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82,https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/show/82,"Nuclear energy and obligations to the future",,,"R. Routley^^V. Routley",,"Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy","January 1, 1978","This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, Dr. N.A.J. Taylor.","For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library.",,Manuscript,,"Journal Article",,,"Inquiry, 21, 133-79
Nuclear Energy and Obligations
to the Future
R. and V. Routley
Plumwood Mountain, Braidwood, Australia
The paper considers the morality of nuclear energy development as it concerns
future people, especially the creation of highly toxic nuclear wastes requiring longterm storage. On the basis of an example with many parallel moral features it is
argued that the imposition of such costs and risks on the future is morally unacceptable. The paper goes on to examine in detail possible ways of escaping this
conclusion, especially the escape route of denying that moral obligations of the
appropriate type apply to future people. The bulk of the paper comprises discussion
of this philosophical issue, including many arguments against assigning obligations
to the future drawn both from analyses of obligation and from features of the future
such as uncertainty and indeterminacy. A further escape through appeal to moral
conflict is also considered, and in particular two conflict arguments, the Poverty
and Lights-going-out arguments are briefly discussed. Both these escape routes are
rejected and it is concluded that if the same standards of behaviour are applied to
the future as to the present, nuclear energy development is morally unacceptable.
I. The Bus Example
Suppose we consider a bus, a bus which we hope is to make a very long
journey. This bus, a third world bus, carries both passengers and freight.
The bus sets down and picks up many different passengers in the course of
its long journey and the drivers change many times, but because of the way
the bus line is managed and the poor service on the route it is nearly always
full to overcrowded, with passengers hanging off the back, and as in
Afghanistan, passengers riding on the roof, and chickens and goats in the
freight compartment.
Early in the bus's journey someone consigns on it, to a far distant
destination, a package containing a highly toxic and explosive gas. This is
packaged in a very thin container, which as the consigner well knows is
unlikely to contain the gas for the full distance for which it is consigned,
and certainly will not do so if the bus should encounter any trouble, for
example if there is a breakdown and the interior of the bus becomes very
hot, if the bus should strike a very large bump or pothole of the sort
commonly found on some of the bad roads it has to traverse, or if some
1
134 R. and V. Routley
passenger should interfere deliberately or inadvertently with the cargo or
perhaps try to steal some of the freight, as also frequently happens. All of
these things, let us suppose, have happened on some of the bus's previous
journeys. If the container should break the resulting disaster would probably kill at least some of the people and animals on the bus, while others
could be maimed or contract serious diseases.
There does not seem much doubt about what most of us would say about
the morality of the consigner's action, and there is certainly no doubt
about what the passengers would say. The consigner's action in putting
the safety of the occupants of the bus at risk is appalling. What could
excuse such an action, what sort of circumstances might justify it, and
what sort of case could the consigner reasonably put up? The consigner
might say that it is by no means certain that the gas will escape; he himself
is an optimist and therefore feels that such unfavourable possible outcomes should be ignored. In any case the bus might have an accident and
the passengers be killed long before the container gets a chance to leak; or
the passengers might change to another bus and leave the lethal parcel
behind.
He might say that it is the responsibility of the passengers and the driver
to ensure that the journey is a smooth one, and that if they fail to do so, the
results are not his fault. He might say that the journey is such a long one
that many of the passengers may have become mere mindless vegetables
or degenerate wretches about whose fate no decent person need concern
himself, or that they might not care about losing their lives or health or
possessions anyway by that time.
Most of these excuses will seem little more than a bad joke, and certainly would not usually be reckoned any sort of justification. The main
argument the consigner of the lethal parcel employs, however, is that his
own pressing needs justify his actions. He has no option but to consign his
potentially lethal parcel, he says, since the firm he owns, and which has
produced the material as a by-product, is in bad financial straits and
cannot afford to produce a better container or to stop the production of the
gas. If the firm goes out of business, the consigner says, his wife will leave
him, and he will lose his family happiness, the comfortable way of life to
which he has become accustomed and sees now as a necessity; his employees will lose their jobs and have to look for others; not only will the
firm's customers be inconvenienced but he, the consigner, will have to
break some business contracts; the inhabitants of the local village through
loss of spending and cancellation of the Multiplier Effect will suffer finan-
Obligations to the Future 135
cial hardship, and, worst of all, the tiny flow of droplets that the poor of the
village might receive (theoretically at any rate) as a result of the trickling
down of these good things would dry up entirely. In short, some basic and
some perhaps uncomfortable changes will be needed in the village.
Even if the consigner's story were accepted at face value - and it would
be wise to look critically at his story - only someone whose moral sensibilities had been paralysed by the disease of galloping economism could see
such a set of considerations, based on 'needs', comfort, and the goal of
local prosperity, as justifying the consigner's action.
One is not generally entitled to thus simply transfer the risks and costs
arising from one's own life onto other uninvolved parties, to get oneself
out of a hole of one's own making by creating harm or risk of harm to
someone else who has had no share in creating the situation. To create
serious risks and costs, especially risks to life or health for such others,
simply to avoid having to make some changes to a comfortable life style, or
even for a somewhat better reason, is usually thought deserving of moral
condemnation, and sometimes considered a crime; for example, the action
of a company in creating risks to the lives or health of its workers or
customers to prevent itself from going bankrupt. What the consigner says
may be an explanation of his behaviour, but it is not a justification.
The problem raised by nuclear waste disposal is by no means a perfect
analogy to the bus case, since, for example, the passengers on the nuclear
bus cannot get off the bus or easily throw out the lethal package. In many
crucial moral respects, however, the nuclear waste storage problem as it
affects future people, the passengers in the bus we are considering, resembles the consignment of the faultily packaged lethal gas. Not only are
rather similar moral principles involved, but a rather similar set of arguments to the lamentable excuses the consigner presents have been seriously put up to justify nuclear development, the difference being that in the
nuclear case these arguments have been widely accepted. There is also
some parallel in the risks involved; there is no known safe way to package
the highly toxic wastes generated by nuclear plants that will be spread
around the world if large-scale nuclear development goes ahead.1 The
wastes problem will not be a slight one, with each one of the more than
2,000 reactors envisaged by the end of the century, producing on average
annual wastes containing one thousand times the radioactivity of the
Hiroshima bomb.2 The wastes include not merely the spent fuels and their
radioactive by-products, but also everything they contaminate, from fuel
containers to the thousands of widely distributed decommissioned nuclear
136 R. and V. Routley
reactors which will have to be abandoned, still in a highly radioactive
condition, after the expiry of their expected lifetimes of about thirty years,
and which have been estimated to require perhaps one and a half million
years to reach safe levels of radioactivity.3 The wastes must be kept
suitably isolated from the environment for their entire active lifetime; for
fission products the required storage period averages a thousand years or
so, and for the actinides (transuranic elements) which include plutonium,
there is a half-million to a million-year storage problem.4
Serious problems have arisen with both short-term and proposed longterm methods of storage, even with the comparatively small quantities of
waste that have been produced over the last twenty years.5 With present
known short-term surface methods of storage there is a continued need for
human intervention to keep the material isolated from the environment,
while with proposed longer-term methods such as storage in salt mines or
granite to the risk of human interference there are added the risks of
leakage, e.g. through water seepage, and of disturbance, for example
through climatic change, earth movements, etc. The risks are significant:
no reasonable person with even a limited acquaintance with the history of
human affairs over the last 3,000 years could be confident of safe storage
by methods involving human intervention over the enormous time periods
involved. No one with even a slight knowledge of the geological and
climatic history of the earth over the last million years, a period which has
seen a number of ice ages and great fluctuations in climate for example,
could be confident that the waste material could be safely stored for the
vast periods of time required. Much of this waste is highly toxic; for
example, even a beachball sized quantity of plutonium appropriately
distributed is enough to give every person on the planet lung cancer - so
that a leak of even a small part of this waste material could involve huge
loss of life, widespread disease and genetic damage, and contamination of
immense areas of land.6
Given the enormous costs which could be involved for the future, it is
plainly grossly inadequ'ate'to merely speculate concerning untested, but
possibly or even probably, safe methods for disposal of wastes. Yet none
of the proposed methods has been properly tested, and they may prove to
involve all sorts of unforeseen difficulties and risks when an attempt is
made to put them into practice on a commercial scale. Only a method that
could provide a rigorous guarantee of safety over the storage period, that
placed safety beyond reasonable doubt, would be acceptable. It is difficult
to see how such rigorous guarantees could be given concerning either the
Obligations to the Future 137
geological or future human factors. But even if an economically viable,
rigorously safe long-term storage method could be devised, there is the
problem of guaranteeing that it would be universally and invariably used.
The assumption that it would be, especially if, as seems likely, such a
method proved expensive economically and politically, seems to presuppose a level of efficiency, perfection, and concern for the future not
previously encountered in human affairs, and certainly not conspicuous in
the nuclear industry.7 Again, unless we assume continuous and faultless
guarding of long-term storage sites through perhaps a million years of
possible future human activity, weapons-grade radioactive material will
be accessible, over much of the million-year storage period, to any party
who is in a position to retrieve it.
Our behaviour in creating this nightmare situation for the future is
certainly no better than that of the consigner in the bus example. Industrialized countries, in order to get out of a mess of their own making essentially the creation of economies dependent on an abundance"" of
non-renewable energy in a situation where it is in fact in limited supply opt for a 'solution' which may enable them to avoid the making of uncomfortable changes during the lifetime of those now living, at the expense of
passing heavy burdens on to the inhabitants of the earth at a future time burdens in the shape of costs and risks which, just as in the bus case, may
adversely affect the life and health of future people and their opportunity
to lead a decent life.8
It is sometimes suggested that analogies like the bus example are defective; that morally they are crucially different from the nuclear case, since
future people, unlike the passengers in the bus, will benefit directly from
nuclear development, which will provide an abundance of energy for the
indefinite future. But this is incorrect. Nuclear fission creates wastes
which may remain toxic for a million years, but even with the breeder
reactor it could be an energy source for perhaps only 150 years. It will do
nothing for the energy problems of the people of the distant future whose
lives could be seriously affected by the wastes. Thus perhaps 30,000
generations of future people could be forced to bear significant risks,
without any corresponding benefits, in order to provide for the extravagant energy use of only five generations.
Nor is the risk of direct harm from the escape or misuse of radioactive
materials the only burden the nuclear solution imposes on the future.
Because the energy provided by nuclear fission is merely a stop-gap, it
seems probable that in due course the same problem, that of making a
138 R. and V. Routley
transition to renewable sources of energy, will have to be faced again by a
future population which will probably, again as a result of our actions, be
very much worse placed to cope with it.9 For they may well have to face
the change to renewable resources in an over-populated world not only
burdened with the legacy of our nuclear wastes, but also in a world in
which, if the nuclear proponents' dream of global industrialization is
realized, more and more of the global population will have become dependent on high energy consumption and associated technology and heavy
resource use, and will have lost or reduced its ability to survive without it.
It will, moreover, probably be a world which is largely depleted of non-renewable resources, and in which such renewable resources as forests and
soils as remain, resources which will have to form a very important part of
the basis of life, are in a run-down condition. Such points tell against the
idea that future people must be, if not direct beneficiaries of nuclear fission
energy, at least indirect beneficiaries.
The 'solution' then is to buy time for contemporary industrial society at
a price which not only creates serious problems for future people but
which reduces their ability to cope with those problems. Just as in the bus
case, contemporary industrial society proposes to get itself out of a hole of
its own making by creating risk of harm, and by transferring costs and
risks, to someone else who has had no part in producing the situation and
who will obtain no clear benefit. It has clear alternatives to this action.
That it does not take them is due essentially to its unwillingness to avoid
changing wasteful patterns of consumption and to its desire to protect the
interests of those who benefit from them.
If we apply to the nuclear situation the same standards of behaviour and
moral principles that we acknowledge (in principle if perhaps often not in
fact) in the contemporary world, it will not be easy to avoid the conclusion
that the situation involves injustice with respect to future people on a
grand scale. It seems to us that there are only two plausible moves that
might enable the avoidance of such a conclusion. First, it might be argued
that the moral principles and obligations which we acknowledge for the
contemporary world and the immediate future do not apply because the
recipients of our nuclear parcel are in the non-immediate future. Secondly,
an attempt might be made to appeal to overriding circumstances; for to
reject the consigner's action in the circumstances outlined is not of course
to say that there are no circumstances in which such an action might
possibly be justifiable, or at least where the case is less clearcut. It is the
same with the nuclear case. Just as in the case of the consigner of the
Obligations to the Future 139
package there is a need to consider what these justifying circumstances
might be, and whether they apply in the present case. We turn now to the
first of these possible escape routes for the proponent of nuclear development, to the philosophical question of our obligations to the future.
II. Obligations to the Distant Future
The area in which these philosophical problems arise is that of the distant
(i.e. non-immediate) future, that is, the future with which people alive
today will make no direct contact; the immediate future provides comparatively few problems for moral theories. The issues involved, although of
far more than academic interest, have not received any great attention in
recent philosophical literature, despite the fact that the question of obligations to future people presents tests which a number of ethical theories fail
to pass, and also raises a number of questions in political philosophy
concerning the adequacy of accepted institutions which leave out of
account the interests of future people.
Moral philosophers have predictably differed on the issue. But contrary
to the picture painted in a recent, widely read, and influential work
discussing it, Passmore's Man's Responsibility for Nature, a good many
philosophers who have explicitly considered the question have come
down in favour of the same consideration being given to the rights and
interests of future people as to those of contemporary or immediately
future people. Other philosophers have tended to fall into three categories
- those who acknowledge obligations to the future but who do not take
them seriously or who assign them less weight, those who deny, or who
are committed by their general moral position to denying, that there are
moral obligations beyond the immediate future, and those like Passmore
and Golding who come down, with admirable philosophical caution, on
both sides of the issue, but with the weight of the argument favouring the
view underlying prevailing economic and political institutions, that there
are no moral obligations to the future beyond those to the next generation.
• According to the most extreme of these positions against moral obligations to the future, our behaviour with respect to the future is morally
unconstrained; there are no moral restrictions on acting or failing to act
deriving from the effect of our actions on future people. Of those philosophers who say, or whose views imply, that we don't have obligations to
the (non-immediate) future, i.e. those who have opted for the uncon-
140 R. and V. Routley
strained position, many have based this view on accounts of moral obligation which are built on relations which presuppose some degree of temporal or spatial contiguity. Thus moral obligation is seen as grounded on or as
presupposing various relations which could not hold between people
widely separated in time (or sometimes in space). For example, obligation
is seen as grounded in relations which are proximate or of short duration
and also non-transitive. Among such suggested bases or grounds of moral
obligation, or requirements for moral obligation, which would rule out
obligations to the non-immediate future are these: First, there are those
accounts which require that someone to whom a moral obligation is held
be able to claim his rights or entitlement. People in the distant future will
not be able to claim rights and entitlements as against us, and of course
they can do nothing to enforce any claims they might have for their rights
against us. Secondly, there are those accounts which base moral obligations on social or legal convention, for example a convention which would
require punishment of offenders or at least some kind of social enforcement. But plainly these and other conventions will not hold invariantly
over change in society and amendment of legal conventions and so will not
be invariant over time. Also future people have no way of enforcing their
interests or punishing offenders, and there could be no guarantee that any
contemporary institution would do it for them.
Both the view that moral obligation requires the context of a moral
community and the view that it is contractually based appear to rule out
the distant future as a field of moral obligation, as they not only require a
commonality, or some sort of common basis, which cannot be guaranteed
in the case of the distant future, but also a possibility of interchange or
reciprocity of action which cannot apply to the future. Where the basis of
moral obligation is seen as mutual exchange, the interests of future people
must be set aside because they cannot change the past and cannot be
parties to any mutual contract. The exclusion of moral obligations to the
distant future also follows from those views which attempt to ground
moral obligations in non-transitive relations of short duration such as
sympathy and love. There are some difficulties also about love and sympathy for (non-existent) people in the far distant future about whose
personal qualities and characteristics one must know very little and who
may well be committed to a life-style for which one has no sympathy. On
the current showing in the case of nuclear energy it would be easy to
conclude that contemporary society lacks both love and sympathy for
future people; and it would appear to follow from this that contemporary
Obligations to the Future 141
people have no obligations to future people and can harm them as it suits
them.
What all these views have in common is a naturalistic picture of obligation as something acquired, either individually or institutionally, something which is conditional on doing something or failing to do something
(e.g. participating in the moral community, contracting), or having some
characteristic one can fail to have (e.g. love, sympathy, empathy).10
Because obligation therefore becomes conditional, features usually
thought to characterize it, such as universality of application and necessitation (i.e. the binding features), are lost, especially where there is a choice
of whether or not to do the thing required to acquire the obligation, and so
of whether to acquire it. The criteria for acquisition suggested are such as
to exclude people in the distant future.
However, the view that there are no moral constraints with respect to
future people, that one is free to act as one likes with respect to them, is a
very difficult one to sustain. Consider the example of a scientific group
which, for no particular reason other than to test a particular piece of
technology, places in orbit a cobalt bomb which is to be set off by a
triggering device designed to go off several hundred years from the time of
its despatch. No presently living person and none of their immediate
descendants would be affected, but the population of the earth in the
distant future would be wiped out as a direct and predictable result of the
action. The unconstrained position clearly implies that this is an acceptable moral enterprise, that whatever else we might legitimately criticize in
the scientists' experiment, perhaps its being unduly expensive or badly
designed, we cannot lodge a moral protest about the damage it will do to
future people. The unconstrained position also endorses as morally acceptable the following sorts of examples: A firm discovers it can make a
handsome profit from mining, processing, and manufacturing a new type
of material which, although it causes no problems for present people or
their immediate descendants, will over a period of hundreds of years
decay into a substance which will cause an enormous epidemic of cancer
among the inhabitants of the earth at that time. According to the unconstrained view the firm is free to act in its own interests, without any
consideration for the harm it does to future people.
Such counterexamples to the unconstrained view might seem childishly
obvious. Yet the unconstrained position concerning the future from which
they follow is far from being a straw man; not only have a number of
philosophers writing on the issue endorsed this position, but it is the clear
142 R. and V. Routley
implication of many currently popular views of the basis of moral obligation, as well as of economic theory. It does not appear, on the other hand,
that those who opt for the unconstrained position have considered such
examples and endorsed them as morally acceptable, despite their being
clearly implied by their position. We suspect that when it is brought out
that the unconstrained position admits such counterexamples, that being
free to act implies, among other things being free to inflict pointless harm,
most of those who opted for the unconstrained position would want to
assert that it was not what they intended. What those who have put
forward the unconstrained position seem to have had in mind in denying
moral obligation is rather that future people can look after themselves, that
we are not responsible for their lives. The view that the future can take
care of itself also seems to assume a future causally independent of the
present. But it is not. It is not as if, in cases such as those discussed above
and the nuclear case, the future is simply being left alone to take care of
itself. Present people are influencing it, and in doing so must acquire many
of the same sorts of moral responsibilities as they do in causally affecting
the present and immediate future. The thesis seems thus to assume an
incorrect model of an independent and unrelated future.
Also, to say that we are not responsible for the lives of future people
does not amount to the same as saying that we are free to do as we like with
respect to them, that there are no moral constraints on our action involving
them. In just the same way, the fact that one does not have, or has not
acquired, an obligation to some stranger with whom one has never been
involved - that one has no responsibility for his life - does not imply that
one is free to do what one likes with respect to him, for example to rob him
or to pursue some course of action of advantage to oneself which could
seriously harm him.
These difficulties for the unconstrained position arise in part from the
failure to make an important distinction between, on the one hand, acquired or assumed obligations towards somebody, for which some act of
acquisition or assumption is required as a qualifying condition, and on the
other hand moral constraints, which require, for example, that one should
not act so as to damage or harm someone, and for which no act of
acquisition is required. There is a considerable difference in the level and
kind of responsibility involved. In the first case one must do something or
be something which one can fail to do or be, e.g. have loves, sympathy, be
contracted. In the second case responsibility arises as a result of being a
causal agent aware of the consequences or probable consequences of his
Obligations to the Future 143
action, and thus does not have to be especially acquired or assumed. Thus
there is no problem about how the latter class, moral constraints, can
apply to the distant future in cases where it may be difficult or impossible
for acquisition or assumption conditions to be satisfied. They apply as a
result of the ability to produce causal effects on the distant future of a
reasonably predictable nature. Thus also moral constraints can apply to
what does not (yet) exist, just as actions can cause results that do not (yet)
exist. While it may be the case that there would need to be an acquired or
assumed obligation in order for it to be claimed that contemporary people
must make special sacrifices of an heroic kind for future people, or even to
help them especially, only moral constraints are needed in order for us to
be constrained from harming them. Thus, to return to the bus example, the
consigner cannot argue in justification of his action that he has never
assumed or acquired responsibility for the passengers, that he does not
know them and therefore has no love or sympathy for them, and that they
are not part of his moral community, in short that he has no special
obligations to help them. All that one needs to argue in respect of both the
bus and the nuclear case is that there are moral constraints against harming, not that there are specially acquired obligations to take responsibility
for the lives of the people involved.
The confusion of moral constraints with acquired obligation, and the
attempt therewith to view all constraints as acquired and to write off
non-acquired constraints, is facilitated through the use of the term 'moral
obligation' in philosophy to indicate any type of deontic constraint, while
in natural language it is used to indicate something which has to be
assumed or acquired. Hence the equation and at least one root of the
unconstrained position, that is of the belief that there are no moral constraints concerning the distant future.
The unconstrained view tends to give way, under the weight of counterexamples, to a more qualified, and sometimes ambivalent position. Passmore's position in [1] is a striking example of the second ambivalent
position. On the one hand Passmore regularly gives the impression of one
championing future people; for example, in the final sentence of [1] he
says, concerning men a century hence:
My sole concern is that we should do nothing which will reduce their
freedom of thought and action, whether by destroying.the natural
world which makes that freedom possible or the social traditions
which permit and encourage it.
144 R. and V. Routley
Earlier (esp. pp. 84-85) Passmore appears to endorse the principle 'that we
ought not to act so as certainly to harm posterity' and claims (p. 98) that,
even where there are uncertainties, 'these uncertainties do not justify
negligence'. Nevertheless, though obligations concerning non-immediate
posterity are thus admitted, the main thrust of Passmore's argument is
entirely different, being in favour of the unconstrained position according
to which we have no obligations to non-immediate posterity. Thus his
conclusion (p. 91):
So whether we approach the problem of obligations to posterity by
way of Bentham and Sidgwick, Rawls or Golding, we are led to
something like the same conclusion: our obligations are to immediate
posterity, we ought to try to improve the world so that we shall be able
to hand it over to our immediate successors in a better condition, and
that is all.11
Passmore's position is, to all appearances, simply inconsistent. There are
two ways one might try to render it consistent, but neither is readily
available to Passmore. The first is by taking advantage of the distinction
between moral constraints and acquired obligations, but a basis for this
distinction is not evident in Passmore's work and indeed the distinction is
antithetical to the analyses of obligation that Passmore tries to synthesize
with his own analysis in terms of loves. The second, sceptical, route to
consistency is by way of the argument that we shall consider shortly, that
there is always gross uncertainty with respect to the distant future, uncertainty which relieves us in practice of any moral constraints regarding the
distant future. But though Passmore's writing strongly suggests this uncertainty argument (especially his sympathetic discussion of the Premier
of Queensland's argument against conservationists [p. 77]), he also rules it
out with the claim that uncertainties do not justify negligence.12
Many of the accounts of moral obligation that give rise to the unconstrained position are fused in Passmore's work, again not entirely consistently, since the different accounts exploited do not give uniform results.
Thus the primary account of obligation is said to be in terms of loves though the account is never satisfactorily formulated or developed - and it
is suggested that because our loves do not extend into the distant future,
neither do our obligations. This sentimental account of obligation will
obviously lead to different results from utilitarian accounts of obligation,
which however Passmore appeals to in his discussion of wilderness. In yet
other places in [1], furthermore, social contract and moral community
Obligations to the Future 145
views are appealed to - see, e.g., the treatment of animals, of preservation, and of duties to nature. In the case of obligations to future people,
however, Passmore does try to sketch an argument - what we call the
convergence argument - that all the accounts lead in the end to the
unconstrained position.
As well as the convergence argument, and various uncertainty arguments to be considered later, Passmore appears to endorse several other
arguments in favour of his theme that there are in practice no obligations to
the distant future. In particular, he suggests that such obligations would in
practice be otiose. Everything that needs to be accounted for can be
encompassed through the chain picture of obligation as linking successive
generations, under which each generation has obligations, based on loves,
only to the succeeding generation. We outline three objections to this
chain account. First, it is inadequate to treat constraints concerning the
future as if they applied only between generations, as if there were no
question of constraints on individuals as opposed to whole generations,
since individuals can create causal effects, e.g. harm, on the future in a
way which may create individual responsibility, and which can't necessarily be sheeted home to an entire generation. Secondly, such chains, since
they are non-transitive, cannot yield direct obligations to the distant
future. But for this very reason the chain picture cannot be adequate, as
examples again show. For the picture is unable to explain several of the
cases that have to be dealt with, e.g. the examples already discussed which
show that we can have a direct effect on the distant future without
affecting the next generation, who may not even be able to influence
matters.13 Thirdly, improvements for immediate successors may be
achieved at the expense of disadvantages to people of the more distant
future. Improving the world for immediate successors is quite compatible
with, and may even in some circumstances be most easily achieved by,
ruining it for less immediate successors. Such cases can hardly be written
off as 'never-never land' examples, since many cases of environmental
exploitation might be seen as of just this type, e.g. not just the nuclear case
but also the exhaustion of non-renewable resources and the long-term
depletion of renewable resources such as soils and forests through overcropping. If then such obvious injustices to future people arising from the
favouring or exclusive concern with immediate successors are to be avoided, obligations to the future will have to be seen as in some way fairly
distributed over time, and not merely as accruing to particular generations
in the way the chain picture suggests.
146 R. and V. Routley
Passmore tries to represent all obligations to the distant future in terms
of heroic self-sacrifice, something which cannot of course be morally
required. But in view of the distinctions between constraints and acquired
obligation and between obligation and supererogation, this is just to misrepresent the position of these obligations. For example, one is no more
engaging in heroic self-sacrifice by not forcing future people into an
unviable life position or by refraining from causing them direct harm, than
one is resorting to heroic self-sacrifice in refraining from beating and
robbing some stranger and leaving him to starve.
Passmore's most sustained argument for the unconstrained position is a
convergence argument, that different analyses of obligations, including
his own, lead to the one conclusion. This style of argument is hardly
convincing when there are well-known accounts of obligation which do
not lead to the intended conclusion, e.g. deontological accounts such as
those of Kant and of modern European schools, and teleological accounts
such as those of Moore (in [8]). But such unfavourable positions are either
rapidly passed over or ignored in Passmore's historical treatment and
narrow selection of historical figures. The style of argument becomes even
less persuasive when it is discovered that the accounts of the main authorities appealed to, Bentham, Sidgwick, and Rawls,14 do not lead, without
serious distortion, to the intended conclusion. Indeed Passmore has twisted the historical and textual evidence to suit his case, as we now try to
indicate.
Consider Bentham first. Passmore's assumption, for which no textual
evidence is cited, ls is that no Benthamite calculation can take account of a
future more extensive than the immediate future (cf. pp. 87-88). The
assumption seems to be based simply on the fact that Bentham remarked
that 'the value of the pleasure or pain to each person to be considered in
any estimate will be greater or less in virtue of the following circumstances'. '3. Its certainty or uncertainty. 4. Its propinquity or remoteness'
([10], p. 16). But this does nothing to show that future persons are discounted: the certainty and propinquity do not concern persons, but the
utilities of the persons concerned. As regards which persons are concerned in any calculation Bentham is quite explicit, detailing how
to take an exact account. . . of the general tendency of any act.. . .5 .
Take an account of the number of persons whose interests appear to
be concerned; and repeat the above process [summation of values of
pleasure and of pain] with respect to each. ([10], p. 16)
Obligations to the Future 147
It follows that Bentham's calculation takes account of everyone (and, in
his larger scheme, every sentient creature) whose interests appear to be
concerned: if the interests of people in the distant future appear to be
concerned - as they are in conservation issues - they are to be included in
the calculation. And there is independent evidence16 that in Bentham's
view the principle of utility was not temporally restricted: 'that is useful
which, taking all times and all persons into consideration, leaves a balance
of happiness' ([10], pp. 17-18, our italics). Thus the future cut-off that
Passmore has attributed to Bentham is contradicted by Bentham's own
account.
The case of Sidgwick is more complex, because there is isolated oscillation in his application of utilitarianism between use of utility and of
(something like) expected utility (see [11], pp. 381,414): Sidgwick's utilitarianism is, in its general characterization, essentially that of Bentham:
the conduct which . . . is objectively right is that which will produce
the greatest amount of happiness on the whole; that is, taking into
account all those whose happiness is affected by the conduct. ([11], p.
411)
All includes all sentient beings, both existing and to exist, as Sidgwick goes
on to explain (p. 414). In particular, in answer to the question 'How far are
we to consider the interests of posterity when they seem to conflict with
those of existing human beings?' Sidgwick writes ([11], p. 414, our italics):
It seems, however, clear that the time at which a man exists cannot
affect the value of his happiness from a universal point of view; and
that the interests of posterity must concern a Utilitarian as much as
those of his contemporaries, except in so far as the effect of his
actions on posterity - and even the existence of human beings to be
affected - must necessarily be more uncertain.
But Passmore manages, first of all, to give a different sense to what
Sidgwick is saying by adjusting the quotation, by omitting the clause we
have italicized, which equalizes the degree of concern for present and
future persons, and by italicizing the whole except-clause, thereby placing
much greater emphasis than Sidgwick does on uncertainty. For according
to Sidgwick's impartiality principle, 'the mere difference in time is not a
148 R. and V. Routley
reasonable ground for having more regard to the consciousness of one
-amount than to that of another' ([11], p. 381; see also p. 124). The apparent
tension in Sidgwick's theory as to whether uncertainty should be taken
into account is readily removed by resort to a modern distinction between
values and expected values (i.e. probability weighted values); utilitarian
rightness is defined as before in terms of the net happiness of all concerned
over all time without mention of uncertainty or probabilities, but it is
distinguished from probable rightness (given present information), in the
utilitarian sense,17 which is defined in terms of the expected net happiness
of those concerned, using present probabilities. It is the latter notion, of
probable rightness, that practical reasoning is commonly concerned with
and that decision theory studies; and it is this that Passmore supposes
Sidgwick is using ([1], p. 84). But it is evident that the utilitarian determination of probable rightness, like that of rightness, will sometimes take
into account the distant future - as Sidgwick's discussion of utilitarian
determination of optimum population (immediately following his remark
on uncertainty) does. So how does Passmore contrive to reverse matters,
to have Sidgwick's position lead to his own unconstrained conclusion?
The answer is: By inserting an additional assumption of his own - which
Sidgwick would certainly have rejected - that the uncertainties entitle us
to ignore the distant future. What Passmore has implicitly assumed in his
claim ([1], p. 85) that 'utilitarian principles [such as Sidgwick's] are not
strong enough' 'to justify the kinds of sacrifice some conservationists now
call upon us to make' is his own thesis that 'The uncertainty of harms we
are hoping to prevent would in general entitle us to ignore them.. .'. From
a decision-theory viewpoint this is simply irrational18 unless the probabilities of damage are approaching zero. We will deal with the essentially
sceptical uncertainty arguments on which Passmore's position depends
shortly: here it is enough to observe that Sidgwick's position does not lead
to anything like that which Passmore attributes to him - without uncertainty assumptions which Sidgwick would have rejected (for he thought
that future people'will certainly have pleasure and suffer pain).
We can also begin to gauge from Passmore's treatment of nineteenthcentury utilitarians, such as Bentham and Sidgwick, the extent of the
distortion which underlies his more general historical case for the unconstrained position which, so he claims,
represents accurately enough what, over the last two centuries, men
have seen as their duty to posterity as a whole. . . . ([1], p. 91)
Obligations to the Future 149
The treatment accorded Rawls in only marginally more satisfactory.
Passmore supposes that Rawls's theory of justice leads directly to the
unconstrained position ([1], p. 87 and p. 91), whereas Rawls claims ([5], p.
293) that we have obligations to future people just as to present ones. But
the situation is more complicated than Rawls's claim would indicate, as we
now try to explain in a summary way (more detail is given in the Appendix). For, in order to justify this claim on his theory (with its present
time-of-entry interpretation), Rawls has to invoke additional and dubious
motivational assumptions; even so the theory which thus results does not
yield the intended conclusion, but a conclusion inconsistent with Rawls's
claim. However, by changing the time-of-entry interpretation to an omnitemporal one, Rawls's claim does result from the theory so amended.
Moreover, the amended theory also yields, by exactly Rawls's argument
for a just saving rate, a resource conservation policy, and also a case
against nuclear development. Accordingly Passmore's other claims regarding Rawls are mistaken, e.g. that the theory cannot justify a policy of
resource conservation. Rawls does not emerge unscathed either. As on
the issue of whether his contract is a necessary condition for obligations,
so on obligations which the contract yields to the distant future, Rawls is
far from consistent. Furthermore, institutions such as qualified market
and voting systems are recommended as just though from a future perspective their results are far from that. Rawls, then, does not take obligations to the future with full seriousness.
In sum, it is not true that the theory of Rawls, any more than the theories
of the historical figures actually discussed by Passmore, unequivocally
supports the unconstrained position.
III. Uncertainty and Indeterminacy Arguments
Although there are grave difficulties for the unconstrained position, qualification leads to a more defensible position. According to the qualified
position we are not entirely unconstrained with respect to the distant
future: there are obligations, but these are not so important as those to the
present, and the interests of distant future people cannot weigh very much
in the scale against those of the present and immediate future. The interests of future people then, except in unusual cases, count for very much
less than the interests of present people. Hence such things as nuclear
development and various exploitative activities which benefit present
150 R. and V. Routley
people should proceed, even if people of the distant future are disadvantaged by them.
The qualified position appears to be widely held and is implicit in most
modern economic theories, where the position of a decrease in weight of
future costs and benefits (and so of future interests) is obtained by application over time of an (opportunity cost) discount rate. The attempt to
apply economics as a moral theory, something that is becoming increasingly common, can lead then to the qualified position. What is objectionable in such an approach is that economics must operate within the bounds
of moral (deontic) constraints, just as in practice it operates within legal
constraints, and cannot determine what those constraints are. There are,
moreover, alternative economic theories and simply to adopt one which
discounts the future is to beg all the questions at issue. The discounting
move often has the same result as the unconstrained position; if, for
instance, we consider the cancer example and consider costs as payable
compensation, it is evident that, over a sufficiently long period of time,
discounting at current prices would lead to the conclusion that there are no
recoverable damages and so, in economic terms, no constraints. In short,
even certain damage to future people could be written off. One way to
achieve the bias against future people is by the application of discount
rates which are set in accord with the current economic horizons of no
more than about fifteen years,19 and application of such rates would
simply beg the question against the interests and rights of future people.
Where there is certain future damage of a morally forbidden type the
whole method of discounting is simply inapplicable, and its use would
violate moral constraints.20
Another argument for the qualified position, which avoids the objections from cases of certain damage, comes from probability considerations.The distant future, it is argued, is much more uncertain than the
present and immediate future, so that probabilities are consequently lower, perhaps even approaching or coinciding with zero for any hypothesis
concerning the distant future.21 But then if we take account of probabilities in the obvious way, by simply multiplying them against costs and
benefits, it is evident that the interests of future people, except in cases
where there is an unusually high degree of certainty, must count for (very
much) less than those of present and neighbouring people where (much)
higher probabilities obtain. So in the case of conflict between the present
and the future where it is a question of weighing certain benefits to the
people of the present and the immediate future against a much lower
Obligations to the Future 151
probability of indeterminate costs to an indeterminate number of distant
future people, the issue would normally be decided in favour of the
present, assuming that anything like similar costs and benefits were involved. But of course it can't be assumed that anything like similarly
weighted costs and benefits are involved in the nuclear case, especially if it
is a question of risking poisoning some of the earth for half a million or so
years, with consequent risk of serious harm to thousands of generations of
future people, in order to obtain quite doubtful or trivial benefits for some
present people, in the shape of the opportunity to continue unnecessarily
high energy use. And even if the costs and benefits were comparable or
evenly weighted, such an argument would be defective, since an analogous argument would show that the consigner's action is acceptable
provided the benefit, e.g. the profit he stood to gain from imposing significant risks on other people, was sufficiently large. Such a cost-benefit
approach to moral and decision problems, with or without the probability
frills, is quite inadequate where different parties are concerned, or for
dealing with cases of conflict of interest or moral problems where deontic
constraints are involved, and commonly yields counterintuitive results.
For example, it would follow on such principles that it is permissible for a
firm to injure, or very likely injure, some innocent party provided the firm
stands to make a sufficiently large gain from it. But the costs and benefits
involved are not transferable in any simple or general way from one party
to another. Transfers of this kind, of costs and benefits involving different
parties, commonly raise moral issues - e.g. is x entitled to benefit himself
by imposing costs ony ? - which are not susceptible to a simple cost-benefit approach of the sort adopted by some proponents of nuclear energy,
who attempt to dismiss the costs to future people with the soothing remark
that any development involves costs as well as benefits. The transfer point
is enough to invalidate the comparison, heavily relied on by McCracken
[16] in building a case for the acceptability of the nuclear risk, between
nuclear risks and those from cigarette smoking. In the latter case those
who supposedly benefit from the activity are also, to an overwhelming
extent* those who bear the serious health costs and risks involved. In
contrast the users and supposed beneficiaries of nuclear energy will be
risking not only, or even primarily, their own lives and health, but also
those of others who may be non-beneficiaries and who may be spatially or
temporally removed, and these risks will not be in any direct way related
to a person's extent of use.
The transfer objection is essentially the same as that to the utilitarian's
152 R. and V. Routley
happiness sums as a way of solving moral conflict between different
parties, and the introduction of probability considerations does not change
the principles involved but merely complicates analyses. One might further object to the probability argument that probabilities involving distant
future situations are not always less than those concerning the immediate
future in the way the argument supposes, and that the outcomes of some
moral problems such as the bus example do not depend on a high level of
probability anyway. In some sorts of cases it is enough, as the bus example
reveals, that a significant risk is created; such cases do not depend critically on high probability assignments.
Uncertainty arguments in various forms are the most common and
important ones used by philosophers and others to argue for the position
that we cannot be expected to take serious account of the effects of our
actions on the distant future. There are two strands to the uncertainty
argument, capable of separation, but frequently entangled. Both arguments are mistaken, the first on a priori grounds, the second on a posteriori grounds. The first argument is a generalized uncertainty argument
which runs as follows: In contrast to the exact information we can obtain
about the present, the information we can obtain about the effects of our
actions on the distant future is unreliable, woolly, and highly speculative.
But we cannot base assessments of how we should act on information of
this kind, especially when accurate information is obtainable about the
present which would indicate different action. Therefore we must regretfully ignore the uncertain effects of our actions on the distant future. More
formally and crudely: One only has obligations to the future if these
obligations are based on reliable information; there is no reliable information at present as regards the distant future; therefore one has no obligations to the distant future.
The first argument is essentially a variation on a sceptical argument in
epistemology concerning our knowledge of the future (formally, replace
'obligations' by 'knowledge' in the crude statement of the argument
above). The main ploy is to considerably overestimate and overstate the
degree of certainty available with respect to the present and immediate
future, and the degree of certainty which is required as the basis for moral
consideration both with respect to the present and with respect to the
future. Associated with this is the attempt to suggest a sharp division as
regards certainty between the present and immediate future on the one
hand and the distant future on the other. We shall not find, we suggest, that
there is any such sharp or simple division between the distant future and
Obligations to the Future 153
the adjacent future and present, at least with respect to those things in the
present which are normally subject to moral constraints. We can and
constantly do act on the basis of such 'unreliable' information as the
sceptic as regards the future conveniently labels 'uncertainty'; for scepticproof certainty is rarely, or never, available with respect to much of the
present and immediate future. In moral situations in the present, action
often takes account of risk and probability, even quite low probabilities. A
good example is again the bus case. We do not need to know for certain
that the container will break and the lethal gas escape. In fact it does not
even have to be probable, in the relevant sense of more probable than not,
in order for us to condemn the consigner's action. It is enough that there is
a significant risk of harm in this sort of case. It does not matter if the
decreased well-being of the consigner is certain and the prospects of the
passengers quite uncertain; the resolution of the problem is still clearly in
favour of the so-called 'speculative' and 'unreliable'. But if we do not
require certainty of action to apply moral constraints in contemporary
affairs, why should we require a much higher standard of certainty in the
future? Why should we require epistemic standards for the future which
the more familiar sphere of moral action concerning the present and
adjacent future does not need to meet? The insistence on certainty as a
necessary condition before moral consideration can be given to the distant
future, then, amounts to an epistemic double standard. But such an
epistemic double standard, proposed in explaining the difference between
the present and the future and to justify ignoring future peoples' interests,
in fact cannot itself provide an explanation of the differences, since it
already presupposes different standards of certainty appropriate to each
class, which difference is in turn in need of justification.
The second uncertainty argument is a practical uncertainty argument,
that whatever our theoretical obligations to the future, we cannot in
practice take the interests of future people into account, because uncertainty about the distant future is so gross that we cannot determine what
the likely consequences of actions upon it will be and therefore, however
good our intentions to the people of the distant future, in practice we have
no choice but to ignore their interests. Uncertainty is gross where certain
incompatible hypotheses are as good as one another and there is no
rational ground for choosing between them. The second uncertainty argument can also be put in this way: If moral principles are, like other
principles, implicational in form, that is of such forms as 'if* has character
h then x is wrong, for every (action) x', then what the argument claims is
154 R. and V. Routley
that we can never obtain the information about future actions which would
enable us to detach the antecedent of the implication. So even if moral
principles theoretically apply to future people, in practice they cannot be
applied to obtain clear conclusions or directions concerning contemporary
action of the 'It is wrong to do x' type.
Many of the assumptions of the second argument have to be conceded.
If the distant future really is so grossly uncertain that in every case it is
impossible to determine in any way that is better than chance what the
effects of present action will be, and whether any given action will help or
hinder future people, then moral principles, although they may apply
theoretically to the future, will not be applicable in practice for obtaining
any clear conclusions about how to act. Hence the distant future will
impose no practical moral constraints on action. However, the argument
is factually incorrect in assuming that the future is always so grossly
uncertain or indeterminate. Admittedly there is often a high degree of
uncertainty concerning the distant future, but as a matter of (contingent)
fact it is not always so gross or sweeping as the argument has to assume.
There are some areas where uncertainty is not so great as to exclude
constraints on action, especially when account is taken of the point,
noticed in connection with the first argument, that complete certainty is
commonly not required for moral constraints and that all that may be
needed in some cases is the creation of""a significant risk. Again there is
considerable uncertainty about many factors which are not highly, or at
all, morally relevant, but this does not extend to many factors which are of
much greater importance to moral issues. For example, we may not have
any idea what the fashions will be in a hundred years in girls' names or
men's footwear, or what brands of ice cream people will be eating if any,
but we do have excellent reason to believe, especially if we consider 3,000
years of history, that what people there are in a hundred years are likely to
have material and psychic needs not entirely unlike our own, that they will
need a healthy biosphere for a good life; that like us they will not be
immune to radiation; that their welfare will not be enhanced by a high
incidence of cancer or genetic defects, by the destruction of resources, or
the elimination from the face of the earth of that wonderful variety of
non-human life which at present makes it such a rich and interesting place.
For this sort of reason, the second uncertainty argument should be rejected. While it is true that there are many areas in which the morally relevant
information needed is uncertain or unavailable, and in which we cannot
therefore determine satisfactorily how to act, there are certainly others in
Obligations to the Future 155
which uncertainty in morally relevant areas is not so great as to preclude
moral constraints on action, where we ascertain if not absolute certainties
at least probabilities of the same sort of order as are considered sufficient
for the application of moral principles in parallel contemporary cases,
especially where spatially remote people are involved. The case of nuclear
waste storage, and of uncertainty of the effects of it on future people,
seems to be of the latter sort. Here there is no gross indeterminacy or
uncertainty; it is simply not true that incompatible hypotheses about what
may happen are as good as each other. It is plain that nuclear waste storage
does impose significant risks of harm on future people, and, as we can see
from the bus example, the significant risk of harm is enough in cases of this
type to make moral constraints applicable.
In terms of the defects of the preceding uncertainty arguments, we can
see the corresponding defects in a number of widely employed uncertainty
arguments used to write off probable harm to future people as outside the
scope of proper consideration. Most of these popular moves employ both
of the uncertainty arguments as suits the case, switching from one to the
other in a way that is again reminiscent of sceptical moves. For example,
we may be told that we cannot really take account of future people because
we cannot be sure that they will exist or that their tastes and wants will not
be completely different from our own, to the point where they will not
suffer from our exhaustion of resources or from the things that would
affect us (cf. Passmore [1]). But this is to insist upon complete certainty of
a sort beyond what is required for the present and immediate future, where
there is also commonly no guarantee that some disaster will not overtake
those we are morally committed to. Again we may be told that there is no
guarantee that future people will be worthy of any efforts on our part,
because they may be morons or forever plugged into enjoyment- or other
machines (Golding [12]). Even if one is prepared to accept the elitist
approach presupposed - according to which only those who meet certain
properly civilized or intellectual standards are eligible for moral consideration - what we are being handed in such arguments as a serious defeating
consideration is again a mere outside possibility - like the sceptic who says
that the solid-looking desk in front of us is perhaps only a facade, not
because he has any particular reason for doing so, but because he hasn't
looked around the back, drilled holes in it, etc. Neither the contemporary
nor the historical situation gives any positive reason for supposing that a
lapse into universal moronity or universal pleasure-machine escapism is a
serious possibility, as opposed to a logical possibility. We can contrast
156 R. and V. Routley
with these mere logical possibilities the very real historically supportable
risks of escape of nuclear waste or decline of a civilization through destruction of its resource base.
The possibilities just considered in these uncertainty arguments of
sceptical character are not real possibilities. Another argument which may
consider a real possibility, but still does not succeed in showing that it is
acceptable to proceed with an action which would appear to be harmful to
future people, is often introduced in the nuclear waste case. This is the
argument that future people may discover a rigorously safe and permanent
storage method for nuclear wastes before they are damaged by escaped
waste material. Let us grant for the sake of the argument that this is a real
possibility (though physical arguments may show that it is not). This still
does not affect the fact that there is a significant risk of serious damage and
that the creation of a significant risk is enough to rule out an action of this
type as morally impermissible. In just the same way, future people may
discover a cure for cancer, and the fact that this appears to be a real and not
merely a logical possibility, does not make the action of the firm in the
example discussed above, of producing a substance likely to cause cancer
in future people, morally admissible. The fact that there was a real possibility of future people avoiding the harm would show that actions of these
sorts were admissible only if what was required for inadmissibility was
certainty of harm or a very high probability of it. In such cases, before such
actions could be considered admissible, what would be required is far
more than a possibility, real or not22 - it is at least the availability of an
applicable, safe, and rigorously tested, not merely speculative, technique
for achieving it, something that future people could reasonably be expected to apply to protect themselves.
The strategy of most of these uncertainty arguments is fairly clear then,
and may be brought out by looking yet again at the bus example, where the
consigner says that he cannot be expected to take account of the effect of
his actions on the passengers because they may find an effective way to
deal with his parcel or some lucky or unlucky accident may occur, e.g. the
bus may break down and they may all change to a different bus leaving the
parcel behind, or the bus may crash, killing all the passengers before the
container gets a chance to leak. These are all possibilities, of course, but
there is no positive reason to believe that they are any more than that, that
is they are not real possibilities. The strategy is to stress such outside
possibilities in order to create the false impression that there is gross
uncertainty about the future, that the real possibility that the container will
Obligations to the Future 157
break should be treated in the same way as these mere logical possibilities,
that uncertainty about the future is so great as to preclude the consigners'
taking account of the passengers' welfare and of the real possibility of
harm from his parcel, and thereby excuse his action. A related strategy is
to stress a real possibility, such as finding a cure for cancer, and thereby
imply that this removes the case for applying moral constraints .This move
implicitly makes the assumptions of the first argument, that certainty, or at
least a very high probability, of harm is required before an action can be
judged morally inadmissible, and the point of stressing the real possibility
of avoidance of damage is to show that this allegedly required high degree
of certainty or probability cannot be attained. That is, the strategy draws
attention to some real uncertainty implying that this is sufficient to defeat
the application of moral constraints. But, as we have seen, this is often not
so.
An argument closely related to the uncertainty arguments is based on
the non-existence and indeterminacy of the future.23 An item is indeterminate in a given respect if its properties in that respect are, as a matter of
logic, not settled (nor are they settlable in a non-arbitrary fashion). The
respects in which future items are indeterminate are well enough known
for a few examples to serve as reminders: all the following are indeterminate: the population of Australia at 2001, its distribution, its age structure,
the preferences of its members for folk music, wilderness, etc., the size
and shape of Wollongong, the average number of rooms in its houses and
in its office blocks, and so on. Philosophical discussion of such indeterminacy is as old as Aristotle's sea battle and as modern as truth-value gaps
and fuzzy logics, and many positions have been adopted on the existence
and determinacy of future items. Nevertheless theories that there are
obligations to the future are not sensitive to the metaphysical position
adopted concerning the existence or non-existence of the future. Any
theory which denied obligations to the future on the metaphysical grounds
that the future did not exist, and did not have properties, so that the
present could not be related to it, would be committed to denying such
obvious facts as that the present could causally influence the future, that
present people could be great-grandparents of purely future people, and so
on, and hence would have to be rejected on independent grounds. This is
not to say that there are not important problems about the existence or
non-existence of future items, problems which are perhaps most straightforwardly handled by a Meinongian position which allows that items
which do not exist may have properties. The non-existence of the future
158 R. and V. Routley
does raise problems for standard theories which buy the Ontological
Assumption (the thesis that what does not exist does not have properties),
especially given the natural (and correct) inclination to say that the future
does not (now) exist; but such theories can adopt various strategies for
coping with these problems (e.g. the adoption of a platonistic position
according to which the future does now exist, or the allowance for certain
sorts of relations between existents at different times), although the satisfactoriness of these strategies is open to question (cf. [4]). Thus whether or
not the Ontological Assumption is assumed and however it is applied, it
will be allowed that future items will have properties even if they do not
have them now, and that is enough to provide the basis for moral concern
about the future. Thus the thesis of obligations to the future does not
presuppose any special metaphysical position on the existence of the
future.
If the non-existence of future items creates no special problems for
obligations to the future, the same is not true of their indeterminacy.
Whether the indeterminacy of future items is seen as a logical feature of
the future which results from the non-existence of purely future items or
whether one adopts a (mistaken) platonistic view of the future as existing
and sees the indeterminacy as an epistemological one resulting from our
inability to know the character of these entities - that is, we cannot
completely know the future .though it exists and has a definite characterwhichever view we take indeterminacy still creates major difficulties for
certain ethical theories and their treatment of the future.
The difficulties arise for theories which appear to require a high level of
determinacy with respect to the number and character of future items, in
particular calculus-type theories such as utilitarianism in its usual forms,
where the calculations are critically dependent on such information as
numbers, totals, and averages, information which so far as the future is
concerned is generally indeterminate. The fact that this numerical information is typically indeterminate means that insofar as head-count utilitarianism requires determinate information on numbers, it is in a similar
position to theories discussed earlier; it may apply theoretically to future
people, but since the calculations cannot be applied to them their interests
will be left out of account. And, in fact, utilitarianism for the most part
does not, and perhaps cannot, take future creatures and their interests
seriously; there is little discussion as to how the difficulties or impossibility of calculations regarding the open future are to be obtained. Non-platonistic utilitarianism is in logical difficulty on this matter, while platonis-
Obligations to the Future 159
tic utilitarianism - which faces a range of other objections - is inapplicable
because of epistemic indeterminacy. We have yet another case of a theory
of the sort that applies theoretically but in practice doesn't take the future
seriously. But far from this showing that future people's interests should
be left out of account, what these considerations show are deficiencies in
these sorts of theories, which require excessive determinacy of information. This kind of information is commonly equally unavailable for the
accepted areas of moral constraint, the present and immediate future; and
the resolution of moral issues is often not heavily dependent on knowledge
of such specific determinate features as numbers or other determinate
features. For example, we do not need to know how many people there
will be on the bus, how intelligent they are, what their preferences are or
how badly they will be injured, in order to reach the conclusion that the
consigner's action in despatching his parcel is a bad one. Furthermore, it is
only the ability of moral considerations to continue to apply in the absence
of determinate information about such things as numbers that makes it
possible to take account of the possible effects of action, as the risks
associated with action - something which is quite essential even for the
present if moral considerations are to apply in the normal and accepted
way. For it is essential in order to apply moral considerations in the
accepted way that we consider alternative worlds, in order to take account
of options, risks, and alternative outcomes; but these alternative or counterfactual worlds are not in so different a position from the future with
respect to determinacy; for example, there is indeterminacy with respect
to the number of people who may be harmed in the bus case or in apossible
nuclear reactor melt-down. These alternative worlds, like the distant
future, are indeterminate in some respects, but not totally indeterminate.
It might still be thought that the indeterminacy of the future, for example
with respect to number and exact character, would at least prevent the
interest of future people being taken into account where there is a conflict
with the present. Since their numbers are indeterminate and their interests
unknown, how can we weigh their competing claims against those of the
present and immediate future where this information is available in a more
or less accurate form? The question is raised particularly by problems of
sharing fixed quantities of resources among present and future people,
when the numbers of the latter are indeterminate. Such problems are
indeed difficult, but they are not resolved by ignoring the claims of the
future, any more than the problems raised by the need to take account in
decision-making of factors difficult to quantify are resolved by ignoring
160 R. and V. Routley
such factors. Nor are such distributional problems as large and representative a class of moral problems concerning the future as the tendency to
focus on them would suggest. It should be conceded then that there will be
cases where the indeterminacy of aspects of the future will make conflicts
very difficult or indeed impossible to resolve - a realistic ethical theory
will not deliver a decision procedure - but there will equally be other
conflict cases where the level of indeterminacy does not hinder resolution
of the issue, e.g. the bus example which is a conflict case of a type. In
particular, there will be many cases which are not solved by weighing
numbers, numbers of interests, or whatever, cases for which one needs to
know only the most general probable characteristics of future people.
Moreover, even where numbers are relevant often only bounds will be
required, exact numerical counts only being required where, for instance,
margins are narrow; e.g. issues may be resolved as in parliament where a
detailed vote (or division) is only required when the issue is close. It is
certainly not necessary then to have complete determinacy to resolve all
cases of conflict.
The question we must ask then is what features of future people could
disqualify them from moral consideration or reduce their claims to it to
below those of present people? The answer is: in principle None. Prima
facie moral principles are universalizable, and lawlike, in that they apply
independently of position in space or in time, for example.24 But universalizability of principles is an outcome of those ethical theories which are
capable of dealing satisfactorily with the present; in other words, a theory
that did not allow properly for the future would be found to have defects as
regards the present, to deal unjustly or unfairly with some present people,
e.g. those remotely located, those outside some select subgroup such as
(white-skinned) humans, etc. The only candidates for characteristics that
would fairly rule out future people are the logical features we have been
looking at, uncertainty and indeterminacy; what we have argued is that it
would be far too sweeping to see these features as affecting the moral
claims of future people in a general way. These special features only affect
certain sorts of cases (e.g. the determination of best probable or practical
course of action given only present information). In particular they do not
affect cases of the sort being considered, the nuclear one, where highly
determinate or certain information about the numbers and characteristics
of the class likely to be harmed or certainty of damage are not required.
