industrial world, through the diversion of very
much available
capital into an industry which is not only an exceptionally
poor provider of direct employment, but also helps to reduce available jobs through
40
encouraging substitution of energy use for labour use.
The argument that nuclear
energy is needed for the third world is even less convincing.
Nuclear energy is
both politically and economically inappropriate for the third world, since it
requires massive amounts of capital, requires numbers of imported scientists
and engineers, but creates negligible local employment, and depends for its
feasibility upon, what is largely lacking, established electricity transmission
systems and back-up facilities and sufficient electrical appliances to plug into
the system.
Politically it increases foreign dependence, adds to centralised
entrenched power and reduces the chance for change in the oppressive political
41
structures which are a large part of the problem.
The fact that nuclear energy
is not in the interests of the people of the third world does not of course
mean that it is not in the interests of, and wanted by, their rulers, the
westernised and often military elites in whose interests the economies of these
countries are usually organised, and wanted often for military purposes.
It
is not paternalistic to examine critically the demands these ruling elites may
make in the name of the poor.
35.
The poverty argument is then a fraud.
help the poor.
Nuclear energy will not be used to
Both for the third world and for the industrialised countries
there are well-known energy-conserving alternatives and the practical option of
developing other energy sources, alternatives some of which offer far better
prospects for helping the poor.
It can no longer be pretended that there is no alternative to nuclear
development: indeed nuclear development is itself but a bridging, or stop-gap,
procedure on route to solar or perhaps fusion development.
And there are various
alternatives: coal and other fossil fuels, geothermal, and a range of solar
options (including as well as narrowly solar, wind, water, tidal and plant power),
42
each possibly in combination with conservation measures;
Despite the availability
of alternatives, it may still be pretended that nuclear development is necessary
for affluence (what will emerge is that it is advantageous for the power and
affluence of certain select groups).
Such an assumption really underlies part
of the poverty argument, which thus amounts to an elaboration of the trickledown argument (much favoured within the Old Paradigm setting).
runs:-
For the argument
Nuclear development is necessary for (continuing and increasing)
affluence.
Affluence inevitably trickles down to the poor.
Therefore nuclear
First, the argument does not on its own show
development benefits the poor.
anything specific about nuclear power: for it works equally well if ’energy’
is substituted for ’nuclear’.
It has also to be shown, what the next major
argument will try to claim, that nuclear development is unique among energy
alternatives in increasing affluence.
The second assumption, that affluence
inevitably trickles down, has now been roundly refuted, both by recent historical
data, which show increasing affluence (e.g. in terms of GNP averaged per capita)
coupled with increasing poverty in several countries, both developing and
developed, and through economic models which reveal how "affluence” can increase
without redistribution occurring.
Another major argument advanced to show moral conflict appeals to a set
of supposedly overriding and competing obligations to future people.
We have,
it is said, a duty to pass on the immensely valuable things and institutions
which our culture has developed.
Unless our high-technology, high energy
industrial society is continued and fostered, our valuable institutions and
traditions will fall into decay or be swept away.
The argument is essentially
that without nuclear power, without the continued level of material wealth
it alone is assumed to make possible, the lights of our civilization will go out.
Future people will be the losers.
4;
36.
The lights-going-out argument does raise questions as to what is valuable
in our society, and of what characteristics are necessary for a good society.
But for the most part these large questions, which deserve much fuller
examination, can be avoided.
The reason is that the argument adopts an extremely
uncritical position with respect to present high-technology societies, apparently
assuming that they are uniformly and uniquely valuable.
It assumes that technological
society is unmodifiable, that it cannot be changed in the direction of energy
conservation or alternative (perhaps high technology) energy sources without
collapse.
It has to be accepted and assessed as a whole, and virtually unlimited
supplies of energy - such as nuclear and only nuclear power is alleged to furnish -
are essential to maintain this whole.
These assumptions are hard to accept.
The assumption that technological
society’s energy patterns are unmodifiable is especially so - after all it has
survived events such as world wars which have required major social and technological
restructuring and consumption modification.
If western society’s demands for energy
are totally unmodifiable without collapse, not only would it be committed to a
program of increasing destruction, but one might ask what use its culture could
be to future people who would very likely, as a consequence of this destruction,
lack the resource base which the argument assumes to be essential in the case of
contemporary society.
There is also difficulty with the assumption of uniform valuableness;
but if this is rejected the question becomes not: what is necessary to maintain
existing high-technological society and its political institutions, but rather:
what is necessary to maintain what is valuable in that society and the political
institutions which are needed to maintain those valuable things.
While it may be
easy to argue that high energy consumption centrally controlled is necessary to
maintain the political and economic status quo, it is not so easy to argue that it
is essential to maintain what is valuable, and it is what is valuable, presumably
that we have a duty to pass on to the future.
The evidence, for instance from history, is that no very high level of
material affluence or energy consumption is needed to maintain what is valuable.
There is good reason in fact to believe that a society with much lower energy and
resource consumption would better foster what is valuable than our own.
But even
if a radical change in these directions is independently desirable, as we should
argue, it is not necessary to presuppose such a change, in the short term at least,
in order to see that the assumptions of the lights-going-out argument are wrong.
No enormous reduction of well-being is required to consume less energy than at
37.
present, and certainly far less than the large increase over present levels of
44
consumption which is assumed in the usual economic case for nuclear energy.
What the nuclear strategy is really designed to do then is not to prevent the
lights going out in western civilisation, but to enable the lights to go on
burning all the time - to maintain and even increase the wattage output of
the Energy Extravaganza.
In fact there is good reason to think that, far from the high energy
consumption society fostering what is valuable, it will, especially if energy
is obtained by nuclear fission means, be positively inimical to it.
A society
which has become heavily dependent upon an extremely high centralised, controlled
and garrisoned, capital-
and expertise-intensive energy source, must be one
which is highly susceptible to entrenchment of power, and one in which the forces
which control this energy source, whether capitalist or bureaucratic, can exert
enormous power over the political system and over people’s lives, even more
than they do at present.
Such a society would, almost inevitably tend to become
authoritarian and increasingly anti-democratic, as an outcome, among other
things, of its response to the threat posed by dissident groups in the nuclear
...
45
situation.
Nuclear development may thus help in passing on to future generations
some of the worst aspects of our society - the consumerism, alienation,
destruction of nature, and latent authoritarianism - while many valuable
aspects, such as the degree of political freedom and those opportunities for
personal and collective autonomy which exist, would be lost or diminished:
political freedom, for example, is a high price to pay for consumerism and
energy extravagance.
But it is not the status quo, but what is valuable in
our society, presumably, that we have some obligation to pass on to the future,
and if possible enhance.
Again, as in the case of the poverty arguments, clear alternatives,
alternative social, economic and political choices, which do not involve such
unacceptable consequences, are available.
The alternative to the high technology-
nuclear option is not a return to the cave, the loss of all that is valuable,
but either the adoption of an available alternative such as coal for power or,
rather, the development of alternative technologies and lifestyles which offer
far greater scope for the maintenance and further development of what is
valuable in our society than the highly centralised nuclear option.
The lights-
going-out argument, as a moral conflict argument, accordingly fails, because it
also is based on a false dichotomy.
38.
Thus the further escape route, the appeal to moral conflict, is, like the
If then we apply - as we have argued we should -
appeal to futurity, closed.
the same standards of morality to the future as we ought to acknowledge for the
present, the conclusion that large-scale nuclear development is a crime against
the future is inevitable.
Closed also, in the same way, are the escape routes
to other arguments - from reactor melt-down, radiation emissions, and so on -
for rejecting nuclear development as morally unacceptable, for saying that it is
not only a moral crime against the distant future but also a crime against the
present and immediate future.
In sum, nuclear development is morally
unacceptable on several grounds.
A corollary is that only political arrangements
that are morally unacceptable will support the impending nuclear future.
VIII. A NUCLEAR FUTURE IS NOT A RATIONAL CHOICE, EVEN IN OLD PARADIGM TERMS.
The argument thus far, to anti-nuclear conclusions, has relied upon, and
defended premisses that would be rejected under the Old Paradigm; for example,
such theses as that the interests and utilities of future people are not
discounted (in contrast to the temporally-limited utilitarianism of marketcentred economic theory), and that serious costs and risks to health and life
cannot admissibly be simply transferred to uninvolved parties (in contrast
to the transfer and limited compensation assumptions of mainstream economic
theory).
To close the case, arguments will now be outlined which are designed
to show that even within the confines of the Old Paradigm, choosing the nuclear
future is not a rational choice.
Large-scale nuclear development is not just something that happens, it
requires, on a continuing basis, an immense input of capital and energy.
Such
investment calls for substantial reasons; for the investment should be, on
Old Paradigm assumptions, the best among feasible alternatives to given economic
ends.
Admittedly so much capital has already been invested in nuclear fission
research and development, in marked contrast to other newer rival sources of
power, that there is strong political incentive to proceed - as distinct from
requisite reasons for further capital and energy inputs.
The reasons can be
divided roughly into two groups, front reasons, which are the reasons given
(out), and which are, in accordance with Old Paradigm percepts, publicly
economic (in that they are approved for public consumption), and the real
reasons, which involve private economic factors and matters of power and social
control.
39.
The main argument put up, an economic growth argument, upon which
variations are played, is the following version of the lights-going-out argument
(with economic growth duly standing in for material wealth, and even for what is
valuable!):-
Nuclear power is necessary to sustain economic growth.
Economic
growth is desirable (for all the usual reasons, e.g. to increase the size of
the pie, to avoid or postpone redistribution problems, and connected social
unrest, etc.).
Therefore nuclear power is desirable.
part of US energy policy,
economics textbooks.
The first premiss is
and the second premiss is supplied by standard
But both premisses are defective, the second because
what is valuable in economic growth can be achieved by selective economic growth,
which jettisons the heavy social and environmental costs carried by unqualified
47
economic growth.
More to the point, since the second premiss is an assumption
of the dominant paradigm, the first premiss (or rather an appropriate and less
vulnerable restatement of it) fails even on Old Paradigm standards.
For of course
nuclear power is not necessary given that there are other, perhaps costlier
alternatives.
The premiss usually defended is some elaboration of the premiss :
Nuclear power is the economically best way to sustain economic growth, ’economically
best’ being filled out as ’most efficient’, ’cheapest’,
benefit-cost ratio’, etc.
’having most favourable
Unfortunately for the argument, and for nuclear
development schemes, nuclear power is none of these things
a good deal of economic cheating (easy to do) is done.
the cancellation of nuclear plant orders, can
decisively, unless
Much data, beginning with
be assembled to show as much.
Yet
the argument requires a true premiss, not an uncertain or merely possible one, if
it is to succeed and detachment is to be permitted at all, and evidently true
premisses
if the argument is to be decisive.
The data to be summarised splits into two parts, public (governmental)
analyses, and private (utility) assessments.
Virtually all available data
concerns the USA; in Europe, West and East, true costs of uniformly "publicly^
controlled” nuclear power
are generally not divulged.
Firstly, the capital costs of nuclear plants, which have been rising much
more rapidly than inflation, now exceed those of coal-fired plants.
Komanoff
has estimated that capital costs of a nuclear generator (of optimal capacity)
49
will exceed comparable costs of a coal-fired unit by about 26% in 1985.
And
capital costs are only one part of the equation that now tell
against private utility purchase of new nuclear plants.
rather decisively
Another main factor
is the poor performance and low reliability of nuclear generators.
Coney showed
that nuclear plants can only generate about half the electricity they were
designed to produce, and that when Atomic Energy Commission estimates of relative
costs of nuclear and coal power, which assumed that both operated at 80% of design
capacity, were adjusted accordingly, nuclear generated power proved to be far more
40.
expensive than estimated.50
The discrepancy between actual and estimated
capacity
is especially important because a plant with an actual capacity factor of 55%
produced electricity at a cost about 25% higher than if the plant had performed
at the manufacturers ’ projected capacity rate of 70-75%.
The low reliability
of nuclear plants (per kilowatt output) as compared with the superior
reliability of smaller coal-fired plants adds to the case, on conventional economic
grounds of efficiency and product production costs, against nuclear power.
These unfavourable assessments are from a private (utility) perspective,
before the very extensive public subsidization of nuclear power is duly taken
into account.
The main subsidies are through research and development, by way
of insurance (under the important but doubtfully constitutional Price-Anderson
Act5'1'), in enrichment, and in waste management.
It has been estimated that
charging such costs to the electricity consumer would increase electricity bills
for nuclear power by at least 25% (and probably much more).
When official US cost/benefit analyses favouring nuclear power over
coal are examined, it is found that they inadmissibly omit several of the public
costs involved in producing nuclear power.
For example, the analyses ignore
waste costs on the quite inadmissible ground that it is not known currently
what the costs involved are.
But even using actual waste handling costs (while
wastes await storage) is enough to show that coal power is preferable to nuclear.
When further public costs, such as insurance against accident and for radiation
damage, are duly taken into account, the balance is swung still further in
favour of alternatives to nuclear and
against nuclear power.
In short, even on
proper Old Paradigm accounting, the nuclear alternative should be rejected.
Nuclear development is not economical, it certainly seems; it has been
kept going not through its clear economic viability, but by massive public
subsidization, of several types.
In USA, to take a main example where
information is available, nuclear development is publicly supported through
heavily subsidized or sometimes free research and development, under
Price-Anderson Act
the
which sharply limits both private and public liability,
i.e. which in effect provided the insurance subsidy making corporate nuclear
development economically feasible, and through government agreement to handle all
radioactive wastes.
While the Old Paradigm strictly construed cannot support uneconomical
developments, contemporary liberalisation of the Paradigm does allow for
uneconomic projects, seen as operated in the public interest, in such fields as
social welfare.
Duly admitting social welfare and some
equity
principles
41.
in the distribution of wealth (not necessarily of pollution) leads
version of the Old Paradigm, called the Modified Old Paradigm.
to the modern
The main
changes from the Old Paradigm are (as with state socialism) as emphasis of
economic factors, e.g. individual self-help is down-played, wealth is to a
small extent redistributed, e.g. through taxation, market forces are regulated
or displaced (not in principle eliminated, as with state socialism).
Now it
has been contended - outrageous though it should now seem - that nuclear power
is in the public interest as a means to various sought public ends, for example,
as well as those already mentioned such as energy for growth and cheap
electricity, and such as plentiful power for heating and cooking and appliance
brown-outs and the like.
use, avoidance of shortages, rationing,
Since
alternative power sources, such as coal, could serve the same ends given power was
supplied with suitable extravagance, the
argument has again to show that the
choice of nuclear power over other alternatives is best in the requisite
respects, in serving the public interest.
Such an argument is a matter for
decision theory, under which head cost-benefit analyses which rank alternatives
also fall as special cases.
Decision theory purports to cover theoretically the field of choice
between alternatives; it is presented as the
theory which ’deals with the
53
problem of choosing one course of action among several possible courses’.
Thus the choice of alternative modes of energy production, the energy choice
problem, becomes an exercise
in decision theory; and the nuclear choice is
often'justified” in Old Paradigm terms through appeal to decision theory.
But though decision theory is in principle comprehensive, as soon as it is put
to work in such practical cases as energy choice,
it is very considerably
contracted in scope, several major assumptions are surreptitiously imported,
and what one is confronted with is a
depauperate
theory drastically
pruned down to conform with the narrow utilitarianism of mainstream economic
theory.
The extent of reduction can be glimpsed by comparing, to take one
important example, a general optimisation model for decision (where
uncertainty is not gross) with comparable decision theory methods, such as the
expected utility model.
The general model for best choice among alternatives
specifies maximisation of expected value subject to constraints, which may
include
ethical constraints excluding certain alternatives under given
conditions.
Expected utility
models demote value to utility, assuming thereby
measurability and transference properties that may not obtain, and eliminate
constraints altogether (absorbing what is forbidden, for example, as having a
high disutility, but one that can be compensated for nonetheless).
Thus, in
42.
particular,
ethical constraints against nuclear development are replaced, in
Old Paradigm fashion, by allowance in principle for compensation for damage
sustained.
Still it is with decision making in Old Paradigm terms that we
are now embroiled, so no longer at issue are the defective (neo-classical)
economic
assumptions made in the theory, for example as to the assessment of
everything to be taken into account through utility (which comes down to
monetary terms : everything worth accounting has a price), and as to the legitimacy
of transferring with limited compensation risks and costs to involved parties.
The energy choice problem is, so it has commonly been argued in the
assumed Old Paradigm framework, a case of decision under uncertainty.
It is not a
case of decision under risk (and so expected utility models are not applicable),
because some possible outcomes are so uncertain that, in contrast to the case of
risk, no (suitably objective) quantifiable probabilities can be assigned to them.
Items that are so uncertain are taken to include nuclear war and core meltdown
54
of a reactor, possible outcomes of nuclear development :
widespread radio
active pollution is, by contrast, not uncertain.
The correct rule for decision under uncertainty is, in the case of energy
choice, maximin, to maximize the minimum payoff, so it is sometimes contended.
In fact, once again, it is unnecessary for present purposes to decide which
energy option is selected, but only whether the nuclear option is rejected.
Since competing selection rules tend to deliver the same
rejections for
options early rejected as the nuclear options, a convergence in the rejection of
the nuclear option can be effected.
All rational roads lead, not to Rome,
but to rejection of the nuclear option.
A further convergence can be effected
also, because the best possible (economic) outcomes of such leading options as
coal and a hydroelectric mix are very roughly of the same order as the nuclear
option (so Elster contends, and his argument can be elaborated).
conditions complex decision rules
(such as the Arrow-Horowicz rule) which take
account of both best possible and worst possible outcomes under
reduce to the maximin
rule.
Under these
each option
Whichever energy option is selected under the
maximin rule, the nuclear option is certainly rejected since there are options
where worst outcomes are
substantially better
than that of the nuclear
option (just consider the scenario if the nuclear nightmare, not the nuclear
dream, is realised).
Further application of the rejection rule will reject
the fossil fuel (predominantly coal) option, on the basis of estimated effects
on the earth’s climate from burning massive quantities of such fuels.
43.
Although the rejection rule coupled with
position several rivals to maximin
proposed,
maximin
enjoys a privileged
for decision under uncertainty have been
of which has associated rejection rules.
each
rules, such as the risk- added
Some of these
reasoning criticised by Goodin (pp.507-8),
the riskiness of a policy in terms of the increment of
which ’assesses
risk it adds to those pre-existing in the status quo, rather than in terms of
the absolute value of the risk associated with the policy’ are decidedly
and rather than offering a
dubious,
rational
decision procedure appears to
afford protection of the (nuclear) status quo.
What will be argued, or rather
what Goodin has in effect argued for us, is that wherever one of these rival
rules is applicable, and not dubious, it leads to rejection of the nuclear
option.
For example, the keep-options-open or allow-for-reversibility
(not an entirely unquestionable rule
rule
’of strictly limited applicability’)
excludes the nuclear option because ’nuclear plants and their by-products have
an air of irreversibility ... ’’One cannot
the
way one can abandon
alternatives rule
*
simply abandon
a coal-fired plant’”
(p.506).
a nuclear reactor
The compare-the-
in ordinary application, leads back to the cost-benefit
assessments, which,
as already observed, tell decisively against a nuclear
option when costing is done properly.
The maximise-sustainable—benefits rule,
which ’directs us to opt for the policy producing the highest level of net
benefits which can be sustained indefinitely’, ’decisively favours renewable
Other lesser rules Goodin discusses,
sources’, ruling out the nuclear option.
which have not really been applied in the nuclear debate, and which lead yet
further from the Old Paradigm framework,
vulnerable, also yield
harm-avoidance and protecting-the-
the same nuclear-excluding results.
Harm-avoidance,
in particular, points ’decisively in favour of ’’alternative" and "renewable"
energy sources ... combined with strenuous efforts at energy conservation’
The upshot is evident: whatever reasonable decision rule is adopted
(p.442).
the result is the same, a
standards.
nuclear choice is rejected, even by Old Paradigm
Nor would reversion to an expected utility analysis alter this
conclusion; for such analyses are but glorified cost-benefit analyses, with
probabilities duly multiplied in, and the
conclusion
is as before from
cost-benefit considerations, against a nuclear choice.
The Old Paradigm does not, it thus appears, sustain the nuclear
juggernaut: nor does its Modification.
The real reasons for the continuing
development program and the heavy commitment to the program have to be sought
elsewhere, outside the Old Paradigm, at least as preached.
It is, in any case,
sufficiently evident that contemporary economic behaviour does not accord with
Old Paradigm percepts, practice does not accord with neo-classical economic
theory nor, to consider the main modification, with social
theory.
democratic
There are, firstly, reasons of previous commitment, when nuclear
power, cleverly promoted at least, looked a rather cheaper and safer deal,
and certainly profitable one:
corporations so committed are understandably
keen to realise returns on capital already invested.
There are also typical
self-interest reasons for commitment to the program, that advantages accrue to
some, like those whose field happens to be nuclear engineering, that profits
accrue to some, like giant corporations, that are influential in political
affairs, and as a spin-off profits accrue to others, and so on.
There are
just as important, ideological reasons, such as a belief in the control of
both political and physical power by technocratic-entreprenial elite, a belief
in social control from above, control which nuclear power offers far more than
alternatives, some of which (vaguely) threaten to alter the power base, a faith
in the unlimitedness of technological enterprise, and nuclear in particular,
so that any real problems that arise will be solved as development proceeds.
Such beliefs are especially conspicuous in the British scene, among the
governing and technocratic classes.
Within contemporary corporate capitalism,
these sorts of reasons for nuclear development are intimately linked, because
those whose types of enterprise benefit substantially from nuclear development
are commonly those who hold the requisite beliefs.
It is then, contemporary corporate capitalism, along with its state
enterprise image, that fuels the nuclear juggernaut.
To be sure, corporate
capitalism, which is the political economy largely thrust upon us in western
nations, is not necessary for a nuclear future; a totalitarian state of the
type such capitalism often supports in the third world will suffice.
But,
unlike a hypothetical state that does conform to precepts of the Old Paradigm,
it is sufficient for a nuclear future - evidently, since we are well embarked
on such a future.
The historical route by which the world reached its present advanced
threshold to a nuclear future confirms this diagnosis.
split into two main cases, the national
This diagnosis can be
development of nuclear power in the
US, and the international spread of nuclear technology for which the US has been
largely responsible.
the
Eastern bloc is
which had in 1977 only
nuclear plants.
By comparison with the West, nuclear power production in
small
and is largely confined to the Soviet Union
about
one-sixth
the wattage output of
US
Nuclear development in USSR has been, of course, a state
controlled and subsidized venture, in which there has been virtually
no public
participation or discussion; but Russian technology has not been exported else
where to any great extent.
American technology has.
45.
The 60s were, because of the growth in electricity demand, a period of
These companies were
great expansion of the electrical utilities in the US.
encouraged to build nuclear plants, rather than coal or oil burning plants,
for several state controlled or influenced reasons:-
Firstly, owing to
governmental regulation procedures the utilities could (it then seemed) earn
a higher rate of profit on a nuclear plant than a fossil fuel one.
Secondly,
the US government arranged to meet crucial costs and risks of nuclear operation,
and in this way, and more directly through its federal agencies, actively
encouraged a nuclear choice and nuclear development.
In particular, state
limitation of liability and shouldering of part of insurance for nuclear
accidents and state arrangements to handle nuclear wastes were what made
profitable private utility operation appear feasible and resulting in nuclear
investment.
In the 70s, though the state subsidization
continued, the private
picture changed : ’high costs of construction combined with low capacity
factors and poor reliability have wiped out the
cost advantage that nuclear power’
had enjoyed in the US.
Much as the domestic nuclear market in the US is controlled by a few
corporations, so the world market is dominated by a few countries, predominantly
and first of all the US, which through its two leading nuclear companies,
Westinghouse and General Electric, has been the major exporter of nuclear
55
technology.
These companies were enabled to gain entry into European and
subsequently world markets by US foreign policies, basically the "Atoms for
Peace" program supplemented by bilateral agreements providing for US technology,
research, enriched uranium and financial capital.
’The US offered a Estate
subsidized J nuclear package that Europe could not refuse and with which the
British could not compete’.
In the 70s the picture of US domination of Common
Market nuclear technology had given way to subtler influence: American companies
with relevant governments) substantial interests in European
held (usually along
and Japanese nuclear companies and held licences on the technology which remained
largely American.
Meanwhile in the 60s and 70s the US entered into bilateral
agreements for civilian use of atomic energy with many other countries, for
example, Argentina, Brasil, Columbia, India, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Israel,
Pakistan, Philippines, South Korea, Portugal, South Africa,
Taiwan, Turkey, Venezuela, South Vietnam.
The US proceeded,
Spain,
in this way, to ship
nuclear technology and nuclear materials in great quantities round the world.
It also proceeded to spread nuclear technology through the International Atomic
Energy Agency, originally designed to control and safeguard nuclear operations,
but most of whose *
budget
activities’.
and activities ... have gone to promote nuclear
46.
A main reason for the promotion and sales pressure on Third World
countries has been the failure of US domestic market and industrial world
markets for reactors.
Less developed countries
offer a new frontier where reactors can be built with
easy public financing, where health and safety regulations
are loose and enforcement rare, where public opposition
is not permitted and where weak and corrupt regimes offer
easy sales.
[For]
... the US has considerable leverage
with many of these countries. We know from painful
experience that many of the worst dictatorships in the planet
would not be able to stand without overt and covert US support.
Many of those same regimes
are n°w^ pursuing
the
nuclear path, for all the worst reasons.
It is evident from this sketch of the ways and means of reactor
proliferation that not only have practices departed far from the framework
of the Old Paradigm and its social Modification, but that the practices (of
corporate capitalism and associated third world imperialism) involve much
that is ethically unacceptable, whether
percepts;for principles such as
by older, modified, or alternative
those
assembled under fairness
and self-determination are grossly violated.
IX. SOCIAL OPTIONS ; SHALLOWER AND DEEPER ALTERNATIVES .
The future energy
option that is most often contrasted with nuclear power, namely coal power,
while no doubt preferable to nuclear power, is hardly acceptable.
For it
carries with it the likelihood of serious (air) pollution and associated
phenomena such as acid rain and atmospheric heating, not to mention the
despoliation caused by extensive strip mining, all of which result from its use
in meeting very high projected consumption figures.
Such an option would also
fail, it seems, to meet the necessary transfer condition, because it would
impose widespread costs on nonbeneficiaries for some concentrated benefits to
some profit takers and to some users who do not pay the full costs of production
i
58
and replacement.
To these conventional main options a third is often added which emphasizes
softer and more benign technologies, such as those of solar energy and, in
Northern Europe, hydroelectricity.
The deeper choice, which even softer paths
tend to neglect, is not technological but social, and involves both
conservation measures and the restructuring of production away from energy
intensive uses: at a more basic level there is a choice between consumeristic
and nonconsumeristic futures.
These more fundamental choices between social
alternatives, conventional technologically-oriented discussion of energy options
tends to be obscure.
It is not just a matter of deciding in which way to meet
given and unexamined goals (as the Old Paradigm would imply), but also a matter
of examining the goals.
That is, we are not merely faced with the question of
comparing different technologies or substitute ways of meeting some fixed or given
demand or level of consumption, and of trying to see whether we can meet this
with soft rather than hard technologies; we are also faced, and primarily, with the
matter of examining those alleged needs and the cost of a society that creates
them.
It is not just a question of devising less damaging ways to meet these
alleged needs conceived of as inevitable and unchangeable.
(Hence there are
solar ways of producing unnecessary trivia no one really wants, as opposed to
nuclear ways.)
Naturally this is not to deny that these softer options are
superior because of the ethically unacceptable features of the harder options.
But it is doubtful that any technology, however benign in principle, will
be likely to leave a tolerable world for the future if it is expected to meet
unbounded and uncontrolled energy consumption and demands.
Even the more benign
technologies such as solar technology could be used in a way which creates costs
for future people and are likely to result in a deteriorated world being handed
on to them.
Consider, for example, the effect on the world’s forests, which are
commonly counted as a solar resource, of use for production of methanol or of
electricity by woodchipping (as already planned by forest authorities and
contemplated by many other energy organisations).
While few would object to the
use of genuine waste material for energy production, the unrestricted exploitation
of forests - whether it goes under the name of "solar energy" or not - to meet
ever increasing energy demands could well be the final indignity for the world’s
already hard-pressed natural forests.
The effects of such additional demands on the maintenance of the
forests are often dismissed, even by soft technologicalists, by the simple
expedient of waving around the label ’renewable resources’.
Many forests are
in principle renewable, it is a true, given a certain (low) rate and kind of
exploitation, but in fact there are now very few forestry operations anywhere
in the world where the forests are treated as completely renewable in the sense
59
of the renewal of all their values.
In many regions too the rate of
exploitation which would enable renewal has already been exceeded, so that a total
decline is widely thought to be imminent if not already well advanced.
It certainly
has begun in many regions, and for many forest types (such as rainforest types)
which are now, and very rapidly, being lost for the future.
The addition of a
major further and not readily limitable demand pressure, that for energy,
on top of present pressures is one which anyone with a realistic appreciation
of the conduct of contemporary forestry operations, who is also concerned with
long-term conservation of the forests and remaining natural communities, must
regard with alarm.
The result of massive deforestation for energy purposes,
48.
resembling the deforestation of England at the beginning of the Industrial
Revolution, again for energy purposes, would be extensive and devastating
erosion in steeper lands and tropical areas, desertification in more arid
regions, possible climatic change, and massive impoverishment of natural
ecosystems.
Some of us do not want to pass on - we are not entitled to pass
on - a deforested world to the future, any more than we want to pass on one
poisoned by nuclear products or polluted by coal products.
In short, a mere
switch to a more benign technology - important though this is - without any
more basic structural and social change is inadequate.
Nor is such a simple technological switch likely to be achieved.
It is
not as if political pressure could oblige the US government to stop its nuclear
program (and that of the countries it influences, much of the world), in the
to succeed in halting the Vietnam war.
way pressure appeared
While without
doubt it would be good if this could be accomplished, it is very unlikely
given the integration of political powerholders with those sponsoring
nuclear
development.
The deeper social options involve challenging and trying to change a social
structure which promotes consumerism, consumption far beyond genuine needs, and
an economic structure which encourages increasing use of highly energy-intensive
modes of production.
This means, for instance, trying to change a social
structure in which those who are lucky enough to make it into the work force
are cogs in a production machine over which they have very little real control
and in which most people do unpleasant or boring work from which they derive
very little real satisfaction in order to obtain the reward of consumer goods
and services.
A society in which social rewards are obtained primarily from
products rather than processes, from consumption, rather than from satisfaction
in work and in social relations and other activities, is virtually bound to be
one which generates a vast amount of unnecessary consumption.
(A production
system that produces goods not to meet genuine needs but for created and non-
genuine needs is virtually bound to overproduce.)
Consumption frequently
becomes a substitute for satisfaction in other areas.
The adjustments focussed upon are only parts of the larger set of
adjustments involved in socially implementing the New Paradigm, the
move away
from consumerism is for example part of the more general shift from materialism
and materialist values.
The social change option tends to be obscured in most discussions of
energy options and of how to meet energy needs, in part because it does
question underlying values of current social arrangements.
The conventional
discussion proceeds by taking alleged demand (often conflated with wants or
61
needs
) as unchallengeable, and the issue to be one of which technology can
48.
resembling the deforestation of England at the beginning of the Industrial
Revolution, again for energy purposes, would be extensive and devastating
erosion in steeper lands and tropical areas, desertification in more arid
regions, possible climatic change, and massive impoverishment of natural
ecosystems.
Some of us do not want to pass on - we are not entitled to pass
on - a deforested world to the future, any more than we want to pass on one
poisoned by nuclear products or polluted by coal products.
In short, a mere
switch to a more benign technology - important though this is - without any
more basic structural and social change is inadequate.
Nor is such a simple technological switch likely to be achieved.
It is
not as if political pressure could oblige the US government to stop its nuclear
program (and that of the countries it influences, much of the world), in the
to succeed in halting the Vietnam war.
way pressure appeared
While without
doubt it would be good if this could be accomplished, it is very unlikely
given the integration of political powerholders with those sponsoring
nuclear
development.
The deeper social options involve challenging and trying to change a social
structure which promotes consumerism, consumption far beyond genuine needs, and
an economic structure which encourages increasing use of highly energy-intensive
modes of production.
This means, for instance, trying to change a social
structure in which those who are lucky enough to make it into the work force
are cogs in a production machine over which they have very little real control
and in which most people do unpleasant or boring work from which they derive
very little real satisfaction in order to obtain the reward of consumer goods
and services.
A society in which social rewards are obtained primarily from
products rather than processes, from consumption, rather than from satisfaction
in work and in social relations and other activities, is virtually bound to be
one which generates a vast amount of unnecessary consumption.
(A production
system that produces goods not to meet genuine needs but for created and non-
genuine needs is virtually bound to overproduce.)
Consumption frequently
becomes a substitute for satisfaction in other areas.
The adjustments focussed upon are only parts of the larger set of
adjustments involved in socially implementing the New Paradigm, the
move away
from consumerism is for example part of the more general shift from materialism
and materialist values.
The social change option tends to be obscured in most discussions of
energy options and of how to meet energy needs, in part because it does
question underlying values of current social arrangements.
The conventional
discussion proceeds by taking alleged demand (often conflated with wants or
61
needs
) as unchallengeable, and the issue to be one of which technology can
49.
be most profitably employed to meet them.
This effectively presents a false
choice, and is the result of taking needs and demand as lacking a social
context so that the social structure which produces the needs is similarly
taken as unchallengeable and unchangeable.
It is commonly argued by representatives
The point is readily illustrated.
of such industries as transportation and petroleum, as for example by McGrowth
of the XS Consumption Co., that people want deep freezers, air conditioners,
power boats, ... It would be authoritarian to prevent them from satisfying
these wants.