To establish obligations to the future a full universalizability principle is
not needed: it is enough to require that the temporal position of a person
Obligations to the Future 161
cannot affect his entitlement to just and fair treatment, to full moral
consideration;25 inversely that it is without basis to discriminate morally
against a person in virtue of his temporal position. As a result of this
universalizability, there is the same obligation to future people as to the
present; and thus there is the same obligation to take account of them and
their interests in what we do, to be careful in our actions, to take account of
the probability (and not just the certainty) of our actions' causing harm or
damage, and to see, other things being equal, that we do not act so as to rob
future people of what is necessary for the chance of a good life. Uncertainty and indeterminacy do not free us of these obligations. If, in a closely
comparable case concerning the present, the creation of a significant risk
is enough to rule out an action as immoral, and there are no independent
grounds for requiring greater certainty of harm in the future case under
consideration, then futurity alone will not provide adequate grounds for
proceeding with the action, thus discriminating against future people.
Accordingly we cannot escape, through appeal to futurity, the conclusion
tentatively reached in our first section, that proposals for nuclear development in the present state of technology for future waste disposal are
immoral.
IV. Overriding Consideration Arguments
In the first part we noticed that the consigner's action could not be justified
by purely economistic arguments, such as that his profits would rise, the
firm or the village would be more prosperous, or by appealing to the fact
that some possibly uncomfortable changes would otherwise be needed.
We also observed that the principle on which this assessment was based,
that one was not usually entitled to create a serious risk to others for these
sorts of reasons, applied more generally and, in particular, applied to the
nuclear case. For this reason the economistic arguments which are thus
most commonly advanced to promote nuclear development - e.g. cheapness, efficiency, profitability for electricity utilities, and the need otherwise for uncomfortable changes such as restructuring of employment,
investment, and consumption-do not even begin to show that the nuclear
alternative is an acceptable one. Even if these economistic assumptions
about benefits to present people were correct (and there is reason to doubt
that most of them are),26 the arguments would fail because economics
must operate within the framework of moral constraints, and not vice
versa.
162 R. and V. Routley
What one does have to consider, however, are moral conflict arguments, that is arguments to the effect that, unless the prima facie unacceptable alternative is taken, some even more unacceptable alternative is
the only possible outcome, and will ensue. For example, in the bus case,
the consigner may argue that his action is justified because unless it is
taken the village will starve. It is by no means clear that even such a
justification as this would be sufficient, especially where the risk to the
passengers is high, as the case seems to become one of transfer of costs
and risks onto others; but such a moral situation would no longer be so
clearcut, and one would perhaps hesitate to condemn any action taken in
such circumstances.
Some of the arguments advanced to show moral conflict are based on
competing duties to present people, and others on competing obligations
to future people, both of which are taken to override the obligations not to
impose on the future significant risk of serious harm. The structure of such
moral conflict arguments is based crucially on the presentation of a genuine and exhaustive set of alternatives (or at least practical alternatives),
and upon showing that the only alternatives to admittedly morally undesirable actions are even more undesirable ones. If some practical alternative which is not morally worse than the action to be justified is overlooked, suppressed, or neglected in the argument-for example, if in the bus
case it turns out that the villagers have another option to starving or to the
sending off of the parcel, namely earning a living in some other way - then
the argument is defective and cannot readily be patched. We want to argue
that suppression of practicable alternatives has occurred in the argument,
designed to show that the alternatives to the nuclear option are even worse
than the option itself, and that there are other factual defects in these
arguments as well. In short, the arguments depend essentially on the
presentation of false dichotomies.
The first argument, the poverty argument, is that there is an overriding
obligation to the poor, both the poor of the third world and the poor of
industrialized countries. Failure to develop nuclear energy, it is often
claimed, would amount to denying them the opportunity to reach the
standard of affluence we currently enjoy and would create unemployment
and poverty in the industrialized nations.
The unemployment and poverty argument does not stand up to examination either for the poor of the industrial countries or for those of the third
world. There is good evidence that large-scale nuclear energy will help to
increase unemployment and poverty in the industrial world, through the
Obligations to the Future 163
diversion of great amounts of available capital into an industry which is not
only an exceptionally poor provider of direct employment, but also helps
to reduce available jobs through encouraging substitution of energy use for
labour use. 27 The argument that nuclear energy is needed for the third
world is even less convincing. Nuclear energy is both politically and
economically inappropriate for the third world, since it requires massive
amounts of capital, requires numbers of imported scientists and engineers,
and creates negligible employment, while politically it increases foreign
dependence, adds to centralized entrenched power and reduces the
chance for change in the oppressive political structures which are a large
part of the problem.28 The fact that nuclear energy is not in the interests of
people of the third world does not, of course, mean that it is not in the
interests of, and wanted by, their rulers, the westernized and often military elites in whose interests the economies of these countries are usually
organized; but it is not paternalistic to examine critically the demands
these ruling elites may make in the name of the poor.
The poverty argument then is a fraud. Nuclear energy will not be used to
help the poor.29 Both for the third world and for the industrialized countries there are well-known energy-conserving alternatives and the practical option of developing other energy sources,30 alternatives which are
morally acceptable and socially preferable to nuclear development, and
which have far better prospects for helping the poor.31
The second major argument advanced to show moral conflict appeals to
a set of supposedly overriding and competing obligations to future people.
We have, it is said, a duty to pass on the immensely valuable things and
institutions which our culture has developed. Unless our high-technological, high-energy industrial society is continued and fostered, our valuable
institutions and traditions will fall into decay or be swept away. The
argument is essentially that without nuclear power, without the continued
level of material wealth it alone is assumed to make possible, the lights of
our civilization will go out.32 .
The lights-going-out argument raises rather sharply questions as to
what is valuable in our society, and of what characteristics are necessary
for a good society. These are questions which deserve much fuller treatment than we can allot them here, but a few brief points should be made.
The argument adopts an extremely uncritical position with respect to
existing high-technology societies, apparently assuming that they are
uniformly and uniquely valuable; it also assumes that technological society is unmodifiable, that it can't be changed in the direction of energy
164 R. and V. Routley
conservation or alternative energy sources without collapse. Such a society has to be accepted and assessed as a whole, and virtually unlimited
supplies of energy are essential to maintain this whole.
These assumptions are hard to accept. The assumption that technological society's energy patterns are unmodifiable is especially so - after all, it
has survived events such as world wars which have required major social
and technological restructuring and consumption modification. If western
society's demands for energy are totally unmodifiable without collapse,
not only would it be committed to a programme of increasing destruction,
but one might ask what use its culture could be to future people who would
very likely, as a consequence of this destruction, lack the resource base
which the argument assumes to be essential in the case of contemporary
society.
There is also difficulty with the assumption of uniform valuableness; but
if this is rejected the question becomes not: what is necessary to maintain
existing high-technological society and its political institutions? but rather: what is necessary to maintain what is valuable in that society and the
political institutions which are needed to maintain those valuable things?
While it may be easy to argue that high energy consumption is necessary to
maintain the political and economic status quo, it is not so easy to argue
that it is essential to maintain what is valuable, and it is what is valuable,
presumably, that we have a duty to pass on to the future.
The evidence, e.g. from history, is that no very high level of material
affluence or energy consumption is needed to maintain what is valuable.
There is good reason in fact to believe that a society with much lower
energy and resource consumption would better foster what is valuable
than our own. But even if a radical change in these directions is independently desirable, as we believe it is, it is not necessary to presuppose such
a change, in the short term at least, in order to see that the assumptions of
the lights-going-out argument are wrong. No enormous reduction of wellbeing is required to consume less energy than at present, and certainly far
less than the large increase over present levels of consumption which is
assumed in the usual economic case for nuclear energy.33 What the nuclear strategy is really designed to do then is not to prevent the lights going
out in western civilization, but to enable the lights to go on burning all the
time - to maintain and even increase the wattage output of the Energy
Extravaganza.
In fact there is good reason to think that, far from the high energy
consumption society fostering what is valuable, it will, especially if energy
Obligations to the Future 165
is obtained by nuclear-fission means, be positively inimical to it. A society
which has become heavily dependent upon an extremely high centralized,
controlled, and garrisoned, capital- and expertise-intensive energy
source, must be one which is highly susceptible to entrenchment of power,
and one in which the forces which control this energy source, whether
capitalist or bureaucratic, can exert enormous power over the political
system and over people's lives, even more than they do at present. Very
persuasive arguments have been advanced by civil liberties groups and
others in a number of countries to suggest that such a society would tend to
become authoritarian, if only as an outcome of its response to the threat
posed by dissident groups in the nuclear situation.34
There are reasons to believe then that with nuclear development what
we would be passing on to future generations would be some of the worst
aspects of our society (e.g. the consumerism, growing concentration of
power, destruction of the natural environment, and latent authoritarianism), while certain valuable aspects would be lost or threatened. Political
freedom is a high price to pay for consumerism and energy extravagance.
Again, as in the case of the poverty arguments, clear alternatives which
do not involve such unacceptable consequences are available. The alternative to the high technology-nuclear option is not a return to the cave, the
loss of all that is valuable, but the development of alternative technologies
and life-styles which offer far greater scope for the maintenance and
further development of what is valuable in our society than the highly
centralized nuclear option.35 The lights-going-out argument, as a moral
conflict argument, accordingly fails, because it also is based on a false
dichotomy. Thus both the escape routes, the appeal to moral conflict and
to the appeal to futurity, are closed.
If then we apply the same standards of morality to the future as we
acknowledge for the present - as we have argued we should - the conclusion that the proposal to develop nuclear energy on a large scale is a crime
against the future is inevitable, since both the escape routes are closed.
There are, of course, also many other grounds for ruling it out as morally
unacceptable, for saying that it-is not only a crime against the distant future
but also a crime against the present and immediate future. These other
grounds for moral concern about nuclear energy, as it affects the present
and immediate future, include problems arising from the possibility of
catastrophic releases of radioactive fuel into the environment or of waste
material following an accident such as reactor melt-down, of unscheduled
discharges of radiation into the environment from a plant fault, of proli-
166 R. and V. Routley
feration of nuclear weapons, and of deliberate release or threat of release
of radioactive materials as a measure of terrorism or of extortion. All these
are important issues, of much moral interest. What we want to claim,
however, is that on the basis of its effects on the future alone, the nuclear
option is morally unacceptable.
Appendix
Passmore's Treatment ofRawls,
and What Really Happens on Rawls's Theory
Passmore takes it that Rawls's theory yields an unconstrained position
but, according to Rawls, the theory leads to quite the opposite result;
namely,
persons in different generations [and not merely neighbouring generations] have duties and obligations to one another just as contemporaries do. The present generation cannot do as it pleases but is bound
by the principles that would be chosen in the original position to
define justice between persons at different moments of time.. . . The
derivation of these duties and obligations may seem at first a somewhat far-fetched application of the central doctrine. Nevertheless
these requirements would be acknowledged in the original position
[where the parties do not know to which generation they belong], and
so the conception of justice as fairness covers these matters without
any change in its basic idea. ([5], p. 293; the second insert is drawn
from p. 287)
Through judicious use of the veil of ignorance and the time of entry of
parties to the original contract position, Rawls's contract theory, unlike
simpler explicit contract theories, can yield definite obligations to distant
future people,36 for example, we ought to save at a just rate for future
people.
But, as Rawls remarks (p. 284), 'the question of justice between generations . . . subjects any ethical theory to severe if not impossible tests'. It is
doubtful that Rawls's theory as formulated passes the tests; for the theory
as formulated does not yield the stated conclusion, but a conclusion
inconsistent with the thesis that there are the same obligations to future
people as to contemporaries. Exactly how these obligations arise from the
initial agreement depends critically on the interpretation of the time of
Obligations to the Future 167
entry of the parties into the agreement. Insofar as Rawls insists upon the
present-time-of-entry interpretation (p. 139), he has to introduce supplementary motivational assumptions in order to (try to) secure the desired
bondings between generations, in particular to ensure that the generation
of the original position saves for any later generation, even their immediate successors ([5], p. 140 and p. 292). Rawls falls back on-what is as we
have seen inadequate to the task, since it does not exclude one generation
damaging another remote generation in a way that bypasses mutually
successive generations - 'ties of sentiment between successive generations' (p. 292): to this limited extent Passmore has a point, for such a social
contract on its own (without additional assumptions about the motives of
the parties to the agreement) does not furnish obligations even to our
immediate successors. This is indicative also of the unsatisfactory instability of Rawls's theory under changes, its sensitivity to the way the original
agreement is set up, to the motivation of parties, their time of entry, what
they can know, etc.
To arrive at a more adequate account of obligations to the distant future
under Rawls's theory, let us adopt, to avoid the additional, dubious and
unsatisfactory, motivational assumptions Rawls invokes, one of the alternative - and non -equivalent - time-of-entry interpretations that Rawls lists
(p. 146), that of persons alive at some time in simultaneous agreement. Let
us call this, following Rawls's notation (on p. 140), interpretation 4b (it is
perhaps unnecessary to assume for 4b any more than 4a that all people
need be involved: it may be enough given the equivalencizing effect of the
veil of ignorance that some are, and as with the particular quantifier it is
quite unnecessary to be specific about numbers). Then of course the
parties, since they are, for all they know, of different generations, will
presumably agree on a just savings rate, and also to other just distribution
principles, simply on the basis of Rawlsian rationality, i.e. advancing their
own interests, without additional motivation assumptions. This more
appealing omnitemporal interpretation of time of entry into the agreement,
which gives a superior account of obligation to the future consistent with
Rawls's claim, Rawls in some places puts down as less than best (p. 292)
but in his most detailed account of the original position simply dismisses
(p. 139):
To conceive of the original position [as a gathering of people living at
different times] would be to stretch fantasy too far; the conception
would cease to be a natural guide to intuition.
168 R. and V. Rout ley
This we question: it would be a better guide to intuition than a position
(like 4a) which brings out intuitively wrong results; it is a more satisfactory
guide, for example, to justice between generations than the present-timeof-entry interpretation, which fails conspicuously to allow for the range of
potential persons (all of whom are supposed to qualify on Rawls's account
for just treatment, cf. § 77). Moreover, it stretches fantasy no further than
science fiction or than some earlier contract accounts.36 But it does
require changes in the way the original position is conceived, and it does
generate metaphysical difficulties for orthodox ontological views (though
not to the same extent for the Meinongian view we prefer); for, to consider
the latter, either time travel is possible or the original hypothetical position
is an impossible situation, with people who live at different times assembled at the same time. The difficulties - of such an impossible meeting help to reveal that what Rawls's theory offers is but a colourful representation of obligations in terms of a contract agreed upon at a meeting.
The metaphysical difficulties do not concern merely possible people,
because all those involved are sometime-actual people; nor are there
really serious difficulties generated by the fact that very many of these
people do not exist, i.e. exist now. The more serious difficulties are either
those of time travel, e.g. that future parties relocated into the present may
be able to interfere with their own history, or, if time travel is ruled out
logically or otherwise, that future parties may be advantaged (or disadvantaged) by their knowledge of history and technology, and that accordingly fairness is lost. As there is considerable freedom in how we choose to
(re)arrange the original position, we shall suppose that time travel is
rejected as a means of entering the original position. For much less than
travel is required; some sort of limited communicational network which
filters out, for example, all historical data (and all cultural or species
dependent material) would suffice; and in any case if time travel were not
excluded essentially the present-time-of-entry interpretation would serve,
though fairness would again be put in doubt. The filtered communicational
hook-up by which the omnitemporal position is engineered still has - if
fairness is to be seen to be built into the decision making - to be combined
with a reinterpreted veil of ignorance, so that parties do not know where
they are located temporally any more than they know who they are
characterwise. This implies, among other things, limitations on the parties' knowledge of factual matters, such as available technology and world
and local history; for otherwise parties could work out their location,
temporal or spatial. For example, if some party knew, as Rawls supposes,
Obligations to the Future 169
the general social facts, then he would presumably be aware of the history
of his time and so of where history ends, that is of the date of his
generation, his time (his present), and so be aware of his temporal location. These are already problems for Rawls's so-called 'present-time-ofentry interpretation' - it is, rather, a variable-time-of-entry interpretation
- given that the parties may be, as Rawls occasionally admits (e.g. p. 287),
of any one generation, not necessarily the present: either they really do
have to be ofthepresent time or they cannot be assumed to know as much
as Rawls supposes.37 There is, however, no reason why the veil of ignorance should not be extended so as to avoid this problem; and virtually any
extension that solves the problem for the variable-time-of-entry interpretation should serve, so it seems, for the omnitemporal one. We shall
assume then that the parties know nothing which discloses their respective
locations (i.e. in effect we write in conditions for universalizability of
principles decided upon). There are still gaps between the assumptions of
the omnitemporal position as roughly sketched and the desired conclusion
concerning obligations to the future, but (the matter is beginning to look
non-trivially provable given not widely implausible assumptions and) the
intuitive arguments are as clear as those in [5], indeed they simply restate
arguments to obligations given by Rawls.
Rawls's theory, under interpretation 4b, admits of nice application to
the problems of just distribution of material resources and of nuclear
power. The just distribution, or rate of usage, of material resources38 over
time is an important conservation issue to which Rawls's theory seems to
apply, just as readily, and in a similar fashion, to that in which it applies to
the issue of a just rate of savings. In fact the argument from the original
position for a just rate of saving - whatever its adequacy - can by simply
mimicked to yield an argument for just distribution of resources over
generations. Thus, for example:
persons in the original position are to ask themselves how much they
would be willing to save [i.e. conserve] at each stage of advance on
the assumption that all other generations are to save at the same rate
[conserve resources to the same extent]. . . . In effect, then, they
must choose a just savings principle [resources distribution principle]
that assigns an appropriate rate of accumulation to [degree of resource conservation at] each level of advance. ([5], p. 287; our
bracketed options give the alternative argument)
170 R. and V. Routley
Just as 'they try to piece together a just savings schedule' (p. 289), so they
can try to piece together a just resource distribution policy. Just as a case
for resource conservation can be made out by appeal to the original
position, since it is going to be against the interests of, to the disadvantage
of, later parties to find themselves in a resource depleted situation (thus,
on Rawlsian assumptions, they will bargain hard for a share of resources),
so, interestingly, a case against a rapid programme of nuclear power
development can be devised. The basis of a case against large-scale
nuclear development is implicit in Rawls's contract theory under interpretation 4b, though naturally the theory is not applied in this sort of way
by Rawls. To state the case in its crude but powerful form: people from
later generations in the original position are bound to take it as against their
interests to simply carry the waste can for energy consumed by an earlier
generation. (We have already argued that they will find no convincing
overriding considerations that make it worth their while to carry the waste
can.) Thus not only has Passmore misrepresented the obligations to the
future that Rawls's theory admits; he is also wrong in suggesting (p. 87 and
p. 91) that Rawls's theory cannot justify a policy of resource conservation
which includes reductions in present consumption.
There is, in this connection, an accumulation of errors in Passmore,
some of which spill over to Rawls, which it is worth trying to set out. First,
Passmore claims ([1], p. 86; cf. also p. 90) that 'Rawls does not so much
mention the saving of natural resources'. In fact the 'husbanding of natural
resources' is very briefly considered ([5], p. 271). It is true, however, that
Rawls does not reveal any of the considerable power that his theory,
properly interpreted, has for natural resource conservation, as implying a
just distribution of natural resources over time. Secondly, Passmore attempts ([1], pp. 87 ff.) to represent the calls of conservationists for a
reduction in present resource usage and for a more just distribution as a
call for heroic self-sacrifices; this is part of his more general attempt to
represent every moral constraint with respect to the non-immediate future
as a matter of self-sacrifice. 'Rawls's theory', Passmore says (on p. 87),
'leaves no room for heroic sacrifice', and so, he infers, leaves no room for
conservation. Not only is the conclusion false, but the premiss also:
Rawls's theory allows for supererogation, as Rawls explains ([5], p. 117).
But resource conservation is, like refraining from nuclear development,
not a question of heroic self-sacrifice; it is in part a question of obligations
or duties to the distant future. And Rawls's theory allows not only for
obligations as well as supererogation, but also for natural duties. Rawls's
Obligations to the Future 171
contract, unlike the contracts of what is usually meant by a 'contract
theory', is by no means exhaustive of the moral sphere:
But even this wider [contract] theory fails to embrace all moral
relationships, since it would seem to include only our relations with
other persons and to leave out of account how we are to conduct
ourselves towards,animals and the rest of nature. I do not contend
that the contract notion offers a way to approach these questions
which are certainly of the first importance; and I shall have to put
them aside, (p. 17)
The important class of obligations beyond the scope of the contract theory
surely generates obligations between persons which even the wider contract theory likewise cannot explain. The upshot is that such a contract
account, even if sufficient for the determination of obligations, is not
necessary. To this extent Rawls' s theory is not a full social contract theory
at all. However, Rawls appears to lose sight of the fact that his contract
theory delivers only a sufficient condition when he claims, for example (p.
298), that 'one feature of the contract doctrine is that it places an upper
bound on how much a generation can be asked to save for the welfare of
later generations'. For greater savings may sometimes be required to meet
obligations beyond those that the contract doctrine delivers. In short,
Rawls appears to have slipped into assuming, inconsistently, that his
contract theory is a necessary condition.
Although Rawls's theory caters for justice between generations and
allows the derivation of important obligations to people in the distant
future, the full theory is far from consistent on these matters and there are
significant respects in which Rawls does not take justice to the future
seriously. The most conspicuous symptoms of this are that justice to the
future is reduced to a special case, justice between generations, and that
the only aspect of justice between generations that Rawls actually considers is a just savings rate; there is, for example, no proper examination of
the just distribution of resources among generations, though these resources, Rawls believes, provide the material base of the just institutions that
he wants to see maintained. In fact Rawls strongly recommends a system
of markets as a just means for the allocation of most goods and services,
recognizing their well-known limitations only in the usual perfunctory
fashion ([5], pp. 270 ff.). Yet market systems are limited by a narrow time
horizon, and are quite ill-equipped to allocate resources in a just fashion
172 R. and V. Rout ley
over a time span of several generations. Similarly Rawls's endorsement of
democratic voting procedures as in many cases a just method of determining procedures depends upon the assumptions that everyone with ah
interest is represented. But given his own assumptions about obligations
to the future and in respect of potential persons this is evidently not the
case. Catering in a just fashion for the interests of future people poses
serious problems for any method of decision that depends upon people
being present to represent their own interests.
Some of the more conservative, indeed reactionary, economic assumptions in Rawls emerge with the assumption that all that is required for
justice between generations is a just savings rate, that all we need to pass
on to the future are the things that guarantee appropriate savings such as
capital, factories, and machines. But the transmission of these things is
quite insufficient for justice to the future, and neither necessary nor
sufficient as a foundation for a good life for future generations. What is
required for justice is the transmission in due measure of what is valuable.
Rawls has, however, taken value accumulation as capital accumulation,
thereby importing one of the grossest economic assumptions, that capital
reflects value. But of course the accumulation of capital may conflict with
the preservation of what is valuable. It is for this sort of reason (and thus,
in essence, because of the introduction of supplementary economistic
theses which are not part of the pure contract theory) that Rawls's theory
is a reactionary one from an environmental point of view; on the theory as
presented (i.e. the contract theory plus all the supplementary assumptions) there is no need to preserve such things as wilderness or natural
beauty. The savings doctrine supposes that everything of value for transmission to the future is negotiable in the market or tradeable; but then
transmission of savings can by no means guarantee that some valuable
things, not properly represented in market systems, are not eliminated or
not passed on, thereby making future people worse off. It becomes evident
in this way, too, how culturally-bound Rawls's idea of ensuring justice to
future generations through savings is. It is not just that the idea does not
apply, without a complete overhaul, to non-industrial societies such as
those of hunter-gatherers; it does not apply to genuinely post-industrial
societies either. Consideration of such alternative societies suggests that
whafis required, in place of capital accumulation, is that we pass on what
is necessary for a good life, that we ensure that the basics are fairly
distributed over time and not eroded, e.g. that in the case of the forest
people that the forest is maintained. The narrowness of Rawls's picture,
Obligations to the Future 173
which makes no due allowance for social or cultural diversity (from the
original contractual position on) or for individual diversity arises in part
from his underlying and especially narrow socio-economic assumption as
to what people want:
What men want is meaningful work in free association with others,
these associations regulating their relations to one another within a
framework of just basic institutions. ([5], p. 290)
This may be what many Harvard men want; but as a statement of what
men want it supplies neither sufficient nor even necessary conditions.39
NOTES
1 Thus according to the Fox Report ([2], p. 110; our italics).
There is at present no generally accepted means by which high level waste can be
permanently isolated from the environment and remain safe for very long periods.
. . . Permanent disposal of high-level solid wastes in stable geological formations is
regarded as the most likely solution, but has yet to be demonstrated as feasible. It is
not certain that such methods and disposal sites will entirely prevent radioactive
releases following disturbances caused by natural processes or human activity.
The Fox Report also quoted approvingly ([2], p. 187; our italics) the conclusion of the
British (Flowers) Report [6]:
There should be no commitment to a large programme of nuclear fission power until
it has been demonstrated beyond reasonable doubt that a method exist s to ensure the
safe containment of long-lived, highly radioactive waste for the indefinite future.
Although the absence of a satisfactory storage method has been conceded by some
leading proponents of nuclear development, e.g. Weinberg ([3], pp. 32-33), it is now
disputed by others. In particular, the headline for Cohen [15], which reads 'A substantial
body of evidence indicates that the high level radioactive wastes generated by U.S.
nuclear power plants can be stored satisfactorily in deep geological formations', has
suggested to many readers - what it was no doubt intended to suggest- that there is really
no problem about the disposal of radioactive wastes after all. Cohen presents, however,
no new hard evidence, no evidence not already available to the British and Australian
Commissions ([2] and [6]). Moreover the evidence Cohen does outline fails conspicuously
to measure up to the standards rightly required by the Flowers and Fox Reports. Does
Cohen offer a commercial-scale procedure for waste disposal which can be demonstrated
as safe? Far from it:
174 R. and V. Routley
The detailed procedures for handling the high-level wastes are not yet definite, but
present indications are that. . . . (Cohen [1], p. 24; our italics)
Does Cohen 'demonstrate beyond reasonable doubt' the long-term safety of burial of
wastes, deep underground? Again, far from it:
On the face of it such an approach appears to be reasonably safe. . . . (p. 24; our
italics)
Cohen has apparently not realized what is required.
At issue here are not so much scientific or empirical issues as questions of methodology, of standards of evidence required for claims of safety, and above all, of values, since
claims of safety, for example, involve implicit evaluations concerning what counts as an
acceptable risk, an admissible cost, etc. In the headline 'a substantial body of evidence
. . . indicates that. . . wastes . . . can be stored satisfactorily' the key words (italicized)
are evaluative or elastic, and the strategy of Cohen's case is to adopt very low standards
for their application. But in view of what is at stake it is hardly acceptable to do this, to
dress up in this way what are essentially optimistic assurances and untested speculations
about storage, which in any case do little to meet the difficulties and uncertainties that
have been widely pointed out as regards precisely the storage proposals Cohen outlines,
namely human or natural interference or disturbance.
2 See [18], pp. 24-25.
3 On all these points, see [14], esp. p. 141. According to the Fox Report ([2], p. 110):
Parts of the reactor structure will be highly radioactive and their disposal could be
very difficult. There is at present no experience of dismantling a full size reactor.
4 See, in particular, The Union of Concerned Scientists, The Nuclear Fuel Cycle, Friends
of the Earth Energy Paper, San Francisco 1973, p. 47; also [3], p. 32 and [14], p. 149.
5 As the discussion in [14], pp. 153-7, explains.
6 Cf. [17], pp. 35-36, [18] and, for much detail, J. R. Goffman and A. R. Tamplin, Poisoned
Power, Rodale Press, Emmau Pa. 1971.
7 On the pollution and waste disposal record of the infant nuclear industry, see [14] and
[17].
The record of many countries on pollution control, where in many cases available
technologies for reducing or removing pollution are not applied because they are considered too expensive or because they adversely affect the interests of some powerful group,
provides clear historical evidence that the problem of nuclear waste disposal would not
end simply with the devising of a 'safe' technology for disposal, even if one could be
devised which provided a sufficient guarantee of safety and was commercially feasible.
The fact that present economic and political arrangements are overwhelmingly weighted
in favour of the interests and concerns of (some) contemporary humans makes it not
unrealistic to expect the long-term nuclear waste disposal, if it involved any significant
cost at all, when public concern about the issue died down, would be seen to conflict with
the interests of contemporary groups, and that these latter interests would in many cases
be favoured. Nor, as the history of movements such as the Campaign for Nuclear
Disarmament shows, could generalized public concern in the absence of direct personal
interest, be relied upon to be sustained for long enough to ensure implementation of costly
or troublesome long-term disposal methods - even in those places where public concern
exists and is a politically significant force.
It must be stressed then that the problem is not merely one of disposal technique.
Historical and other evidence points to the conclusion that many of the most important
risks associated with nuclear waste disposal are not of the kind which might be amenable
Obligations to the Future
175
to technical solutions in the laboratory. A realistic assessment of potential costs to the
future from nuclear development cannot overlook these important non-technical risk
factors.
8 Of course the effect on people is not the only factor which has to be taken into consideration in arriving at a moral judgment. Nuclear radiation, unlike most ethical theories, does
not confine its scope to human life. But since the harm nuclear development is likely to
cause to non-human life can hardly improve its case, it suffices if the case against it can be
made out solely in terms of its effects on human life in the conventional way.
9 Proponents of nuclear power often try to give the impression that future people will not
just bear costs from nuclear development but will also be beneficiaries, because nuclear
powerprovides an 'abundant' or even 'unlimited' source of energy; thus Weinberg ([3], p.
34): 'an all but infinite source of relatively cheap and clean energy'. A good example of an
attempt to create the impression that 'abundant' and 'cheap' energy from nuclear fission
will be available to 'our descendants', i.e. all future people, is found in the last paragraph
of Cohen [15]. Such claims are most misleading, since fission power even with the breeder
reactor has only about the same prospective lifetime as coal-produced electricity (a point
that can be derived using data in A. Parker, 'World Energy Resources: A Survey', Energy
Policy, Vol. 3 [1975], pp. 58-66), and it is quite illegitimate to assume that nuclear fusion,
for which there are still major unsolved problems, will have a viable, clean technology by
the time fission runs out, or, for that matter, that it ever will. Thus while some few
generations of the immediate future may obtain some benefits as well as costs, there is a
very substantial chance that tho se of the more distant future will obtain nothing but costs.
10 These feelings, of which Smith's and Hume's sympathy is representative, are but the
feeling echoes of obligation. At most, sympathy explains the feeling of obligation or lack
of it, and this provides little guide as to whether there is an obligation or not - unless one
interprets moral sympathy, the feeling of having a obligation, or being obligated, itself as
a sufficient indication of obligation, in which case moral sympathy is a non-explanatory
correlate in the feelings department of obligation itself and cannot be truly explanatory of
the ground of it; unless, in short, moral sympathy reduces to an emotive rewrite of moral
obligation.
11 Elsewhere in [1] Passmore is especially exercised that our institutions and intellectual
traditions - presumably only the better ones - should be passed on to posterity, and that
we should strive to make the world a better place, if not eventually an ideal one.
12 This is not the only philosophically important issue in environmental ethics on which
Passmore is inconsistent. Consider his: 'over-arching intention: to consider whether the
solution of ecological problems demands a moral or metaphysical revolution' (p. x),
whether the West needs a new ethic and a new metaphysics. Passmore's answer in [1] is
an emphatic No.
Only insofar as Western moralists have [made various erroneous suggestions] can
the West plausibly be said to need a 'new ethic'. What it needs, for the most part, is
not so much a 'new ethic' as adherence to a perfectly familiar ethic.
For the major sources of our ecological disasters - apart from ignorance - are
greed and shortsightedness, which amount to much the same thing. . . There is no
novelty in the view that greed is evil; no need of a new ethic to tell us as much. (p. 187)
'The view that the West now needs. . . a new concept of nature' is similarly dismissed (p.
186, cf. p. 72). But in his paper [1*] (i.e. 'Attitudes to Nature', Royal Institute of
Philosophy Lectures, Vol. 8, Macmillan, London 1975), which is said to be an attempt to
bring together and to reformulate some of the basic philosophical themes of [1], Passmore's answer is Yes, and quite different themes, inconsistent with those of [1], are
advanced:
176 R. and V. Routley
[T]he general conditions I have laid down . . . have not been satisfied in most of the
traditional philosophies of nature. To that degree it is true, I think, that we do need a
'new metaphysics' which is genuinely not anthropocentric. . . . A 'new metaphysics', if it is not to falsify the facts, will have to be naturalistic, but not reductionist.
The working out of such a metaphysics is, in my judgement, the most important task
which lies ahead of philosophy. ([1*], pp. 260-1)
A new ethic accompanies this new metaphysics.
The emergence of new moral attitudes to nature is bound up, then, with the emergence of a more realistic philosophy of nature. That is the only adequate foundation
for effective ecological concern. ([1*], p. 264)
This is a far cry from the theme of [1] that ecological problems can be solved within the
traditions of the West.
13 Put differently, the causal linkage can bypass intermediate generations, especially given
action at a temporal distance: the chain account implies that there are no moral constraints in initiating such causal linkages. The chain picture accordingly seems to presuppose an unsatisfactory Humean model of causation, demanding contiguity and excluding
action at a distance.
14 Golding we shall concede to Passmore, though even here the case is not clearcut. For
Golding writes towards the end of his article ([12], p. 96):
My discussion, until this point, has proceeded on the view that we have obligations
to future generations. But do we? I am not sure that the question can be answered in
the affirmative with any certainty. I shall conclude this note with a very brief
discussion of some of the difficulties.
All of Passmore's material on Golding is drawn from this latter and, as Golding says,
'speculative' discussion.
15 There is no textual citation for Bentham at all for the chapter of [1] concerned, viz. Ch. 4,
'Conservation'.
16 As Passmore himself at first concedes ([1], p. 84):
If, as Bentham tells us, in deciding how to act men ought to take account of the
effects of their actions on every sentient being, they obviously ought to take account
of the pleasure and pains of the as yet unborn.
17 Neither rightness nor probable lightness in the hedonistic senses correspond to these
notions in the ordinary sense; so at least [13] argues, following much anti-utilitarian
literature.
18 On this irrationality different theories agree: the rational procedure, for example according to the minimax rule for decision-making under uncertainty, is to minimize that
outcome which maximizes harm.
19 Discount, or bank, rates in the economists' sense are usually set to follow the market (cf.
P. A. Samuelson, Economics, 7th ed., McGraw-Hill, New York 1967, p. 351). Thus the
rates have little moral relevance.
20 Cf. Rawls [5], p. 287: 'From a moral point of view there are no grounds for discounting
future well-being on the basis of pure time preference.'
21 What the probabilities would be depends on the theory of probability adopted: a Carnapian theory, e.g., would lead back to the unconstrained position.
Obligations to the Future 177
22 A real possibility is one which there is evidence for believing could eventuate. A real
possibility requires producible evidence for its consideration. The contrast is with mere
logical possibility.
23 Thus, to take a simple special case, economists dismiss distant future people from their
assessments of utility, welfare, etc., on the basis of their non-existence; cf. Ng ('the utility
of a non-existent person is zero') and Harsanyi ('only existing people [not even ""nonexisting potential individuals""] can have real utility levels since they are the only ones
able to enjoy objects with a positive utility, suffer from objects with a negative utility, and
feel indifferent to objects with zero utility') (see Appendix B of Y. K. Ng, 'Preference,
Welfare, and Social Welfare', paper presented at the Colloquium on Preference, Choice
and Value Theory, RSSS, Australian National University, August 1977, pp. 24, 26-27).
Non-existent people have no experiences, no preferences; distant future people do not
exist; therefore distant future people have no utility assignments - so the sorites goes. But
future people at least will have wants, preferences, and so on, and these have to be taken
into account in adequate utility assessments (which should be assessed over afuture time
horizon), no matter how much it may complicate or defeat calculations.
24 There are problems about formulating universalizability satisfactorily, but they hardly
affect the point. The requisite universalizability can in fact be satisfactorily brought out
from the semantical analysis of deontic notions such as obligation, and indeed argued for
on the basis of such an analysis which is universal in form. The lawlikeness requirement,
which can be similarly defended, is essentially that imposed on genuine scientific laws by
logical empiricists (e.g. Carnap and Hempel), that such laws should contain no proper
names or the like, no reference to specific locations or times.
25 Such a principle is explicit both in classical utilitarianism (e.g. Sidgwick [11], p. 414), and
in a range of contract and other theories from Kant and Rousseau toRawls ([5], p. 293).
How the principle is argued for will depend heavily, however, on the underlying theory;
and we do not want to make our use depend heavily on particular ethical theories.
26 See esp. R. Lanoue, NuclearPlants:The MoreTheyBuild, The More You Pay, Centerfor
Study of Responsive Law, Washington DC 1976; also [14], pp. 212 ff.
27 On all these points see R. Grossman and G. Daneker, Guide to Jobs and Energy,
Environmentalists for Full Employment, Washington DC 1977, pp. 1-7, and also the
details supplied in substantiating the interesting case of Commoner [7]. On the absorption
of available capital by the nuclear industry, see as well [18], p. 23. On the employment
issues, see too H. E. Daly in [9], p. 149. A more fundamental challenge to the poverty
argument appears in I. Illich, Energy and Equality, Calder & Boyars, London 1974,
where it is argued that the sort of development nuclear energy represents is exactly the
opposite of what the poor need.
28 For much more detail on the inappropriateness see E. F. Schumacher, Small is Beautiful,
Blond & Briggs, London 1973. As to the capital and other requirements, see [2], p. 48, and
also [7] and [9].
For an illuminating look at the sort of development high-energy technology will tend to
promote in the so-called underdeveloped countries, see the paper of Waiko and other
papers in the Melanesian Environment (ed. by J. H. Winslow), Australian National
University Press, Canberra 1977.
29 This fact is implicitly recognized in [2], p. 56.
30 A useful survey is given in A. Lovins, Energy Strategy: The Road Not Taken, Friends of
the Earth Australia, 1977 (reprinted from Foreign Affairs, October 1976); see also [17],
[6], [7], [14], pp. 233 ff., and Schumacher, op. cit.
31 This is also explained in [2], p. 56.
32 An argument like this is suggested in Passmore [1], Chs. 4 and 7, with respect to the
question of saving resources. In Passmore this argument for the overriding importance
of passing on contemporary culture is underpinned by what appears to be a future-
178 R. and V. Routley
directed ethical version of the Hidden Hand argument of economics - that, by a coincidence which if correct would indeed be fortunate, the best way to take care of the future
(and perhaps even the only way to do so, since do-good intervention is almost certain to
go wrong) is to take proper care of the present and immediate future. The argument has
all the defects of the related Chain Argument discussed above and others.
33 See [14], p. 66, p. 191, and also [7].
34 For such arguments see esp. M. Flood and R. Grove-White, Nuclear Prospects. A
Comment on the Individual, the State and Nuclear Power, Friends of the Earth, Council
for the Protection of Rural England and National Council for Civil Liberties, London
1976.
35 For a recent sketch of one such alternative which is outside the framework of the
conventional option of centralized bureaucratic socialism, see E. Callenbach's novel,
Ecotopia, Banyan Tree Books, Berkeley, California 1975. For the outline of a liberation
socialist alternative see Radical Technology (ed. by G. Boyle and P. Harper), Undercurrents Limited, London 1976, and references therein.
36 Some earlier contract theories also did. Burke's contract (in E. Burke, Reflections on the
Revolution in France, Dent, London 1910, pp. 93-94) 'becomes a partnership not only
between those who are living, but between those who are living, those who are dead and
those who are not yet born'. Thus Burke's contract certainly appears to lead to obligations to distant future generations. Needless to say, there are metaphysical difficulties,
which however Burke never considers, about contracts between parties at widely separated temporal locations.
37 Several of the preceding points we owe to M. W. Jackson.
38 Resources such as soil fertility and petroleum could even be a primary social goods on
Rawls's very hazy general account of these goods ([5], pp. 62, 97): are these 'something a
rational man wants whatever else he wants'? The primary social goods should presumably be those which are necessary for the good and just life -which will however vary with
culture.
39 We have benefited from discussion with Ian Hughes and Frank Muller and useful
comments on the paper from Brian Martin and Derek Browne.
REFERENCES
[1] J. Passmore, Man's Responsibility for Nature, Duckworth, London 1974.
[2] Ranger Uranium Environmental Inquiry First Report, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra 1977.
[3] A. M. Weinberg, 'Social Institutions and Nuclear Energy"", Science, Vol. 177 (July 1972),
pp. 27-34.
•
[4] R. Routley, 'Exploring Meinong's Jungle II. Existence is Existence Now', Notre Dame
Journal of Formal Logic (to appear).
[5] J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass. 1971.
[6] Nuclear Power and the Environment. Sixth Report of the British Royal Commission on
Environmental Pollution, London 1976.
[7] B. Commoner, The Poverty of Power, Knopf, New York 1976.
[8] G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1903.
[9] B. Commoner, H. Boksenbaum and M. Corr (Eds.), Energy and Human Welfare - A
Critical Analysis, Vol. III, Macmillan, New York 1975.
Obligations to the Future 179
[10] J. Bentham, The Works of Jeremy Bentham, Vol. 1, published under the superintendence of J. Bowring, with an intro. by J. H. Burton; William Tait, Edinburgh 1843.
[11] H. Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, Macmillan, London 1962 (reissue).
[12] M. P. Golding, 'Obligations to Future Generations', Monist, Vol. 56 (1972), pp. 85-99.
[13] R. and V. Routley, 'An Expensive Repair Kit for Utilitarianism', presented at the
Colloquium on Preference, Choice and Value Theory, RSSS, Australian National
University, August 1977.
[14] R. Nader and J. Abbotts, The Menace of Atomic Energy, Outback Press, Melbourne
1977.
[15] B. L. Cohen, 'The Disposal of Radioactive Wastes from Fission Reactors', Scientific
American, Vol. 236 (June 1977), pp. 22-31.
[16] S. McCracken, 'The Waragainst the Atom' .Commentary (September 1977), pp. 33-47.
[17] A. B. Lovins and J. H. Price, Non-Nuclear Futures: The Case for an Ethical Energy
Strategy, Friends of the Earth International, San Francisco 1975.
[18] A. Roberts, ""The Politics of Nuclear Power', Arena, No. 41 (1976), pp. 22-47.
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73,https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/show/73,"Box 15, item 1721: Notes and cuttings on environmental ethics","Handwritten notes and annotated photocopy (2 copies) of Routley R (1973) 'Is there a need for a new, an environmental, ethic?', Proceedings of the XVth World Congress of Philosophy, 1:205-210.
","Title in collection finding aid: Blue Folder containing more of the same .
","Richard Routley","The University of Queensland's Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291, Box 15, item 1721","Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy",,"This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, Dr. N.A.J. Taylor.","For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library.",,"[68] leaves. 62.47 MB.",,Manuscript,"https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:62d159c",,"IS THERE A NEED FOR A NEW, AN ENVIRONMENTAL, ETHIC?
Richard Routley (Australia)
§ 1. It is increasingly said that civilization, Western civilization at least, stands in need of a new
ethic (and derivatively of a new economics) setting out people's relations to the natural environ
ment, in Leopold’s words ‘an ethic dealing with man’s relation to land and to the animals and
plants which grow upon it' (| 1], p. 238). It is not of course that old and prevaling ethics do not deal
with man’s relation to nature: they do, and on the prevailing view man is free to deal with nature as
he pleases, i.e. his relations with nature, insofar at least as they do not affect others, are not subject
to moral censure. Thus assertions such as ‘Crusoe ought not to be mutilating those trees’ are
significant and morally determinate but, inasmuch at least as Crusoe's actions do not interfere with
others, they are false or do not hold - and trees are not, in a good sense, moral objects.1 It is to
this, to the values and evaluations of the prevailing ethics, that Leopold and others in fact take ex
ception. Leopold regards as subject to moral criticism, as wrong, behaviour that on prevailing
views is morally permissible. But it is not, as Leopold seems to think, that such behaviour is
beyond the scope of the prevailing ethics and that an extension of traditional morality is required
to cover such cases, to fill a moral void. If Leopold is right in his criticism of prevailing conduct
what is required is a change in the ethics, in attitudes, values and evaluations. For as matters stand,
as he himself-explains, men do not feel morally ashamed if they interfere with a wilderness, if they
maltreat the land, extract from it whatever it will yield, and then move on; and such conduct is not
taken to interfere with and does not rouse the moral indignation of others. ‘A farmer who clears the
woods ofTa 75% slope, turns his cows into the clearing, and dumps its rainfall, rocks, and soil into
the community creek, is still (if otherwise decent) a respected member of society.’ (UJ), p.245)
Under what we shall call an environmental ethic such traditionally permissible conduct would be
accounted morally wrong, and the farmer subject to proper moral criticism.
Let us grant such evaluations for the purpose of the argument. What is not so clear is that a
new ethic is required even for such radical judgements. For one thing it is none too clear what is
going to count as a new ethic, much as it is often unclear whether a new development in physics
counts as a new physics or just as a modification or extension of the old. For, notoriosly, ethics are
not clearly articulated or at all well worked out, so that the application of identity criteria for ethics
may remain obscure.2 Furthermore we tend to cluster a family of ethical systems which do not
differ on core or fundamental principles together as the one ethic; e.g. the Christain ethic, which is
an umbrella notion covering a cluster of differing and even competing systems. In fact then there
are two other possibilities, apart from a new environmental ethic, which might cater for the
evaluations, namely that of an extension of modification of the prevailing ethics or that of the
development of principles that are already encompassed or latent within the prevailing ethic. The
second possibility, that environmental evaluations can be incorporated within (and ecological
problems solved within) the framework of prevailing Western ethics, is open because there isn’t a
1 A view occasionally tempered by the idea that trees house spirits
2 To the consternation nodoubt of Quineans But the fact is that we can talk perfectly well about inchoate and fragmentary
systems the identity of which may be indeterminate
205
single ethical system uniquely assumed in Western civilisation: on many issues, and especially on
controversial issues such as infanticide, women’s rights and drugs, there are competing sets of prin
ciples. Talk of a new ethic and prevailing ethics tends to suggest a sort of monolithic structure, a
uniformity, that prevailing ethics, and even a single ethic, need not have.
Indeed Passmore (in [21) has mapped out three important traditions in Western ethical views
concerning man’s relation to nature; a dominant tradition, the despotic position, with man as
despot (or tyrant), and two lesser traditions, the stewardship position, with man as custodian, and
the co-operative position with man as perfcctor. Nor are these the only traditions; primitivism is
another, and both romanticism and mysticism have influenced Western views.
The dominant Western view is simply inconsistent with an environmental ethic; for according
to it nature is the dominion of man and he is free to deal with it as he pleases (since - at least on the
mainstream Stoic - Augustine view - it exists only for his sake), whereas on an environmental
ethic man is not so free to do as he pleases. But it is not quite so obvious that an environmental
ethic cannot be coupled with one of the lesser traditions. Part of the problem is that the lesser
traditions are by no means adequately characterised anywhere, especially when the religious
backdrop is removed, e.g. who is man steward for and responsible to? However both traditions are
inconsistent with an environmental ethic because they imply policies of complete interference,
whereas on an environmental ethic some worthwhile parts of the earth’s surface should be preserv
ed from substantial human interference, whether of the “improving” sort or not. Both traditions
would in fact prefer to see the earth’s land surfaces reshaped along the lines of the tame and com
fortable north-European small farm and village landscape. According to the co-operative position
man’s proper role is todevelop, cultivate and perfect nature — all nature eventually - by bringing
out its potentialities, the test of perfection being primarily usefulness for human purposes; while on
the stewardship view man’s role, like that of a farm manager, is to make nature productive by his
efforts though not by means that will deliberately degrade its resources. Although these positions
both depart from the dominant position in a way which enables the incorporation of some
evaluations of an environmental ethic, e.g. some of those concerning the irresponsible farmer, they
do not go far enough: for in the present situation of expanding populations confined to finite
natural areas, they will lead to, and enjoin, the perfecting, farming and utilizing of all natural areas.
Indeed these lesser traditions lead to, what a thoroughgoing environmental ethic would reject, a
principle of total use,implying that every natural area should be cultivated or otherwise used3 for
human ends, “humanized”.
As the important Western traditions exclude an environmental ethic, it would appear that
such an ethic, not primitive, mystical or romantic, would be new alright. The matter is not so
straightforward; for the dominant ethic has been substantially qualified by the rider that one is not
always entitled to do as one pleases where this physically interferes with others. Maybe some such
proviso was implicit all along (despite evidence to the contrary), and it was simply assumed that
doing what one pleased with natural items would not affect others (the non-interference assump
tion). Be this as it may, the modified dominant position appears, at least for many thinkers, to have
supplanted the dominant position; and the modified position can undoubtedly go much further
towards an environmental ethic. For example, the farmer’s polluting of a community stream may
be ruled immoral on the grounds that it physically interferes with others who use or would use the
stream. Likewise business enterprises which destroy the natural environment for no satisfactory
returns or which cause pollution deleterious to the health of future humans, can be criticised on the
sort of welfare basis (e.g. that of [3]) that blends with the modified position; and so on. The posi
tion may even serve to restrict the sort of family size one is entitled to have since in a finite situa
tion excessive population levels will interfere with future people. Nontheless neither the modified
dominant position nor its Western variants, obtained by combining it with the lesser traditions, is
adequate as an environmental ethic, as I shall try to show. A new ethic is wanted.
2. -A^ we noticed-(an) ethic is ambiguous, as between a specific ethical system, a specific ethic,
and a more generic notion, a super ethic, under which specific ethics cluster.4 An ethical system S
3 If ‘use’ is extended, somewhat illicitly, to include use for preservation, this total use principle is rendered inocuous at least
as regards its actual effects. Note that the total use principle is tied to the resource view of nature
4 A meta-ethic is, as usual, a theory about ethics, super ethics, their features and fundamental notions
206
'^""es
- a( SeS’a,Pr0pos^r th«>ry whlch in.
is, near enough, a proposit1or ., ~""f'm (1.e. a structured set of propositions) or theory which in--.:ludes ( like individuals of a th• . a set of values and (like postulates of a theory) a set
° of general
or to‘other
he^er conduct.
to verselytypically
to its of
thers
obligatory,
or isonf
? applypermissible
n’ untableand wrong,
what
concern,n~
evaluativeOnjudgements
of what are rights, what is valued, and !>O forth. A general or lawlike proposition of a system is a
principle; and certainly if systems S, and S2 contain _different principles, then they are different
systems. It follows that any en\llnnmental ethic differs from the important traditional ethics outlined. Moreover if environmental ethic5 lifTer from Western ethical systems on some core principle
embedded in Western systems, then ,hese systems differ from the Western super ethic (assurring,
what seems to be so, that it can be uniquely characterised) - in which case if an environmental
ethic is needed t!ien a new ethic is wanted It suffices then to locate a core principle and to provide
environmental count,·r examples to 1t.
It 1s commonly assumed that there are, what amount to, core principles of Western ethical
systems. principles that will accordingly belong to the super ethic. The fairness principle inscribed
in the Golden Ruk I w ,des one example. Directly relevant here. as a good stab at a core principle.
is the com111unli, formulated liberal principle 0f the moqified flominan""-,~siti on..A recent for-""""•..._ ,/c,.,.M,....,,, ~ lo/,'/
mulation~ runs a, follows ( 131, p. 58}:
'The liberal philosophy of the Western world holds that one should be able to do what he
wishes, providing ( I) that he does not harm others and (2) that he is not hkel 1 to harm himself
irreparably.'
Let us call this prmciple basic (/Funan) chauvinism - because under it humans, or people,
come fir~t and everything else a bad last - though sometimes the principle is hailed as a freedom
principle because it gives perm1ss10n to perform a wide range of actions (including actions which
mess up the environment and natural things) providing they do not harm others. In fact it tends to
cunningly shift the onus of proof to others. It is wortti remarking that harming others in the restriction is narrower than a rc,tnction tu the I usual) interests of others; it is not enough that 1t is in my
interests, because I detest you, that you stop breathing; you are free to breathe, for the time being
anywa~ because 1t does not harm me. There remains a problem however as to e~actly what counts
as harm or interference. Moreover the width of the pnnciple is so far obscure because 'other' ma~
be filled out in significantly diffen:nt 11, ays. it makes a difference to the e,itent, and pri, ilege, of the
chauvinism whether 'other' expands to ·other human' - which is too restrictive - or to 'other'peradequacy
toCthe
a ^t
being'; and
fnd
uture
k to 'other'sentient
s^ed other
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Wor
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future
e.
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others,
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IS THERE A NEED FOR A NEW, AN ENVIRONMENTAL, ETHIC?
Richard Routley (Australia)
§ 1. It is increasingly said that civilization, Western civilization at least, stands in need of a new
ethic (and derivatively of a new economics) setting out people's relations to the natural environ
ment, in Leopold's words ‘an ethic dealing with man’s relation to land and to the animals and
plants which grow upon it’ ([1], p. 238). It is not of course that old and prevaling ethics do not deal
with man's relation to nature: they do, and on the prevailing view man is free to deal with nature as
he pleases, i.e. his relations with nature, insofar at least as they do not affect others, are not subject
to moral censure. Thus assertions such as ‘Crusoe ought not to be mutilating those trees’ are
significant and morally determinate but, inasmuch at least as Crusoe's actions do not interfere with
others, they are false or do not hold - and trees are not, in a good sense, moral objects.1 It is to
this, to the values and evaluations of the prevailing ethics, that Leopold and others in fact take ex
ception. Leopold regards as subject to moral criticism, as wrong, behaviour that on prevailing
views is morally permissible. But it is not, as Leopold seems to think, that such behaviour is
beyond the scope of the prevailing ethics and that an extension of traditional morality is required
to cover such cases, to fill a moral void. If Leopold is right in his criticism of prevailing conduct
what is required is a change in the ethics, in attitudes, values and evaluations. For as matters stand,
as he himself explains, men do not feel morally ashamed if they interfere with a wilderness, if they
maltreat the land, extract from it whatever it will yield, and then move on; and such conduct is not
taken to interfere with and does not rouse the moral indignation of others. ‘A farmer who clears the
woods off a 75% slope,turns his cows into the clearing, and dumps its rainfall,rocks, andsoil into
the community creek, is still (if otherwise decent) a respected member of society.’ ([1]), p.245)
Under what we shall call an environmental ethic such traditionally permissible conduct would be
accounted morally wrong, and the farmer subject to proper moral criticism.