Such an argument conveniently ignores the social framework in
which such needs and wants arise or are produced.
To point to the determination
of many such wants at the framework level is not however to accept a Marxist
approach according to which they are entirely determined at the framework level
(e.g. by industrial organisation) and there is no such thing as individual
choice or determination at all.
It is to see the social framework as a major
factor in determining certain kinds of choices, such as those for travel,
and to see apparently individual choices made in such matters as being channelled
and directed by a social framework determined largely in the interests of
corporate and private profit and advantage.
The social change option is a hard option - at least it will be difficult
to obtain politically - but it is the only way, so it has been argued, of avoiding
passing on serious costs to the future.
And there are other sorts of reasons than
such ethical ones for taking it: it is the main, indeed the only sort of option
62
open to those who take a deeper ecological perspective , a perspective integral
with the New Paradigm but not essential to radical departure from the dominant
paradigm.
The ethical transmission requirement defended accordingly requires,
hardly surprisingly, social and political adjustment.
The social and political changes that the deeper alternative requires will
be strongly resisted because they
and power structure.
mean changes in current social organisation
To the extent that the option represents some kind of
threat to parts of present political and economic arrangements it is not surprising
that official energy option discussion proceeds by misrepresenting and often
obscuring it.
But difficult though a change will be, especially one with such
far-reaching effects on the prevailing power structure, is to obtain, it is
imperative to try : we are all on the nuclear train.
FOOTNOTES
1.
All but the last line of the quote is drawn from Goodin, p. 417;
the last line is from the Fox Report, p. 6.
While it is unnecessary to know much about the nuclear fuel cycle
in order to consider ethical and social dimensions of nuclear power, it
helps to know a little.
& Abbotts, Gyorgy.
The basics are presented in many texts, e.g. Nader
Of course in order to assess fully reports as to such
important background and stage-setting matters as the likelihood of a
core meltdown of a (lightwater) reactor, much more information is required.
For many assessment purposes however, some knowledge of economic fallacies
and decision theory is at least as important as knowledge of nuclear technology.
2.
As to the first, see references cited in Goodin, p. 417, footnote 1.
As regards the second see Cotgrove and Duff, and some of the references
given therein.
3.
Cotgrove and Duff, p. 339.
4.
The table is adapted from Cotgrove and Duff, p. 341;
compare also
Catton and Dunlap, especially p. 34.
5.
See, e.g., Gyorgy, pp. 357-8.
6.
For one illustration, see the conclusions of Mr Justice Parker at
the Windscale inquiry (The Windscale Inquiry Vol. 1., Her Majesty’s
Stationery Office, London, 1978), discussed in both Cotgrove and
Duff, p. 347 and in Goodin, p. 501 ff.
7.
Much as with the argument of one theory or position against another.
One can argue both from one’s own position against the other, and in the
other’s own terms against the other.
8.
As well as screening the debate from the public such manoeuvres
favour the (pro-)nuclear establishment, since they (those of the
alliance of military, large industry, and government) control much of the
information and (subject to minor qualifications) can release what, and only
what, suits them.
9.
This is a conclusion of several governmental inquiries and is
conceded by some leading proponents of nuclear development; for requisite
details up to 1977 see Routley (a).
The same conclusion has been reached in
some, but not all, more recent official reports, see, e.g.,
2
10.
For some details see Gyorgy, p. 60 ff.
11.
See the papers, and simulations, discussed in Goodin, p. 428.
11a.
Naturally the effect on humans is not the only factor that has to be
taken into account in arriving at moral assessments.
Nuclear radiation, unlike
most ethical theories, does not confine its scope to human life and welfare.
But since the harm nuclear development may afflict on non-human life, for
example, can hardly improve its case, it suffices if the case against it can
be made out solely in terms of its effects on human life in the conventional
(Old Paradigm) way.
12.
On the pollution and waste disposal record of the nuclear industry,
see Nader and Abbotts, Lovins and Price, and Gyorgy.
On the more general
problem of effective pollution controls, see also, Routley (a), footnote 7.
13.
Back of thus Humanity Unlimited assumption is the idea of Man
replacing God.
First God had unlimited power, e.g. over nature, then when
during the Enlightenment Man replaced God, Man was to have unlimited
power.
Science and technology were the tools which were to put Man into the
position of unlimitedness.
More recently nuclear power is seen as providing
man at least with unlimited physical power, power obtained through technology,
[ability to manage technology represents the past]
14.
On such limitation theorems, which go back to Finsler and Godel on one
side and to Arrow on the other, see, e.g. Routley 80.
All these theorems mimic
paradoxes, semantical "paradoxes” on one side and voting "paradoxes" on the
other.
Other different limitation results are presented in Routley 81.
It
follows that there are many problems that have no solution and much that is
necessarily unknowable.
Limitative results put a serious dent in the progress picture.
According
the Dominant Western Worldview,
the history of humanity is one of progress; for every problem
there is a solution, and thus progress need never cease (Catton
and Dunlap, p. 34).
15.
See Lovins and Price.
15a.
The points also suggest a variant argument against a nuclear future,
namely
.
A nuclear future narrows the range of opportunities
open to future generations.
.
’What justice requires ... is that the overall range
of opportunities open to successor generations should not be
narrowed’
(Barry, p.243).
Therefore, a nuclear future contravenes requirements of justice.
3
16.
For examples, and for some details of the history of philosophers ’
positions on obligations to the future, see Routley (a).
17.
Passmore, p. 91.
Passmore’s position is ambivalent and, to
all appearances, inconsistent.
It is considered in detail in Routley (a),
as also is Rawls’ position.
18.
For related criticisms of the economists’ arguments for discounting,
and for citation of the often eminent economists who sponsor them, see
Goodin, pp. 429-30.
19.
The reasons (not elaborated here) are that the properties are different
e.g. a monetary reduction of value imposes a linear ordering on values to which
value rankings, being only partial orderings, do not conform.
20.
Goodin however puts his case against those rules in a less than
satisfactory fashion.
What he claims is that we cannot list all the
possible outcomes in the way that such rules as expected utility maximization
presupposes, e.g. Goodin suggests that we cannot list all the things that can
go wrong with a nuclear power plant or with waste storage procedures.
But
outstanding alternatives can always be comprehended logically, at worst by
saying "all the rest” (e.g. ~p covers everything except p).
For example,
outcomes Goodin says cannot be listed, can be comprehended along such lines
as "plant breakdown through human error".
Furthermore the different
more appropriate rules Goodin subsequently considers also require listing of
"possible" outcomes.
are really two points.
Goodin’s point can be alternatively stated however.
There
The first trouble is that such ragbag alternatives
cannot in general be assigned required quantitative probabilities, and it is
at that point that applications of the models breaks down.
The breakdown is
just what separates decision making under uncertainty from decision making
under risk.
Secondly, many influential applications of decision theory methods,
the Rasmussen Report is a good example, do, illegitimately, delete possible
alternatives from their modellings.
21.
Discount, or bank, rates in the economists’ sense are usually set to
follow the market, cf. P.A. Samuelson, Economics, 7th Edition, McGraw-Hill,
New York, 1967, p.351.
22.
A real possibility is one which there is evidence for believing could
eventuate,
A real possibility requires producible evidence for its
consideration.
23.
Thus the rates have little moral relevance.
The contrast is with mere logical possibility.
4
24.
Such a principle is explicit both in classical utilitarianism (e.g.
Sidgwick p. 414), and in a range of contract and other theories from Kant and
Rousseau to Rawls (p.293).
How
the principle is argued for will depend
heavily, however, on the underlying theory; and we do not want to make our use
depend heavily on particular ethical theories.
25.
The latter question is taken up in section VII; see especially, the
Poverty argument.
26.
SF, p. 27.
Shrader-Frechette is herself somewhat critical of the
carte blanche adoption of these methods, suggesting that ’whoever affirms ov'
denies the desirability of ... [such] standards is, to some degree,
symbollically assenting to a number of American value patterns and cultural
norms’
27.
(p. 28).
The example parallels the sorts of counterexamples often advanced to
utilitarianism, e.g. the admissible
lynching
of pleasure given to the large lynching party.
of an innocent person because
For the more general case
against utilitarianism, see ...
28.
US Atomic Energy Commission, Comparative Risk-Cost-Benefit Study of
Alternative sources of Electrical Energy (WASH-1224), US Government Printing
Office, Washington, D.C., December 1974, p.4-7 and p. 1-16.
29.
As SF points out, p.37-44., in some detail.
As she remarks,
... since standards need not be met, so long as the
NRC [Nuclear Regulatory commission] judges that the
licence shows ’a reasonable effort’ at meeting them,
current policy allows government regulators to trade
human health and welfare for the [apparent] good
intentions of the promotors of technology.
[Such]
good intentions have never been known to be sufficient
for the morality of an act (p. 39).
The failure of state regulation, even where the standards are as mostly not very
demanding, and
the alliance of regulators with those they are supposed to be
regulating, are conspicuous features of modern environmental control, not just
of (nuclear) pollution control.
30.
r
31.
The figures are those from the original Brookhaven Report:
possibilities and consequences of major
’Theoretical
accidents in large nuclear plants’,
USAEC Report WASH-740, Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1957.
This report was requested in the first place because the Commission
on Atomic Energy
wanted positive safety conclusions "to reassure the
private insurance companies” so that they would provide
coverage for the nuclear industry.
Since even the
conservative statistics of the report were alarming it
was
suppressed and its data were not made public until
almost 20 years later, after a suit was brought as a result of
the Freedom of Information Act (Shrader-Frechette, pp. 78-9).
32.
Atomic Energy Commission, Reactor Safety Study: An Assessment of
Accident Risks in US Commercial Nuclear Power Plants, Government Printing Office,
Washington, D.C., 1975.
This report, the only allegedly complete study,
concluded that fission reactors presented only a minimal health risk to the
public.
Early in 1979, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the relevant
organisation that superseded the troubled Atomic Energy Commission) withdrew
its support for the report, with the result that there is now no comprehensive
analysis of nuclear power approved by the1 US Government.
32a.
Most present and planned reactors are of this type: see Gyorgy.
33.
34.
Even then relevant environment factors may have been neglected.
35.
There are variations on (i) and (ii) which multiply costs against
numbers such as probabilities.
In this way risks, construed as probable
costs, can be taken into account in
the assessment.
(Alternatively, risks may
be assessed through such familiar methods as insurance.)
A principle varying (ii), and formulated as follows:
(ii3) a is ethically acceptable if (for some b) a includes no more risks than b
and b is socially accepted,
was the basic ethical principle in terms of which
the Cluff Lake Board of Inquiry recently decided that nuclear power development
in Saskatchewan is ethically acceptable:
see Cluff Lake Board of Inquiry Final
Report, Department of Environment, Government of Saskatchewan, 1978, p. 305 and
In this report, a is nuclear power and b is either activities clearly
p. 288.
accepted by society as alternative power sources.
In other applications b has
been taken as cigarette smoking, motoring, mining and even the Vietnam War (!)
The points made in the text do not exhaust the objections to principles
(i) - (ii
).
*
The principles are certainly ethically substantive, since an
ethical consequence cannot be deduced from nonethical premisses, but they have an
inadmissible conventional character.
For look at the origin of b: b may be
socially accepted though it is no longer socially acceptable, or though its
social acceptibility is no longer so clearcut and it would not have been socially
accepted if as much as is now known had been known when it was introduced.
What
is required in (ii’), for instance, for the argument to begin to look convincing
is then ’ethically acceptable’ rather than ’socially accepted’.
But even with
the amendments the principles are invalid, for the reasons given in the text.
It is not disconcerting that these arguments do not work.
It would be
sad to see yet another area lost to the experts, namely ethics to actuaries.
36.
A main part of the trouble with the models is that they are narrowly
utilitarian, and like utilitarianism they neglect distributional features,
involve naturalistic fallacies, etc.
Really they try to treat as an uncon
strained optimisation what is a deontically constrained optimisation:
see R. and
V. Routley ’An expensive repair kit for utilitarianism’.
37.
Apparent exceptions to the principle such as taxation (and redistribution
of income generally) vanish when wealth is construed (as it has to be if taxation
is to be properly justified) as at least partly a social asset unfairly
monopolised by a minority of the population.
Examples such as that of motoring
dangerously do not constitute counterexamples to the principle; for one is not
morally entitled to so motor.
38.
SF, p. 15, where references are also cited.
39.
Goodin, p. 433.
40.
On all these points see R. Grossman and G. Daneker, Guide to Jots and
Energy3 Environmentalists for Full Employment, Washington DC, 1977, pp.1-7,
and also the details supplied in substantiating the interesting case of Commoner,
fx------ On the absorption of available capital by the nuclear industry, see as
well
p. 23.
A. Roberts,
’The politics of nuclear power’, Arena No. 41 (1976) 22-47,
On the employment issues, see too Daly, in Commoner and others, p. 149.
7
A more fundamental challenge to the poverty argument appears in I. Illich,
Energy and Equality3 Calden and Boyars, London 1974, where it is argued that
the sort of development nuclear energy represents is exactly the opposite of
what the poor need.
41.
For much more detail on the inappropriateness see E.F. Schumacher,
Small is Beautiful3 Blond and Briggs, London, 1973.
As to the capital and
other requirements, see Fox Report, p.48, and also Commoner, and Commoner and others.
For an illuminating look at the sort of development high-energy
technology will tend to promote in the so-called underdeveloped countries see
the paper of Waiko and other papers in TTze Melanesian Environment (edited
J.H. Winslow), Australian National University Press, Canberra, 1977.
42.
A useful survey is given in A. Lovins, Energy Strategy: The Road Not
Taken3 Friends of the Earth Australia, 1977 (reprinted from Foreign Affairs3
October 1976); see a|so Nader & Abbotts, p.233 ff., Lovins and Price, Commoner,
and Schumacher, op.czt.
43.
An argument like this is suggested in Passmore, Chapters 4 and 7,
with respect to the question of saving resources.
In Passmore this argument
for the overriding importance of passing on contemporary culture is underpinned
by what appears to be a future-directed ethical version of the Hidden Hand
argument of economics - that, by a coincidence which if correct would indeed be
fortunate, the best way to take care of the future (and perhaps even the only
way to do so, since do-good intervention is almost certain to go wrong) is to
take proper care of the present and immediate future.
The argument has all
the defects of the related Chain Argument discussed above and others.
44.
See Nader and Abbotts, p. 66, p. 191, and also Commoner.
45.
Very persuasive arguments to this effect have been advanced by civil
liberties groups and others in a number of countries: see especially M. Flood
and R. Grove-White,
Nuclear Prospects.
A comment on the individual3 the State
and Nuclear Power3 Friends of the Earth, Council for the Protection of Rural
England and National Council for Civil Liberties, London, 1976.
46.
’US energy policy, for example, since the passage of the 1954 Atomic
Energy Act, has been that nuclear power is necessary to provide "an economical
and reliable basis"
needed "to sustain economic growth" (SF, p.lll, and
references there cited).
47.
There are now a great many criticisms of the second premiss in the
literature.
For our criticism, and a reformulation of the premiss in terms
of selective economic growth (which would exclude nuclear development), see
Routley (b), and also Berkley and Seckier.
To simple-mindedly contrast economic growth with no-growth, in the fashion
of some discussions of nuclear power, c.f. Elster, is to leave out
alternatives; the contraction
crucial
of course much simplifies the otherwise faulty
case for unalleged growth.
48.
In UK and USSR nuclear development is explicitly in the public domain,
in such countries as France and West Germany the government has very substantial
interests in main nuclear
involved companies.
Even as regards nuclear plant
operation in the US,
it is difficult to obtain comprehensive data.
Estimates of cost very dramtically according to the
sample of plants chosen and the assumptions made
concerning the measurement of plant performance
(Gyorgy, p. 173).
49.
See Kalmanoff, p.
50.
See Comey.
51.
Ref. to what it has to say about Price Anderson Act.
52.
Full ref to SF onargument
from ignorance etc.
On decision theory see also,
53.
These e.g. Elster, p. 377.
54.
A recent theme in much economic literature is that Bayesian decision
theory and risk analysis can be universally applied.
The theme is upset as
soon as one steps outside of select Old Paradigm confines.
In any case, even
within these confines there is no consensus at all on, and few (and
widely diverging) figures for; the probability of a reactor core meltdown,
and no reliable estimates as to the likelihood of a nuclear confrontation.
Thus Goodin argues (in 78) that ’such uncertainties plague energy theories’
as to ’render expected utility calculations impossible’.
55.
For details see Gyorgy, p. 398 ff., from which presentation of the
international story is adapted.
7
56.
Gyorgy, p. 307, and p. 308.
points, see Chomsky
For elaboration of some of the important
and Hermann.
Whatever one thinks of the ethical principles underlying the Old
57.
Paradigm or its Modification - and they do form a coherent set that many
can
people
respect - these are not the principles underlying contemporary
corporate capitalism and associated third-world imperialism.
Certainly practical transitional programs may involve temporary and
58.
limited use of unacceptable long term commodities such as coal, but in
presenting such practical details one should not lose sight of the more basic
social and structural changes, and the problem is really one of making those.
Similarly practical transitional strategies should make use of such
measures as environmental (or replacement) pricing of energy i.e. so that the
price of some energy unit includes the full cost of replacing it by an
equivalent unit taking account of environmental cost of production.
Other
(sometimes cooptive) strategies towards more satisfactory alternatives should
also, of course, be adopted, in particular the removal of institutional barriers
to energy conservation and alternative technology (e.g. local government
regulations blocking these), and the removal of state assistance to fuel and
power industries.
59.
Symptomatic of the fact that it is not treated as renewable is that
forest economics do not generally allow for full renewability - if they did
the losses and deficits on forestry operations would be much more striking than
they already are often enough.
It is doubtful, furthermore, that energy cropping of forests can be a
fully renewable operation if net energy production is to be worthwhile; see, e.g.
the argument in L.R.B. Mann ’Some difficulties with energy farming for portable
fuels’, and add in the costs of ecosystem maintenance.
60.
For an outline and explanation of this phenomena see Gyorgy,
and also Woodmansee.
61.
The requisite distinction is made in several places, e.g. Routley (b),
and (to take one example from the real Marxist literature), Baran and
Sweezy.
62.
The distinction between shallow and deep ecology was first emphasised
by Naess.
For its environmental importance see Routley (c) (where
further references are cited).
S ta te s o c ia lis m , a s p r a c tis e d in m ost o f th e ’’E a s te rn b lo c ” , d if f e r s
a s to econom ic o r g a n is a tio n , th e m a rk e t in p a r t i c u l a r b e in g re p la c e d
sy stem by a command s y s te m ) B ut s in c e th e r e i s v i r t u a l l y no d e b a te
c o n fin e s o f s t a t e s o c ia lis m , th a t m in o r v a r ia n t on th e Old P arad ig m
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REFERENCES USED
Works especially useful for further investigation of the ethical issues
raised by nuclear development are indicated with an asterisk (*
).
t
I
/S. Congrove and A. Duff,
’Environmentalism, middle-class radicalism and
politics’, Sociological Review
28(2) (1980), 333-51.
A.
R. Cotton, Jr. , and R. E. Dunlj/p, ’A new ecological paradigm for post
f /
exuberant sociology’ American Behavioural Scientist 24 (1980).
15-47.
v/r
Report :
Vr
Ranger Uranium En/ynmental Inquiry First Report,
Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1977.
E. Goodin, ’No moral ni^k^S
’, Ethics 90 (1980), 417-49.
Gyorgy and friends, No /Juk^
:
everyone’s guide to nuclear power,
South End Press, Boston, Mass., 1979
/ R. Nader and J. Abbotts, The Menace of Atomic Energy,
Melbourne, 1977.
/
/
D.
*
Mannison, M. McRobbie and R. Routley (editors), Environmental Philosophy,
RSSS, Australian National University, 1980.
!
N. Myers, The Sinking Ark,
x.
&
Outback Press,
/
K.
*
Pergamon Press, Oxford, 1979.
S. Shrader-Frechette, Nuclear Power and Public Policy, Reid^l, Dordrecht,
1980 (referred to as SF).
R. and V. Routley,
’Nuclear energy and obligations to the future’, Inquiry
21 (1978), 133-79.
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Typescript of draft, corrections with whiteout and handwritten emendations, undated. First page includes correct typescript cut-out pasted on page. Paper published, Routley R and Routley V (1982) 'Nuclear power—some ethical and social dimensions', in Regan T and VanDeVeer D (eds) And justice for all: new introductory essays in ethics and public policy, Rowman and Littlefield.
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Box 97: Paper - Extracts - Articles and Chapters by Richard Sylvan
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ABSTRACT OF
PROBLEMS and SOLUTIONS in DEEP ECOPOLITICAL THEORY
A reshaping of social and political institutions, which are often outmoded or suboptimal
and certainly commonly anti-environmental, is now prominent on theoretical agendas, at least in
Australia. One such project is the multi-million dollar "Reshaping Australian Institutions^^
project at the Australian National University.
At the same time there is widespread
disenchantment with prevailing politics in Australia. Accordingly there is an opportunity to put
radical green themes on agendas for real political and institutional change.
A deep change, however, which is what deep green theories require, encounters several
problems. For one, there appears to be a contradiction between demands for, on the one side,
increasing environmental regulations and welfare arrangements, characteristically dependent
upon bureaurcratic centralisation and economic growth, and on the other, decentralized lower
impact organisation, which halts anti-environmentally industry and economic growth. A
functional resolution, partially dissolving a central state, is outlined, along with a theory of
encephaletic organisation.
Further problems to surmount include human chauvinism and present-time bias, even in
present t4best practice” democratic institutions. Deep demarchoidal resolutions of these
problems are sketched and defended.
R. Sylvan
RMB 683
Bungendore Australia 2621
�
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Notes, Correspondences and Marginalia
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In one obituary, Sylvan's handwriting was said to have "looked like the oscilloscope for a patient in intensive care", and thus "not for the timid".
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ABSTRACT OF
PROBLEMS and SOLUTIONS in DEEP ECOPOLITICAL THEORY
A reshaping of social and political institutions, which are often outmoded or suboptimal
and certainly commonly anti-environmental, is now prominent on theoretical agendas, at least in
Australia. One such project is the multi-million dollar "Reshaping Australian Institutions^^
project at the Australian National University.
At the same time there is widespread
disenchantment with prevailing politics in Australia. Accordingly there is an opportunity to put
radical green themes on agendas for real political and institutional change.
A deep change, however, which is what deep green theories require, encounters several
problems. For one, there appears to be a contradiction between demands for, on the one side,
increasing environmental regulations and welfare arrangements, characteristically dependent
upon bureaurcratic centralisation and economic growth, and on the other, decentralized lower
impact organisation, which halts anti-environmentally industry and economic growth. A
functional resolution, partially dissolving a central state, is outlined, along with a theory of
encephaletic organisation.
Further problems to surmount include human chauvinism and present-time bias, even in
present t4best practice” democratic institutions. Deep demarchoidal resolutions of these
problems are sketched and defended.
R. Sylvan
RMB 683
Bungendore Australia 2621
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Box 18, Item 1225: Abstract of Problems in deep ecopolitical theory
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Box 18: Green Projects in Progress
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13.6.96
GREEN POLITICAL THEORY:
a different account
Green political theory is divided according to one of our guides1, rather like Gaul
according to Caesar, into three parts:
—a green theory of value,
—a subordinate green theory of agency, and
—a green lifestyle program, portrayed as a set of altogether dispensible lifestyle
recommendations.
While it is the high-handed insistent dismissal of green lifestyles by this guide, Goodin, that has
captured the attention of critics and been highlighted, the brash partitioning of green political
theory, and the surreptitious dismissal therewith of significant parts of it, should not pass
unnoticed. To the contrary, virtually the whole of what political theory is taken to treat comes up
for reassessment once green lights are played upon it, certainly under deeper green illumination.
That bogus exhaustiveness taken for granted, that all there is to it amounts to value and action,
no doubt derives largely from an underlying utilitarianism, according to which other theoretical
matters can be subsumed under these.2
In short, partly through dispensing with lifestyle considerations, primarily by virtue of a
background utilitarianism operating within a conventional state-setting, Goodin can suppose that
green political theory reduces to these two parts: a theory of value and a subordinate theory of
agency. Such a reduction is however much too simple, leaving out, as it does, much of ethics of
political relevance, as well as a large slab of politics. For example, ethical omissions include the
fields of deontology (environmental permissions, prescriptives, directives; environmental
justice, rights and so on), of virtue theory, and of accountability. Among political omissions
most striking is the absence of any due consideration of institutional and ideological alternatives
to what now prevails. Prevailing Western political arrangements—with staged elections, urban
bureaucratic control, incremental reformism (often environmentally regressive), and so on—are
simply taken for granted. Above all, there is no critique of the state, an increasingly important
part of radical green politics. One reason for this gross omission— f radical green theory from
what is presented as green political theory—is that Goodin does not question the conventional
political assumption that the appropriate objective of green political activity consists in gaining
power or influence within established statist arrangements, for example at best through electoral
1
R. Goodin Green Political Theory, Polity Press, Cambridge 1992. This was undoubtedly a book
worth criticizing.
2
See the appendix.
�2
success enabling control of some of the administrative and executive functions of state (we shall
encounter this conventional “political realism^^ again later). However significant strands of
green political theory no longer accept this assumption. A related reason, reaching deeper, is
that Goodin likewise does not question, as strands of green theory now do, what helps
undergird the conventional political assumption and reformist utilitarianism, an Enlightenment
ideology with its faith in reason and science, technologically-based progress, overall human
goodness and dominance, and so on.3
The bold overstatement of claims, along with misrepresentation as to what green political
theory comprises, is symptomatic of much of the book: overstatement and undersubstantiation.4
Virtually all main themes of the book are false, indeed rather patently so once exhibited
unadorned, because limited truths are overextended; and they are undersupplied with cogent
support. So it is with the green theory of value, which inflates what is a significant factor in
green evaluation into the supposed total green theory. So it is with the green package, which is
presented as having an absolutely tight integration, which it in fact lacks. And so on, as will
appear. Not only are main themes seriously defective; more disappointing, a salvage operation
will not yield a lode of green gold.
As troubling is the anti-subversive character of the work. Goodin has wheeled another
Trojan horse into green territory, a horse bringing a number of anti-green academic warriors
armed with anti-green ideas and sentiments, and engaged in and advocating anti-green lifestyles,
(as will emerge).5 Of course, 'Green political theory' is a clever title, which is complemented by
a politically clever introduction on the crises which are not minimized or marginalised but given
considerable weight—all of which suggest that the text might be of much more interest to
politically inclined greens than the usual academic fare. But the title does not say how the green
theory is to be treated, explained and encouraged, exposed and condemned. Neither really. The
text is not written for greens (though the publishers obviously hope they may buy it,6 or be
3
For an exposition and criticism of Enlightenment Ideology, see Sylvan TM.
4
In part because these sorts of deficiencies have not been addressed in reviews of the book, I
decided to persevere with this less charitable critique (a tiresome exercise bound to alienate).
Regrettably most of the reviews appear to derive from a political science orientation. They trip
lightly by philosophical fundamentals, where the book is noticeably weak, and vulnerable.
And they tend to be very light on argument.
5
Trojan horses are in extensive use by academics, particularly in green regions. We will
encounter a number of these horses. They are evident from sociology to biogeography and
climatology, and particularly prominent around economic enslaves.
6
They form part of the intended audience for the book according to accompanying publishers'
work and flyers. Indeed the publishers have participated in the deception, supplying a cover
featuring a boss of the Green Man from the cloisters of Norwich cathedral, which sends, as they
�3
tricked into buying it), but for a cohert of academic colleagues—for colleagues who form part of
the prevailing system, of politics-more-or-less-as-usual and so on.
Deapite its character, there are several useful and attractive features of Goodin's book,
which do make it worthwhile reading for awake greens of theoretical bent (one of these features
is an Appendix, putting together succinctly a green political program). It is a smoothly written
book, encouraging readers to glide along, glossing over the underlying content and messages,
and not grasping the enormity of some of what is presented, for instance even as green gospel.
It may be just the style that is attractive (the cut of the book, the easy flow, an appealingly simple
structure, and other stylish features), rather than details of the real content. If the book has a
weakness from the PR angle, it may lie in its flippancy, and failure to take several green issues
seriously, both of which sometimes enter irritatingly and will turn off some committed greens.
But, by and large, it is a splendidly packaged work; it is what is packaged and what is pushed on
greens that is the trouble.
For a book purportedly on green theory, treatment of greens is extraordinary
condescending. Not much notice is going to be taken of 'what self-styled greens... happen to
believe', 'what positions greens actually do take' (p.vii). (How then does he justify the green
attributions he proceeds to make, e.g. 'green theory of value5? Evidently his procedure is
methodologically unsound). No, it is 'an attempt to saves greens from themselves5 (p.viii). To
rescue them,4to tidy up' their slovenly positions—while throwing away critical features of green
approaches, such as green lifestyles—Goodin is particularly concerned that green lifestyles
should not be seen as part of a rectified green political package. Green lifestyle
recommendations are entirely dispensible (so he and others can look and indeed be green without
deffort, without making any green contribution; they are conveniently absolved from any
relevant action, or lifestyle adjustment).
At one stage Goodin claims that the theory is 'moderately deep'. But elsewhere he has
more accurately said that it is a pale green theory, very pale green given the attitude taken to
green lifestyles. Green Political Theory it may be called: deeper green political theory, at least, it
certainly is not, even genuine green it but dubiously is. However Goodin's aim, he regularly
informs us, is once again not 4to describe what positions greens actually do take5. His project is
a normative one, aimed instead to show what positions greens should take, given their core
concerns... what they have to say given their core values'?. In this attempt he should be seen to
remarks, 'precisely the contrary signal concerning the nature of the author's project in there
behind the Green Man's work*.
7
P. viii - p.vii, itals added.
�4
fail entirely. He is astray not merely on the core concerns of many of them (which concerns are
far from uniform), but also in loosely coupled resultant positions. Greens are under no such
obligations as Goodin would load them with; they are not boxed in as he would suppose.
The approach is not only condescending towards greens; it is a touch arrogant. The aim is
said to be 'to show greens how to cast their position in the strongest possible form\8 This will
turn out to be not a strong theoretical form, by any means, but merely a strong form
pragmatically, given a raft of assumptions about prevailing electoral arrangements, an interests
theory of voting and human behaviour, and so on. According to many a green however, thereby
made are some of the assumptions that have to be turned around if humanly undesirable features
are to be avoided, if social collapse of one sort or another is to be avoided.
At the very outset, Goodin does something to offset such concerns, as those concerning
limits of growth.9 He rolls out a familiar quasi-inductive argument, beloved of economists, that
past predictions of limits have been riotously astray (e.g. Jeavons on coal, Meadows and others
in Limits of Growth on tin). Granted some predictions have, those regularly offered as
illustrations; though others have not, naturally such examples are not emphasized.
Not only is the inductive base for the quasi-inductive argument defective, the argument
itself exhibits some flaws. That it has been claimed before and shown wrong is hardly decisive
evidence that it will not be right a next time. Recall not only the boy who cried "wolf' too often
and was eventually consumed, but also the turkeys who every week approaching Christmas
triumphantly announced that everything was proceeding just fine.
[Simple enumerative
induction is not reliable in such settings.]
On this-here green theory of value.
Much of Goodin's text, that segment that is not pleasant enough "ecopolitical fiir5 (stock
descriptions of ecological problems, green movement and their platforms, and so on), is
occupied in one way or another with what he is pleased call to 'a green theory of value', quickly
to become 'the green theory of value'. Most of the remainder develops from a complementing
4green theory of action5.10 This green theory of value is pushed in a surprisingly deontological
fashion, likely to arouse immediate suspicions: as what greens should adopt and wear, if they
know what is good for them.
A theory of value is just a theory of the good, so it is engagingly asserted at the outset.
Not so, unless the rest
of what is considered to belong to value theory (standing,
8
P.viii.
9
See the beginning of the main text p.l.
10
This theory of value is also presented in a much published paper, 'A green theory of value'. As
to the definite formulation, the green theory, see many places in the text, e.g. p.87.
�5
considerability, worth, rating, and so on) reduces. It does not (and Goodin makes no effort to
effect a reduction).
It will become plain that Goodin is rather good at presenting topics as what they are not.
The practice goes beyond introductory and presentational matters to what is taken to be central,
value theory. 'A theory of value is, quite simply, a theory of the good', so we are engagingly
informed.11 A theory of value is much more comprehensive than a theory of the good (as a
perusal of Austrian value theory will quickly confirm), and does not contract, without extensive
and dubious reductions (there is the 'quite simply5), to a theory of the good. Do not anticipate
then what is promised: a green theory of value. As it turns out, not only are greens short
changed on value, they get a very small serve of theory, and again a very pale green offering at
that.
There are certain peripheral obstacles to this purported green theory of value. In particular,
does it even measure up to admittedly lax standards for a theory as to value? As is readily
ascertained, the "theory” does not even say what a value is like and is, what kind of object, what
identity criteria it satisfies, what postulates it conforms to. Let us call what is presented a
pseudo-theory. Perhaps it can be upgraded to a theory, but requisite work is so far lacking.
Is this "green pseudo-theory" green? This sort of challenge Goodin is aware of and aims
to deflect. Granted the pseudo-theory is admittedly shallow, all politically acceptable theories
have to be, he suggests, for instance to seize wide common ground, etc. But this too is astray,
because of pluralistic alternatives.
According to this green pseudo-theory, not only is naturalness a source of green value,
naturalness is the source of value (i.e. goodness).