Let us grant such evaluations for the purpose of the argument. What is not so clear is that a
new ethic is required even for such radical judgements. For one thing it is none too clear what is
going to count as a new ethic, much as it is often unclear whether a new development in physics
counts as a new physics or just as a modification or extension of the old. For, notoriosly, ethics are
not clearly articulated or at all well worked out, so that the application of identity criteria for ethics
may remain obscure.2 Furthermore we tend to cluster a family of ethical systems which do not
differ on core or fundamental principles together as the one ethic; e.g. the Christain ethic, which is
an umbrella notion covering a cluster of differing and even competing systems. In fact then there
are two other possibilities, apart from a new environmental ethic, which might cater for the
evaluations, namely that of an extension of modification of the prevailing ethics or that of the
development of principles that are already encompassed or latent within the prevailing ethic. The
second possibility, that environmental evaluations can be incorporated within (and ecological
problems solved within) the framework of prevailing Western ethics, is open because there isn’t a
1 A view occasionally tempered by the idea that trees house spirits
2 To the consternation .nodoubt of Quineans. But the fact is that we can talk perfectly well about inchoate and fragmentary
systems the identity of which may be indeterminate
205
is, near enough: ~ propositional system (i.e. a structured set of propositions) or theory which includes ( like md1v1duals of a theory) a set of values and (like postulates of a theory) a set of general
evaluative Ju~gements co~cermng conduct, typically of what is obligatory, permissible and wrong
of_ what ~re rights, what _is valued, and so forth. A ~eneral or lawlike proposition of a system is ~
prmc1ple, and certainly 1f syst~ms S, and S2 contam different principles, then they are different
systems. It foll?ws t~at any environmental ethic differs from the important traditional ethics outlined. Moreo~er 1f environmental ethics differ from Western ethical systems on some core principle
embedded m Western systems, then these systems differ from the Western super ethic (assuming
wh~t _seems to be so, that it can be uniquely characterised) - in which case if an environm~ntai
eth1_c 1s needed then a new ethic is wanted. It suffices then to locate a core principle and to provide
environmental counter examples to it.
It is com_monly assu_med that_ there are. what amount to, core principles of Western ethical
~ystems, principles that will accordingly belong to the super ethic. The fairness principle inscribed
~n the Golden Rule provides o~e example. Directly relevant here, as a good stab at a core principle,
ts the . commonly formulated hberal pnnc1ple of the modified dominance position .. A recent for: · "" • ""'• ,;, /'' /,'. /
~·- - ·· ..._
mulation 5 runs as follows ( [ 3 I, p. 58):
. 'The liberal philosophy of the Wes tern world holds that one should be able to do what he
wishes, prov1dmg ( 1) that he d0es not harm orhers and (2) that he is not likely to harm himself
irreparably.'
Let us call this principle basic (human) chauvinism - because under it humans, or people.
co_me_ first and everyt_hmg else a bad last - though sometimes the principle is hailed as a freedom
pnnc1ple becaus~ 1t gives perm1ss1on to perform a wide range of actions (including actio.ns which
mess_ up the ~nv1ronment and natural things) providing they do not harm others. In fact it tends to
c_unn_mgly shift the onus of pro?fto others. It is worth remarking that harming others in the restrict10n 1s narrower than a restnct1on to the (usual) interests of others; it is not enough that it is in my
mterests, because. I detest you, that you stop breathing; you are free to breathe, for the time being
anyway, because 1t does not harm me. There remains a problem however as to exactly what counts
as harm or mter_ference. Mor~over the width of the principle is so far obscure because 'other' may
be fill~d. out m s1gmficantly different ways: it makes a difference to the e~tent, and privilege, of the
cha~vm1s~ whe~her '.other' _ex~ands to 'other human' - which is too restrictive - or to 'other'person or to _other sent1~nt be1~g ; and 1t mak~s a difference to the adequacy of the principle, and inversely to its economic apphcab1hty, to which class of others it is intended to apply whether to
future as well as to present others, whether to remote future others or only to non-discountable
future others, a?d. whether to possible others. The latter would make the principle completely unworkable, and 1t 1s generally assumed that it applies at most to present and future others. ' //4-_ ItIt_ is taken for granted. in_ d_e_signing counter examples to basic chauvinist principles, that a ....,. /..~..., . (
sem_antical analysis of perm1ss1b1hty and obligation statements stretches out over ideal situations r.,.·-=-""'t.. :.;1 -c.:
, · ~/:_
("".~-htch may be mcon:iplete or even inconsistent), so that what is permissible holds in some ideal
ideal
every
in
s1tuat10n, what 1s obl_1gato_ry in every ideal situation, and what is wrong is excluded
~1tuat10n. But the_mam pomt to grasp for the counter examples that follow, is that ethical principles
· t·
1f correct are umversal and are assessed over the class of I·deal s1tua
ions.
(') Th z
collapse of the world system
the
1
_survi~ing
perso~)
(or
man
e as_t ma~ e~a~ple. The last
lays ~bout him, ehmmatmg, ~s far as he can, e~ery !tvmg th_mg, animal or plant (but painlessly if
iou hke, a~ at the best abattoirs). What he does 1s qmte permissible according to basic chauvinism
ut on envir?nmental grounds what he does is wrong. Moreover one does not have to be commit~
~~d \o e~ot~nc values to regard M'.. Las_t Man as behaving badly (the reason being perhaps that ra~cfa th mkmg a nd val~es have shifted m an environmental direction in advance of corresponding
s .. 1 ts m the formulation of fundamental evaluative principles).
(u) The last people example. The last man example can be broadened to the last people example.
We can assume that they know they are the last people, e.g. because they are aware that radiation
effects h_a~~ blocked any chance of reproduction. One considers the last people in order to rule out
~e pos~1b1hty that what these pe~ple d~ harms or somehow physically interferes with later people.
therwise one could as well consider science fiction cases where people arrive at a new planet and
single ethical system uniquely assumed in Western civilization: on many issues, and especially on
controversial issues such as infanticide, women's rights and drugs, there are competing sets of principles. Talk of a new ethic and prevailing ethics tends to suggest a sort of monolithic structure, a
uniformity, that prevailing ethics, and even a single ethic, need not have.
Indeed Passmore (in [2]) has mapped out three important traditions in Western ethical views
concerning man's relation to nature; a dominant tradition, the despotic position, with man as
despot (or tyrant), and two lesser traditions, the stewardship position, with man as custodian, and
the co-operative position with man as perfector. Nor are these the only traditions; primitivism is
another, and both romanticism and mysticism have influenced Western views.
The dominant Western view is simply inconsistent with an environmental ethic; for according
to it nature is the dominion of man and he is free to deal with it as he pleases (since - at least on the
mainstream Stoic - Augustine view - it exists only for his sake), whereas on an environmental
ethic man is not so free to do as he pleases. But it is not quite so obvious that an environmental
ethic cannot be coupled with one of the lesser traditions. Part of the problem is that the lesser
traditions are by no means adequately characterised anywhere, especially when the religious
backdrop is removed, e.g. who is man steward for and responsible to? However both traditions are
inconsistent with an environmental ethic because they imply policies of complete interference,
whereas on an environmental ethic some worthwhile parts of the earth's surface should be preserved from substantial human interference, whether of the ""improving"" sort or not. Both traditions
would in fact prefer to see the earth's land surfaces reshaped along the lines of the tame and comfortable north-Europea n small farm and village landscape. According to the co-operative position
man's proper role is todevelop, cultivate and perfect nature - all nature eventually - by bringing
out its potentialities, the test of perfection being primarily usefulness for human purposes; while on
the stewardship view man's role, like that of a farm manager, is to make nature productive by his
efforts though not by means that will deliberately degrade its resources. Although these positions
both depart from the dominant position in a way which enables the incorporation of some
evaluations of an environmental ethic, e.g. some of those concerning the irresponsible farmer, they
do not go far enough: for in the present situation of expanding populations confined to finite
natural areas, they will lead to, and enjoin, the perfecting, farming and utilizing of all natural areas.
Indeed these lesser traditions lead to, what a thoroughgoing environmental ethic would reject, a
3
principle of total use,implying that every natural area should be cultivated or otherwise used for
human ends, ""humanized"".
As the important Western traditions exclude an environmental ethic, it would appear that
such an ethic, not primitive, mystical or romantic, would be new alright. The matter is not so
straightforwa rd; for the dominant ethic has been substantially qualified by the rider that one is riot
always entitled to do as one pleases where this physically interferes with others. Maybe some such
proviso was implicit all along (despite evidence to the contrary), and it was simply assumed that
doing what one pleased with natural items would not affect others (the non-interference assumption). Be this as it may, the modified dominant position appears, at least for m~ny thinkers, to have
supplanted the dominant position; and the modified position can undoubtedly go much further
towards an environmental ethic. For example, the farmer's polluting of a community stream may
be ruled immoral on the grounds that it physically interferes with others who use or would use the
stream. Likewise business enterprises which destroy the natural environment for no satisfactory
returns or which cause pollution deleterious to the health of future humans, can be criticised on the
sort of welfare basis (e.g. that of [3]) that blends with the modified position; and so on. The position may even serve to restrict the sort of family size one is entitled to have since in a finite situation excessive population levels will interfere with future people. Nontheless neither the modified
dominant position nor its Western variants, obtained by combining it with the lesser traditions, is
adequate as an environmental ethic, as I shall try to show. A new ethic is wanted.
a ~pecific ethic,
/§ 2. -As. we noticed----(a~ ethic is ambi~uous, as bet_ween a specifi~ ethical system,
and a more generic notion, a super ethic, under which specific ethics cluster.4 An ethical system S
./
3 If 'use' is extended, somewhat illicitly, to include use for preservation, this total use principle is rendered inocuous at least
as regards its actual effects. Note that the total use p1 inciple is tied to the resource view of nature
4-A meta-elhic is, as usual, a theory about ethics, super ethics, their features and fundamental notions
5 A related principle is that (modified) free c.1tcrprise can operate
I
il
11 ,·thi'n
s· -1 1- •
1m1 ar 1m11s
207
destroy its ecosystems, whether with good intentions such as perfecting the planet for their ends
and making it more fruitful or, forgetting the lesser traditions, just for the hell of it.
Let us assume that the last people are very numerous. They humanely exterminate every wild
ar,imal and they eliminate the fish of the seas, they put all arable land under intensive cultivation,
and all ~emaining forests disappear in favour of quarries or plantations, and so on. They may give
various familiar reasons for this, e.g. they believe it is the way to salvation or to perfection, or they
are simply satisfying reasonable needs, or even that it is needed to keep the last people employed or
occupied so that they do not worry too much about their impending extinctions. On an environmental ethic the last people have behaved badly; they have simplified and largely destroyed
all the natural ecosystems, and with their demise the world will soon be an ugly and largely wrecked place. But this conduct may conform with the basic chauvinist principle, and as well with the
principles enjoined ·by the lesser traditions. Indeed the main point of elaborating this example is
because, as the last man example reveals, basic chauvinism may conflict with stewardship or cooperation principles. The conflict may be removed it seems by conjoining a further proviso to the
basic principle, to the effect (3) that he does not wilfully destroy natural resources. But as the last
people do not destroy resources wilfully, but perhaps ""for the best of reasons"", the variant is still
environmentally inadequate.
(iii) The great entrepreneur example. The last man example can be adjusted so as to not fall foul
of clause (3). The last man is an industrialist; he runs a giant complex of automated factories and
farms which he proceeds to extend. He produces automobiles among other things, from renewable
and recyclable resources of course, only he dumps and recycles these shortly after manufacture
and sale to a dummy buyer instead of putting them on the road for a short time as we do. Of
course he has the best of reasons for his activity, e.g. he is increasing gross world product, or he is
improving outpJt to fulfil some plan, and he will be increasing his own and general welfare since h~
much prefers increased output and productivity. The entrepreneur's behaviour is on the Western
ethic quite permissible; indeed his conduct is commonly thought to be quite fine and may even
meet Pareto optimality requirements given prevailing notions of being ""better off'.
Just as we can extend the last man example to a class of last people, so we can extend this example to the industrial society example: the society looks rather like ours.
(iv) The vanishing species example. Consider the blue whale, a mixed good on the economic picture. The blue whale is on the verge of extinction because of his qualities as a private good, as a
source of valuable oil and meat. The catching and marketing of blue whales does not harm the
whalers; it does not harm or physically interfere with others in any good sense, though it may upset them and they may be prepared to compensate the whalers if they desist; nor need whale hunting be wilful destruction. (Slightly different examples which eliminate the hunting aspect of the
blue whale example are provided by cases where a species is eliminated or threatened through
destruction of its habitat by man's activity or the activities of animals he has introduced, e.g. many
plains-dwelling Australian marsupials and the Arabian oryx.) The l?ehaviour of the whalers in
eliminating this magnificent species of whale is accqrdingly quite permissible-at least according to
basic chauvinism. But on an environmental ethic it is not. However the free-market mechanism will
not cease allocating whal~[~ to commercial uses, as a satisfactory environmental econo_mics
would; instead the market model will grind inexorably 6 along the private demand curve until the
blue whale population is no longer viable-if that point has not already been passed.
In sum, the class of permissible actions that rebound on the environment _is more narrowly
circumscribed on an environmental ethic than it is in the Western super ethic. But aren't environmentalists going too far in claiming that these people, those of the examples and respe~ted industrialists fishermen and farmers are behaving, when engaging in environmentally degrading activities of ;he sort described, in a morally impermissible way~ No, what these people do _is to a
greater or lesser extent evil, and hence in serious cases morally impermissible. For exampl_e, mso~ar
as the killing or forced displacement of primitive peoples who stand in the way of an mdustnal
development is morally indefensible and impermissible, so also is _the slau~hter of the last_ remaining blue whales for private profit. But how to reformulate basic chauvm1sm as a satisfactory
6 For the tragedy-of-the-commons type reasons well explained in [31
freedom principle is a more difficult matter. A tentative, but none too adequate beginning might be
made by extending (2) to include harm to or interference with others who would be so affected by
the action in question were they placed in the environment and (3) to exclude specieside. It may be
preferable , in view of the way the freedom principle sets the onus of proof. simply to scrap it
altogether, and instead to specify classes of rights and permissible conduct. as in a bill of rights.
§ 3. A radical change in a {eory sometimes forces changes in the meta-theory; e.g. a logic which
rejects the Reference Theory in a thoroughgoing way requires a modification of the usual metatheory which also accepts the Reference Theory and indeed which is tailored to cater only for
logics which do conform. A somewhat similar phenomena seems to occur in the case of a
meta-ethic adequate for an environmental ethic. Quite apart from introducing several environmentally important notions, such as conservation, pollu1io11, growth and presen•atio11,for meta-ethical
analysis, an environmental ethic compels re-examination and modified analyses of such
characteristic actions as na1ural right, ground of right, and of the relations of obligation and permissibility to rights: it may well require re-assessment of traditional analyses of such notions as
i-alue and right, especially where these are based on chauvinist assumptions; and it forces the rejection o [ many of the more prominent meta-ethical positions. These points are illustrated by a very
brief examination of accounts of natural right and then by a sketch of the species bias of some
major positions. 7
Hart (in I 5]) accepts. subject to defeating conditions which are here irrelevant, the classical
doctrine of natural rights according to which. among other things, 'any adult human . .. capable of
choice is at liberty to do (i.e. is under no obligation to abstain from) any action which is not one
coercing or restraining or designed to injure other persons'. But this sufficient condition for a
human natural right depends on accepting the very human chauvinist principle an em iron mental
ethic rt::jects, since if a person has a natural right he has a right; so too the deflni1io11 of a natural
right adopted by classical theorists and accepted with minor qualifications by Hart presupposes
the same defective principle. Accordingly an environmental ethic would have to amend the
classical notion of a natural right. a far from straight forward matter now that human rights with
rcspc:ct to animals and the natural environment are, like those with respect to slaves not all that
lon g ago, undergoing major re-evaluation.
An environmental ethic does not commit one to the view that natural objects such as trees
have rights (though such a view is occa~ionally held, e.g. by pantheists. But pantheism is false since
artefacts are not alive). For moral prohibitions forbidding certain actions with respect to an object
do not award that object a correlative right. That it would be wrong to mutilate a given tree or
piece of property does not entail that the tree or piece of property has a correlative right n_ot to _be
mutilated (without seriously stretching the notion of a right). Environmental views can stick with
mainstream theses according to which rights are coupled with corresponding responsibilities and
so with bearing obligations, and with corresponding interests and concern; i.e., at least, whatever
has a right also has responsibilities and therefore obligations, and whatever has a right has interests . Thus although any person may have a right by no means every living thing can
(significantly) have rights. and arguably most sentient objects other than persons cannot have
rights. But persons can relate morally, through obligations, prohibitions and so forth. to practically
anything at all.
The species bias of certain ethical and economic positions which aim to make principles of
conduct or reasonable economic behaviour calculable is easily brought out. These positions
typically employ a single criterion p, such as preference or happiness, as a summ.um_ bonu_m;
characteristically each individual of some base class, almost always humans, but perhaps mcludmg
future humans, is supposed to have an ordinal p ranking of the states in question (e.g. of affairs, 6f
the economy); then some principle is supplied to determine a collective p ranking of these states in
terms of individual prankings, and what is best or ought to be done is determined either_ ~ire~tl~, as
in act-utilitarianism under the Greatest Happiness principle, or indirectly, asin rule-ut1lttanantsm,
in terms of some optimization principle applied to the collective ranking. The species bias is
transparent from the selection of the base class. And even if the base class is extended to embr~ce
persons. or even some animals (at the cost. like that of including remotely future humans, of losing
1 Some of thes< points arc developed by those protesting about human maltreatment of animals; see especially the essays
collec!ed in I 4 I
9
~
iii
208
WJ 6
14
209
testability), the positions are open to familiar criticism, namely that the whole of the base class may
be prejudiced in a way which leads to unjust principles. For example if every member of the base
class detests dingoes, on the basis of mistaken data as to dingoes’ behaviour, then by the Pareto
ranking test the collective ranking will rank states where dingoes are exterminated very highly,
from which it will generally be concluded that dingoes ought to be exterminated (the evaluation of
most Australian farmers anyway). Likewise it would just be a happy accident, it seems, if collective
demand (horizontally summed from individual demand) for a state of the economy with blue
whales as a mixed good, were to succeed in outweighing private whaling demands; for if no one in
the base class happened to know that blue whales exist or cared a jot that they do then
“rational” economic decision-making would do nothing to prevent their extinction. Whether the
blue whale survives should not have to depend on what humans know or what they see on televi
sion. Human interests and preferences are far too parochial to provide a satisfactory basis for
deciding on what is environmentally desirable.
These ethical and economic theories are not alone in their species chauvinism; much the
same applies to most going meta-ethical theories which, unlike intuitionistic theories, try to offer
some rationale for their basic principles. For instance, on social contract positions obligations are a
matter of mutual agreements between individuals of the base class; on a social justice picture rights
and obligations spring from the application of symmetrical fairness principles to members of the
_base class, usually a rather special class of persons, while on a Kantian position which has some
v v^gue obligations somehow arise from respect for members of the base class, persons. In each case
if members of the base class happen to be ill-disposed to items outside the base class then that is
too bad for them: that is (rough) justice.
REFERENCES
1. A. Leopold, A Sand Country Almanac with other essays on Conservation. New York (1966).
2. J. Passmore, Ecological Problems and Western Traditions (unpublished).
3. P.W.Barkley and D.W.Seckier, Economic Growth and Environmental Decay. The Solution becomes the
Problem, New York (1972).
4. S. and R.Godlovitch and J. Harris (editors), A nimals, Men and Morals. An enquiry into the maltreatment
of non-humans, London (1971).
5. H.L.A.Hart, ‘Are there any natural rights?’, reprinted in A.Quinton (editor), Political Philosophy, Oxford
(1967).
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it is none loo clear what is
going to count as a new ethic, much as it is often unclear whether a new development in physics
counts as a new physics or just as a modification or extension of the old. For, notoriosly, ethics are
not clearly articulated or al all well worked out. so that the application of identity criteria foi ethics
may remain obscure. Furthermore we tend to cluster a family of ethical sy stems which do not
differ on core or fundamental principles together as the one ethic; e.g. the Christen ethic, which is
an umbrella notion covering a cluster of differing and even competing systems. In fact then there
are two,.other possibilities, apart from a new environmental ethic, which might cater for the
evaluations, namely that of an extension of modification of the prevailing ethicszor that of the
development of principles that are already encompassed or latent within the prevailing ethic. The
second possibility, that environmental evaluations can be incorporated within (and ecological
problems solved within) the /?
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single ethical system uniquely assumed in Western civilization: on many issues, and especially on
ckd«°T^a *ssues such as infanticide, women’s rights and drugs, there are competing sets of prin
S’ T.
? nCW e^h‘C and Prevai,ln8 ethics tends to suggest a sort of monolithic structure, a
uniformity that prevathng ethics, and even a single ethic, need not have.
- r. .
jM40/
Indeed Passmore (in |2|) has mapped out three important traditions in Western ethical views
concerning man’s relation to nature; a dominant tradition, the despotic position, with man as
despot (or tyrant), and two lesser traditions, the stewardship position, with man as custodian, and
the co-operative position with man as perfector. Nor are these the only traditions; primitivism is
another, and both romanticism and mysticism have influenced Western views.-31
' j
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The dominant Western view is simply inconsistent with an environmental ethic; for according
to it nature is the dominion of man and he is free to deal with it as he pleases (since - at least on the
mainstream Stoic^— Augustine view - it exists only for his sake), whereas on an environmental
ethic man is not so free to do as he pleases. But it is not quite so obvious that an environmental
ethic cannot be coupled with one of the lesser traditions. Part of the problem is that the lesser
traditions are by no means adequately characterised anywhere, especially when the religious
backdrop is removeej, eg. vv/zo is man steward for and responsible to? However both traditions are
inconsistent with a ^environmental ethic because they imply policies of complete interference,
whereas on an environmental ethic some worthwhile parts of the earth’s surface should be presen
ed from substantial human interference, whether of the “improving” sort or not. Both traditions
would in fact prefer to see the earth's land surfaces reshaped along the lines of the tame and com
fortable north-European small farm and village landscape. According to the co-operative position
man’s proper role is todevelop, cultivate and perfect galiye - all nature eventually - by bringing
out its potentialities, the test of perfection being
^usefulness for.human purposes: while on
the stewardship view man's role, like that of a farm manager, is to make nature productive by his
efforts though not by means that will deliberately degrade its resources./ '7Zu^ /fate-
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Indeeo these lesser traditions lead to what a thomnpho’ ‘dr‘”""lg anJ utl,izing ofall natural areas
principle of total use,imping that every r-turJl X
m ^v,ronmental othic would reject, a
human ends, “humanized”
'
area shou,d be ^‘^ted or otherw.se used 3 f v
3 rr •
H use is extended, somewhat illicitly, to inciud.
as regards its actual eftects. Note that the toU’
e
•eSiCrVat‘<>n; thiS tOtal USe Princ‘P|c is rendered mocuous al least
<»e pr , pie is tied to the resource view of nature ,
such an ethic, not primitive, mystical or’romantic, would be new aljigjiu The matter is r
straightforward: for the dominant.ethic has been substantial!v uuaiitle^y the n&er that one is not
always entitled to do as one pleases where this physically int^Tes \0tn peers'.
7
> proviso was implicit all along (despite evidence to the contrary), and it was simply assumed that
doing what one pleased with natural items would not affect others (the Goiyuuterference assump
tion). Be this as it may, the modified dominant position appears, at least for many thinkers, to have
supplanted the dominant position: and the modified position can undoubtedly go much further
'* towards an environmental ethic. For example, the farmer's polluting of a community stream may
be ruled immoral on the grounds that it physically interferes with others who use or would use the
stream. Likewise business enterprises which, destroy the natural environment for no satisfactory
returns or which cause pollution deleterious to the health of future humans, can be criticised on the
sort of welfare basis (e.g. that of [31) that blends with the modified position;
/hcrt/t f'cd
c-Z^x
. may even serve to restrict the sort of family size one is entitled to have since in a finite situa
tion excessive population levels will interfere with future people. Nontheless neither the modified
dominant position nor its Western variants, obtained by combining it with the lesser traditions, is
adequate as an environmental ethic, as I ^vall
A new ethic is wanted,
aoh/
1,
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is, near‘enough, a propositional system (i.e. a structured set of propositions) or theory which in
dudes (like individuals of a theory > a set of values and (like postulates of a theory) a set of general
evaluative judgements concerning conduct, typically of what is obligators permissible and wrong.'x* !
of what are rights, what is valued, and so forth. A general or lawlike proposition of a system is a \
principle; and certamlv if systems S, and S2contain different principles, then they are different
systems. It follows that anv en onmental ethic differs from the important traditional ethics outlin
ed. Moreover if environmental ethics differ from Western ethical systems on some core principlaJL
embedded in Western systems, then these systems differ from the Western super ethic (assuming. I
what seems to be so. that it can be uniquely characterised) - in which case if an environmental
ethic /s needed then a new- ethic is wanted. It suffices then to locate a core principle and to provide
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obhgatio/falementsjstretc^. out over ideal mInations•
(which may be incomplete or even inconsistent), so that what is permissible holds in some idefl^fe
situation, what is obligatory in every ideal situation, and what is wrong is excluded in every ideal ' ■
situation. But the main point to grasp for the counter examples that follow, is that ethical principles
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(i) ’ The last man example. The last man (or person) surviving the collapse of the world system
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eliminating, as far as he can, every living thing, animal or plant (but painlessly if
you like, as at the best abattoirs). What he does is quite permissible according to
f/))
but on environmental grounds what he does is wrong. Moreover pne d^gsjtot have to Ke commit
ted to esoteric values to regard Mr. Last Man as behaving badly, (the reason l^eing^crhapsthatra
dica! thinking and values have shifted in an environmental direction in advance of corresponding
shifts in the formulation of fundamental evaluative principles)./^
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(ii) The last people example. The last man example can be
. to the last people example.
We can assume that they know they are the last people, e.g. because they are aware that radiation
effects have blocked any chance of reproduction. One considers the last people in order to rule out
the possibility that what these people do harms or somehow physically interferes with later people.
Otherwise one could as well consider science fiction cases where people arrive at a new planet and
ft})
destroy its ecosystems, whether with good intentions such as perfecting the planet for their ends
and making it more fruitful or, forgetting the lesser traditions, just for the
Let us assume that the last people are very numerous. They humanely exterminate every wild
animal and they eliminate the fish of the seas, they put all arable land under intensive cultivation, ""
and all remaining forests disappear in favour ofpatfuM or plantations, and so on. They may give
various familiar reasons for this, e.g. they believe it is the way to salvation or to perfection, or they
are simply satisfying reasonable needs, or even that it is needed to keep the last people employed or
occupied so that they do not worry too much about their impending extinctions. On an en
vironmental ethic the last people have behaved badly;
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they have simplified and largely destroyed
all the natural ecosystems, and with their demise the world will soon be an ugly and largely wreck
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effect (3) that he does not wilfully destroy natural resources. But as the last
people do not destroy resources wilfully, but perhaps “for the best of reasons’"", the variant is still
environmentally inadequate.
(iii) The great entrepreneur example. The last man example can be adjusted so as to not fall foul
of clause (3). The last man is an industrialist; he runs a giant complex of automated factories and
farms which he proceeds to extend. He produces automobiles among other things, from renewable
and recyclable resources of course, only he dumps and recycles these shortly after manufacture
and sale to a dummy buyer instead of putting them on the road for a short time as we do. Of
course he has the best of reasons for his activity, e.g. he is increasing gross world product, or he is
improving output to fulfil some plan, and he will be increasing his own and general welfare since he
much prefers increased output and productivity. The entrepreneur's behaviour is on the Western
ethic quite permissible; indeed his conduct is commonly thought to be quite fine and may even
meet Pareto optimality requirements given prevailing notions of being “better ofT’.
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jf vironmentalists going too far in claiming that these people, those of the examples and respected in
dustrialists, fishermen and farmers arc behaving, when engaging in environmentally degrading ac
tivities of the sort described, in a morally impermissible way? No, what these people do is to a
5 greater or lesser extent eviitand hence in serious vases morally impermissible. For example, insofar
as the killing or forced displacement of primiioe peoples who stand in the way of an industrial
development is morally indefensible and-^r* permissible, so also is the slaughter ol the last remain
ing blue whale^for private profit,.
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does not commit one to the view
that natural objects such as trees have rights
is occasionally held, e.g. by pantheists.
since artefacts are not alive).
(though such a view
But pantheism is false
For moral prohibitions forbidding
certain actions with respect to an object do^riot award that object
a correlative right.
That it would be wrong to mutilate a given
tree or piece of property does not entail that the tree or piece of
property has a correlative right not to be mutilated (without
seriously stretching the notion of a right).
Environmental views
can stick with,jmainstrean» theses according to which rights
X
coupled with corresponding responsibilities and so with bearing
obligations, and with corresponding interests and concerns; i.e.,
at least, whatever, has a right also has responsibilities and therefore obligations, and whatever^has a right has^interests
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",,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,"Australian National University Office,Australian National University Office > Second Bookcase > Third Shelf > Second Pile,Box 15: Green Projects in Progress",https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/1a6f9df968598ef8d62edae0aa4919b3.pdf,Text,"Draft Papers",1,0
77,https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/show/77,"Box 13, item 996: Draft chapters 1 to 4 on anarchism, for correction",,"Typescripts and handwritten chapters, with handwritten emendations and annotations. Title in collection finding aid: Blue folder: Anarkism - For Correction - chapters 1-4.
","Richard Routley","The University of Queensland's Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291, Box 13, item 996","Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy",,"This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, Dr. N.A.J. Taylor.","For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library.",,"[60] leaves. 137.3 MB. ",,Manuscript,"https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:9ab5607",,"CASE DISSOLVED:
critique of argumentsto and for the State
Over the centuries that humans have been stuck with states, many different attempts to
justify them, as in some way necessary or desirable (as more than an unfortunate accident of
history), have been attempted. None pf these arguments succeed (as much would perhaps be
quite widely conceded^).
/
/
There are various wayjs of showing that the arguments fail. One powerful way deploys,
indicates or develops, counterexamples; for instance modelling social arrangements without
states. Another more pedestrian but essential way consists in direct examination of the
arguments, not merely some of them or various classes of them, but, for completeness, each and
every one of them. Ultimately that calls for, what is attempted first in a first attempt fashion,
an exhaustive classification of the arguments „
A preliminary classification of these arguments can take the following form:
1. //i-yfonc or V
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to be accomplices in a crime, have been
separately imprisoned. A State represen
tative makes the following offers
separately to each: if the prisoner con
fesses and becomes a State's witness
while his or her accomplice remains
silent, he or she will be released at once
while the accomplice gets 8 years. It so
happens that if both prisoners remain
silent the State has only enough evidence
to impose a 1 year sentence. But if both
confess they would each receive 4 years.
The 'game' can be summarised in the
following 'payoff' matrix:
Prisoner 1
Strategies S(ilence) C(onfess)
S
-1, -1
-8, 0
C
0, -8
-4, -4
Prisoner 2
3. T7/E C/1SE z1G.4/MSE
AEFL.4 CEA^E^T ERCW
ER/5CWERS' D/EEA7AE1
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E/7E E/AE.
I he main arguments designed to rebut
the replacement argument for anarchism
and to buttress the State status quo, are
based on variants of the Prisoners'
Dilemma, to the effect that there are /wporftm/cases where individuals will not
agree^-or co-operate to provide them
selves with (or to maintain) collective
goods without coercion, such as cw/y the
State can furnish/ In such 'dilemma'
situations each individual will hope to
gain advantage, without contributing (or
exercising restraint), from others' contri
butions (or restraint), by freeloading on
others (or profiting from others'
restraint). The claim is that only the
State with its backing of force can
resolve such situations: anarchistic
replacement cannot succeed^
A basic ingredient of a considerable
variety of arguments of this type, in
cluding Hobbes' and Hume's arguments
for the State, the 'Tragedy of the Com
mons' argument, and recent economic
arguments for State intervention to
secure collective goods, is the single
Prisoners' Dilemma game with just two
players/ Two prisoners, 1 and 2, taken
The game^ is not intended to present a
moral dilemma, that each can only go
free at the cost of the others' freedom,
but the following dilemma: It is in each
prisoner's private interest to choose
strategy C no matter what the other
docs: strategy C is, in the jargon, each
players' 'dominant' strategy (and also in
fact a minimax strategy). For if 2, for ex
ample, remains silent, then 1 goes free
by confessing, while if 2 confesses, then
1 halves his or her sentence by confess
ing.
if both prisoners choose their
dominant strategy they obtain an m/er/or
outcome to that which would have
resulted by what is tendentiously called
'co-operating', by their both remaining
silent.
?./
It is bizarre that a dilemma alleged to
show the necessity of the State — which
is supposed to intervene, forcibly if re
quired, to ensure that the prisoners 'co
operate' to obtain an optimal outcome
— should bg set up by the State's own
operative.^Of course the State's
presence in arranging (or accentuating)
such dilemmas is inessential, as is
much else from the example. But some
features of the prisoner's relations are
essential, in particular the separability
assumption that the prisoners are
isolated, and so have no opportunity to
communicate or rec/Zy co-operate.
Similarly, in the more general argument,
a privatisation assumption is smuggled
in in the way the dilemma is formulated,
that we are dealing with self contained
individuals who, like the prisoners, act
only in their own narrowly construed
private interests and whose interests are
opposed. The applicability of the dilem-
A
7
ma to the human condition is accordingly
seriously limited/
A cursory aside is often added to the
Prisoners' Dilemma to the effect that the
segregation of the prisoners makes no
real difference. It is claimed that even if
the prisoners could meet and discuss and
even agreed to co-operate, that would
make no difference, since neither could
trust (the sincerity) of the other
(Abrams, p.193), 'neither has an incen
tive to keep the agreement' (Taylor, p.5).
Experimental and historical evidence in
dicates that this is very often not so —
and in a more co-operative social setting
than the currently encouraged privatisa
tion of life, the extent of co-operation
and trust would undoubtedly be much
higher/ The argument has to depend
crucially then on substantially mistaken
assumptions about human propensities
in various settings, e.g. that purely
egoistic interests are always pursued,
backed up by a large measure of scep
ticism about the reliability of other peo
ple (but if people were /Ar?/ unreliable
and devious, many State arrangements
involved in providing public goods
would not succeed either). That such
assumptionsareoperating can be seen by
elaborating the situation; e.g. to bring
out the first, suppose the prisoners have
a common bond, e.g. they are friends or
they are political prisoners with a shared
social commitment, or they are neigh
bours and face a future in the same com
munity; to bring out the philosophical
scepticism involved, suppose the
prisoner with a tarnished record offers
the other security against default, and so
on.
The question of the character of
human interests and preferences
the
extent of their determination by the
social context in which they occur is
/MnrArznrvna/ to the whole question of
social and economic arrangements, and
also accordingly to arguments for the
State on the basis of human propensities.
A major assumption underlying prevail
ing (non-Marxist) economics and
associated political theory, is that the in
terests and preferences, as summed up in
a preference ranking or utility function,
of each human that is taken to count is
an mc/e/zenr/enf parameter, which
depends neither on the preference rank
ings of others nor on the social context
in which that human operates. While the
individuals and firms of mainstream
economic theory do, by definition,
satisfy the independence requirements,
and while there is very substantial
cultural pressure on consumers to con
form (through advertising, education,
popular media),
wany
<7o
/?oz ccw/bfTn, and the extent of cultural
pressure towards privatisation itself
belies the naturalness of this indepen-
sequential games permit that isolated
games exclude, is that players' actions
may be dependent upon past perfor
mance of other players. This dependence
effectively removes one extremely
....a major functmn of the state is unrealistic self-containment assumption
to maintain and pohee inequitable from Dilemma situations, that in
dividuals act in totally isolated ways, not
distribution.
learning from past social interaction. In
such supergames then, no intervention is
required.
Undoubtedly some Dilemmas are
Z/gtZ-f resolved by 'intervention', e.g. by allow
dence. And having sufficiently many/ ing the prisoners to get in touch so that
interest-interdependent people in a smali they find they are neighbours or that
community (which is not thoroughly im they can really co-operate. Equally im
poverished) is normally enough, given portant, and equally independent of the
State, is the matter of breaking down the
their social influence, to avoid or resolve
adversary, or game, situation so the
by co-operation the types of Prisoners'
prisoners do not act as competitors but
Dilemma situations that appear to count are
prepared to co-operate/' Informa
in favour of the State/
tional input may also be important, e.g.
news that each prisoner has a good
ff /yy 77/E /VLEA7A/.1
record of adhering to agreement, or if
not is prepared to stake collateral, etc.
Nor is force or threat of force required
SC/CC777)
as an incentive to guarantee optimal
What the Dilemma-based case for the strategies: a range of other inducements
State has to show — what never has been and incentives is known (should they be
shown — is that there are outstanding required in recalcitrant cases), and is
Dilemma situations which are relevant, used even by the State, e.g. gifts,
important, and also damaging if deprivation, social pressure, etc. But at
unresolved, and that they are resolvable no stage is the State required to make
by State intervention, and only so (op these arrangements: much as some real
timally) resolvable. Finally it has to be Prisoners' Dilemmas are resolved by
shown that in the course of so resolving work of Amnesty International, so
these Dilemma situations, worse situa voluntary organisations can be formed
tions than those that are resolved are not to detect and deal with Prisoners' Dilem
thereby induced. These complex condi ma situations where they are not already
tions cannot be satisfied, if they can be catered for. And in fact communal and
satisfied at all, in a way that is not ques co-operative organisation did resolve
tion begging. For several of the condi Prisoners' Dilemma-type situations
tions are value dependent (e.g. what is historically, for example in the case of
important, damaging, optional, worse) the Commons.
In sum, here also replacement works.
and involve considerations about which
reasonable parties can differ. The selec There are no important Dilemma situa
tion of Dilemmas itself provides an ex tions, it seems, where the State is essen
ample of value dependence: after all tial. The State has been thought to be
there are many such Dilemmas (e.g. as to essential because of certain influential
environmental degradation, of over false dichotomies; for example, that all
exploitation, of family fcuds/or^violencQ) behaviour that is not egoistic is altruistic
which are considered beyond the sphere (but altruistic behaviour is uncommon,
of the State or not worthy of State atten and 'irrational'), that the only way of
allocating goods, apart from profittion.
There are now grounds for concluding directed markets — which tend to deal
that the conditions cannot be satisfied at abysmally with collective goods — is
all. For many of the arguments using through State control.'^ But it is quite
Prisoners' Dilemma games, Hobbes' evident that there are o/Aer methods of
and Hume's arguments for the State and allocation, both economic (e.g. ex
Hardin's 'Tragedy of the Commons' for change, through traditional markets,
instance, turn out when projver/y /or- based on supply costs) and social (e.g. by
to consist not just of a single co-operatives, clubs).
Lastly, introduction of the State to
game but of a sequence of such games,
to be more adequately represented by resolve so/ne Dilemma situations has
what is called a
But in many very extensive effects/ many of them
such sequential Prisoners' Dilemma negative, so that the gains made, if any,
games, rational 'co-operation' can oc in so resolving Dilemma situations, ap
cur, even assuming separated players pear to be substantially outweighed by
with purely egoistic interests.'"" For what the costs involved. For there are the
SOCIAL ALTERNA ! tVES Vet. 2 No. 3. )982
25
many evi! aspects of the typicai State to
put in the baiance. As regards Dilemma
situations, entry of the State with its
authority showing may not help but may
worsen some situations, and more im
portant, new Dilemmas may be initiated
by State activity, as in the case of the
prisoners, or differently with the State as
a further player (since the State may
engage in whaling, have access to a com
mons, etc.). These points lead also to
further arguments against the State.
available 'collective good' (e.g. commons, un
polluted streams, whales, wilderness). That
received arguments of ail these types involves
Prisoners' Dilemma situations (in the wide
sense) is argued, in effect, in Taylor, op.cit.
and etsewhere. An easier introduction to the
material covered by Taylor, which also
surveys other Important literature, is given in
the final chapter of R Abrams, Foundations
of Political Analysis, Columbia University
Press, New York, 1980.
5.
An important matter the two player game
does not illustrate is the relevance of popula
tion size in the arguments for the State. But
size is not decisive (see, e.g., Taylor, chapter
2), and the issue can be avoided (or relocated)
by organisation into smaller communities.
The figures given in the matrix are illustrative
only; for inequalities which suffice for a
Dilemma situation, see Taylor, p.5.
6.
It is similarly bizarre that there should be out
comes that the State alone is said to be able to
arrange, but not mere social cooperation,
when the State zs (as on many theories) the
result or reflection of social cooperation.
7.
This important point is much elaborated in V.
and R. Routley, Soc/af Theories, Se//
Management, and T'n wronwm'a/ ProAferru
in Environmental Philosophy (edited D
Mannison and others), RSSS, Australian
National University, 1980.
9.
10.
11.
12.
4.
Arguments of this type are sometimes said to
represent 'the strongest case that can be made
for the desirability of the State' (M. Taylor,
Anarchy and Cooperation, Wiley, London,
1976. p.9). To cover all arguments of the
type, and to avoid repetition of the phrase
'variants of' and disputes as to whether cer
tain arguments such as those of Hume and of
Olson involve Prisoners' Diiernnta situations,
Prisoner's Dilemma' is used in a wide sense
to include not merely single n-person
Prisoners' Dilemma games, but for example,
games where the payoffs are not merely
egoistic (as with both Hobbes and Hume) and
where such games are iterated. As the
bracketed clauses in the text indicate, there
are two types of case, not sharply separated
and both of the same /ogtcaZ/orm — those
where people do not rwr/A/wfe to sup/r/y
themselves with, or with 'optimum' quantities
of, a 'collective good' (e.g. security, order,
sewage), and those where people do not
re.s/ram themselves to mam/am, or maintain
'optimum"" quantities of, some already
13.
As a result of G. Hardin's Tragerh' o/ rhe
Commons, historical evidence has been
assembled which reveals how far Hardin's
'Commons' diverges from historic commons;
see, in particular, A. Roberts, 7'he Se/fManagmg TTiwonmenr, Allison & Busby.
London, 1979, chapter 10, but also Routley,
op.cit. p.285 and pp. 329-332. Similar points
apply as regards many other Dilemma situa
tions. 'In the experimental studies of the
prisoner's dilemma game approxtmately half
of the participants choose a cooperative
strategy even when they know for certain that
the other player will cooperate'. Abrams.
op.cit., p.3O8.
'
Cf. the discussion in Taylor, op.cit.. p.93.
This important result is established in
Taylor, op.cit, for a number of critical cases,
though not generally; see, e.g. p.32 but
especially chapter 5.
Such moves have proved valuable in reducing
the State's role in legal prosecution, and in
eliminating courtroom procedures, including
cases where the State is one of the 'adver
saries'.
Both the false dichotomies cited are common
place, not to say rife, in modern economic
and political theorising. Both are to be found
in Abram's final chapter, for example, and
the first (with an attempt to plaster over the
gap with a definition) in Taylor. For a further
criticism of such false dichotomies, see
Routley, op.cit., pp.25O ff.
To take one lesser example. State intrusion
often induces a certain social escapism: one
escapes one's social roles and is enabled to
concentrate on private affairs or just to laze.
Or so it may appear: for in reality anyone
who works, works long and often alienated
hours to pay for this apparent escapism and
to cover the high costs of frequently inade
quate State activity.
of course. ]
5^
The case if broken-backed right here:
to agree
because if we don't to this not goint/
to social contract - which allegedly implies these things - either.
Similarly, the social contract theory is broken-backed.
G5;
. Alternative longer
at this point in §3:-
In shof^* in certain
important cases, cooperative individual choice cannot replace state-covered choice.
There are (as the bracketed clauses indicate) two main types of case, those
where people do not contribute to supply themselves with, or with optimum quant
ities of, a ""collective good"", and those where people do not restrain themselves
to maintain, or maintain optimum quantities of, some already available ""collective
good"".
The first type of case is taken to include such traditional and
modern
concerns of the state and its subsidiary institutions as order, security, defence,
and perhaps private property, as well as sewerage schemes, water supplies^.waste
services, public health, social security, etc.
The second case is supposed to
include, as well as village commons, newer environmental concerns such as clean
air, unpolluted streams and beaches, parks, rainforests, wilderness, wha les, etc.
But there is no sharp division between the cases (security or parks could be of
either type depending on the status quo), and as arguments for state institution
both have the same logical form, that of a Prisoners' Dilemma or some finite
sequence of Pri soners' Dilemma games (what are called Prisoners' Dilemma
The arguments are not mere exercises in game theory since it is through
arguments of this type that political theorists such as Hobbes and Hume have
5.
attempted to demonstrate the necessity of the Stato4^
Furthermore, it is with
arguments of the same form, the ""Tragedy of the Commons"", that Hardia and others
have tried to show that extensive, indeed draconian, state powers are required
to resolve environmental problems;
without such powers no exploiter or polluter
will exercise restraint.
Consider the gj^le Prisoners' Dilemma game where each player, or prisoner,
is assuined, as is usual in these things, to be egoistic (sometime equated with
""being rational""), to seek just&axijnisation of his own private payoff, in the
special case where there are just two players.
(The special case illustrates all
the main points except one, the importance of size in making a case for the state.)
[Joins text again at fn.5 point.]
/* 4.
In §3:-
The Trac^ec[y of the Commons is set up so as to assume no collective
methods had [Teen developed or can be developed without coercion.
(Roberts).
The point of coercian is to ret^n the privatised individual.
$
For the factor
of coercion makes it in interests of private individualize coercion makes the
effect of relations to be got without exceeding privatised individual picture.
Coercion substitutes for relations in the context of privatised individuals.
Privatised individuals are, of course, products, in large part, of the
operation (and enforcement and entrenchment) of a particular social theory, or
rather sort of social theory.
^5^
In §4:-
The case looks like an inside job;
and it is, though neither
the operative, nor for that matter the prisoners ^n their own,
essential role.
play an
The prisoners, in any finite number, can be members of a
community and payoffs quantities of some collective good .
The claim is, that
without intervention (by thecate), the community will only corpse a subeyy^mo/
quantity of the good if any.
Some features of the prisoners' relations are
assumed to transfer however.
Suppose, to see the impact of the first reason for the
failure of independence, the prisoners are friends and their common interest is to
6.
be together.
Then, if they are given the opportunity to cooperate, and independ
ence is not enforced by separation, they will, quite rationally, choose a joint
optimal strategy,and there is no dilemma.
Since the same considerations will not
apply where large numbers of strangers are involved, the question arises as the
extent and severity of Dilemma situations.
The question is complicated by the
second double-edged reason for the failure of independence, namely that statist
political arrangements undoubtedly accentuate the extent and severity of Dilemma
situations by discouraging (providing negative incentives) for genuinely cooper
ative behaviour and nmttAcd
aid.
This is another respect in which statist
arrangments (like some subclimax biological communities) tend to be self-reinforcing
and self-perpetuating.
[Transfer some experimental material to here?]
Accordingly, what arguments for the State on such b ases as Prisoners' Dilemma
situations have to show is not merely
1)
that state coercion does suffice to resolve (sufficiently^ many such (damaging)
Dilemmas, but also
2)
that such coercion is the only way of doing so, and
3)
that in doing so worse situations than those that are resolved are not thereby
induced.
These things have never been shown:
nor can they be shown definitely, since firstly
4
there are various nonstatist arrangements for resolving what are taken to be
damaging Dilemmas, and secondly the overall assessment of what Dilemmas are damaging
and what costs are worth incurring in resolving them are ultimately evaluative and
go back to rival, and presumably coherent, value systems.
Hence, when all this is
spelled out, the irrefutability of anarchism.
To get some feel for the complexity of the
issue
and for the extent to
evolutive matters do enter, several points relevant to l)-3) should be introduced.
Firstly, there are many Dilemma situations into which the State puts little or no
effort and many others which are, or were, considered as beyond the sphere of
influence of the State or as not worthy of State attention, for instance, cases of
7.
environmental degradation, overexploitation of a ""resource"", personal or family
feuds, etc., several of them aggravated by State arrangements such as excessive
privatisation of resources (e.g. enclosure of the commons).
(If such Dilemmas can
be downgraded in importance to suit the Statist case so can other Dilemmas appar
ently favouring State intervention.)
Many of these cases would not be helped at all by the entry of the State or
its representatives with their authority duly showing (though they might be
assisted by sensitive mediation, which does not call for a State, only rudiments
Secondly, introduction of the State tof&yolve some Prisoners'
of a society).
Dilemma situations is not without wide-ranging effects, many of them negative, so
that the gains made, if any, in so resolving Dilemma situations have to be
weighed against costs involved in achieving these gains.
Among the costs are
new Dilemmas, such as the very example considered in illustrating Prisoner Dilemma
games which was initiated by State activity.
Differently, new Dilemmas will
result with the state as a further player (since the State may have access to the
commons, engage in whaling, etc.).
Some of these situations are interesting in
that they may lead to litigation and decision-making outside of or
independ
ent of the State, the resultgof which the State is supposed to enforce though it
may be against its
d
Nothing does:
interests.
But what ensures that rt sticks to the findings.
it is simply assumed that the State will adhere to its role.
But
if that assumption is valid with respect to the State (not known for its reliability)
then it is good also for various other parties.
In short,agreement or decision!*
can be reached and adhered to without need for State enforcement.
So coercion is not
always required.
Are there important Dilemmas where use the authority of the State is the
only way?
Often behind the claim that is is, is a false (but very influential)
dichotomy, that the only way of allocating goods, apart from profit-directed
markets which may deal abysmally with collective goods, is through state control^'
8.
But it is quite evident that there
are other methods of allocation, both
economic (e.g. exchange, based on costs involved) and social (e.g. clubs, cooper
[And a mixture of these methods can be applied to resolve any Prinsoners'
atives).
Dilemma that matters, i.e. here too replacement works.
An important initial move
is, as was seen, to put the prisoners in touch, so that they could cooperate:
equally important is breaking down the ...]
[Joins top of p.7]
Such organisations would not have nearly so much to do as statists would like
us to believe, especially once cooperative ways of doing things and mutual aid had
become established ways in contrast to competitive and privatised ways.
For the
extent of simple Prisoners' Dilemma situations calling for intervention (o^ some
sort) has been exaggerated and many, probably, very many, of those that have been
thought to require intervention do not because the players (are prepared to)
""cooperate"" anyway.
happen:-
There are importantly different reasons why the latter can
Firstly, enough players operate with motives which are not purely priv
atised for a sufficiently optimal outcome to result.
these players have altruistic motives:
This does not imply that
their interests may depend on those of
other players in a range of nonaltruistic ways.
Secondly, many cases presented
as if they were simple Prisoner's Dilemma games turn out when properly analysed,
in particular when time is duly taken account of, to be Prisoners' Dilemma supergames.
Such, for instance, is the position with the arguments of Hobbes, Hume
and Hardin.
But in such supergames rational ""cooperation"" often occurs, even
assuming the players have the worst of privatised
correct analysis of a Prisoner's Dil&wima
often beaten at their own game.
problems.]
motives.
In short, where the
game is as a supergame, statists are
[Detail Taylor's partial results, and their
Chapter 3
Con,v7i^c%y^ /)
CRITIQUE OF THE STATE
1. ARGUMENTS
The main argument for anarchism can be concentrated in a detailed critique of the state.
For therewith arguments against state-like institutions are also advanced. However further
ado is no doubt required to remove all other (unexplified) alternatives to anarchism.
A
Anarchist critiques of the state advance the following themes:
* States and state-like institutions are without satisfactory justification.
* Such institutions are not required for organisational purposes.
* Such institutions have most inharmonious consequences; they bring a whole series of
social and environmental bungles or evils in their train.
In brief, they are unnecessary unjustified evils. The anarchist critique does not end
there, but typically includes, such further themes as :
* States have excessive power,
linkages to state power.
* Societies are not inductably saddled with states. States can be displaced or even decay
(though they are unlikely to just wither away).
(9
1
Chapter 3
: CRITIQUE OF THE STATE
1. ARGUMENTS
The main argument for anarchism can be concentrated in a detailed critique of the state.
For therewith arguments against state-like institutions are also advanced. However further
ado is no doubt required to remove all other (unexplified) alternatives to anarchism.
/
Anarchist critiques of the state advance the following themes:
*
States and state-like institutions are without satisfactory justification.
e
Such institutions are not required for organisational purposes.
Such institutions have most inharmonious consequences; they bring a whole series of
social and environmental bungles or evils in their train.
In brief, they are unnecessary unjustified evils. The anarchist critique does not end
there, but typically includes, such further themes as :
* States have excessive power.
* States are devices for channelling privilege and wealth to certain minorities with inside
linkages to state power.
* Societies are not ineluctably saddled with states. States can be displaced or even decay
(though they are unlikely to just wither away).
1. The state is an undesirable, or even downright evii, institution, for the following range
of reasons:-
* States entrench inequities, domination and exploitation. States are devices for the
protection of wealth, property and privilege, and usually for the redistribution upwards, and
often concentration, of wealth and privilege. A minor but popular illustration is offered by the
expensive conferences and other junkets that state employees or party officials organise for
themselves and manage to bill to state revenue, in turn sucked up from inequitable taxation.
Certainly a main historical outcome of the state has been domination of exploitation of certain
segments of society by others, and some see its main, and barely concealed, purpose as just
that: domination and exploitation.
* States are typically corrupt. For example, there are enquiries presently in train, or with
follow-through activities yet to be duly completed, in many states in Australia, enquires
which have revealed considerable corruption, and there are prima facie cases for similar
enquiries in most of the remainder. Nor is this a new phenomenon: these revelations often
resemble older or on-going scandals.
* States are enormously expensive, and constitute a heavy drain upon regional resources, and
accordingly on local environments. In poorer regions they are not merely a heavy burden, but
2
a main cause of impoverishment. One reason for their voracious appetite is an excess of over
remunerated and often under-productive state employees. Another connected reason is that
many state operations are far from lean and efficient, but incorporate many duplications, drag
factors and dead weight. Under anarchisms, of all varieties, these heavy cost burdens,
weighing down subservient populaces, would be shed. Costs of organisation would be very
significantly reduced.
* The state is an incubus. States are major impositions on everyday life. They are intrusive
and demanding. Never has this been more forcefully expressed than in Proudhon's famous
denouncement of state government:
To be GOVERNED is to be at every operation, at every transaction,
noted, registered, enrolled, taxed, stamped, measured, numbered, assessed,
licensed, authorized, admonished, forbidden, reformed, corrected, punished.
It is, under pretext of public utility, and in the name of the general interest,
to be placed under contribution, trained, ransomed, exploited, monopolized,
extorted, squeezed, mystified, robbed; then, at the slightest resistance, the
first world of complaint, to be repressed, fined, despised, harassed, tracked,
abused, clubbed, disarmed, choked, imprisoned, judged, condemned, shot,
deported sacrificed, sold, betrayed; and, to crown all, mocked, ridiculed,
outraged, dishonoured. That is government; that is its justice; that is its
morality (quoted in M p.6).
As a result, there are constant demands for the reduction of the cancerous state, for removing
parts of it through deregulation, selling off state enterprises and so on. There are two troubles
with such demands from anarchist standpoints: they never go far enough, to the complete
reduction of the state to zero, but characteristically retain parts supportive of or favourable to
bigger business, and they proceed in the wrong way, stripping away social safety nets rather
than ripping off business support nets (such as limited liability, strike limitation legislation,
etc.).
* States, for all that they have been promoted as delivering public goods, are mostly dismal
news for environmental protection and health and for social justice. Furthermore they are
liable to impose substantial hazards or risks upon subservient populations not merely through
military and like activities but, more insidious, through support and promotion of dangerous
industries, such as nuclear and giant chemical industries.
* States usually exert a heavy pressure to uniformity, they tend to eliminate plurality and
cultural differences. These pressures are exercised by a state in the alleged interests of
national unity, and against its enemies, external and internal. Even the most liberal of states
tend to give minorities more difficult lives in times of stress, such as war. They are always
espousing national values, state interests, and commonly assimilation and adoption of state
values (thus for example Canada, formerly and briefly a state toying with multiculturalism,
now insistent upon ""Canadian values""). Such exercises are conspicuous, not only in citizen
ceremonies and other state rituals, such as national sporting and religious events, but more
important are virtually ubiquitous in elementary education (down to deference to the flag, and
3
similar).
* States are a major source of wars, and the major source of major wars, undoubted evils
(however supposedly inevitable). They are major sources and suppliers of military
technology and weapons, the means of war. Roughly, the more powerful and ""advanced"" a
state, the further it is engaged in weapon production and export. Without states it is doubtful
that there would be any nuclear weapons, and accordingly there would be no prospect of
nuclear wars as there would be no weapons with which to fight them.
* States are a serious drag on a more satisfactory international order. That there are not
more, and more satisfactory, international regulatory organisations ""is mainly a matter of the
reluctance of nation states to surrender their powers and the dangers of their being dominated
by very powerful states. If only nation states would be dissolved into specialized
[departments] there is every reason to believe that most world problems could be handled by
appropriate specialized [organisations]' (Bumheimp.221).
* States have excessive power, and are even accumulating or trying to accumulate more, for
instance through more centralization, further controls, additional licences, etc., etc. The
excessive power of the state is exhibited not only in the treatment of its citizens and foreigners
within its territory; it is exemplified also in its practices
its territory, through such
features as military pressures, including invasion, trade pressures, including sanitions, and in
treatment of its citizens everywhere.!
Obvious responses to excessive power are
regionalization of powers, separation of powers, achieved by decoupling and some
fragmentation, limitation of powers, and so on.
* Present monolithic governments have assumed far too many roles, for many of which they
are not competent, from some of which they are disqualified by other roles (e.g. as impartial
referees by their business commitments). Because the centre tries to do and control foo much,
as a consequence it does very much unsatisfactorily. Improved arrangements would separate
these roles, deconcentrating and decentralizing power.
States thus appear far from a good bargain on a preliminary consideration of costs, and
very far from maximal or optimal. Especially bad states, the run of states, which engage in
politically-motivated inclination or torture of their citizens, and so on. Where are the
The issue tends to be avoided; it is contended that, contrary to
appearances, we cannot get along without state cossetting: states are necessary. But, given
that we can get along without them, would we really be significantly worse off without them?
cfr .
Richard Routley","The University of Queensland's Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291, Box 14, item 1978","Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy",,"This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, Dr. N.A.J. Taylor.","For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library.",,"[10] leaves. 8.49 MB. ",,Manuscript,"https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:5bcffeb","Australian National University - [Unlisted in Error Likely 2nd Drawer] ","Richapd'Sylvan
/> << Ji
197d
p. I
WHAT IS WRONG WITH APPLIED ETHICS
Richard Sylvan
There is much that is wrong with and in applied ethics. Specifically, there are three comprehensive
counts where things are wrong with the commodity concerned, applied ethics, that is with applied
ethics so economically viewed.1 Namely on the following three counts:
•
extraneous, with the supply, delivery, consumption, and the like of applied ethics, AE. The
category prominently includes the delivery of applied ethics: what is done, taught and learnt,
by whom, and how qualified (e.g. whether taught by professionals, professional ethicists or
philosophers in particular). That has tended to presume that the commodity itself is more or
less in order, though the presumption lacks good pedigree, delivery of defective goods being
almost as ubiquitous as business enterprise.
The present focus is not however upon the delivery, or other features of the production and
consumption, packaging and marketing of the goods, but on features of the commodity itself, applied
ethics itself. Thus
•
intraneous counts, concerning the commodity itself, where a further two things are wrong:
••
the applied idea, and
•••
what the application is presumed to be made to, established - or, should it be,
establishment - ethics.
Because an implicit premiss in organising the Philosophy and Applied Ethics Re-examined1
Conference seems to have been that the issues to be addressed are predominantly extraneous, and
because most of the papers actually relevant to the Conference topic appear to focus on extraneous
issues, the present exercise, by contrast, concentrates upon intraneous problems, especially the third:
radical deficiencies in what is supposed to be applied, prevailing ethics, and some extensive repairs
thereto.
1.
The applied count
To begin with, there is something decidedly3 odd, not to say radically unsatisfactory, about the very
idea of applied ethics. To bring out the oddness, the conceptual inadequacy, it helps to consider the
dictionary senses and established usage of applied. The term in the only relevant sense (the other
obsolete sense is that offolded) means: ‘put to practical use; practical as distinguished from abstract
or theoretical' (OED, similarly Concise English). Relevant examples cited are: ‘the applied sciences’
(from Babbage 1832), ‘applied logic (as distinguished from pure)’ (from Thomson 1806).4
It may appear then, that ""applied ethics"" amounts to pleonasm, a popular tautology (and ""pure ethics""
correspondingly to an oxymoron), because ethics itself is already practical, for instance much or all
of it being concerned with practical action and its qualities (such is Maclver s assumption: moral
philosophy is practical - in a way in which other branches of philosophy are not’, p.206). In this
respect ""applied ethics"", even more ""applied morals"", is rather like ""applied motoring"", ""applied
nursing"" or ""applied housekeeping"". Conceptual confusion would be considerably reduced by
removing the modifier ‘applied .5 Such a charge of confusion can however be mitigated by properly
I7
18
What is wrong with applied ethics
distinguishing ethics, which includes philosophy and theory of morality, from morals, thereby
revealing, perhaps, elements of some theory apt for application. No doubt something like this is the
presupposition of those who preach or profit from practical ethics (similarly practical economics, but
doubtfully practical housekeeping): that standing in contrast is a suitably established theoretical ethics
(could it perchance be utilitarianism?) which can rather uncontroversiarbe used to guide practice.
But is there such a theory, apt for application, for translation into practice?
To appreciate what is required for adequacy, consider successful applied subjects. Let us compare
""applied ethics"" with^long established applied discipline, namely applied mathematics, which often
boasts a separate department in universities (a discipline I was obliged to study as an undergraduate
in order to proceed further in pure mathematics). In the first place, applied mathematics contrasts with
pure mathematics, applied logic with pure. Where, a naive outsider may ask, is pure ethics that
similarly stands in contrast with applied ethics? Could there decently be separate departments of pure
and of applied ethics?
For the most part, applied mathematics applies to practice, in some wide sense, a body of pure
mathematics that is more or less correct, at least within the assumption framework and contextual
settings where it is applied. (The qualified formulation is given for pluralistic reasons; given the
dominant paradigm, the pure mathematics that is applied is correct without further qualification,
correct period.) A body of substantially correct theory ready for application is then the first of several
pertinent features of that relational object, applied mathematics, the first of several dubiously
matchable by ""applied ethics"". The proviso ‘for the most part’ (introducing the paragraph) signals
another discrepancy. There is a, presumably derivative, part of applied mathematics that investigates,
in essentially the manner of pure mathematics, theories, algebras, spaces and similar, selected through
postulates, principles or equational sets drawn from standard applied mathematics (thus e.g. Newtonian
theories where classical force laws are satisfied, Hilbert and phase spaces, and so on).6 Such
derivative applied mathematics need not compromise at all normal methodological requirements (such
as they are) of pure mathematics, for rigour, exactness, and similar.
Ordinary applied mathematics, in its quest, even haste, for practical results, does compromise, or
violate, pure mathematical methodology. For example, shortcuts are taken, simplifications made,
information shed, figures rounded, approximations adopted, and so. Science veers towards art. From
a pure perspective, dreadful things are often done to data or mathematical transformations of data.
Skilled practitioners tend to appreciate what they can get away with in this sort of regard. Again,
none of this, neither the body of information nor the kinds of skills, is really matched in ethics, in
putting ethical theory to practical work.
Next, the mathematics that is applied, a body of pure mathematics, is not thoroughly contested. Ethics
however is. There is nothing in ethics like arithmetic or elementary mechanics; the nearest thing
ethics can offer is some controversial development along axiomatic geometric lines. Mathematics has
its critics, both inside (e.g. intuitionists) and out (e.g., cultural relativists), but none (hard core sceptics
excepted) suggest changing all of it or tampering with most of what is applied. By contrast, in ethics,
there continues to be an array of competing theories, none of which has managed to win broad
allegiance. What pure theory is there to apply, to do dreadful things to? It might be said in response:
whichever of them is adopted!
Even that, a hollow compromise will not stand up for long. For deeper environmental ethics challenge
a broad range of pure theory that is alleged to be applied! What challenges a whole subject, that
would change it, can hardly be an application of it. The rise of such environmental ethics is one
reason why the modifier applied is a misnomer. For deeper environmental ethics is not any sort of
/
Richard Sylvan
19
application of ethics; it instead challenges prevailing ethics. Nor is it, like stock ""applied ethics"", an
adaptation of ethics within an environmental context.
The label applied is substantially, if not entirely, a misnomer. Adjectives in modifier or attributive
roles, in the combination adjective-noun phrase, often enough do not signify application. The
assumption that all modification is application invokes a dubious, presumably false, theory of
adjectival attribution. Consider a few examples involving a relevant adjective, ‘medical’.
Combinations such as ‘medical student’, ‘medical book’, ‘medical trial’ do not signify applications.
A medical s is not normally an application of s to medical matters (of books or students in this
fashion); normally it is a type (an m type) of s.7 There are occasional exceptions, in which case
compounds are liable to be recorded in dictionaries, as with medical jurisprudence which is not a type
of jurisprudence, but ‘the legal knowledge required of a doctor’. There is good reason to think that
ethics induces no exception, that medical ethics, and similarly business ethics, follow the normal
pattern. Thus business ethics is a type of ethics, namely ethics within a specifically business setting,
and accordingly adapted thereto. Observe that such a preliminary account incorporates automatically
(what gives the applied presumption some problemsj^sce-^ppendix T) allowance for variations in
standards, that business corporations for example should not be expected to measure up to standards
set up for ordinary persons (any more than they should iw»t be expected to pay the same levels of
taxes)!
Given the manifold inadequacies of the label applied, amendment of terminology appears warranted.
Amendment, not abandonment. After all, what ‘applied ethics’ is supposed to comprehend, such as
medical ethics, business ethics, even environmental ethics, are not themselves in court, but presently
taken as viable fields. A superior label is field, for field-defined or field-restricted; another is type,
for type-delimited, another domain. Where others speak of ""applied ethics"", let us discourse about
field ethics. Investment ethics, for instance, is a field ethic, with field investment. An ""institute for
applied ethics concentrating upon applications to business"" is an institute for field ethics with main
field business. The ""applied ethics"" movement becomes effectively a field ethics movement.
Observe that professional ethics are field ethics, with the field in each case the profession concerned.
But professional ethics in sum form a quite proper subclass of field ethics; bio-ethics and ecological
ethics are plainly not professional ethics. Less obviously, more importantly, field ethics differs from
practical ethics (as usually poorly defined), with which ""applied ethics"" is regularly conflated. For,
on the one side, ordinary living and daily life, central to practical ethics, are not fields. On the other,
field ethics are not confined to practice, but may involve considerable theoretical material, particularly
from the fields concerned.
2.
The ethics count
Not only is the applied operation in trouble, ethics also is in deep trouble. Indeed, in a way, the main
problem lies here. There is not a fit, properly satisfactory subject, for some significant applications.
For some ""applications"" have to change and develop the subject! But, the problems do not vanish
when the amendment to field ethics is made. Satisfactory fieldwork, satisfactory outcomes in field
ethics are seriously hampered by long-standing troubles in ethics. For as field ethics involve ethics,
whatever is wrong with ethics affects field ethics.
To glimpse these troubles, consider recent ambivalence towards ethics. Is ethics even a good good.
There is a most curious contrast in later 20th century attitudes towards ethics. On the one side, there
are great expectations, for instance for what ethics can contribute, to social and professional lite
20
What is -wrong with applied ethics
especially; but on the other there is serious disquiet, occasionally verging upon despair and into
nihilism, as to ethics, and its role. Virtually the whole spectrum from great expectations through no
expectations to substantial forebodings is selectively represented. A few examples:
•
Great expectations for ethics, beginning to re-emerge these days, tend to come from outside
professional philosophical ranks, from scientists and social scientists.8 Ethics is seen as taking
up again its grand legitimization and critical roles. It can indeed be used in this respect as
regards to a wide variety of practices, such as in business, economics, government, scientific
experimentation, and so on. Of course it cannot always succeed, because one ethics can be
pitted against another, and each and all challenged.
( p-— These expectations, a bit surprising after the drab days of analytic moral philosophy (where
I
philosophy could express no interesting moral opinions), contrast sharply with
' /•—•
heavy disquiet or worse as to present ethics. A recent example is afforded by
z
MacIntyre’s disturbing introduction to After Virtue', that ‘we have - very largely, if not
entirely - lost our comprehension, both theoretical and practical of morality’ (p.2).
Some, like MacIntyre, promise a happy, even a great, outcome, should we return to
proper paths, to a virtue ethic in the tradition of Aristotle. Others are not so sanguine;
,
there is
1
•
no hope for ethics. There are divergent routes here. Either it can play no relevant
,
role any longer, or it can play only a negative or damaging role (thus e.g. Hinckfuss).
Though both these routes lead badly astray, present (merely classificatory) objectives
do not include showing as much.9
There is, furthermore, reason for at least serious disquiet. Should we care to look closely at, and try
to assess, the total ethical heritage, then what we find is not very promising.
•
What is on offer is mostly extremely sketchy and very piecemeal, much of it a hotchpotch.
There are extraordinarily few well-worked out and detailed ethics. Spinoza’s Ethics is perhaps
one rare example.
•
Most of what is on offer is seriously biassed or prejudiced, indeed from a deep environmental
perspective even unethical. Prime examples include
•
religious bias, heavily constraining or distorting creatures’ lives, and putting them to
work to serve imagined religious objectives.
•
spiritualistic distortion. Even where an explicit religion does not feature, as in
Platonism and neo-Platonism and in edified Buddhism, the whole of life may be
distorted through promise of an after-life or successor life or extra-material life, where
furthermore some system of rewards or punishments may be dished out for previous
performance. No doubt such biasses help in conferring upon ethics authority,
unwarranted authority (fulfil duties or be dammed, etc.).
•
humanistic distortion, summed up as human chauvinism. It is upon this prejudice,
critical for environmental ethics, that we concentrate.
A main matter that is wrong with ethics, and ipso facto its practice and its belated appearance in many
professional settings (when it$ should have been in evidence long ago), is its anthropic bias, its
considerable prejudice in favour of (present) humans.10 The matter is highly material in several fields,
most obviously in environmental ethics, but also in medical ethics, bio-ethics, agricultural and
vefinarian ethics, and similar.
It is widely assumed, however, that ethics is inevitably human biassed, that it has to be
anthropocentric. That is not so. Ethics can be repaired. So much is the substance of ethics without
humans. Both morals and ethics can be characterised, in substantially reportive ways, so as to free
Richard Sylvan
21
them of anthropocentrism and the like.11 Furthermore, the whole superstructural theory can be
developed in a fashion that makes no essential reference to humans or any other biological species.12
These repairs represent, however, only the beginning of adjustment and change - of many changes if
a satisfactory deep-green ethics is to be reached. When repairing goods, there often comes a stage,
increasingly rapidly encountered those days, when it becomes a more attractive proposition to acquire
new items than to persist with repairs. So it may be, it is now suggested, with ethics. So increasingly
it has been suggested this century, with demands for new ethics, new moral philosophies. Those
making such proposals include Schweitzer, Maclver, Leopold, along with many others.13
Suppose we should arrive, through addressing different or new fields, at what amounts to a new ethics,
as many think we do (thus Maclver, p. 179 and many ecocentric philosophers). Then what emerges
is no ""application"" of a standard ethics, but something different, not an applied standard ethics at all.
Now something similar may appear to occur for normal applied subjects. A newly encountered group
of physical phenomena, for instance, leads not to the elevation of some dusty mathematical theory
buried in archives, what is mostly the case, but to elaboration of a new mathematical theory.
Normally in this event, the main body of pure mathematics would remain untouched; a new annex or
suburb would simply be added to it.14 With ethics, however, things are different. There are grounds
for contending that the green (environmental) revolution has shaken ethics to its (dubious) foundations
and core, and, as coupled with associated non domination themes (as emphasised especially in
ecofeminism), has left comparatively little untouched. The standard city of ethics is not left alone,
unscathed.
Much the same sort of points can be presented in the form of a dilemma, for standard ethics and a
proposed field, such as environmental issues. Either standard ethics will not cover the field (or cannot
be extended to do so because it (or its extension) does not apply, or through being forced upon the
field it twists or damages the data, for instance leaves an indelible anthropic bias. A homely carpentry
analogy may help: there is some cabinet work where delicate hammering would be appropriate, but
the only tool we have is a sledgehammer.15 Likewise, a standard chauvinistic ethic is the wrong tool
to try to use or extend for deeper environmental work.
Unremarkably, the three options emerging, namely (inappropriate) application, extension or adjustment,
and fashioning of something new or different, correspond more or less to the now familiar threefold
division of environmental positions, into shallow, intermediate and deep.16 As before, deep ethics are
not ""applications"", but near ethics.
3.
Extraneous issues
Among the many extraneous issues concerning field ethics, those that have come to exercise
philosophers do look distinctly partisan:17 namely, the role of philosophers, especially professionals;
the place of philosophy in field ethics; and the poor practice of these ethics, particularly from a
professional philosophical perspective. Here the main thesis to be advanced inclines towards these
professionally unsympathetic lines: insofar as these matters, philosophical extranalities, are of negatixe
impact for philosophy, philosophers have largely themselves to blame, for they are largely of their own
making (or, to sheet some of the responsibility more accurately, of the controlling power elite of the
profession}.18 Let us investigate some of the extraneous issues seriatim.
Because a field ethics concerns the field as well as (relevant parts of) ethics, its investigation, practice
and teaching, requires an intersection of capacities and skills, drawn from both ethics and the field.
n
What is wrong with applied ethics
This simple observation enables an immediate response to such questions as: if not philosophers, then
who is to investigate, and teach, field ethics? That response is: those from one area or the other who
have acquired requisite knowledge and technique in the other, or less promising, those from outside
(but with some appropriate informational background) who acquire these prerequisites in both. In
medical ethics, where there is perhaps a larger pool of information concerning the field than there is
regarding ethics, a moral philosopher untrained in medicine may have more to learn than a medical
doctor unversed in ethics and lacking philosophical skills. (Really, neither should be let loose on
students before they are duly prepared in the intersection.) It is evident, then, that philosophy enjoys
no natural monopoly in field ethics. The place of philosophy is less exalted, and certainly is not
dominant - still less given recent proposed (but hardly well justified) decoupling of ethics from
philosophy.19
There are corollaries regarding the roles of philosophers on committees relating to field ethics, in
decision-making and so on on these topics. Philosophers do not have an automatic place. Unless they
are well-informed as to ethics (many philosophers are not) and as to the field, they do not deserve a
place at all (of course they still may gain a role for want of any better placed). Ousting of
under-informed or unenergetic philosophers is not always such a bad thing.
While the informational situation is now significantly better than in 1945 when Maclver was agonising
over the predicament of moral philosophy, it is still true that ‘academic moral philosophers are not
using ‘every opportunity to make themselves acquainted, so far as possible, with the real difficulties
of those [not merely present humans] who need the help of moral philosophy most... I ... confess that
I myself lack the factual knowledge which would be required to do this work well. I suspect that
many ethic philosophers are in the same position ...20 One of the reasons why philosophy has lost
prestige in recent years is that it has not kept pace’ (pp.204-205). One example Maclver incisively
develops concerns ‘discoveries associated with the name of Freud. The behaviour of philosophers in
this connection is particularly hard to excuse. At first they flatly denied the reality of the alleged
discoveries - maintained that the notion of ""unconscious mind"" was self contradictory, and so forth.
But all this has now been given up. ... Philosophers no longer dispute ... details of the Freudian
system - but disregard them. If they mention them at all, they talk as if they somehow concerned
none but medical men - as if the same propositions could be sene in medicine and false outside it.
In the light of the recognition of unconscious motives the whole traditional theory of moral
responsibility needs overhauling, but no moral philosopher undertakes this’ (p.205). The reason why
the corresponding philosophical debate (about whether unconscious desires are sometimes evil, whether
relevant moral predicates are restricted to conscious motives, and so forth) had not ""by 1945, after 40
years of exposure to Freudian issues, Maclver attributed to the mass of psychological literature which
philosophers have not read and would have to read, reading that is obligatory if moral philosophy is
to be made ‘the subject which it ought to be’ (p.206).
There has been disappointment among some professional philosophers, those with expansionist .
instin^tions, that field ethics has not turned out to be quite the bonanza anticipated, that the expected /
boom in new opportunities and positions began to dissipate as field practitioners started to supply their
own ""field ethicists"".21 None of this should have been surprising, for broad inductive reasons.
Philosophy had long shed subjects and fields of overlap; and those professionals who have hung in
have become something different (economists instead of social philosophers, computer scientists
instead of logicians22) Nor have philosophers, especially those who have not changed or reskilled, all
the virtues assumed by professionals; e.g. they have little or no theory, they are too fuzzy, they are
indecisive, or vacillate, etc. (remember the sophists; these provide some of the reasons too why
philosophers are often not welcome on committees).
(
Richard Sylvan
23
Some outside inputs into ethics, such as field studies or field workers may supply, would not go
astray. For there is theoretically little that is new or interesting on the standard ethics scene. Much
of it is 19th century revival, refinement of utilitarianism or Kantianism, and ornate additions (with
bells and whistles). One of the few ""new"" offerings is the revival of Aristotelian virtue ethics!
Nothing, however, stops outside inputs. Anyone is free to attempt philosophy. Professionals have no
exclusive rights over philosophy, still less over ethics; nor should they. There is a case for widening
practice of philosophy, and encouraging paraphilosophers. For critical problems emerging are not so
much those of philosophy itself (which could be very different from the way it is practised and
professionalised), but of philosophy as professionalised and as conducted. The immediate future does
not bode well for change in the latter, for several reasons; the prevailing materialistic technological
ethos (which dev^lyes pure intellectual activity), the consequent marginalisation of subjects like
philosophy and continuing narrowness of dominant philosophical activity.
Nor, moreover, have philosophers proceeded well, particularly in the Antipodes, in training and
""^pp^ing students who can readily adapt to become field ethicists. Philosophy has never been strongly
employment-market driven (but has tended to rely on a version of Say’s flawed law); indeed there are
features intrinsic to philosophy, such as its contemplative character, that renders it antithetical to the
veiy idea of responding to markets at all. There are other regional features that compound this sort
of problem: the conservative, and class, bias of philosophy (inherited from similar British
arrangements), which has meant that Australian philosophy has not been innovative in adapting its
topics and emphases to changing circumstances;23 and the heavy concentration, as in British
empiricism (still dominant in Australia), upon epistemology, with ethics and what went into moral
sciences and social philosophy still regarded as second class arenas and not what philosophy was really
about or what first class chaps would mainly concern themselves. These are major reasons why
philosophy lost out, and Reserved to lose.
It is for those latter sorts of reasons in particular, that environmental ethics and environmental
philosophy have been unable to gain more than occasional marginal status in philosophy curricula in
Australian universities. Fuller accounts of the predicament of environmental philosophy have been
given elsewhere.24 Its predicament tends to illustrate a general problem for field ethics, with bioethics
(with its own institutional settings) the only partial exception.
Now that field ethics is being lost to the fields in many cases, there are complaints about the calibre
of what is done and taught, the quality of the investigators and teachers, and so on. No doubt much
of this criticism is warranted; some similar criticism of ethics within philosophy would also be
warranted. Among the justified criticisms are these:
•
that field ethics as done from the field is divorced from ethical theory (from what theory has
so far been developed). Too much comprises mere case studies, as with business MBAs.
•
that the field practitioners are not trained in ethical theory, and are often ill-informed ethically
and lacking in analytic and critical skills crucial for satisfactory philosophy.
A different complaint, of importance, concerns the poor ethical practice, even the unethical practice
in some of the fields, despite the development of field ethics. Such a problem is particularly
conspicuous in the field of business.25 But this has been a long-standing problem for ethics itself;
how to get people to behave as they ought? Teaching agents ethics can certainly enable, and
encourage, them to be moral: but it cannot make them moral. Nor would it be proper for it to do so.
The field ethics movement, successor to the late AE movement, is both important and timely,
especially as regards getting ethics and axiology back into many fields that hard tried, erroneously it
now appears, to eliminate them. The movement will have to be carefully orchestrated however to
\
I
1
24
What is wrong with applied ethics
avoid capture by the very power structures and disciplinary paradigms that it should transform. These
are certainly grounds for some cynicism about such movements: that they are easy targets for
co-option, that they can bemused to cover up abuses by power structures, and to authorise dubious
procedures, or worse,^with a rubber stamp of ethical approval from appropriate ethics’ committees and
inquiries. Such grounds for cynicism can be reasoned, however, and new hope inaugurated, given
more adequate formulation and development of relevant field ethics (exercises including considerable
theoretical work), along with independent and impartial administration of emerging codes and decision
methods, and with appropriate openness of the formerly abused procedures they are intended to
regulate fairly.
REFERENCES
Callicott, J.B., In Defense of the Land Ethic, State University of New York Press, Albany, 1989.
Edwards, J.C., Ethics without Philosophy, University Presses of Florida, Tampa, 1982.
Engel, J.R., Ethics of Environment and Development, Belhaven Press, 1990.
Hinkfuss, I., The Moral Society: Its Structure and Effects, Discussion papers in environmental
philosophy, no. 16, The Australian National University, 1987.
Leopold, A., A Sand Country Almanac, Oxford University Press, New York, 1949.
MacIntyre, A., After Virtue, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, 1981.
Maclver, A.M., ""Towards anew moral philosophy"", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, no. 46
(1945-6): 179-206.
Sylvan, R. ""Prospects for regional philosophy in Australasia"", Australasian Journal of Philosophy,
1986.
Sylvan, R., From Wisdom to Wowserism, typescript, 1991.
Sylvan, R., Deep-Green Ethics, typescript, 1993.
i
Sylvan, R. and Bennett, H., The Greening of Ethics, White Horse Press, Cambridge, 199^.
Wilson, E.O. (ed.), Biodiversity, National Academy Press, Washington, DC, 1988.
NOTES
1. For such a treatment of items like ethics, as economic goods, see further Greening of Ethics.
2. The Conference, organised by the University of Newcastle in August 1993, where this paper was
presented.
3. Ethical theory has tended to borrow classifications from elsewhere, from apparently more successful
enterprises. Thus, for instance, the (normative) ethics/meta-ethics distinction lifted, none too adeptly,
25
Richard Sylvan
from logical theory. Thus too the present pure/applied distinction, also purloined. By no means
everything that intelligent agents dream up and promote is entirely in order. Rather uncontroversially
colourless green ideas is one such combination, more controversially human nature, deep ecology and
post-modernism are such. Applied ethics appears to belong to this not-in-satisfactory-order or
out-of-order bunch.
4. ‘Applied. Practical, put to practical use. Applied science. Science of which the abstract principles
are put to practical use in the arts’ (Concise English').
‘2. Put to practical use; practical as distinguished from abstract or theoretical’ (OED). Though
we persevere with these dictionary explications, there are grounds for complaint; there are neglected
nuances. For example, the practical/theoretical contrast (just one of the muddy contrasts with
practical) differs from an applied/pure contrast. A theory can in principle be applied (a plying to, i.e.,
a mapping) in a non practical, or impractical, field. Different again is that concrete/abstract contrast.
And what exactly is practical?
5. The advance notices for the Conference (which look pretty confused, even mumbo jumbo), well
they add insult to injury by invoking talk of a theory of applied ethics. There is said to ‘appear to be
a significant gap between the theory of applied ethics and its practice’; this is said to be why
‘disillusionment has set in’ now. While there may be a theory of applications, talk of a ""theory of
applied ethics"" heaps confusion (‘theory of) upon confusion (‘applied ethics’). As for gaps (really,
between the theory and practice of ethics), there are two, as we shall see; there is an ambiguity in
‘gap’As for mumbo jumbo, try the following sentence:
‘The teaching and practice of applied ethics has grown rapidly and in an unruly manner across many
disciplines, with many practitioners now not possessing any depth of philosophical knowledge and
expertise and, because of difficulties experienced with the theory and practice given, in some cases
deciding that same is relevant.’ Its sequel is easily unscrambled:
‘We wish to hold a conference to explore this issue for the Australian community and its practical
consequences.’
6. Thus, too, there is a two way process. Application feeds back to inform theory and to enrich the
pure subject. With ethics, as we shall see, something similar or more dramatic happens. Field
developments not merely may inform and enlarge the ethical theory; some may alter it irrevocably.
7. Of course not all adjectives function in this way. butTor. instance without types of responded s.
Thus, e.g. possible, probable, alleged, putative,etc.
I
8. Examples include Wilson in Biodiversity, Engel.
9. We try to
show as much elsewherey-Routley and HTIF.
10. This is by no means all that is wrong with standard ethics. Another, important for field ethics,
is the lack of an adequate theory of ethical dilemmas, confronting which is a main engine of progress
in ethics.
11. See Greening of Ethics', also ‘Ethics without humans. Philosophy without humans', Observe that
^repairs are not unique.
[Unlisted in Error Likely 2nd Drawer],Box 14: Green Projects in Progress",https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/e8f40bdcc644ad46c5a77df4b8940142.pdf,Text,"Draft Papers",1,0
79,https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/show/79,"Box 15, Item 1720: Papers and notes on environmental theory, ethics, preference and economics","Typescripts and handwritten notes. Includes 2 draft copies of 'Is there a need for a new, an environmental, ethic?' by Sylvan, with handwritten emendations and annotations; and 2 letters.
","Letters redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions. Title in collection finding aid: Manilla Folder - Environmental Theory /1) Ethics 2) preference 3) economics - papers. and notes RS & VP + others","Richard Routley","The University of Queensland's Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291, Box 15, Item 1720","Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy",,"This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, Dr. N.A.J. Taylor.","For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library.",,"[75] leaves. 57.42 MB.",,Manuscript,"https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:857e1c6","Australian National University Office - Second Bookcase - Third Shelf - Second Pile ","/Zr
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-125
TABLE 2.
Populations of Australia at 2040 under
various assumptions as to population at
2000 and various growth rates.
Population in
Hypothesis as
Population in
millions at 2000
to growth rate
millions at 2040
more \
likely) •'
range /'
17-3
1.1% from 1970
26.8
17.8
1.2% from 1970
28.7
18.9
1.1% from 2000
29.2
18.9
1.2% from 2000
30.4
20.0
1.1% from 2000
30.9
20.0
1.2% from 2000
32.2
21.0
1.1% from 2000
32.5
21.0
1.2% from 2000
33.8
21.0
1.4% from 2000
36.6
22.0
1.7% from 2000
38.2
22.0
1.5% from 2000
39.6
22.4
1.87% from 2000
46.99
probable
range
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The following has been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions.
Letter, Dick Coutinho, Royal Vangorcum to Dr Richard Routley, Australian National University,
1974? re Routhley's manuscript on environmental ethics. (1 leaf)
u*^
•f-—
Is there a need for a new, an environmental, ethic?
§1.
It is increasingly said that civilization, Western
civilization at least, stands in need of a new ethic (and
derivatively of a new economics) setting out people's
relations to the natural environment, in Leopold's words
'an ethic dealing with man's relation to land and to the
animals and plants which grow upon it'
([1], p.238).
It
is not of course that old and prevailing ethics do not deal
with man's relation to nature:
they do, and on the prevailing
view man is free to deal with nature as he pleases, i.e. his
relations with nature, insofar at least as they do not affect
others, are not subject to moral censure.
Thus assertions
such as 'Crusoe ought not to be mutilating those trees' are
significant and morally determinate but, inasmuch at least
as Crusoe's actions do not interfere with others, they are
false or do not hold - and trees are not, in a good sense,
It is to this, to the values and evaluations
moral objects.
*
of the prevailing ethics, that Leopold and others in fact
take exception.
Leopold regards as subject to moral crit
icism, as wrong, behaviour that on prevailing views is morally
permissible.
But it is not, as Leopold seems to think, that
such behaviour is beyond the scope of the prevailing ethics
and that an extension of traditional morality is required to
cover such cases,to fill a moral void.
If Leopold is right
in his criticism of prevailing conduct what is required is
a change in the ethics, in attitudes, values and evaluations.
For as matters stand, as he himself explains, men do not feel
morally ashamed if they interfere with a wilderness, if they
maltreat the land, extract from it whatever it will yield,
and then move on; and such conduct is not taken to interfere
with and does not rouse the moral indignation of others.
'A
* A view occasionally tempered by the idea that trees house
spirits.
2
farmer who clears the woods off a 75% slope, turns his
cows into the clearing, and dumps its rainfall, rocks,
and soil into the community creek, is still (if other
wise decent) a respected member of society.'
([1], p.245)
Under what we shall call an environmental ethic such trad
itionally permissible conduct would be accounted morally
wrong, and the farmer subject to proper moral criticism.
Let us grant such evaluations for the purpose
What is not so clear is that a new ethic
is required even for such radical judgements.
For one thing
of the argument.
it is none too clear what is going to count as a new ethic,
much as it is often unclear whether a new development in
physics counts as a new physics or just as a modification
or extension of the old.
For, notoriously, ethics are not
clearly articulated or at all well worked out, so that the
application of identity criteria for ethics may remain
*
obscure.
Furthermore we tend to cluster a family of
ethical systems which do not differ on core or fundamental
principles together as the one ethic; e.g. the Christain
ethic, which is an umbrella notion covering a cluster of
differing and even competing systems.
In fact then there
are two other possibilities, apart from a new environmental
ethic, which might cater for the evaluations, namely that
of an extension or modification of the prevailing ethics
or that of the development of principles that are already
encompassed or latent within the prevailing ethic.
The
second possibility, that environmental evaluations can be
incorporated within (and ecological problems solved within)
the framework of prevailing Western ethics, is open because
there isn't a single ethical system uniquely assumed in
* To the consternation no doubt of Quineans.
But the fact
is that we can talk perfectly well about inchoate and
fragmentary systems the identity of which may be indeter
minate .
3.
Western civilization:
on many issues, and especially on
controversial issues such as infanticide, women's rights
and drugs, there are competing sets of principles.
Talk
of a new ethic and prevailing ethics tends to suggest a
sort of monolithic structure, a uniformity, that prevailing
ethics, and even a single ethic, need not have.
Indeed Passmore (in [2]) has mapped out three
important traditions in Western ethical views concerning
man's relation to nature; a dominant tradition, the despotic
position, with man as despot (or tyrant), and two lesser
traditions, the stewardship position, with man as custodian,
and the co-operative position with man as perfector. Nor
are these the only traditions; primitivism is another, and
both romanticism and mysticism have influenced Western views.
The dominant Western view is simply inconsistent
with an environmental ethic; for according to it nature is
the dominion of man and he is free to deal with it as he
pleases (since - at least on the mainstream Stoic - Augustine
view - it exists only for his sake), whereas on an environ
mental ethic man is not so free to do as he pleases.
But
it is not quite so obvious that an environmental ethic can
*
not be coupled with one of the lesser traditions.
Part of
the problem is that the lesser traditions are by no means
adequately characterised anywhere, especially when the
religious backdrop is removed, e.g. who is man steward for
and responsible to?
However both traditions are inconsistent
with an environmental ethic because they imply policies of
complete interference, whereas on an environmental ethic
some worthwhile parts of the earth's surface should be
preserved from substantial human interference, whether of
4.
the ""improving"" sort or not.
Both traditions would in
fact prefer to see the earth's land surfaces reshaped along
the lines of the tame and comfortable north-European small
farm and village landscape. According to the co-operative
position man's proper role is to develop, cultivate and
perfect nature - all nature eventually - by bringing out
its potentialities, the test of perfection being primarily
usefulness for human purposes; while on the stewardship
view man's role, like that of a farm manager, is to make
nature productive by his efforts though not by means that
will deliberately degrade its resources.
Although these
positions both depart from the dominant position in a way
which enables the incorporation of some evaluations of an
environmental ethic, e.g. some of those concerning the
irresponsible farmer, they do not go far enough:
for in
the present situation of expanding populations confined to
finite natural areas, they will lead to, and enjoin, the
perfecting, farming and utilizing of all natural areas.
Indeed these lesser traditions lead to, what a thorough
going environmental ethic would reject, a principle of
total use, implying that every natural area should be culti
vated or otherwise used
*
for human ends, ""humanized"".
As the important Western traditions exclude an
environmental ethic, it would appear that such an ethic,
not primitive, mystical or romantic, would be new alright.
The matter is not so straightforward; for the dominant ethic
has been substantially qualified by the rider that one is
not always entitled to do as one pleases where this physically
interferes with others.
Maybe some such proviso was implicit
all along (despite evidence to the contrary), and it was
* If 'use' is extended, somewhat illicitly, to include use
for preservation, this total use principle is rendered
inocuous at least as regards its actual effects. Note
that the total use principle is tied to the resource view
of nature.
simply assumed that doing what one pleased with natural
items would not affect others (the non-interference
assumption).
Be this as it may, the modified dominant
position appears, at least for many thinkers, to have
supplanted the dominant position; and the modified posi
tion can undoubtedly go much further towards an environ
mental ethic.
For example, the farmer's polluting of a
community stream may be ruled immoral on the grounds that
it physically interferes with others who use or would use
the stream.
Likewise business enterprises which destroy
the natural environment for no satisfactory returns or which
cause pollution deleterious to the health of future humans,
can be criticised on the sort of welfare basis (e.g. that
of [3]) that blends with the modified position; and so on.
The position may even serve to restrict the sort of family
size one is entitled to have since in a finite situation
excessive population levels will interfere with future people.
Nontheless neither the modified dominant position nor its
Western variants, obtained by combining it with the lesser
traditions, is adequate as an environmental ethic, as I shall
A new ethic is wanted.
e
As we noticed (an) ethic is ambiguous, as between
try to show.
§2.
a specific ethical system, a specific ethic, and a more generic
notion, a super ethic, under which specific ethics cluster.
*
An ethical system S is, near enough, a propositional system
(i.e. a structured set of propositions) or theory which
includes (like individuals of a theory) a set of values
and (like postulates of a theory) a set of general evalu
ative judgements concerning conduct, typically of what is
obligatory, permissible and wrong, of what are rights^what
* A meta-ethic is, as usual, a theory about ethics, super
ethics, their features and fundamental notions.
6.
is valued, and so forth.
A general or lawlike proposition
of a system is a principle; and certainly if systems S| and
S2 contain different principles then they are different
systems.
It follows that any environmental ethic differs
from the important traditional ethics outlined.
Moreover
if environmental ethics differ from Western ethical systems
on some core principle embedded in Western systems, then
these systems differ from the Western super ethic (assuming,
what seems to be so, that it can be uniquely characterised)
- in which case if an environmental ethic is needed then a
new ethic is wanted.
It suffices then to locate a core
principle and to provide environmental counter examples to
it.
It is commonly assumed that there are, what amount
to, core principles of Western ethical systems, principles
that will accordingly belong to the super ethic.
The fair-
ness principle inscribed in the Golden Rule provides one
example.
Directly relevant here, as a good stab at a core
principle, is the commonly formulated liberal principle of
4- A'/Z
the modified dominance position:.
A recent formulation
*
runs
as follows ([3], p.58):
'The liberal philosophy of the Western world holds
that one should be able to do what he wishesproviding (1)
that he does not harm others and (2) that he is not likely
to harm himself irreparably.'
Let us call this principle basic (human) chauvinism -because
under it humans, or people, come first and everything else a
bad last - though sometimes the principle is hailed as a
freedom principle because it gives permission to perform a
wide range of actions (including actions which mess up the
environment and natural things) providing they do not harm
* A related principle is that (modified)
can operate within similar limits.
t
X
/< > /Cy
,
.... r -r-
free enterprise
'i-
others.
In fact it tends to cunningly shift the onus of
proof to others.
It is worth remarking that harming others
in the restriction is narrower than a restriction to the
(usual) interests of others; it is not enough that it is in
my interests, because I detest you, that you stop breathing;
you are free to breathe, for the time being anyway, because
it does not harm me.
There remains a problem however as to
exactly what counts as harm or interference.
Moreover the
width of the principle is so far obscure because 'other' may
be filled out in significantly different ways:
it makes a
difference to the extent, and privilege, of the chauvinism
whether 'other' expands to 'other human' - which is too
restrictive - or to 'other person' or to 'other sentient
-hv
being'; and it makes a difference to the adequacy of the
principle, and inversely to its economic applicability, to
which class of others it is intended to apply, whether to
future as well as to present others, whether to remote future
others or only to non-discountable future others, and whether
to possible others.
The latter would make the principle
completely unworkable, and it is generally assumed that it
applies at most to present and future others,
7/v
It is taken for granted in designing counter examples
to basic chauvinist principles, that a semantical analysis
of permissibility and obligation statements stretches out
over ideal situations (which may be incomplete or even incon
sistent) , so that what is permissible holds in some ideal
situation, what is obligatory in every ideal situation, and
what is wrong is excluded in every ideal situation.
But the
main point to grasp for the counter examples that follow, is
that ethical principles if correct are universal and are
assessed over the class of ideal situations.
(i)
The last man (or person)
surviving the collapse of the world system lays
about him, eliminating, as far as he can, every
The last man example.
living thing, animal or plant (but painlessly if
you like, as at the best abattoirs) .
What he does
is quite permissible according to basic chauvinism,
but on environmental grounds what he does is wrong.
Moreover one does not have to be committed to esot
eric
values
to regard Mr. Last Man as behaving
badly (the reason being perhaps that radical thinking
and values have shifted in an environmental direction
in advance of corresponding shifts in the formulation
of fundamental evaluative principles).
(ii)
The last people example.
The last man example can
be broadened to the last people example.
We can
assume that they know they are the last people, e.g.
because they are aware that radiation effects have
blocked any chance of reproduction.
One considers
the last people in order to rule out the possibility
that what these people do harms or somehow physically
interferes with later people.
Otherwise one could as
well consider science fiction cases where people
arrive at a new planet and destroy its ecosystems,
whether with good intentions such as perfecting the
planet for their ends and making it more fruitful
or, forgetting the lesser traditions, just for the
hell of it.
Let us assume that the last people are
very numerous.
They humanely exterminate every wild
9.
animal and they eliminate the fish of the seas, they
put all arable land under intensive cultivation, and
all remaining forests disappear in favour of quarries
or plantations, and so on.
They may give various
familiar reasons for this, e.g. they believe it is
the way to salvation or to perfection, or they are
simply satisfying reasonable needs, or even that it
is needed to keep the last people employed or occupied
so that they do not worry too much about their impending
extinctions.
On an environmental ethic the last
people have behaved badly; they have simplified and
largely destroyed all the natural ecosystems, and
with their demise the world will soon be an ugly and
largely wrecked place.
But this conduct may conform
with the basic chauvinist principle, and as well with
the principles enjoined by the lesser traditions.
Indeed the main point of elaborating this example is
because, as the last man example reveals, basic chauv
inism may conflict with stewardship or co-operation
principles.
The conflict may be removed it seems by
conjoining a further proviso to the basic principle,
to the effect (3) that he does not wilfully destroy
natural resources.
But as the last people do not
destroy resources wilfully, but perhaps ""for the
best of reasons"", the variant is still environmentally
inadequate.
(iii)
The great entrepreneur example.
The last man example
can be adjusted so as to not fall foul of clause (3).
The last man is an industrialist; he runs a giant
complex of automated factories and farms which he
10.
proceeds to extend.
He produces automobiles among
other things, from renewable and recyclable resources
of course, only he dumps and recycles these shortly
after manufacture and sale to a dummy buyer instead
of putting them on the road for a short time as we
do.
Of course he has the best of reasons for his
activity, e.g. he is increasing gross world product,
or he is improving output to fulfil some plan, and
he will be increasing his own and general welfare
since he much prefers increased output and product
ivity.
The entrepreneur's behaviour is on the Western
ethic quite permissible; indeed his conduct is commonly
thought to be quite fine and may even meet Pareto
optimality requirements given prevailing notions of
being ""better off"".
Just as we can extend the last man example
to a class of last people, so we can extend this
example to the industrial society example:
looks rather like
Civ)
the society
ours.
The vanishing species example. Consider the blue
whale, a mixed good on the economic picture. The
blue whale is on the verge of extinction because of
his qualities as a private good, as a source of valuable oil and meat. The catching and marketing of blue
whales does not harm the whalers; it does not harm or
physically interfere with others in any good sense,
though it may upset them and they may be prepared to
compensate the whalers if they desist; nor need whale
hunting be wilful destruction.
(Slightly different
examples which eliminate the hunting aspect of the
11.
blue whale example are provided by cases where a
species is eliminated or threatened through destruc
tion of its habitat by man's activity or the activ
ities of animals he has introduced, e.g. many plains-
dwelling Australian marsupials and the Arabian oryx.)
The behaviour of the whalers in eliminating this
magnificent species of whale is accordingly quite
permissible - at least according to basic chauvinism.
But on an environmental ethic it is not.
However the
free-market mechanism will not cease allocating
whalers to commercial uses, as a satisfactory environ
mental economics would; instead the market model will
grind inexorably
*
along the private demand curve until
the blue whale population is no longer viable - if
’r <
that point has not already been passed.
7/7 /
(U•
‘
In sum'
class of permissible actions that
/rebound on the environment is more narrowly circumscribed
on an environmental ethic than it is in the Western super
ethic.
But aren't environmentalists going too far in claim
ing that these people, those of the examples and respected
industrialists, fishermen and farmers are behaving, when
engaging in environmentally degrading activities of the
sort described, in a morally impermissible way?
these people do is
No, what
to a greater or lesser extent evil,
and hence in serious cases morally impermissible.
For example,
insofar as the killing or forced displacement of primitive
peoples who stand in the way of an industrial development is
morally indefensible and impermissible, so also is the
slaughter of the last remaining blue whales for private
profit.
But how to reformulate basic chauvinism as a
* For the tragedy-of-the-commons type reasons well explained
in [3] .
13.
/•~i'<'-^\,<
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capable of choice is at liberty to do (i.e. is under no oblig
ation to abstain from) any action which is not one coercing or
restraining or designed to injure other persons'.
But this
sufficient condition for a human natural right depends on accepting
the very human chauvinist principle an environmental ethic rejects,
since if a person has a natural right he has a right; so too the
definition of a natural right adopted by classical theorists and
accepted with minor qualifications by Hart presupposes the same
defective principle.
Accordingly an environmental ethic would
have to amend the classical notion of a natural right, a far from
straight forward matter now that human rights with respect to
animals and the natural environment are, like those with respect
to slaves not all that long ago, undergoing major re-evaluation.
An environmental ethic
14.
morally, through obligations
practically anything at all.
The species bias of certain ethical and economic positions
which aim to make principles of conduct or reasonable economic
behaviour calculable is easily brought out.
These positions typ
ically employ a single criterion p, such as preference or happi
ness, as a summum banum; characteristically each individual of
some base class, almost always humans, but perhaps including future
humans, is supposed to have an ordinal p ranking of the states in
question (e.g. of affairs, of the economy); then some principle is
supplied to determine a collective p ranking of these states in
terms of individual p rankings, and what is best or ought to be
done is determined either directly, as in act-utilitarianism under
the Greatest Happiness principle, or indirectly, as in rule
utilitarianism, in terms of some optimization principle applied to
the collective ranking.
The species bias is transparent from the
selection of the base class.
And even if the base class is extended
to embrace persons, or even some animals (at the cost, like that of
including remotely future humans, of losing testability), the
positions are open to familiar criticism; namely that the whole of
the base class may be prejudiced in a way which leads to unjust
principles.
For example if every member of the base class detests
dingoes, on the basis of mistaken data as to dingoes' behaviour,
ive
then by the Pareto ranking test the collect/ranking will rank states
where dingoes are exterminated very highly, from which it will
generally be concluded that dingoes ought to be exterminated (the
evaluation of most Australian farmers anyway).
Likewise it would
just be a happy accident, it seems, if collective demand (hori
zontally summed from individual demand) for a state of the economy
with blue whales as a mixed good, were to succeed in outweighing
J
15.
private whaling demands; for if no one in the base class happened
to know that blue whales exist or cared a jot that they do then
""rational"" economic decision-making would do nothing to prevent
their extinction.
Whether the blue whale survives should not have
to depend on what humans know or what they see on television.
Human interests and preferences are far too parochial to provide
a satisfactory basis for deciding on what is environmentally
desirable.
These ethical and economic theories are not alone in
their species chauvinism; much the same applies to most going
meta-ethical theories which, unlike intuitionistic theories,
try to offer some rationale for their basic principles.
For
instance, on social contract positions obligations are a matter
of mutual agreements between individuals of the base class; on
a social justice picture rights and obligations spring from the
application of symmetrical fairness principles to members of the
base class, usually a rather special class of persons, while on
a Kantian position.which has some vogue-obligations somehow
arise from respect for members of the base class, persons.
In each case if members of the base class happen to be ill-
disposed to items outside the base class then that is too bad
for them; that is (rough) justice.
R. Routley
Australian National University
REFERENCES
[1]
A. Leopold,
A Sand Country Almenac with other essays
on Conservation,
[2]
J. Passmore,
New York (196 6) .
Ecological Problems and Western Traditions
(unpublished).
[3]
P.W. Barkley and D.W. Seckier, Economic Growth and
Environmental Decay. The Solution becomes the Problem,
New York (1972).
[4]
S. and R. Godlovitch and J. Harris (editors),
Men and Morals.
hon-humans,
[5]
Animals,
An enquiry into the maltreatment of
London (1971).
H.L.A. Hart,
‘Are there any natural rights?',
reprinted in A. Quinton (editor), Political Philosophy,
Oxford (1967).
The following has been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions.
Letter, S. I. Benn, Acting Head of Department of Philosophy to Dr. R. Rosenkrantz, Department
of Philosophy, University of South Caroline, 6 Sep 1973 re fellowship at the Research School of
Social Sciences, supervised by Richard Routley. (3 pages)
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Is there a need for a new, an environmental, ethic?
§1.
It is increasingly said that civilization, Western
civilization at least, stands in need of a new ethic (and
derivatively of a new economics) setting out people's
relations to the natural environment, in Leopold’s words
’an ethic dealing with man's relation to land and to the
animals and plants which grow upon it'
([1], p.238).
It
is not of course that old and prevailing ethics do not deal
with man's relation to nature:
they do, and on the prevailing
view man is free to deal with nature as he pleases, i.e. his
relations with nature, insofar at least as they do not affect
others, are not subject to moral censure.
such as
Thus assertions
Crusoe ought not to be mutilating those trees' are
significant and morally determinate but, inasmuch at least
as Crusoe's actions do not interfere with others, they are
false or do not hold - and trees are not, in a good sense,
It is to this, to the values and evaluations
moral oojects.
*
of the prevailing ethics, that Leopold and others in fact
take exception.
Leopold regards as subject to moral crit
icism, as wrong, behaviour that on prevailing views is morally
permissible.
But it is not, as Leopold seems to think, that
such behaviour is beyond the scope of the prevailing ethics
and that an extension of traditional morality is required to
cover such cases,to fill a moral void.
If Leopold is right
in his criticism of prevailing conduct what is required is
a change in the ethics, in attitudes, values and evaluations.
For as matters stand, as he himself explains, men do not feel
morally ashamed if they interfere with a wilderness, if they
maltreat the land, extract from it whatever it will yield,
and then move on; and such conduct is not taken to interfere
with and does not rouse the moral indignation of others.
'A
* A view occasionally tempered by the idea that trees house
* spirits.
2.
fanner who clears the woods off a 75% slope, turns his
cows into the clearing, and dumps its rainfall, rocks,
and soil into the community creek, is still (if other
wise decent) a respected member of society.'
([1], p.245)
Under what we shall call an environmental ethic such trad
itionally permissible conduct would be accounted morally
wrong, and the fanner subject to proper moral criticism.
Let us grant such evaluations for the purpose
of the argument.
What is not so clear is that a new ethic
is required even for such radical judgements.
For one thing
it is none too clear what is going to count as a new ethic,
much as it is often unclear whether a new development in
physics counts as a new physics or just as a modification
or extension of the old.
For, notoriously, ethics are not
clearly articulated or at all well worked out, so that the
application of identity criteria for ethics may remain
*
obscure.
Furthermore we tend to cluster a family of
ethical systems which do not differ on core or fundamental
principles together as the one ethic; e.g. the Christain
ethic, which is an umbrella notion covering a cluster of
differing and even competing systems.
In fact then there
are two other possibilities, apart from a new environmental
ethic, which might cater for the evaluations, namely that
of an extension or modification of the prevailing ethics
or that of the development of principles that are already
encompassed or latent within the prevailing ethic.
The
second possibility, that environmental evaluations can be
incorporated within (and ecological problems solved within)
the framework of prevailing Western ethics, is open because
there isn't a single ethical system uniquely assumed in
* To the consternation no doubt of Quineans. But the fact
is that we can talk perfectly well about inchoate and
fragmentary systems the identity of which may be indeter
minate .
3.
Western civilization: on many issues, and especially on
controversial issues such as infanticide, women's rights
and drugs, there are competing sets of principles.
Talk
of a new ethic and prevailing ethics tends to suggest a
sort of monolithic structure, a uniformity, that prevailing
ethics, and even a single ethic, need not have.
Indeed Passmore (in [2]) has mapped out three
important traditions in Western ethical views concerning
man's relation to nature? a dominant tradition, the despotic
position, with man as despot (or tyrant^ and two lesser
traditions, the stewardship position, with man as custodian, ■
and tne co-operative position with man as perfector. Nor
are these the only traditions; primitivism is another, and
both romanticism and mysticism have influenced Western views.
The dominant Western view is simply inconsistent
with an environmental ethic; for according to it nature is
the dominion of man and he is free to deal with it as he
pleases (since - at least on the mainstream Stoic - Augustine
view - it exists only for his sake), whereas on an environ
mental ethic man is not so free to do as he pleases,
it is not quite so obvious that an environmental ethic can
not be coupled with one of the lesser traditions. Part of
the problem is that the lesser traditions are by no means
adequately characterised anywhere, especially when the
religious backdrop is removed, e.g. who is man steward for
and responsible to?
However both traditions are inconsistent
with an environmental ethic because they imply policies of
complete interference, whereas on an environmental ethic
some worthwhile parts of the earth's surface should be
preserved *
rom substantial human interference, whether of
4.
the ""improving"" sort or not.
Both traditions would in
fact prefer to see the earth's land surfaces reshaped along
the lines of the tame and comfortable north-European small
farm and village landscape. According to the co-operative
position man's proper role is to develop, cultivate and
perfect nature - all nature eventually - by bringing out
its potentialities, the test of perfection being primarily
usefulness for human purposes; while on the stewardship
view man's role, like that of a farm manager, is to make
nature productive by his efforts though not by means that
will deliberately degrade its resources.
Although these
positions both depart from the dominant position in a way
which enables the incorporation of some evaluations of an
environmental ethic, e.g. some of those concerning the
irresponsible farmer, they do not go far enough:
for in
the present situation of expanding populations confined to
finite natural areas, they will lead to, and enjoin, the
perfecting, farming and utilizing of all natural areas.
Indeed these lesser traditions lead to, what a thorough
going environmental ethic would reject, a principle of
total use, implying that every natural area should be culti
vated or otherwise used
*
for human ends, ""humanized"".
As the important Western traditions exclude an
environmental ethic, it would appear that such an ethic,
not primitive, mystical or romantic, would be new alright,
h//
The matter is not so straightforward; for the dominant ethic
has been substantially qualified by the rider that one is
not always entitled to do as one pleases where this physically
interferes with others.