How does Goodin arrive at this
identification? By various unsound moves. Most simply, he invalidly concludes, from a
consideration of 'naturalness as a source of (green) value', that it is the source of value.12 Such
an inference from an indefinite to a definite description is invalid unless uniqueness conditions
are independently ensured. Less simply, there is a simplistic derivation of "theories of value"
from the three conventional factors of economic production: land (or resources), labour, and
capital, each of which is schematically linked to corresponding theories of value. No doubt the
land ethic and the labour theory of value just could suggest as much, but it is dubious that
anyone much, green or otherwise disposed, would rest content for long with such a “pure"
theory, as the factors operate together, not separately. Moreover, the economic “derivations" of
these theories should be enough to raise serious green doubts about them.
11
P.19. This claim is also made in several other overlapping Goodin productions.
12
Ibid. p.30.
�6
The core theme resulting from the identification is that natural objects are valuable, i.e.
good, because they are the result of natural processes and not artificial or human ones. What
gives natural objects their value is precisely their naturalness.13
In support of his green theory, Goodin produces a rather nauseating sociological argument,
along the following lines: 'humans' have a deeply felt need to find meaning in their lives, i.e. to
see their lives as set within a larger context with which they can feel linked. Such a context is
provided by nature. In fuller presentation, it is claimed that people want coherence 'between
their inner worlds and the external world'; that 'whatever makes people strive for harmony
within their own lives would also lead them to strive to lead their lives in harmony with the
external world'; and that 'natural processes provide just such a larger context... within which we
can set out our own life plans and projects5.14 The argument is entirely shallow, appealing to
what some humans want (if they do, not even to what might be good for them); it is utterly
instrumental, with nature an instrument for human wants and needs; it is extraordinarily weak,
each step being highly contestable; and it does not lead to the intended conclusion, uniqueness of
naturalness not being shown. Moreover, for what it is worth, the argument also commits the
naturalistic fallacy, purportedly arriving at an identification of value, as what is natural, on the
basis of "natural" human wants and needs.15
Observe that this is Goodin's theory as to green theory, an ultimately shallow theory,
reached in a shallow economic way, defended in a shallow sociological way, hardly likely to be
reflective of deeper green thought. However, it is made to look in some places as if it were
some sort of descriptive account; while at other places it appears as a normative account, as if it
13
find quote
14
Ibid p.3&
15
An identification of that Moorean nonnatural feature as natural furthermore.
It is worth appending a relevant point from Brennan (pp.805-6):
For theorists like Goodin, the status of environmental systems, species and
non-human animals appears to be problematic. Although he regards them as
proivind a large, independent context within which human life makes sense, it
seems that he at the same time regards them as akin to consumer goods, to be
displayed, consumed or prozed according to our informed preferences. For
those influenced by the resource economists, it can be hard to understand the
challenge posed by environmental ethics»>. Once nature is thought of as a
resource, a standing reserve, a set of processes and objects that have the
potential to satisfy human desires, it is easy to think of it as a nothing more
than that. And the challenge posed by any ethic which is properly called
'environmental' is to find a way of articulating the attitude that nature is
indeed a great deal more than that.
�7
were a very reasonable thing for greens to expouse. But really it is of neither sort; it is neither
descriptive of green positions, nor something they should, or would reasonably, adopt; rather it
is a theory foisted on greens. It might be pretended that Goodin has offered a "reconstruction”，
a rational reconstruction even, of green theory; but such a pretence fails as the construction fails,
to meet even basic adequacy conditions, as will appear.
As regards descriptive elements, no solid evidence is assembled that most, or even some,
greens adopt this green theory, with naturalness as the sole source. Indeed Goodin offers no
evidence that any do, and perhaps none of any standing do.16
Furthermore, as but little investigation reveals, there is not a single green "theory" of value,
but various different, sometimes competing, positions.
Nor could a single essence be
satisfactorily distilled from those positions, and even what could be distilled would not resemble
Goodin's construction. For some conspicuous green positions, such as ecofeminism or deep
ecology, would in no way underwrite naturalness as the source of value, or for that matter a
single source of value. More generally, the principles and arguments advanced within green
critiques of reductionist science—including that central lesson of ecology, that meaning is to be
found in connections, in patterns, in relations—similarly militate against any reductionist
grounding of value.
Conveniently Goodin appears to absolve us from more detailed fieldwork on green
positions. His intention, he boldly announces, is to make it clear to greens and others not what
greens in fact think, but what they should think. Indeed he pushes this normative tack to
amazing length; only if greens change in the direction he indicates will they be able to make any
practical difference to public policies! That rash claim has already been resoundingly falsified.
But as regards prescriptive aspects, no intellectually alert greens would adopt Goodin's
theory, either. It is not simply because they have other objectives on their agendas, than directly
influencing party politics. It is because the theory is seriously defective, and open to evident,
damaging objections. So it should not be sought by greens.
A central reason why no aware greens should adopt the theory, and why it should be
rejected is that it is open to a range of fairly decisive counterexamples. There are many natural
items, natural objects or processes, that are not, either on the face of it or after reflection,
valuable, as they are or were or where they are. Much that is natural is at least very problematic,
some is downright bad. A first class of problematic examples, not involving life in a direct way,
16
It is suggested, by Achtenberg, that McKibben may, but a reading of The End of Nature does
not support such a suggestion. As it happens, the situation with McKibben is more than a
little curious. For what McKibben want to insist upon—adopting an inadmissibly high
redefinition of natural—is that realy nothing is natural any more (hence The End) whence
courtesy of Goodin, nothing is valuable any more. But that is not what McKibben wants to
say, or says.
�8
are those occurrences clustered together as natural disasters, catastrophes, and the like. Included
therewith are earthquakes, landslides, soil erosion, meteorite collisions, volcanic eruptions, tidal
waves, cyclones, ice ages, and so on. These examples include dramatic and damaging (natural)
variations in the natural more stable course of events, variations with climatic or geophysical
origins. Consider the devastating Lisbon earthquake of 1775 which so shocked European
intellectuals (and was construed by Voltaire as evidence that Gthe natural world is farm from the
best of all possible). By contrast, Goodin would be obliged to maintain that it was a good event,
because natural (just as good as the new arrival of a passenger pigeon on a splendid autumnal
morning) and presumably not at all shocking because of the natural beneficence of the whole
disaster. No doubt the problems with global warming, ozone depletion, and so forth, that so
exercise Goodin at the outset of his text, are that these are not natural (being induced by human
activity which falls outside what is natural, under one conventional ruling); no doubt these
would be valuable, and unproblematic, processes were they to proceed naturally without human
intervention or assistance. So it was with the volcanic eruptions that demolished the splendid
pink and white terraces and laid waste much beautiful New Zealand forest last century; so it was
with the earlier ice-age which much reduced the richness of New Zealand flora, eliminating 3 of
4 groups of palms; these were good, even admirable, events.
Similar ridiculous outcomes issue when we turn to life (life forms somehow still achieve a
privileged role in Goodin, though they are no more natural). Consider the wide range of
monsters, cripples, sports, freaks, and so on that natural processes, such as birth, regularly
deliver: deformities, malignant mutations, and so on, outcomes that are still generally hidden
away, put out of general sight, or quietly removed, at least in the case of more hideous outputs.
It is very difficult to see that all these objects are good, even just as good as the most splendid
products of nature.17 Roughly Goodin has landed in a similar awkward position to the theist
17
It seems admissible to record that I put several such counterexamples to Goodin well before he
undertook final revision of his working typescript. Here is his response on these and connected
issues (Goodin, personal communication, numbered and reordered with [1] now proceeding [2]):
[1]
[2]
A somatic organism in a natural environment is a (nonmoral) normative system.
Whatever has that much complexity, richness, self-organization, telos has
(presumptively) value.
I think I still incline to say (despite your chastening) that a sponaneous biological
life is always of prima facie value (intrinsic). Though I recognize at once that such
value can sometimes be overridden and become in some environmental contexts a new
disvalue. And here I just hold in abeyance what the overlay of moral agency with the
moral (past biological) life in humans does to the presumption.
�9
who announces that all the natural works of God are good, and is then confronted by awful
work such as monstrosities or catastrophes. He can try, like the theist, to fall back to some
larger valuable setting of which these prima facie nonvaluable components are an integral part; in
Goodin's case there is a wider encompassing theory available, namely evolutionary theory (with
variation required for natural selection).18 But already this means significant qualification and
modification of Goodin's original theory, and shift to a different and so far undeveloped theory.
Better to abandon the original theory, given that superior alternatives are on offer namely
multiple factor theories, with naturalness one factor in the mix.19
There remain many other lesser difficulties for theories like Goodin's which try to reduce
value-making factors to one, such as naturalness (or biological life, richness, or whatever). For
naturalness, difficulties arise with pests and weeds, which may be quite natural objects, but
objects which are located in the wrong places, notably outside their natural range. No doubt
Goodin's theory can be elaborated to take account of such exceptions, but elaborated it needs to
be. Other difficulties arise with natural objects which are in natural places, but which are in
some way out of balance with their natural environment, for instance through excess numbers,
excessive predation (leading to population collapses, etc.). Consider, for example, members of
a natural herd of elephants, grown too large for their natural environment, who become
destroyers, demolishing significant forests in their range. Again this is natural enough in the
circumstances, but the outcomes are certainly not good, nor praiseworthy or the like.
The deficiencies of the approach as offering a “theory” of value are accentuated by the
specific narrow recipe Goodin tries to impose on greens. In particular, it appears to supply only
an on-off qualitative assessment. An item is either good or not according as it is natural, and that
[3]
I will have to interpet monstrosities, mutation, deformities as struggling life,
somehow a necessary part of the process, even though they are in some respects failures.
Anyway, more on that some other time.
[4]
I also hold that (geo) physical nature can sometimes have intrinsic value, so that life,
while sufficient for value prima facie, is not necessary for it.
A few comments:- Paragraph [1] already points to a more satisfactory, sophisticated theory than
greens are saddled with, with a mix of factors (of which naturalness is surely one) yielding
presumptive value. Paragraphs [2] and [3] also indicate elements of a more sensitive theory,
again at substantial odds with that presented in the book. Paragraph [3] suggest the sort of
theological or evolutionary escape discussed in the text below; it does nothing to counter the
counterexamples.
18
Also the theist's problems concerning maximization are perhaps reduced in this setting.
19
See e.g. EE or FF.
�10
is all. But not all items are of the same value, which is all this allows: valuable because natural.
Some, while not being “more natural”，are much more valuable than others. It is well known
that comparative assessments, such as bettemess, and likewise quantitative assessments cannot
be directly defined in terms of mere quantitative assessments, and it is sufficiently appreciated
that a satisfactory axiological theory should account at least for comparative assessments. In this
respect too, Goodin's pseudo-theory falls far short of adequacy. On the other side of the
qualitative divide, even the best art museums and the best painings within them are not valuable,
not good, because not natural. Even if Goodin should say, what his text sometimes suggests,
that his green "theory" applies only to natural objects, artifacts are left out, then the theory is at
best seriously incomplete. Greens will have some more comprehensive theory of value which
covers all items, and integrates a range of assessments of artifacts with natural objects:
naturalness will properly disappear as sole criterion, becoming but one factor.
It is noteworthy that much of the subsequent development of green political theory in
Goodin's text does not depend upon the excessively strong value theory he tries to load upon
greens; it does not require—r always, for that matter, use—naturalness as sole criterion. Much
of what comes later, all that appears right enough, will "go through" will naturalness as a critical
factor. Where appropriate call this the alternate scheme, according to which naturalness is only
one critical, but not always decisive, factor in a mix. The alternate scheme is an integral part of
that different green account alluded to above.
On the touted tightly-integrated Green package, and strong holism.
Certain extraordinarily bold claims are advanced, under the banner of 'a unified moral
vision5 in the chapter advertised as 4the unity of the green programme\ Notably
the green theory of value...[as] elaborated... is what underlies and
unifies the entire green political programme .... It is what makes it
illogical and inconsistent for other, more established parties to try
picking and choosing some bits off that agenda, without accepting all
the rest of its demands as well.20
The claims are never established, would not be established by what is suggested, and indeed
cannot be satisfactorily established, because the claims do not stand up. The arguments outlined
are seriously wanting. Even what is said would make good the claims would not (traces are not
enough for "making good^^); but in any case Goodin does not attempt these things, opting to
proceed 'more impressionistically *.
20
p.87. The same sort of theme is reiterated (with but minor variations) subsequently, e.g. p.92.
Note the ascent from an everyday theory of the good to a unified moral vision.
�11
Even impressionistically little works satisfactorily. For 'the green theory of value' of
Goodin is not 'uniquely able to account for the coherence of the green public-policy
proposals\2122Apart from the critical features, to be considered below,
that green proposals do not enjoy the sort of coherence alleged, and that
established parties can, and do, pick over green programs selectively,
the uniqueness claim, the special position of Goodin's theory, is quietly dropped in the
impressionistic "argument". All that is used is the alternate scheme, that a concern for nature
informs, directly or indirectly, all the connected 'plants in the green programme'.22
Evidently a variety of concerns for nature can motivate and justify attitudes and procedures
regarding pollution, waste, environmental destruction, and so forth. Uniqueness lapses.
Worse, the more remote, less directly environmental parts of the green agenda do not fall out
eith of Goodin's theory or from the alternate scheme. In a note, Goodin concedes as much; but
these (decentralization, grass roots democracy, nonviolence, and much else) derive so he
claims, from the subsidiary, but logically separate, green theory of agency.23 Whether they do
so derive or not (they do not), they do not derive indirectly from a green theory of value,
because of the separation of agency from value. For similar reasons, the "integrated" green
programme (outlined in an Appendix) begins to unravel.
All that Goodin tries to make out, then only suggestively, is that the alternative scheme
helps in explaining certain green attitudes that appear anomalous or otherwise problematic.
Even should this exercise succeed (and its success is at best mixed), it would not achieve what
is required.
Interestingly, the Appendix, 'The Green Political Programme5—far from demonstrating
that the narrow green theory of value runs through all green policy, not just the overly
'environmental5 parts—helps in revealing what a patchwork the presented programme is really,
a patchwork from which separate patches can be unsewn. A basic problem with the whole
approach is this: that there is not a single green program, different green groups have different
programms. Witness the many internal disputes, the very public conflicts between social and
deep ecology, between animal liberationists and nature greens, between luddites and smart new-
age technologists, between spiritual and secular greens, and son. Granted various loose
conalitions may be stitched together; but they are various, not unique, and the stitching is very
loose, and may easily be undone, for different repackaging. In short, there are many green
packages, corresponding to different green theories of value and agency and so on. As there is
21
Ibid p.87.
22
Ibid. p.87. Goodin himself slides back to the indefinite, to a green theory of value, e.g. p.88.
23
Note & p.8&
�12
no single green theory, so there is no such tightly unified single package, which is what
empirical evidence also seems to show. Moreover, established parties have drawn very
selectively upon these sorts of packages, and filched elements selectively. Witness the fate of
the early Values party in New Zealand.
'The prima facie wrongness of ... piecemeal borrowing from the greens is easily
explicated. It derives straight forwardly from the logic of consistency. It would be simply
wrong to embrace a theory of value... for some purposes while shunning it for others. The
truth status of value theories just does not flicker on and off like that/2425Embedded therein, in
this strong holism, is one basic confusion that pervades the book, a confusion between a theory
and what derives from it, between a source and its outputs. Nothing in logic stops selective
borrowing from what derives from a program, however tightly integrated. Strong holism is far
too strong; it would imply that we cannot adopt, or even toy with, one part of some value
theory, or ethical theory on Goodin's account of the matter, without embracing the lot. We
cannot accept some on Moore's claims, some of Spinoza's analyses, part of Aristotle without
being stuck with the whole. Eclecticism, at least as regards a theory of value, is impossible.
Which is absurd, and a reductio thereto of a seriously defective argument.
The conclusion has to be that yet another of Goodin's main themes is seriously astray and
should be rejected: that 'greens make (radical) demands on an all-or-nothing basis525, that
greens 'might reasonably demand that we implement their political program on an all-or-nothing
basis5.26
On the misadvertised green theory of agency: green collective organization・
The title 'The Green Theory of Agency5 is something of a misnomer. Most of the chapter
consemed (chapter 4) is taken up with what is inaccurately headed 'Principles of green political
structures*, which treats not agency but certain elements of macro-political organisation,
notably decentralization and policy coordination (itself headed, misleadingly, 'think globally, act
locally5). Most of the remainder of the chapter is occupied with what is headed, generally,
'Principles of green political action', but reduces to 'democratic participation5 and
'nonviolence5, and with 'Principles of green party organisation', cut down to 'grassroots
democracy5 and 'nrotation in office*, both something of travesties, given the indicated sweep
and generality.
The theory of "agency" is itself rather a part of a theory of collective action. Virtually
nothing on agency in the usual sense of individual action theory enters, except a footnote
24
p.92, partly reiterating the integrated package theme.
25
p.168? [check, locate]
26
Back cover.
�13
referring to some work on the topic, and no theory at all of green individual agents (their
lifestyles, etc.). The relevant part of collective action theory looks not so much at the roles of
operative agents and their individual instrumentality, as at the character and corodinating
mechanisms of collective action, namely that needed or designed to realize green values. And
really, what is considered is green collective organization, which comprises not only action and
practices, but also associated political procedures and structures. Into this expanded account,
furthermore, some large assumptions are written, assumptions not accepted by many greens:
roughly, reduction of the political to the collective, and of the collective to aggregated
individuals, i.e. themes of individualism.2728These reductive assumptions, which are inserted
and infiltrated unargued, come to matter in the material on policy coordination, which adopts a
standard game-theory approach drawn from the received reductive theory of collective action, a
theory unlikely to gain much green applause, for all its academic fashionability.
The case for green engagement in coalitions is less straightforward than depicted. No
doubt greens who opt for this course of action—what Goodin tries to insist upon, involvement
in the politics of the established system—do not then have the option of spuming power-sharing
opportunities when those opportunities present themselves. Our guide is, however, too
optimistic about how often such opportunies are like to occur, and too sanguine about how they
are likely to operate to green advantage. For one thing, greens are not the only political forces
within conventional politics who have a theory of value. Furthermore, just as greens seeking to
enter into a coalition with a party of the electoral left (at present the only plausible option) must
look askance at the likely ttincohe^ence^^ of the compromise reached, so too must the other
coalescing party. If, under such circumstances, 'the blame for the logical incoherence would lie
with the parties that insisted on adulterating the green programme528, so too, from the
perspective of the party of the left, must *the blame for the logical incoherence lie with the
greens who insisted on adulterating the pink programme'. It should come as little surprise then,
that the evidence suggests that parties of the moderate left are every bit as reluctant to enter into
coalitions with the greens as the greens are with them.29
Green agents: their lifestyles, their commitments, their changed consciousness.
These matters feature large in American deep ecology; they are neglected or dismissed in
Goodin. His rejection of green personal lifestyles is indicative, in these terms, of personal
green consciousness and commitment, and of but subdued or diminished green values. It seems
fair to remark that only weak environmental commitments are displayed in the book (however
27
See e.g. p.l 14 top.
28
To cite Goodin p.179.
29
Hay op.cit., where various examples confirming the final claim are assembled.
�14
even weak commitments, typical of much academic literature, are better than none, typical of
former academic literature); or, more provocatively, to infer that Goodin has not really absorbed
genuine green values (else he would act personally). What does come through from the book is
that Goodin remains something of an outsider to green activism. That he is not together at the
cutting edge of things green is betrayed by occasional telling slips, as with what greens worry
about in different places (esp. pp. 180-1). It is not that what he asserts is wrong; it is that
emphases and contrasts are different.
Reasons offered for rejection of green lifestyles are, where clear, extraordinarily weak.
Consider what is offered:
• living too close to nature, too much in harmony with it, might cause it to lose its valued role
for us30一which is (remember) to provide us with a larger context in which we can see our lives
as being set! Test the force of the argument by comparing living in the vicinity of other valued
items: worthy lives, art, music, intellectual accomplishments. Moreover, there are counter
arguments and considerations: that closeness brings respect and awe, and can enhance
appreciation of value. Consider the idea of Christians distancing themselves from Cathedrals
and Churches, ritual and practice.
• to achieve political change, greens should make every effort to minimise the perceived distance
between themselves and the “orthodox” community一whereas the association of 'alternative
lifestyling5 with 'green' has exactly the opposite effect. Such a claim reveals much as regards
subcontests, such as: claimants commitments and seriousness, type and extent of change
envisaged, and so on. Christians, feminists, revolutionaries and others would not be too
impressed. As in other reaches where orthodoxy may be morally or otherwise amiss, so with
regard to green lifestyles: There is a case for a politics of “exemplary practice”； for whilst some
people will treat those who so engage as objects of scorn and ridicule, it is evident that many
people have been recruited to green values through positive contact with experiments in "right
living”，or with elements of green lifestyles. It is important too that at least some people
endeavour to demonstrate how green principles might be put into practice at the level of daily
living.
• Bizarre examples, selective unfavourable examples, advanced under the heading 'green
heresies5.31 Granted 'some of this “exemplary practice” might be so outlandish that it reflects
negatively on larger green projects. But the influence of this can be overstated; this sort of game
can be played with many things that have features to recommend parts of them. After all, every
social movement and every tradition of political philosophy, has its fringe-dwellers, even its
30
Thus p.81ff.
31
pp.78-81.
�15
practitioners of a particular reductio ad absurdum extracted from a larger coherency.32
• local lifestyle set the focus astray. It should be on grander issues, on global environmental
problems, fate of earth, etc. But plainly more regional and local problems also matter, esp. for
preservation of habitats, creatures, etc. And here personal and local things can be very
important.
Finally, there are other reasons for green lifestyles. For example, for the structural
changes necessary for environmentally satisfactory societies of one sort or another, something
like internalization of green values and adoption of a green lifestyle proves highly advantageous.
To this end and others, committed green subcultures and inspiring individual examples are
extremely valuable.
APPENDIX: a defective setting.
Many productions that may look new and interesting in fact prove conservative, brushing
off and wheeling out old ideas as if they would accomplish all requisite work. That is, it is
implicitly claimed, under conservative approaches, that prevailing paradigms offer all necessary
resources for capturing what has (wrongly) been presented as radically new.33 In environmental
philosophy a classical exercise of this sort, well received by an environmentally conservative or
reactionary establishment, was Passmore's text. Passmore's (and was followed, in a slightly
expanded and apparently more liberal setting by Attfield, in a series of broadly consequentialist
productions. Now the exercise repeated in environmental political theory by Goodin, who
simply imports utilitarianism as supplying a unique and unquestionable rationality, in place of
Passmore's vague utilitarianism of humans interests.
It does not bode well for a genuinely green theory that its presentation lies virtually entirely
within a shallow utilitarian setting, the setting of the dominant economic and public policy
paradigm. For just such a setting is what has assisted significantly in getting the Earth into the
present environmental mess. Consider what Goodin tries to insist upon in his section (s.1.3) on
the arguments (and also elsewhere):- He assumes, in so trying to preempt the range of
arguments, both that
—the case for environmental protection has to be made in utilitarian terms if it is to prove
effective
—the most telling arguments concern the ways environmental protection measures are required
to further human interests (and intertwined items: people, profits, property, resources, etc.).
It is worth commencing erosion of these commonplace assumptions immediately. As for what
arguments "work”，are telling or effective, that depends heavily on the context, who is engaged
32
This paragraph borrows heavily from Hay.
33
Brennan's third reductive trend(p.800.
�16
in a dialogue, and so on. Those with deep green sympathies are not going to be vastly
impressed by a sheaf of utilitarian and human interests (first and only) arguments, any more than
by other privileged class arguments. Goodin seems to have rather assumed that, in effect, we
are always paired with our political masters, who are and will remain shallow utilitarians. Even
now this is by no means uniformly so, and there are grounds for hope that things could be much
ameliorated in the future. Accordingly there is little reason to accept Goodin's further excessive
claim that the 'essence' of the arguments (all satisfactory arguments he really wants to have us
concede) remains the same: 'inadequate protection of the human environment, seriously
compromised human interests\34
Pretty much the same problematic ethos is likewise taken for granted for proposed
remedies: a standard economic public policy framework, with the essence of the remedy
consisting in correcting market failure. From deeper green perspectives this is extraordinarily
tired stuff, with "remedies" that have been tried and tried and continue to fail.
As part of his case, he tries the stock shallow strategy of rubbishing the idea of admitting
interests beyond humans (to grant animals interests is hardly to ''widen'' or ttextend^^ interests).
The arguments are all very cheap, and the counter-case is not properly addressed. Regrettably, a
shallow utilitarianism raises its ugly head all over the place. A few examples: 'it is more
important that the right things be done than that they be done in any particular way or through
any particular agency * (p.120). But it is unnecessary to document utilitarian imput as Goodin
himself has provided it in susequent work.
A main orientation of Goodin's work一which help explain several of its features一 is
towards policy-makers or would-be policy-makers. Among such audiences utilitarian and
economic rationales contue to be greeted enthusistically. For one reason, such rationales seem
made to order when policy makers, or "bureaucratic rationality,5, require 'a means of justifying
decisions that may be unpopular with large members of people5. For through these rationales
they have seemed
able to give principled reasons for action. The policy-maker can claim
to have weighed up all the relevant considerations for and against a
course of action; each consideration was in some way commensurable
with every other—perhaps because each had a dollar value associated
with it—and so it was possible to reach a determinate conclusion, by
fair and objective means. The appearance of determinacy, fairness and
objectivity is an important tool for those who wield and manipulate
power in business, government, and even universities. But this
rationalizing use of economic approaches should be resisted by
everyone, including economists themselves.35
34
Ibid p.8 (check).
35
Brennan p.807.
�17
The reasons are now entirely familiar ones.
References
Achtenberg, W., Review of Goodin, Environmental Values, (1994).
Foucault, M., 'What is Enlightenment5
Goodin, R., Green political Theory, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1992.
Habermus, J., 'Modernity—an incomplete project*, in Postmodern Culture (ed. H. Foster),
Pluto Press, London, 1987.
Hay, P., Review of Goodin typescript, University of Tasmania, 1994.
McGowan, J., Postmodernism and Its Critics, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 199x.
Osborne, P, 'Modernity is a qualitative, not a stromological, category: notes on the dialectics of
differential historical time', in Postmodernism and the re-reading of modernity (ed. F. Barker
and others) Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1991/2.
Priest, G., 'On alternative geometries, arithmetics, and logics; a tribute to Lukasiewicz5,
typsescript, 1996.
Routley, R. and V., “Human chauvinism and environmental ethics' referred to as EE
Routley, R. and V., The Fight for the Forests，referred to as FF.
�
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13.6.96
GREEN POLITICAL THEORY:
a different account
Green political theory is divided according to one of our guides1, rather like Gaul
according to Caesar, into three parts:
—a green theory of value,
—a subordinate green theory of agency, and
—a green lifestyle program, portrayed as a set of altogether dispensible lifestyle
recommendations.
While it is the high-handed insistent dismissal of green lifestyles by this guide, Goodin, that has
captured the attention of critics and been highlighted, the brash partitioning of green political
theory, and the surreptitious dismissal therewith of significant parts of it, should not pass
unnoticed. To the contrary, virtually the whole of what political theory is taken to treat comes up
for reassessment once green lights are played upon it, certainly under deeper green illumination.
That bogus exhaustiveness taken for granted, that all there is to it amounts to value and action,
no doubt derives largely from an underlying utilitarianism, according to which other theoretical
matters can be subsumed under these.2
In short, partly through dispensing with lifestyle considerations, primarily by virtue of a
background utilitarianism operating within a conventional state-setting, Goodin can suppose that
green political theory reduces to these two parts: a theory of value and a subordinate theory of
agency. Such a reduction is however much too simple, leaving out, as it does, much of ethics of
political relevance, as well as a large slab of politics. For example, ethical omissions include the
fields of deontology (environmental permissions, prescriptives, directives; environmental
justice, rights and so on), of virtue theory, and of accountability. Among political omissions
most striking is the absence of any due consideration of institutional and ideological alternatives
to what now prevails. Prevailing Western political arrangements—with staged elections, urban
bureaucratic control, incremental reformism (often environmentally regressive), and so on—are
simply taken for granted. Above all, there is no critique of the state, an increasingly important
part of radical green politics. One reason for this gross omission— f radical green theory from
what is presented as green political theory—is that Goodin does not question the conventional
political assumption that the appropriate objective of green political activity consists in gaining
power or influence within established statist arrangements, for example at best through electoral
1
R. Goodin Green Political Theory, Polity Press, Cambridge 1992. This was undoubtedly a book
worth criticizing.
2
See the appendix.
2
success enabling control of some of the administrative and executive functions of state (we shall
encounter this conventional “political realism^^ again later). However significant strands of
green political theory no longer accept this assumption. A related reason, reaching deeper, is
that Goodin likewise does not question, as strands of green theory now do, what helps
undergird the conventional political assumption and reformist utilitarianism, an Enlightenment
ideology with its faith in reason and science, technologically-based progress, overall human
goodness and dominance, and so on.3
The bold overstatement of claims, along with misrepresentation as to what green political
theory comprises, is symptomatic of much of the book: overstatement and undersubstantiation.4
Virtually all main themes of the book are false, indeed rather patently so once exhibited
unadorned, because limited truths are overextended; and they are undersupplied with cogent
support. So it is with the green theory of value, which inflates what is a significant factor in
green evaluation into the supposed total green theory. So it is with the green package, which is
presented as having an absolutely tight integration, which it in fact lacks. And so on, as will
appear. Not only are main themes seriously defective; more disappointing, a salvage operation
will not yield a lode of green gold.
As troubling is the anti-subversive character of the work. Goodin has wheeled another
Trojan horse into green territory, a horse bringing a number of anti-green academic warriors
armed with anti-green ideas and sentiments, and engaged in and advocating anti-green lifestyles,
(as will emerge).5 Of course, 'Green political theory' is a clever title, which is complemented by
a politically clever introduction on the crises which are not minimized or marginalised but given
considerable weight—all of which suggest that the text might be of much more interest to
politically inclined greens than the usual academic fare. But the title does not say how the green
theory is to be treated, explained and encouraged, exposed and condemned. Neither really. The
text is not written for greens (though the publishers obviously hope they may buy it,6 or be
3
For an exposition and criticism of Enlightenment Ideology, see Sylvan TM.
4
In part because these sorts of deficiencies have not been addressed in reviews of the book, I
decided to persevere with this less charitable critique (a tiresome exercise bound to alienate).
Regrettably most of the reviews appear to derive from a political science orientation. They trip
lightly by philosophical fundamentals, where the book is noticeably weak, and vulnerable.
And they tend to be very light on argument.
5
Trojan horses are in extensive use by academics, particularly in green regions. We will
encounter a number of these horses. They are evident from sociology to biogeography and
climatology, and particularly prominent around economic enslaves.
6
They form part of the intended audience for the book according to accompanying publishers'
work and flyers. Indeed the publishers have participated in the deception, supplying a cover
featuring a boss of the Green Man from the cloisters of Norwich cathedral, which sends, as they
3
tricked into buying it), but for a cohert of academic colleagues—for colleagues who form part of
the prevailing system, of politics-more-or-less-as-usual and so on.
Deapite its character, there are several useful and attractive features of Goodin's book,
which do make it worthwhile reading for awake greens of theoretical bent (one of these features
is an Appendix, putting together succinctly a green political program). It is a smoothly written
book, encouraging readers to glide along, glossing over the underlying content and messages,
and not grasping the enormity of some of what is presented, for instance even as green gospel.
It may be just the style that is attractive (the cut of the book, the easy flow, an appealingly simple
structure, and other stylish features), rather than details of the real content. If the book has a
weakness from the PR angle, it may lie in its flippancy, and failure to take several green issues
seriously, both of which sometimes enter irritatingly and will turn off some committed greens.
But, by and large, it is a splendidly packaged work; it is what is packaged and what is pushed on
greens that is the trouble.
For a book purportedly on green theory, treatment of greens is extraordinary
condescending. Not much notice is going to be taken of 'what self-styled greens... happen to
believe', 'what positions greens actually do take' (p.vii). (How then does he justify the green
attributions he proceeds to make, e.g. 'green theory of value5? Evidently his procedure is
methodologically unsound). No, it is 'an attempt to saves greens from themselves5 (p.viii). To
rescue them,4to tidy up' their slovenly positions—while throwing away critical features of green
approaches, such as green lifestyles—Goodin is particularly concerned that green lifestyles
should not be seen as part of a rectified green political package. Green lifestyle
recommendations are entirely dispensible (so he and others can look and indeed be green without
deffort, without making any green contribution; they are conveniently absolved from any
relevant action, or lifestyle adjustment).
At one stage Goodin claims that the theory is 'moderately deep'. But elsewhere he has
more accurately said that it is a pale green theory, very pale green given the attitude taken to
green lifestyles. Green Political Theory it may be called: deeper green political theory, at least, it
certainly is not, even genuine green it but dubiously is. However Goodin's aim, he regularly
informs us, is once again not 4to describe what positions greens actually do take5. His project is
a normative one, aimed instead to show what positions greens should take, given their core
concerns... what they have to say given their core values'?. In this attempt he should be seen to
remarks, 'precisely the contrary signal concerning the nature of the author's project in there
behind the Green Man's work*.
7
P. viii - p.vii, itals added.
4
fail entirely. He is astray not merely on the core concerns of many of them (which concerns are
far from uniform), but also in loosely coupled resultant positions. Greens are under no such
obligations as Goodin would load them with; they are not boxed in as he would suppose.
The approach is not only condescending towards greens; it is a touch arrogant. The aim is
said to be 'to show greens how to cast their position in the strongest possible form\8 This will
turn out to be not a strong theoretical form, by any means, but merely a strong form
pragmatically, given a raft of assumptions about prevailing electoral arrangements, an interests
theory of voting and human behaviour, and so on. According to many a green however, thereby
made are some of the assumptions that have to be turned around if humanly undesirable features
are to be avoided, if social collapse of one sort or another is to be avoided.