Maybe some such proviso was implicit
all along (despite evidence to the contrary), and it was
* If 'use' is extended, somewhat illicitly, to include use
for preservation, this total use principle is rendered
inocuous at least as regards its actual effects. Note
that the total use principle is tied to the resource view
of nature.
simply assumed that doing what one pleased with natural
items would not affect others (the non-interference
assumption).
Be this as it may, the modified dominant
position appears, at least for many thinkers, to have
supplanted the dominant position; and the modified posi
tion can undoubtedly go much further towards an environ
mental ethic.
For example, the farmer's polluting of a
community stream may be ruled immoral on the grounds that
it physically interferes with others who use or would use
the stream. Likewise business enterprises which destroy
the natural environment for no satisfactory returns or which
cause pollution deleterious to the health of future humans,
can be criticised on the sort of welfare basis (e.g. that
of(j[3]) that blends with the modified position; and so on.
The position may even serve to restrict the sort of family
size one is entitled to have since in a finite situation
excessive population levels will interfere with future people.
Nonetheless neither the modified dominant position nor its
Western variants, obtained by combining it with the lesser
traditions, is adequate as an environmental ethic, as I shall
try to show.
A new ethic is wanted.
§2.
As we noticed (an) ethic is ambiguous, as between
a specific ethical system, a specific ethic, and a more generic
notion, a super ethic, under which specific ethics cluster.
*
An ethical system S is, near enough, a propositional system
(i.e. a structured set of propositions) or theory which
includes (like individuals of a theory) a set of values
and (like postulates of a theory) a set of general evalu
ative judgements concerning conduct, typically of what is
obligatory, permissible and wrong, of what are rightsr what
* A meta-ethic is, as usual, a theory about ethics, super
ethics, their features and fundamental notions.
6.
is valued, and so forth.
A general or lawlike proposition
of a system is a principle; and certainly if systems Sj and
S2 contain different principles then they are different
systems.
It follows that any environmental ethic differs
from the important traditional ethics outlined.
Moreover
if environmental ethics differ from Western ethical systems
on some core principle embedded in Western systems, then
these systems differ from the Western super ethic (assuming,
what seems to be so, that it can be uniquely characterised)
- in which case if an environmental ethic is needed then a
new ethic is wanted.
It suffices then to locate a core
principle and to provide environmental counter examples to
it.
It is commonly assumed that there are, what amount
to, core principles of Western ethical systems, principles
that will accordingly belong to the super ethic. The fair
ness principle inscribed in the Golden Rule provides one
example. Directly relevant here, as a good stab at a core
principle, is the commonly formulated liberal principle of
the modified dominance position.
A recent formulation
*
runs
as follows ([3], p.58):
K^> AACC C-aU tv/'
i^/' of
O'f
speA
SPcP
yvxo &""(
The liberal philosophy of the Western world holds
that one should be able to do what he wishes, providing (1)
that he does not harm others and (2) that he is not likely
to harm himself irreparably.'
Let us call this principle basic (human) chauvinism - because
jlfjA-aw
itUU*
under it humans, or people, come first and everything else a
$4vM« *h
bad last - though sometimes the principle is hailed as a
freedom principle because it gives permission to perform a
d(L<- tic.
tic. Cl-IK
Cl-ik
i/Au*/
7.
others.
In fact it tends to cunningly shift the onus of
proof to others.
It is worth remarking that harming others
in the restriction is narrower than a restriction to the
(usual) interests of others; it is not enough that it is in
£my interests, because I detest you?, that you stop breathing «
I-
you are free to breathe , for the time being anyway, because
it does not harm me
There remains a problem however as to
exactly what counts as harm or interference
Moreover the
width of the principle is so far obscure because ’other' may
be filled out in significantly different ways: it makes a
difference to the extent, and privilege, of the chauvinism
•
t.
whether 'other' expands to 'other human' - which is too
^1- -fL 3^
- WAa-Zm
lullu
rfy - Ah. I W-tc
restrictive -
J'""
J
fi.
t(r JJj,
/A
h
9-
‘s,
L
.
it
ilr
ll'
^onJk
^cU-i
/6 U' ,
zcrta srS
o/J oa
animal and they eliminate the fish of the seas, they
put all arable land under intensive cultivation, and
all remaining forests disappear in favour of quarries
or plantations, and so on. They may give various
V, familiar reasons for this, e.g. they believe it is
the way to salvation or to perfection, or they are
simply satisfying reasonable needs, or even that it
is needed to keep the last people employed or occupied
so that they do not worry too much about their impending
extinctions.
On an environmental ethic the last
people have behaved badly; they have simplified and
KfalltL
largely destroyed all the natural ecosystems, and
with their demise the world will soon bean ugly and
largely wrecked place. But this conduct may conform
witlCthe^basic chauvinist principle, and as well with
jltZ -
/W's
the principles enjoined by the lesser traditions.
Indeed the main point of elaborating this example is
foz‘
QC
Ko^r‘
because, as the last man example reveals, basic chauv
1
ft/qh'a»4.
inism may conflict with stewardship or co-operation
principles. The conflict may be removed it seems by
conjoining a further proviso to the basic principle, b’J
to the effect (3) that he does not wilfully destroy^
4^fV Vl to-
A,
(.
^,kJ ; 7
brovj^ rsuei
jUj^^-°
£o loot e^>
K'oV«f^arjJ<
(lii)
?
But as_____________
the last people do not
natural resources.
--------------------------------------------- -------- —..... —
xO°V
' ! J
destroy resources wilfully, but perhaps ""for the
the variant is still environmentallW^,^
best of reasons"",
inadequate.
The great entrepreneur example. The last man example
can be adjusted so as to not fall foul of clause (3) .
The last man is an industrialist; he runs a giant,
S.sau'»'
\
v#' rei
complex of automated factories and farms which he
-
I01""
’•
I Z/
""11
*-)-
LJ
°
V / f O XI
10.
proceeds to extend.
He produces automobiles among
other things, from renewable and recyclable resources
of course, only he dumps and recycles these shortly
after manufacture and sale to a dummy buyer instead
of putting them on the road for a short time as we
do.
A
Of coarse he has the best of reasons for his
activity, e.g. he is increasing gross world product,
or he is improving output to fulfil some plan, and
he will be increasing his own and general welfare
CHvc
since he much prefers increased output and product
ka L■/
l^,(-
if-
A> p^i^ /?
* ’ gUV*
k'
I
*/t^> pQ
(J
ivity.
The entrepreneur's behaviour is on the Western
J
ethic quite permissible; indeed his conduct is commonlyj'bovtW',
thought to be quite fine and may even meet Pareto
optimality requirements given prevailing notions of
being ""better off"".
Just as we can extend the last man example
to a class of last people, so we can extend this
C^S/XU-i
example to the industrial society example:
looks rather like ours.
(iv)
The vanishing species example.
(,
J X «<
T 7/
vr
u*fl ^4/
’“fa *•
TafeTT
lQ w
the society
Consider the blue
whale, a mixed good on the economic picture.
The
J—
'
blue whale is on the verge of extinction because of
X
his qualities as a private good, as a source of valu-
able oil and meat.
The catching and marketing of blue
whales does not harm the whalers; it does not harm or
physically interfere with others in any good sense,
7
though it may upset them and they may be prepared to
compensate the whalers if they desist; nor need whale
hunting be wilful destruction.
(Slightly different
examples which eliminate the hunting aspect rf the
""C
V
'•S
M
'n
11.
blue whale example are provided by cases where a
species is eliminated or threatened through destruc—
tion of its habitat by man's activity or the activ
ities of animals he has introduced, e.g. many plainsdwelling Australian marsupials and the Arabian oryx.)
The behaviour of the whalers in eliminating this
magnificent species of whale is accordingly quite
permissible — at least according to basic chauvinism.
L-iUl
il~
Wk
&
But on an environmental ethic it is not.
However the
free-market mechanism will not cease allocating
whalers to commercial uses, as a satisfactory environ
mental economics would; instead the market model will
HL
ui
7?I
grind inexorably
*
along the private demand curve until
the blue whale population is no longer viable - if
a
n
a 2^ o>^.‘
I, fisKis
that point has not already been passed.
In sum, the class of permissible actions that
Ola
rebound on the environment is more narrowly circumscribed
on an environmental ethic than it is in the Western super
ethic. But aren't environmentalists going too far in claim
ing that these people, those of the examples and respected
industrialists, fishermen and farmers are behaving, when
engaging in environmentally degrading activities of the
sort described, in a morally impermissible way? No, what
these people do is
to a greater or lesser extent evil,
and hence in serious cases morally impermissible.
For example,
insofar as the killing or forced displacement of primitive
peoples who stand in the way of an industrial development is
morally indefensible and impermissible, so also is the
slaughter of the last remaining blue whales for private
profit.
But how to reformulate basic chauvinism as a
* For the tragedy-of-the-commons type reasons well explained
in [ 3 ] .
0
n ‘s
■UjK
,
i
111
„lth
... „„ r .=...
.J-
extending (2) to rnclu
.,question were they placed in
would be so affected by the action in
It may be preferand (3) to exclude speciej&de.
the environment
in vieW of the way the freedom
“J
ab le,
imply to scrap it altogether, and mate
proof, s of rights and permissible conduct, as in a b
classes
theory sometimes forces changes
§3
a radical change in a
rejects the Reference
in the meta-theory; e.g. a logic which
a modification of the
Theory in a
Reference Theory and
usual -ta-tdef-eh^also^aeee
Jat simllt pheno^nCseens to occur in the case of a neta-
A somewhat s nxl
P
ethlc.
Quite apart from
ethl°de’“ several environmentally important notions, such as
introducing several
meta—
n 4.4™ arowth and preservation, for mec»
conservation, pollut^COTp^e-examinatlon
I
ethical analysis, an ,< of such characteristic(actions) as natural
and modified analyses
3 of obligation and
round of right, and of the relations
right■
may well require re-assessment of
permissibility to rights; it
notions as value and right, espectraditional analyses of such
on chauvinist assumptions; and it
ially where these are based
of the more prominent meta-ethical
forces the rejection of many
illustrated by a very brief exam
positions. These points are
then by a sketch of the
ination of accounts of nature^ right an
speciess bias of some major positions.
*
positions.
to defeating conditions
Hart (in [5]) accepts, subject
doctrine of natural rights
here irrelevant, the classical
which are
'anv adult human ■.•
to
which,
among
other
things,
according
are developed by those protesting about
points are oevei p
especially the essay s
Some of these
ltreatment of animals; see especial y
human ma
collected in [4] .
9
/z
O
/<
A, °uf
13.
a
i, g>OT' ° >f
1
capable of choice is at liberty to do (i.e. is under no oblig
ation to abstain from) any action which is not one coercing or
restraining or designed to injure other persons'.
But this
sufficient condition for a human natural right depends on accepting
the very human chauvinist principle an environmental ethic rejects,
since if a person has a natural right he has a right; so too the
definition of a natural right adopted by classical theorists and
accepted with minor qualifications by Hart presupposes the same
defective principle. Accordingly an environmental ethic would
have to amend the classical notion of a natural right, a far from
straight forward matter now that human rights with respect to
animals and the natural environment are, like those with respect
.. to slaves not all that long ago, undergoing major re-evaluation.
An environmental ethic does not commit one to the view
that natural objects such as trees^have rights (though such a view
is occasionally held, e.g. by partheists.
since artefacts are not alive).
But p^/theism is false
For moral prohibitions forbidding
certairTactions with respect to an object do not award that object
a correlative right. That it would be wrong to mutilate a given
tree or piece of property does not entail that the tree or piece of
property has a correlative right not to be mutilated (without
seriously stretching the notion of a right). Environmental views
can stick with mainstream theses according to which rights are
coupled with corresponding responsibilities and so with bearing
obligations, and with corresponding interests and concern; i.e.,
has a right also has responsibilities and thereat least , whatever____________
'J
fore obligations, and whatever has a right has interests, Thus
although any person may have a right by no means every living thing
can (significantly) have rights, and arguably most sentient objects
other than persons cannot have rights.
r \fhO<
*
But persons can relate
AT
***.
A-
*/Z
/»
A '^s"" fa
. ... 8(^
14.
morally, through obligations, prohibitions and so forth, to
practically anything at all.
The species bias of certain ethical and economic positions
which aim to make principles of conduct or reasonable economic
behaviour calculable is easily brought out.
These positions typ
ically employ a single criterion p, such as preference or happi
ness, as a summum bgnum; characteristically each individual of
soine base class, almost always humans, but perhaps including future
humans, is supposed to have an ordinal p ranking of the states in
question (e.g. of affairs, of the economy); then some principle is
supplied to determine a collective p ranking of these states in
terms of individual p rankings, and what is best or ought to be
done is determined either directly, as in act-utilitarianism under
the Greatest Happiness principle, or indirectly, as in rule
utilitarianism, in terms of some optimization principle applied to
The species bias is transparent from the
the collective ranking.
selection of the base class.
And even if the base class is extended
to embrace persons, or even some animals (at the cost, like that of
including remotely future humans, of losing testability), the
positions are open to familiar criticism; namely that the whole of
the base class may be prejudiced in a way which leads to unjust
principles.
For example if every member of the base class detests
dingoes, on the basis of mistaken data as to dingoes’ behaviour,
ive
then by the Pareto ranking test the collect/ranking will rank states
where dingoes are exterminated very highly, from which it will
generally be concluded that dingoes ought to be exterminated (the
evaluation of most Australian farmers anyway).
Likewise it would
just be a happy accident, it seems, if collective demand (hori
zontally summed from individual demand) for a state of the economy
with blue whales as a mixed good, were to succeed in outweighing
*
b'v
d(k^
V10'""
hU
•x'5
5
15.
oP ,
X»
private whaling demands; for if no one in the base class happened
to kr^ow that blue whales exist or cared a jot that they do then
""rational"" economic decision-making would do nothing to prevent
their extinction.
Whether the blue whale survives should not have
to depend on what humans know or what they see on television.
Human interests and preferences are far too parochial to provide
a satisfactory basis for deciding on what is environmentally
desirable.
These ethical and economic theories are not alone in
their species chauvinism; much the same applies to most going
meta-ethical theories which, unlike intuitionistic theories,
try to offer some rationale for their basic principles.
For
instance, on social contract positions obligations are a matter
of mutual agreements between individuals of .the base class; on
a social justice picture rights and obligations spring from the
application of symmetrical fairness principles to members of the
base class, usually a rather special class of persons, while on
a Kantian position which has some vogue obligations somehow
arise from respect for members of the base class, persons.
In each case if members of the base class happen to be ill-
disposed to items outside the base class then that is too bad
for them: that is
R. Routley
(rough) justice.
Australian National University
REFERENCES
[1]
A. Leopold,
A Sand Country Almenac with other essays
on Conservation,
New York (1966) .
[2]
J. Passmore, Ecological Problems and Western Traditions
(unpublished).
[3]
P.W. Barkley and D.W. Seckier,
Environmental Decay.
New York (1972).
[4]
The Solution becomes the Problem,
S. and R. Godlovitch and J. Harris (editors),
Men and Morals.
hon-humans,
[5]
Economic Growth and
H.L.A. Hart,
An enquiry into the maltreatment of
London (1971) .
'Are there any natural rights?',
reprinted in A. Quinton (editor),
Oxford (1967).
Animals,
Political Philosophy,
The species bias of certain ethical and economic positions which aim to make principles of
conduct or reasonable economic behaviour calculable is easily brought out. These positions
typically employ a single criterion p, such as preference or happiness, as a summum bonum;
characteristically each individual of some base class, almost always humans, but perhaps including
future humans, is supposed to have an ordinal p ranking of the states in question (e.g. of affairs, Of
the economy); then some principle is supplied to determine a collective p ranking of these states in
terms of individual prankings, and what is best or ought to be done is determined either directly, as
in act-utilitarianism under the Greatest Happiness principle, or indirectly, as in rule-utilitarianism,
in terms of some optimization principle applied to the collective ranking. The species bias is
transparent from the selection of the base class. And even if the base class is extended to embrace
persons, or even some animals (at the cost, like that of including remotely future humans, of losing
testability), the positions are open to familiar criticism, namely that-the whole of the base class may
be prejudiced in a way which leads to unjust principles. For example if every member of the base
class detests dingoes, on the basis of mistaken data as to dingoes’ behaviour, then by the Pareto
ranking test the collective ranking will rank states where dingoes are exterminated very highly,
from which it will generally be concluded that dingoes ought to be exterminated (the evaluation of
most Australian farmers anyway). Likewise it would just be a happy accident, it seems, if collective
demand (horizontally summed from individual demand) for a state of the economy with blue
whales as a mixed good, were to succeed in outweighing private whaling demands; for if no one in
the base class happened to know that blue whales exist or cared a jot that they do then
“rational” economic decision-making would do nothing to prevent their extinction. Whether the
blue whale survives should not have to depend on what humans know or what they see on televi
sion. Human interests and preferences are far too parochial to provide a satisfactory basis for
deciding on what is environmentally desirable.
These ethical and economic theories are not aione in their species chauvinism; much the
same applies to most going meta-ethical theories which, unlike intuitionistic theories, try to offer
some rationale for their basic principles. For instance, on social contract positions obligations are a
matter of mutual agreements between individuals of the base class; on a social justice picture rights
and obligations spring from the application of symmetrical fairness principles to members of the
base class, usually a rather special class of persons, while on a Kantian position which has some
vigue obligations somehow arise from respect for members of the base class, persons. In each case
if members of the base class happen to be ill-disposed to items outside the base class then that is
too bad for them: that is (rough) justice.
/
REFERENCES
1. A. Leopold, A Sand Country Almanac with other essays on Conservation. New York (1966).
2. J. Passmore, Ecological Problems and Western Traditions (unpublished).
3. P.W.Barkley and D.W.Seckier, Economic Growth and Environmental Decay. The Solution becomes the
Problem, New York (1972).
4. S. and R.Godlovitch and J. Harris (editors), Animals, Men and Morals. An enquiry into the maltreatment
of non-humans, London (1971).
5. H.L.A.Hart, ‘Are there any natural rights?’, reprinted in A.Quinton (editor), Political Philosophy, Oxford
(1967).
§ 3. A radical change in a teory sometimes forces changes in the meta-theory; e.g. a logic which
rejects the Reference Theory in a thoroughgoing way requires a modification of the usual metatheory which also accepts the Reference Theory and indeed which is tailored to cater only for
logics which do conform. A somewhat similar phenomena seems to occur in the case of a
meta-ethic adequate for an environmental ethic. Quite apart from introducing several environmen
tally important notions, such as conservation, pollution, growth and preservation,for meta-ethical
analysis, an environmental ethic compels re-examination and modified analyses of such
characteristic actions as natural right, ground of right, and of the relations of obligation and permissibility to rights; it may well require re-assessment of traditional analyses of such notions as
XT
value and right, especially where these are based on chauvinist assumptions; and it forces the rejec
tion of many of the more prominent meta-ethical positions. These points are illustrated by a very
brief examination of accounts of natural right and then by a sketch of the species bias of some *
6
major positions.7
A
Hart (in [5]) accepts, subject to defeating conditions which are here irrelevant, the classical
doctrine of natural rights according to which, among other things, ‘any adult human . . . capable of
choice is at liberty to do (i.e. is under no obligation to abstain from) any action which is not one
coercing or restraining or designed to injure other persons’. But this sufficient condition for a
human natural right depends on accepting the very human chauvinist principle an environmental
ethic rejects, since if a person has a natural right he has a right; so too the definition of a natural
right adopted by classical theorists and accepted with minor qualifications by Hart presupposes *
the same defective principle. Accordingly an environmental ethic would have to amend the
classical notion of a natural right, a farzfrom straight forward matter now that human rights with'
respect to animals and the natural environment are, like those with respect to slaves not all that
long ago, undergoing major re-evaluation.
An environmental ethic does not commit one to the view that natural objects such as trees
have rights (though such a view is occasionally held, e.g. by pantheists. But pantheism is false since
artefacts are not alive). For moral prohibitions forbidding certain actions with respect to an object
do not award that object a correlative right. That it would be wrong to mutilate a given tree or
piece of property does not entail that the tree or piece of property has a correlative right not to be
mutilated (without seriously stretching the notion of a right). Environmental views can stick with
mainstream theses according to which rights are coupled with corresponding responsibilities and
so with bearing obligations, and with corresponding interests and concern; i.e., at least, whatever
has a right also has responsibilities and therefore obligations, and whatever has a right has in
terests. Thus although any person may have a right by no means every living thing can
(significantly) have rights, and arguably most sentient objects other than persons cannot have
rights. But persons can relate morally, through obligations, prohibitions and so forth, to practically
anything at all.
H Some of these points are developed by those protesting about human maltreatment of animals; see especially the essays
collected in [4]
/§ 2. As we noticed (an) ethic is ambiguous, as between a specific ethical system, a specific ethic,
and a more generic notion, a super ethic, under which specific ethics cluster.4 An ethical system S
3 If ‘use’ is extended, somewhat illicitly, to include use for preservation, this total use principle is rendered inocuous at least
as regards its actual effects. Note that the total use principle is tied to the resource view of nature
4 A meta-ethic is, as usual, a theory about ethics, super ethics, their features and fundamental notions
is, near enough, a propositional system (i.e. a structured set of propositions) or theory which in
cludes (like individuals of a theory) a set of values and (like postulates of a theory) a set of general
evaluative judgements concerning conduct, typically of what is obligatory, permissible and wrong,
of what are rights, what is valued, and so forth. A general or lawlike proposition of a system is a
principle; and certainly if systems Sj and S2contain different principles, then they are different
systems. It follows that any environmental ethic differs from the important traditional ethics outlin
ed. Moreover if environmental ethics differ from Western ethical systems on some core principle
embedded in Western systems, then these systems differ from the Western super ethic (assuming,
what seems to be so, that it can be uniquely characterised) — in which case if an environmental
ethic is needed then a new ethic is wanted. It suffices then to locate a core principle and to provide
environmental counter examples to it.
It is commonly assumed that there are. what amount to, core principles of Western ethical
systems, principles that will accordingly belong to the super ethic. The fairness principle inscribed
in the Golden Rule provides one example. Directly relevant here, as a good stab at a core principle,
is the commonly formulated liberal principle of the modified dominance position. A recent for
mulation5 runs as follows ( [31, p. 58):
’The liberal philosophy of the Western world holds that one should be able to do what he
wishes, providing (1) that he does not harm others and (2) that he is not likely to harm himself
irreparably.’
Let us call this principle basic (human) chauvinism - because under it humans, or people,
come first and everything else a bad last - though sometimes the principle is hailed as a freedom
principle because it gives permission to perform a wide range of actions (including actions which
mess up the environment and natural things) providing they do not harm others. In fact it tends to
cunningly shift the onus of proof to others. It is worth remarking that harming others in the restric
tion is narrower than a restriction to the (usual) interests of others; it is not enough that it is in my
interests, because I detest you, that you stop breathing; you are free to breathe, for the time being t
anywav, because it does not harm me. There remains a problem however as to exactly what counts
as harm or interference. Moreover the width of the principle is so far obscure because ‘other’ may
be filled out in significantly different ways: it makes a difference to the extent, and privilege, of the
chauvinism whethe^ ‘other’ expands to ‘other human’ - which is too restrictive - or to ‘other’person’ or to ‘other’seritient being’; and it makes a difference to the adequacy of the principle, and in
versely to its economic applicability, to which class of others it is intended to apply, whether to
future as well as to present others, whether to remote future others or only to non-discountable
future others, and whether to possible others. The latter would make the principle completely un
workable, and it is generally assumed that it applies at most to present and future others.
It is taken for granted in designing counter examples to basic chauvinist principles, that a
semantical analysis of permissibility and obligation statements stretches out over ideal situations *
(which may be incomplete or even inconsistent), so that what is permissible holds in some ideal
situation, what is obligatory in every ideal situation, and what is wrong is excluded in every ideal
situation. But the main point to grasp for the counter examples that follow, is that ethical principles
if correct are universal and are assessed over the class of ideal situations.
(i)
The last man example. The last man (or person) surviving the collapse of the world system
lays about him, eliminating, as far as he can, every living thing, animal or plant (but painlessly if
you like, as at the best abattoirs). What he does is quite permissible according to basic chauvinism,
but on environmental grounds what he does is wrong. Moreover one does not have to be commit
ted to esoteric values to regard Mr. Last Man as behaving badly (the reason being perhaps that ra
dical thinking and values have shifted in an environmental direction in advance of corresponding
shifts in the formulation of fundamental evaluative principles).
(ii) The last people example. The last man example can be broadened to the last people example.
We can assume that they know they are the last people, e.g. because they are aware that radiation
effects have blocked any chance of reproduction. One considers the last people in order to rule out
the possibility that what these people do harms or somehow physically interferes with later people.
Otherwise one could as well consider science fiction cases where peonle arrive at a new planet and
5 A related principle is that (modified) free enterprise can operate v. ithin similar limits
destroy its ecosystems, whether with good intentions such as perfecting the planet for their ends
and making it more fruitful or, forgetting the lesser traditions, just for the hell of it.
Let us assume that the last people are very numerous. They humanely exterminate every wild
animal and they eliminate the fish of the seas, they put all arable land under intensive cultivation,
and all remaining forests disappear in favour of quarries or plantations, and so on. They may give
various familiar reasons for this, e.g. they believe it is the way to salvation or to perfection, or they
are simply satisfying reasonable needs, or even that it is needed to keep the last people employed or
occupied so that they do not worry too much about their impending extinctions. On an en
vironmental ethic the last people have behaved badly; they have simplified and largely destroyed
all the natural ecosystems, and with their demise the world will soon be an ugly and largely wreck
ed place. But this conduct may conform with the basic chauvinist principle, and as well with the
principles enjoined by the lesser traditions. Indeed the main point of elaborating this example is
because, as the last man example reveals, basic chauvinism may conflict with stewardship or co
operation principles. The conflict may be removed it seems by conjoining a further proviso to the
basic principle, to the effect (3) that he does not wilfully destroy natural resources. But as the last
people do not destroy resources wilfully, but perhaps “for the best of reasons”, the variant is still
environmentally inadequate.
(iii) The great entrepreneur example. The last man example can be adjusted so as to not fall foul
of clause (3). The last man is an industrialist; he runs a giant complex of automated factories and
farms which he proceeds to extend. He produces automobiles among other things, from renewable
and recyclable resources of course, only he dumps and recycles these shortly after manufacture
and sale to a dummy buyer instead of putting them on the road for a short time as we do. Of
course he has the best of reasons for his activity, e.g. he is increasing gross world product, or he is
improving output to fulfil some plan, and he will be increasing his own and general welfare since he
much prefers increased output and productivity. The entrepreneur’s behaviour is on the Western
ethic quite permissible; indeed his conduct is commonly thought to be quite fine and may even
meet Pareto optimality requirements given prevailing notions of being “better off’.
Just as we can extend the last man example to a class of last people, so we can extend this ex
ample to the Industrial society example: the society looks rather like ours.
(iv) The vanishing species example. Consider the blue whale, a mixed good on the economic pic
ture. The blue whale is on the verge of extinction because of his qualities as a private good, as a
source of valuable oil and meat. The catching and marketing of blue whales does not harm the
whalers; it does not harm or physically interfere with others in any good sense, though it may up
set them and they may be prepared to compensate the whalers if they desist; nor need whale hun
ting be wilful destruction. (Slightly different examples which eliminate the hunting aspect of the
blue whale example are provided by cases where a species is eliminated or threatened through
destruction of its habitat by man’s activity or the activities of animals he has introduced, e.g. many
plains-dwelling Australian marsupials and the Arabian oryx.) The behaviour of the whalers in
eliminating this magnificent species of whale is accordingly quite permissible-at least according to
basic chauvinism. But on an environmental ethic it is not. However the free-market mechanism will
not cease allocating whalep to commercial uses, as a satisfactory environmental economics
would; instead the market model will grind inexorably 6 along the private demand curve until the
blue whale population is no longer viable-if that point has not already been passed.
In sum, the class of permissible actions that rebound on the environment is more narrowly
circumscribed on an environmental ethic than it is in the Western super ethic. But aren’t en
vironmentalists going too far in claiming that these people, those of the examples and respected in
dustrialists, fishermen and farmers are behaving, when engaging in environmentally degrading ac
tivities of the sort described, in a morally impermissible way? No, what these people do is to a
greater or lesser extent evil, and hence in serious cases morally impermissible. For example, insofar
as the killing or forced displacement of primitive peoples who stand in the way of an industrial
development is morally indefensible and impermissible, so also is the slaughter of the last remain
ing blue whales for private profit. But how to reformulate basic chauvinism as a satisfactory
6 For the tragedy-of-the-commons type reasons well explained in [3]
freedom principle is a more difficult matter. A tentative, but none too adequate beginning might be
made by extending (2) to include harm to or interference with others who would be so affected by
the action in question were they placed in the environment and (3) to exclude specieside. It may be
preferable, in view of the way the freedom principle sets the onus of proof, simply to scrap it
altogether, and instead to specify classes of rights and permissible conduct, as in a bill of rights.
CJ\^<.
& ’
§ 1. It is increasingly said that civilization, Western civilization at least, stands in need of a new
ethic (and derivatively of a new economics) setting out people’s relations to the natural environ
ment, in Leopold’s words ‘an ethic dealing with man’s relation to land and to the animals and
plants which grow upon it’ ([1], p. 238). It is not of course that old and prevaling ethics do not deal
with man’s relation to nature: they do, and on the prevailing view man is free to deal with nature as
he pleases, i.e. his relations with nature, insofar at least as they do not affect others, are not subject
to moral censure. Thus assertions such as ‘Crusoe ought not to be mutilating those trees’ are
significant and morally determinate but, inasmuch at least as Crusoe’s actions do not interfere with
others, they are false or do not hold - and trees are not, in a good sense, moral objects.1 It is to
this, to the values and evaluations of the prevailing ethics, that Leopold and others in fact take ex
ception. Leopold regards as subject to moral criticism, as wrong, behaviour that on prevailing
views is morally permissible. But it is not, as Leopold seems to think, that such behaviour is
beyond the scope of the prevailing ethics and that an extension of traditional morality is required
to cover such cases, to fill a moral void. If Leopold is right in his criticism of prevailing conduct
what is required is a change in the ethics, in attitudes, values and evaluations. For as matters stand,
as he himself explains, men do not feel morally ashamed if they interfere with a wilderness, if they
maltreat the land, extract from it whatever it will yield, and then move on; and such conduct is not
taken to interfere with and does not rouse the moral indignation of others. ‘A farmer who clears the
woods off a 75% slope,turns his cows into the clearing, and dumps its rainfall,rocks, andsoil into
the community creek, is still (if otherwise decent) a respected member of society.’ ([1]), p.245)
Under what we shall call an environmental ethic such traditionally permissible conduct would be
accounted morally wrong, and the farmer subject to proper moral criticism.
Let us grant such evaluations for the purpose of the argument. What is not so clear is that a
new ethic is required even for such radical judgements. For one thing it is none too clear what is
going to count as a new ethic, much as it is often unclear whether a new development in physics
counts as a new physics or just as a modification or extension of the old. For, notoriosly, ethics are
not clearly articulated or at all well worked out, so that the application of identity criteria for ethics
may remain obscure.2 Furthermore we tend to cluster a family of ethical systems which do not
differ on core or fundamental principles together as the one ethic; e.g. the Christain ethic, which is
an umbrella notion covering a cluster of differing and even competing systems. In fact then there
are two other possibilities, apart from a new environmental ethic, which might cater for the
evaluations, namely that of an extension of modification of the prevailing ethics or that of the
development of principles that are already encompassed or latent within the prevailing ethic. The
second possibility, that environmental evaluations can be incorporated within (and ecological
problems solved within) the framework of prevailing Western ethics, is open because there isn’t a
1 A view occasionally tempered by the idea that trees house spirits
- To the consternation modoubt of Quineans. But the fact is that we can talk perfectly well about inchoate and fragmentary
systems the identity of which may be indeterminate
205
single ethical system uniquely assumed in Western civilization: on many issues, and especially on
controversial issues such as infanticide, women’s rights and drugs, there are competing sets of prin
ciples. Talk of a new ethic and prevailing ethics tends to suggest a sort of monolithic structure, a
uniformity, that prevailing ethics, and even a single ethic, need not have.
Indeed Passmore (in [2]) has mapped out three important traditions in Western ethical views
concerning man’s relation to nature; a dominant tradition, the despotic position, with man as
despot (or tyrant), and two lesser traditions, the stewardship position, with man as custodian, and
the co-operative position with man as perfector. Nor are these the only traditions; primitivism is
another, and both romanticism and mysticism have influenced Western views.
The dominant Western view is simply inconsistent with an environmental ethic; for according
to it nature is the dominion of man and he is free to deal with it as he pleases (since - at least on the
mainstream Stoic - Augustine view - it exists only for his sake), whereas on an environmental
ethic man is not so free to do as he pleases. But it is not quite so obvious that an environmental
ethic cannot be coupled with one of the lesser traditions. Part of the problem is that the lesser
traditions are by no means adequately characterised anywhere, especially when the religious
backdrop is removed, e.g. who is man steward for and responsible to? However both traditions are
inconsistent with an environmental ethic because they imply policies of complete interference,
whereas on an environmental ethic some worthwhile parts of the earth's surface should be preserv
ed from substantial human interference, whether of the “improving” sort or not. Both traditions
would in fact prefer to see the earth’s land surfaces reshaped along the lines of the tame and com
fortable north-European small farm and village landscape. According to the co-operative position
man's proper role is todevelop, cultivate and perfect nature - all nature eventually - by bringing
out its potentialities, the test of perfection being primarily usefulness for human purposes; while on
the stewardship view man’s role, like that of a farm manager, is to make nature productive by his
efforts though not by means that wiil deliberately degrade its resources. Although these positions
both depart from the dominant position in a way which enables the incorporation of some
evaluations of an environmental ethic, e.g. some of those concerning the irresponsible farmer, they
do not go far enough: for in the present situation of expanding populations confined to finite
natural areas, they will lead to, and enjoin, the perfecting, farming and utilizing of all natural areas.
Indeed these lesser traditions lead to, what a thoroughgoing environmental ethic would reject, a
principle of total use,implying that every natural area should be cultivated or otherwise used3 for
human ends, “humanized”.
As the important Western traditions exclude an environmental ethic, it would appear that
such an ethic, not primitive, mystical or romantic, would be new alright. The matter is not so
straightforward; for the dominant ethic has been substantially qualified by the rider that one is not
always entitled to do as one pleases where this physically interferes with others. Maybe some such
proviso was implicit all along (despite evidence to the contrary), and it was simply assumed that
doing what one pleased with natural items would not affect others (the non-interference assump
tion). Be this as it may, the modified dominant position appears, at least for many thinkers, to have
supplanted the dominant position; and the modified position can undoubtedly go much further
towards an environmental ethic. For example, the farmer’s polluting of a community stream may
be ruled immoral on the grounds that it physically interferes with others who use or would use the
stream. Likewise business enterprises which destroy the natural environment for no satisfactory
returns or which cause pollution deleterious to the health of future humans, can be criticised on the
sort of welfare basis (e.g. that of [3]) that blends with the modified position; and so on. The posi
tion may even serve to restrict the sort of family size one is entitled to have since in a finite situa
tion excessive population levels will interfere with future people. Nontheless neither the modified
dominant position nor its Western variants, obtained by combining it with the lesser traditions, is
adequate as an environmental ethic, as I shall try to show. A new ethic is wanted.
",,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,"Australian National University Office,Australian National University Office > Second Bookcase > Third Shelf > Second Pile,Box 15: Green Projects in Progress",https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/adac1ea1e18dbc6bbd0afb6f54567c38.pdf,Text,"Notes, Correspondences and Marginalia",1,0
83,https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/show/83,"Nuclear Power—Some Ethical and Social Dimensions",,,"Richard Routley^^Val Routley",,"Rowman and Littlefield",1982,"This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, Dr. N.A.J. Taylor.","For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library.",,Manuscript,,"Book Section",,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/aa63c63d0f45fac75f526b06c8424b3c.pdf,Text,"Published Papers",1,0
85,https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/show/85,"Nuclear Power—Some Ethical, Social and Political Dimensions",,,"Richard Routley^^Val Routley",,"Richard Sylvan Papers, UQFL291",1984,"This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, Dr. N.A.J. Taylor.","For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library.",,Manuscript,,Manuscript,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/0b7902d211e4ae23ce6364a79b1fdef4.pdf,Text,"Draft Papers",1,0
86,https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/show/86,"Draft of Nuclear Power—Some Ethical, Social and Political Dimensions",,,"Richard Routley^^Val Routley",,"Richard Sylvan Papers, UQFL291",1984,"This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, Dr. N.A.J. Taylor.","For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library.",,Manuscript,,Manuscript,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/448d8517e9ca68f07df1452eec947883.pdf,Text,"Draft Papers",1,0
87,https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/show/87,"Nuclear energy and obligations to the future",,,"Richard Routley^^Val Routley",,"Prometheus Books. Richard Sylvan Papers, UQFL291.",1981,"This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, Dr. N.A.J. Taylor.","For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library.",,Manuscript,,"Book Section",,,"Inquiry, 21, 133-79
Nuclear Energy and Obligations
to the Future
R. and V. Routley
Plumwood Mountain, Braidwood, Australia
The paper considers the morality of nuclear energy development as it concerns
future people, especially the creation of highly toxic nuclear wastes requiring longterm storage. On the basis of an example with many parallel moral features it is
argued that the imposition of such costs and risks on the future is morally unacceptable. The paper goes on to examine in detail possible ways of escaping this
conclusion, especially the escape route of denying that moral obligations of the
appropriate type apply to future people. The bulk of the paper comprises discussion
of this philosophical issue, including many arguments against assigning obligations
to the future drawn both from analyses of obligation and from features of the future
such as uncertainty and indeterminacy. A further escape through appeal to moral
conflict is also considered, and in particular two conflict arguments, the Poverty
and Lights-going-out arguments are briefly discussed. Both these escape routes are
rejected and it is concluded that if the same standards of behaviour are applied to
the future as to the present, nuclear energy development is morally unacceptable.
I. The Bus Example
Suppose we consider a bus, a bus which we hope is to make a very long
journey. This bus, a third world bus, carries both passengers and freight.
The bus sets down and picks up many different passengers in the course of
its long journey and the drivers change many times, but because of the way
the bus line is managed and the poor service on the route it is nearly always
full to overcrowded, with passengers hanging off the back, and as in
Afghanistan, passengers riding on the roof, and chickens and goats in the
freight compartment.
Early in the bus's journey someone consigns on it, to a far distant
destination, a package containing a highly toxic and explosive gas. This is
packaged in a very thin container, which as the consigner well knows is
unlikely to contain the gas for the full distance for which it is consigned,
and certainly will not do so if the bus should encounter any trouble, for
example if there is a breakdown and the interior of the bus becomes very
hot, if the bus should strike a very large bump or pothole of the sort
commonly found on some of the bad roads it has to traverse, or if some
1
134 R. and V. Routley
passenger should interfere deliberately or inadvertently with the cargo or
perhaps try to steal some of the freight, as also frequently happens. All of
these things, let us suppose, have happened on some of the bus's previous
journeys. If the container should break the resulting disaster would probably kill at least some of the people and animals on the bus, while others
could be maimed or contract serious diseases.
There does not seem much doubt about what most of us would say about
the morality of the consigner's action, and there is certainly no doubt
about what the passengers would say. The consigner's action in putting
the safety of the occupants of the bus at risk is appalling. What could
excuse such an action, what sort of circumstances might justify it, and
what sort of case could the consigner reasonably put up? The consigner
might say that it is by no means certain that the gas will escape; he himself
is an optimist and therefore feels that such unfavourable possible outcomes should be ignored. In any case the bus might have an accident and
the passengers be killed long before the container gets a chance to leak; or
the passengers might change to another bus and leave the lethal parcel
behind.
He might say that it is the responsibility of the passengers and the driver
to ensure that the journey is a smooth one, and that if they fail to do so, the
results are not his fault. He might say that the journey is such a long one
that many of the passengers may have become mere mindless vegetables
or degenerate wretches about whose fate no decent person need concern
himself, or that they might not care about losing their lives or health or
possessions anyway by that time.
Most of these excuses will seem little more than a bad joke, and certainly would not usually be reckoned any sort of justification. The main
argument the consigner of the lethal parcel employs, however, is that his
own pressing needs justify his actions. He has no option but to consign his
potentially lethal parcel, he says, since the firm he owns, and which has
produced the material as a by-product, is in bad financial straits and
cannot afford to produce a better container or to stop the production of the
gas. If the firm goes out of business, the consigner says, his wife will leave
him, and he will lose his family happiness, the comfortable way of life to
which he has become accustomed and sees now as a necessity; his employees will lose their jobs and have to look for others; not only will the
firm's customers be inconvenienced but he, the consigner, will have to
break some business contracts; the inhabitants of the local village through
loss of spending and cancellation of the Multiplier Effect will suffer finan-
Obligations to the Future 135
cial hardship, and, worst of all, the tiny flow of droplets that the poor of the
village might receive (theoretically at any rate) as a result of the trickling
down of these good things would dry up entirely. In short, some basic and
some perhaps uncomfortable changes will be needed in the village.
Even if the consigner's story were accepted at face value - and it would
be wise to look critically at his story - only someone whose moral sensibilities had been paralysed by the disease of galloping economism could see
such a set of considerations, based on 'needs', comfort, and the goal of
local prosperity, as justifying the consigner's action.
One is not generally entitled to thus simply transfer the risks and costs
arising from one's own life onto other uninvolved parties, to get oneself
out of a hole of one's own making by creating harm or risk of harm to
someone else who has had no share in creating the situation. To create
serious risks and costs, especially risks to life or health for such others,
simply to avoid having to make some changes to a comfortable life style, or
even for a somewhat better reason, is usually thought deserving of moral
condemnation, and sometimes considered a crime; for example, the action
of a company in creating risks to the lives or health of its workers or
customers to prevent itself from going bankrupt. What the consigner says
may be an explanation of his behaviour, but it is not a justification.
The problem raised by nuclear waste disposal is by no means a perfect
analogy to the bus case, since, for example, the passengers on the nuclear
bus cannot get off the bus or easily throw out the lethal package. In many
crucial moral respects, however, the nuclear waste storage problem as it
affects future people, the passengers in the bus we are considering, resembles the consignment of the faultily packaged lethal gas. Not only are
rather similar moral principles involved, but a rather similar set of arguments to the lamentable excuses the consigner presents have been seriously put up to justify nuclear development, the difference being that in the
nuclear case these arguments have been widely accepted. There is also
some parallel in the risks involved; there is no known safe way to package
the highly toxic wastes generated by nuclear plants that will be spread
around the world if large-scale nuclear development goes ahead.1 The
wastes problem will not be a slight one, with each one of the more than
2,000 reactors envisaged by the end of the century, producing on average
annual wastes containing one thousand times the radioactivity of the
Hiroshima bomb.2 The wastes include not merely the spent fuels and their
radioactive by-products, but also everything they contaminate, from fuel
containers to the thousands of widely distributed decommissioned nuclear
136 R. and V. Routley
reactors which will have to be abandoned, still in a highly radioactive
condition, after the expiry of their expected lifetimes of about thirty years,
and which have been estimated to require perhaps one and a half million
years to reach safe levels of radioactivity.3 The wastes must be kept
suitably isolated from the environment for their entire active lifetime; for
fission products the required storage period averages a thousand years or
so, and for the actinides (transuranic elements) which include plutonium,
there is a half-million to a million-year storage problem.4
Serious problems have arisen with both short-term and proposed longterm methods of storage, even with the comparatively small quantities of
waste that have been produced over the last twenty years.5 With present
known short-term surface methods of storage there is a continued need for
human intervention to keep the material isolated from the environment,
while with proposed longer-term methods such as storage in salt mines or
granite to the risk of human interference there are added the risks of
leakage, e.g. through water seepage, and of disturbance, for example
through climatic change, earth movements, etc. The risks are significant:
no reasonable person with even a limited acquaintance with the history of
human affairs over the last 3,000 years could be confident of safe storage
by methods involving human intervention over the enormous time periods
involved. No one with even a slight knowledge of the geological and
climatic history of the earth over the last million years, a period which has
seen a number of ice ages and great fluctuations in climate for example,
could be confident that the waste material could be safely stored for the
vast periods of time required. Much of this waste is highly toxic; for
example, even a beachball sized quantity of plutonium appropriately
distributed is enough to give every person on the planet lung cancer - so
that a leak of even a small part of this waste material could involve huge
loss of life, widespread disease and genetic damage, and contamination of
immense areas of land.6
Given the enormous costs which could be involved for the future, it is
plainly grossly inadequ'ate'to merely speculate concerning untested, but
possibly or even probably, safe methods for disposal of wastes. Yet none
of the proposed methods has been properly tested, and they may prove to
involve all sorts of unforeseen difficulties and risks when an attempt is
made to put them into practice on a commercial scale. Only a method that
could provide a rigorous guarantee of safety over the storage period, that
placed safety beyond reasonable doubt, would be acceptable. It is difficult
to see how such rigorous guarantees could be given concerning either the
Obligations to the Future 137
geological or future human factors. But even if an economically viable,
rigorously safe long-term storage method could be devised, there is the
problem of guaranteeing that it would be universally and invariably used.
The assumption that it would be, especially if, as seems likely, such a
method proved expensive economically and politically, seems to presuppose a level of efficiency, perfection, and concern for the future not
previously encountered in human affairs, and certainly not conspicuous in
the nuclear industry.7 Again, unless we assume continuous and faultless
guarding of long-term storage sites through perhaps a million years of
possible future human activity, weapons-grade radioactive material will
be accessible, over much of the million-year storage period, to any party
who is in a position to retrieve it.
Our behaviour in creating this nightmare situation for the future is
certainly no better than that of the consigner in the bus example. Industrialized countries, in order to get out of a mess of their own making essentially the creation of economies dependent on an abundance"" of
non-renewable energy in a situation where it is in fact in limited supply opt for a 'solution' which may enable them to avoid the making of uncomfortable changes during the lifetime of those now living, at the expense of
passing heavy burdens on to the inhabitants of the earth at a future time burdens in the shape of costs and risks which, just as in the bus case, may
adversely affect the life and health of future people and their opportunity
to lead a decent life.8
It is sometimes suggested that analogies like the bus example are defective; that morally they are crucially different from the nuclear case, since
future people, unlike the passengers in the bus, will benefit directly from
nuclear development, which will provide an abundance of energy for the
indefinite future. But this is incorrect. Nuclear fission creates wastes
which may remain toxic for a million years, but even with the breeder
reactor it could be an energy source for perhaps only 150 years. It will do
nothing for the energy problems of the people of the distant future whose
lives could be seriously affected by the wastes. Thus perhaps 30,000
generations of future people could be forced to bear significant risks,
without any corresponding benefits, in order to provide for the extravagant energy use of only five generations.
Nor is the risk of direct harm from the escape or misuse of radioactive
materials the only burden the nuclear solution imposes on the future.
Because the energy provided by nuclear fission is merely a stop-gap, it
seems probable that in due course the same problem, that of making a
138 R. and V. Routley
transition to renewable sources of energy, will have to be faced again by a
future population which will probably, again as a result of our actions, be
very much worse placed to cope with it.9 For they may well have to face
the change to renewable resources in an over-populated world not only
burdened with the legacy of our nuclear wastes, but also in a world in
which, if the nuclear proponents' dream of global industrialization is
realized, more and more of the global population will have become dependent on high energy consumption and associated technology and heavy
resource use, and will have lost or reduced its ability to survive without it.
It will, moreover, probably be a world which is largely depleted of non-renewable resources, and in which such renewable resources as forests and
soils as remain, resources which will have to form a very important part of
the basis of life, are in a run-down condition. Such points tell against the
idea that future people must be, if not direct beneficiaries of nuclear fission
energy, at least indirect beneficiaries.
The 'solution' then is to buy time for contemporary industrial society at
a price which not only creates serious problems for future people but
which reduces their ability to cope with those problems. Just as in the bus
case, contemporary industrial society proposes to get itself out of a hole of
its own making by creating risk of harm, and by transferring costs and
risks, to someone else who has had no part in producing the situation and
who will obtain no clear benefit. It has clear alternatives to this action.
That it does not take them is due essentially to its unwillingness to avoid
changing wasteful patterns of consumption and to its desire to protect the
interests of those who benefit from them.
If we apply to the nuclear situation the same standards of behaviour and
moral principles that we acknowledge (in principle if perhaps often not in
fact) in the contemporary world, it will not be easy to avoid the conclusion
that the situation involves injustice with respect to future people on a
grand scale. It seems to us that there are only two plausible moves that
might enable the avoidance of such a conclusion. First, it might be argued
that the moral principles and obligations which we acknowledge for the
contemporary world and the immediate future do not apply because the
recipients of our nuclear parcel are in the non-immediate future. Secondly,
an attempt might be made to appeal to overriding circumstances; for to
reject the consigner's action in the circumstances outlined is not of course
to say that there are no circumstances in which such an action might
possibly be justifiable, or at least where the case is less clearcut. It is the
same with the nuclear case. Just as in the case of the consigner of the
Obligations to the Future 139
package there is a need to consider what these justifying circumstances
might be, and whether they apply in the present case. We turn now to the
first of these possible escape routes for the proponent of nuclear development, to the philosophical question of our obligations to the future.
II. Obligations to the Distant Future
The area in which these philosophical problems arise is that of the distant
(i.e. non-immediate) future, that is, the future with which people alive
today will make no direct contact; the immediate future provides comparatively few problems for moral theories. The issues involved, although of
far more than academic interest, have not received any great attention in
recent philosophical literature, despite the fact that the question of obligations to future people presents tests which a number of ethical theories fail
to pass, and also raises a number of questions in political philosophy
concerning the adequacy of accepted institutions which leave out of
account the interests of future people.
Moral philosophers have predictably differed on the issue. But contrary
to the picture painted in a recent, widely read, and influential work
discussing it, Passmore's Man's Responsibility for Nature, a good many
philosophers who have explicitly considered the question have come
down in favour of the same consideration being given to the rights and
interests of future people as to those of contemporary or immediately
future people. Other philosophers have tended to fall into three categories
- those who acknowledge obligations to the future but who do not take
them seriously or who assign them less weight, those who deny, or who
are committed by their general moral position to denying, that there are
moral obligations beyond the immediate future, and those like Passmore
and Golding who come down, with admirable philosophical caution, on
both sides of the issue, but with the weight of the argument favouring the
view underlying prevailing economic and political institutions, that there
are no moral obligations to the future beyond those to the next generation.
• According to the most extreme of these positions against moral obligations to the future, our behaviour with respect to the future is morally
unconstrained; there are no moral restrictions on acting or failing to act
deriving from the effect of our actions on future people. Of those philosophers who say, or whose views imply, that we don't have obligations to
the (non-immediate) future, i.e. those who have opted for the uncon-
140 R. and V. Routley
strained position, many have based this view on accounts of moral obligation which are built on relations which presuppose some degree of temporal or spatial contiguity. Thus moral obligation is seen as grounded on or as
presupposing various relations which could not hold between people
widely separated in time (or sometimes in space). For example, obligation
is seen as grounded in relations which are proximate or of short duration
and also non-transitive. Among such suggested bases or grounds of moral
obligation, or requirements for moral obligation, which would rule out
obligations to the non-immediate future are these: First, there are those
accounts which require that someone to whom a moral obligation is held
be able to claim his rights or entitlement. People in the distant future will
not be able to claim rights and entitlements as against us, and of course
they can do nothing to enforce any claims they might have for their rights
against us. Secondly, there are those accounts which base moral obligations on social or legal convention, for example a convention which would
require punishment of offenders or at least some kind of social enforcement. But plainly these and other conventions will not hold invariantly
over change in society and amendment of legal conventions and so will not
be invariant over time. Also future people have no way of enforcing their
interests or punishing offenders, and there could be no guarantee that any
contemporary institution would do it for them.
Both the view that moral obligation requires the context of a moral
community and the view that it is contractually based appear to rule out
the distant future as a field of moral obligation, as they not only require a
commonality, or some sort of common basis, which cannot be guaranteed
in the case of the distant future, but also a possibility of interchange or
reciprocity of action which cannot apply to the future. Where the basis of
moral obligation is seen as mutual exchange, the interests of future people
must be set aside because they cannot change the past and cannot be
parties to any mutual contract. The exclusion of moral obligations to the
distant future also follows from those views which attempt to ground
moral obligations in non-transitive relations of short duration such as
sympathy and love. There are some difficulties also about love and sympathy for (non-existent) people in the far distant future about whose
personal qualities and characteristics one must know very little and who
may well be committed to a life-style for which one has no sympathy. On
the current showing in the case of nuclear energy it would be easy to
conclude that contemporary society lacks both love and sympathy for
future people; and it would appear to follow from this that contemporary
Obligations to the Future 141
people have no obligations to future people and can harm them as it suits
them.
What all these views have in common is a naturalistic picture of obligation as something acquired, either individually or institutionally, something which is conditional on doing something or failing to do something
(e.g. participating in the moral community, contracting), or having some
characteristic one can fail to have (e.g. love, sympathy, empathy).10
Because obligation therefore becomes conditional, features usually
thought to characterize it, such as universality of application and necessitation (i.e. the binding features), are lost, especially where there is a choice
of whether or not to do the thing required to acquire the obligation, and so
of whether to acquire it. The criteria for acquisition suggested are such as
to exclude people in the distant future.
However, the view that there are no moral constraints with respect to
future people, that one is free to act as one likes with respect to them, is a
very difficult one to sustain. Consider the example of a scientific group
which, for no particular reason other than to test a particular piece of
technology, places in orbit a cobalt bomb which is to be set off by a
triggering device designed to go off several hundred years from the time of
its despatch. No presently living person and none of their immediate
descendants would be affected, but the population of the earth in the
distant future would be wiped out as a direct and predictable result of the
action. The unconstrained position clearly implies that this is an acceptable moral enterprise, that whatever else we might legitimately criticize in
the scientists' experiment, perhaps its being unduly expensive or badly
designed, we cannot lodge a moral protest about the damage it will do to
future people. The unconstrained position also endorses as morally acceptable the following sorts of examples: A firm discovers it can make a
handsome profit from mining, processing, and manufacturing a new type
of material which, although it causes no problems for present people or
their immediate descendants, will over a period of hundreds of years
decay into a substance which will cause an enormous epidemic of cancer
among the inhabitants of the earth at that time. According to the unconstrained view the firm is free to act in its own interests, without any
consideration for the harm it does to future people.
Such counterexamples to the unconstrained view might seem childishly
obvious. Yet the unconstrained position concerning the future from which
they follow is far from being a straw man; not only have a number of
philosophers writing on the issue endorsed this position, but it is the clear
142 R. and V. Routley
implication of many currently popular views of the basis of moral obligation, as well as of economic theory. It does not appear, on the other hand,
that those who opt for the unconstrained position have considered such
examples and endorsed them as morally acceptable, despite their being
clearly implied by their position. We suspect that when it is brought out
that the unconstrained position admits such counterexamples, that being
free to act implies, among other things being free to inflict pointless harm,
most of those who opted for the unconstrained position would want to
assert that it was not what they intended. What those who have put
forward the unconstrained position seem to have had in mind in denying
moral obligation is rather that future people can look after themselves, that
we are not responsible for their lives. The view that the future can take
care of itself also seems to assume a future causally independent of the
present. But it is not. It is not as if, in cases such as those discussed above
and the nuclear case, the future is simply being left alone to take care of
itself. Present people are influencing it, and in doing so must acquire many
of the same sorts of moral responsibilities as they do in causally affecting
the present and immediate future. The thesis seems thus to assume an
incorrect model of an independent and unrelated future.