At the very outset, Goodin does something to offset such concerns, as those concerning
limits of growth.9 He rolls out a familiar quasi-inductive argument, beloved of economists, that
past predictions of limits have been riotously astray (e.g. Jeavons on coal, Meadows and others
in Limits of Growth on tin). Granted some predictions have, those regularly offered as
illustrations; though others have not, naturally such examples are not emphasized.
Not only is the inductive base for the quasi-inductive argument defective, the argument
itself exhibits some flaws. That it has been claimed before and shown wrong is hardly decisive
evidence that it will not be right a next time. Recall not only the boy who cried "wolf' too often
and was eventually consumed, but also the turkeys who every week approaching Christmas
triumphantly announced that everything was proceeding just fine.
[Simple enumerative
induction is not reliable in such settings.]
On this-here green theory of value.
Much of Goodin's text, that segment that is not pleasant enough "ecopolitical fiir5 (stock
descriptions of ecological problems, green movement and their platforms, and so on), is
occupied in one way or another with what he is pleased call to 'a green theory of value', quickly
to become 'the green theory of value'. Most of the remainder develops from a complementing
4green theory of action5.10 This green theory of value is pushed in a surprisingly deontological
fashion, likely to arouse immediate suspicions: as what greens should adopt and wear, if they
know what is good for them.
A theory of value is just a theory of the good, so it is engagingly asserted at the outset.
Not so, unless the rest
of what is considered to belong to value theory (standing,
8
P.viii.
9
See the beginning of the main text p.l.
10
This theory of value is also presented in a much published paper, 'A green theory of value'. As
to the definite formulation, the green theory, see many places in the text, e.g. p.87.
5
considerability, worth, rating, and so on) reduces. It does not (and Goodin makes no effort to
effect a reduction).
It will become plain that Goodin is rather good at presenting topics as what they are not.
The practice goes beyond introductory and presentational matters to what is taken to be central,
value theory. 'A theory of value is, quite simply, a theory of the good', so we are engagingly
informed.11 A theory of value is much more comprehensive than a theory of the good (as a
perusal of Austrian value theory will quickly confirm), and does not contract, without extensive
and dubious reductions (there is the 'quite simply5), to a theory of the good. Do not anticipate
then what is promised: a green theory of value. As it turns out, not only are greens short
changed on value, they get a very small serve of theory, and again a very pale green offering at
that.
There are certain peripheral obstacles to this purported green theory of value. In particular,
does it even measure up to admittedly lax standards for a theory as to value? As is readily
ascertained, the "theory” does not even say what a value is like and is, what kind of object, what
identity criteria it satisfies, what postulates it conforms to. Let us call what is presented a
pseudo-theory. Perhaps it can be upgraded to a theory, but requisite work is so far lacking.
Is this "green pseudo-theory" green? This sort of challenge Goodin is aware of and aims
to deflect. Granted the pseudo-theory is admittedly shallow, all politically acceptable theories
have to be, he suggests, for instance to seize wide common ground, etc. But this too is astray,
because of pluralistic alternatives.
According to this green pseudo-theory, not only is naturalness a source of green value,
naturalness is the source of value (i.e. goodness).
How does Goodin arrive at this
identification? By various unsound moves. Most simply, he invalidly concludes, from a
consideration of 'naturalness as a source of (green) value', that it is the source of value.12 Such
an inference from an indefinite to a definite description is invalid unless uniqueness conditions
are independently ensured. Less simply, there is a simplistic derivation of "theories of value"
from the three conventional factors of economic production: land (or resources), labour, and
capital, each of which is schematically linked to corresponding theories of value. No doubt the
land ethic and the labour theory of value just could suggest as much, but it is dubious that
anyone much, green or otherwise disposed, would rest content for long with such a “pure"
theory, as the factors operate together, not separately. Moreover, the economic “derivations" of
these theories should be enough to raise serious green doubts about them.
11
P.19. This claim is also made in several other overlapping Goodin productions.
12
Ibid. p.30.
6
The core theme resulting from the identification is that natural objects are valuable, i.e.
good, because they are the result of natural processes and not artificial or human ones. What
gives natural objects their value is precisely their naturalness.13
In support of his green theory, Goodin produces a rather nauseating sociological argument,
along the following lines: 'humans' have a deeply felt need to find meaning in their lives, i.e. to
see their lives as set within a larger context with which they can feel linked. Such a context is
provided by nature. In fuller presentation, it is claimed that people want coherence 'between
their inner worlds and the external world'; that 'whatever makes people strive for harmony
within their own lives would also lead them to strive to lead their lives in harmony with the
external world'; and that 'natural processes provide just such a larger context... within which we
can set out our own life plans and projects5.14 The argument is entirely shallow, appealing to
what some humans want (if they do, not even to what might be good for them); it is utterly
instrumental, with nature an instrument for human wants and needs; it is extraordinarily weak,
each step being highly contestable; and it does not lead to the intended conclusion, uniqueness of
naturalness not being shown. Moreover, for what it is worth, the argument also commits the
naturalistic fallacy, purportedly arriving at an identification of value, as what is natural, on the
basis of "natural" human wants and needs.15
Observe that this is Goodin's theory as to green theory, an ultimately shallow theory,
reached in a shallow economic way, defended in a shallow sociological way, hardly likely to be
reflective of deeper green thought. However, it is made to look in some places as if it were
some sort of descriptive account; while at other places it appears as a normative account, as if it
13
find quote
14
Ibid p.3&
15
An identification of that Moorean nonnatural feature as natural furthermore.
It is worth appending a relevant point from Brennan (pp.805-6):
For theorists like Goodin, the status of environmental systems, species and
non-human animals appears to be problematic. Although he regards them as
proivind a large, independent context within which human life makes sense, it
seems that he at the same time regards them as akin to consumer goods, to be
displayed, consumed or prozed according to our informed preferences. For
those influenced by the resource economists, it can be hard to understand the
challenge posed by environmental ethics»>. Once nature is thought of as a
resource, a standing reserve, a set of processes and objects that have the
potential to satisfy human desires, it is easy to think of it as a nothing more
than that. And the challenge posed by any ethic which is properly called
'environmental' is to find a way of articulating the attitude that nature is
indeed a great deal more than that.
7
were a very reasonable thing for greens to expouse. But really it is of neither sort; it is neither
descriptive of green positions, nor something they should, or would reasonably, adopt; rather it
is a theory foisted on greens. It might be pretended that Goodin has offered a "reconstruction”，
a rational reconstruction even, of green theory; but such a pretence fails as the construction fails,
to meet even basic adequacy conditions, as will appear.
As regards descriptive elements, no solid evidence is assembled that most, or even some,
greens adopt this green theory, with naturalness as the sole source. Indeed Goodin offers no
evidence that any do, and perhaps none of any standing do.16
Furthermore, as but little investigation reveals, there is not a single green "theory" of value,
but various different, sometimes competing, positions.
Nor could a single essence be
satisfactorily distilled from those positions, and even what could be distilled would not resemble
Goodin's construction. For some conspicuous green positions, such as ecofeminism or deep
ecology, would in no way underwrite naturalness as the source of value, or for that matter a
single source of value. More generally, the principles and arguments advanced within green
critiques of reductionist science—including that central lesson of ecology, that meaning is to be
found in connections, in patterns, in relations—similarly militate against any reductionist
grounding of value.
Conveniently Goodin appears to absolve us from more detailed fieldwork on green
positions. His intention, he boldly announces, is to make it clear to greens and others not what
greens in fact think, but what they should think. Indeed he pushes this normative tack to
amazing length; only if greens change in the direction he indicates will they be able to make any
practical difference to public policies! That rash claim has already been resoundingly falsified.
But as regards prescriptive aspects, no intellectually alert greens would adopt Goodin's
theory, either. It is not simply because they have other objectives on their agendas, than directly
influencing party politics. It is because the theory is seriously defective, and open to evident,
damaging objections. So it should not be sought by greens.
A central reason why no aware greens should adopt the theory, and why it should be
rejected is that it is open to a range of fairly decisive counterexamples. There are many natural
items, natural objects or processes, that are not, either on the face of it or after reflection,
valuable, as they are or were or where they are. Much that is natural is at least very problematic,
some is downright bad. A first class of problematic examples, not involving life in a direct way,
16
It is suggested, by Achtenberg, that McKibben may, but a reading of The End of Nature does
not support such a suggestion. As it happens, the situation with McKibben is more than a
little curious. For what McKibben want to insist upon—adopting an inadmissibly high
redefinition of natural—is that realy nothing is natural any more (hence The End) whence
courtesy of Goodin, nothing is valuable any more. But that is not what McKibben wants to
say, or says.
8
are those occurrences clustered together as natural disasters, catastrophes, and the like. Included
therewith are earthquakes, landslides, soil erosion, meteorite collisions, volcanic eruptions, tidal
waves, cyclones, ice ages, and so on. These examples include dramatic and damaging (natural)
variations in the natural more stable course of events, variations with climatic or geophysical
origins. Consider the devastating Lisbon earthquake of 1775 which so shocked European
intellectuals (and was construed by Voltaire as evidence that Gthe natural world is farm from the
best of all possible). By contrast, Goodin would be obliged to maintain that it was a good event,
because natural (just as good as the new arrival of a passenger pigeon on a splendid autumnal
morning) and presumably not at all shocking because of the natural beneficence of the whole
disaster. No doubt the problems with global warming, ozone depletion, and so forth, that so
exercise Goodin at the outset of his text, are that these are not natural (being induced by human
activity which falls outside what is natural, under one conventional ruling); no doubt these
would be valuable, and unproblematic, processes were they to proceed naturally without human
intervention or assistance. So it was with the volcanic eruptions that demolished the splendid
pink and white terraces and laid waste much beautiful New Zealand forest last century; so it was
with the earlier ice-age which much reduced the richness of New Zealand flora, eliminating 3 of
4 groups of palms; these were good, even admirable, events.
Similar ridiculous outcomes issue when we turn to life (life forms somehow still achieve a
privileged role in Goodin, though they are no more natural). Consider the wide range of
monsters, cripples, sports, freaks, and so on that natural processes, such as birth, regularly
deliver: deformities, malignant mutations, and so on, outcomes that are still generally hidden
away, put out of general sight, or quietly removed, at least in the case of more hideous outputs.
It is very difficult to see that all these objects are good, even just as good as the most splendid
products of nature.17 Roughly Goodin has landed in a similar awkward position to the theist
17
It seems admissible to record that I put several such counterexamples to Goodin well before he
undertook final revision of his working typescript. Here is his response on these and connected
issues (Goodin, personal communication, numbered and reordered with [1] now proceeding [2]):
[1]
[2]
A somatic organism in a natural environment is a (nonmoral) normative system.
Whatever has that much complexity, richness, self-organization, telos has
(presumptively) value.
I think I still incline to say (despite your chastening) that a sponaneous biological
life is always of prima facie value (intrinsic). Though I recognize at once that such
value can sometimes be overridden and become in some environmental contexts a new
disvalue. And here I just hold in abeyance what the overlay of moral agency with the
moral (past biological) life in humans does to the presumption.
9
who announces that all the natural works of God are good, and is then confronted by awful
work such as monstrosities or catastrophes. He can try, like the theist, to fall back to some
larger valuable setting of which these prima facie nonvaluable components are an integral part; in
Goodin's case there is a wider encompassing theory available, namely evolutionary theory (with
variation required for natural selection).18 But already this means significant qualification and
modification of Goodin's original theory, and shift to a different and so far undeveloped theory.
Better to abandon the original theory, given that superior alternatives are on offer namely
multiple factor theories, with naturalness one factor in the mix.19
There remain many other lesser difficulties for theories like Goodin's which try to reduce
value-making factors to one, such as naturalness (or biological life, richness, or whatever). For
naturalness, difficulties arise with pests and weeds, which may be quite natural objects, but
objects which are located in the wrong places, notably outside their natural range. No doubt
Goodin's theory can be elaborated to take account of such exceptions, but elaborated it needs to
be. Other difficulties arise with natural objects which are in natural places, but which are in
some way out of balance with their natural environment, for instance through excess numbers,
excessive predation (leading to population collapses, etc.). Consider, for example, members of
a natural herd of elephants, grown too large for their natural environment, who become
destroyers, demolishing significant forests in their range. Again this is natural enough in the
circumstances, but the outcomes are certainly not good, nor praiseworthy or the like.
The deficiencies of the approach as offering a “theory” of value are accentuated by the
specific narrow recipe Goodin tries to impose on greens. In particular, it appears to supply only
an on-off qualitative assessment. An item is either good or not according as it is natural, and that
[3]
I will have to interpet monstrosities, mutation, deformities as struggling life,
somehow a necessary part of the process, even though they are in some respects failures.
Anyway, more on that some other time.
[4]
I also hold that (geo) physical nature can sometimes have intrinsic value, so that life,
while sufficient for value prima facie, is not necessary for it.
A few comments:- Paragraph [1] already points to a more satisfactory, sophisticated theory than
greens are saddled with, with a mix of factors (of which naturalness is surely one) yielding
presumptive value. Paragraphs [2] and [3] also indicate elements of a more sensitive theory,
again at substantial odds with that presented in the book. Paragraph [3] suggest the sort of
theological or evolutionary escape discussed in the text below; it does nothing to counter the
counterexamples.
18
Also the theist's problems concerning maximization are perhaps reduced in this setting.
19
See e.g. EE or FF.
10
is all. But not all items are of the same value, which is all this allows: valuable because natural.
Some, while not being “more natural”，are much more valuable than others. It is well known
that comparative assessments, such as bettemess, and likewise quantitative assessments cannot
be directly defined in terms of mere quantitative assessments, and it is sufficiently appreciated
that a satisfactory axiological theory should account at least for comparative assessments. In this
respect too, Goodin's pseudo-theory falls far short of adequacy. On the other side of the
qualitative divide, even the best art museums and the best painings within them are not valuable,
not good, because not natural. Even if Goodin should say, what his text sometimes suggests,
that his green "theory" applies only to natural objects, artifacts are left out, then the theory is at
best seriously incomplete. Greens will have some more comprehensive theory of value which
covers all items, and integrates a range of assessments of artifacts with natural objects:
naturalness will properly disappear as sole criterion, becoming but one factor.
It is noteworthy that much of the subsequent development of green political theory in
Goodin's text does not depend upon the excessively strong value theory he tries to load upon
greens; it does not require—r always, for that matter, use—naturalness as sole criterion. Much
of what comes later, all that appears right enough, will "go through" will naturalness as a critical
factor. Where appropriate call this the alternate scheme, according to which naturalness is only
one critical, but not always decisive, factor in a mix. The alternate scheme is an integral part of
that different green account alluded to above.
On the touted tightly-integrated Green package, and strong holism.
Certain extraordinarily bold claims are advanced, under the banner of 'a unified moral
vision5 in the chapter advertised as 4the unity of the green programme\ Notably
the green theory of value...[as] elaborated... is what underlies and
unifies the entire green political programme .... It is what makes it
illogical and inconsistent for other, more established parties to try
picking and choosing some bits off that agenda, without accepting all
the rest of its demands as well.20
The claims are never established, would not be established by what is suggested, and indeed
cannot be satisfactorily established, because the claims do not stand up. The arguments outlined
are seriously wanting. Even what is said would make good the claims would not (traces are not
enough for "making good^^); but in any case Goodin does not attempt these things, opting to
proceed 'more impressionistically *.
20
p.87. The same sort of theme is reiterated (with but minor variations) subsequently, e.g. p.92.
Note the ascent from an everyday theory of the good to a unified moral vision.
11
Even impressionistically little works satisfactorily. For 'the green theory of value' of
Goodin is not 'uniquely able to account for the coherence of the green public-policy
proposals\2122Apart from the critical features, to be considered below,
that green proposals do not enjoy the sort of coherence alleged, and that
established parties can, and do, pick over green programs selectively,
the uniqueness claim, the special position of Goodin's theory, is quietly dropped in the
impressionistic "argument". All that is used is the alternate scheme, that a concern for nature
informs, directly or indirectly, all the connected 'plants in the green programme'.22
Evidently a variety of concerns for nature can motivate and justify attitudes and procedures
regarding pollution, waste, environmental destruction, and so forth. Uniqueness lapses.
Worse, the more remote, less directly environmental parts of the green agenda do not fall out
eith of Goodin's theory or from the alternate scheme. In a note, Goodin concedes as much; but
these (decentralization, grass roots democracy, nonviolence, and much else) derive so he
claims, from the subsidiary, but logically separate, green theory of agency.23 Whether they do
so derive or not (they do not), they do not derive indirectly from a green theory of value,
because of the separation of agency from value. For similar reasons, the "integrated" green
programme (outlined in an Appendix) begins to unravel.
All that Goodin tries to make out, then only suggestively, is that the alternative scheme
helps in explaining certain green attitudes that appear anomalous or otherwise problematic.
Even should this exercise succeed (and its success is at best mixed), it would not achieve what
is required.
Interestingly, the Appendix, 'The Green Political Programme5—far from demonstrating
that the narrow green theory of value runs through all green policy, not just the overly
'environmental5 parts—helps in revealing what a patchwork the presented programme is really,
a patchwork from which separate patches can be unsewn. A basic problem with the whole
approach is this: that there is not a single green program, different green groups have different
programms. Witness the many internal disputes, the very public conflicts between social and
deep ecology, between animal liberationists and nature greens, between luddites and smart new-
age technologists, between spiritual and secular greens, and son. Granted various loose
conalitions may be stitched together; but they are various, not unique, and the stitching is very
loose, and may easily be undone, for different repackaging. In short, there are many green
packages, corresponding to different green theories of value and agency and so on. As there is
21
Ibid p.87.
22
Ibid. p.87. Goodin himself slides back to the indefinite, to a green theory of value, e.g. p.88.
23
Note & p.8&
12
no single green theory, so there is no such tightly unified single package, which is what
empirical evidence also seems to show. Moreover, established parties have drawn very
selectively upon these sorts of packages, and filched elements selectively. Witness the fate of
the early Values party in New Zealand.
'The prima facie wrongness of ... piecemeal borrowing from the greens is easily
explicated. It derives straight forwardly from the logic of consistency. It would be simply
wrong to embrace a theory of value... for some purposes while shunning it for others. The
truth status of value theories just does not flicker on and off like that/2425Embedded therein, in
this strong holism, is one basic confusion that pervades the book, a confusion between a theory
and what derives from it, between a source and its outputs. Nothing in logic stops selective
borrowing from what derives from a program, however tightly integrated. Strong holism is far
too strong; it would imply that we cannot adopt, or even toy with, one part of some value
theory, or ethical theory on Goodin's account of the matter, without embracing the lot. We
cannot accept some on Moore's claims, some of Spinoza's analyses, part of Aristotle without
being stuck with the whole. Eclecticism, at least as regards a theory of value, is impossible.
Which is absurd, and a reductio thereto of a seriously defective argument.
The conclusion has to be that yet another of Goodin's main themes is seriously astray and
should be rejected: that 'greens make (radical) demands on an all-or-nothing basis525, that
greens 'might reasonably demand that we implement their political program on an all-or-nothing
basis5.26
On the misadvertised green theory of agency: green collective organization・
The title 'The Green Theory of Agency5 is something of a misnomer. Most of the chapter
consemed (chapter 4) is taken up with what is inaccurately headed 'Principles of green political
structures*, which treats not agency but certain elements of macro-political organisation,
notably decentralization and policy coordination (itself headed, misleadingly, 'think globally, act
locally5). Most of the remainder of the chapter is occupied with what is headed, generally,
'Principles of green political action', but reduces to 'democratic participation5 and
'nonviolence5, and with 'Principles of green party organisation', cut down to 'grassroots
democracy5 and 'nrotation in office*, both something of travesties, given the indicated sweep
and generality.
The theory of "agency" is itself rather a part of a theory of collective action. Virtually
nothing on agency in the usual sense of individual action theory enters, except a footnote
24
p.92, partly reiterating the integrated package theme.
25
p.168? [check, locate]
26
Back cover.
13
referring to some work on the topic, and no theory at all of green individual agents (their
lifestyles, etc.). The relevant part of collective action theory looks not so much at the roles of
operative agents and their individual instrumentality, as at the character and corodinating
mechanisms of collective action, namely that needed or designed to realize green values. And
really, what is considered is green collective organization, which comprises not only action and
practices, but also associated political procedures and structures. Into this expanded account,
furthermore, some large assumptions are written, assumptions not accepted by many greens:
roughly, reduction of the political to the collective, and of the collective to aggregated
individuals, i.e. themes of individualism.2728These reductive assumptions, which are inserted
and infiltrated unargued, come to matter in the material on policy coordination, which adopts a
standard game-theory approach drawn from the received reductive theory of collective action, a
theory unlikely to gain much green applause, for all its academic fashionability.
The case for green engagement in coalitions is less straightforward than depicted. No
doubt greens who opt for this course of action—what Goodin tries to insist upon, involvement
in the politics of the established system—do not then have the option of spuming power-sharing
opportunities when those opportunities present themselves. Our guide is, however, too
optimistic about how often such opportunies are like to occur, and too sanguine about how they
are likely to operate to green advantage. For one thing, greens are not the only political forces
within conventional politics who have a theory of value. Furthermore, just as greens seeking to
enter into a coalition with a party of the electoral left (at present the only plausible option) must
look askance at the likely ttincohe^ence^^ of the compromise reached, so too must the other
coalescing party. If, under such circumstances, 'the blame for the logical incoherence would lie
with the parties that insisted on adulterating the green programme528, so too, from the
perspective of the party of the left, must *the blame for the logical incoherence lie with the
greens who insisted on adulterating the pink programme'. It should come as little surprise then,
that the evidence suggests that parties of the moderate left are every bit as reluctant to enter into
coalitions with the greens as the greens are with them.29
Green agents: their lifestyles, their commitments, their changed consciousness.
These matters feature large in American deep ecology; they are neglected or dismissed in
Goodin. His rejection of green personal lifestyles is indicative, in these terms, of personal
green consciousness and commitment, and of but subdued or diminished green values. It seems
fair to remark that only weak environmental commitments are displayed in the book (however
27
See e.g. p.l 14 top.
28
To cite Goodin p.179.
29
Hay op.cit., where various examples confirming the final claim are assembled.
14
even weak commitments, typical of much academic literature, are better than none, typical of
former academic literature); or, more provocatively, to infer that Goodin has not really absorbed
genuine green values (else he would act personally). What does come through from the book is
that Goodin remains something of an outsider to green activism. That he is not together at the
cutting edge of things green is betrayed by occasional telling slips, as with what greens worry
about in different places (esp. pp. 180-1). It is not that what he asserts is wrong; it is that
emphases and contrasts are different.
Reasons offered for rejection of green lifestyles are, where clear, extraordinarily weak.
Consider what is offered:
• living too close to nature, too much in harmony with it, might cause it to lose its valued role
for us30一which is (remember) to provide us with a larger context in which we can see our lives
as being set! Test the force of the argument by comparing living in the vicinity of other valued
items: worthy lives, art, music, intellectual accomplishments. Moreover, there are counter
arguments and considerations: that closeness brings respect and awe, and can enhance
appreciation of value. Consider the idea of Christians distancing themselves from Cathedrals
and Churches, ritual and practice.
• to achieve political change, greens should make every effort to minimise the perceived distance
between themselves and the “orthodox” community一whereas the association of 'alternative
lifestyling5 with 'green' has exactly the opposite effect. Such a claim reveals much as regards
subcontests, such as: claimants commitments and seriousness, type and extent of change
envisaged, and so on. Christians, feminists, revolutionaries and others would not be too
impressed. As in other reaches where orthodoxy may be morally or otherwise amiss, so with
regard to green lifestyles: There is a case for a politics of “exemplary practice”； for whilst some
people will treat those who so engage as objects of scorn and ridicule, it is evident that many
people have been recruited to green values through positive contact with experiments in "right
living”，or with elements of green lifestyles. It is important too that at least some people
endeavour to demonstrate how green principles might be put into practice at the level of daily
living.
• Bizarre examples, selective unfavourable examples, advanced under the heading 'green
heresies5.31 Granted 'some of this “exemplary practice” might be so outlandish that it reflects
negatively on larger green projects. But the influence of this can be overstated; this sort of game
can be played with many things that have features to recommend parts of them. After all, every
social movement and every tradition of political philosophy, has its fringe-dwellers, even its
30
Thus p.81ff.
31
pp.78-81.
15
practitioners of a particular reductio ad absurdum extracted from a larger coherency.32
• local lifestyle set the focus astray. It should be on grander issues, on global environmental
problems, fate of earth, etc. But plainly more regional and local problems also matter, esp. for
preservation of habitats, creatures, etc. And here personal and local things can be very
important.
Finally, there are other reasons for green lifestyles. For example, for the structural
changes necessary for environmentally satisfactory societies of one sort or another, something
like internalization of green values and adoption of a green lifestyle proves highly advantageous.
To this end and others, committed green subcultures and inspiring individual examples are
extremely valuable.
APPENDIX: a defective setting.
Many productions that may look new and interesting in fact prove conservative, brushing
off and wheeling out old ideas as if they would accomplish all requisite work. That is, it is
implicitly claimed, under conservative approaches, that prevailing paradigms offer all necessary
resources for capturing what has (wrongly) been presented as radically new.33 In environmental
philosophy a classical exercise of this sort, well received by an environmentally conservative or
reactionary establishment, was Passmore's text. Passmore's (and was followed, in a slightly
expanded and apparently more liberal setting by Attfield, in a series of broadly consequentialist
productions. Now the exercise repeated in environmental political theory by Goodin, who
simply imports utilitarianism as supplying a unique and unquestionable rationality, in place of
Passmore's vague utilitarianism of humans interests.
It does not bode well for a genuinely green theory that its presentation lies virtually entirely
within a shallow utilitarian setting, the setting of the dominant economic and public policy
paradigm. For just such a setting is what has assisted significantly in getting the Earth into the
present environmental mess. Consider what Goodin tries to insist upon in his section (s.1.3) on
the arguments (and also elsewhere):- He assumes, in so trying to preempt the range of
arguments, both that
—the case for environmental protection has to be made in utilitarian terms if it is to prove
effective
—the most telling arguments concern the ways environmental protection measures are required
to further human interests (and intertwined items: people, profits, property, resources, etc.).
It is worth commencing erosion of these commonplace assumptions immediately. As for what
arguments "work”，are telling or effective, that depends heavily on the context, who is engaged
32
This paragraph borrows heavily from Hay.
33
Brennan's third reductive trend(p.800.
16
in a dialogue, and so on. Those with deep green sympathies are not going to be vastly
impressed by a sheaf of utilitarian and human interests (first and only) arguments, any more than
by other privileged class arguments. Goodin seems to have rather assumed that, in effect, we
are always paired with our political masters, who are and will remain shallow utilitarians. Even
now this is by no means uniformly so, and there are grounds for hope that things could be much
ameliorated in the future. Accordingly there is little reason to accept Goodin's further excessive
claim that the 'essence' of the arguments (all satisfactory arguments he really wants to have us
concede) remains the same: 'inadequate protection of the human environment, seriously
compromised human interests\34
Pretty much the same problematic ethos is likewise taken for granted for proposed
remedies: a standard economic public policy framework, with the essence of the remedy
consisting in correcting market failure. From deeper green perspectives this is extraordinarily
tired stuff, with "remedies" that have been tried and tried and continue to fail.
As part of his case, he tries the stock shallow strategy of rubbishing the idea of admitting
interests beyond humans (to grant animals interests is hardly to ''widen'' or ttextend^^ interests).
The arguments are all very cheap, and the counter-case is not properly addressed. Regrettably, a
shallow utilitarianism raises its ugly head all over the place. A few examples: 'it is more
important that the right things be done than that they be done in any particular way or through
any particular agency * (p.120). But it is unnecessary to document utilitarian imput as Goodin
himself has provided it in susequent work.
A main orientation of Goodin's work一which help explain several of its features一 is
towards policy-makers or would-be policy-makers. Among such audiences utilitarian and
economic rationales contue to be greeted enthusistically. For one reason, such rationales seem
made to order when policy makers, or "bureaucratic rationality,5, require 'a means of justifying
decisions that may be unpopular with large members of people5. For through these rationales
they have seemed
able to give principled reasons for action. The policy-maker can claim
to have weighed up all the relevant considerations for and against a
course of action; each consideration was in some way commensurable
with every other—perhaps because each had a dollar value associated
with it—and so it was possible to reach a determinate conclusion, by
fair and objective means. The appearance of determinacy, fairness and
objectivity is an important tool for those who wield and manipulate
power in business, government, and even universities. But this
rationalizing use of economic approaches should be resisted by
everyone, including economists themselves.35
34
Ibid p.8 (check).
35
Brennan p.807.
17
The reasons are now entirely familiar ones.
References
Achtenberg, W., Review of Goodin, Environmental Values, (1994).
Foucault, M., 'What is Enlightenment5
Goodin, R., Green political Theory, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1992.
Habermus, J., 'Modernity—an incomplete project*, in Postmodern Culture (ed. H. Foster),
Pluto Press, London, 1987.
Hay, P., Review of Goodin typescript, University of Tasmania, 1994.
McGowan, J., Postmodernism and Its Critics, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 199x.
Osborne, P, 'Modernity is a qualitative, not a stromological, category: notes on the dialectics of
differential historical time', in Postmodernism and the re-reading of modernity (ed. F. Barker
and others) Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1991/2.
Priest, G., 'On alternative geometries, arithmetics, and logics; a tribute to Lukasiewicz5,
typsescript, 1996.
Routley, R. and V., “Human chauvinism and environmental ethics' referred to as EE
Routley, R. and V., The Fight for the Forests，referred to as FF.
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A dialethic approach to paradoxes of social and political theory
Conspectus: The rough working idea is this: These paradoxes get treated in
the same way as moral dilemmas in deontic theory. Namely they are
accepted, so theory and assumptions do not require revision and excision.
Rather is required is elaboration, additions to say what do when a dilemma is
encounter (e.g. proceed to fall back on rational decision theory, as modified).
Thus it is with voters paradoxes, inconsistent preferences, Arrow’s theorem,
and so on: STET! let them stand. If they are encountered head-on, then work
through them using alternative methods. It is an important point that methods
do not give out, as things do not go haywire when consistency is
encountered.
Let us start with desires and preferences, which are the basic items in much theory (eg.
stock economics). Although standard theory smooths out—removes—inconsistencies in
agents’ desires and preferences, it is widely appreciated that they can both be inconsistent. A
person can both want something for one set of reasons or urges and not want it perhaps for
another (e.g. because moral constraints enter).
The so-called empirical “problem” of
nontransitive preferences is, turned around, simply a case of inconsistency. A simple case (like
that of voting paradoxes) is where an agent has circular preferences. Over some loop, which
may be quite large an agent prefers a to bi, bi to b2, ... bn-i to bn and bn to a. So by
transitivity this agent prefers a to bi and bi to a, and similar, which preferences are
inconsistent. Given the usual assumption that a Pb implies ~bPa, these circular preferences are
explicitly inconsistent. Yet such preference ordering are frequently observed, especially in
children (who are often keen to exhibit preferences).
A theory admitting explictly inconsistent preferences has to be paraconsistent, on pain of
triviality otherwise. Certainly a theory where inconsistency was not exposed, but is to say
locked up in preference relations need not be paraconsistent, but such a theory would be only
partial, not a sufficiently full theory revealing what was transpiring. A normal modal theory
would, for instance, be worthless in the presence of inconsistent preferences or desires,
because it would yield such results as that any such agent desires everything. (For instance, by
virtue of systematic requirements for D, desire, it follows that Dp & D~p -» DB. The system
requirements are A -* B/DA -» DB and DA & DB -> D(A & B).)
The state of an agent with inconsistent preferences or desires need not run out of control.
Consistency is not the only constraint, the only limit on logical licence, but a special, often
excessively powerful one. In these cases control can be provided by agents not processing
trivial preferences or desiresi, by some, sufficiently many, things not being preferred or
desired. More comprehensively, a rather minimally adequate agent will have both a logically
organised set of inclusions, preferences that obtain or are held, etc., and of exclusions, items
that are not desired etc. Thus a more satisfactory logic for this sort of area will exhibit both
acceptances and rejections. For example: i- DA & DB -> D(A & B) usual coounterexamples to
�which assume inconsistent desire cannot obtain explicitly. Normally where h DA then i- D(A&
B); but of course an agent may not desire something on its own, which would be differently
formulated. Most important, h Dp. That is necessary, though far from sufficient for a coherent
agent (and it as with coherents agents, as distinct from consistent agents, that we are now
primarily concerned). Now it is not difficult to show that there are paraconsistent logical
theories that can combine all these sorts of features with inconsistency in desires or preferences,
e.g. with i- D (qo & ~qo) for some qo (for some agent).
If individual agents can have inconsistent motivational states, so, still more, can groups
of agents. Broadly, many sorts of pooling induce inconsistency: of information, knowledge,
and so on, as is now well appreciated. But if of beliefs why not of desires, if of information
why not of preferences, which, for one thing, are based on information? Such inconsistency
induced by aggregation is what manifests itself in voting paradoxes.
Now we can adapt an argument from what do in case of individual agent situation to
apply to what do in group case. Namely, not revise and elide, but proceed on through an
inconsistency; proceed by further available methods, e.g. further voting differently arranged.
(Compare perhaps a football match which results in a draw or stalemate. Do not go back and
try to start over. Play on into extra time, with new rules to give a more rapid outcome.)
To the extent that it can be carried out on the basis of received preference theory, standard
economic theory can be simulated on the basis of paraconsistent preference theory. For there
are, in general, simply more preferences to start with, for instance in extending to utility
functions, expanding typically in complete preference orderings. Indifference curves can be
constructed in the standard way, the only difference being that there will be some singularities,
as regards where items are both preferred and not.