Also, to say that we are not responsible for the lives of future people
does not amount to the same as saying that we are free to do as we like with
respect to them, that there are no moral constraints on our action involving
them. In just the same way, the fact that one does not have, or has not
acquired, an obligation to some stranger with whom one has never been
involved - that one has no responsibility for his life - does not imply that
one is free to do what one likes with respect to him, for example to rob him
or to pursue some course of action of advantage to oneself which could
seriously harm him.
These difficulties for the unconstrained position arise in part from the
failure to make an important distinction between, on the one hand, acquired or assumed obligations towards somebody, for which some act of
acquisition or assumption is required as a qualifying condition, and on the
other hand moral constraints, which require, for example, that one should
not act so as to damage or harm someone, and for which no act of
acquisition is required. There is a considerable difference in the level and
kind of responsibility involved. In the first case one must do something or
be something which one can fail to do or be, e.g. have loves, sympathy, be
contracted. In the second case responsibility arises as a result of being a
causal agent aware of the consequences or probable consequences of his
Obligations to the Future 143
action, and thus does not have to be especially acquired or assumed. Thus
there is no problem about how the latter class, moral constraints, can
apply to the distant future in cases where it may be difficult or impossible
for acquisition or assumption conditions to be satisfied. They apply as a
result of the ability to produce causal effects on the distant future of a
reasonably predictable nature. Thus also moral constraints can apply to
what does not (yet) exist, just as actions can cause results that do not (yet)
exist. While it may be the case that there would need to be an acquired or
assumed obligation in order for it to be claimed that contemporary people
must make special sacrifices of an heroic kind for future people, or even to
help them especially, only moral constraints are needed in order for us to
be constrained from harming them. Thus, to return to the bus example, the
consigner cannot argue in justification of his action that he has never
assumed or acquired responsibility for the passengers, that he does not
know them and therefore has no love or sympathy for them, and that they
are not part of his moral community, in short that he has no special
obligations to help them. All that one needs to argue in respect of both the
bus and the nuclear case is that there are moral constraints against harming, not that there are specially acquired obligations to take responsibility
for the lives of the people involved.
The confusion of moral constraints with acquired obligation, and the
attempt therewith to view all constraints as acquired and to write off
non-acquired constraints, is facilitated through the use of the term 'moral
obligation' in philosophy to indicate any type of deontic constraint, while
in natural language it is used to indicate something which has to be
assumed or acquired. Hence the equation and at least one root of the
unconstrained position, that is of the belief that there are no moral constraints concerning the distant future.
The unconstrained view tends to give way, under the weight of counterexamples, to a more qualified, and sometimes ambivalent position. Passmore's position in [1] is a striking example of the second ambivalent
position. On the one hand Passmore regularly gives the impression of one
championing future people; for example, in the final sentence of [1] he
says, concerning men a century hence:
My sole concern is that we should do nothing which will reduce their
freedom of thought and action, whether by destroying.the natural
world which makes that freedom possible or the social traditions
which permit and encourage it.
144 R. and V. Routley
Earlier (esp. pp. 84-85) Passmore appears to endorse the principle 'that we
ought not to act so as certainly to harm posterity' and claims (p. 98) that,
even where there are uncertainties, 'these uncertainties do not justify
negligence'. Nevertheless, though obligations concerning non-immediate
posterity are thus admitted, the main thrust of Passmore's argument is
entirely different, being in favour of the unconstrained position according
to which we have no obligations to non-immediate posterity. Thus his
conclusion (p. 91):
So whether we approach the problem of obligations to posterity by
way of Bentham and Sidgwick, Rawls or Golding, we are led to
something like the same conclusion: our obligations are to immediate
posterity, we ought to try to improve the world so that we shall be able
to hand it over to our immediate successors in a better condition, and
that is all.11
Passmore's position is, to all appearances, simply inconsistent. There are
two ways one might try to render it consistent, but neither is readily
available to Passmore. The first is by taking advantage of the distinction
between moral constraints and acquired obligations, but a basis for this
distinction is not evident in Passmore's work and indeed the distinction is
antithetical to the analyses of obligation that Passmore tries to synthesize
with his own analysis in terms of loves. The second, sceptical, route to
consistency is by way of the argument that we shall consider shortly, that
there is always gross uncertainty with respect to the distant future, uncertainty which relieves us in practice of any moral constraints regarding the
distant future. But though Passmore's writing strongly suggests this uncertainty argument (especially his sympathetic discussion of the Premier
of Queensland's argument against conservationists [p. 77]), he also rules it
out with the claim that uncertainties do not justify negligence.12
Many of the accounts of moral obligation that give rise to the unconstrained position are fused in Passmore's work, again not entirely consistently, since the different accounts exploited do not give uniform results.
Thus the primary account of obligation is said to be in terms of loves though the account is never satisfactorily formulated or developed - and it
is suggested that because our loves do not extend into the distant future,
neither do our obligations. This sentimental account of obligation will
obviously lead to different results from utilitarian accounts of obligation,
which however Passmore appeals to in his discussion of wilderness. In yet
other places in [1], furthermore, social contract and moral community
Obligations to the Future 145
views are appealed to - see, e.g., the treatment of animals, of preservation, and of duties to nature. In the case of obligations to future people,
however, Passmore does try to sketch an argument - what we call the
convergence argument - that all the accounts lead in the end to the
unconstrained position.
As well as the convergence argument, and various uncertainty arguments to be considered later, Passmore appears to endorse several other
arguments in favour of his theme that there are in practice no obligations to
the distant future. In particular, he suggests that such obligations would in
practice be otiose. Everything that needs to be accounted for can be
encompassed through the chain picture of obligation as linking successive
generations, under which each generation has obligations, based on loves,
only to the succeeding generation. We outline three objections to this
chain account. First, it is inadequate to treat constraints concerning the
future as if they applied only between generations, as if there were no
question of constraints on individuals as opposed to whole generations,
since individuals can create causal effects, e.g. harm, on the future in a
way which may create individual responsibility, and which can't necessarily be sheeted home to an entire generation. Secondly, such chains, since
they are non-transitive, cannot yield direct obligations to the distant
future. But for this very reason the chain picture cannot be adequate, as
examples again show. For the picture is unable to explain several of the
cases that have to be dealt with, e.g. the examples already discussed which
show that we can have a direct effect on the distant future without
affecting the next generation, who may not even be able to influence
matters.13 Thirdly, improvements for immediate successors may be
achieved at the expense of disadvantages to people of the more distant
future. Improving the world for immediate successors is quite compatible
with, and may even in some circumstances be most easily achieved by,
ruining it for less immediate successors. Such cases can hardly be written
off as 'never-never land' examples, since many cases of environmental
exploitation might be seen as of just this type, e.g. not just the nuclear case
but also the exhaustion of non-renewable resources and the long-term
depletion of renewable resources such as soils and forests through overcropping. If then such obvious injustices to future people arising from the
favouring or exclusive concern with immediate successors are to be avoided, obligations to the future will have to be seen as in some way fairly
distributed over time, and not merely as accruing to particular generations
in the way the chain picture suggests.
146 R. and V. Routley
Passmore tries to represent all obligations to the distant future in terms
of heroic self-sacrifice, something which cannot of course be morally
required. But in view of the distinctions between constraints and acquired
obligation and between obligation and supererogation, this is just to misrepresent the position of these obligations. For example, one is no more
engaging in heroic self-sacrifice by not forcing future people into an
unviable life position or by refraining from causing them direct harm, than
one is resorting to heroic self-sacrifice in refraining from beating and
robbing some stranger and leaving him to starve.
Passmore's most sustained argument for the unconstrained position is a
convergence argument, that different analyses of obligations, including
his own, lead to the one conclusion. This style of argument is hardly
convincing when there are well-known accounts of obligation which do
not lead to the intended conclusion, e.g. deontological accounts such as
those of Kant and of modern European schools, and teleological accounts
such as those of Moore (in [8]). But such unfavourable positions are either
rapidly passed over or ignored in Passmore's historical treatment and
narrow selection of historical figures. The style of argument becomes even
less persuasive when it is discovered that the accounts of the main authorities appealed to, Bentham, Sidgwick, and Rawls,14 do not lead, without
serious distortion, to the intended conclusion. Indeed Passmore has twisted the historical and textual evidence to suit his case, as we now try to
indicate.
Consider Bentham first. Passmore's assumption, for which no textual
evidence is cited, ls is that no Benthamite calculation can take account of a
future more extensive than the immediate future (cf. pp. 87-88). The
assumption seems to be based simply on the fact that Bentham remarked
that 'the value of the pleasure or pain to each person to be considered in
any estimate will be greater or less in virtue of the following circumstances'. '3. Its certainty or uncertainty. 4. Its propinquity or remoteness'
([10], p. 16). But this does nothing to show that future persons are discounted: the certainty and propinquity do not concern persons, but the
utilities of the persons concerned. As regards which persons are concerned in any calculation Bentham is quite explicit, detailing how
to take an exact account. . . of the general tendency of any act.. . .5 .
Take an account of the number of persons whose interests appear to
be concerned; and repeat the above process [summation of values of
pleasure and of pain] with respect to each. ([10], p. 16)
Obligations to the Future 147
It follows that Bentham's calculation takes account of everyone (and, in
his larger scheme, every sentient creature) whose interests appear to be
concerned: if the interests of people in the distant future appear to be
concerned - as they are in conservation issues - they are to be included in
the calculation. And there is independent evidence16 that in Bentham's
view the principle of utility was not temporally restricted: 'that is useful
which, taking all times and all persons into consideration, leaves a balance
of happiness' ([10], pp. 17-18, our italics). Thus the future cut-off that
Passmore has attributed to Bentham is contradicted by Bentham's own
account.
The case of Sidgwick is more complex, because there is isolated oscillation in his application of utilitarianism between use of utility and of
(something like) expected utility (see [11], pp. 381,414): Sidgwick's utilitarianism is, in its general characterization, essentially that of Bentham:
the conduct which . . . is objectively right is that which will produce
the greatest amount of happiness on the whole; that is, taking into
account all those whose happiness is affected by the conduct. ([11], p.
411)
All includes all sentient beings, both existing and to exist, as Sidgwick goes
on to explain (p. 414). In particular, in answer to the question 'How far are
we to consider the interests of posterity when they seem to conflict with
those of existing human beings?' Sidgwick writes ([11], p. 414, our italics):
It seems, however, clear that the time at which a man exists cannot
affect the value of his happiness from a universal point of view; and
that the interests of posterity must concern a Utilitarian as much as
those of his contemporaries, except in so far as the effect of his
actions on posterity - and even the existence of human beings to be
affected - must necessarily be more uncertain.
But Passmore manages, first of all, to give a different sense to what
Sidgwick is saying by adjusting the quotation, by omitting the clause we
have italicized, which equalizes the degree of concern for present and
future persons, and by italicizing the whole except-clause, thereby placing
much greater emphasis than Sidgwick does on uncertainty. For according
to Sidgwick's impartiality principle, 'the mere difference in time is not a
148 R. and V. Routley
reasonable ground for having more regard to the consciousness of one
-amount than to that of another' ([11], p. 381; see also p. 124). The apparent
tension in Sidgwick's theory as to whether uncertainty should be taken
into account is readily removed by resort to a modern distinction between
values and expected values (i.e. probability weighted values); utilitarian
rightness is defined as before in terms of the net happiness of all concerned
over all time without mention of uncertainty or probabilities, but it is
distinguished from probable rightness (given present information), in the
utilitarian sense,17 which is defined in terms of the expected net happiness
of those concerned, using present probabilities. It is the latter notion, of
probable rightness, that practical reasoning is commonly concerned with
and that decision theory studies; and it is this that Passmore supposes
Sidgwick is using ([1], p. 84). But it is evident that the utilitarian determination of probable rightness, like that of rightness, will sometimes take
into account the distant future - as Sidgwick's discussion of utilitarian
determination of optimum population (immediately following his remark
on uncertainty) does. So how does Passmore contrive to reverse matters,
to have Sidgwick's position lead to his own unconstrained conclusion?
The answer is: By inserting an additional assumption of his own - which
Sidgwick would certainly have rejected - that the uncertainties entitle us
to ignore the distant future. What Passmore has implicitly assumed in his
claim ([1], p. 85) that 'utilitarian principles [such as Sidgwick's] are not
strong enough' 'to justify the kinds of sacrifice some conservationists now
call upon us to make' is his own thesis that 'The uncertainty of harms we
are hoping to prevent would in general entitle us to ignore them.. .'. From
a decision-theory viewpoint this is simply irrational18 unless the probabilities of damage are approaching zero. We will deal with the essentially
sceptical uncertainty arguments on which Passmore's position depends
shortly: here it is enough to observe that Sidgwick's position does not lead
to anything like that which Passmore attributes to him - without uncertainty assumptions which Sidgwick would have rejected (for he thought
that future people'will certainly have pleasure and suffer pain).
We can also begin to gauge from Passmore's treatment of nineteenthcentury utilitarians, such as Bentham and Sidgwick, the extent of the
distortion which underlies his more general historical case for the unconstrained position which, so he claims,
represents accurately enough what, over the last two centuries, men
have seen as their duty to posterity as a whole. . . . ([1], p. 91)
Obligations to the Future 149
The treatment accorded Rawls in only marginally more satisfactory.
Passmore supposes that Rawls's theory of justice leads directly to the
unconstrained position ([1], p. 87 and p. 91), whereas Rawls claims ([5], p.
293) that we have obligations to future people just as to present ones. But
the situation is more complicated than Rawls's claim would indicate, as we
now try to explain in a summary way (more detail is given in the Appendix). For, in order to justify this claim on his theory (with its present
time-of-entry interpretation), Rawls has to invoke additional and dubious
motivational assumptions; even so the theory which thus results does not
yield the intended conclusion, but a conclusion inconsistent with Rawls's
claim. However, by changing the time-of-entry interpretation to an omnitemporal one, Rawls's claim does result from the theory so amended.
Moreover, the amended theory also yields, by exactly Rawls's argument
for a just saving rate, a resource conservation policy, and also a case
against nuclear development. Accordingly Passmore's other claims regarding Rawls are mistaken, e.g. that the theory cannot justify a policy of
resource conservation. Rawls does not emerge unscathed either. As on
the issue of whether his contract is a necessary condition for obligations,
so on obligations which the contract yields to the distant future, Rawls is
far from consistent. Furthermore, institutions such as qualified market
and voting systems are recommended as just though from a future perspective their results are far from that. Rawls, then, does not take obligations to the future with full seriousness.
In sum, it is not true that the theory of Rawls, any more than the theories
of the historical figures actually discussed by Passmore, unequivocally
supports the unconstrained position.
III. Uncertainty and Indeterminacy Arguments
Although there are grave difficulties for the unconstrained position, qualification leads to a more defensible position. According to the qualified
position we are not entirely unconstrained with respect to the distant
future: there are obligations, but these are not so important as those to the
present, and the interests of distant future people cannot weigh very much
in the scale against those of the present and immediate future. The interests of future people then, except in unusual cases, count for very much
less than the interests of present people. Hence such things as nuclear
development and various exploitative activities which benefit present
150 R. and V. Routley
people should proceed, even if people of the distant future are disadvantaged by them.
The qualified position appears to be widely held and is implicit in most
modern economic theories, where the position of a decrease in weight of
future costs and benefits (and so of future interests) is obtained by application over time of an (opportunity cost) discount rate. The attempt to
apply economics as a moral theory, something that is becoming increasingly common, can lead then to the qualified position. What is objectionable in such an approach is that economics must operate within the bounds
of moral (deontic) constraints, just as in practice it operates within legal
constraints, and cannot determine what those constraints are. There are,
moreover, alternative economic theories and simply to adopt one which
discounts the future is to beg all the questions at issue. The discounting
move often has the same result as the unconstrained position; if, for
instance, we consider the cancer example and consider costs as payable
compensation, it is evident that, over a sufficiently long period of time,
discounting at current prices would lead to the conclusion that there are no
recoverable damages and so, in economic terms, no constraints. In short,
even certain damage to future people could be written off. One way to
achieve the bias against future people is by the application of discount
rates which are set in accord with the current economic horizons of no
more than about fifteen years,19 and application of such rates would
simply beg the question against the interests and rights of future people.
Where there is certain future damage of a morally forbidden type the
whole method of discounting is simply inapplicable, and its use would
violate moral constraints.20
Another argument for the qualified position, which avoids the objections from cases of certain damage, comes from probability considerations.The distant future, it is argued, is much more uncertain than the
present and immediate future, so that probabilities are consequently lower, perhaps even approaching or coinciding with zero for any hypothesis
concerning the distant future.21 But then if we take account of probabilities in the obvious way, by simply multiplying them against costs and
benefits, it is evident that the interests of future people, except in cases
where there is an unusually high degree of certainty, must count for (very
much) less than those of present and neighbouring people where (much)
higher probabilities obtain. So in the case of conflict between the present
and the future where it is a question of weighing certain benefits to the
people of the present and the immediate future against a much lower
Obligations to the Future 151
probability of indeterminate costs to an indeterminate number of distant
future people, the issue would normally be decided in favour of the
present, assuming that anything like similar costs and benefits were involved. But of course it can't be assumed that anything like similarly
weighted costs and benefits are involved in the nuclear case, especially if it
is a question of risking poisoning some of the earth for half a million or so
years, with consequent risk of serious harm to thousands of generations of
future people, in order to obtain quite doubtful or trivial benefits for some
present people, in the shape of the opportunity to continue unnecessarily
high energy use. And even if the costs and benefits were comparable or
evenly weighted, such an argument would be defective, since an analogous argument would show that the consigner's action is acceptable
provided the benefit, e.g. the profit he stood to gain from imposing significant risks on other people, was sufficiently large. Such a cost-benefit
approach to moral and decision problems, with or without the probability
frills, is quite inadequate where different parties are concerned, or for
dealing with cases of conflict of interest or moral problems where deontic
constraints are involved, and commonly yields counterintuitive results.
For example, it would follow on such principles that it is permissible for a
firm to injure, or very likely injure, some innocent party provided the firm
stands to make a sufficiently large gain from it. But the costs and benefits
involved are not transferable in any simple or general way from one party
to another. Transfers of this kind, of costs and benefits involving different
parties, commonly raise moral issues - e.g. is x entitled to benefit himself
by imposing costs ony ? - which are not susceptible to a simple cost-benefit approach of the sort adopted by some proponents of nuclear energy,
who attempt to dismiss the costs to future people with the soothing remark
that any development involves costs as well as benefits. The transfer point
is enough to invalidate the comparison, heavily relied on by McCracken
[16] in building a case for the acceptability of the nuclear risk, between
nuclear risks and those from cigarette smoking. In the latter case those
who supposedly benefit from the activity are also, to an overwhelming
extent* those who bear the serious health costs and risks involved. In
contrast the users and supposed beneficiaries of nuclear energy will be
risking not only, or even primarily, their own lives and health, but also
those of others who may be non-beneficiaries and who may be spatially or
temporally removed, and these risks will not be in any direct way related
to a person's extent of use.
The transfer objection is essentially the same as that to the utilitarian's
152 R. and V. Routley
happiness sums as a way of solving moral conflict between different
parties, and the introduction of probability considerations does not change
the principles involved but merely complicates analyses. One might further object to the probability argument that probabilities involving distant
future situations are not always less than those concerning the immediate
future in the way the argument supposes, and that the outcomes of some
moral problems such as the bus example do not depend on a high level of
probability anyway. In some sorts of cases it is enough, as the bus example
reveals, that a significant risk is created; such cases do not depend critically on high probability assignments.
Uncertainty arguments in various forms are the most common and
important ones used by philosophers and others to argue for the position
that we cannot be expected to take serious account of the effects of our
actions on the distant future. There are two strands to the uncertainty
argument, capable of separation, but frequently entangled. Both arguments are mistaken, the first on a priori grounds, the second on a posteriori grounds. The first argument is a generalized uncertainty argument
which runs as follows: In contrast to the exact information we can obtain
about the present, the information we can obtain about the effects of our
actions on the distant future is unreliable, woolly, and highly speculative.
But we cannot base assessments of how we should act on information of
this kind, especially when accurate information is obtainable about the
present which would indicate different action. Therefore we must regretfully ignore the uncertain effects of our actions on the distant future. More
formally and crudely: One only has obligations to the future if these
obligations are based on reliable information; there is no reliable information at present as regards the distant future; therefore one has no obligations to the distant future.
The first argument is essentially a variation on a sceptical argument in
epistemology concerning our knowledge of the future (formally, replace
'obligations' by 'knowledge' in the crude statement of the argument
above). The main ploy is to considerably overestimate and overstate the
degree of certainty available with respect to the present and immediate
future, and the degree of certainty which is required as the basis for moral
consideration both with respect to the present and with respect to the
future. Associated with this is the attempt to suggest a sharp division as
regards certainty between the present and immediate future on the one
hand and the distant future on the other. We shall not find, we suggest, that
there is any such sharp or simple division between the distant future and
Obligations to the Future 153
the adjacent future and present, at least with respect to those things in the
present which are normally subject to moral constraints. We can and
constantly do act on the basis of such 'unreliable' information as the
sceptic as regards the future conveniently labels 'uncertainty'; for scepticproof certainty is rarely, or never, available with respect to much of the
present and immediate future. In moral situations in the present, action
often takes account of risk and probability, even quite low probabilities. A
good example is again the bus case. We do not need to know for certain
that the container will break and the lethal gas escape. In fact it does not
even have to be probable, in the relevant sense of more probable than not,
in order for us to condemn the consigner's action. It is enough that there is
a significant risk of harm in this sort of case. It does not matter if the
decreased well-being of the consigner is certain and the prospects of the
passengers quite uncertain; the resolution of the problem is still clearly in
favour of the so-called 'speculative' and 'unreliable'. But if we do not
require certainty of action to apply moral constraints in contemporary
affairs, why should we require a much higher standard of certainty in the
future? Why should we require epistemic standards for the future which
the more familiar sphere of moral action concerning the present and
adjacent future does not need to meet? The insistence on certainty as a
necessary condition before moral consideration can be given to the distant
future, then, amounts to an epistemic double standard. But such an
epistemic double standard, proposed in explaining the difference between
the present and the future and to justify ignoring future peoples' interests,
in fact cannot itself provide an explanation of the differences, since it
already presupposes different standards of certainty appropriate to each
class, which difference is in turn in need of justification.
The second uncertainty argument is a practical uncertainty argument,
that whatever our theoretical obligations to the future, we cannot in
practice take the interests of future people into account, because uncertainty about the distant future is so gross that we cannot determine what
the likely consequences of actions upon it will be and therefore, however
good our intentions to the people of the distant future, in practice we have
no choice but to ignore their interests. Uncertainty is gross where certain
incompatible hypotheses are as good as one another and there is no
rational ground for choosing between them. The second uncertainty argument can also be put in this way: If moral principles are, like other
principles, implicational in form, that is of such forms as 'if* has character
h then x is wrong, for every (action) x', then what the argument claims is
154 R. and V. Routley
that we can never obtain the information about future actions which would
enable us to detach the antecedent of the implication. So even if moral
principles theoretically apply to future people, in practice they cannot be
applied to obtain clear conclusions or directions concerning contemporary
action of the 'It is wrong to do x' type.
Many of the assumptions of the second argument have to be conceded.
If the distant future really is so grossly uncertain that in every case it is
impossible to determine in any way that is better than chance what the
effects of present action will be, and whether any given action will help or
hinder future people, then moral principles, although they may apply
theoretically to the future, will not be applicable in practice for obtaining
any clear conclusions about how to act. Hence the distant future will
impose no practical moral constraints on action. However, the argument
is factually incorrect in assuming that the future is always so grossly
uncertain or indeterminate. Admittedly there is often a high degree of
uncertainty concerning the distant future, but as a matter of (contingent)
fact it is not always so gross or sweeping as the argument has to assume.
There are some areas where uncertainty is not so great as to exclude
constraints on action, especially when account is taken of the point,
noticed in connection with the first argument, that complete certainty is
commonly not required for moral constraints and that all that may be
needed in some cases is the creation of""a significant risk. Again there is
considerable uncertainty about many factors which are not highly, or at
all, morally relevant, but this does not extend to many factors which are of
much greater importance to moral issues. For example, we may not have
any idea what the fashions will be in a hundred years in girls' names or
men's footwear, or what brands of ice cream people will be eating if any,
but we do have excellent reason to believe, especially if we consider 3,000
years of history, that what people there are in a hundred years are likely to
have material and psychic needs not entirely unlike our own, that they will
need a healthy biosphere for a good life; that like us they will not be
immune to radiation; that their welfare will not be enhanced by a high
incidence of cancer or genetic defects, by the destruction of resources, or
the elimination from the face of the earth of that wonderful variety of
non-human life which at present makes it such a rich and interesting place.
For this sort of reason, the second uncertainty argument should be rejected. While it is true that there are many areas in which the morally relevant
information needed is uncertain or unavailable, and in which we cannot
therefore determine satisfactorily how to act, there are certainly others in
Obligations to the Future 155
which uncertainty in morally relevant areas is not so great as to preclude
moral constraints on action, where we ascertain if not absolute certainties
at least probabilities of the same sort of order as are considered sufficient
for the application of moral principles in parallel contemporary cases,
especially where spatially remote people are involved. The case of nuclear
waste storage, and of uncertainty of the effects of it on future people,
seems to be of the latter sort. Here there is no gross indeterminacy or
uncertainty; it is simply not true that incompatible hypotheses about what
may happen are as good as each other. It is plain that nuclear waste storage
does impose significant risks of harm on future people, and, as we can see
from the bus example, the significant risk of harm is enough in cases of this
type to make moral constraints applicable.
In terms of the defects of the preceding uncertainty arguments, we can
see the corresponding defects in a number of widely employed uncertainty
arguments used to write off probable harm to future people as outside the
scope of proper consideration. Most of these popular moves employ both
of the uncertainty arguments as suits the case, switching from one to the
other in a way that is again reminiscent of sceptical moves. For example,
we may be told that we cannot really take account of future people because
we cannot be sure that they will exist or that their tastes and wants will not
be completely different from our own, to the point where they will not
suffer from our exhaustion of resources or from the things that would
affect us (cf. Passmore [1]). But this is to insist upon complete certainty of
a sort beyond what is required for the present and immediate future, where
there is also commonly no guarantee that some disaster will not overtake
those we are morally committed to. Again we may be told that there is no
guarantee that future people will be worthy of any efforts on our part,
because they may be morons or forever plugged into enjoyment- or other
machines (Golding [12]). Even if one is prepared to accept the elitist
approach presupposed - according to which only those who meet certain
properly civilized or intellectual standards are eligible for moral consideration - what we are being handed in such arguments as a serious defeating
consideration is again a mere outside possibility - like the sceptic who says
that the solid-looking desk in front of us is perhaps only a facade, not
because he has any particular reason for doing so, but because he hasn't
looked around the back, drilled holes in it, etc. Neither the contemporary
nor the historical situation gives any positive reason for supposing that a
lapse into universal moronity or universal pleasure-machine escapism is a
serious possibility, as opposed to a logical possibility. We can contrast
156 R. and V. Routley
with these mere logical possibilities the very real historically supportable
risks of escape of nuclear waste or decline of a civilization through destruction of its resource base.
The possibilities just considered in these uncertainty arguments of
sceptical character are not real possibilities. Another argument which may
consider a real possibility, but still does not succeed in showing that it is
acceptable to proceed with an action which would appear to be harmful to
future people, is often introduced in the nuclear waste case. This is the
argument that future people may discover a rigorously safe and permanent
storage method for nuclear wastes before they are damaged by escaped
waste material. Let us grant for the sake of the argument that this is a real
possibility (though physical arguments may show that it is not). This still
does not affect the fact that there is a significant risk of serious damage and
that the creation of a significant risk is enough to rule out an action of this
type as morally impermissible. In just the same way, future people may
discover a cure for cancer, and the fact that this appears to be a real and not
merely a logical possibility, does not make the action of the firm in the
example discussed above, of producing a substance likely to cause cancer
in future people, morally admissible. The fact that there was a real possibility of future people avoiding the harm would show that actions of these
sorts were admissible only if what was required for inadmissibility was
certainty of harm or a very high probability of it. In such cases, before such
actions could be considered admissible, what would be required is far
more than a possibility, real or not22 - it is at least the availability of an
applicable, safe, and rigorously tested, not merely speculative, technique
for achieving it, something that future people could reasonably be expected to apply to protect themselves.
The strategy of most of these uncertainty arguments is fairly clear then,
and may be brought out by looking yet again at the bus example, where the
consigner says that he cannot be expected to take account of the effect of
his actions on the passengers because they may find an effective way to
deal with his parcel or some lucky or unlucky accident may occur, e.g. the
bus may break down and they may all change to a different bus leaving the
parcel behind, or the bus may crash, killing all the passengers before the
container gets a chance to leak. These are all possibilities, of course, but
there is no positive reason to believe that they are any more than that, that
is they are not real possibilities. The strategy is to stress such outside
possibilities in order to create the false impression that there is gross
uncertainty about the future, that the real possibility that the container will
Obligations to the Future 157
break should be treated in the same way as these mere logical possibilities,
that uncertainty about the future is so great as to preclude the consigners'
taking account of the passengers' welfare and of the real possibility of
harm from his parcel, and thereby excuse his action. A related strategy is
to stress a real possibility, such as finding a cure for cancer, and thereby
imply that this removes the case for applying moral constraints .This move
implicitly makes the assumptions of the first argument, that certainty, or at
least a very high probability, of harm is required before an action can be
judged morally inadmissible, and the point of stressing the real possibility
of avoidance of damage is to show that this allegedly required high degree
of certainty or probability cannot be attained. That is, the strategy draws
attention to some real uncertainty implying that this is sufficient to defeat
the application of moral constraints. But, as we have seen, this is often not
so.
An argument closely related to the uncertainty arguments is based on
the non-existence and indeterminacy of the future.23 An item is indeterminate in a given respect if its properties in that respect are, as a matter of
logic, not settled (nor are they settlable in a non-arbitrary fashion). The
respects in which future items are indeterminate are well enough known
for a few examples to serve as reminders: all the following are indeterminate: the population of Australia at 2001, its distribution, its age structure,
the preferences of its members for folk music, wilderness, etc., the size
and shape of Wollongong, the average number of rooms in its houses and
in its office blocks, and so on. Philosophical discussion of such indeterminacy is as old as Aristotle's sea battle and as modern as truth-value gaps
and fuzzy logics, and many positions have been adopted on the existence
and determinacy of future items. Nevertheless theories that there are
obligations to the future are not sensitive to the metaphysical position
adopted concerning the existence or non-existence of the future. Any
theory which denied obligations to the future on the metaphysical grounds
that the future did not exist, and did not have properties, so that the
present could not be related to it, would be committed to denying such
obvious facts as that the present could causally influence the future, that
present people could be great-grandparents of purely future people, and so
on, and hence would have to be rejected on independent grounds. This is
not to say that there are not important problems about the existence or
non-existence of future items, problems which are perhaps most straightforwardly handled by a Meinongian position which allows that items
which do not exist may have properties. The non-existence of the future
158 R. and V. Routley
does raise problems for standard theories which buy the Ontological
Assumption (the thesis that what does not exist does not have properties),
especially given the natural (and correct) inclination to say that the future
does not (now) exist; but such theories can adopt various strategies for
coping with these problems (e.g. the adoption of a platonistic position
according to which the future does now exist, or the allowance for certain
sorts of relations between existents at different times), although the satisfactoriness of these strategies is open to question (cf. [4]). Thus whether or
not the Ontological Assumption is assumed and however it is applied, it
will be allowed that future items will have properties even if they do not
have them now, and that is enough to provide the basis for moral concern
about the future. Thus the thesis of obligations to the future does not
presuppose any special metaphysical position on the existence of the
future.
If the non-existence of future items creates no special problems for
obligations to the future, the same is not true of their indeterminacy.
Whether the indeterminacy of future items is seen as a logical feature of
the future which results from the non-existence of purely future items or
whether one adopts a (mistaken) platonistic view of the future as existing
and sees the indeterminacy as an epistemological one resulting from our
inability to know the character of these entities - that is, we cannot
completely know the future .though it exists and has a definite characterwhichever view we take indeterminacy still creates major difficulties for
certain ethical theories and their treatment of the future.
The difficulties arise for theories which appear to require a high level of
determinacy with respect to the number and character of future items, in
particular calculus-type theories such as utilitarianism in its usual forms,
where the calculations are critically dependent on such information as
numbers, totals, and averages, information which so far as the future is
concerned is generally indeterminate. The fact that this numerical information is typically indeterminate means that insofar as head-count utilitarianism requires determinate information on numbers, it is in a similar
position to theories discussed earlier; it may apply theoretically to future
people, but since the calculations cannot be applied to them their interests
will be left out of account. And, in fact, utilitarianism for the most part
does not, and perhaps cannot, take future creatures and their interests
seriously; there is little discussion as to how the difficulties or impossibility of calculations regarding the open future are to be obtained. Non-platonistic utilitarianism is in logical difficulty on this matter, while platonis-
Obligations to the Future 159
tic utilitarianism - which faces a range of other objections - is inapplicable
because of epistemic indeterminacy. We have yet another case of a theory
of the sort that applies theoretically but in practice doesn't take the future
seriously. But far from this showing that future people's interests should
be left out of account, what these considerations show are deficiencies in
these sorts of theories, which require excessive determinacy of information. This kind of information is commonly equally unavailable for the
accepted areas of moral constraint, the present and immediate future; and
the resolution of moral issues is often not heavily dependent on knowledge
of such specific determinate features as numbers or other determinate
features. For example, we do not need to know how many people there
will be on the bus, how intelligent they are, what their preferences are or
how badly they will be injured, in order to reach the conclusion that the
consigner's action in despatching his parcel is a bad one. Furthermore, it is
only the ability of moral considerations to continue to apply in the absence
of determinate information about such things as numbers that makes it
possible to take account of the possible effects of action, as the risks
associated with action - something which is quite essential even for the
present if moral considerations are to apply in the normal and accepted
way. For it is essential in order to apply moral considerations in the
accepted way that we consider alternative worlds, in order to take account
of options, risks, and alternative outcomes; but these alternative or counterfactual worlds are not in so different a position from the future with
respect to determinacy; for example, there is indeterminacy with respect
to the number of people who may be harmed in the bus case or in apossible
nuclear reactor melt-down. These alternative worlds, like the distant
future, are indeterminate in some respects, but not totally indeterminate.
It might still be thought that the indeterminacy of the future, for example
with respect to number and exact character, would at least prevent the
interest of future people being taken into account where there is a conflict
with the present. Since their numbers are indeterminate and their interests
unknown, how can we weigh their competing claims against those of the
present and immediate future where this information is available in a more
or less accurate form? The question is raised particularly by problems of
sharing fixed quantities of resources among present and future people,
when the numbers of the latter are indeterminate. Such problems are
indeed difficult, but they are not resolved by ignoring the claims of the
future, any more than the problems raised by the need to take account in
decision-making of factors difficult to quantify are resolved by ignoring
160 R. and V. Routley
such factors. Nor are such distributional problems as large and representative a class of moral problems concerning the future as the tendency to
focus on them would suggest. It should be conceded then that there will be
cases where the indeterminacy of aspects of the future will make conflicts
very difficult or indeed impossible to resolve - a realistic ethical theory
will not deliver a decision procedure - but there will equally be other
conflict cases where the level of indeterminacy does not hinder resolution
of the issue, e.g. the bus example which is a conflict case of a type. In
particular, there will be many cases which are not solved by weighing
numbers, numbers of interests, or whatever, cases for which one needs to
know only the most general probable characteristics of future people.
Moreover, even where numbers are relevant often only bounds will be
required, exact numerical counts only being required where, for instance,
margins are narrow; e.g. issues may be resolved as in parliament where a
detailed vote (or division) is only required when the issue is close. It is
certainly not necessary then to have complete determinacy to resolve all
cases of conflict.
The question we must ask then is what features of future people could
disqualify them from moral consideration or reduce their claims to it to
below those of present people? The answer is: in principle None. Prima
facie moral principles are universalizable, and lawlike, in that they apply
independently of position in space or in time, for example.24 But universalizability of principles is an outcome of those ethical theories which are
capable of dealing satisfactorily with the present; in other words, a theory
that did not allow properly for the future would be found to have defects as
regards the present, to deal unjustly or unfairly with some present people,
e.g. those remotely located, those outside some select subgroup such as
(white-skinned) humans, etc. The only candidates for characteristics that
would fairly rule out future people are the logical features we have been
looking at, uncertainty and indeterminacy; what we have argued is that it
would be far too sweeping to see these features as affecting the moral
claims of future people in a general way. These special features only affect
certain sorts of cases (e.g. the determination of best probable or practical
course of action given only present information). In particular they do not
affect cases of the sort being considered, the nuclear one, where highly
determinate or certain information about the numbers and characteristics
of the class likely to be harmed or certainty of damage are not required.
To establish obligations to the future a full universalizability principle is
not needed: it is enough to require that the temporal position of a person
Obligations to the Future 161
cannot affect his entitlement to just and fair treatment, to full moral
consideration;25 inversely that it is without basis to discriminate morally
against a person in virtue of his temporal position. As a result of this
universalizability, there is the same obligation to future people as to the
present; and thus there is the same obligation to take account of them and
their interests in what we do, to be careful in our actions, to take account of
the probability (and not just the certainty) of our actions' causing harm or
damage, and to see, other things being equal, that we do not act so as to rob
future people of what is necessary for the chance of a good life. Uncertainty and indeterminacy do not free us of these obligations. If, in a closely
comparable case concerning the present, the creation of a significant risk
is enough to rule out an action as immoral, and there are no independent
grounds for requiring greater certainty of harm in the future case under
consideration, then futurity alone will not provide adequate grounds for
proceeding with the action, thus discriminating against future people.
Accordingly we cannot escape, through appeal to futurity, the conclusion
tentatively reached in our first section, that proposals for nuclear development in the present state of technology for future waste disposal are
immoral.
IV. Overriding Consideration Arguments
In the first part we noticed that the consigner's action could not be justified
by purely economistic arguments, such as that his profits would rise, the
firm or the village would be more prosperous, or by appealing to the fact
that some possibly uncomfortable changes would otherwise be needed.
We also observed that the principle on which this assessment was based,
that one was not usually entitled to create a serious risk to others for these
sorts of reasons, applied more generally and, in particular, applied to the
nuclear case. For this reason the economistic arguments which are thus
most commonly advanced to promote nuclear development - e.g. cheapness, efficiency, profitability for electricity utilities, and the need otherwise for uncomfortable changes such as restructuring of employment,
investment, and consumption-do not even begin to show that the nuclear
alternative is an acceptable one. Even if these economistic assumptions
about benefits to present people were correct (and there is reason to doubt
that most of them are),26 the arguments would fail because economics
must operate within the framework of moral constraints, and not vice
versa.
162 R. and V. Routley
What one does have to consider, however, are moral conflict arguments, that is arguments to the effect that, unless the prima facie unacceptable alternative is taken, some even more unacceptable alternative is
the only possible outcome, and will ensue. For example, in the bus case,
the consigner may argue that his action is justified because unless it is
taken the village will starve. It is by no means clear that even such a
justification as this would be sufficient, especially where the risk to the
passengers is high, as the case seems to become one of transfer of costs
and risks onto others; but such a moral situation would no longer be so
clearcut, and one would perhaps hesitate to condemn any action taken in
such circumstances.
Some of the arguments advanced to show moral conflict are based on
competing duties to present people, and others on competing obligations
to future people, both of which are taken to override the obligations not to
impose on the future significant risk of serious harm. The structure of such
moral conflict arguments is based crucially on the presentation of a genuine and exhaustive set of alternatives (or at least practical alternatives),
and upon showing that the only alternatives to admittedly morally undesirable actions are even more undesirable ones. If some practical alternative which is not morally worse than the action to be justified is overlooked, suppressed, or neglected in the argument-for example, if in the bus
case it turns out that the villagers have another option to starving or to the
sending off of the parcel, namely earning a living in some other way - then
the argument is defective and cannot readily be patched. We want to argue
that suppression of practicable alternatives has occurred in the argument,
designed to show that the alternatives to the nuclear option are even worse
than the option itself, and that there are other factual defects in these
arguments as well. In short, the arguments depend essentially on the
presentation of false dichotomies.
The first argument, the poverty argument, is that there is an overriding
obligation to the poor, both the poor of the third world and the poor of
industrialized countries. Failure to develop nuclear energy, it is often
claimed, would amount to denying them the opportunity to reach the
standard of affluence we currently enjoy and would create unemployment
and poverty in the industrialized nations.
The unemployment and poverty argument does not stand up to examination either for the poor of the industrial countries or for those of the third
world. There is good evidence that large-scale nuclear energy will help to
increase unemployment and poverty in the industrial world, through the
Obligations to the Future 163
diversion of great amounts of available capital into an industry which is not
only an exceptionally poor provider of direct employment, but also helps
to reduce available jobs through encouraging substitution of energy use for
labour use. 27 The argument that nuclear energy is needed for the third
world is even less convincing. Nuclear energy is both politically and
economically inappropriate for the third world, since it requires massive
amounts of capital, requires numbers of imported scientists and engineers,
and creates negligible employment, while politically it increases foreign
dependence, adds to centralized entrenched power and reduces the
chance for change in the oppressive political structures which are a large
part of the problem.28 The fact that nuclear energy is not in the interests of
people of the third world does not, of course, mean that it is not in the
interests of, and wanted by, their rulers, the westernized and often military elites in whose interests the economies of these countries are usually
organized; but it is not paternalistic to examine critically the demands
these ruling elites may make in the name of the poor.
The poverty argument then is a fraud. Nuclear energy will not be used to
help the poor.29 Both for the third world and for the industrialized countries there are well-known energy-conserving alternatives and the practical option of developing other energy sources,30 alternatives which are
morally acceptable and socially preferable to nuclear development, and
which have far better prospects for helping the poor.31
The second major argument advanced to show moral conflict appeals to
a set of supposedly overriding and competing obligations to future people.
We have, it is said, a duty to pass on the immensely valuable things and
institutions which our culture has developed. Unless our high-technological, high-energy industrial society is continued and fostered, our valuable
institutions and traditions will fall into decay or be swept away. The
argument is essentially that without nuclear power, without the continued
level of material wealth it alone is assumed to make possible, the lights of
our civilization will go out.32 .
The lights-going-out argument raises rather sharply questions as to
what is valuable in our society, and of what characteristics are necessary
for a good society. These are questions which deserve much fuller treatment than we can allot them here, but a few brief points should be made.
The argument adopts an extremely uncritical position with respect to
existing high-technology societies, apparently assuming that they are
uniformly and uniquely valuable; it also assumes that technological society is unmodifiable, that it can't be changed in the direction of energy
164 R. and V. Routley
conservation or alternative energy sources without collapse. Such a society has to be accepted and assessed as a whole, and virtually unlimited
supplies of energy are essential to maintain this whole.
These assumptions are hard to accept. The assumption that technological society's energy patterns are unmodifiable is especially so - after all, it
has survived events such as world wars which have required major social
and technological restructuring and consumption modification. If western
society's demands for energy are totally unmodifiable without collapse,
not only would it be committed to a programme of increasing destruction,
but one might ask what use its culture could be to future people who would
very likely, as a consequence of this destruction, lack the resource base
which the argument assumes to be essential in the case of contemporary
society.
There is also difficulty with the assumption of uniform valuableness; but
if this is rejected the question becomes not: what is necessary to maintain
existing high-technological society and its political institutions? but rather: what is necessary to maintain what is valuable in that society and the
political institutions which are needed to maintain those valuable things?
While it may be easy to argue that high energy consumption is necessary to
maintain the political and economic status quo, it is not so easy to argue
that it is essential to maintain what is valuable, and it is what is valuable,
presumably, that we have a duty to pass on to the future.
The evidence, e.g. from history, is that no very high level of material
affluence or energy consumption is needed to maintain what is valuable.
There is good reason in fact to believe that a society with much lower
energy and resource consumption would better foster what is valuable
than our own. But even if a radical change in these directions is independently desirable, as we believe it is, it is not necessary to presuppose such
a change, in the short term at least, in order to see that the assumptions of
the lights-going-out argument are wrong. No enormous reduction of wellbeing is required to consume less energy than at present, and certainly far
less than the large increase over present levels of consumption which is
assumed in the usual economic case for nuclear energy.33 What the nuclear strategy is really designed to do then is not to prevent the lights going
out in western civilization, but to enable the lights to go on burning all the
time - to maintain and even increase the wattage output of the Energy
Extravaganza.
In fact there is good reason to think that, far from the high energy
consumption society fostering what is valuable, it will, especially if energy
Obligations to the Future 165
is obtained by nuclear-fission means, be positively inimical to it. A society
which has become heavily dependent upon an extremely high centralized,
controlled, and garrisoned, capital- and expertise-intensive energy
source, must be one which is highly susceptible to entrenchment of power,
and one in which the forces which control this energy source, whether
capitalist or bureaucratic, can exert enormous power over the political
system and over people's lives, even more than they do at present. Very
persuasive arguments have been advanced by civil liberties groups and
others in a number of countries to suggest that such a society would tend to
become authoritarian, if only as an outcome of its response to the threat
posed by dissident groups in the nuclear situation.34
There are reasons to believe then that with nuclear development what
we would be passing on to future generations would be some of the worst
aspects of our society (e.g. the consumerism, growing concentration of
power, destruction of the natural environment, and latent authoritarianism), while certain valuable aspects would be lost or threatened. Political
freedom is a high price to pay for consumerism and energy extravagance.
Again, as in the case of the poverty arguments, clear alternatives which
do not involve such unacceptable consequences are available. The alternative to the high technology-nuclear option is not a return to the cave, the
loss of all that is valuable, but the development of alternative technologies
and life-styles which offer far greater scope for the maintenance and
further development of what is valuable in our society than the highly
centralized nuclear option.35 The lights-going-out argument, as a moral
conflict argument, accordingly fails, because it also is based on a false
dichotomy. Thus both the escape routes, the appeal to moral conflict and
to the appeal to futurity, are closed.
If then we apply the same standards of morality to the future as we
acknowledge for the present - as we have argued we should - the conclusion that the proposal to develop nuclear energy on a large scale is a crime
against the future is inevitable, since both the escape routes are closed.
There are, of course, also many other grounds for ruling it out as morally
unacceptable, for saying that it-is not only a crime against the distant future
but also a crime against the present and immediate future. These other
grounds for moral concern about nuclear energy, as it affects the present
and immediate future, include problems arising from the possibility of
catastrophic releases of radioactive fuel into the environment or of waste
material following an accident such as reactor melt-down, of unscheduled
discharges of radiation into the environment from a plant fault, of proli-
166 R. and V. Routley
feration of nuclear weapons, and of deliberate release or threat of release
of radioactive materials as a measure of terrorism or of extortion. All these
are important issues, of much moral interest. What we want to claim,
however, is that on the basis of its effects on the future alone, the nuclear
option is morally unacceptable.
Appendix
Passmore's Treatment ofRawls,
and What Really Happens on Rawls's Theory
Passmore takes it that Rawls's theory yields an unconstrained position
but, according to Rawls, the theory leads to quite the opposite result;
namely,
persons in different generations [and not merely neighbouring generations] have duties and obligations to one another just as contemporaries do. The present generation cannot do as it pleases but is bound
by the principles that would be chosen in the original position to
define justice between persons at different moments of time.. . . The
derivation of these duties and obligations may seem at first a somewhat far-fetched application of the central doctrine. Nevertheless
these requirements would be acknowledged in the original position
[where the parties do not know to which generation they belong], and
so the conception of justice as fairness covers these matters without
any change in its basic idea. ([5], p. 293; the second insert is drawn
from p. 287)
Through judicious use of the veil of ignorance and the time of entry of
parties to the original contract position, Rawls's contract theory, unlike
simpler explicit contract theories, can yield definite obligations to distant
future people,36 for example, we ought to save at a just rate for future
people.
But, as Rawls remarks (p. 284), 'the question of justice between generations . . . subjects any ethical theory to severe if not impossible tests'. It is
doubtful that Rawls's theory as formulated passes the tests; for the theory
as formulated does not yield the stated conclusion, but a conclusion
inconsistent with the thesis that there are the same obligations to future
people as to contemporaries. Exactly how these obligations arise from the
initial agreement depends critically on the interpretation of the time of
Obligations to the Future 167
entry of the parties into the agreement. Insofar as Rawls insists upon the
present-time-of-entry interpretation (p. 139), he has to introduce supplementary motivational assumptions in order to (try to) secure the desired
bondings between generations, in particular to ensure that the generation
of the original position saves for any later generation, even their immediate successors ([5], p. 140 and p. 292). Rawls falls back on-what is as we
have seen inadequate to the task, since it does not exclude one generation
damaging another remote generation in a way that bypasses mutually
successive generations - 'ties of sentiment between successive generations' (p. 292): to this limited extent Passmore has a point, for such a social
contract on its own (without additional assumptions about the motives of
the parties to the agreement) does not furnish obligations even to our
immediate successors. This is indicative also of the unsatisfactory instability of Rawls's theory under changes, its sensitivity to the way the original
agreement is set up, to the motivation of parties, their time of entry, what
they can know, etc.
To arrive at a more adequate account of obligations to the distant future
under Rawls's theory, let us adopt, to avoid the additional, dubious and
unsatisfactory, motivational assumptions Rawls invokes, one of the alternative - and non -equivalent - time-of-entry interpretations that Rawls lists
(p. 146), that of persons alive at some time in simultaneous agreement. Let
us call this, following Rawls's notation (on p. 140), interpretation 4b (it is
perhaps unnecessary to assume for 4b any more than 4a that all people
need be involved: it may be enough given the equivalencizing effect of the
veil of ignorance that some are, and as with the particular quantifier it is
quite unnecessary to be specific about numbers). Then of course the
parties, since they are, for all they know, of different generations, will
presumably agree on a just savings rate, and also to other just distribution
principles, simply on the basis of Rawlsian rationality, i.e. advancing their
own interests, without additional motivation assumptions. This more
appealing omnitemporal interpretation of time of entry into the agreement,
which gives a superior account of obligation to the future consistent with
Rawls's claim, Rawls in some places puts down as less than best (p. 292)
but in his most detailed account of the original position simply dismisses
(p. 139):
To conceive of the original position [as a gathering of people living at
different times] would be to stretch fantasy too far; the conception
would cease to be a natural guide to intuition.
168 R. and V. Rout ley
This we question: it would be a better guide to intuition than a position
(like 4a) which brings out intuitively wrong results; it is a more satisfactory
guide, for example, to justice between generations than the present-timeof-entry interpretation, which fails conspicuously to allow for the range of
potential persons (all of whom are supposed to qualify on Rawls's account
for just treatment, cf. § 77). Moreover, it stretches fantasy no further than
science fiction or than some earlier contract accounts.36 But it does
require changes in the way the original position is conceived, and it does
generate metaphysical difficulties for orthodox ontological views (though
not to the same extent for the Meinongian view we prefer); for, to consider
the latter, either time travel is possible or the original hypothetical position
is an impossible situation, with people who live at different times assembled at the same time. The difficulties - of such an impossible meeting help to reveal that what Rawls's theory offers is but a colourful representation of obligations in terms of a contract agreed upon at a meeting.
The metaphysical difficulties do not concern merely possible people,
because all those involved are sometime-actual people; nor are there
really serious difficulties generated by the fact that very many of these
people do not exist, i.e. exist now. The more serious difficulties are either
those of time travel, e.g. that future parties relocated into the present may
be able to interfere with their own history, or, if time travel is ruled out
logically or otherwise, that future parties may be advantaged (or disadvantaged) by their knowledge of history and technology, and that accordingly fairness is lost. As there is considerable freedom in how we choose to
(re)arrange the original position, we shall suppose that time travel is
rejected as a means of entering the original position. For much less than
travel is required; some sort of limited communicational network which
filters out, for example, all historical data (and all cultural or species
dependent material) would suffice; and in any case if time travel were not
excluded essentially the present-time-of-entry interpretation would serve,
though fairness would again be put in doubt. The filtered communicational
hook-up by which the omnitemporal position is engineered still has - if
fairness is to be seen to be built into the decision making - to be combined
with a reinterpreted veil of ignorance, so that parties do not know where
they are located temporally any more than they know who they are
characterwise. This implies, among other things, limitations on the parties' knowledge of factual matters, such as available technology and world
and local history; for otherwise parties could work out their location,
temporal or spatial. For example, if some party knew, as Rawls supposes,
Obligations to the Future 169
the general social facts, then he would presumably be aware of the history
of his time and so of where history ends, that is of the date of his
generation, his time (his present), and so be aware of his temporal location. These are already problems for Rawls's so-called 'present-time-ofentry interpretation' - it is, rather, a variable-time-of-entry interpretation
- given that the parties may be, as Rawls occasionally admits (e.g. p. 287),
of any one generation, not necessarily the present: either they really do
have to be ofthepresent time or they cannot be assumed to know as much
as Rawls supposes.37 There is, however, no reason why the veil of ignorance should not be extended so as to avoid this problem; and virtually any
extension that solves the problem for the variable-time-of-entry interpretation should serve, so it seems, for the omnitemporal one. We shall
assume then that the parties know nothing which discloses their respective
locations (i.e. in effect we write in conditions for universalizability of
principles decided upon). There are still gaps between the assumptions of
the omnitemporal position as roughly sketched and the desired conclusion
concerning obligations to the future, but (the matter is beginning to look
non-trivially provable given not widely implausible assumptions and) the
intuitive arguments are as clear as those in [5], indeed they simply restate
arguments to obligations given by Rawls.
Rawls's theory, under interpretation 4b, admits of nice application to
the problems of just distribution of material resources and of nuclear
power. The just distribution, or rate of usage, of material resources38 over
time is an important conservation issue to which Rawls's theory seems to
apply, just as readily, and in a similar fashion, to that in which it applies to
the issue of a just rate of savings. In fact the argument from the original
position for a just rate of saving - whatever its adequacy - can by simply
mimicked to yield an argument for just distribution of resources over
generations. Thus, for example:
persons in the original position are to ask themselves how much they
would be willing to save [i.e. conserve] at each stage of advance on
the assumption that all other generations are to save at the same rate
[conserve resources to the same extent]. . . . In effect, then, they
must choose a just savings principle [resources distribution principle]
that assigns an appropriate rate of accumulation to [degree of resource conservation at] each level of advance. ([5], p. 287; our
bracketed options give the alternative argument)
170 R. and V. Routley
Just as 'they try to piece together a just savings schedule' (p. 289), so they
can try to piece together a just resource distribution policy. Just as a case
for resource conservation can be made out by appeal to the original
position, since it is going to be against the interests of, to the disadvantage
of, later parties to find themselves in a resource depleted situation (thus,
on Rawlsian assumptions, they will bargain hard for a share of resources),
so, interestingly, a case against a rapid programme of nuclear power
development can be devised. The basis of a case against large-scale
nuclear development is implicit in Rawls's contract theory under interpretation 4b, though naturally the theory is not applied in this sort of way
by Rawls. To state the case in its crude but powerful form: people from
later generations in the original position are bound to take it as against their
interests to simply carry the waste can for energy consumed by an earlier
generation. (We have already argued that they will find no convincing
overriding considerations that make it worth their while to carry the waste
can.) Thus not only has Passmore misrepresented the obligations to the
future that Rawls's theory admits; he is also wrong in suggesting (p. 87 and
p. 91) that Rawls's theory cannot justify a policy of resource conservation
which includes reductions in present consumption.