A conundrum for green theory over democracy, which it typically supports, is put in a
sharp form as follows1: Democracy concerns procedures, environmentalism certain outcomes.
What guarantee can there be that the procedures will deliver the outcomes? That democracy will
yield a way of protesting environments?
First greens are not seeking guarantees, which they could not in general expect.
1
Goodin under way So-wind p.168.
�a
ABSTRACT OF
PROBLEMS and SOLUTIONS in DEEP ECOPOLITICAL THEORY
A reshaping of social and political institutions, which are often outmoded or suboptimal
and certainly commonly anti-environmental, is now prominent on theoretical agendas, at least in
Australia. One such project is the multi-million dollar “Reshaping Australian Institutions”
project at the Australian National University.
At the same time there is widespread
disenchantment with prevailing politics in Australia. Accordingly there is an opportunity to put
radical green themes on agendas for real political and institutional change.
A deep change, however, which is what deep green theories require, encounters several
problems. For one, there appears to be a contradiction between demands for, on the one side,
increasing environmental regulations and welfare arrangements, characteristically dependent
upon bureaurcratic centralisation and economic growth, and on the other, decentralized lower
impact organisation, which halts anti-environmentally industry and economic growth. A
functional resolution, partially dissolving a central state, is outlined, along with a theory of
encephaletic organisation.
Further problems to surmount include human chauvinism and present-time bias, even in
present “best practice” democratic institutions. Deep demarchoidal resolutions of these
problems are sketched and defended.
R. Sylvan
RMB683
Bungendore Australia 2621
�
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A dialethic approach to paradoxes of social and political theory
Conspectus: The rough working idea is this: These paradoxes get treated in
the same way as moral dilemmas in deontic theory. Namely they are
accepted, so theory and assumptions do not require revision and excision.
Rather is required is elaboration, additions to say what do when a dilemma is
encounter (e.g. proceed to fall back on rational decision theory, as modified).
Thus it is with voters paradoxes, inconsistent preferences, Arrow’s theorem,
and so on: STET! let them stand. If they are encountered head-on, then work
through them using alternative methods. It is an important point that methods
do not give out, as things do not go haywire when consistency is
encountered.
Let us start with desires and preferences, which are the basic items in much theory (eg.
stock economics). Although standard theory smooths out—removes—inconsistencies in
agents’ desires and preferences, it is widely appreciated that they can both be inconsistent. A
person can both want something for one set of reasons or urges and not want it perhaps for
another (e.g. because moral constraints enter).
The so-called empirical “problem” of
nontransitive preferences is, turned around, simply a case of inconsistency. A simple case (like
that of voting paradoxes) is where an agent has circular preferences. Over some loop, which
may be quite large an agent prefers a to bi, bi to b2, ... bn-i to bn and bn to a. So by
transitivity this agent prefers a to bi and bi to a, and similar, which preferences are
inconsistent. Given the usual assumption that a Pb implies ~bPa, these circular preferences are
explicitly inconsistent. Yet such preference ordering are frequently observed, especially in
children (who are often keen to exhibit preferences).
A theory admitting explictly inconsistent preferences has to be paraconsistent, on pain of
triviality otherwise. Certainly a theory where inconsistency was not exposed, but is to say
locked up in preference relations need not be paraconsistent, but such a theory would be only
partial, not a sufficiently full theory revealing what was transpiring. A normal modal theory
would, for instance, be worthless in the presence of inconsistent preferences or desires,
because it would yield such results as that any such agent desires everything. (For instance, by
virtue of systematic requirements for D, desire, it follows that Dp & D~p -» DB. The system
requirements are A -* B/DA -» DB and DA & DB -> D(A & B).)
The state of an agent with inconsistent preferences or desires need not run out of control.
Consistency is not the only constraint, the only limit on logical licence, but a special, often
excessively powerful one. In these cases control can be provided by agents not processing
trivial preferences or desiresi, by some, sufficiently many, things not being preferred or
desired. More comprehensively, a rather minimally adequate agent will have both a logically
organised set of inclusions, preferences that obtain or are held, etc., and of exclusions, items
that are not desired etc. Thus a more satisfactory logic for this sort of area will exhibit both
acceptances and rejections. For example: i- DA & DB -> D(A & B) usual coounterexamples to
which assume inconsistent desire cannot obtain explicitly. Normally where h DA then i- D(A&
B); but of course an agent may not desire something on its own, which would be differently
formulated. Most important, h Dp. That is necessary, though far from sufficient for a coherent
agent (and it as with coherents agents, as distinct from consistent agents, that we are now
primarily concerned). Now it is not difficult to show that there are paraconsistent logical
theories that can combine all these sorts of features with inconsistency in desires or preferences,
e.g. with i- D (qo & ~qo) for some qo (for some agent).
If individual agents can have inconsistent motivational states, so, still more, can groups
of agents. Broadly, many sorts of pooling induce inconsistency: of information, knowledge,
and so on, as is now well appreciated. But if of beliefs why not of desires, if of information
why not of preferences, which, for one thing, are based on information? Such inconsistency
induced by aggregation is what manifests itself in voting paradoxes.
Now we can adapt an argument from what do in case of individual agent situation to
apply to what do in group case. Namely, not revise and elide, but proceed on through an
inconsistency; proceed by further available methods, e.g. further voting differently arranged.
(Compare perhaps a football match which results in a draw or stalemate. Do not go back and
try to start over. Play on into extra time, with new rules to give a more rapid outcome.)
To the extent that it can be carried out on the basis of received preference theory, standard
economic theory can be simulated on the basis of paraconsistent preference theory. For there
are, in general, simply more preferences to start with, for instance in extending to utility
functions, expanding typically in complete preference orderings. Indifference curves can be
constructed in the standard way, the only difference being that there will be some singularities,
as regards where items are both preferred and not.
A conundrum for green theory over democracy, which it typically supports, is put in a
sharp form as follows1: Democracy concerns procedures, environmentalism certain outcomes.
What guarantee can there be that the procedures will deliver the outcomes? That democracy will
yield a way of protesting environments?
First greens are not seeking guarantees, which they could not in general expect.
1
Goodin under way So-wind p.168.
a
ABSTRACT OF
PROBLEMS and SOLUTIONS in DEEP ECOPOLITICAL THEORY
A reshaping of social and political institutions, which are often outmoded or suboptimal
and certainly commonly anti-environmental, is now prominent on theoretical agendas, at least in
Australia. One such project is the multi-million dollar “Reshaping Australian Institutions”
project at the Australian National University.
At the same time there is widespread
disenchantment with prevailing politics in Australia. Accordingly there is an opportunity to put
radical green themes on agendas for real political and institutional change.
A deep change, however, which is what deep green theories require, encounters several
problems. For one, there appears to be a contradiction between demands for, on the one side,
increasing environmental regulations and welfare arrangements, characteristically dependent
upon bureaurcratic centralisation and economic growth, and on the other, decentralized lower
impact organisation, which halts anti-environmentally industry and economic growth. A
functional resolution, partially dissolving a central state, is outlined, along with a theory of
encephaletic organisation.
Further problems to surmount include human chauvinism and present-time bias, even in
present “best practice” democratic institutions. Deep demarchoidal resolutions of these
problems are sketched and defended.
R. Sylvan
RMB683
Bungendore Australia 2621
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<a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a>
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This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>.
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Australian National University Office
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29.5.95
PROBLEMS IN DEEPER GREEN
POLITICAL ORGANIZATION:
an Australian perspective on radical institutional change.
... people are ready for change and the impending debate will result in
constitutional change. We should, therefore, explore all options ... J
As elsewhere, there is growing dissatisfaction with Australia's political institutions, and
increasing demand to change them. This demand, hiding co-optative elements, has been
initiated and fostered in a conspicuously top-down fashion, by politicians and by academics.
There is so far little surge of political enterprise at grass-roots levels, little pressure for the
usually very limited changes proposed. Nonetheless, along with apathy, there is widespread
popular disenchantment with present political arrangements. There is now an opportunity
(although still only a small window no doubt) to put green and radical themes on the agenda for
real political change in Australia. That opportunity should not be missed, within Australia, or
elsewhere. While the exposition that follows concentrates upon Australia, as a convenient
advanced example, much of what is argued and urged applies or adapts elsewhere.
1. Disenchantment with politics, and political proposals for change.
There is now evident in Australia, what is variously described as disillusionment and
anxiety, cynicism and pessimism about the state of politics—a loss of confidence in it, and a
retreat from commitment. As much and more, Mackay has nicely exposed in a survey of the
Australian situation:
anxiety about the nature and quality of Australian politics [has] increased. ...
Widespread anxiety about the state of politics is based [in part] on an uneasy feeling
that, if the parties are not going to stand for some identifiable philosophy, and the
leaders are going to be chosen on the basis of their potential as television performers
or even as head-kickers, then the only appropriate response is cynicism.
That cynicism is reflected in a turning away from support for the major parties ... and
revealed in the attitudes of young Australians ...12
who often cannot be bothered registering to vote, or voting (though voting is legally
compulsory).
1
Hon. Ian Macphee, ‘A new constitution?’. Of course Macphee did not really mean all options, nor
even all constitutional options. Furthermore, his claim about preparedness of people for change is
incompatible with Mackey’s data (mentioned below) on exhaustion with change.
2
Mackay pp. 174-177. For all the Australian casualness of Mackay's presentation, his sociological
findings are nonetheless fairly solidly survey and interview based (if occasionally stretching the
data). Main findings are replicated by other sociologists.
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Lack of confidence is beginning to show not only as cynicism about politicians, but
also as doubt about the integrity of Australia's political institutions.3
In a recent survey, ‘62 percent of [Australians] expressed either little or no confidence in the
political system. Such a figure accurately reflects the mood of the Australian community’.4
Australian loss offaith in conventional politics is attributed to a mix of factors. A first
explanatory factor as regards this disenchantment comes from the changes in politics already
remarked (ranging from policy issues to media performers) and from resultant uncertainty. ‘...
the Australian electorate is confused about which party stands for what, and about whether any
party has a long-term commitment to any particular point of view’ .5
A complex ‘second factor ... concerns the adversarial nature of two-party politics’.6
How can this ‘two party, adversarial approach ... continue to be appropriate when the
distinctions between the two parties themselves are so hard to define’? But ‘redefinition of
party politics implies the possibility of a redefinition of the whole parliamentary process itself’.
Why ‘when parties seem quite capable of stealing each other's policies or of invading each
other's traditional philosophical territory, [can not] politicians work together in a more co
operative and harmonious spirit’?7 ‘Adversarial politics may have made sense ... when ...
distinctions between the parties were stark and when arguments about principle could be
justified; today, the idea that politicians would be arguing over a point of principle or
philosophy is almost unthinkable.... [They] are much more likely to be arguing over matters of
personality, prejudice and power than over issues which effect the long-term health of the body
politic’.8
‘The quality of parliamentary debate is regarded not only as a symptom of the
adversarial nature of the institution, but also as a symptom either of the poor quality of
politicians ..., or of the effect of the system on those who are enmeshed in it’.9 Unless there is
3
Ibid, p.178
4
Ibid. The figure is the more surprising inasmuch as such disillusioning factors as corruption and
graft are not features of overt political life in Austral-asia by comparison with elsewhere in the
hemispherical region.
5
Ibid. pp. 178-179.
6
Ibid. The adversarial character of dominant State legal systems is also becoming subject to more
and more criticism. It appears likely that significant movement towards different inquiratorial
systems will occur, not least because of the huge expense and growing unaffordability of
adversarial systems.
7
Ibid.
8
Ibid, p.180.
9
Ibid, p.179. It is a symptom of both, the latter especially.
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marked improvement in party philosophies, programs and performance, ‘the call to re-examine
the nature of the parliamentary process will gather momentum’.1011
A third relevant factor contributing to loss of faith is the impression of Australians that
‘they are overgoverned ’H, with too many expensive bureaucracies and too many houses of
parliament.
Conflicts between State and Federal parliaments — and between the various State
parliaments themselves — are regarded as a particularly unproductive expenditure of
political energy, and Australians question whether 15 houses of parliament may be
too many for the efficient government of 18 million people. The sheer number of
parliaments is often blamed for the problem of too many bureaucracies and for many
duplications of bureaucratic and political activity between State and Federal
governments.
... Whilst there is little love felt in the Australian community for Canberra and for the
idea of more centralised government even that is beginning to appear preferable ....
The widespread support for the idea of a republic which emerged during 1992 is
closely related to the underlying sense that Australia is overdue for some kind of
reexamination of its political institutions, and even the notion of Federation itself. ...
As debate about the idea of a republic proceeds ... it has begun to incorporate the idea
that Australian's political structures and systems might be quite significantly
reformed.12
Such disaffection reflects too a growing awareness that Australia’s political arrangements
owe more to historical accident than to rational design. Even though the main proposals for
change no doubt remain reformist in character and could lead in unfortunate directions, some of
them are far-reaching by normal standards. Both the extensive disenchantment with present
political arrangements and the felt need for significant change further suggest political times are
not altogether normal. Elements underpinning a political paradigm shift are already present, as
are features supporting rational redesign, to which radical additions are now feasible.
So far there have been, along with normal inertial resistance to change, two main
responses to growing pressure for change: political, from politicians, ex-politicians and political
commentators, and academic from intellectuals, academic entrepreneurs and academic
journalists. By and large, political responses have been grander, more sweeping and vaguer;
10
Ibid, p.181.
11
Ibid, p.181, itals added. The problem has now surfaced strikingly in the heavily indebted
Australian Capital Territory (“toy town” as its is facetiously called locally) which is swamped by
bureaucracy, where it has been discovered that there is one expensive bureaucrat for every fifteen
persons.
12
Ibid. p. 181-2. Republican proposals have been circulating for some time. But the cause was
finally taken up by prominent politicians, who made it their own, after which it became a popular
issue. Mackay's accurate presentation of popular support for political change contrasts drolly with
the first part of his book which depicts an Australian populace exhausted by change and longing for
the old ease and somnolence.
�4
academic responses more theoretical and cautious, piecemeal and detailed. But there are no
grand detailed plans.
Under the leading proposal so far for political change, Australia's constitutional
monarchy will be displaced by a constitutional republic with its own head of state displacing the
monarch, but with perhaps minimal adjustments otherwise.
Nonetheless, as a result,
republicanism is in the air. Politicians have begun to contemplate other practical reforms, while
academics have begun to embroider theories around republicanism and institutional reform.
What happens to the Australian federation of states is one of the many unresolved issues
presently being debated.
The main reason for reform offered by the political camp can be summed up simply as
changing geopolitical circumstances. The camp tends not to acknowledge what would reflect
adversely upon it, the poorness of federal political practice. Rather it tends to attribute popular
dissatisfaction to economic circumstances and uncertainties: declining real standards of living,
extensive unemployment, persistent recession until recently, problems to be surmounted by
full-steam ahead untrammelled economic growth, to be attained by recoupling Australia to the
Asian economic express. Meanwhile an orchestrated republican movement can help divert
popular political attention from poor political management and a gloomy economic predicament.
Much has changed in the century since present antiquated political arrangements were
hammered out, arrangements making the newly-fashioned Commonwealth of Australia,
politically a federation of states, into a constitutional monarchy coupled to Britain, arrangements
of convenience fashioned for very different circumstances. Most non-symbolic linkages with
Britain, which has been inching towards a place in a united Europe, have already been severed.
Australia has gradually begun to appreciate its geo-political position in the Indian-Pacific region
(and the money-making opportunities for a sagging resource-based economy in allegedly
booming parts of Asia). Whence the main idealistic proposal: for an independent republic,
decoupled from Europe, assuming its own (prominent) place in its geo-political regions. In
principle at least, place and region begin to assume, or resume, some of their neglected, but
historic, significance (however that is not how it is yet seen).
Most proposals for constitutional and federal reform fit within that limited idealistic
conception. One important proposal, advanced by established political players, their most
radical proposal so far, includes abolition of the present states. Such a proposal would clearly
represent a welcome step in anarchist directions, were it not regularly offset by the idea of a
strengthened central state.13 Supposing this latter unfortunate idea is bracketed for the moment,
13
Anarchists can even rest (if uneasily) with a constitution, so long as it provides for an
organisation, Australia Inc. even, sufficiently different from a state and its authoritarian trappings.
�5
♦>
then what is being seriously considered already starts to look like a much more rational
regionalism than what presently prevails.
The present states of Australia are undoubtedly an anachronism, based on accidental
boundaries of a contingent colonial history. They are ecologically irrational management units,
utterly failing to reflect ecological regions. Yet the states possess extensive environmental and
other management powers, inappropriate ‘powers which derive from what was largely a
political bargaining process conducted a century ago.’ Another effect of inapposite state-federal
arrangements, especially ‘funding arrangements, has been to lock out local government and,
more importantly, local communities. ... local communities must be given greater control over
those decisions of government which effect their lives ...’; the opportunity ‘to design and
provide the services which are needed locally.’14
At this stage of the dialectic McPhee slides easily and naturally from localism to
regionalism.
A glance at the map reveals natural regions for local government on a viable scale [an
optimistic contention]. Some cross State boundaries, and I would envisage that State
governments would be replaced with regional governments. These would be more
akin to larger local governments and would certainly not have the trappings of the
States. They should not have parliaments and the expensive, unwieldy and inefficient
bureaucracies which characterise our States. They should have a small number of
full-time councillors ... Regional governments should be solely accountable to their
ratepayers ...15 .
So far so good: however McPhee thereupon begins to infiltrate stock (small Z) liberal
management assumptions. Nonetheless the basic idea to retain is simple: that of ecologicallyrational local and regional rearrangement of anachronistic state partitions.
regionalization should be greened, as reform should be radicalized.
But that
More generally,
opportunites now present themselves to insert more radical ideas throughout the debate about
Australia’s future directions.
For much has been left off political agendas for change, not merely environments and
habitats of their less prominent or noisy inhabitants, but also such issues as rights and liberties,
transformation of antiquated legal and executive frameworks, and so on. Omission of (human)
rights is especially remarkable in states such as Australia, whose constitutions astonishingly do
not mention at all (what is however often supposed to justify states) individual rights, such
rights only being ensured, so far as they are, assumptions from uncodified common law, by
14
All quotes in this paragraph are drawn from McPhee. An address along similar lines to the Hon.
Ian McPhee, also proposing abolition of the states, was delivered by the former Prime Minister
R.G. Hawke. Hawke's speech, by contrast with McPhee's, attracted much media attention, and
though facilely dismissed as “unrealistic” by some practicing politicians, appeared to gain a good
deal of support.
15
McPhee ibid.
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indirect routes (statutes regarding treatment of minorities and the like). Nor do the political
camps pushing limited change speak of rights or liberties; a very limited conception of
adjustments required prevails (though without rights and liberties and a generous public sphere
there is little, and little prospect of, justification for a state at all). Accordingly political agendas
for change need to be conspicuously broadened, to accommodate a decidedly more ambitious
range of constitutional and institutional redesign.
2. A project within a project: radically reshaping Australian institutions.
Academic entrepreneurs have also responded quickly to proposals for constitutional and
institutional changes. Early to scramble on the bandwagon was the institution to which I am
affiliated, the Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, with its
ambitious decade-long project, Reshaping Australian Institutions: Towards and Beyond
2001.16 One small part of this project does connect with the republican push, which no doubt
helped inspire it and gain its funding. The academic version of republicanism furnishes an
institutional and historic setting, tracing its roots back to ancient Rome, and thereby linking in,
what admits much modem adaptation, notions of citizenship and civic virtues. But most of the
project is independent of any republican reorganisation.
The Reshaping Australian Institutions project is presented in predominantly reformist
fashion, unsurprisingly. It is supposed, for instance, to ‘provide major input into evaluation
and reform of Australia's institutions’; indeed it is explicitly ‘aimed at contributing to Australian
constitutional reform’.17
Nothing however precludes consideration of reshaping or
transforming Australian institutions — those of the whole ecological region — in a unreformist
and possibly unconstitutional way, in a radical way.
Admittedly, the rough boundary between reformist and radical routes becomes even more
blurred when the constitution of a country is open for possible major reconsideration and much
political infrastructure may be altered. Nonetheless, from the perspective of a strong central
state, the stock boundary stands intact. For reformist changes would amount to comparatively
small adjustments leaving the state substantially intact. For example, a minimal transformation,
16
A recent brief description of this two million dollar project, now outlined in several places, is
given in Tynan, pp.17-19. Fuller descriptions are available from a main coordinator of the project,
J. Braithwaite, Law, RSSS, ANU. One of the many strands (17 at last count) of this project is an
environmental (or green) strand.
The immediate predecessor of this article was presented in a workshop at RSSS on green political
theory, arranged under the project. That accounts for some of the otherwise puzzling structure of
what has eventuated. Another earlier version was tried out at Ecopolitics VIII, Pacific Visions,
held at Lincoln University, Christchurch, New Zealand, in July 1994.
17
‘Reshaping Australian institutions: towards and beyond 2001’ in Tynan , p.17, italics added.
�7
of the sort presently much favoured, from constitutional monarchy to Australian republic,
though entailing non-negligible constitutional redrafting, need only amend the roles of a few
elite power- and position-holders. By contrast, radical changes would substantially alter that
strong central state, perhaps (as will be proposed) eliminating it altogether.
There are appealing reasons for attempting wider, more radical investigations. For,
firstly, there may be more satisfactory institutional structures not accessible, or even visible,
along normal constitutional reform routes. Secondly, there is a demand, a small but growing
demand from green directions for instance, for radical institutional change. It would be
prudent, then, to make some investigation of the options, to assess their prospects. Thirdly,
reflection on such structures would certainly be part of a more comprehensive study of and
theory of institutional design, which the Reshaping project also presents as an objective.
Fourthly, much more controversially, major environmental problems cannot be satisfactorily
solved along merely reformist paths. For states, what are reformed, states themselves are
ecologically dysfunctional. In practice this appears obvious enough. Simply reflect upon their
environmental records; these are even worse than those abysmal records compiled for human
rights. But the practical case can be argued in detail in a state by state way, or less laboriously,
through the familiar rough classification of states into first, second and third world states. In
main third world regions, the rise of the state has seen the serious decline of environments.
Those third world states that have not largely destroyed their natural environments are in rapid
process of doing so. The activities involved are, furthermore, not merely tolerated by these
states but are usually actively encouraged (e.g. with state participation or by state concessions,
as through taxation advantages, subsidies, export incentives, etc.).
Further, the role of
exploitation and plunder of remaining natural “resources”, and depletion of “biological capital”,
by third world states, most of which are now trapped in debt and structural adjustment, has
increased many-fold in the last two decades.
How destructively second world states of eastern
Europe treated their own (and also other regions’) environment, how they over-expoited and
polluted them, has recently been much publicized. While the recent record in first world states
is no doubt marginally better, many of these states dominated their natural environments and
their wild inhabitants in the past, and have heavily polluted and congested their urban and
industrial regions. Nor does their present record gain an environmental pass. For example,
those that have any natural forests (similarly fisheries) left are in the process of eliminating or
degrading most of what remains; most are failing seriously in meeting (their own) targets on
greenhouse emissions, and so on. More theoretically, it is unlikely that states, increasingly
focussed narrowly upon shallow and short-term economic agendas, will or can deliver
satisfactorily environmentally. A prime reason is this: states are ineluctably committed, more
and more as their populations expand, to high levels of economic activity characteristically to
�0
economic growth of sorts which impact heavily environmentally, inducing inevitable
degradation.18
Accordingly, there are then, or should be, two bands to any green (or environmental)
strand of a restructuring Australian institutions project: not merely an important reformist side,
but as well a radical spread. It is part of this underfunded and undersupported radical spread
which forms the main object of investigation in what follows, that part that relinquishes present
state structures, in favour of more environmentally benign institutions - which no doubt can be
designed, even if not so readily brought into practical operation.19
In order to reach radical redesign ideas quickly, let us touch only lightly upon some of the
more distinctively green reasons for this anarchoid quest (familiar anarchist reasons stand: the
illegitimacy of present states, the undesirability and severe disutility of states, which typically
are highly destructive and corrosive institutions based on concentration of power, hierarchical
authority, massive coercion, manipulation by economic elites, technobureaucracy, utilitarian
rationality, and sundry other evils.20) As indicated, present states are incompatible with stock
ecologically sustainable practices, because of their heavy unrelenting commitments to shallow
economic growth. More generally, standard states and their practices comprise very significant
parts of environmental problems, but quite insufficient parts of any solutions. Moreover, states
constitute an enormous and destructive drain on regional environments, a feature particularly
evident in smaller states which are always looking out for revenue-raising expedients for their
own expensive running.
Apart from those greens who have recognised the excessive environmental costs of states
and their heavy demands on environments, and thus or otherwise have come to recognise the
desirability of their withering away, there are many more who have become ambivalent about
states, who appreciate their very problematic character and very questionable legitimacy, but do
not see yet how to get along altogether without them, or more exactly (to indicate thereby a
partial resolution) without certain functions that they serve. Indeed to point immediately
towards a resolution of this crucial problem, the functional dissolution idea advocated is this:
that the functioning parts may be separately utilized without the colossal whole. The state is not
18
This theme, that states are normally ecologically dysfunctional, is documented and argued in detail
elsewhere; see e.g. Carter and especially Sylvan 96. On the dismal environmental records of
particular states see Ponting. For shocking figures and illustrations as regards environmental
exploitation in third world states, see Bello, pp. 57-65.
19
Nonetheless practical revolutionary displacement of the state is not so remote, or difficult, as is
generally supposed.
20
To adapt a referee’s trenchant summary. For detail on some familiar anarchist reasons, see Burnheim
and above all Marshall.
�9
an organism the functioning parts of which must fail without the whole. So it may well be the
enormous fat of state can simply be shed, to great advantage.
In any event, ‘the State is a social institution’, always ‘within’, Marxists continue, ‘a
concrete historic setting’.21 Granted, it is an institution. For an institution in the relevant sense
is ‘a society or association for the organisation or promotion of some particular object or
function’.22 Institutions include therefore the state, the central state. So it too is up for
reshaping, radical slimming, and possible removal in a concrete historical setting, such as late
twentieth century Australia. Whittling away the state means in turn dismantling corporate
capitalism, which now dwells in symbiosis with the bureaucratic state, and also much else,
often environmentally undesirable, that the state affords a supportive framework for and enables
to flourish.
Ideas and schemes for radical redesign are already available from rich anarchist and
socialist sources, those for green design and reshaping from growing and diverse
environmental sources. In main part, then, radical ecoredesign is a matter of convivially
meeting (not joining) the two, an intersection that favours anarchist inputs. Something of the
sort has already been attempted, in an environmentally shallower way, in eco-anarchism, alias
social ecology, and in a deeper way, in deep-green social theory.23 Moreover, it could be
attempted in other kinds of deeper green theory—itself really a plurality of theories, which
however does not itself force radical ecoredesign, though most variants would support it. Thus
Naess's “deep ecology” for example, which is not so far politically radical, only strongly
reformist, could (and should) be given a radical turn.24
Concentrating upon the radical spread of deeper green theory does not preclude
concomitant reformist investigation and activity. Both sides of the green street should be
played. Reformist opportunities should of course be pursued—incremental change, social
engineering, “ecologizing” economics, greening bureaucrats, lobbying politicians, and like
activity (but better really to cut through much such pleading and obiesance and be rid of
politicians and bureaucrats). There are many reformist proposals being advanced for the
greening of Australian federal institutions—with but few so far having much impact on
21
Thus, Green p.61, who adds quite wrongly that Proudhon and his disciples do not see it that way
‘but as an abstraction and aberration’.
22
Adaptation of the Oxford English Dictionary. An institution is, so to say, an organitution.
23
On social ecology, see Bookchin 90, and for information on deep-green social theory, see Sylvan
and Bennett 94 and Routleys 80.
24
As to the political character of deep ecology, and why it should be turned, see Sylvan and Bennett
94, where an expose of the political theory of Naess's ecosophy is presented.
�practice.25 Nonetheless, more limited, more constrained, proposals of this sort certainly have a
better chance, within the prevailing paradigm, of making a difference than radical redesigns, too
smartly dismissed as “unrealistic” or “utopian”. No doubt the normal “reshaping institutions”
investigations are rightly focussed then upon institutional reform, not upon revolutionary
reshaping, where much freer scope for redesign is offered. However the real possibility of
radical change should not be excluded; green radicals should be prepared. There have been
various opportunities for revolutionary change in Australian history, the last occurring,
according to some historians, with the ignominious fall of the Whitlam government. There
may well be opportunities again both in the near and intermediate future, especially should some
solid work be put into propagating the prospect. In the near term there is economic disarray,
social fragmentation, and constitutional destabilization; in the longer term increasing ecological
problems and expanding eco-catastrophes loom.
Under present incremental reform and regression, for all the spasmodic environmental
rhetoric, comparatively little in the way of radical green change occurs or can be expected.
Witness, for comparison, the snail pace of the establishment movement towards a rather
minimal grey republicanism in Australia, or differently away from meeting carbon-reduction
commitments. It is increasingly doubtful, given prevailing responses to economic and other
difficulties, that present structural and systematic problems confronting Australia, for example,
will be satisfactorily addressed, environmental problems such as extensive and expanding land
and water degradation not least. Furthermore, under more incremental reform, the sorts of
problems concerning reorganising society in deeper green ways, problems that provide
subsequent topics, would likely not arise. So in getting beyond more muddling along, do
imagine fairly free scope for institutional eco-redesign is somehow dispensed. One nice
corollary is that once it is worked out where to go organisationally, it is much easier to ascertain
how to arrive there.
3. A basic problem of structure: central or decentralised organisation?
There are large and immediate advantages in pursuing a problem-oriented approach to
redesign. That approach, which will tend towards anarchoid outcomes, will be anarchistically
guided in this respect: Unless there is a genuine problem, already causing difficulties or
developing, nothing need be done; otherwise let things alone, let Being be.26 On this non
25
There are many many narrower economic and technological proposals. One of the more interesting
wider proposals comes from an Opposition not noted for its green initiatives and commitments, for
an overseeing Department of Sustainable Development, a Department that could see to the
greening of all federal institutions.
26
To echo also Heideggerian wisdom. The non-prejudicial term ‘anarchoid’ is deployed, not because
what emerges will not be anarchistic (as characterized in Marshall and in Sylvan 94), but because it
�11
managerial low-work approach a good deal of structure presently inoperational, and of idle
regulation presently enacted, can be removed; organisational arrangements can be very
significantly down-sized.
The leading methodological idea is that enough relevant
(biodegradable) structure is introduced to resolve organisational problems, but not substantially
more. Organisational oversupply and waste is thus avoided. Moreover, much structure that
keeps so much environmentally destructive industry in business is likewise shed.
Among basic problems for deeper green theory are those of political reorganisation and so
of organisation. Evidently institutions, and their types, are critical to such organisation. And a
major organisational problem for any putative green society concerns structure', to take a critical
case, whether society is centrally organised (concentrated, bureaucratised, hierarchical, large-
scale and so on) or decentralised (dispersed, non-hierarchical, small-scale and supposedly
beautiful, and so on).
This focal problem, to centralise or not to centralise, is sometimes presented as a serious
dilemma for concerned green theorists.27 The binary horns of this dilemma are respectively: on
the one hom, the pull (or push) to localisation and regionalisation, to non-anonymous smallscale low-impacting environmentally-friendly arrangements, to diffusion of power and
dismantling of the incubus of a central state with its crippling costs and unfriendly practices; and
on the other horn, the need for continuing and further central income generation and welfare
(re)distribution, central regulation and control, and the pressures to environmental reliance upon
and use of the central state.28
The dilemma has been trenchantly posed as follows:
... the demands of the Greens sometimes appear contradictory, in seeking increasing
environmental regulation and welfare measures... alongside a halt to industrial
expansion, the very source of income for the welfare state. Yet the expansion and
further centralization of the bureaucratic state apparatus is neither their overt goal nor
covert motivation. Quite the contrary. Their genuine long term vision is of a
decentralized, steady state society of self-sufficient, relationally autonomous (albeit
interlinked) regions.29
departs from standard forms of anarchism in significant respects, not least in planned political
organization. In this exercise organization is of the essence.
27
As by Jacobs of The Green Economy, who has posed the problem sharply, as part of an argument
however for retaining the central state (and much of present status quo arrangements).
28
Environmental reasons for favouring small-scale bioregional organisation are nicely gathered in
McLaughlin, chapter 10.
29
Unknown source.
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As it happens, not only does the theoretical and utopian literature run both ways, towards and
away from centralisation, but so does practice and experience. As to theory, anarchisticallyinclined presentations tend to favour decentralisation, perhaps with some central compensation
through federation (thus recent Blueprints, ecotopias, and so on), whereas socialisticallyinclined presentations invariably opt for powerful central states (to control and redistribute
grander social programs, etc.).
As to practice, there are local councils, community
organisations, residents' groups aiming to keep out, or to remove, the state-sponsored nuclear
plants, toxic waste incinerators, waste dumps or super-highways, on the one horn; and, on the
other, central states blocking, modifying, or regulating local or regionally promoted schemes
for large dams (e.g. Tasmania's Franklin), forest exploitation, pulp mills, strip mining, and so
on.30
To some extent, the way the problem has often been re-presented, in terms of a dilemma
between top-down and bottom-up structure and power transmission, already points towards a
theoretical resolution: namely, both, or rather enough of both. But how is this combination to
be achieved? An answer does not fall out by pure reason, operating in isolation from other
problems. By taking advantage of information gathered from other connected problems, a
promising answer can be teased out. Neither standard socialism nor anarchism afford answers,
socialism because it leaves the central institution of state intact. But standard anarchism, much
more promising, does not resolve the problem either, because federation, as usually explained,
does not leave enough structure; it may not even concede sufficient power to delegates to
constrain exploitative local communities.
A solution to such dilemma lies through a combinational strategy, which includes partial
dissolution of the central state, into its actual organisational functions in each region. While
removing the state, itself source of several environmental and social problems, and its
concentration of power, invariably under environmentally unfriendly control, functional
dissolution nonetheless retains its apparently essential services, including (where necessary)
those of environmental regulation. Relevant continent-wide functions would persist or be
introduced: for example, services controlling inflow into Australia of damaging forms and
materials such as toxic wastes and exotic pest species, or regulating outflow from Australia of
native wildlife and flora. In part, ecoregional functionalism offers a radical continuation of the
separation ofpowers of recent historical process, of church and state, legislature and executive,
and so forth. As these functions come to operate separately while remaining coordinated, so
would those functional arrangements and institutions dissolving the state.
30
Much turns on the exploitative character of certain local and regional communities, their get-richquick schemes, what they are prepared to do to survive in old or superficially affluent ways, and so
on.
�13
It is a major illusion of modem political theory that a central state, ceded monopolies on
coercion, currency, taxation and so on, is necessary in order to secure adequate supply of
public goods, including public order and environmental regulation. To the contrary, the most
that appears required, the most that arguments would support, is some network of specific
organisations functioning to look after specific kinds of goods and services, those necessary for
this or that, that are not otherwise supplied. There is no inherent reason why communities
should not institute and regulate specialised bodies coordinated among themselves (by
negotiations or, failing that, through recognised arbitrators) to ensure the adequate maintenance
or production of various types of public goods, including control of damaging crime. Each
such institution could gain community standing from its support base, for instance through
achieving democratically-generated recognition. Such an institution would aim to secure
execution of its recommendations and decisions by sanctions and like admissible means, and in
doing this it could mobilize in co-operation with communities and with other recognised
institutions.
There are many examples of such institutions operating successfully both
regionally and internationally; for instance, those for postal and communicational arrangements,
international sporting bodies, international academies and clubs, environmental and consumer
organizations.31
4.
Selecting satisfactory political arrangements within the span of anarchoid
options.
Anarchoid options come in a wide variety of forms, including, among others, both right
leaning individualistic or capitalistic varieties, and left-leaning social or communitarian
varieties.32 A suitably generous political pluralism will allow for all these forms, while not
encouraging all, as they are of very different merit. For example, some may be neglectful or
repressive of some of their inhabitants, or destructive of their environments; others, superior in
31
This passage borrows from the summary in Burnheim 86 p.221 of Burnheim 85. For much fuller
elaboration see Burnheim 85 and Sylvan 94.
The critical issue of funding administration, without a coercive taxation system, is also broached in
these places (and developed in Sylvan 96). The broad proposal is that low-cost administration,
much of which would be volunteer, could be funded by rents (there would be no property in land
and resources), use charges, and fines.
32
There are many more varieties of political systems than much recent theory has cared to concede.
For example, to take right-leaning dimensions, all of individualism, market-organization and
capitalism function substantially independently. There can be markets without capitalism
(characterised through opportunities to accumulate capital), and conversely, capitalism without free
market arrangements. And so on. Most historic and modern systems, upon which political theory
has tended inadmissibly to concentrate almost exclusively, are hybrid arrangements with mixes of
different elements drawn from both “left” and “right”.
�14
these socio-environmental regards, may not be. Dismantling or deconstructing a state does not,
on its own, make a sharp selection between alternatives. No doubt the hope is, what can be
striven for, that adequate designs are sought and adequate selections made, that inadmissible
forms rapidly perish. Those remaining forms that are admissible can be ranked; for instance,
they might be graded according to defeasible criteria based upon “pillars” of German green
movement such as environmental sensitivity, democratic institutions, and nonviolent practices.
While right-leaning anarchoid arrangements could work in theory (e.g. under what is
improbable, benevolent capitalism), they are unlikely to succeed in practice, for several reasons.
Consider, to illustrate in outline, why that much promoted rightist form, market (or “liberal”)
capitalism is unlikely to serve. For one reason, an intrusive state is likely to emerge, with state
controlled and state funded standing military and police forces, needed to defend capitalist
interests and accumulation, to protect private property, to uphold endemic social inequalities,
and to enforce particular market and trade structures, with a substantial and heavy taxation
system to fund these forces and a corresponding bureaucracy needed to administer and regulate
these and other institutions, such as those required to guarantee that capitalist liabilities are
strictly limited and to keep markets (far from self-regulating) unclogged, “free” and competitive.
Not only are anarchoid conditions thus violated, so are those for benign green societies. In
normal practice, market capitalism tends to be highly environmental exploitative, as modern
history demonstrates all too plainly (plainly too it is not alone in this propensity, so are other
modem statist systems). Furthermore, given the sorts of humans these systems tend to elevate,
and exalt, and the sorts of practices (including extravagant consumption for all that can afford it)
they encourage and sometimes even enforce, extensive exploitation is to be expected and liable
to persist. At least that is so without, what is thereupon required in a self-reinforcing spiral,
further state intervention to distort “natural” capitalistic incentives and institutions, to limit
practices on private property (thereby effectively altering the institution), to establish new
instruments and commodities such as pollution licences, green investments and futures, and so
forth.33 Even though a shallow greenness can also be sprayed upon parts of market capitalism
(factories in fields, forest reserves retained for tourists, and so on), and some green showcase
exhibits tacked on, environmental depth cannot. Shallowness is both an inevitable consequence
of the justifying socio-economic theory, and also an expected best outcome of practice.
Accordingly in institutional design it is much more promising to look in democratic left
leaning directions. For, as argued, it would be rash to gamble upon any bright new dawn of
environmentally and socially benign market capitalism, which in any event could easily revert
back towards dark industrial times. However, very similar arguments to those sketched could
33
Infiltrated, along with propaganda on behalf of such instruments, is much mythology, including
acclaimed environmental virtues of private property and privatization generally.
�15
be developed as regards centralised socialism, especially as untempered by democratic
procedures. While island communities of a wide range of varieties are naturally not excluded
under anarchoidal pluralism, brighter continental prospects lie through modifications of
democratic sociality, which appears to permit much of what is sought in design.
Under duly decentralized social organization, each requisite function would be carried out
by some association of agents comprising operative and support staff (that is, as regards bare
formal structure, more or less as now, in institutions like departments and corporations). For
direct accountability downwards, and also to ensure desirable separation and dilution of power,
upper operatives, those of a directing or steering committee (the nervous system of the
organisation), would be democratically selected (from a relevant lower level constituency, and
from the whole people of an ecoregion in case of a typical bottom level institution). Note well
that selection is not election: election is but one method of democratic selection, and often
enough not an altogether satisfactory method. The point of some sort of democratic selection,
as a guiding though not invariant rule, is manifold: it is in part to ensure due accountability, in
part to prevent unethical accumulation of power in special classes, and in part for reasons that
devolve from the very notion of democracy itself.
In brief, certain forms of democracy offer promising prospects for green reorganisation,
particularly within complementing left-leaning settings where those forms can function in
favour of sustainability. However even with an informed democracy in place, there are few
guarantees. Some structure, such as limited executive power separated from judicial and
administrative functions, needs to be set in place to block or retard worse eventualities (such as
mob actions, selection of tyrants, mistreatment of noncitizens and so on). Even then several
thorny problems remain for any deeper green political reorganization.
5.
Problems of chauvinism and present-time bias in democratic political
institutions.
In modem usage of the motherhood term democracy, two main lines are visible: included
are not only forms of political organisation where ‘power [is presumed to] reside in the people
as a whole, and is exercised either directly by them ... or by officers [selected] by them’, but
‘often more vaguely denoting a social state in which all have equal rights, without hereditary or
arbitrary differences of rank or privilege’34. It is on the basis of this second line that the call for
democracy has operated to remove chauvinism and discrimination of a range of forms: against
unpropertied minorities, nonconformists, women, blacks, tribals, and so on. Even so pursuit
34
Oxford English Dictionary entry 1, main entry. These two lines are by no means the only
distinctive lines now visible: increasingly conspicuous in calls for “democracy”, notably in Asia,
are calls to freedom and rights: not merely for basic legal freedoms such as free assembly, fair
process and so on, but for freedom to access information (the “right to know”).
�16
of the line, where successful, has not generally conferred adequate representation and rights on
several of these groups; but, more important, pursuit has stopped short in its inclusions at
certain humans, such as those granted citizenship—though relevant interests of many other
creatures and welfare of many of other items may be affected by what those citizens elect to do.
While democratic voters can perhaps be entrusted to take some account of those near and dear
(within remarkably sharp limits, as the situation of women in many regions still shows), such
as those deemed incompetent to vote: the young, deranged, and so on, much evidence reveals
that they cannot be relied for what is less near or dear (and indeed are easily herded into casting
their votes in accord with a shallow mercantilism). Consider what gets left out, outcasts of
even perfect democratic control:• spatially distant agents. For example, the interests of many humans outside USA are much
affected by practices of the US government, which however is outside their democratic reach.
• temporally distant agents. Since the past is past, it is future agents who would be affected,
often drastically affected, by present practices, that matter. Some way of taking due account of
future agents, their interests and welfare, is required, even under shallow long-term ecology,
that is under lighter green positions. Sustainable development has been regularly diverted
into—what is part of what it is about—such a way, an indirect and so far utterly ineffectual
way.
Much more of importance is also excluded according to deep-green theory:
• creatures with interests, other than present human citizens, and
• items with welfare, but perhaps lacking interests. The category includes items with intrinsic
value, whose value can be effected, made to fare worse or better.
A major problem, little addressed, is how to take due account of such democratically
excludeds. It is a problem especially for deeper green theories: that deep problem is, so to say,
how to obtain satisfactory representation of all that is of value in the natural world? That way of
putting it, while a little misleading, does point to a particular type of resolution.
Problems special to deep ecopolitical theory, include, that is, issues as to adequacy of
representation of items of value outside those humans that are represented, representation of
their interests, where they have them, of their welfare otherwise, of favourable conditions for
their sustenance, continuation and retention of value. Democracy of discussed modem sorts,
whether representative or participative, will not serve these purposes at all satisfactorily. For
instance, insofar as party-political representative democracies represent anything (even human
“bottom lines” as is sometimes erroneously supposed), they appear to represent primarily
interests of certain business-allied elites. Among the issues are of course those as to adequacy
of retention and protection of nonhuman items of intrinsic value, tropical forests and their
inhabitants and elements for instance.
�17
As observed, there is really no organisational alternative to proceeding with and through
agents, preferably well-disposed and quality agents. It is hard to guarantee either politically.
As agents are but a subclass of what requires democratic representation and what should have
its welfare or interests considered, how are the rest to be taken care of satisfactorily? There are
significant older responses to like problems, through totems and taboos, guardians and
constraints. Looked at one way the problem repeats, more or less, a familiar problem: namely,
how in larger constituencies do decision-making agents represent the whole mass of agents and
others in the constituency? A main democratic answer, designed to avoid many shortcomings
of alternatives, was: by representative means—only “representation” was almost never taken
seriously or literally enough. The sorts of considerations that made representation a promising
resolution make what is to be proposed—where representation has, in any case, to be expanded
—also promising. A key principle is this: all relevant items are to be represented. Relevance
criteria enter importantly. Steering committees of lower level institutions among the main
decision-making bodies should be appropriately representative of all items whose welfare is
affected by their decisions (principle of deepened demanarchy).
Under more equitable
arrangements, then, some decision-engaged agents will have to be selected as representative of
relevant classes of excludeds. Electoral arrangements do not so readily allow for such;
sortition, well-designed selection by lot, does.35 Of course, however good the selection
processes, however disinterested and well-intentioned the agents selected, some bias may
remain. Nonetheless prejudice and maltreatment can be much reduced.
As already hinted, deepened representation is not the only promising resolution of the
present problem that might be tried. Another, which could be attempted either separately or
concurrently, operates through the directive of ecologically sustainable development, requiring
as a constraint, not only intergenerational equity but also preservation of items of ecological
value.36 It might be suggested that such a directive be made mandatory, applying to all relevant
steering committees. But, as already evident, there are severe obstacles to getting such a
directive properly implemented. (In prevailing oligarchical circumstances, even very dilute
versions are worth pressing for however, as they would offer definite improvements upon what
presently happens.)
6.
A fundamental dilemma for deeper green organization: democratic or
authoritarian procedures?
35
No doubt there are electoral approximations; e.g. candidates in separate classes for each category to
be represented.
36
For elaboration of this option, see Sylvan and Bennett 94 and its sequel.
�18
There is strictly no logical space for a deeper green democracy, according to Saward for
one. For there is a clash, an essential tension, between democratic procedures and deeper green
values and commitments, notably to intrinsic values in nature. The main drift of the argument is
that green values, which are mandatory for deeper greens, require for their implementation anti
democratic, indeed authoritarian procedures; otherwise they cannot be guaranteed.
This nasty conundrum for green theory over democracy, which the theory typically
sponsors, is put in
sharper form as follows:37
Democracy concerns procedures,
environmentalism certain outcomes. What guarantee can there be that the procedures will
deliver the outcomes? What guarantee that democracy would yield a way of protecting
environments?
However the type of situation is worse than a matter of guarantees, which greens are not
really seeking and could not in general expect. (For here as almost everywhere else, things can
go wrong. Anarchism especially supplies few absolutes and little certainty.) It is a type of
situation, moreover, which effects not only environmentalism but any sort of social and other
amelioration, and even democracy itself. For democratic procedures may yield unsatisfactory
and even anti-democratic outcomes.
Unfortunately there are few or no guarantees that
meritorious forms will eventuate or persist. Political history itself copiously illustrates that.
But it can be argued theoretically. For example, succession of regimes must occur (owing to
finite lifetimes of power-holders, etc.), and in successional transitions deterioration can occur;
nor are there effective mechanisms that can exclude decline absolutely. Democratic procedures
of certain sorts offer better controls, and better prospects of satisfactory transition than most
others available, but even they afford no cast-iron guarantees of adequacy, and they are beset by
paradoxes of their own. With inadequate democratic structures plausible scenarios are easily
designed where just such outcomes occur, for instance as in what has been called a “paradox of
democracy” where a constituency elects an anti-democratic tyrant.38
A concerned attempt is made by Saward to mount a destructive version of such a paradox
against deep-green political theory (which he darkly calls ‘dark green’). The version is based
upon holism and intrinsic value requirements, coupled with democratic demands, of deeper
green theory. In clearest form, the version runs as follows: Holism implies consistency or
compatibility. But intrinsic value maintenance and democracy are not compatible, under evident
conditions (e.g. democratic procedures result in diminution or destruction of intrinsic value).
Firstly, partial confirmation for this explication:
37
Goodin, condensing Saward, p. 168.
38
Such paradoxes of democracy, and variants thereupon, are presented trenchantly by Popper, and
presumed nullified in Sylvan and Bennett 90. Improved structures can undoubtedly much reduce the
likelihood and problematicness of paradoxical overthrows.
�19
[The green imperative] usually contains a number of elements, variously
economic, political, social, geographical, religious, and so on. Its force
comes partly from the holism it embodies, and partly from its basis in the idea
of the ‘intrinsic value’ of nature. Holism implies that the various elements
which make up the imperative are compatible. The elements of the imperative
gain their importance, and their links with each other, by being referable back
to a common, intrinsic value of nature. It is at this point that we can pick up
the position of democracy or ‘direct democracy’ in lists of basic values set out
by greens. [These goals are the elements of the overall green imperative, and
gain their importance from both the holistic nature and intrinsic merit of the
values which the imperative represents]39
*
As should now be plain, and is becoming plainer, consistency is not an invariant desideratum,
and not to be insisted upon; coherence is what is “implied” and what supersedes consistency.40
As more than a century of Hegelian theory should have revealed, there can be inconsistent
wholes.
A further key assumption in the argument is that guaranteeing that intrinsic value is
protected (or like absolutes sustained) will require undemocratic procedures, such as
authoritarian ones.
An underlying assumption (soon to be rejected, for instance as
incorporating an offensive false dichotomy) is that only undemocratic, authoritarian procedures
fit with deeper green imperatives or givens.41 Several illustrations are offered of inconsistency
of green imperatives with types of democratic procedures—none of which tell, without testing
adaptation, specifically against deeper green positions.
A first illustration is directed against Porritt:
A direct democratic procedure (is not) compatible with imperative goals like
‘local production for local need’, ‘low consumption’, ‘labour-intensive
production’, and ‘voluntary simplicity’ (other items from Porritt’s list).42
Against this and other illustrations, it is worth emphasizing goals resemble objectives and
targets; goals are goals which are not mandatory and by no means always achieved, especially if
the achievers, like present humans, fall short (e.g. in ecological sensitivity) or their
organisational means and opportunities are inadequate. Observe too the oppositional attempt to
convert or to twist (since it is an up-grading by high redefinition) goals and programs and
principles—through ‘imperative goals’ and the like—into ‘imperatives’, ‘prescribed outcomes’,
undeniable principles, ultimates. That attempt should be resisted.
A second example looks at an alleged
39
G. Saward, p.65; square bracketed sections are taken from an earlier circulated version of this
article.
40
See Priest and others.
41
G. Saward, p.63
42
Saward, p.66.
�20
contradiction in the programme of the German Green Party. ‘Grassroots
democracy’ is one of the four ‘basic principles’ of the party’s ‘global
conception’. Another is the ‘ecological’: ‘Proceeding from the laws of nature,
and especially from the knowledge that unlimited growth is impossible in a
limited system, and ecological policy means understanding ourselves and our
environment as part of nature’. In effect, this means that certain outcomes are
proscribed from decision-making procedures. Such proscribed outcomes
must surely go well beyond any plausible list of outcomes which must be
proscribed in the interests of defending a direct democratic decision
procedure. Therefore, there is a clear contradiction between elements of the
value-set, whereas given the holism the green imperative is based on we
would have the right to expect these goals and values to be thoroughly
compatible.43
The last charge repeats the critical point already rejected, that holism implies consistency. A
further critical point should also be rejected: the flawed inference that ‘certain outcomes are
proscribed’. A political party in a democratic system has to be prepared to see its principles,
however spendid, overridden, certainly by other parties if they gain or hold political power.
There is a misconception too about principles (especially higher level principles) and their roles:
‘principles [too] can only be akin to [givens and] “laws of nature”, against which democratic
procedures must inevitably be traded off the board’. Sets of principles, which may themselves
turn out to be inconsistent, are hardly akin to natural laws; consider for instance reasons for
their revision, procedures for rechecking and revision, and so on. In any case, democratic
procedures are not traded away against laws of nature, which they may try to upset or suppress.
(Rather effort should be directed at informing the electorate and the like.)
To reinforce his case, Saward appeals to other authors who have advanced similar claims
(it is like appealing for confirmation of a newspaper report to other newspapers).
Boris Frankel accuses Rudolf Bahro of an ‘anti-democratic ’ vision of an
ecological society, given that politics as conflict will have no place in a sea of
‘givens’. He sees the dilemma as being similar to that of socialists—deeming
certain things as desirable in an ultimate sense, but proclaiming attachment to
democracy and the diversity it implies. Ophuls has stated the matter especially
clearly. The basic question about politics, he writes, is ‘Is the way we
organize our communal life and rule ourselves compatible with ecological
imperatives and other natural laws? ... how we run our lives will be
increasingly determined by ecological imperatives’44
In an ecological society, enough of the demos (members of democratic constituency) will hold
ecological attitudes and vote or select accordingly, almost by definition. Problems of effecting
change lie with unecological communities, which may not support ecological principles under
instituted democratic procedures (as presently in many places). Principles, and ecological
“givens”, stand, they remain ‘desirable in an ultimate sense’, but they are not followed and
43
Saward, p.66.
44
Saward, p.67. Note that only a very streamlined version of Saward’s case is being presented.
�21
implemented, while revealed democratic preferences go unchanged. There need be no ‘anti
democratic vision’, but rather an unecological praxis, which principled greens will work to
change.
The route is accordingly barred to Say ward’s
important conclusions...: that at best direct democracy[, and for that matter
indirect forms of democracy,] can only be at or near the bottom of value-lists
of greens. A commitment to democracy must clash with core green values
which, if taken on board, limit the range of acceptable policy outcomes
beyond these self-binding constraints that democracy logically requires.45
What Saward proposes instead is depressingly familiar: pragmatism, jettison intrinsic value.
Out therewith go deep-green positions.
... greens should not think in terms of overriding principles or [green]
imperatives. Indeed, it suggests that to think in terms of imperatives based on
arguments about intrinsic merit is unjustifiable.46
Fortunately the argument developed does not sustain the proposals. There is, to iterate a
central point, no internal or latent contradiction between (deep-)green policy objectives and
democratic procedures. Rather, green objectives would fail to be achieved without well-
disposed decision makers, who may not straightforwardly reflect any “will” of the demos. A
logical requirement on a realistic set of political objectives is that there are accessible
circumstances where they are realisable, where all elements of the whole would obtain. It
should not be required that there are are no situations where they may conflict, become
inconsistent.
It is certainly not required that they are realised, by whatever means.
A
community, as variously represented, can choose better or worse. There are many means
available, which it may shun (again there are no absolute guarantees), enabling it to choose
better, including improved structures, attitudinal change and consciousness raising, and so on.
In the end Saward too recognises the popular power of attitudinal change, thereby
himself removing his previous imposition of authoritarian means upon greens. There
45
Saward, p.68. The lead-in to Saward’s proposal was clearer in the earlier circulated version, which
ended in more precise (and dubious) form:
A commitment to democracy must clash with values that are inherent to
ecologism—and ecologism is about inherency, intrinsic values, laws of nature and
holism. Things—like democracy—that can only have instrumental value must lose
out to imperatives backed by inescapable canonical force.
46
Saward, p.75. Of course it is now put in terms of “imperatives”; it would be better expressed
simply in terms of (what did not figure in the earlier version) principles, policy objectives or the
like.
Opposition to deeper green political approaches often derives, as in Saward and in Goodin, from a
underlying shallow utilitarianism. The differences concern not only depth; they also concern the
rejection of individual interest bases, in favour of welfare bases and holism of deeper approaches.
�22
*
needs, from a green perspective [and others], to be a change in political
culture such that it will be compatible with sustainability. This, of course, is a
familiar theme from green writing. How[?] ... It can only be the case that
‘political change will ony occur once people think differently or, more
particularly, that sustainable living must be prefaced by sustainable thinking’.
By abandoning foundationalist myths of intrinsic merit, greens abandon the
implicit arrogance that have made democracy such a tenuous part of green
political theory.47
But he overstates the attitudinal point, with ‘only...the case’. People can be politically led
(retardation, however, as distinct from genuine advancement, is more familiar); they could just
elect a green government which instituted, under permissible democratic methods, sustainable
living or the like. Worse still, his final ungrammatical sentence is a complete non-sequitur.
Attitudinal change may include coming to appreciate intrinsic merit in natural things other than
humans, and seeing through pragmatic utilitarianism.
7. Ecoregional demanarchoid reshaping of Australian political institutions: one
beginning.
Is such a radical restructuring as that suggested feasible? Initial investigations hold out
the hope that major problems for deeper green theory can be solved, at least in theory.
Investigations accordingly suggest that the project within the Reshaping Australian Institutions
project is viable and worth pursuing. A logical next stage offers sketches for a radical political
reorganisation of Australia.48 Evidently there would be many designs (thereby removing facile
jeers against “the blueprint”, a part of co-optative strategy for persistence with prevailing statist
arrangements). Among the many designs, some few, conforming to favoured principles,
would be selected for detailed study. If the study were attempted, most appropriately through
systems modellings, then flexibility could be built into modellings, so that even though only a
few basic designs were examined, many variations would be feasible. Not only .is systems
modelling particularly well suited to modelling network designs; it also further offers prospects
for computing simulation and implementation, and even some simulated political
experimentation. Furthermore, such modellings begin to give some grasp on the size and
47
Saward, p.77. There are further defects in this passage than those noted in the text. For one,
admission of intrinsic merit does not entail foundationalism. For another, such recognition of
merit—which is less liable to disturb democracy, or render it tenuous, than adherence to
Christianity—need carry no tinges of arrogance; to the contrary, by contrast with humanism it may
yield a certain humbleness.
48
Such design, well accomplished, would help considerably in revealing what is possible, thereby
providing a seriously neglected contribution to politics, itself sometimes presented, with undue
licence, as the art of the possible.
�23
complexity of the task (a useful comparison is with World 3 modelling of the on-going “Limits
to Growth” project49, or, better, with a regionalized version of it).
To get started on such ecoregional design, for Australia, two broad classifications and
associated maps and charts are required:
• 1. an ecoregional classification, with partitions and overlays, for Australia and its continental
shelf. Observe that this classification would be hierarchical, as smaller regions merge into
larger regions; but it is a benign hierarchy of levels (it facilitates no accumulation of power or
wealth). Observe too that any such classification is far from unique. Plurality has already set
in, and a choice of classification (or a few choices) would have to be made, taking due account
of political organisational principles and objectives. Fortunately some of the preliminary
classificatory work has already been accomplished in Environmental Regionalisations of
Australia, where 3 broad classifications are presented and procedures for generating many more
given.50 For political purposes further classification attributes (e.g. demographic features) need
to be included.
Ecoregions provide the basis for spatially linked administrative and community units.
(Not all units need be of this sort; many contemporary arrangements are spatially unlinked). At
this stage a basic principle of decentralization and distributed and smaller-scale organization can
be invoked, namely
• subsidiarization: organisational functions should be allowed to fall down to (or to be pushed
down to) the lowest level compatible with their satisfactory performance. Thus, for instance,
most matters concerning such things as sewerage and primary education would be localized.
This subsidiarization principle, drawn from classical anarchism, has been widely adopted in
green planning proposals.
(It is said to have been applied by the Catholic Church in
administration of the Holy Roman Empire, whence the not altogether apt title derives. It is
presently being reassessed for use in that successor organisation, united Europe.) No doubt the
principle is open to challenge, for instance on grounds of efficiency, that larger size may prove
more efficient, of duplication, and so on.
But, the objective is not maximization of
technological values such as efficiency factors; instead it aims to satisize on a wider framework
of values, including holistic social arrangements. Presumably, however, undue duplication of
expensive administrative bodies is to be avoided.
Coupled with subsidiarization is another principle,
• direct accountability downwards: units should answer directly to regional constituencies. This
49
See e.g. Meadows.
50
See Thackway and Cresswell. Rudiments of a politically useful classification begin to emerge on
their 30 Group Regionalisation.
�*
24
.contrasts with prevailing accountability (such as it is) upwards, through some indirect and
tenuous, centralized circuiting chain.
Naturally much more gets comprehended under
accountability, for instance openness of environmental accounting.
There are also principles interrelating smaller with larger regions, both bottom-up and topdown (or centre-down) principles. Among these will be
• representation of smaller regions in relevant planning institutions of more comprehensive
regions. Representation, appropriately regulated, would often replace anarchistic federation,
which as observed appears too weak for requisite environmental control.
The point needs no labouring that the classifications and principles are open to challenge
at every step; for instance, there is nothing rock-hard about the type of ecoregional classification
preferred, nor about social functions to be addressed.
At a theoretical stage that is
unproblematic: there are other (less preferable) models; elaborate your own if you want to and
can. In any case, it is to be hoped that a diversity in theory might be to some extent reflected in
some diversity in practice—with different regions and continents trying different arrangements,
with much less of the sort of cosmopolitan political monoculture that we are presently being
harassed toward, with much more resilient political biodiversity. Of course, not all political
forms (including stateless types) are equally desirable or satisfactory, and some (including
present state examples) are unacceptable. So there are bounds upon diversity. Moreover, what
suits one community or region well may not suit another to be satisfactory for it. So too there
are limits upon successful transfer of organisational structure; what works in one region may
require much modification in another, or may substantially resist transfer.
• 2 a social function classification, of those community matters that require explicit organisation
at some level. An initial listing can be compiled by consulting Australian metropolitan telephone
directories, especially the government sections that used to feature in the front (until a year ago).
What results under redesign and reorganisation would, of course, look very different from what
is listed. Parliaments, parties and all their supporting apparatus would vanish; the Australian
Bureau of Statistics will assume a new significance and independent role, and so on. But
which institutions are retained, which adapted, and so on, would depend on further social
organisational features, not yet considered here. The result would be a levelled pyramidal
structure, a flat-untopped network as depicted in the structural diagram below, not a power
hierarchy.
�25
Structural diagram: a schematic depiction of organisational structure
(with some sample components indicated, but not all their network interlinkages displayed).
statistics
bureau
upper levels:
administrative,
executive,
research
ground level:
functional
selectoral
college
Australian
region
(federal)
immigration
control of
materials
inflow
super
regions
(a to k)
interregional
transport
(local)
regions
(1 to n)
arbitration
bureau
upper
levels
rental
entitlements
office
resources
income
office
ground
level
water
systems
sewer
systems
hospital
systems
region 1
region n
While some requisite research has been undertaken upon how the various functional
bodies and decision-making committees can be selected and can operate51, insufficient
investigation has been made of the interrelations and adequate funding of the bodies and
institutions involved — whichever they are! For little such detailed anarchoid modelling has
apparently been attempted for any region anywhere. Evidently there is much to be done
51
Thus e.g. Burnheim 85. The present article is not only heavily indebted to Burnheim's work, but
overlaps on-going investigations on his part.
�26
theoretically. Detailed modellings could bring issues down to earth, without setting things in
concrete; no doubt too they would disclose many further problems hidden in the detailing,
problems to which anarchoid solutions can however reasonably be expected.
Nonetheless comparatively little is likely to be done, unless requisite support is
forthcoming, support in the shape of researchers (research volunteers and students) and
research infrastructure (from research gifts, donations and the like). For such support, support
for investigating its own demise, a state is hardly likely knowingly to supply; nor are its
established research institutions. Insofar then as it is done visibly, it will probably have to be
accomplished largely outside state-supported and state-supporting infrastructure, such as
prominent university projects (like Reshaping Australian Institutions). Fortunately there are
now other structures, such as internet and radio communicational channels, that can facilitate
interconnections and interchanges of researchers, both regionally and internationally. On these
sorts of anarchoid communicational bases, networks of groups interested in elaborating such
alternative political modellings, both in theory and in practice, could be formed. Given the
dismal state of present political arrangements, almost everywhere terrestial, there is a great
need, as a very minimum, for networks of innovative researchers who share such goals.52
Richard Sylvan
References.
Bello, W., Dark Victory, Pluto Press, London, 1994.
Bookchin, M., Remaking Society: Pathways to a Green Future, South End Press,
Boston, 1990.
Burnheim, J., Is Democracy Possible?, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1985.
Burnheim, J., ‘Democracy, nation states and the world system’, New Forms of
Democracy, (ed. D. Held and C. Pollitt) London, Sage, 1986, pp.218-239.
Carter, A., ‘Towards a green political theory’, in The Politics of Nature. Explorations
in green political theory (ed. A. Dobson and P. Lucardie), Routledge, London, 1993,
pp.39-62.
Goodin, R., Green Political Theory, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1992.
Green, G., The New Radicalism: Anarchist or Marxist?, International Publishers, New
York, 1971.
52
To echo one referee. My sincere thanks to demanding referees for several helpful suggestions and
many improvements.
�27
Jacobs, M., The Green Economy: environment, sustainable development, and the
politics of the future., Pluto Press, Concord, Mass, 1991.
Mackay, H., Reinventing Australia: the mind and mood of Australia in the 90s,
Hugh Mackay, Pymble, NSW, Angus & Robertson, 1993.
Macphee, I., A new constitution?’ (excerpts from an opening address) NILEFA Newsletter,
Griffith University School of Law, June 1993.
Marshall, P., Demanding the Impossible: a history of anarchism, London, Harper
Collins 1992.
Me Laughlin, A., Regarding Nature, SUNY Press, Albany NY., 1993.
Meadows D., and others, Beyond the Limits, Chesley Green, Vermont, 1992.
Naess, A., Ecology, community and lifestyle (trans, and ed. D. Rothenberg),
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1989.
Ponting, C., A Green History of the World, Sinclair-Stevenson, London, 1991.
Priest, G., Routley, R. and Norman, J. (eds), Paraconsistent Logic, Philosophia Verlag,
Munich, 1989.
Routley, V. and R., ‘Social theories, self management and environmental problems’, in
Environmental Philosophy (ed. D Mannison and others), RSSS, Australian National
University, 1980.
Saward, M., ‘Green Democracy’, in The Politics of Nature: Explorations in green
political theory (ed. A. Dobson and P. Lucardie) Routledge, London, 1993 pp. 63-80.
Sylvan, R. and Bennett, D., Utopias, Tao and Deep Ecology, Green Series , RSSS,
Australian National University, 1990.
Sylvan, R. and Bennett, D., The Greening of Ethics, White Horse Press, Cambridge,
1994.
Sylvan, R., ‘Anarchism’, in Contemporary Political Theory (ed. R. Goodin and P.Pettit)
Blackwell, Oxford, 1993.
Sylvan, R., Green Anarchism, to appear, 1996.
Thackway, R. and Cresswell, I.D., Environmental Regionalisations of Australia,
Environmental Resources Information Network, Australian National Parks and Wildlife
Service, 1992.
Tynan, L., The Institute of Advanced Studies, The Australian National University, May
1993.
�
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29.5.95
PROBLEMS IN DEEPER GREEN
POLITICAL ORGANIZATION:
an Australian perspective on radical institutional change.
... people are ready for change and the impending debate will result in
constitutional change. We should, therefore, explore all options ... J
As elsewhere, there is growing dissatisfaction with Australia's political institutions, and
increasing demand to change them. This demand, hiding co-optative elements, has been
initiated and fostered in a conspicuously top-down fashion, by politicians and by academics.