There is, in this connection, an accumulation of errors in Passmore,
some of which spill over to Rawls, which it is worth trying to set out. First,
Passmore claims ([1], p. 86; cf. also p. 90) that 'Rawls does not so much
mention the saving of natural resources'. In fact the 'husbanding of natural
resources' is very briefly considered ([5], p. 271). It is true, however, that
Rawls does not reveal any of the considerable power that his theory,
properly interpreted, has for natural resource conservation, as implying a
just distribution of natural resources over time. Secondly, Passmore attempts ([1], pp. 87 ff.) to represent the calls of conservationists for a
reduction in present resource usage and for a more just distribution as a
call for heroic self-sacrifices; this is part of his more general attempt to
represent every moral constraint with respect to the non-immediate future
as a matter of self-sacrifice. 'Rawls's theory', Passmore says (on p. 87),
'leaves no room for heroic sacrifice', and so, he infers, leaves no room for
conservation. Not only is the conclusion false, but the premiss also:
Rawls's theory allows for supererogation, as Rawls explains ([5], p. 117).
But resource conservation is, like refraining from nuclear development,
not a question of heroic self-sacrifice; it is in part a question of obligations
or duties to the distant future. And Rawls's theory allows not only for
obligations as well as supererogation, but also for natural duties. Rawls's
Obligations to the Future 171
contract, unlike the contracts of what is usually meant by a 'contract
theory', is by no means exhaustive of the moral sphere:
But even this wider [contract] theory fails to embrace all moral
relationships, since it would seem to include only our relations with
other persons and to leave out of account how we are to conduct
ourselves towards,animals and the rest of nature. I do not contend
that the contract notion offers a way to approach these questions
which are certainly of the first importance; and I shall have to put
them aside, (p. 17)
The important class of obligations beyond the scope of the contract theory
surely generates obligations between persons which even the wider contract theory likewise cannot explain. The upshot is that such a contract
account, even if sufficient for the determination of obligations, is not
necessary. To this extent Rawls' s theory is not a full social contract theory
at all. However, Rawls appears to lose sight of the fact that his contract
theory delivers only a sufficient condition when he claims, for example (p.
298), that 'one feature of the contract doctrine is that it places an upper
bound on how much a generation can be asked to save for the welfare of
later generations'. For greater savings may sometimes be required to meet
obligations beyond those that the contract doctrine delivers. In short,
Rawls appears to have slipped into assuming, inconsistently, that his
contract theory is a necessary condition.
Although Rawls's theory caters for justice between generations and
allows the derivation of important obligations to people in the distant
future, the full theory is far from consistent on these matters and there are
significant respects in which Rawls does not take justice to the future
seriously. The most conspicuous symptoms of this are that justice to the
future is reduced to a special case, justice between generations, and that
the only aspect of justice between generations that Rawls actually considers is a just savings rate; there is, for example, no proper examination of
the just distribution of resources among generations, though these resources, Rawls believes, provide the material base of the just institutions that
he wants to see maintained. In fact Rawls strongly recommends a system
of markets as a just means for the allocation of most goods and services,
recognizing their well-known limitations only in the usual perfunctory
fashion ([5], pp. 270 ff.). Yet market systems are limited by a narrow time
horizon, and are quite ill-equipped to allocate resources in a just fashion
172 R. and V. Rout ley
over a time span of several generations. Similarly Rawls's endorsement of
democratic voting procedures as in many cases a just method of determining procedures depends upon the assumptions that everyone with ah
interest is represented. But given his own assumptions about obligations
to the future and in respect of potential persons this is evidently not the
case. Catering in a just fashion for the interests of future people poses
serious problems for any method of decision that depends upon people
being present to represent their own interests.
Some of the more conservative, indeed reactionary, economic assumptions in Rawls emerge with the assumption that all that is required for
justice between generations is a just savings rate, that all we need to pass
on to the future are the things that guarantee appropriate savings such as
capital, factories, and machines. But the transmission of these things is
quite insufficient for justice to the future, and neither necessary nor
sufficient as a foundation for a good life for future generations. What is
required for justice is the transmission in due measure of what is valuable.
Rawls has, however, taken value accumulation as capital accumulation,
thereby importing one of the grossest economic assumptions, that capital
reflects value. But of course the accumulation of capital may conflict with
the preservation of what is valuable. It is for this sort of reason (and thus,
in essence, because of the introduction of supplementary economistic
theses which are not part of the pure contract theory) that Rawls's theory
is a reactionary one from an environmental point of view; on the theory as
presented (i.e. the contract theory plus all the supplementary assumptions) there is no need to preserve such things as wilderness or natural
beauty. The savings doctrine supposes that everything of value for transmission to the future is negotiable in the market or tradeable; but then
transmission of savings can by no means guarantee that some valuable
things, not properly represented in market systems, are not eliminated or
not passed on, thereby making future people worse off. It becomes evident
in this way, too, how culturally-bound Rawls's idea of ensuring justice to
future generations through savings is. It is not just that the idea does not
apply, without a complete overhaul, to non-industrial societies such as
those of hunter-gatherers; it does not apply to genuinely post-industrial
societies either. Consideration of such alternative societies suggests that
whafis required, in place of capital accumulation, is that we pass on what
is necessary for a good life, that we ensure that the basics are fairly
distributed over time and not eroded, e.g. that in the case of the forest
people that the forest is maintained. The narrowness of Rawls's picture,
Obligations to the Future 173
which makes no due allowance for social or cultural diversity (from the
original contractual position on) or for individual diversity arises in part
from his underlying and especially narrow socio-economic assumption as
to what people want:
What men want is meaningful work in free association with others,
these associations regulating their relations to one another within a
framework of just basic institutions. ([5], p. 290)
This may be what many Harvard men want; but as a statement of what
men want it supplies neither sufficient nor even necessary conditions.39
NOTES
1 Thus according to the Fox Report ([2], p. 110; our italics).
There is at present no generally accepted means by which high level waste can be
permanently isolated from the environment and remain safe for very long periods.
. . . Permanent disposal of high-level solid wastes in stable geological formations is
regarded as the most likely solution, but has yet to be demonstrated as feasible. It is
not certain that such methods and disposal sites will entirely prevent radioactive
releases following disturbances caused by natural processes or human activity.
The Fox Report also quoted approvingly ([2], p. 187; our italics) the conclusion of the
British (Flowers) Report [6]:
There should be no commitment to a large programme of nuclear fission power until
it has been demonstrated beyond reasonable doubt that a method exist s to ensure the
safe containment of long-lived, highly radioactive waste for the indefinite future.
Although the absence of a satisfactory storage method has been conceded by some
leading proponents of nuclear development, e.g. Weinberg ([3], pp. 32-33), it is now
disputed by others. In particular, the headline for Cohen [15], which reads 'A substantial
body of evidence indicates that the high level radioactive wastes generated by U.S.
nuclear power plants can be stored satisfactorily in deep geological formations', has
suggested to many readers - what it was no doubt intended to suggest- that there is really
no problem about the disposal of radioactive wastes after all. Cohen presents, however,
no new hard evidence, no evidence not already available to the British and Australian
Commissions ([2] and [6]). Moreover the evidence Cohen does outline fails conspicuously
to measure up to the standards rightly required by the Flowers and Fox Reports. Does
Cohen offer a commercial-scale procedure for waste disposal which can be demonstrated
as safe? Far from it:
174 R. and V. Routley
The detailed procedures for handling the high-level wastes are not yet definite, but
present indications are that. . . . (Cohen [1], p. 24; our italics)
Does Cohen 'demonstrate beyond reasonable doubt' the long-term safety of burial of
wastes, deep underground? Again, far from it:
On the face of it such an approach appears to be reasonably safe. . . . (p. 24; our
italics)
Cohen has apparently not realized what is required.
At issue here are not so much scientific or empirical issues as questions of methodology, of standards of evidence required for claims of safety, and above all, of values, since
claims of safety, for example, involve implicit evaluations concerning what counts as an
acceptable risk, an admissible cost, etc. In the headline 'a substantial body of evidence
. . . indicates that. . . wastes . . . can be stored satisfactorily' the key words (italicized)
are evaluative or elastic, and the strategy of Cohen's case is to adopt very low standards
for their application. But in view of what is at stake it is hardly acceptable to do this, to
dress up in this way what are essentially optimistic assurances and untested speculations
about storage, which in any case do little to meet the difficulties and uncertainties that
have been widely pointed out as regards precisely the storage proposals Cohen outlines,
namely human or natural interference or disturbance.
2 See [18], pp. 24-25.
3 On all these points, see [14], esp. p. 141. According to the Fox Report ([2], p. 110):
Parts of the reactor structure will be highly radioactive and their disposal could be
very difficult. There is at present no experience of dismantling a full size reactor.
4 See, in particular, The Union of Concerned Scientists, The Nuclear Fuel Cycle, Friends
of the Earth Energy Paper, San Francisco 1973, p. 47; also [3], p. 32 and [14], p. 149.
5 As the discussion in [14], pp. 153-7, explains.
6 Cf. [17], pp. 35-36, [18] and, for much detail, J. R. Goffman and A. R. Tamplin, Poisoned
Power, Rodale Press, Emmau Pa. 1971.
7 On the pollution and waste disposal record of the infant nuclear industry, see [14] and
[17].
The record of many countries on pollution control, where in many cases available
technologies for reducing or removing pollution are not applied because they are considered too expensive or because they adversely affect the interests of some powerful group,
provides clear historical evidence that the problem of nuclear waste disposal would not
end simply with the devising of a 'safe' technology for disposal, even if one could be
devised which provided a sufficient guarantee of safety and was commercially feasible.
The fact that present economic and political arrangements are overwhelmingly weighted
in favour of the interests and concerns of (some) contemporary humans makes it not
unrealistic to expect the long-term nuclear waste disposal, if it involved any significant
cost at all, when public concern about the issue died down, would be seen to conflict with
the interests of contemporary groups, and that these latter interests would in many cases
be favoured. Nor, as the history of movements such as the Campaign for Nuclear
Disarmament shows, could generalized public concern in the absence of direct personal
interest, be relied upon to be sustained for long enough to ensure implementation of costly
or troublesome long-term disposal methods - even in those places where public concern
exists and is a politically significant force.
It must be stressed then that the problem is not merely one of disposal technique.
Historical and other evidence points to the conclusion that many of the most important
risks associated with nuclear waste disposal are not of the kind which might be amenable
Obligations to the Future
175
to technical solutions in the laboratory. A realistic assessment of potential costs to the
future from nuclear development cannot overlook these important non-technical risk
factors.
8 Of course the effect on people is not the only factor which has to be taken into consideration in arriving at a moral judgment. Nuclear radiation, unlike most ethical theories, does
not confine its scope to human life. But since the harm nuclear development is likely to
cause to non-human life can hardly improve its case, it suffices if the case against it can be
made out solely in terms of its effects on human life in the conventional way.
9 Proponents of nuclear power often try to give the impression that future people will not
just bear costs from nuclear development but will also be beneficiaries, because nuclear
powerprovides an 'abundant' or even 'unlimited' source of energy; thus Weinberg ([3], p.
34): 'an all but infinite source of relatively cheap and clean energy'. A good example of an
attempt to create the impression that 'abundant' and 'cheap' energy from nuclear fission
will be available to 'our descendants', i.e. all future people, is found in the last paragraph
of Cohen [15]. Such claims are most misleading, since fission power even with the breeder
reactor has only about the same prospective lifetime as coal-produced electricity (a point
that can be derived using data in A. Parker, 'World Energy Resources: A Survey', Energy
Policy, Vol. 3 [1975], pp. 58-66), and it is quite illegitimate to assume that nuclear fusion,
for which there are still major unsolved problems, will have a viable, clean technology by
the time fission runs out, or, for that matter, that it ever will. Thus while some few
generations of the immediate future may obtain some benefits as well as costs, there is a
very substantial chance that tho se of the more distant future will obtain nothing but costs.
10 These feelings, of which Smith's and Hume's sympathy is representative, are but the
feeling echoes of obligation. At most, sympathy explains the feeling of obligation or lack
of it, and this provides little guide as to whether there is an obligation or not - unless one
interprets moral sympathy, the feeling of having a obligation, or being obligated, itself as
a sufficient indication of obligation, in which case moral sympathy is a non-explanatory
correlate in the feelings department of obligation itself and cannot be truly explanatory of
the ground of it; unless, in short, moral sympathy reduces to an emotive rewrite of moral
obligation.
11 Elsewhere in [1] Passmore is especially exercised that our institutions and intellectual
traditions - presumably only the better ones - should be passed on to posterity, and that
we should strive to make the world a better place, if not eventually an ideal one.
12 This is not the only philosophically important issue in environmental ethics on which
Passmore is inconsistent. Consider his: 'over-arching intention: to consider whether the
solution of ecological problems demands a moral or metaphysical revolution' (p. x),
whether the West needs a new ethic and a new metaphysics. Passmore's answer in [1] is
an emphatic No.
Only insofar as Western moralists have [made various erroneous suggestions] can
the West plausibly be said to need a 'new ethic'. What it needs, for the most part, is
not so much a 'new ethic' as adherence to a perfectly familiar ethic.
For the major sources of our ecological disasters - apart from ignorance - are
greed and shortsightedness, which amount to much the same thing. . . There is no
novelty in the view that greed is evil; no need of a new ethic to tell us as much. (p. 187)
'The view that the West now needs. . . a new concept of nature' is similarly dismissed (p.
186, cf. p. 72). But in his paper [1*] (i.e. 'Attitudes to Nature', Royal Institute of
Philosophy Lectures, Vol. 8, Macmillan, London 1975), which is said to be an attempt to
bring together and to reformulate some of the basic philosophical themes of [1], Passmore's answer is Yes, and quite different themes, inconsistent with those of [1], are
advanced:
176 R. and V. Routley
[T]he general conditions I have laid down . . . have not been satisfied in most of the
traditional philosophies of nature. To that degree it is true, I think, that we do need a
'new metaphysics' which is genuinely not anthropocentric. . . . A 'new metaphysics', if it is not to falsify the facts, will have to be naturalistic, but not reductionist.
The working out of such a metaphysics is, in my judgement, the most important task
which lies ahead of philosophy. ([1*], pp. 260-1)
A new ethic accompanies this new metaphysics.
The emergence of new moral attitudes to nature is bound up, then, with the emergence of a more realistic philosophy of nature. That is the only adequate foundation
for effective ecological concern. ([1*], p. 264)
This is a far cry from the theme of [1] that ecological problems can be solved within the
traditions of the West.
13 Put differently, the causal linkage can bypass intermediate generations, especially given
action at a temporal distance: the chain account implies that there are no moral constraints in initiating such causal linkages. The chain picture accordingly seems to presuppose an unsatisfactory Humean model of causation, demanding contiguity and excluding
action at a distance.
14 Golding we shall concede to Passmore, though even here the case is not clearcut. For
Golding writes towards the end of his article ([12], p. 96):
My discussion, until this point, has proceeded on the view that we have obligations
to future generations. But do we? I am not sure that the question can be answered in
the affirmative with any certainty. I shall conclude this note with a very brief
discussion of some of the difficulties.
All of Passmore's material on Golding is drawn from this latter and, as Golding says,
'speculative' discussion.
15 There is no textual citation for Bentham at all for the chapter of [1] concerned, viz. Ch. 4,
'Conservation'.
16 As Passmore himself at first concedes ([1], p. 84):
If, as Bentham tells us, in deciding how to act men ought to take account of the
effects of their actions on every sentient being, they obviously ought to take account
of the pleasure and pains of the as yet unborn.
17 Neither rightness nor probable lightness in the hedonistic senses correspond to these
notions in the ordinary sense; so at least [13] argues, following much anti-utilitarian
literature.
18 On this irrationality different theories agree: the rational procedure, for example according to the minimax rule for decision-making under uncertainty, is to minimize that
outcome which maximizes harm.
19 Discount, or bank, rates in the economists' sense are usually set to follow the market (cf.
P. A. Samuelson, Economics, 7th ed., McGraw-Hill, New York 1967, p. 351). Thus the
rates have little moral relevance.
20 Cf. Rawls [5], p. 287: 'From a moral point of view there are no grounds for discounting
future well-being on the basis of pure time preference.'
21 What the probabilities would be depends on the theory of probability adopted: a Carnapian theory, e.g., would lead back to the unconstrained position.
Obligations to the Future 177
22 A real possibility is one which there is evidence for believing could eventuate. A real
possibility requires producible evidence for its consideration. The contrast is with mere
logical possibility.
23 Thus, to take a simple special case, economists dismiss distant future people from their
assessments of utility, welfare, etc., on the basis of their non-existence; cf. Ng ('the utility
of a non-existent person is zero') and Harsanyi ('only existing people [not even ""nonexisting potential individuals""] can have real utility levels since they are the only ones
able to enjoy objects with a positive utility, suffer from objects with a negative utility, and
feel indifferent to objects with zero utility') (see Appendix B of Y. K. Ng, 'Preference,
Welfare, and Social Welfare', paper presented at the Colloquium on Preference, Choice
and Value Theory, RSSS, Australian National University, August 1977, pp. 24, 26-27).
Non-existent people have no experiences, no preferences; distant future people do not
exist; therefore distant future people have no utility assignments - so the sorites goes. But
future people at least will have wants, preferences, and so on, and these have to be taken
into account in adequate utility assessments (which should be assessed over afuture time
horizon), no matter how much it may complicate or defeat calculations.
24 There are problems about formulating universalizability satisfactorily, but they hardly
affect the point. The requisite universalizability can in fact be satisfactorily brought out
from the semantical analysis of deontic notions such as obligation, and indeed argued for
on the basis of such an analysis which is universal in form. The lawlikeness requirement,
which can be similarly defended, is essentially that imposed on genuine scientific laws by
logical empiricists (e.g. Carnap and Hempel), that such laws should contain no proper
names or the like, no reference to specific locations or times.
25 Such a principle is explicit both in classical utilitarianism (e.g. Sidgwick [11], p. 414), and
in a range of contract and other theories from Kant and Rousseau toRawls ([5], p. 293).
How the principle is argued for will depend heavily, however, on the underlying theory;
and we do not want to make our use depend heavily on particular ethical theories.
26 See esp. R. Lanoue, NuclearPlants:The MoreTheyBuild, The More You Pay, Centerfor
Study of Responsive Law, Washington DC 1976; also [14], pp. 212 ff.
27 On all these points see R. Grossman and G. Daneker, Guide to Jobs and Energy,
Environmentalists for Full Employment, Washington DC 1977, pp. 1-7, and also the
details supplied in substantiating the interesting case of Commoner [7]. On the absorption
of available capital by the nuclear industry, see as well [18], p. 23. On the employment
issues, see too H. E. Daly in [9], p. 149. A more fundamental challenge to the poverty
argument appears in I. Illich, Energy and Equality, Calder & Boyars, London 1974,
where it is argued that the sort of development nuclear energy represents is exactly the
opposite of what the poor need.
28 For much more detail on the inappropriateness see E. F. Schumacher, Small is Beautiful,
Blond & Briggs, London 1973. As to the capital and other requirements, see [2], p. 48, and
also [7] and [9].
For an illuminating look at the sort of development high-energy technology will tend to
promote in the so-called underdeveloped countries, see the paper of Waiko and other
papers in the Melanesian Environment (ed. by J. H. Winslow), Australian National
University Press, Canberra 1977.
29 This fact is implicitly recognized in [2], p. 56.
30 A useful survey is given in A. Lovins, Energy Strategy: The Road Not Taken, Friends of
the Earth Australia, 1977 (reprinted from Foreign Affairs, October 1976); see also [17],
[6], [7], [14], pp. 233 ff., and Schumacher, op. cit.
31 This is also explained in [2], p. 56.
32 An argument like this is suggested in Passmore [1], Chs. 4 and 7, with respect to the
question of saving resources. In Passmore this argument for the overriding importance
of passing on contemporary culture is underpinned by what appears to be a future-
178 R. and V. Routley
directed ethical version of the Hidden Hand argument of economics - that, by a coincidence which if correct would indeed be fortunate, the best way to take care of the future
(and perhaps even the only way to do so, since do-good intervention is almost certain to
go wrong) is to take proper care of the present and immediate future. The argument has
all the defects of the related Chain Argument discussed above and others.
33 See [14], p. 66, p. 191, and also [7].
34 For such arguments see esp. M. Flood and R. Grove-White, Nuclear Prospects. A
Comment on the Individual, the State and Nuclear Power, Friends of the Earth, Council
for the Protection of Rural England and National Council for Civil Liberties, London
1976.
35 For a recent sketch of one such alternative which is outside the framework of the
conventional option of centralized bureaucratic socialism, see E. Callenbach's novel,
Ecotopia, Banyan Tree Books, Berkeley, California 1975. For the outline of a liberation
socialist alternative see Radical Technology (ed. by G. Boyle and P. Harper), Undercurrents Limited, London 1976, and references therein.
36 Some earlier contract theories also did. Burke's contract (in E. Burke, Reflections on the
Revolution in France, Dent, London 1910, pp. 93-94) 'becomes a partnership not only
between those who are living, but between those who are living, those who are dead and
those who are not yet born'. Thus Burke's contract certainly appears to lead to obligations to distant future generations. Needless to say, there are metaphysical difficulties,
which however Burke never considers, about contracts between parties at widely separated temporal locations.
37 Several of the preceding points we owe to M. W. Jackson.
38 Resources such as soil fertility and petroleum could even be a primary social goods on
Rawls's very hazy general account of these goods ([5], pp. 62, 97): are these 'something a
rational man wants whatever else he wants'? The primary social goods should presumably be those which are necessary for the good and just life -which will however vary with
culture.
39 We have benefited from discussion with Ian Hughes and Frank Muller and useful
comments on the paper from Brian Martin and Derek Browne.
REFERENCES
[1] J. Passmore, Man's Responsibility for Nature, Duckworth, London 1974.
[2] Ranger Uranium Environmental Inquiry First Report, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra 1977.
[3] A. M. Weinberg, 'Social Institutions and Nuclear Energy"", Science, Vol. 177 (July 1972),
pp. 27-34.
•
[4] R. Routley, 'Exploring Meinong's Jungle II. Existence is Existence Now', Notre Dame
Journal of Formal Logic (to appear).
[5] J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass. 1971.
[6] Nuclear Power and the Environment. Sixth Report of the British Royal Commission on
Environmental Pollution, London 1976.
[7] B. Commoner, The Poverty of Power, Knopf, New York 1976.
[8] G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1903.
[9] B. Commoner, H. Boksenbaum and M. Corr (Eds.), Energy and Human Welfare - A
Critical Analysis, Vol. III, Macmillan, New York 1975.
Obligations to the Future 179
[10] J. Bentham, The Works of Jeremy Bentham, Vol. 1, published under the superintendence of J. Bowring, with an intro. by J. H. Burton; William Tait, Edinburgh 1843.
[11] H. Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, Macmillan, London 1962 (reissue).
[12] M. P. Golding, 'Obligations to Future Generations', Monist, Vol. 56 (1972), pp. 85-99.
[13] R. and V. Routley, 'An Expensive Repair Kit for Utilitarianism', presented at the
Colloquium on Preference, Choice and Value Theory, RSSS, Australian National
University, August 1977.
[14] R. Nader and J. Abbotts, The Menace of Atomic Energy, Outback Press, Melbourne
1977.
[15] B. L. Cohen, 'The Disposal of Radioactive Wastes from Fission Reactors', Scientific
American, Vol. 236 (June 1977), pp. 22-31.
[16] S. McCracken, 'The Waragainst the Atom' .Commentary (September 1977), pp. 33-47.
[17] A. B. Lovins and J. H. Price, Non-Nuclear Futures: The Case for an Ethical Energy
Strategy, Friends of the Earth International, San Francisco 1975.
[18] A. Roberts, ""The Politics of Nuclear Power', Arena, No. 41 (1976), pp. 22-47.
",,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/f6c3d304b2d018293fdb7af1b751feb9.pdf,Text,"Published Papers",1,0
88,https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/show/88,"Nuclear waste, obligations to the future, and social choice",,,"Richard Routley^^Val Routley",,"Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy",c.1979,"This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, Dr. N.A.J. Taylor.","For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library.",,Manuscript,,Manuscript,,,"Inquiry, 21, 133-79
Nuclear Energy and Obligations
to the Future
R. and V. Routley
Plumwood Mountain, Braidwood, Australia
The paper considers the morality of nuclear energy development as it concerns
future people, especially the creation of highly toxic nuclear wastes requiring longterm storage. On the basis of an example with many parallel moral features it is
argued that the imposition of such costs and risks on the future is morally unacceptable. The paper goes on to examine in detail possible ways of escaping this
conclusion, especially the escape route of denying that moral obligations of the
appropriate type apply to future people. The bulk of the paper comprises discussion
of this philosophical issue, including many arguments against assigning obligations
to the future drawn both from analyses of obligation and from features of the future
such as uncertainty and indeterminacy. A further escape through appeal to moral
conflict is also considered, and in particular two conflict arguments, the Poverty
and Lights-going-out arguments are briefly discussed. Both these escape routes are
rejected and it is concluded that if the same standards of behaviour are applied to
the future as to the present, nuclear energy development is morally unacceptable.
I. The Bus Example
Suppose we consider a bus, a bus which we hope is to make a very long
journey. This bus, a third world bus, carries both passengers and freight.
The bus sets down and picks up many different passengers in the course of
its long journey and the drivers change many times, but because of the way
the bus line is managed and the poor service on the route it is nearly always
full to overcrowded, with passengers hanging off the back, and as in
Afghanistan, passengers riding on the roof, and chickens and goats in the
freight compartment.
Early in the bus's journey someone consigns on it, to a far distant
destination, a package containing a highly toxic and explosive gas. This is
packaged in a very thin container, which as the consigner well knows is
unlikely to contain the gas for the full distance for which it is consigned,
and certainly will not do so if the bus should encounter any trouble, for
example if there is a breakdown and the interior of the bus becomes very
hot, if the bus should strike a very large bump or pothole of the sort
commonly found on some of the bad roads it has to traverse, or if some
1
134 R. and V. Routley
passenger should interfere deliberately or inadvertently with the cargo or
perhaps try to steal some of the freight, as also frequently happens. All of
these things, let us suppose, have happened on some of the bus's previous
journeys. If the container should break the resulting disaster would probably kill at least some of the people and animals on the bus, while others
could be maimed or contract serious diseases.
There does not seem much doubt about what most of us would say about
the morality of the consigner's action, and there is certainly no doubt
about what the passengers would say. The consigner's action in putting
the safety of the occupants of the bus at risk is appalling. What could
excuse such an action, what sort of circumstances might justify it, and
what sort of case could the consigner reasonably put up? The consigner
might say that it is by no means certain that the gas will escape; he himself
is an optimist and therefore feels that such unfavourable possible outcomes should be ignored. In any case the bus might have an accident and
the passengers be killed long before the container gets a chance to leak; or
the passengers might change to another bus and leave the lethal parcel
behind.
He might say that it is the responsibility of the passengers and the driver
to ensure that the journey is a smooth one, and that if they fail to do so, the
results are not his fault. He might say that the journey is such a long one
that many of the passengers may have become mere mindless vegetables
or degenerate wretches about whose fate no decent person need concern
himself, or that they might not care about losing their lives or health or
possessions anyway by that time.
Most of these excuses will seem little more than a bad joke, and certainly would not usually be reckoned any sort of justification. The main
argument the consigner of the lethal parcel employs, however, is that his
own pressing needs justify his actions. He has no option but to consign his
potentially lethal parcel, he says, since the firm he owns, and which has
produced the material as a by-product, is in bad financial straits and
cannot afford to produce a better container or to stop the production of the
gas. If the firm goes out of business, the consigner says, his wife will leave
him, and he will lose his family happiness, the comfortable way of life to
which he has become accustomed and sees now as a necessity; his employees will lose their jobs and have to look for others; not only will the
firm's customers be inconvenienced but he, the consigner, will have to
break some business contracts; the inhabitants of the local village through
loss of spending and cancellation of the Multiplier Effect will suffer finan-
Obligations to the Future 135
cial hardship, and, worst of all, the tiny flow of droplets that the poor of the
village might receive (theoretically at any rate) as a result of the trickling
down of these good things would dry up entirely. In short, some basic and
some perhaps uncomfortable changes will be needed in the village.
Even if the consigner's story were accepted at face value - and it would
be wise to look critically at his story - only someone whose moral sensibilities had been paralysed by the disease of galloping economism could see
such a set of considerations, based on 'needs', comfort, and the goal of
local prosperity, as justifying the consigner's action.
One is not generally entitled to thus simply transfer the risks and costs
arising from one's own life onto other uninvolved parties, to get oneself
out of a hole of one's own making by creating harm or risk of harm to
someone else who has had no share in creating the situation. To create
serious risks and costs, especially risks to life or health for such others,
simply to avoid having to make some changes to a comfortable life style, or
even for a somewhat better reason, is usually thought deserving of moral
condemnation, and sometimes considered a crime; for example, the action
of a company in creating risks to the lives or health of its workers or
customers to prevent itself from going bankrupt. What the consigner says
may be an explanation of his behaviour, but it is not a justification.
The problem raised by nuclear waste disposal is by no means a perfect
analogy to the bus case, since, for example, the passengers on the nuclear
bus cannot get off the bus or easily throw out the lethal package. In many
crucial moral respects, however, the nuclear waste storage problem as it
affects future people, the passengers in the bus we are considering, resembles the consignment of the faultily packaged lethal gas. Not only are
rather similar moral principles involved, but a rather similar set of arguments to the lamentable excuses the consigner presents have been seriously put up to justify nuclear development, the difference being that in the
nuclear case these arguments have been widely accepted. There is also
some parallel in the risks involved; there is no known safe way to package
the highly toxic wastes generated by nuclear plants that will be spread
around the world if large-scale nuclear development goes ahead.1 The
wastes problem will not be a slight one, with each one of the more than
2,000 reactors envisaged by the end of the century, producing on average
annual wastes containing one thousand times the radioactivity of the
Hiroshima bomb.2 The wastes include not merely the spent fuels and their
radioactive by-products, but also everything they contaminate, from fuel
containers to the thousands of widely distributed decommissioned nuclear
136 R. and V. Routley
reactors which will have to be abandoned, still in a highly radioactive
condition, after the expiry of their expected lifetimes of about thirty years,
and which have been estimated to require perhaps one and a half million
years to reach safe levels of radioactivity.3 The wastes must be kept
suitably isolated from the environment for their entire active lifetime; for
fission products the required storage period averages a thousand years or
so, and for the actinides (transuranic elements) which include plutonium,
there is a half-million to a million-year storage problem.4
Serious problems have arisen with both short-term and proposed longterm methods of storage, even with the comparatively small quantities of
waste that have been produced over the last twenty years.5 With present
known short-term surface methods of storage there is a continued need for
human intervention to keep the material isolated from the environment,
while with proposed longer-term methods such as storage in salt mines or
granite to the risk of human interference there are added the risks of
leakage, e.g. through water seepage, and of disturbance, for example
through climatic change, earth movements, etc. The risks are significant:
no reasonable person with even a limited acquaintance with the history of
human affairs over the last 3,000 years could be confident of safe storage
by methods involving human intervention over the enormous time periods
involved. No one with even a slight knowledge of the geological and
climatic history of the earth over the last million years, a period which has
seen a number of ice ages and great fluctuations in climate for example,
could be confident that the waste material could be safely stored for the
vast periods of time required. Much of this waste is highly toxic; for
example, even a beachball sized quantity of plutonium appropriately
distributed is enough to give every person on the planet lung cancer - so
that a leak of even a small part of this waste material could involve huge
loss of life, widespread disease and genetic damage, and contamination of
immense areas of land.6
Given the enormous costs which could be involved for the future, it is
plainly grossly inadequ'ate'to merely speculate concerning untested, but
possibly or even probably, safe methods for disposal of wastes. Yet none
of the proposed methods has been properly tested, and they may prove to
involve all sorts of unforeseen difficulties and risks when an attempt is
made to put them into practice on a commercial scale. Only a method that
could provide a rigorous guarantee of safety over the storage period, that
placed safety beyond reasonable doubt, would be acceptable. It is difficult
to see how such rigorous guarantees could be given concerning either the
Obligations to the Future 137
geological or future human factors. But even if an economically viable,
rigorously safe long-term storage method could be devised, there is the
problem of guaranteeing that it would be universally and invariably used.
The assumption that it would be, especially if, as seems likely, such a
method proved expensive economically and politically, seems to presuppose a level of efficiency, perfection, and concern for the future not
previously encountered in human affairs, and certainly not conspicuous in
the nuclear industry.7 Again, unless we assume continuous and faultless
guarding of long-term storage sites through perhaps a million years of
possible future human activity, weapons-grade radioactive material will
be accessible, over much of the million-year storage period, to any party
who is in a position to retrieve it.
Our behaviour in creating this nightmare situation for the future is
certainly no better than that of the consigner in the bus example. Industrialized countries, in order to get out of a mess of their own making essentially the creation of economies dependent on an abundance"" of
non-renewable energy in a situation where it is in fact in limited supply opt for a 'solution' which may enable them to avoid the making of uncomfortable changes during the lifetime of those now living, at the expense of
passing heavy burdens on to the inhabitants of the earth at a future time burdens in the shape of costs and risks which, just as in the bus case, may
adversely affect the life and health of future people and their opportunity
to lead a decent life.8
It is sometimes suggested that analogies like the bus example are defective; that morally they are crucially different from the nuclear case, since
future people, unlike the passengers in the bus, will benefit directly from
nuclear development, which will provide an abundance of energy for the
indefinite future. But this is incorrect. Nuclear fission creates wastes
which may remain toxic for a million years, but even with the breeder
reactor it could be an energy source for perhaps only 150 years. It will do
nothing for the energy problems of the people of the distant future whose
lives could be seriously affected by the wastes. Thus perhaps 30,000
generations of future people could be forced to bear significant risks,
without any corresponding benefits, in order to provide for the extravagant energy use of only five generations.
Nor is the risk of direct harm from the escape or misuse of radioactive
materials the only burden the nuclear solution imposes on the future.
Because the energy provided by nuclear fission is merely a stop-gap, it
seems probable that in due course the same problem, that of making a
138 R. and V. Routley
transition to renewable sources of energy, will have to be faced again by a
future population which will probably, again as a result of our actions, be
very much worse placed to cope with it.9 For they may well have to face
the change to renewable resources in an over-populated world not only
burdened with the legacy of our nuclear wastes, but also in a world in
which, if the nuclear proponents' dream of global industrialization is
realized, more and more of the global population will have become dependent on high energy consumption and associated technology and heavy
resource use, and will have lost or reduced its ability to survive without it.
It will, moreover, probably be a world which is largely depleted of non-renewable resources, and in which such renewable resources as forests and
soils as remain, resources which will have to form a very important part of
the basis of life, are in a run-down condition. Such points tell against the
idea that future people must be, if not direct beneficiaries of nuclear fission
energy, at least indirect beneficiaries.
The 'solution' then is to buy time for contemporary industrial society at
a price which not only creates serious problems for future people but
which reduces their ability to cope with those problems. Just as in the bus
case, contemporary industrial society proposes to get itself out of a hole of
its own making by creating risk of harm, and by transferring costs and
risks, to someone else who has had no part in producing the situation and
who will obtain no clear benefit. It has clear alternatives to this action.
That it does not take them is due essentially to its unwillingness to avoid
changing wasteful patterns of consumption and to its desire to protect the
interests of those who benefit from them.
If we apply to the nuclear situation the same standards of behaviour and
moral principles that we acknowledge (in principle if perhaps often not in
fact) in the contemporary world, it will not be easy to avoid the conclusion
that the situation involves injustice with respect to future people on a
grand scale. It seems to us that there are only two plausible moves that
might enable the avoidance of such a conclusion. First, it might be argued
that the moral principles and obligations which we acknowledge for the
contemporary world and the immediate future do not apply because the
recipients of our nuclear parcel are in the non-immediate future. Secondly,
an attempt might be made to appeal to overriding circumstances; for to
reject the consigner's action in the circumstances outlined is not of course
to say that there are no circumstances in which such an action might
possibly be justifiable, or at least where the case is less clearcut. It is the
same with the nuclear case. Just as in the case of the consigner of the
Obligations to the Future 139
package there is a need to consider what these justifying circumstances
might be, and whether they apply in the present case. We turn now to the
first of these possible escape routes for the proponent of nuclear development, to the philosophical question of our obligations to the future.
II. Obligations to the Distant Future
The area in which these philosophical problems arise is that of the distant
(i.e. non-immediate) future, that is, the future with which people alive
today will make no direct contact; the immediate future provides comparatively few problems for moral theories. The issues involved, although of
far more than academic interest, have not received any great attention in
recent philosophical literature, despite the fact that the question of obligations to future people presents tests which a number of ethical theories fail
to pass, and also raises a number of questions in political philosophy
concerning the adequacy of accepted institutions which leave out of
account the interests of future people.
Moral philosophers have predictably differed on the issue. But contrary
to the picture painted in a recent, widely read, and influential work
discussing it, Passmore's Man's Responsibility for Nature, a good many
philosophers who have explicitly considered the question have come
down in favour of the same consideration being given to the rights and
interests of future people as to those of contemporary or immediately
future people. Other philosophers have tended to fall into three categories
- those who acknowledge obligations to the future but who do not take
them seriously or who assign them less weight, those who deny, or who
are committed by their general moral position to denying, that there are
moral obligations beyond the immediate future, and those like Passmore
and Golding who come down, with admirable philosophical caution, on
both sides of the issue, but with the weight of the argument favouring the
view underlying prevailing economic and political institutions, that there
are no moral obligations to the future beyond those to the next generation.
• According to the most extreme of these positions against moral obligations to the future, our behaviour with respect to the future is morally
unconstrained; there are no moral restrictions on acting or failing to act
deriving from the effect of our actions on future people. Of those philosophers who say, or whose views imply, that we don't have obligations to
the (non-immediate) future, i.e. those who have opted for the uncon-
140 R. and V. Routley
strained position, many have based this view on accounts of moral obligation which are built on relations which presuppose some degree of temporal or spatial contiguity. Thus moral obligation is seen as grounded on or as
presupposing various relations which could not hold between people
widely separated in time (or sometimes in space). For example, obligation
is seen as grounded in relations which are proximate or of short duration
and also non-transitive. Among such suggested bases or grounds of moral
obligation, or requirements for moral obligation, which would rule out
obligations to the non-immediate future are these: First, there are those
accounts which require that someone to whom a moral obligation is held
be able to claim his rights or entitlement. People in the distant future will
not be able to claim rights and entitlements as against us, and of course
they can do nothing to enforce any claims they might have for their rights
against us. Secondly, there are those accounts which base moral obligations on social or legal convention, for example a convention which would
require punishment of offenders or at least some kind of social enforcement. But plainly these and other conventions will not hold invariantly
over change in society and amendment of legal conventions and so will not
be invariant over time. Also future people have no way of enforcing their
interests or punishing offenders, and there could be no guarantee that any
contemporary institution would do it for them.
Both the view that moral obligation requires the context of a moral
community and the view that it is contractually based appear to rule out
the distant future as a field of moral obligation, as they not only require a
commonality, or some sort of common basis, which cannot be guaranteed
in the case of the distant future, but also a possibility of interchange or
reciprocity of action which cannot apply to the future. Where the basis of
moral obligation is seen as mutual exchange, the interests of future people
must be set aside because they cannot change the past and cannot be
parties to any mutual contract. The exclusion of moral obligations to the
distant future also follows from those views which attempt to ground
moral obligations in non-transitive relations of short duration such as
sympathy and love. There are some difficulties also about love and sympathy for (non-existent) people in the far distant future about whose
personal qualities and characteristics one must know very little and who
may well be committed to a life-style for which one has no sympathy. On
the current showing in the case of nuclear energy it would be easy to
conclude that contemporary society lacks both love and sympathy for
future people; and it would appear to follow from this that contemporary
Obligations to the Future 141
people have no obligations to future people and can harm them as it suits
them.
What all these views have in common is a naturalistic picture of obligation as something acquired, either individually or institutionally, something which is conditional on doing something or failing to do something
(e.g. participating in the moral community, contracting), or having some
characteristic one can fail to have (e.g. love, sympathy, empathy).10
Because obligation therefore becomes conditional, features usually
thought to characterize it, such as universality of application and necessitation (i.e. the binding features), are lost, especially where there is a choice
of whether or not to do the thing required to acquire the obligation, and so
of whether to acquire it. The criteria for acquisition suggested are such as
to exclude people in the distant future.
However, the view that there are no moral constraints with respect to
future people, that one is free to act as one likes with respect to them, is a
very difficult one to sustain. Consider the example of a scientific group
which, for no particular reason other than to test a particular piece of
technology, places in orbit a cobalt bomb which is to be set off by a
triggering device designed to go off several hundred years from the time of
its despatch. No presently living person and none of their immediate
descendants would be affected, but the population of the earth in the
distant future would be wiped out as a direct and predictable result of the
action. The unconstrained position clearly implies that this is an acceptable moral enterprise, that whatever else we might legitimately criticize in
the scientists' experiment, perhaps its being unduly expensive or badly
designed, we cannot lodge a moral protest about the damage it will do to
future people. The unconstrained position also endorses as morally acceptable the following sorts of examples: A firm discovers it can make a
handsome profit from mining, processing, and manufacturing a new type
of material which, although it causes no problems for present people or
their immediate descendants, will over a period of hundreds of years
decay into a substance which will cause an enormous epidemic of cancer
among the inhabitants of the earth at that time. According to the unconstrained view the firm is free to act in its own interests, without any
consideration for the harm it does to future people.
Such counterexamples to the unconstrained view might seem childishly
obvious. Yet the unconstrained position concerning the future from which
they follow is far from being a straw man; not only have a number of
philosophers writing on the issue endorsed this position, but it is the clear
142 R. and V. Routley
implication of many currently popular views of the basis of moral obligation, as well as of economic theory. It does not appear, on the other hand,
that those who opt for the unconstrained position have considered such
examples and endorsed them as morally acceptable, despite their being
clearly implied by their position. We suspect that when it is brought out
that the unconstrained position admits such counterexamples, that being
free to act implies, among other things being free to inflict pointless harm,
most of those who opted for the unconstrained position would want to
assert that it was not what they intended. What those who have put
forward the unconstrained position seem to have had in mind in denying
moral obligation is rather that future people can look after themselves, that
we are not responsible for their lives. The view that the future can take
care of itself also seems to assume a future causally independent of the
present. But it is not. It is not as if, in cases such as those discussed above
and the nuclear case, the future is simply being left alone to take care of
itself. Present people are influencing it, and in doing so must acquire many
of the same sorts of moral responsibilities as they do in causally affecting
the present and immediate future. The thesis seems thus to assume an
incorrect model of an independent and unrelated future.
Also, to say that we are not responsible for the lives of future people
does not amount to the same as saying that we are free to do as we like with
respect to them, that there are no moral constraints on our action involving
them. In just the same way, the fact that one does not have, or has not
acquired, an obligation to some stranger with whom one has never been
involved - that one has no responsibility for his life - does not imply that
one is free to do what one likes with respect to him, for example to rob him
or to pursue some course of action of advantage to oneself which could
seriously harm him.
These difficulties for the unconstrained position arise in part from the
failure to make an important distinction between, on the one hand, acquired or assumed obligations towards somebody, for which some act of
acquisition or assumption is required as a qualifying condition, and on the
other hand moral constraints, which require, for example, that one should
not act so as to damage or harm someone, and for which no act of
acquisition is required. There is a considerable difference in the level and
kind of responsibility involved. In the first case one must do something or
be something which one can fail to do or be, e.g. have loves, sympathy, be
contracted. In the second case responsibility arises as a result of being a
causal agent aware of the consequences or probable consequences of his
Obligations to the Future 143
action, and thus does not have to be especially acquired or assumed. Thus
there is no problem about how the latter class, moral constraints, can
apply to the distant future in cases where it may be difficult or impossible
for acquisition or assumption conditions to be satisfied. They apply as a
result of the ability to produce causal effects on the distant future of a
reasonably predictable nature. Thus also moral constraints can apply to
what does not (yet) exist, just as actions can cause results that do not (yet)
exist. While it may be the case that there would need to be an acquired or
assumed obligation in order for it to be claimed that contemporary people
must make special sacrifices of an heroic kind for future people, or even to
help them especially, only moral constraints are needed in order for us to
be constrained from harming them. Thus, to return to the bus example, the
consigner cannot argue in justification of his action that he has never
assumed or acquired responsibility for the passengers, that he does not
know them and therefore has no love or sympathy for them, and that they
are not part of his moral community, in short that he has no special
obligations to help them. All that one needs to argue in respect of both the
bus and the nuclear case is that there are moral constraints against harming, not that there are specially acquired obligations to take responsibility
for the lives of the people involved.
The confusion of moral constraints with acquired obligation, and the
attempt therewith to view all constraints as acquired and to write off
non-acquired constraints, is facilitated through the use of the term 'moral
obligation' in philosophy to indicate any type of deontic constraint, while
in natural language it is used to indicate something which has to be
assumed or acquired. Hence the equation and at least one root of the
unconstrained position, that is of the belief that there are no moral constraints concerning the distant future.
The unconstrained view tends to give way, under the weight of counterexamples, to a more qualified, and sometimes ambivalent position. Passmore's position in [1] is a striking example of the second ambivalent
position. On the one hand Passmore regularly gives the impression of one
championing future people; for example, in the final sentence of [1] he
says, concerning men a century hence:
My sole concern is that we should do nothing which will reduce their
freedom of thought and action, whether by destroying.the natural
world which makes that freedom possible or the social traditions
which permit and encourage it.
144 R. and V. Routley
Earlier (esp. pp. 84-85) Passmore appears to endorse the principle 'that we
ought not to act so as certainly to harm posterity' and claims (p. 98) that,
even where there are uncertainties, 'these uncertainties do not justify
negligence'. Nevertheless, though obligations concerning non-immediate
posterity are thus admitted, the main thrust of Passmore's argument is
entirely different, being in favour of the unconstrained position according
to which we have no obligations to non-immediate posterity. Thus his
conclusion (p. 91):
So whether we approach the problem of obligations to posterity by
way of Bentham and Sidgwick, Rawls or Golding, we are led to
something like the same conclusion: our obligations are to immediate
posterity, we ought to try to improve the world so that we shall be able
to hand it over to our immediate successors in a better condition, and
that is all.11
Passmore's position is, to all appearances, simply inconsistent. There are
two ways one might try to render it consistent, but neither is readily
available to Passmore. The first is by taking advantage of the distinction
between moral constraints and acquired obligations, but a basis for this
distinction is not evident in Passmore's work and indeed the distinction is
antithetical to the analyses of obligation that Passmore tries to synthesize
with his own analysis in terms of loves. The second, sceptical, route to
consistency is by way of the argument that we shall consider shortly, that
there is always gross uncertainty with respect to the distant future, uncertainty which relieves us in practice of any moral constraints regarding the
distant future. But though Passmore's writing strongly suggests this uncertainty argument (especially his sympathetic discussion of the Premier
of Queensland's argument against conservationists [p. 77]), he also rules it
out with the claim that uncertainties do not justify negligence.12
Many of the accounts of moral obligation that give rise to the unconstrained position are fused in Passmore's work, again not entirely consistently, since the different accounts exploited do not give uniform results.
Thus the primary account of obligation is said to be in terms of loves though the account is never satisfactorily formulated or developed - and it
is suggested that because our loves do not extend into the distant future,
neither do our obligations. This sentimental account of obligation will
obviously lead to different results from utilitarian accounts of obligation,
which however Passmore appeals to in his discussion of wilderness. In yet
other places in [1], furthermore, social contract and moral community
Obligations to the Future 145
views are appealed to - see, e.g., the treatment of animals, of preservation, and of duties to nature. In the case of obligations to future people,
however, Passmore does try to sketch an argument - what we call the
convergence argument - that all the accounts lead in the end to the
unconstrained position.
As well as the convergence argument, and various uncertainty arguments to be considered later, Passmore appears to endorse several other
arguments in favour of his theme that there are in practice no obligations to
the distant future. In particular, he suggests that such obligations would in
practice be otiose. Everything that needs to be accounted for can be
encompassed through the chain picture of obligation as linking successive
generations, under which each generation has obligations, based on loves,
only to the succeeding generation. We outline three objections to this
chain account. First, it is inadequate to treat constraints concerning the
future as if they applied only between generations, as if there were no
question of constraints on individuals as opposed to whole generations,
since individuals can create causal effects, e.g. harm, on the future in a
way which may create individual responsibility, and which can't necessarily be sheeted home to an entire generation. Secondly, such chains, since
they are non-transitive, cannot yield direct obligations to the distant
future. But for this very reason the chain picture cannot be adequate, as
examples again show. For the picture is unable to explain several of the
cases that have to be dealt with, e.g. the examples already discussed which
show that we can have a direct effect on the distant future without
affecting the next generation, who may not even be able to influence
matters.13 Thirdly, improvements for immediate successors may be
achieved at the expense of disadvantages to people of the more distant
future. Improving the world for immediate successors is quite compatible
with, and may even in some circumstances be most easily achieved by,
ruining it for less immediate successors. Such cases can hardly be written
off as 'never-never land' examples, since many cases of environmental
exploitation might be seen as of just this type, e.g. not just the nuclear case
but also the exhaustion of non-renewable resources and the long-term
depletion of renewable resources such as soils and forests through overcropping. If then such obvious injustices to future people arising from the
favouring or exclusive concern with immediate successors are to be avoided, obligations to the future will have to be seen as in some way fairly
distributed over time, and not merely as accruing to particular generations
in the way the chain picture suggests.
146 R. and V. Routley
Passmore tries to represent all obligations to the distant future in terms
of heroic self-sacrifice, something which cannot of course be morally
required. But in view of the distinctions between constraints and acquired
obligation and between obligation and supererogation, this is just to misrepresent the position of these obligations. For example, one is no more
engaging in heroic self-sacrifice by not forcing future people into an
unviable life position or by refraining from causing them direct harm, than
one is resorting to heroic self-sacrifice in refraining from beating and
robbing some stranger and leaving him to starve.
Passmore's most sustained argument for the unconstrained position is a
convergence argument, that different analyses of obligations, including
his own, lead to the one conclusion. This style of argument is hardly
convincing when there are well-known accounts of obligation which do
not lead to the intended conclusion, e.g. deontological accounts such as
those of Kant and of modern European schools, and teleological accounts
such as those of Moore (in [8]). But such unfavourable positions are either
rapidly passed over or ignored in Passmore's historical treatment and
narrow selection of historical figures. The style of argument becomes even
less persuasive when it is discovered that the accounts of the main authorities appealed to, Bentham, Sidgwick, and Rawls,14 do not lead, without
serious distortion, to the intended conclusion. Indeed Passmore has twisted the historical and textual evidence to suit his case, as we now try to
indicate.
Consider Bentham first. Passmore's assumption, for which no textual
evidence is cited, ls is that no Benthamite calculation can take account of a
future more extensive than the immediate future (cf. pp. 87-88). The
assumption seems to be based simply on the fact that Bentham remarked
that 'the value of the pleasure or pain to each person to be considered in
any estimate will be greater or less in virtue of the following circumstances'. '3. Its certainty or uncertainty. 4. Its propinquity or remoteness'
([10], p. 16). But this does nothing to show that future persons are discounted: the certainty and propinquity do not concern persons, but the
utilities of the persons concerned. As regards which persons are concerned in any calculation Bentham is quite explicit, detailing how
to take an exact account. . . of the general tendency of any act.. . .5 .
Take an account of the number of persons whose interests appear to
be concerned; and repeat the above process [summation of values of
pleasure and of pain] with respect to each. ([10], p. 16)
Obligations to the Future 147
It follows that Bentham's calculation takes account of everyone (and, in
his larger scheme, every sentient creature) whose interests appear to be
concerned: if the interests of people in the distant future appear to be
concerned - as they are in conservation issues - they are to be included in
the calculation. And there is independent evidence16 that in Bentham's
view the principle of utility was not temporally restricted: 'that is useful
which, taking all times and all persons into consideration, leaves a balance
of happiness' ([10], pp. 17-18, our italics). Thus the future cut-off that
Passmore has attributed to Bentham is contradicted by Bentham's own
account.
The case of Sidgwick is more complex, because there is isolated oscillation in his application of utilitarianism between use of utility and of
(something like) expected utility (see [11], pp. 381,414): Sidgwick's utilitarianism is, in its general characterization, essentially that of Bentham:
the conduct which . . . is objectively right is that which will produce
the greatest amount of happiness on the whole; that is, taking into
account all those whose happiness is affected by the conduct. ([11], p.
411)
All includes all sentient beings, both existing and to exist, as Sidgwick goes
on to explain (p. 414). In particular, in answer to the question 'How far are
we to consider the interests of posterity when they seem to conflict with
those of existing human beings?' Sidgwick writes ([11], p. 414, our italics):
It seems, however, clear that the time at which a man exists cannot
affect the value of his happiness from a universal point of view; and
that the interests of posterity must concern a Utilitarian as much as
those of his contemporaries, except in so far as the effect of his
actions on posterity - and even the existence of human beings to be
affected - must necessarily be more uncertain.
But Passmore manages, first of all, to give a different sense to what
Sidgwick is saying by adjusting the quotation, by omitting the clause we
have italicized, which equalizes the degree of concern for present and
future persons, and by italicizing the whole except-clause, thereby placing
much greater emphasis than Sidgwick does on uncertainty. For according
to Sidgwick's impartiality principle, 'the mere difference in time is not a
148 R. and V. Routley
reasonable ground for having more regard to the consciousness of one
-amount than to that of another' ([11], p. 381; see also p. 124). The apparent
tension in Sidgwick's theory as to whether uncertainty should be taken
into account is readily removed by resort to a modern distinction between
values and expected values (i.e. probability weighted values); utilitarian
rightness is defined as before in terms of the net happiness of all concerned
over all time without mention of uncertainty or probabilities, but it is
distinguished from probable rightness (given present information), in the
utilitarian sense,17 which is defined in terms of the expected net happiness
of those concerned, using present probabilities. It is the latter notion, of
probable rightness, that practical reasoning is commonly concerned with
and that decision theory studies; and it is this that Passmore supposes
Sidgwick is using ([1], p. 84). But it is evident that the utilitarian determination of probable rightness, like that of rightness, will sometimes take
into account the distant future - as Sidgwick's discussion of utilitarian
determination of optimum population (immediately following his remark
on uncertainty) does. So how does Passmore contrive to reverse matters,
to have Sidgwick's position lead to his own unconstrained conclusion?
The answer is: By inserting an additional assumption of his own - which
Sidgwick would certainly have rejected - that the uncertainties entitle us
to ignore the distant future. What Passmore has implicitly assumed in his
claim ([1], p. 85) that 'utilitarian principles [such as Sidgwick's] are not
strong enough' 'to justify the kinds of sacrifice some conservationists now
call upon us to make' is his own thesis that 'The uncertainty of harms we
are hoping to prevent would in general entitle us to ignore them.. .'. From
a decision-theory viewpoint this is simply irrational18 unless the probabilities of damage are approaching zero. We will deal with the essentially
sceptical uncertainty arguments on which Passmore's position depends
shortly: here it is enough to observe that Sidgwick's position does not lead
to anything like that which Passmore attributes to him - without uncertainty assumptions which Sidgwick would have rejected (for he thought
that future people'will certainly have pleasure and suffer pain).