There is so far little surge of political enterprise at grass-roots levels, little pressure for the
usually very limited changes proposed. Nonetheless, along with apathy, there is widespread
popular disenchantment with present political arrangements. There is now an opportunity
(although still only a small window no doubt) to put green and radical themes on the agenda for
real political change in Australia. That opportunity should not be missed, within Australia, or
elsewhere. While the exposition that follows concentrates upon Australia, as a convenient
advanced example, much of what is argued and urged applies or adapts elsewhere.
1. Disenchantment with politics, and political proposals for change.
There is now evident in Australia, what is variously described as disillusionment and
anxiety, cynicism and pessimism about the state of politics—a loss of confidence in it, and a
retreat from commitment. As much and more, Mackay has nicely exposed in a survey of the
Australian situation:
anxiety about the nature and quality of Australian politics [has] increased. ...
Widespread anxiety about the state of politics is based [in part] on an uneasy feeling
that, if the parties are not going to stand for some identifiable philosophy, and the
leaders are going to be chosen on the basis of their potential as television performers
or even as head-kickers, then the only appropriate response is cynicism.
That cynicism is reflected in a turning away from support for the major parties ... and
revealed in the attitudes of young Australians ...12
who often cannot be bothered registering to vote, or voting (though voting is legally
compulsory).
1
Hon. Ian Macphee, ‘A new constitution?’. Of course Macphee did not really mean all options, nor
even all constitutional options. Furthermore, his claim about preparedness of people for change is
incompatible with Mackey’s data (mentioned below) on exhaustion with change.
2
Mackay pp. 174-177. For all the Australian casualness of Mackay's presentation, his sociological
findings are nonetheless fairly solidly survey and interview based (if occasionally stretching the
data). Main findings are replicated by other sociologists.
2
♦>
Lack of confidence is beginning to show not only as cynicism about politicians, but
also as doubt about the integrity of Australia's political institutions.3
In a recent survey, ‘62 percent of [Australians] expressed either little or no confidence in the
political system. Such a figure accurately reflects the mood of the Australian community’.4
Australian loss offaith in conventional politics is attributed to a mix of factors. A first
explanatory factor as regards this disenchantment comes from the changes in politics already
remarked (ranging from policy issues to media performers) and from resultant uncertainty. ‘...
the Australian electorate is confused about which party stands for what, and about whether any
party has a long-term commitment to any particular point of view’ .5
A complex ‘second factor ... concerns the adversarial nature of two-party politics’.6
How can this ‘two party, adversarial approach ... continue to be appropriate when the
distinctions between the two parties themselves are so hard to define’? But ‘redefinition of
party politics implies the possibility of a redefinition of the whole parliamentary process itself’.
Why ‘when parties seem quite capable of stealing each other's policies or of invading each
other's traditional philosophical territory, [can not] politicians work together in a more co
operative and harmonious spirit’?7 ‘Adversarial politics may have made sense ... when ...
distinctions between the parties were stark and when arguments about principle could be
justified; today, the idea that politicians would be arguing over a point of principle or
philosophy is almost unthinkable.... [They] are much more likely to be arguing over matters of
personality, prejudice and power than over issues which effect the long-term health of the body
politic’.8
‘The quality of parliamentary debate is regarded not only as a symptom of the
adversarial nature of the institution, but also as a symptom either of the poor quality of
politicians ..., or of the effect of the system on those who are enmeshed in it’.9 Unless there is
3
Ibid, p.178
4
Ibid. The figure is the more surprising inasmuch as such disillusioning factors as corruption and
graft are not features of overt political life in Austral-asia by comparison with elsewhere in the
hemispherical region.
5
Ibid. pp. 178-179.
6
Ibid. The adversarial character of dominant State legal systems is also becoming subject to more
and more criticism. It appears likely that significant movement towards different inquiratorial
systems will occur, not least because of the huge expense and growing unaffordability of
adversarial systems.
7
Ibid.
8
Ibid, p.180.
9
Ibid, p.179. It is a symptom of both, the latter especially.
3
marked improvement in party philosophies, programs and performance, ‘the call to re-examine
the nature of the parliamentary process will gather momentum’.1011
A third relevant factor contributing to loss of faith is the impression of Australians that
‘they are overgoverned ’H, with too many expensive bureaucracies and too many houses of
parliament.
Conflicts between State and Federal parliaments — and between the various State
parliaments themselves — are regarded as a particularly unproductive expenditure of
political energy, and Australians question whether 15 houses of parliament may be
too many for the efficient government of 18 million people. The sheer number of
parliaments is often blamed for the problem of too many bureaucracies and for many
duplications of bureaucratic and political activity between State and Federal
governments.
... Whilst there is little love felt in the Australian community for Canberra and for the
idea of more centralised government even that is beginning to appear preferable ....
The widespread support for the idea of a republic which emerged during 1992 is
closely related to the underlying sense that Australia is overdue for some kind of
reexamination of its political institutions, and even the notion of Federation itself. ...
As debate about the idea of a republic proceeds ... it has begun to incorporate the idea
that Australian's political structures and systems might be quite significantly
reformed.12
Such disaffection reflects too a growing awareness that Australia’s political arrangements
owe more to historical accident than to rational design. Even though the main proposals for
change no doubt remain reformist in character and could lead in unfortunate directions, some of
them are far-reaching by normal standards. Both the extensive disenchantment with present
political arrangements and the felt need for significant change further suggest political times are
not altogether normal. Elements underpinning a political paradigm shift are already present, as
are features supporting rational redesign, to which radical additions are now feasible.
So far there have been, along with normal inertial resistance to change, two main
responses to growing pressure for change: political, from politicians, ex-politicians and political
commentators, and academic from intellectuals, academic entrepreneurs and academic
journalists. By and large, political responses have been grander, more sweeping and vaguer;
10
Ibid, p.181.
11
Ibid, p.181, itals added. The problem has now surfaced strikingly in the heavily indebted
Australian Capital Territory (“toy town” as its is facetiously called locally) which is swamped by
bureaucracy, where it has been discovered that there is one expensive bureaucrat for every fifteen
persons.
12
Ibid. p. 181-2. Republican proposals have been circulating for some time. But the cause was
finally taken up by prominent politicians, who made it their own, after which it became a popular
issue. Mackay's accurate presentation of popular support for political change contrasts drolly with
the first part of his book which depicts an Australian populace exhausted by change and longing for
the old ease and somnolence.
4
academic responses more theoretical and cautious, piecemeal and detailed. But there are no
grand detailed plans.
Under the leading proposal so far for political change, Australia's constitutional
monarchy will be displaced by a constitutional republic with its own head of state displacing the
monarch, but with perhaps minimal adjustments otherwise.
Nonetheless, as a result,
republicanism is in the air. Politicians have begun to contemplate other practical reforms, while
academics have begun to embroider theories around republicanism and institutional reform.
What happens to the Australian federation of states is one of the many unresolved issues
presently being debated.
The main reason for reform offered by the political camp can be summed up simply as
changing geopolitical circumstances. The camp tends not to acknowledge what would reflect
adversely upon it, the poorness of federal political practice. Rather it tends to attribute popular
dissatisfaction to economic circumstances and uncertainties: declining real standards of living,
extensive unemployment, persistent recession until recently, problems to be surmounted by
full-steam ahead untrammelled economic growth, to be attained by recoupling Australia to the
Asian economic express. Meanwhile an orchestrated republican movement can help divert
popular political attention from poor political management and a gloomy economic predicament.
Much has changed in the century since present antiquated political arrangements were
hammered out, arrangements making the newly-fashioned Commonwealth of Australia,
politically a federation of states, into a constitutional monarchy coupled to Britain, arrangements
of convenience fashioned for very different circumstances. Most non-symbolic linkages with
Britain, which has been inching towards a place in a united Europe, have already been severed.
Australia has gradually begun to appreciate its geo-political position in the Indian-Pacific region
(and the money-making opportunities for a sagging resource-based economy in allegedly
booming parts of Asia). Whence the main idealistic proposal: for an independent republic,
decoupled from Europe, assuming its own (prominent) place in its geo-political regions. In
principle at least, place and region begin to assume, or resume, some of their neglected, but
historic, significance (however that is not how it is yet seen).
Most proposals for constitutional and federal reform fit within that limited idealistic
conception. One important proposal, advanced by established political players, their most
radical proposal so far, includes abolition of the present states. Such a proposal would clearly
represent a welcome step in anarchist directions, were it not regularly offset by the idea of a
strengthened central state.13 Supposing this latter unfortunate idea is bracketed for the moment,
13
Anarchists can even rest (if uneasily) with a constitution, so long as it provides for an
organisation, Australia Inc. even, sufficiently different from a state and its authoritarian trappings.
5
♦>
then what is being seriously considered already starts to look like a much more rational
regionalism than what presently prevails.
The present states of Australia are undoubtedly an anachronism, based on accidental
boundaries of a contingent colonial history. They are ecologically irrational management units,
utterly failing to reflect ecological regions. Yet the states possess extensive environmental and
other management powers, inappropriate ‘powers which derive from what was largely a
political bargaining process conducted a century ago.’ Another effect of inapposite state-federal
arrangements, especially ‘funding arrangements, has been to lock out local government and,
more importantly, local communities. ... local communities must be given greater control over
those decisions of government which effect their lives ...’; the opportunity ‘to design and
provide the services which are needed locally.’14
At this stage of the dialectic McPhee slides easily and naturally from localism to
regionalism.
A glance at the map reveals natural regions for local government on a viable scale [an
optimistic contention]. Some cross State boundaries, and I would envisage that State
governments would be replaced with regional governments. These would be more
akin to larger local governments and would certainly not have the trappings of the
States. They should not have parliaments and the expensive, unwieldy and inefficient
bureaucracies which characterise our States. They should have a small number of
full-time councillors ... Regional governments should be solely accountable to their
ratepayers ...15 .
So far so good: however McPhee thereupon begins to infiltrate stock (small Z) liberal
management assumptions. Nonetheless the basic idea to retain is simple: that of ecologicallyrational local and regional rearrangement of anachronistic state partitions.
regionalization should be greened, as reform should be radicalized.
But that
More generally,
opportunites now present themselves to insert more radical ideas throughout the debate about
Australia’s future directions.
For much has been left off political agendas for change, not merely environments and
habitats of their less prominent or noisy inhabitants, but also such issues as rights and liberties,
transformation of antiquated legal and executive frameworks, and so on. Omission of (human)
rights is especially remarkable in states such as Australia, whose constitutions astonishingly do
not mention at all (what is however often supposed to justify states) individual rights, such
rights only being ensured, so far as they are, assumptions from uncodified common law, by
14
All quotes in this paragraph are drawn from McPhee. An address along similar lines to the Hon.
Ian McPhee, also proposing abolition of the states, was delivered by the former Prime Minister
R.G. Hawke. Hawke's speech, by contrast with McPhee's, attracted much media attention, and
though facilely dismissed as “unrealistic” by some practicing politicians, appeared to gain a good
deal of support.
15
McPhee ibid.
6
indirect routes (statutes regarding treatment of minorities and the like). Nor do the political
camps pushing limited change speak of rights or liberties; a very limited conception of
adjustments required prevails (though without rights and liberties and a generous public sphere
there is little, and little prospect of, justification for a state at all). Accordingly political agendas
for change need to be conspicuously broadened, to accommodate a decidedly more ambitious
range of constitutional and institutional redesign.
2. A project within a project: radically reshaping Australian institutions.
Academic entrepreneurs have also responded quickly to proposals for constitutional and
institutional changes. Early to scramble on the bandwagon was the institution to which I am
affiliated, the Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, with its
ambitious decade-long project, Reshaping Australian Institutions: Towards and Beyond
2001.16 One small part of this project does connect with the republican push, which no doubt
helped inspire it and gain its funding. The academic version of republicanism furnishes an
institutional and historic setting, tracing its roots back to ancient Rome, and thereby linking in,
what admits much modem adaptation, notions of citizenship and civic virtues. But most of the
project is independent of any republican reorganisation.
The Reshaping Australian Institutions project is presented in predominantly reformist
fashion, unsurprisingly. It is supposed, for instance, to ‘provide major input into evaluation
and reform of Australia's institutions’; indeed it is explicitly ‘aimed at contributing to Australian
constitutional reform’.17
Nothing however precludes consideration of reshaping or
transforming Australian institutions — those of the whole ecological region — in a unreformist
and possibly unconstitutional way, in a radical way.
Admittedly, the rough boundary between reformist and radical routes becomes even more
blurred when the constitution of a country is open for possible major reconsideration and much
political infrastructure may be altered. Nonetheless, from the perspective of a strong central
state, the stock boundary stands intact. For reformist changes would amount to comparatively
small adjustments leaving the state substantially intact. For example, a minimal transformation,
16
A recent brief description of this two million dollar project, now outlined in several places, is
given in Tynan, pp.17-19. Fuller descriptions are available from a main coordinator of the project,
J. Braithwaite, Law, RSSS, ANU. One of the many strands (17 at last count) of this project is an
environmental (or green) strand.
The immediate predecessor of this article was presented in a workshop at RSSS on green political
theory, arranged under the project. That accounts for some of the otherwise puzzling structure of
what has eventuated. Another earlier version was tried out at Ecopolitics VIII, Pacific Visions,
held at Lincoln University, Christchurch, New Zealand, in July 1994.
17
‘Reshaping Australian institutions: towards and beyond 2001’ in Tynan , p.17, italics added.
7
of the sort presently much favoured, from constitutional monarchy to Australian republic,
though entailing non-negligible constitutional redrafting, need only amend the roles of a few
elite power- and position-holders. By contrast, radical changes would substantially alter that
strong central state, perhaps (as will be proposed) eliminating it altogether.
There are appealing reasons for attempting wider, more radical investigations. For,
firstly, there may be more satisfactory institutional structures not accessible, or even visible,
along normal constitutional reform routes. Secondly, there is a demand, a small but growing
demand from green directions for instance, for radical institutional change. It would be
prudent, then, to make some investigation of the options, to assess their prospects. Thirdly,
reflection on such structures would certainly be part of a more comprehensive study of and
theory of institutional design, which the Reshaping project also presents as an objective.
Fourthly, much more controversially, major environmental problems cannot be satisfactorily
solved along merely reformist paths. For states, what are reformed, states themselves are
ecologically dysfunctional. In practice this appears obvious enough. Simply reflect upon their
environmental records; these are even worse than those abysmal records compiled for human
rights. But the practical case can be argued in detail in a state by state way, or less laboriously,
through the familiar rough classification of states into first, second and third world states. In
main third world regions, the rise of the state has seen the serious decline of environments.
Those third world states that have not largely destroyed their natural environments are in rapid
process of doing so. The activities involved are, furthermore, not merely tolerated by these
states but are usually actively encouraged (e.g. with state participation or by state concessions,
as through taxation advantages, subsidies, export incentives, etc.).
Further, the role of
exploitation and plunder of remaining natural “resources”, and depletion of “biological capital”,
by third world states, most of which are now trapped in debt and structural adjustment, has
increased many-fold in the last two decades.
How destructively second world states of eastern
Europe treated their own (and also other regions’) environment, how they over-expoited and
polluted them, has recently been much publicized. While the recent record in first world states
is no doubt marginally better, many of these states dominated their natural environments and
their wild inhabitants in the past, and have heavily polluted and congested their urban and
industrial regions. Nor does their present record gain an environmental pass. For example,
those that have any natural forests (similarly fisheries) left are in the process of eliminating or
degrading most of what remains; most are failing seriously in meeting (their own) targets on
greenhouse emissions, and so on. More theoretically, it is unlikely that states, increasingly
focussed narrowly upon shallow and short-term economic agendas, will or can deliver
satisfactorily environmentally. A prime reason is this: states are ineluctably committed, more
and more as their populations expand, to high levels of economic activity characteristically to
0
economic growth of sorts which impact heavily environmentally, inducing inevitable
degradation.18
Accordingly, there are then, or should be, two bands to any green (or environmental)
strand of a restructuring Australian institutions project: not merely an important reformist side,
but as well a radical spread. It is part of this underfunded and undersupported radical spread
which forms the main object of investigation in what follows, that part that relinquishes present
state structures, in favour of more environmentally benign institutions - which no doubt can be
designed, even if not so readily brought into practical operation.19
In order to reach radical redesign ideas quickly, let us touch only lightly upon some of the
more distinctively green reasons for this anarchoid quest (familiar anarchist reasons stand: the
illegitimacy of present states, the undesirability and severe disutility of states, which typically
are highly destructive and corrosive institutions based on concentration of power, hierarchical
authority, massive coercion, manipulation by economic elites, technobureaucracy, utilitarian
rationality, and sundry other evils.20) As indicated, present states are incompatible with stock
ecologically sustainable practices, because of their heavy unrelenting commitments to shallow
economic growth. More generally, standard states and their practices comprise very significant
parts of environmental problems, but quite insufficient parts of any solutions. Moreover, states
constitute an enormous and destructive drain on regional environments, a feature particularly
evident in smaller states which are always looking out for revenue-raising expedients for their
own expensive running.
Apart from those greens who have recognised the excessive environmental costs of states
and their heavy demands on environments, and thus or otherwise have come to recognise the
desirability of their withering away, there are many more who have become ambivalent about
states, who appreciate their very problematic character and very questionable legitimacy, but do
not see yet how to get along altogether without them, or more exactly (to indicate thereby a
partial resolution) without certain functions that they serve. Indeed to point immediately
towards a resolution of this crucial problem, the functional dissolution idea advocated is this:
that the functioning parts may be separately utilized without the colossal whole. The state is not
18
This theme, that states are normally ecologically dysfunctional, is documented and argued in detail
elsewhere; see e.g. Carter and especially Sylvan 96. On the dismal environmental records of
particular states see Ponting. For shocking figures and illustrations as regards environmental
exploitation in third world states, see Bello, pp. 57-65.
19
Nonetheless practical revolutionary displacement of the state is not so remote, or difficult, as is
generally supposed.
20
To adapt a referee’s trenchant summary. For detail on some familiar anarchist reasons, see Burnheim
and above all Marshall.
9
an organism the functioning parts of which must fail without the whole. So it may well be the
enormous fat of state can simply be shed, to great advantage.
In any event, ‘the State is a social institution’, always ‘within’, Marxists continue, ‘a
concrete historic setting’.21 Granted, it is an institution. For an institution in the relevant sense
is ‘a society or association for the organisation or promotion of some particular object or
function’.22 Institutions include therefore the state, the central state. So it too is up for
reshaping, radical slimming, and possible removal in a concrete historical setting, such as late
twentieth century Australia. Whittling away the state means in turn dismantling corporate
capitalism, which now dwells in symbiosis with the bureaucratic state, and also much else,
often environmentally undesirable, that the state affords a supportive framework for and enables
to flourish.
Ideas and schemes for radical redesign are already available from rich anarchist and
socialist sources, those for green design and reshaping from growing and diverse
environmental sources. In main part, then, radical ecoredesign is a matter of convivially
meeting (not joining) the two, an intersection that favours anarchist inputs. Something of the
sort has already been attempted, in an environmentally shallower way, in eco-anarchism, alias
social ecology, and in a deeper way, in deep-green social theory.23 Moreover, it could be
attempted in other kinds of deeper green theory—itself really a plurality of theories, which
however does not itself force radical ecoredesign, though most variants would support it. Thus
Naess's “deep ecology” for example, which is not so far politically radical, only strongly
reformist, could (and should) be given a radical turn.24
Concentrating upon the radical spread of deeper green theory does not preclude
concomitant reformist investigation and activity. Both sides of the green street should be
played. Reformist opportunities should of course be pursued—incremental change, social
engineering, “ecologizing” economics, greening bureaucrats, lobbying politicians, and like
activity (but better really to cut through much such pleading and obiesance and be rid of
politicians and bureaucrats). There are many reformist proposals being advanced for the
greening of Australian federal institutions—with but few so far having much impact on
21
Thus, Green p.61, who adds quite wrongly that Proudhon and his disciples do not see it that way
‘but as an abstraction and aberration’.
22
Adaptation of the Oxford English Dictionary. An institution is, so to say, an organitution.
23
On social ecology, see Bookchin 90, and for information on deep-green social theory, see Sylvan
and Bennett 94 and Routleys 80.
24
As to the political character of deep ecology, and why it should be turned, see Sylvan and Bennett
94, where an expose of the political theory of Naess's ecosophy is presented.
practice.25 Nonetheless, more limited, more constrained, proposals of this sort certainly have a
better chance, within the prevailing paradigm, of making a difference than radical redesigns, too
smartly dismissed as “unrealistic” or “utopian”. No doubt the normal “reshaping institutions”
investigations are rightly focussed then upon institutional reform, not upon revolutionary
reshaping, where much freer scope for redesign is offered. However the real possibility of
radical change should not be excluded; green radicals should be prepared. There have been
various opportunities for revolutionary change in Australian history, the last occurring,
according to some historians, with the ignominious fall of the Whitlam government. There
may well be opportunities again both in the near and intermediate future, especially should some
solid work be put into propagating the prospect. In the near term there is economic disarray,
social fragmentation, and constitutional destabilization; in the longer term increasing ecological
problems and expanding eco-catastrophes loom.
Under present incremental reform and regression, for all the spasmodic environmental
rhetoric, comparatively little in the way of radical green change occurs or can be expected.
Witness, for comparison, the snail pace of the establishment movement towards a rather
minimal grey republicanism in Australia, or differently away from meeting carbon-reduction
commitments. It is increasingly doubtful, given prevailing responses to economic and other
difficulties, that present structural and systematic problems confronting Australia, for example,
will be satisfactorily addressed, environmental problems such as extensive and expanding land
and water degradation not least. Furthermore, under more incremental reform, the sorts of
problems concerning reorganising society in deeper green ways, problems that provide
subsequent topics, would likely not arise. So in getting beyond more muddling along, do
imagine fairly free scope for institutional eco-redesign is somehow dispensed. One nice
corollary is that once it is worked out where to go organisationally, it is much easier to ascertain
how to arrive there.
3. A basic problem of structure: central or decentralised organisation?
There are large and immediate advantages in pursuing a problem-oriented approach to
redesign. That approach, which will tend towards anarchoid outcomes, will be anarchistically
guided in this respect: Unless there is a genuine problem, already causing difficulties or
developing, nothing need be done; otherwise let things alone, let Being be.26 On this non
25
There are many many narrower economic and technological proposals. One of the more interesting
wider proposals comes from an Opposition not noted for its green initiatives and commitments, for
an overseeing Department of Sustainable Development, a Department that could see to the
greening of all federal institutions.
26
To echo also Heideggerian wisdom. The non-prejudicial term ‘anarchoid’ is deployed, not because
what emerges will not be anarchistic (as characterized in Marshall and in Sylvan 94), but because it
11
managerial low-work approach a good deal of structure presently inoperational, and of idle
regulation presently enacted, can be removed; organisational arrangements can be very
significantly down-sized.
The leading methodological idea is that enough relevant
(biodegradable) structure is introduced to resolve organisational problems, but not substantially
more. Organisational oversupply and waste is thus avoided. Moreover, much structure that
keeps so much environmentally destructive industry in business is likewise shed.
Among basic problems for deeper green theory are those of political reorganisation and so
of organisation. Evidently institutions, and their types, are critical to such organisation. And a
major organisational problem for any putative green society concerns structure', to take a critical
case, whether society is centrally organised (concentrated, bureaucratised, hierarchical, large-
scale and so on) or decentralised (dispersed, non-hierarchical, small-scale and supposedly
beautiful, and so on).
This focal problem, to centralise or not to centralise, is sometimes presented as a serious
dilemma for concerned green theorists.27 The binary horns of this dilemma are respectively: on
the one hom, the pull (or push) to localisation and regionalisation, to non-anonymous smallscale low-impacting environmentally-friendly arrangements, to diffusion of power and
dismantling of the incubus of a central state with its crippling costs and unfriendly practices; and
on the other horn, the need for continuing and further central income generation and welfare
(re)distribution, central regulation and control, and the pressures to environmental reliance upon
and use of the central state.28
The dilemma has been trenchantly posed as follows:
... the demands of the Greens sometimes appear contradictory, in seeking increasing
environmental regulation and welfare measures... alongside a halt to industrial
expansion, the very source of income for the welfare state. Yet the expansion and
further centralization of the bureaucratic state apparatus is neither their overt goal nor
covert motivation. Quite the contrary. Their genuine long term vision is of a
decentralized, steady state society of self-sufficient, relationally autonomous (albeit
interlinked) regions.29
departs from standard forms of anarchism in significant respects, not least in planned political
organization. In this exercise organization is of the essence.
27
As by Jacobs of The Green Economy, who has posed the problem sharply, as part of an argument
however for retaining the central state (and much of present status quo arrangements).
28
Environmental reasons for favouring small-scale bioregional organisation are nicely gathered in
McLaughlin, chapter 10.
29
Unknown source.
12
As it happens, not only does the theoretical and utopian literature run both ways, towards and
away from centralisation, but so does practice and experience. As to theory, anarchisticallyinclined presentations tend to favour decentralisation, perhaps with some central compensation
through federation (thus recent Blueprints, ecotopias, and so on), whereas socialisticallyinclined presentations invariably opt for powerful central states (to control and redistribute
grander social programs, etc.).
As to practice, there are local councils, community
organisations, residents' groups aiming to keep out, or to remove, the state-sponsored nuclear
plants, toxic waste incinerators, waste dumps or super-highways, on the one horn; and, on the
other, central states blocking, modifying, or regulating local or regionally promoted schemes
for large dams (e.g. Tasmania's Franklin), forest exploitation, pulp mills, strip mining, and so
on.30
To some extent, the way the problem has often been re-presented, in terms of a dilemma
between top-down and bottom-up structure and power transmission, already points towards a
theoretical resolution: namely, both, or rather enough of both. But how is this combination to
be achieved? An answer does not fall out by pure reason, operating in isolation from other
problems. By taking advantage of information gathered from other connected problems, a
promising answer can be teased out. Neither standard socialism nor anarchism afford answers,
socialism because it leaves the central institution of state intact. But standard anarchism, much
more promising, does not resolve the problem either, because federation, as usually explained,
does not leave enough structure; it may not even concede sufficient power to delegates to
constrain exploitative local communities.
A solution to such dilemma lies through a combinational strategy, which includes partial
dissolution of the central state, into its actual organisational functions in each region. While
removing the state, itself source of several environmental and social problems, and its
concentration of power, invariably under environmentally unfriendly control, functional
dissolution nonetheless retains its apparently essential services, including (where necessary)
those of environmental regulation. Relevant continent-wide functions would persist or be
introduced: for example, services controlling inflow into Australia of damaging forms and
materials such as toxic wastes and exotic pest species, or regulating outflow from Australia of
native wildlife and flora. In part, ecoregional functionalism offers a radical continuation of the
separation ofpowers of recent historical process, of church and state, legislature and executive,
and so forth. As these functions come to operate separately while remaining coordinated, so
would those functional arrangements and institutions dissolving the state.
30
Much turns on the exploitative character of certain local and regional communities, their get-richquick schemes, what they are prepared to do to survive in old or superficially affluent ways, and so
on.
13
It is a major illusion of modem political theory that a central state, ceded monopolies on
coercion, currency, taxation and so on, is necessary in order to secure adequate supply of
public goods, including public order and environmental regulation. To the contrary, the most
that appears required, the most that arguments would support, is some network of specific
organisations functioning to look after specific kinds of goods and services, those necessary for
this or that, that are not otherwise supplied. There is no inherent reason why communities
should not institute and regulate specialised bodies coordinated among themselves (by
negotiations or, failing that, through recognised arbitrators) to ensure the adequate maintenance
or production of various types of public goods, including control of damaging crime. Each
such institution could gain community standing from its support base, for instance through
achieving democratically-generated recognition. Such an institution would aim to secure
execution of its recommendations and decisions by sanctions and like admissible means, and in
doing this it could mobilize in co-operation with communities and with other recognised
institutions.
There are many examples of such institutions operating successfully both
regionally and internationally; for instance, those for postal and communicational arrangements,
international sporting bodies, international academies and clubs, environmental and consumer
organizations.31
4.
Selecting satisfactory political arrangements within the span of anarchoid
options.
Anarchoid options come in a wide variety of forms, including, among others, both right
leaning individualistic or capitalistic varieties, and left-leaning social or communitarian
varieties.32 A suitably generous political pluralism will allow for all these forms, while not
encouraging all, as they are of very different merit. For example, some may be neglectful or
repressive of some of their inhabitants, or destructive of their environments; others, superior in
31
This passage borrows from the summary in Burnheim 86 p.221 of Burnheim 85. For much fuller
elaboration see Burnheim 85 and Sylvan 94.
The critical issue of funding administration, without a coercive taxation system, is also broached in
these places (and developed in Sylvan 96). The broad proposal is that low-cost administration,
much of which would be volunteer, could be funded by rents (there would be no property in land
and resources), use charges, and fines.
32
There are many more varieties of political systems than much recent theory has cared to concede.
For example, to take right-leaning dimensions, all of individualism, market-organization and
capitalism function substantially independently. There can be markets without capitalism
(characterised through opportunities to accumulate capital), and conversely, capitalism without free
market arrangements. And so on. Most historic and modern systems, upon which political theory
has tended inadmissibly to concentrate almost exclusively, are hybrid arrangements with mixes of
different elements drawn from both “left” and “right”.
14
these socio-environmental regards, may not be. Dismantling or deconstructing a state does not,
on its own, make a sharp selection between alternatives. No doubt the hope is, what can be
striven for, that adequate designs are sought and adequate selections made, that inadmissible
forms rapidly perish. Those remaining forms that are admissible can be ranked; for instance,
they might be graded according to defeasible criteria based upon “pillars” of German green
movement such as environmental sensitivity, democratic institutions, and nonviolent practices.
While right-leaning anarchoid arrangements could work in theory (e.g. under what is
improbable, benevolent capitalism), they are unlikely to succeed in practice, for several reasons.
Consider, to illustrate in outline, why that much promoted rightist form, market (or “liberal”)
capitalism is unlikely to serve. For one reason, an intrusive state is likely to emerge, with state
controlled and state funded standing military and police forces, needed to defend capitalist
interests and accumulation, to protect private property, to uphold endemic social inequalities,
and to enforce particular market and trade structures, with a substantial and heavy taxation
system to fund these forces and a corresponding bureaucracy needed to administer and regulate
these and other institutions, such as those required to guarantee that capitalist liabilities are
strictly limited and to keep markets (far from self-regulating) unclogged, “free” and competitive.
Not only are anarchoid conditions thus violated, so are those for benign green societies. In
normal practice, market capitalism tends to be highly environmental exploitative, as modern
history demonstrates all too plainly (plainly too it is not alone in this propensity, so are other
modem statist systems). Furthermore, given the sorts of humans these systems tend to elevate,
and exalt, and the sorts of practices (including extravagant consumption for all that can afford it)
they encourage and sometimes even enforce, extensive exploitation is to be expected and liable
to persist. At least that is so without, what is thereupon required in a self-reinforcing spiral,
further state intervention to distort “natural” capitalistic incentives and institutions, to limit
practices on private property (thereby effectively altering the institution), to establish new
instruments and commodities such as pollution licences, green investments and futures, and so
forth.33 Even though a shallow greenness can also be sprayed upon parts of market capitalism
(factories in fields, forest reserves retained for tourists, and so on), and some green showcase
exhibits tacked on, environmental depth cannot. Shallowness is both an inevitable consequence
of the justifying socio-economic theory, and also an expected best outcome of practice.
Accordingly in institutional design it is much more promising to look in democratic left
leaning directions. For, as argued, it would be rash to gamble upon any bright new dawn of
environmentally and socially benign market capitalism, which in any event could easily revert
back towards dark industrial times. However, very similar arguments to those sketched could
33
Infiltrated, along with propaganda on behalf of such instruments, is much mythology, including
acclaimed environmental virtues of private property and privatization generally.
15
be developed as regards centralised socialism, especially as untempered by democratic
procedures. While island communities of a wide range of varieties are naturally not excluded
under anarchoidal pluralism, brighter continental prospects lie through modifications of
democratic sociality, which appears to permit much of what is sought in design.
Under duly decentralized social organization, each requisite function would be carried out
by some association of agents comprising operative and support staff (that is, as regards bare
formal structure, more or less as now, in institutions like departments and corporations). For
direct accountability downwards, and also to ensure desirable separation and dilution of power,
upper operatives, those of a directing or steering committee (the nervous system of the
organisation), would be democratically selected (from a relevant lower level constituency, and
from the whole people of an ecoregion in case of a typical bottom level institution). Note well
that selection is not election: election is but one method of democratic selection, and often
enough not an altogether satisfactory method. The point of some sort of democratic selection,
as a guiding though not invariant rule, is manifold: it is in part to ensure due accountability, in
part to prevent unethical accumulation of power in special classes, and in part for reasons that
devolve from the very notion of democracy itself.
In brief, certain forms of democracy offer promising prospects for green reorganisation,
particularly within complementing left-leaning settings where those forms can function in
favour of sustainability. However even with an informed democracy in place, there are few
guarantees. Some structure, such as limited executive power separated from judicial and
administrative functions, needs to be set in place to block or retard worse eventualities (such as
mob actions, selection of tyrants, mistreatment of noncitizens and so on). Even then several
thorny problems remain for any deeper green political reorganization.
5.
Problems of chauvinism and present-time bias in democratic political
institutions.
In modem usage of the motherhood term democracy, two main lines are visible: included
are not only forms of political organisation where ‘power [is presumed to] reside in the people
as a whole, and is exercised either directly by them ... or by officers [selected] by them’, but
‘often more vaguely denoting a social state in which all have equal rights, without hereditary or
arbitrary differences of rank or privilege’34. It is on the basis of this second line that the call for
democracy has operated to remove chauvinism and discrimination of a range of forms: against
unpropertied minorities, nonconformists, women, blacks, tribals, and so on. Even so pursuit
34
Oxford English Dictionary entry 1, main entry. These two lines are by no means the only
distinctive lines now visible: increasingly conspicuous in calls for “democracy”, notably in Asia,
are calls to freedom and rights: not merely for basic legal freedoms such as free assembly, fair
process and so on, but for freedom to access information (the “right to know”).
16
of the line, where successful, has not generally conferred adequate representation and rights on
several of these groups; but, more important, pursuit has stopped short in its inclusions at
certain humans, such as those granted citizenship—though relevant interests of many other
creatures and welfare of many of other items may be affected by what those citizens elect to do.
While democratic voters can perhaps be entrusted to take some account of those near and dear
(within remarkably sharp limits, as the situation of women in many regions still shows), such
as those deemed incompetent to vote: the young, deranged, and so on, much evidence reveals
that they cannot be relied for what is less near or dear (and indeed are easily herded into casting
their votes in accord with a shallow mercantilism). Consider what gets left out, outcasts of
even perfect democratic control:• spatially distant agents. For example, the interests of many humans outside USA are much
affected by practices of the US government, which however is outside their democratic reach.
• temporally distant agents. Since the past is past, it is future agents who would be affected,
often drastically affected, by present practices, that matter. Some way of taking due account of
future agents, their interests and welfare, is required, even under shallow long-term ecology,
that is under lighter green positions. Sustainable development has been regularly diverted
into—what is part of what it is about—such a way, an indirect and so far utterly ineffectual
way.
Much more of importance is also excluded according to deep-green theory:
• creatures with interests, other than present human citizens, and
• items with welfare, but perhaps lacking interests. The category includes items with intrinsic
value, whose value can be effected, made to fare worse or better.
A major problem, little addressed, is how to take due account of such democratically
excludeds. It is a problem especially for deeper green theories: that deep problem is, so to say,
how to obtain satisfactory representation of all that is of value in the natural world? That way of
putting it, while a little misleading, does point to a particular type of resolution.
Problems special to deep ecopolitical theory, include, that is, issues as to adequacy of
representation of items of value outside those humans that are represented, representation of
their interests, where they have them, of their welfare otherwise, of favourable conditions for
their sustenance, continuation and retention of value. Democracy of discussed modem sorts,
whether representative or participative, will not serve these purposes at all satisfactorily. For
instance, insofar as party-political representative democracies represent anything (even human
“bottom lines” as is sometimes erroneously supposed), they appear to represent primarily
interests of certain business-allied elites. Among the issues are of course those as to adequacy
of retention and protection of nonhuman items of intrinsic value, tropical forests and their
inhabitants and elements for instance.
17
As observed, there is really no organisational alternative to proceeding with and through
agents, preferably well-disposed and quality agents. It is hard to guarantee either politically.
As agents are but a subclass of what requires democratic representation and what should have
its welfare or interests considered, how are the rest to be taken care of satisfactorily? There are
significant older responses to like problems, through totems and taboos, guardians and
constraints. Looked at one way the problem repeats, more or less, a familiar problem: namely,
how in larger constituencies do decision-making agents represent the whole mass of agents and
others in the constituency? A main democratic answer, designed to avoid many shortcomings
of alternatives, was: by representative means—only “representation” was almost never taken
seriously or literally enough. The sorts of considerations that made representation a promising
resolution make what is to be proposed—where representation has, in any case, to be expanded
—also promising. A key principle is this: all relevant items are to be represented. Relevance
criteria enter importantly. Steering committees of lower level institutions among the main
decision-making bodies should be appropriately representative of all items whose welfare is
affected by their decisions (principle of deepened demanarchy).
Under more equitable
arrangements, then, some decision-engaged agents will have to be selected as representative of
relevant classes of excludeds. Electoral arrangements do not so readily allow for such;
sortition, well-designed selection by lot, does.35 Of course, however good the selection
processes, however disinterested and well-intentioned the agents selected, some bias may
remain. Nonetheless prejudice and maltreatment can be much reduced.
As already hinted, deepened representation is not the only promising resolution of the
present problem that might be tried. Another, which could be attempted either separately or
concurrently, operates through the directive of ecologically sustainable development, requiring
as a constraint, not only intergenerational equity but also preservation of items of ecological
value.36 It might be suggested that such a directive be made mandatory, applying to all relevant
steering committees. But, as already evident, there are severe obstacles to getting such a
directive properly implemented. (In prevailing oligarchical circumstances, even very dilute
versions are worth pressing for however, as they would offer definite improvements upon what
presently happens.)
6.
A fundamental dilemma for deeper green organization: democratic or
authoritarian procedures?
35
No doubt there are electoral approximations; e.g. candidates in separate classes for each category to
be represented.
36
For elaboration of this option, see Sylvan and Bennett 94 and its sequel.
18
There is strictly no logical space for a deeper green democracy, according to Saward for
one. For there is a clash, an essential tension, between democratic procedures and deeper green
values and commitments, notably to intrinsic values in nature. The main drift of the argument is
that green values, which are mandatory for deeper greens, require for their implementation anti
democratic, indeed authoritarian procedures; otherwise they cannot be guaranteed.
This nasty conundrum for green theory over democracy, which the theory typically
sponsors, is put in
sharper form as follows:37
Democracy concerns procedures,
environmentalism certain outcomes. What guarantee can there be that the procedures will
deliver the outcomes? What guarantee that democracy would yield a way of protecting
environments?
However the type of situation is worse than a matter of guarantees, which greens are not
really seeking and could not in general expect. (For here as almost everywhere else, things can
go wrong. Anarchism especially supplies few absolutes and little certainty.) It is a type of
situation, moreover, which effects not only environmentalism but any sort of social and other
amelioration, and even democracy itself. For democratic procedures may yield unsatisfactory
and even anti-democratic outcomes.
Unfortunately there are few or no guarantees that
meritorious forms will eventuate or persist. Political history itself copiously illustrates that.
But it can be argued theoretically. For example, succession of regimes must occur (owing to
finite lifetimes of power-holders, etc.), and in successional transitions deterioration can occur;
nor are there effective mechanisms that can exclude decline absolutely. Democratic procedures
of certain sorts offer better controls, and better prospects of satisfactory transition than most
others available, but even they afford no cast-iron guarantees of adequacy, and they are beset by
paradoxes of their own. With inadequate democratic structures plausible scenarios are easily
designed where just such outcomes occur, for instance as in what has been called a “paradox of
democracy” where a constituency elects an anti-democratic tyrant.38
A concerned attempt is made by Saward to mount a destructive version of such a paradox
against deep-green political theory (which he darkly calls ‘dark green’). The version is based
upon holism and intrinsic value requirements, coupled with democratic demands, of deeper
green theory. In clearest form, the version runs as follows: Holism implies consistency or
compatibility. But intrinsic value maintenance and democracy are not compatible, under evident
conditions (e.g. democratic procedures result in diminution or destruction of intrinsic value).
Firstly, partial confirmation for this explication:
37
Goodin, condensing Saward, p. 168.
38
Such paradoxes of democracy, and variants thereupon, are presented trenchantly by Popper, and
presumed nullified in Sylvan and Bennett 90. Improved structures can undoubtedly much reduce the
likelihood and problematicness of paradoxical overthrows.
19
[The green imperative] usually contains a number of elements, variously
economic, political, social, geographical, religious, and so on. Its force
comes partly from the holism it embodies, and partly from its basis in the idea
of the ‘intrinsic value’ of nature. Holism implies that the various elements
which make up the imperative are compatible. The elements of the imperative
gain their importance, and their links with each other, by being referable back
to a common, intrinsic value of nature. It is at this point that we can pick up
the position of democracy or ‘direct democracy’ in lists of basic values set out
by greens. [These goals are the elements of the overall green imperative, and
gain their importance from both the holistic nature and intrinsic merit of the
values which the imperative represents]39
*
As should now be plain, and is becoming plainer, consistency is not an invariant desideratum,
and not to be insisted upon; coherence is what is “implied” and what supersedes consistency.40
As more than a century of Hegelian theory should have revealed, there can be inconsistent
wholes.
A further key assumption in the argument is that guaranteeing that intrinsic value is
protected (or like absolutes sustained) will require undemocratic procedures, such as
authoritarian ones.
An underlying assumption (soon to be rejected, for instance as
incorporating an offensive false dichotomy) is that only undemocratic, authoritarian procedures
fit with deeper green imperatives or givens.41 Several illustrations are offered of inconsistency
of green imperatives with types of democratic procedures—none of which tell, without testing
adaptation, specifically against deeper green positions.
A first illustration is directed against Porritt:
A direct democratic procedure (is not) compatible with imperative goals like
‘local production for local need’, ‘low consumption’, ‘labour-intensive
production’, and ‘voluntary simplicity’ (other items from Porritt’s list).42
Against this and other illustrations, it is worth emphasizing goals resemble objectives and
targets; goals are goals which are not mandatory and by no means always achieved, especially if
the achievers, like present humans, fall short (e.g. in ecological sensitivity) or their
organisational means and opportunities are inadequate. Observe too the oppositional attempt to
convert or to twist (since it is an up-grading by high redefinition) goals and programs and
principles—through ‘imperative goals’ and the like—into ‘imperatives’, ‘prescribed outcomes’,
undeniable principles, ultimates. That attempt should be resisted.
A second example looks at an alleged
39
G. Saward, p.65; square bracketed sections are taken from an earlier circulated version of this
article.
40
See Priest and others.
41
G. Saward, p.63
42
Saward, p.66.
20
contradiction in the programme of the German Green Party. ‘Grassroots
democracy’ is one of the four ‘basic principles’ of the party’s ‘global
conception’. Another is the ‘ecological’: ‘Proceeding from the laws of nature,
and especially from the knowledge that unlimited growth is impossible in a
limited system, and ecological policy means understanding ourselves and our
environment as part of nature’. In effect, this means that certain outcomes are
proscribed from decision-making procedures. Such proscribed outcomes
must surely go well beyond any plausible list of outcomes which must be
proscribed in the interests of defending a direct democratic decision
procedure. Therefore, there is a clear contradiction between elements of the
value-set, whereas given the holism the green imperative is based on we
would have the right to expect these goals and values to be thoroughly
compatible.43
The last charge repeats the critical point already rejected, that holism implies consistency. A
further critical point should also be rejected: the flawed inference that ‘certain outcomes are
proscribed’. A political party in a democratic system has to be prepared to see its principles,
however spendid, overridden, certainly by other parties if they gain or hold political power.
There is a misconception too about principles (especially higher level principles) and their roles:
‘principles [too] can only be akin to [givens and] “laws of nature”, against which democratic
procedures must inevitably be traded off the board’. Sets of principles, which may themselves
turn out to be inconsistent, are hardly akin to natural laws; consider for instance reasons for
their revision, procedures for rechecking and revision, and so on. In any case, democratic
procedures are not traded away against laws of nature, which they may try to upset or suppress.
(Rather effort should be directed at informing the electorate and the like.)
To reinforce his case, Saward appeals to other authors who have advanced similar claims
(it is like appealing for confirmation of a newspaper report to other newspapers).
Boris Frankel accuses Rudolf Bahro of an ‘anti-democratic ’ vision of an
ecological society, given that politics as conflict will have no place in a sea of
‘givens’. He sees the dilemma as being similar to that of socialists—deeming
certain things as desirable in an ultimate sense, but proclaiming attachment to
democracy and the diversity it implies. Ophuls has stated the matter especially
clearly. The basic question about politics, he writes, is ‘Is the way we
organize our communal life and rule ourselves compatible with ecological
imperatives and other natural laws? ... how we run our lives will be
increasingly determined by ecological imperatives’44
In an ecological society, enough of the demos (members of democratic constituency) will hold
ecological attitudes and vote or select accordingly, almost by definition. Problems of effecting
change lie with unecological communities, which may not support ecological principles under
instituted democratic procedures (as presently in many places). Principles, and ecological
“givens”, stand, they remain ‘desirable in an ultimate sense’, but they are not followed and
43
Saward, p.66.
44
Saward, p.67. Note that only a very streamlined version of Saward’s case is being presented.
21
implemented, while revealed democratic preferences go unchanged. There need be no ‘anti
democratic vision’, but rather an unecological praxis, which principled greens will work to
change.
The route is accordingly barred to Say ward’s
important conclusions...: that at best direct democracy[, and for that matter
indirect forms of democracy,] can only be at or near the bottom of value-lists
of greens. A commitment to democracy must clash with core green values
which, if taken on board, limit the range of acceptable policy outcomes
beyond these self-binding constraints that democracy logically requires.45
What Saward proposes instead is depressingly familiar: pragmatism, jettison intrinsic value.
Out therewith go deep-green positions.
... greens should not think in terms of overriding principles or [green]
imperatives. Indeed, it suggests that to think in terms of imperatives based on
arguments about intrinsic merit is unjustifiable.46
Fortunately the argument developed does not sustain the proposals. There is, to iterate a
central point, no internal or latent contradiction between (deep-)green policy objectives and
democratic procedures. Rather, green objectives would fail to be achieved without well-
disposed decision makers, who may not straightforwardly reflect any “will” of the demos. A
logical requirement on a realistic set of political objectives is that there are accessible
circumstances where they are realisable, where all elements of the whole would obtain. It
should not be required that there are are no situations where they may conflict, become
inconsistent.
It is certainly not required that they are realised, by whatever means.
A
community, as variously represented, can choose better or worse. There are many means
available, which it may shun (again there are no absolute guarantees), enabling it to choose
better, including improved structures, attitudinal change and consciousness raising, and so on.
In the end Saward too recognises the popular power of attitudinal change, thereby
himself removing his previous imposition of authoritarian means upon greens. There
45
Saward, p.68. The lead-in to Saward’s proposal was clearer in the earlier circulated version, which
ended in more precise (and dubious) form:
A commitment to democracy must clash with values that are inherent to
ecologism—and ecologism is about inherency, intrinsic values, laws of nature and
holism. Things—like democracy—that can only have instrumental value must lose
out to imperatives backed by inescapable canonical force.
46
Saward, p.75. Of course it is now put in terms of “imperatives”; it would be better expressed
simply in terms of (what did not figure in the earlier version) principles, policy objectives or the
like.
Opposition to deeper green political approaches often derives, as in Saward and in Goodin, from a
underlying shallow utilitarianism. The differences concern not only depth; they also concern the
rejection of individual interest bases, in favour of welfare bases and holism of deeper approaches.
22
*
needs, from a green perspective [and others], to be a change in political
culture such that it will be compatible with sustainability. This, of course, is a
familiar theme from green writing. How[?] ... It can only be the case that
‘political change will ony occur once people think differently or, more
particularly, that sustainable living must be prefaced by sustainable thinking’.
By abandoning foundationalist myths of intrinsic merit, greens abandon the
implicit arrogance that have made democracy such a tenuous part of green
political theory.47
But he overstates the attitudinal point, with ‘only...the case’. People can be politically led
(retardation, however, as distinct from genuine advancement, is more familiar); they could just
elect a green government which instituted, under permissible democratic methods, sustainable
living or the like. Worse still, his final ungrammatical sentence is a complete non-sequitur.
Attitudinal change may include coming to appreciate intrinsic merit in natural things other than
humans, and seeing through pragmatic utilitarianism.
7. Ecoregional demanarchoid reshaping of Australian political institutions: one
beginning.
Is such a radical restructuring as that suggested feasible? Initial investigations hold out
the hope that major problems for deeper green theory can be solved, at least in theory.
Investigations accordingly suggest that the project within the Reshaping Australian Institutions
project is viable and worth pursuing. A logical next stage offers sketches for a radical political
reorganisation of Australia.48 Evidently there would be many designs (thereby removing facile
jeers against “the blueprint”, a part of co-optative strategy for persistence with prevailing statist
arrangements). Among the many designs, some few, conforming to favoured principles,
would be selected for detailed study. If the study were attempted, most appropriately through
systems modellings, then flexibility could be built into modellings, so that even though only a
few basic designs were examined, many variations would be feasible. Not only .is systems
modelling particularly well suited to modelling network designs; it also further offers prospects
for computing simulation and implementation, and even some simulated political
experimentation. Furthermore, such modellings begin to give some grasp on the size and
47
Saward, p.77. There are further defects in this passage than those noted in the text. For one,
admission of intrinsic merit does not entail foundationalism. For another, such recognition of
merit—which is less liable to disturb democracy, or render it tenuous, than adherence to
Christianity—need carry no tinges of arrogance; to the contrary, by contrast with humanism it may
yield a certain humbleness.
48
Such design, well accomplished, would help considerably in revealing what is possible, thereby
providing a seriously neglected contribution to politics, itself sometimes presented, with undue
licence, as the art of the possible.
23
complexity of the task (a useful comparison is with World 3 modelling of the on-going “Limits
to Growth” project49, or, better, with a regionalized version of it).
To get started on such ecoregional design, for Australia, two broad classifications and
associated maps and charts are required:
• 1. an ecoregional classification, with partitions and overlays, for Australia and its continental
shelf. Observe that this classification would be hierarchical, as smaller regions merge into
larger regions; but it is a benign hierarchy of levels (it facilitates no accumulation of power or
wealth). Observe too that any such classification is far from unique. Plurality has already set
in, and a choice of classification (or a few choices) would have to be made, taking due account
of political organisational principles and objectives. Fortunately some of the preliminary
classificatory work has already been accomplished in Environmental Regionalisations of
Australia, where 3 broad classifications are presented and procedures for generating many more
given.50 For political purposes further classification attributes (e.g. demographic features) need
to be included.
Ecoregions provide the basis for spatially linked administrative and community units.
(Not all units need be of this sort; many contemporary arrangements are spatially unlinked). At
this stage a basic principle of decentralization and distributed and smaller-scale organization can
be invoked, namely
• subsidiarization: organisational functions should be allowed to fall down to (or to be pushed
down to) the lowest level compatible with their satisfactory performance. Thus, for instance,
most matters concerning such things as sewerage and primary education would be localized.
This subsidiarization principle, drawn from classical anarchism, has been widely adopted in
green planning proposals.
(It is said to have been applied by the Catholic Church in
administration of the Holy Roman Empire, whence the not altogether apt title derives. It is
presently being reassessed for use in that successor organisation, united Europe.) No doubt the
principle is open to challenge, for instance on grounds of efficiency, that larger size may prove
more efficient, of duplication, and so on.
But, the objective is not maximization of
technological values such as efficiency factors; instead it aims to satisize on a wider framework
of values, including holistic social arrangements. Presumably, however, undue duplication of
expensive administrative bodies is to be avoided.
Coupled with subsidiarization is another principle,
• direct accountability downwards: units should answer directly to regional constituencies. This
49
See e.g. Meadows.
50
See Thackway and Cresswell. Rudiments of a politically useful classification begin to emerge on
their 30 Group Regionalisation.
*
24
.contrasts with prevailing accountability (such as it is) upwards, through some indirect and
tenuous, centralized circuiting chain.
Naturally much more gets comprehended under
accountability, for instance openness of environmental accounting.
There are also principles interrelating smaller with larger regions, both bottom-up and topdown (or centre-down) principles. Among these will be
• representation of smaller regions in relevant planning institutions of more comprehensive
regions. Representation, appropriately regulated, would often replace anarchistic federation,
which as observed appears too weak for requisite environmental control.
The point needs no labouring that the classifications and principles are open to challenge
at every step; for instance, there is nothing rock-hard about the type of ecoregional classification
preferred, nor about social functions to be addressed.
At a theoretical stage that is
unproblematic: there are other (less preferable) models; elaborate your own if you want to and
can. In any case, it is to be hoped that a diversity in theory might be to some extent reflected in
some diversity in practice—with different regions and continents trying different arrangements,
with much less of the sort of cosmopolitan political monoculture that we are presently being
harassed toward, with much more resilient political biodiversity. Of course, not all political
forms (including stateless types) are equally desirable or satisfactory, and some (including
present state examples) are unacceptable. So there are bounds upon diversity. Moreover, what
suits one community or region well may not suit another to be satisfactory for it. So too there
are limits upon successful transfer of organisational structure; what works in one region may
require much modification in another, or may substantially resist transfer.
• 2 a social function classification, of those community matters that require explicit organisation
at some level. An initial listing can be compiled by consulting Australian metropolitan telephone
directories, especially the government sections that used to feature in the front (until a year ago).
What results under redesign and reorganisation would, of course, look very different from what
is listed. Parliaments, parties and all their supporting apparatus would vanish; the Australian
Bureau of Statistics will assume a new significance and independent role, and so on. But
which institutions are retained, which adapted, and so on, would depend on further social
organisational features, not yet considered here. The result would be a levelled pyramidal
structure, a flat-untopped network as depicted in the structural diagram below, not a power
hierarchy.
25
Structural diagram: a schematic depiction of organisational structure
(with some sample components indicated, but not all their network interlinkages displayed).
statistics
bureau
upper levels:
administrative,
executive,
research
ground level:
functional
selectoral
college
Australian
region
(federal)
immigration
control of
materials
inflow
super
regions
(a to k)
interregional
transport
(local)
regions
(1 to n)
arbitration
bureau
upper
levels
rental
entitlements
office
resources
income
office
ground
level
water
systems
sewer
systems
hospital
systems
region 1
region n
While some requisite research has been undertaken upon how the various functional
bodies and decision-making committees can be selected and can operate51, insufficient
investigation has been made of the interrelations and adequate funding of the bodies and
institutions involved — whichever they are! For little such detailed anarchoid modelling has
apparently been attempted for any region anywhere. Evidently there is much to be done
51
Thus e.g. Burnheim 85. The present article is not only heavily indebted to Burnheim's work, but
overlaps on-going investigations on his part.
26
theoretically. Detailed modellings could bring issues down to earth, without setting things in
concrete; no doubt too they would disclose many further problems hidden in the detailing,
problems to which anarchoid solutions can however reasonably be expected.
Nonetheless comparatively little is likely to be done, unless requisite support is
forthcoming, support in the shape of researchers (research volunteers and students) and
research infrastructure (from research gifts, donations and the like). For such support, support
for investigating its own demise, a state is hardly likely knowingly to supply; nor are its
established research institutions. Insofar then as it is done visibly, it will probably have to be
accomplished largely outside state-supported and state-supporting infrastructure, such as
prominent university projects (like Reshaping Australian Institutions). Fortunately there are
now other structures, such as internet and radio communicational channels, that can facilitate
interconnections and interchanges of researchers, both regionally and internationally. On these
sorts of anarchoid communicational bases, networks of groups interested in elaborating such
alternative political modellings, both in theory and in practice, could be formed. Given the
dismal state of present political arrangements, almost everywhere terrestial, there is a great
need, as a very minimum, for networks of innovative researchers who share such goals.52
Richard Sylvan
References.
Bello, W., Dark Victory, Pluto Press, London, 1994.
Bookchin, M., Remaking Society: Pathways to a Green Future, South End Press,
Boston, 1990.
Burnheim, J., Is Democracy Possible?, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1985.
Burnheim, J., ‘Democracy, nation states and the world system’, New Forms of
Democracy, (ed. D. Held and C. Pollitt) London, Sage, 1986, pp.218-239.
Carter, A., ‘Towards a green political theory’, in The Politics of Nature. Explorations
in green political theory (ed. A. Dobson and P. Lucardie), Routledge, London, 1993,
pp.39-62.
Goodin, R., Green Political Theory, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1992.
Green, G., The New Radicalism: Anarchist or Marxist?, International Publishers, New
York, 1971.
52
To echo one referee. My sincere thanks to demanding referees for several helpful suggestions and
many improvements.
27
Jacobs, M., The Green Economy: environment, sustainable development, and the
politics of the future., Pluto Press, Concord, Mass, 1991.
Mackay, H., Reinventing Australia: the mind and mood of Australia in the 90s,
Hugh Mackay, Pymble, NSW, Angus & Robertson, 1993.
Macphee, I., A new constitution?’ (excerpts from an opening address) NILEFA Newsletter,
Griffith University School of Law, June 1993.
Marshall, P., Demanding the Impossible: a history of anarchism, London, Harper
Collins 1992.
Me Laughlin, A., Regarding Nature, SUNY Press, Albany NY., 1993.
Meadows D., and others, Beyond the Limits, Chesley Green, Vermont, 1992.
Naess, A., Ecology, community and lifestyle (trans, and ed. D. Rothenberg),
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1989.
Ponting, C., A Green History of the World, Sinclair-Stevenson, London, 1991.
Priest, G., Routley, R. and Norman, J. (eds), Paraconsistent Logic, Philosophia Verlag,
Munich, 1989.
Routley, V. and R., ‘Social theories, self management and environmental problems’, in
Environmental Philosophy (ed. D Mannison and others), RSSS, Australian National
University, 1980.
Saward, M., ‘Green Democracy’, in The Politics of Nature: Explorations in green
political theory (ed. A. Dobson and P. Lucardie) Routledge, London, 1993 pp. 63-80.
Sylvan, R. and Bennett, D., Utopias, Tao and Deep Ecology, Green Series , RSSS,
Australian National University, 1990.
Sylvan, R. and Bennett, D., The Greening of Ethics, White Horse Press, Cambridge,
1994.
Sylvan, R., ‘Anarchism’, in Contemporary Political Theory (ed. R. Goodin and P.Pettit)
Blackwell, Oxford, 1993.
Sylvan, R., Green Anarchism, to appear, 1996.
Thackway, R. and Cresswell, I.D., Environmental Regionalisations of Australia,
Environmental Resources Information Network, Australian National Parks and Wildlife
Service, 1992.
Tynan, L., The Institute of Advanced Studies, The Australian National University, May
1993.
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Australian National University Office
Australian National University Office > Typing Table at End of Desk
Box 18: Green Projects in Progress
-
https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/e1a2873a54fce7557cfbc89ada6c8b1c.pdf
cf6cba564af11d9dbcc31c7e0159ae37
PDF Text
Text
MOVEMENTS
New social movements along with, and in partial contrast with, new politics and past
materialism as a quasi-technical term in political science and sociology. Like the others, it is
an ill-defined term. Among the problems is the extreme slackness of identity criteria, so it is
too often impossible to know when one has one.1 The terms are regularly introduced as if it
was known what was meant (this is a widespread intellectual sin; the legitimate end of
Wittgenstein's campaign against technical terms in philosophy).
A major problem with the political social science investigations so far is that the
classification of movements is too coarse-grained, and that when subclassifications are made
there are not in terms of movements. For example, the broad environmental movement, the
level movements is sifted down to, jets analysed in a typology, of shades of green, not into
submovements.
A movement involves action and/ or a diseration to action in a concerted direction by a
group of engaged members
type of intensional set-like objects
OED. ‘series of actions and endevours of a body of persons for special object’
WRONG CATEGORY, otherwise Not bad.
What is the movement though?
Extent of doctrine socialism/ anarchism without doctrine
knowing how
without knowing that or theory
practice
without
theory
e.g. golf, most stickingls language.
Deep ecology attempt to shed doctrine; empasis on movement. Doctrine involved that of sub
social paradigm (model).
Further features of a movement:
• a certain duration. An action group that form for a short time purpose, holds a
single parade, achieves its objective and dissolves, it not a movement. These are numerous
short-lived action groups that do not rate as movement, and which need not be categorised or
listed.
• a certain integration. of members. Although there is now a widespread push for
sustainable development (and attempts by many governments to coopt and neutralise
environmental activity in this way), there is no sustainable development movement. That is
not just because of the multiplicity of objectives subsumed under the smooth synthesized
“objective”, but because there is no due integration, no appropriate organisation of adherents.
Deep ecology is now a movement; it was it when Naess first presented it as one.
1
A hyporduct is that post-materialism, usually taken as a single stock-of-affairs, splits into
several.
�2
Environmental movements in Australia. The Australia-wide environmental organisations are
not movements, but there are movements within or associated with them. The big four
organisations, of which ACF is still the largest are
ACF
range of objects
Greenpeace
branches
local
Wilderness Society
specific object
WWOrganisation
Friends of the Earth which used to be a significant organisations, and still runs a national
journal Chain Reaction, for fullen into decline. All these organisations are presently under
pressure from declining membership and declining funding.
Advocacy groups
• Regionally - linked “advocacy” groups: Some of these groups are spread (e.g. over
a whole state); perhaps zeroing in on local issues in campaigns, some are local, sare are in
between. Examples include: National Parks, Wilderness Societies, Heritage Groups, Forestry
coalitions (e.g. SE forestry coalition which is composed of smaller local movements). Anti
freeway and public transport groups,...
• Non-rigionally-linked groups. These are of course contingently tied to actiosn and
campaigns at various locations. Important examples include animal-concerned groups:
animal preservation and conservations groups, animal liberation.
Practice groups
• Lifestyle groups. There are several strands within the broad commune movement,
which is alive and for the most part thriving in Australia (by contrast with other countries
where is was initiated).
• Issue groups, include
^forestry, forest restoration and tree planting groups, such as nationally Greening
Australia regionally bush regeneration groups and independently many local planting and
restoration schemes from local councils down to ornamental rainforest gardens. Earlier there
was a native garden movement, fostered by organisations for growing native plants.
• sustainable and organic agriculture groups. There are several different groups,
depending on the (production) methods allowed*.
Prominent among these is the permaculture (abbreviating “permanent agriculture”)
movement, which plans an integrated agrucultural system perannual food producing plants
rather than annuals.
• alternative energy groups
• ‘Spiritual’ with ritual and ceremony, worship of the Earth, including Council of AllBeing, Re Earthly Homage to Gaia.
�
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Draft Papers
Description
An account of the resource
Sylvan's literary executor encountered an archive in which “all his projects were current", since manuscripts were undated and unattributed.
Text
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MOVEMENTS
New social movements along with, and in partial contrast with, new politics and past
materialism as a quasi-technical term in political science and sociology. Like the others, it is
an ill-defined term. Among the problems is the extreme slackness of identity criteria, so it is
too often impossible to know when one has one.1 The terms are regularly introduced as if it
was known what was meant (this is a widespread intellectual sin; the legitimate end of
Wittgenstein's campaign against technical terms in philosophy).
A major problem with the political social science investigations so far is that the
classification of movements is too coarse-grained, and that when subclassifications are made
there are not in terms of movements. For example, the broad environmental movement, the
level movements is sifted down to, jets analysed in a typology, of shades of green, not into
submovements.
A movement involves action and/ or a diseration to action in a concerted direction by a
group of engaged members
type of intensional set-like objects
OED. ‘series of actions and endevours of a body of persons for special object’
WRONG CATEGORY, otherwise Not bad.
What is the movement though?
Extent of doctrine socialism/ anarchism without doctrine
knowing how
without knowing that or theory
practice
without
theory
e.g. golf, most stickingls language.
Deep ecology attempt to shed doctrine; empasis on movement. Doctrine involved that of sub
social paradigm (model).
Further features of a movement:
• a certain duration. An action group that form for a short time purpose, holds a
single parade, achieves its objective and dissolves, it not a movement. These are numerous
short-lived action groups that do not rate as movement, and which need not be categorised or
listed.
• a certain integration. of members. Although there is now a widespread push for
sustainable development (and attempts by many governments to coopt and neutralise
environmental activity in this way), there is no sustainable development movement. That is
not just because of the multiplicity of objectives subsumed under the smooth synthesized
“objective”, but because there is no due integration, no appropriate organisation of adherents.
Deep ecology is now a movement; it was it when Naess first presented it as one.
1
A hyporduct is that post-materialism, usually taken as a single stock-of-affairs, splits into
several.
2
Environmental movements in Australia. The Australia-wide environmental organisations are
not movements, but there are movements within or associated with them. The big four
organisations, of which ACF is still the largest are
ACF
range of objects
Greenpeace
branches
local
Wilderness Society
specific object
WWOrganisation
Friends of the Earth which used to be a significant organisations, and still runs a national
journal Chain Reaction, for fullen into decline. All these organisations are presently under
pressure from declining membership and declining funding.
Advocacy groups
• Regionally - linked “advocacy” groups: Some of these groups are spread (e.g. over
a whole state); perhaps zeroing in on local issues in campaigns, some are local, sare are in
between. Examples include: National Parks, Wilderness Societies, Heritage Groups, Forestry
coalitions (e.g. SE forestry coalition which is composed of smaller local movements). Anti
freeway and public transport groups,...
• Non-rigionally-linked groups. These are of course contingently tied to actiosn and
campaigns at various locations. Important examples include animal-concerned groups:
animal preservation and conservations groups, animal liberation.
Practice groups
• Lifestyle groups. There are several strands within the broad commune movement,
which is alive and for the most part thriving in Australia (by contrast with other countries
where is was initiated).
• Issue groups, include
^forestry, forest restoration and tree planting groups, such as nationally Greening
Australia regionally bush regeneration groups and independently many local planting and
restoration schemes from local councils down to ornamental rainforest gardens. Earlier there
was a native garden movement, fostered by organisations for growing native plants.
• sustainable and organic agriculture groups. There are several different groups,
depending on the (production) methods allowed*.
Prominent among these is the permaculture (abbreviating “permanent agriculture”)
movement, which plans an integrated agrucultural system perannual food producing plants
rather than annuals.
• alternative energy groups
• ‘Spiritual’ with ritual and ceremony, worship of the Earth, including Council of AllBeing, Re Earthly Homage to Gaia.
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Box 18, Item 1225: Movements
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Printout, undated.
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One of seven papers digitised from item 1225.
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<a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&range=&collection=&type=&user=&tags=&public=&featured=&exhibit=&geolocation-mapped=&geolocation-address=&geolocation-latitude=&geolocation-longitude=&geolocation-radius=10&submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a>
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<a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a>
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This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>.
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Australian National University Office
Australian National University Office > Typing Table at End of Desk
Box 18: Green Projects in Progress