We can also begin to gauge from Passmore's treatment of nineteenthcentury utilitarians, such as Bentham and Sidgwick, the extent of the
distortion which underlies his more general historical case for the unconstrained position which, so he claims,
represents accurately enough what, over the last two centuries, men
have seen as their duty to posterity as a whole. . . . ([1], p. 91)
Obligations to the Future 149
The treatment accorded Rawls in only marginally more satisfactory.
Passmore supposes that Rawls's theory of justice leads directly to the
unconstrained position ([1], p. 87 and p. 91), whereas Rawls claims ([5], p.
293) that we have obligations to future people just as to present ones. But
the situation is more complicated than Rawls's claim would indicate, as we
now try to explain in a summary way (more detail is given in the Appendix). For, in order to justify this claim on his theory (with its present
time-of-entry interpretation), Rawls has to invoke additional and dubious
motivational assumptions; even so the theory which thus results does not
yield the intended conclusion, but a conclusion inconsistent with Rawls's
claim. However, by changing the time-of-entry interpretation to an omnitemporal one, Rawls's claim does result from the theory so amended.
Moreover, the amended theory also yields, by exactly Rawls's argument
for a just saving rate, a resource conservation policy, and also a case
against nuclear development. Accordingly Passmore's other claims regarding Rawls are mistaken, e.g. that the theory cannot justify a policy of
resource conservation. Rawls does not emerge unscathed either. As on
the issue of whether his contract is a necessary condition for obligations,
so on obligations which the contract yields to the distant future, Rawls is
far from consistent. Furthermore, institutions such as qualified market
and voting systems are recommended as just though from a future perspective their results are far from that. Rawls, then, does not take obligations to the future with full seriousness.
In sum, it is not true that the theory of Rawls, any more than the theories
of the historical figures actually discussed by Passmore, unequivocally
supports the unconstrained position.
III. Uncertainty and Indeterminacy Arguments
Although there are grave difficulties for the unconstrained position, qualification leads to a more defensible position. According to the qualified
position we are not entirely unconstrained with respect to the distant
future: there are obligations, but these are not so important as those to the
present, and the interests of distant future people cannot weigh very much
in the scale against those of the present and immediate future. The interests of future people then, except in unusual cases, count for very much
less than the interests of present people. Hence such things as nuclear
development and various exploitative activities which benefit present
150 R. and V. Routley
people should proceed, even if people of the distant future are disadvantaged by them.
The qualified position appears to be widely held and is implicit in most
modern economic theories, where the position of a decrease in weight of
future costs and benefits (and so of future interests) is obtained by application over time of an (opportunity cost) discount rate. The attempt to
apply economics as a moral theory, something that is becoming increasingly common, can lead then to the qualified position. What is objectionable in such an approach is that economics must operate within the bounds
of moral (deontic) constraints, just as in practice it operates within legal
constraints, and cannot determine what those constraints are. There are,
moreover, alternative economic theories and simply to adopt one which
discounts the future is to beg all the questions at issue. The discounting
move often has the same result as the unconstrained position; if, for
instance, we consider the cancer example and consider costs as payable
compensation, it is evident that, over a sufficiently long period of time,
discounting at current prices would lead to the conclusion that there are no
recoverable damages and so, in economic terms, no constraints. In short,
even certain damage to future people could be written off. One way to
achieve the bias against future people is by the application of discount
rates which are set in accord with the current economic horizons of no
more than about fifteen years,19 and application of such rates would
simply beg the question against the interests and rights of future people.
Where there is certain future damage of a morally forbidden type the
whole method of discounting is simply inapplicable, and its use would
violate moral constraints.20
Another argument for the qualified position, which avoids the objections from cases of certain damage, comes from probability considerations.The distant future, it is argued, is much more uncertain than the
present and immediate future, so that probabilities are consequently lower, perhaps even approaching or coinciding with zero for any hypothesis
concerning the distant future.21 But then if we take account of probabilities in the obvious way, by simply multiplying them against costs and
benefits, it is evident that the interests of future people, except in cases
where there is an unusually high degree of certainty, must count for (very
much) less than those of present and neighbouring people where (much)
higher probabilities obtain. So in the case of conflict between the present
and the future where it is a question of weighing certain benefits to the
people of the present and the immediate future against a much lower
Obligations to the Future 151
probability of indeterminate costs to an indeterminate number of distant
future people, the issue would normally be decided in favour of the
present, assuming that anything like similar costs and benefits were involved. But of course it can't be assumed that anything like similarly
weighted costs and benefits are involved in the nuclear case, especially if it
is a question of risking poisoning some of the earth for half a million or so
years, with consequent risk of serious harm to thousands of generations of
future people, in order to obtain quite doubtful or trivial benefits for some
present people, in the shape of the opportunity to continue unnecessarily
high energy use. And even if the costs and benefits were comparable or
evenly weighted, such an argument would be defective, since an analogous argument would show that the consigner's action is acceptable
provided the benefit, e.g. the profit he stood to gain from imposing significant risks on other people, was sufficiently large. Such a cost-benefit
approach to moral and decision problems, with or without the probability
frills, is quite inadequate where different parties are concerned, or for
dealing with cases of conflict of interest or moral problems where deontic
constraints are involved, and commonly yields counterintuitive results.
For example, it would follow on such principles that it is permissible for a
firm to injure, or very likely injure, some innocent party provided the firm
stands to make a sufficiently large gain from it. But the costs and benefits
involved are not transferable in any simple or general way from one party
to another. Transfers of this kind, of costs and benefits involving different
parties, commonly raise moral issues - e.g. is x entitled to benefit himself
by imposing costs ony ? - which are not susceptible to a simple cost-benefit approach of the sort adopted by some proponents of nuclear energy,
who attempt to dismiss the costs to future people with the soothing remark
that any development involves costs as well as benefits. The transfer point
is enough to invalidate the comparison, heavily relied on by McCracken
[16] in building a case for the acceptability of the nuclear risk, between
nuclear risks and those from cigarette smoking. In the latter case those
who supposedly benefit from the activity are also, to an overwhelming
extent* those who bear the serious health costs and risks involved. In
contrast the users and supposed beneficiaries of nuclear energy will be
risking not only, or even primarily, their own lives and health, but also
those of others who may be non-beneficiaries and who may be spatially or
temporally removed, and these risks will not be in any direct way related
to a person's extent of use.
The transfer objection is essentially the same as that to the utilitarian's
152 R. and V. Routley
happiness sums as a way of solving moral conflict between different
parties, and the introduction of probability considerations does not change
the principles involved but merely complicates analyses. One might further object to the probability argument that probabilities involving distant
future situations are not always less than those concerning the immediate
future in the way the argument supposes, and that the outcomes of some
moral problems such as the bus example do not depend on a high level of
probability anyway. In some sorts of cases it is enough, as the bus example
reveals, that a significant risk is created; such cases do not depend critically on high probability assignments.
Uncertainty arguments in various forms are the most common and
important ones used by philosophers and others to argue for the position
that we cannot be expected to take serious account of the effects of our
actions on the distant future. There are two strands to the uncertainty
argument, capable of separation, but frequently entangled. Both arguments are mistaken, the first on a priori grounds, the second on a posteriori grounds. The first argument is a generalized uncertainty argument
which runs as follows: In contrast to the exact information we can obtain
about the present, the information we can obtain about the effects of our
actions on the distant future is unreliable, woolly, and highly speculative.
But we cannot base assessments of how we should act on information of
this kind, especially when accurate information is obtainable about the
present which would indicate different action. Therefore we must regretfully ignore the uncertain effects of our actions on the distant future. More
formally and crudely: One only has obligations to the future if these
obligations are based on reliable information; there is no reliable information at present as regards the distant future; therefore one has no obligations to the distant future.
The first argument is essentially a variation on a sceptical argument in
epistemology concerning our knowledge of the future (formally, replace
'obligations' by 'knowledge' in the crude statement of the argument
above). The main ploy is to considerably overestimate and overstate the
degree of certainty available with respect to the present and immediate
future, and the degree of certainty which is required as the basis for moral
consideration both with respect to the present and with respect to the
future. Associated with this is the attempt to suggest a sharp division as
regards certainty between the present and immediate future on the one
hand and the distant future on the other. We shall not find, we suggest, that
there is any such sharp or simple division between the distant future and
Obligations to the Future 153
the adjacent future and present, at least with respect to those things in the
present which are normally subject to moral constraints. We can and
constantly do act on the basis of such 'unreliable' information as the
sceptic as regards the future conveniently labels 'uncertainty'; for scepticproof certainty is rarely, or never, available with respect to much of the
present and immediate future. In moral situations in the present, action
often takes account of risk and probability, even quite low probabilities. A
good example is again the bus case. We do not need to know for certain
that the container will break and the lethal gas escape. In fact it does not
even have to be probable, in the relevant sense of more probable than not,
in order for us to condemn the consigner's action. It is enough that there is
a significant risk of harm in this sort of case. It does not matter if the
decreased well-being of the consigner is certain and the prospects of the
passengers quite uncertain; the resolution of the problem is still clearly in
favour of the so-called 'speculative' and 'unreliable'. But if we do not
require certainty of action to apply moral constraints in contemporary
affairs, why should we require a much higher standard of certainty in the
future? Why should we require epistemic standards for the future which
the more familiar sphere of moral action concerning the present and
adjacent future does not need to meet? The insistence on certainty as a
necessary condition before moral consideration can be given to the distant
future, then, amounts to an epistemic double standard. But such an
epistemic double standard, proposed in explaining the difference between
the present and the future and to justify ignoring future peoples' interests,
in fact cannot itself provide an explanation of the differences, since it
already presupposes different standards of certainty appropriate to each
class, which difference is in turn in need of justification.
The second uncertainty argument is a practical uncertainty argument,
that whatever our theoretical obligations to the future, we cannot in
practice take the interests of future people into account, because uncertainty about the distant future is so gross that we cannot determine what
the likely consequences of actions upon it will be and therefore, however
good our intentions to the people of the distant future, in practice we have
no choice but to ignore their interests. Uncertainty is gross where certain
incompatible hypotheses are as good as one another and there is no
rational ground for choosing between them. The second uncertainty argument can also be put in this way: If moral principles are, like other
principles, implicational in form, that is of such forms as 'if* has character
h then x is wrong, for every (action) x', then what the argument claims is
154 R. and V. Routley
that we can never obtain the information about future actions which would
enable us to detach the antecedent of the implication. So even if moral
principles theoretically apply to future people, in practice they cannot be
applied to obtain clear conclusions or directions concerning contemporary
action of the 'It is wrong to do x' type.
Many of the assumptions of the second argument have to be conceded.
If the distant future really is so grossly uncertain that in every case it is
impossible to determine in any way that is better than chance what the
effects of present action will be, and whether any given action will help or
hinder future people, then moral principles, although they may apply
theoretically to the future, will not be applicable in practice for obtaining
any clear conclusions about how to act. Hence the distant future will
impose no practical moral constraints on action. However, the argument
is factually incorrect in assuming that the future is always so grossly
uncertain or indeterminate. Admittedly there is often a high degree of
uncertainty concerning the distant future, but as a matter of (contingent)
fact it is not always so gross or sweeping as the argument has to assume.
There are some areas where uncertainty is not so great as to exclude
constraints on action, especially when account is taken of the point,
noticed in connection with the first argument, that complete certainty is
commonly not required for moral constraints and that all that may be
needed in some cases is the creation of""a significant risk. Again there is
considerable uncertainty about many factors which are not highly, or at
all, morally relevant, but this does not extend to many factors which are of
much greater importance to moral issues. For example, we may not have
any idea what the fashions will be in a hundred years in girls' names or
men's footwear, or what brands of ice cream people will be eating if any,
but we do have excellent reason to believe, especially if we consider 3,000
years of history, that what people there are in a hundred years are likely to
have material and psychic needs not entirely unlike our own, that they will
need a healthy biosphere for a good life; that like us they will not be
immune to radiation; that their welfare will not be enhanced by a high
incidence of cancer or genetic defects, by the destruction of resources, or
the elimination from the face of the earth of that wonderful variety of
non-human life which at present makes it such a rich and interesting place.
For this sort of reason, the second uncertainty argument should be rejected. While it is true that there are many areas in which the morally relevant
information needed is uncertain or unavailable, and in which we cannot
therefore determine satisfactorily how to act, there are certainly others in
Obligations to the Future 155
which uncertainty in morally relevant areas is not so great as to preclude
moral constraints on action, where we ascertain if not absolute certainties
at least probabilities of the same sort of order as are considered sufficient
for the application of moral principles in parallel contemporary cases,
especially where spatially remote people are involved. The case of nuclear
waste storage, and of uncertainty of the effects of it on future people,
seems to be of the latter sort. Here there is no gross indeterminacy or
uncertainty; it is simply not true that incompatible hypotheses about what
may happen are as good as each other. It is plain that nuclear waste storage
does impose significant risks of harm on future people, and, as we can see
from the bus example, the significant risk of harm is enough in cases of this
type to make moral constraints applicable.
In terms of the defects of the preceding uncertainty arguments, we can
see the corresponding defects in a number of widely employed uncertainty
arguments used to write off probable harm to future people as outside the
scope of proper consideration. Most of these popular moves employ both
of the uncertainty arguments as suits the case, switching from one to the
other in a way that is again reminiscent of sceptical moves. For example,
we may be told that we cannot really take account of future people because
we cannot be sure that they will exist or that their tastes and wants will not
be completely different from our own, to the point where they will not
suffer from our exhaustion of resources or from the things that would
affect us (cf. Passmore [1]). But this is to insist upon complete certainty of
a sort beyond what is required for the present and immediate future, where
there is also commonly no guarantee that some disaster will not overtake
those we are morally committed to. Again we may be told that there is no
guarantee that future people will be worthy of any efforts on our part,
because they may be morons or forever plugged into enjoyment- or other
machines (Golding [12]). Even if one is prepared to accept the elitist
approach presupposed - according to which only those who meet certain
properly civilized or intellectual standards are eligible for moral consideration - what we are being handed in such arguments as a serious defeating
consideration is again a mere outside possibility - like the sceptic who says
that the solid-looking desk in front of us is perhaps only a facade, not
because he has any particular reason for doing so, but because he hasn't
looked around the back, drilled holes in it, etc. Neither the contemporary
nor the historical situation gives any positive reason for supposing that a
lapse into universal moronity or universal pleasure-machine escapism is a
serious possibility, as opposed to a logical possibility. We can contrast
156 R. and V. Routley
with these mere logical possibilities the very real historically supportable
risks of escape of nuclear waste or decline of a civilization through destruction of its resource base.
The possibilities just considered in these uncertainty arguments of
sceptical character are not real possibilities. Another argument which may
consider a real possibility, but still does not succeed in showing that it is
acceptable to proceed with an action which would appear to be harmful to
future people, is often introduced in the nuclear waste case. This is the
argument that future people may discover a rigorously safe and permanent
storage method for nuclear wastes before they are damaged by escaped
waste material. Let us grant for the sake of the argument that this is a real
possibility (though physical arguments may show that it is not). This still
does not affect the fact that there is a significant risk of serious damage and
that the creation of a significant risk is enough to rule out an action of this
type as morally impermissible. In just the same way, future people may
discover a cure for cancer, and the fact that this appears to be a real and not
merely a logical possibility, does not make the action of the firm in the
example discussed above, of producing a substance likely to cause cancer
in future people, morally admissible. The fact that there was a real possibility of future people avoiding the harm would show that actions of these
sorts were admissible only if what was required for inadmissibility was
certainty of harm or a very high probability of it. In such cases, before such
actions could be considered admissible, what would be required is far
more than a possibility, real or not22 - it is at least the availability of an
applicable, safe, and rigorously tested, not merely speculative, technique
for achieving it, something that future people could reasonably be expected to apply to protect themselves.
The strategy of most of these uncertainty arguments is fairly clear then,
and may be brought out by looking yet again at the bus example, where the
consigner says that he cannot be expected to take account of the effect of
his actions on the passengers because they may find an effective way to
deal with his parcel or some lucky or unlucky accident may occur, e.g. the
bus may break down and they may all change to a different bus leaving the
parcel behind, or the bus may crash, killing all the passengers before the
container gets a chance to leak. These are all possibilities, of course, but
there is no positive reason to believe that they are any more than that, that
is they are not real possibilities. The strategy is to stress such outside
possibilities in order to create the false impression that there is gross
uncertainty about the future, that the real possibility that the container will
Obligations to the Future 157
break should be treated in the same way as these mere logical possibilities,
that uncertainty about the future is so great as to preclude the consigners'
taking account of the passengers' welfare and of the real possibility of
harm from his parcel, and thereby excuse his action. A related strategy is
to stress a real possibility, such as finding a cure for cancer, and thereby
imply that this removes the case for applying moral constraints .This move
implicitly makes the assumptions of the first argument, that certainty, or at
least a very high probability, of harm is required before an action can be
judged morally inadmissible, and the point of stressing the real possibility
of avoidance of damage is to show that this allegedly required high degree
of certainty or probability cannot be attained. That is, the strategy draws
attention to some real uncertainty implying that this is sufficient to defeat
the application of moral constraints. But, as we have seen, this is often not
so.
An argument closely related to the uncertainty arguments is based on
the non-existence and indeterminacy of the future.23 An item is indeterminate in a given respect if its properties in that respect are, as a matter of
logic, not settled (nor are they settlable in a non-arbitrary fashion). The
respects in which future items are indeterminate are well enough known
for a few examples to serve as reminders: all the following are indeterminate: the population of Australia at 2001, its distribution, its age structure,
the preferences of its members for folk music, wilderness, etc., the size
and shape of Wollongong, the average number of rooms in its houses and
in its office blocks, and so on. Philosophical discussion of such indeterminacy is as old as Aristotle's sea battle and as modern as truth-value gaps
and fuzzy logics, and many positions have been adopted on the existence
and determinacy of future items. Nevertheless theories that there are
obligations to the future are not sensitive to the metaphysical position
adopted concerning the existence or non-existence of the future. Any
theory which denied obligations to the future on the metaphysical grounds
that the future did not exist, and did not have properties, so that the
present could not be related to it, would be committed to denying such
obvious facts as that the present could causally influence the future, that
present people could be great-grandparents of purely future people, and so
on, and hence would have to be rejected on independent grounds. This is
not to say that there are not important problems about the existence or
non-existence of future items, problems which are perhaps most straightforwardly handled by a Meinongian position which allows that items
which do not exist may have properties. The non-existence of the future
158 R. and V. Routley
does raise problems for standard theories which buy the Ontological
Assumption (the thesis that what does not exist does not have properties),
especially given the natural (and correct) inclination to say that the future
does not (now) exist; but such theories can adopt various strategies for
coping with these problems (e.g. the adoption of a platonistic position
according to which the future does now exist, or the allowance for certain
sorts of relations between existents at different times), although the satisfactoriness of these strategies is open to question (cf. [4]). Thus whether or
not the Ontological Assumption is assumed and however it is applied, it
will be allowed that future items will have properties even if they do not
have them now, and that is enough to provide the basis for moral concern
about the future. Thus the thesis of obligations to the future does not
presuppose any special metaphysical position on the existence of the
future.
If the non-existence of future items creates no special problems for
obligations to the future, the same is not true of their indeterminacy.
Whether the indeterminacy of future items is seen as a logical feature of
the future which results from the non-existence of purely future items or
whether one adopts a (mistaken) platonistic view of the future as existing
and sees the indeterminacy as an epistemological one resulting from our
inability to know the character of these entities - that is, we cannot
completely know the future .though it exists and has a definite characterwhichever view we take indeterminacy still creates major difficulties for
certain ethical theories and their treatment of the future.
The difficulties arise for theories which appear to require a high level of
determinacy with respect to the number and character of future items, in
particular calculus-type theories such as utilitarianism in its usual forms,
where the calculations are critically dependent on such information as
numbers, totals, and averages, information which so far as the future is
concerned is generally indeterminate. The fact that this numerical information is typically indeterminate means that insofar as head-count utilitarianism requires determinate information on numbers, it is in a similar
position to theories discussed earlier; it may apply theoretically to future
people, but since the calculations cannot be applied to them their interests
will be left out of account. And, in fact, utilitarianism for the most part
does not, and perhaps cannot, take future creatures and their interests
seriously; there is little discussion as to how the difficulties or impossibility of calculations regarding the open future are to be obtained. Non-platonistic utilitarianism is in logical difficulty on this matter, while platonis-
Obligations to the Future 159
tic utilitarianism - which faces a range of other objections - is inapplicable
because of epistemic indeterminacy. We have yet another case of a theory
of the sort that applies theoretically but in practice doesn't take the future
seriously. But far from this showing that future people's interests should
be left out of account, what these considerations show are deficiencies in
these sorts of theories, which require excessive determinacy of information. This kind of information is commonly equally unavailable for the
accepted areas of moral constraint, the present and immediate future; and
the resolution of moral issues is often not heavily dependent on knowledge
of such specific determinate features as numbers or other determinate
features. For example, we do not need to know how many people there
will be on the bus, how intelligent they are, what their preferences are or
how badly they will be injured, in order to reach the conclusion that the
consigner's action in despatching his parcel is a bad one. Furthermore, it is
only the ability of moral considerations to continue to apply in the absence
of determinate information about such things as numbers that makes it
possible to take account of the possible effects of action, as the risks
associated with action - something which is quite essential even for the
present if moral considerations are to apply in the normal and accepted
way. For it is essential in order to apply moral considerations in the
accepted way that we consider alternative worlds, in order to take account
of options, risks, and alternative outcomes; but these alternative or counterfactual worlds are not in so different a position from the future with
respect to determinacy; for example, there is indeterminacy with respect
to the number of people who may be harmed in the bus case or in apossible
nuclear reactor melt-down. These alternative worlds, like the distant
future, are indeterminate in some respects, but not totally indeterminate.
It might still be thought that the indeterminacy of the future, for example
with respect to number and exact character, would at least prevent the
interest of future people being taken into account where there is a conflict
with the present. Since their numbers are indeterminate and their interests
unknown, how can we weigh their competing claims against those of the
present and immediate future where this information is available in a more
or less accurate form? The question is raised particularly by problems of
sharing fixed quantities of resources among present and future people,
when the numbers of the latter are indeterminate. Such problems are
indeed difficult, but they are not resolved by ignoring the claims of the
future, any more than the problems raised by the need to take account in
decision-making of factors difficult to quantify are resolved by ignoring
160 R. and V. Routley
such factors. Nor are such distributional problems as large and representative a class of moral problems concerning the future as the tendency to
focus on them would suggest. It should be conceded then that there will be
cases where the indeterminacy of aspects of the future will make conflicts
very difficult or indeed impossible to resolve - a realistic ethical theory
will not deliver a decision procedure - but there will equally be other
conflict cases where the level of indeterminacy does not hinder resolution
of the issue, e.g. the bus example which is a conflict case of a type. In
particular, there will be many cases which are not solved by weighing
numbers, numbers of interests, or whatever, cases for which one needs to
know only the most general probable characteristics of future people.
Moreover, even where numbers are relevant often only bounds will be
required, exact numerical counts only being required where, for instance,
margins are narrow; e.g. issues may be resolved as in parliament where a
detailed vote (or division) is only required when the issue is close. It is
certainly not necessary then to have complete determinacy to resolve all
cases of conflict.
The question we must ask then is what features of future people could
disqualify them from moral consideration or reduce their claims to it to
below those of present people? The answer is: in principle None. Prima
facie moral principles are universalizable, and lawlike, in that they apply
independently of position in space or in time, for example.24 But universalizability of principles is an outcome of those ethical theories which are
capable of dealing satisfactorily with the present; in other words, a theory
that did not allow properly for the future would be found to have defects as
regards the present, to deal unjustly or unfairly with some present people,
e.g. those remotely located, those outside some select subgroup such as
(white-skinned) humans, etc. The only candidates for characteristics that
would fairly rule out future people are the logical features we have been
looking at, uncertainty and indeterminacy; what we have argued is that it
would be far too sweeping to see these features as affecting the moral
claims of future people in a general way. These special features only affect
certain sorts of cases (e.g. the determination of best probable or practical
course of action given only present information). In particular they do not
affect cases of the sort being considered, the nuclear one, where highly
determinate or certain information about the numbers and characteristics
of the class likely to be harmed or certainty of damage are not required.
To establish obligations to the future a full universalizability principle is
not needed: it is enough to require that the temporal position of a person
Obligations to the Future 161
cannot affect his entitlement to just and fair treatment, to full moral
consideration;25 inversely that it is without basis to discriminate morally
against a person in virtue of his temporal position. As a result of this
universalizability, there is the same obligation to future people as to the
present; and thus there is the same obligation to take account of them and
their interests in what we do, to be careful in our actions, to take account of
the probability (and not just the certainty) of our actions' causing harm or
damage, and to see, other things being equal, that we do not act so as to rob
future people of what is necessary for the chance of a good life. Uncertainty and indeterminacy do not free us of these obligations. If, in a closely
comparable case concerning the present, the creation of a significant risk
is enough to rule out an action as immoral, and there are no independent
grounds for requiring greater certainty of harm in the future case under
consideration, then futurity alone will not provide adequate grounds for
proceeding with the action, thus discriminating against future people.
Accordingly we cannot escape, through appeal to futurity, the conclusion
tentatively reached in our first section, that proposals for nuclear development in the present state of technology for future waste disposal are
immoral.
IV. Overriding Consideration Arguments
In the first part we noticed that the consigner's action could not be justified
by purely economistic arguments, such as that his profits would rise, the
firm or the village would be more prosperous, or by appealing to the fact
that some possibly uncomfortable changes would otherwise be needed.
We also observed that the principle on which this assessment was based,
that one was not usually entitled to create a serious risk to others for these
sorts of reasons, applied more generally and, in particular, applied to the
nuclear case. For this reason the economistic arguments which are thus
most commonly advanced to promote nuclear development - e.g. cheapness, efficiency, profitability for electricity utilities, and the need otherwise for uncomfortable changes such as restructuring of employment,
investment, and consumption-do not even begin to show that the nuclear
alternative is an acceptable one. Even if these economistic assumptions
about benefits to present people were correct (and there is reason to doubt
that most of them are),26 the arguments would fail because economics
must operate within the framework of moral constraints, and not vice
versa.
162 R. and V. Routley
What one does have to consider, however, are moral conflict arguments, that is arguments to the effect that, unless the prima facie unacceptable alternative is taken, some even more unacceptable alternative is
the only possible outcome, and will ensue. For example, in the bus case,
the consigner may argue that his action is justified because unless it is
taken the village will starve. It is by no means clear that even such a
justification as this would be sufficient, especially where the risk to the
passengers is high, as the case seems to become one of transfer of costs
and risks onto others; but such a moral situation would no longer be so
clearcut, and one would perhaps hesitate to condemn any action taken in
such circumstances.
Some of the arguments advanced to show moral conflict are based on
competing duties to present people, and others on competing obligations
to future people, both of which are taken to override the obligations not to
impose on the future significant risk of serious harm. The structure of such
moral conflict arguments is based crucially on the presentation of a genuine and exhaustive set of alternatives (or at least practical alternatives),
and upon showing that the only alternatives to admittedly morally undesirable actions are even more undesirable ones. If some practical alternative which is not morally worse than the action to be justified is overlooked, suppressed, or neglected in the argument-for example, if in the bus
case it turns out that the villagers have another option to starving or to the
sending off of the parcel, namely earning a living in some other way - then
the argument is defective and cannot readily be patched. We want to argue
that suppression of practicable alternatives has occurred in the argument,
designed to show that the alternatives to the nuclear option are even worse
than the option itself, and that there are other factual defects in these
arguments as well. In short, the arguments depend essentially on the
presentation of false dichotomies.
The first argument, the poverty argument, is that there is an overriding
obligation to the poor, both the poor of the third world and the poor of
industrialized countries. Failure to develop nuclear energy, it is often
claimed, would amount to denying them the opportunity to reach the
standard of affluence we currently enjoy and would create unemployment
and poverty in the industrialized nations.
The unemployment and poverty argument does not stand up to examination either for the poor of the industrial countries or for those of the third
world. There is good evidence that large-scale nuclear energy will help to
increase unemployment and poverty in the industrial world, through the
Obligations to the Future 163
diversion of great amounts of available capital into an industry which is not
only an exceptionally poor provider of direct employment, but also helps
to reduce available jobs through encouraging substitution of energy use for
labour use. 27 The argument that nuclear energy is needed for the third
world is even less convincing. Nuclear energy is both politically and
economically inappropriate for the third world, since it requires massive
amounts of capital, requires numbers of imported scientists and engineers,
and creates negligible employment, while politically it increases foreign
dependence, adds to centralized entrenched power and reduces the
chance for change in the oppressive political structures which are a large
part of the problem.28 The fact that nuclear energy is not in the interests of
people of the third world does not, of course, mean that it is not in the
interests of, and wanted by, their rulers, the westernized and often military elites in whose interests the economies of these countries are usually
organized; but it is not paternalistic to examine critically the demands
these ruling elites may make in the name of the poor.
The poverty argument then is a fraud. Nuclear energy will not be used to
help the poor.29 Both for the third world and for the industrialized countries there are well-known energy-conserving alternatives and the practical option of developing other energy sources,30 alternatives which are
morally acceptable and socially preferable to nuclear development, and
which have far better prospects for helping the poor.31
The second major argument advanced to show moral conflict appeals to
a set of supposedly overriding and competing obligations to future people.
We have, it is said, a duty to pass on the immensely valuable things and
institutions which our culture has developed. Unless our high-technological, high-energy industrial society is continued and fostered, our valuable
institutions and traditions will fall into decay or be swept away. The
argument is essentially that without nuclear power, without the continued
level of material wealth it alone is assumed to make possible, the lights of
our civilization will go out.32 .
The lights-going-out argument raises rather sharply questions as to
what is valuable in our society, and of what characteristics are necessary
for a good society. These are questions which deserve much fuller treatment than we can allot them here, but a few brief points should be made.
The argument adopts an extremely uncritical position with respect to
existing high-technology societies, apparently assuming that they are
uniformly and uniquely valuable; it also assumes that technological society is unmodifiable, that it can't be changed in the direction of energy
164 R. and V. Routley
conservation or alternative energy sources without collapse. Such a society has to be accepted and assessed as a whole, and virtually unlimited
supplies of energy are essential to maintain this whole.
These assumptions are hard to accept. The assumption that technological society's energy patterns are unmodifiable is especially so - after all, it
has survived events such as world wars which have required major social
and technological restructuring and consumption modification. If western
society's demands for energy are totally unmodifiable without collapse,
not only would it be committed to a programme of increasing destruction,
but one might ask what use its culture could be to future people who would
very likely, as a consequence of this destruction, lack the resource base
which the argument assumes to be essential in the case of contemporary
society.
There is also difficulty with the assumption of uniform valuableness; but
if this is rejected the question becomes not: what is necessary to maintain
existing high-technological society and its political institutions? but rather: what is necessary to maintain what is valuable in that society and the
political institutions which are needed to maintain those valuable things?
While it may be easy to argue that high energy consumption is necessary to
maintain the political and economic status quo, it is not so easy to argue
that it is essential to maintain what is valuable, and it is what is valuable,
presumably, that we have a duty to pass on to the future.
The evidence, e.g. from history, is that no very high level of material
affluence or energy consumption is needed to maintain what is valuable.
There is good reason in fact to believe that a society with much lower
energy and resource consumption would better foster what is valuable
than our own. But even if a radical change in these directions is independently desirable, as we believe it is, it is not necessary to presuppose such
a change, in the short term at least, in order to see that the assumptions of
the lights-going-out argument are wrong. No enormous reduction of wellbeing is required to consume less energy than at present, and certainly far
less than the large increase over present levels of consumption which is
assumed in the usual economic case for nuclear energy.33 What the nuclear strategy is really designed to do then is not to prevent the lights going
out in western civilization, but to enable the lights to go on burning all the
time - to maintain and even increase the wattage output of the Energy
Extravaganza.
In fact there is good reason to think that, far from the high energy
consumption society fostering what is valuable, it will, especially if energy
Obligations to the Future 165
is obtained by nuclear-fission means, be positively inimical to it. A society
which has become heavily dependent upon an extremely high centralized,
controlled, and garrisoned, capital- and expertise-intensive energy
source, must be one which is highly susceptible to entrenchment of power,
and one in which the forces which control this energy source, whether
capitalist or bureaucratic, can exert enormous power over the political
system and over people's lives, even more than they do at present. Very
persuasive arguments have been advanced by civil liberties groups and
others in a number of countries to suggest that such a society would tend to
become authoritarian, if only as an outcome of its response to the threat
posed by dissident groups in the nuclear situation.34
There are reasons to believe then that with nuclear development what
we would be passing on to future generations would be some of the worst
aspects of our society (e.g. the consumerism, growing concentration of
power, destruction of the natural environment, and latent authoritarianism), while certain valuable aspects would be lost or threatened. Political
freedom is a high price to pay for consumerism and energy extravagance.
Again, as in the case of the poverty arguments, clear alternatives which
do not involve such unacceptable consequences are available. The alternative to the high technology-nuclear option is not a return to the cave, the
loss of all that is valuable, but the development of alternative technologies
and life-styles which offer far greater scope for the maintenance and
further development of what is valuable in our society than the highly
centralized nuclear option.35 The lights-going-out argument, as a moral
conflict argument, accordingly fails, because it also is based on a false
dichotomy. Thus both the escape routes, the appeal to moral conflict and
to the appeal to futurity, are closed.
If then we apply the same standards of morality to the future as we
acknowledge for the present - as we have argued we should - the conclusion that the proposal to develop nuclear energy on a large scale is a crime
against the future is inevitable, since both the escape routes are closed.
There are, of course, also many other grounds for ruling it out as morally
unacceptable, for saying that it-is not only a crime against the distant future
but also a crime against the present and immediate future. These other
grounds for moral concern about nuclear energy, as it affects the present
and immediate future, include problems arising from the possibility of
catastrophic releases of radioactive fuel into the environment or of waste
material following an accident such as reactor melt-down, of unscheduled
discharges of radiation into the environment from a plant fault, of proli-
166 R. and V. Routley
feration of nuclear weapons, and of deliberate release or threat of release
of radioactive materials as a measure of terrorism or of extortion. All these
are important issues, of much moral interest. What we want to claim,
however, is that on the basis of its effects on the future alone, the nuclear
option is morally unacceptable.
Appendix
Passmore's Treatment ofRawls,
and What Really Happens on Rawls's Theory
Passmore takes it that Rawls's theory yields an unconstrained position
but, according to Rawls, the theory leads to quite the opposite result;
namely,
persons in different generations [and not merely neighbouring generations] have duties and obligations to one another just as contemporaries do. The present generation cannot do as it pleases but is bound
by the principles that would be chosen in the original position to
define justice between persons at different moments of time.. . . The
derivation of these duties and obligations may seem at first a somewhat far-fetched application of the central doctrine. Nevertheless
these requirements would be acknowledged in the original position
[where the parties do not know to which generation they belong], and
so the conception of justice as fairness covers these matters without
any change in its basic idea. ([5], p. 293; the second insert is drawn
from p. 287)
Through judicious use of the veil of ignorance and the time of entry of
parties to the original contract position, Rawls's contract theory, unlike
simpler explicit contract theories, can yield definite obligations to distant
future people,36 for example, we ought to save at a just rate for future
people.
But, as Rawls remarks (p. 284), 'the question of justice between generations . . . subjects any ethical theory to severe if not impossible tests'. It is
doubtful that Rawls's theory as formulated passes the tests; for the theory
as formulated does not yield the stated conclusion, but a conclusion
inconsistent with the thesis that there are the same obligations to future
people as to contemporaries. Exactly how these obligations arise from the
initial agreement depends critically on the interpretation of the time of
Obligations to the Future 167
entry of the parties into the agreement. Insofar as Rawls insists upon the
present-time-of-entry interpretation (p. 139), he has to introduce supplementary motivational assumptions in order to (try to) secure the desired
bondings between generations, in particular to ensure that the generation
of the original position saves for any later generation, even their immediate successors ([5], p. 140 and p. 292). Rawls falls back on-what is as we
have seen inadequate to the task, since it does not exclude one generation
damaging another remote generation in a way that bypasses mutually
successive generations - 'ties of sentiment between successive generations' (p. 292): to this limited extent Passmore has a point, for such a social
contract on its own (without additional assumptions about the motives of
the parties to the agreement) does not furnish obligations even to our
immediate successors. This is indicative also of the unsatisfactory instability of Rawls's theory under changes, its sensitivity to the way the original
agreement is set up, to the motivation of parties, their time of entry, what
they can know, etc.
To arrive at a more adequate account of obligations to the distant future
under Rawls's theory, let us adopt, to avoid the additional, dubious and
unsatisfactory, motivational assumptions Rawls invokes, one of the alternative - and non -equivalent - time-of-entry interpretations that Rawls lists
(p. 146), that of persons alive at some time in simultaneous agreement. Let
us call this, following Rawls's notation (on p. 140), interpretation 4b (it is
perhaps unnecessary to assume for 4b any more than 4a that all people
need be involved: it may be enough given the equivalencizing effect of the
veil of ignorance that some are, and as with the particular quantifier it is
quite unnecessary to be specific about numbers). Then of course the
parties, since they are, for all they know, of different generations, will
presumably agree on a just savings rate, and also to other just distribution
principles, simply on the basis of Rawlsian rationality, i.e. advancing their
own interests, without additional motivation assumptions. This more
appealing omnitemporal interpretation of time of entry into the agreement,
which gives a superior account of obligation to the future consistent with
Rawls's claim, Rawls in some places puts down as less than best (p. 292)
but in his most detailed account of the original position simply dismisses
(p. 139):
To conceive of the original position [as a gathering of people living at
different times] would be to stretch fantasy too far; the conception
would cease to be a natural guide to intuition.
168 R. and V. Rout ley
This we question: it would be a better guide to intuition than a position
(like 4a) which brings out intuitively wrong results; it is a more satisfactory
guide, for example, to justice between generations than the present-timeof-entry interpretation, which fails conspicuously to allow for the range of
potential persons (all of whom are supposed to qualify on Rawls's account
for just treatment, cf. § 77). Moreover, it stretches fantasy no further than
science fiction or than some earlier contract accounts.36 But it does
require changes in the way the original position is conceived, and it does
generate metaphysical difficulties for orthodox ontological views (though
not to the same extent for the Meinongian view we prefer); for, to consider
the latter, either time travel is possible or the original hypothetical position
is an impossible situation, with people who live at different times assembled at the same time. The difficulties - of such an impossible meeting help to reveal that what Rawls's theory offers is but a colourful representation of obligations in terms of a contract agreed upon at a meeting.
The metaphysical difficulties do not concern merely possible people,
because all those involved are sometime-actual people; nor are there
really serious difficulties generated by the fact that very many of these
people do not exist, i.e. exist now. The more serious difficulties are either
those of time travel, e.g. that future parties relocated into the present may
be able to interfere with their own history, or, if time travel is ruled out
logically or otherwise, that future parties may be advantaged (or disadvantaged) by their knowledge of history and technology, and that accordingly fairness is lost. As there is considerable freedom in how we choose to
(re)arrange the original position, we shall suppose that time travel is
rejected as a means of entering the original position. For much less than
travel is required; some sort of limited communicational network which
filters out, for example, all historical data (and all cultural or species
dependent material) would suffice; and in any case if time travel were not
excluded essentially the present-time-of-entry interpretation would serve,
though fairness would again be put in doubt. The filtered communicational
hook-up by which the omnitemporal position is engineered still has - if
fairness is to be seen to be built into the decision making - to be combined
with a reinterpreted veil of ignorance, so that parties do not know where
they are located temporally any more than they know who they are
characterwise. This implies, among other things, limitations on the parties' knowledge of factual matters, such as available technology and world
and local history; for otherwise parties could work out their location,
temporal or spatial. For example, if some party knew, as Rawls supposes,
Obligations to the Future 169
the general social facts, then he would presumably be aware of the history
of his time and so of where history ends, that is of the date of his
generation, his time (his present), and so be aware of his temporal location. These are already problems for Rawls's so-called 'present-time-ofentry interpretation' - it is, rather, a variable-time-of-entry interpretation
- given that the parties may be, as Rawls occasionally admits (e.g. p. 287),
of any one generation, not necessarily the present: either they really do
have to be ofthepresent time or they cannot be assumed to know as much
as Rawls supposes.37 There is, however, no reason why the veil of ignorance should not be extended so as to avoid this problem; and virtually any
extension that solves the problem for the variable-time-of-entry interpretation should serve, so it seems, for the omnitemporal one. We shall
assume then that the parties know nothing which discloses their respective
locations (i.e. in effect we write in conditions for universalizability of
principles decided upon). There are still gaps between the assumptions of
the omnitemporal position as roughly sketched and the desired conclusion
concerning obligations to the future, but (the matter is beginning to look
non-trivially provable given not widely implausible assumptions and) the
intuitive arguments are as clear as those in [5], indeed they simply restate
arguments to obligations given by Rawls.
Rawls's theory, under interpretation 4b, admits of nice application to
the problems of just distribution of material resources and of nuclear
power. The just distribution, or rate of usage, of material resources38 over
time is an important conservation issue to which Rawls's theory seems to
apply, just as readily, and in a similar fashion, to that in which it applies to
the issue of a just rate of savings. In fact the argument from the original
position for a just rate of saving - whatever its adequacy - can by simply
mimicked to yield an argument for just distribution of resources over
generations. Thus, for example:
persons in the original position are to ask themselves how much they
would be willing to save [i.e. conserve] at each stage of advance on
the assumption that all other generations are to save at the same rate
[conserve resources to the same extent]. . . . In effect, then, they
must choose a just savings principle [resources distribution principle]
that assigns an appropriate rate of accumulation to [degree of resource conservation at] each level of advance. ([5], p. 287; our
bracketed options give the alternative argument)
170 R. and V. Routley
Just as 'they try to piece together a just savings schedule' (p. 289), so they
can try to piece together a just resource distribution policy. Just as a case
for resource conservation can be made out by appeal to the original
position, since it is going to be against the interests of, to the disadvantage
of, later parties to find themselves in a resource depleted situation (thus,
on Rawlsian assumptions, they will bargain hard for a share of resources),
so, interestingly, a case against a rapid programme of nuclear power
development can be devised. The basis of a case against large-scale
nuclear development is implicit in Rawls's contract theory under interpretation 4b, though naturally the theory is not applied in this sort of way
by Rawls. To state the case in its crude but powerful form: people from
later generations in the original position are bound to take it as against their
interests to simply carry the waste can for energy consumed by an earlier
generation. (We have already argued that they will find no convincing
overriding considerations that make it worth their while to carry the waste
can.) Thus not only has Passmore misrepresented the obligations to the
future that Rawls's theory admits; he is also wrong in suggesting (p. 87 and
p. 91) that Rawls's theory cannot justify a policy of resource conservation
which includes reductions in present consumption.
There is, in this connection, an accumulation of errors in Passmore,
some of which spill over to Rawls, which it is worth trying to set out. First,
Passmore claims ([1], p. 86; cf. also p. 90) that 'Rawls does not so much
mention the saving of natural resources'. In fact the 'husbanding of natural
resources' is very briefly considered ([5], p. 271). It is true, however, that
Rawls does not reveal any of the considerable power that his theory,
properly interpreted, has for natural resource conservation, as implying a
just distribution of natural resources over time. Secondly, Passmore attempts ([1], pp. 87 ff.) to represent the calls of conservationists for a
reduction in present resource usage and for a more just distribution as a
call for heroic self-sacrifices; this is part of his more general attempt to
represent every moral constraint with respect to the non-immediate future
as a matter of self-sacrifice. 'Rawls's theory', Passmore says (on p. 87),
'leaves no room for heroic sacrifice', and so, he infers, leaves no room for
conservation. Not only is the conclusion false, but the premiss also:
Rawls's theory allows for supererogation, as Rawls explains ([5], p. 117).
But resource conservation is, like refraining from nuclear development,
not a question of heroic self-sacrifice; it is in part a question of obligations
or duties to the distant future. And Rawls's theory allows not only for
obligations as well as supererogation, but also for natural duties. Rawls's
Obligations to the Future 171
contract, unlike the contracts of what is usually meant by a 'contract
theory', is by no means exhaustive of the moral sphere:
But even this wider [contract] theory fails to embrace all moral
relationships, since it would seem to include only our relations with
other persons and to leave out of account how we are to conduct
ourselves towards,animals and the rest of nature. I do not contend
that the contract notion offers a way to approach these questions
which are certainly of the first importance; and I shall have to put
them aside, (p. 17)
The important class of obligations beyond the scope of the contract theory
surely generates obligations between persons which even the wider contract theory likewise cannot explain. The upshot is that such a contract
account, even if sufficient for the determination of obligations, is not
necessary. To this extent Rawls' s theory is not a full social contract theory
at all. However, Rawls appears to lose sight of the fact that his contract
theory delivers only a sufficient condition when he claims, for example (p.
298), that 'one feature of the contract doctrine is that it places an upper
bound on how much a generation can be asked to save for the welfare of
later generations'. For greater savings may sometimes be required to meet
obligations beyond those that the contract doctrine delivers. In short,
Rawls appears to have slipped into assuming, inconsistently, that his
contract theory is a necessary condition.
Although Rawls's theory caters for justice between generations and
allows the derivation of important obligations to people in the distant
future, the full theory is far from consistent on these matters and there are
significant respects in which Rawls does not take justice to the future
seriously. The most conspicuous symptoms of this are that justice to the
future is reduced to a special case, justice between generations, and that
the only aspect of justice between generations that Rawls actually considers is a just savings rate; there is, for example, no proper examination of
the just distribution of resources among generations, though these resources, Rawls believes, provide the material base of the just institutions that
he wants to see maintained. In fact Rawls strongly recommends a system
of markets as a just means for the allocation of most goods and services,
recognizing their well-known limitations only in the usual perfunctory
fashion ([5], pp. 270 ff.). Yet market systems are limited by a narrow time
horizon, and are quite ill-equipped to allocate resources in a just fashion
172 R. and V. Rout ley
over a time span of several generations. Similarly Rawls's endorsement of
democratic voting procedures as in many cases a just method of determining procedures depends upon the assumptions that everyone with ah
interest is represented. But given his own assumptions about obligations
to the future and in respect of potential persons this is evidently not the
case. Catering in a just fashion for the interests of future people poses
serious problems for any method of decision that depends upon people
being present to represent their own interests.
Some of the more conservative, indeed reactionary, economic assumptions in Rawls emerge with the assumption that all that is required for
justice between generations is a just savings rate, that all we need to pass
on to the future are the things that guarantee appropriate savings such as
capital, factories, and machines. But the transmission of these things is
quite insufficient for justice to the future, and neither necessary nor
sufficient as a foundation for a good life for future generations. What is
required for justice is the transmission in due measure of what is valuable.
Rawls has, however, taken value accumulation as capital accumulation,
thereby importing one of the grossest economic assumptions, that capital
reflects value. But of course the accumulation of capital may conflict with
the preservation of what is valuable. It is for this sort of reason (and thus,
in essence, because of the introduction of supplementary economistic
theses which are not part of the pure contract theory) that Rawls's theory
is a reactionary one from an environmental point of view; on the theory as
presented (i.e. the contract theory plus all the supplementary assumptions) there is no need to preserve such things as wilderness or natural
beauty. The savings doctrine supposes that everything of value for transmission to the future is negotiable in the market or tradeable; but then
transmission of savings can by no means guarantee that some valuable
things, not properly represented in market systems, are not eliminated or
not passed on, thereby making future people worse off. It becomes evident
in this way, too, how culturally-bound Rawls's idea of ensuring justice to
future generations through savings is. It is not just that the idea does not
apply, without a complete overhaul, to non-industrial societies such as
those of hunter-gatherers; it does not apply to genuinely post-industrial
societies either. Consideration of such alternative societies suggests that
whafis required, in place of capital accumulation, is that we pass on what
is necessary for a good life, that we ensure that the basics are fairly
distributed over time and not eroded, e.g. that in the case of the forest
people that the forest is maintained. The narrowness of Rawls's picture,
Obligations to the Future 173
which makes no due allowance for social or cultural diversity (from the
original contractual position on) or for individual diversity arises in part
from his underlying and especially narrow socio-economic assumption as
to what people want:
What men want is meaningful work in free association with others,
these associations regulating their relations to one another within a
framework of just basic institutions. ([5], p. 290)
This may be what many Harvard men want; but as a statement of what
men want it supplies neither sufficient nor even necessary conditions.39
NOTES
1 Thus according to the Fox Report ([2], p. 110; our italics).
There is at present no generally accepted means by which high level waste can be
permanently isolated from the environment and remain safe for very long periods.
. . . Permanent disposal of high-level solid wastes in stable geological formations is
regarded as the most likely solution, but has yet to be demonstrated as feasible. It is
not certain that such methods and disposal sites will entirely prevent radioactive
releases following disturbances caused by natural processes or human activity.
The Fox Report also quoted approvingly ([2], p. 187; our italics) the conclusion of the
British (Flowers) Report [6]:
There should be no commitment to a large programme of nuclear fission power until
it has been demonstrated beyond reasonable doubt that a method exist s to ensure the
safe containment of long-lived, highly radioactive waste for the indefinite future.
Although the absence of a satisfactory storage method has been conceded by some
leading proponents of nuclear development, e.g. Weinberg ([3], pp. 32-33), it is now
disputed by others. In particular, the headline for Cohen [15], which reads 'A substantial
body of evidence indicates that the high level radioactive wastes generated by U.S.
nuclear power plants can be stored satisfactorily in deep geological formations', has
suggested to many readers - what it was no doubt intended to suggest- that there is really
no problem about the disposal of radioactive wastes after all. Cohen presents, however,
no new hard evidence, no evidence not already available to the British and Australian
Commissions ([2] and [6]). Moreover the evidence Cohen does outline fails conspicuously
to measure up to the standards rightly required by the Flowers and Fox Reports. Does
Cohen offer a commercial-scale procedure for waste disposal which can be demonstrated
as safe? Far from it:
174 R. and V. Routley
The detailed procedures for handling the high-level wastes are not yet definite, but
present indications are that. . . . (Cohen [1], p. 24; our italics)
Does Cohen 'demonstrate beyond reasonable doubt' the long-term safety of burial of
wastes, deep underground? Again, far from it:
On the face of it such an approach appears to be reasonably safe. . . . (p. 24; our
italics)
Cohen has apparently not realized what is required.
At issue here are not so much scientific or empirical issues as questions of methodology, of standards of evidence required for claims of safety, and above all, of values, since
claims of safety, for example, involve implicit evaluations concerning what counts as an
acceptable risk, an admissible cost, etc. In the headline 'a substantial body of evidence
. . . indicates that. . . wastes . . . can be stored satisfactorily' the key words (italicized)
are evaluative or elastic, and the strategy of Cohen's case is to adopt very low standards
for their application. But in view of what is at stake it is hardly acceptable to do this, to
dress up in this way what are essentially optimistic assurances and untested speculations
about storage, which in any case do little to meet the difficulties and uncertainties that
have been widely pointed out as regards precisely the storage proposals Cohen outlines,
namely human or natural interference or disturbance.
2 See [18], pp. 24-25.
3 On all these points, see [14], esp. p. 141. According to the Fox Report ([2], p. 110):
Parts of the reactor structure will be highly radioactive and their disposal could be
very difficult. There is at present no experience of dismantling a full size reactor.
4 See, in particular, The Union of Concerned Scientists, The Nuclear Fuel Cycle, Friends
of the Earth Energy Paper, San Francisco 1973, p. 47; also [3], p. 32 and [14], p. 149.
5 As the discussion in [14], pp. 153-7, explains.
6 Cf. [17], pp. 35-36, [18] and, for much detail, J. R. Goffman and A. R. Tamplin, Poisoned
Power, Rodale Press, Emmau Pa. 1971.
7 On the pollution and waste disposal record of the infant nuclear industry, see [14] and
[17].
The record of many countries on pollution control, where in many cases available
technologies for reducing or removing pollution are not applied because they are considered too expensive or because they adversely affect the interests of some powerful group,
provides clear historical evidence that the problem of nuclear waste disposal would not
end simply with the devising of a 'safe' technology for disposal, even if one could be
devised which provided a sufficient guarantee of safety and was commercially feasible.
The fact that present economic and political arrangements are overwhelmingly weighted
in favour of the interests and concerns of (some) contemporary humans makes it not
unrealistic to expect the long-term nuclear waste disposal, if it involved any significant
cost at all, when public concern about the issue died down, would be seen to conflict with
the interests of contemporary groups, and that these latter interests would in many cases
be favoured. Nor, as the history of movements such as the Campaign for Nuclear
Disarmament shows, could generalized public concern in the absence of direct personal
interest, be relied upon to be sustained for long enough to ensure implementation of costly
or troublesome long-term disposal methods - even in those places where public concern
exists and is a politically significant force.
It must be stressed then that the problem is not merely one of disposal technique.
Historical and other evidence points to the conclusion that many of the most important
risks associated with nuclear waste disposal are not of the kind which might be amenable
Obligations to the Future
175
to technical solutions in the laboratory. A realistic assessment of potential costs to the
future from nuclear development cannot overlook these important non-technical risk
factors.
8 Of course the effect on people is not the only factor which has to be taken into consideration in arriving at a moral judgment. Nuclear radiation, unlike most ethical theories, does
not confine its scope to human life. But since the harm nuclear development is likely to
cause to non-human life can hardly improve its case, it suffices if the case against it can be
made out solely in terms of its effects on human life in the conventional way.
9 Proponents of nuclear power often try to give the impression that future people will not
just bear costs from nuclear development but will also be beneficiaries, because nuclear
powerprovides an 'abundant' or even 'unlimited' source of energy; thus Weinberg ([3], p.
34): 'an all but infinite source of relatively cheap and clean energy'. A good example of an
attempt to create the impression that 'abundant' and 'cheap' energy from nuclear fission
will be available to 'our descendants', i.e. all future people, is found in the last paragraph
of Cohen [15]. Such claims are most misleading, since fission power even with the breeder
reactor has only about the same prospective lifetime as coal-produced electricity (a point
that can be derived using data in A. Parker, 'World Energy Resources: A Survey', Energy
Policy, Vol. 3 [1975], pp. 58-66), and it is quite illegitimate to assume that nuclear fusion,
for which there are still major unsolved problems, will have a viable, clean technology by
the time fission runs out, or, for that matter, that it ever will. Thus while some few
generations of the immediate future may obtain some benefits as well as costs, there is a
very substantial chance that tho se of the more distant future will obtain nothing but costs.
10 These feelings, of which Smith's and Hume's sympathy is representative, are but the
feeling echoes of obligation. At most, sympathy explains the feeling of obligation or lack
of it, and this provides little guide as to whether there is an obligation or not - unless one
interprets moral sympathy, the feeling of having a obligation, or being obligated, itself as
a sufficient indication of obligation, in which case moral sympathy is a non-explanatory
correlate in the feelings department of obligation itself and cannot be truly explanatory of
the ground of it; unless, in short, moral sympathy reduces to an emotive rewrite of moral
obligation.
11 Elsewhere in [1] Passmore is especially exercised that our institutions and intellectual
traditions - presumably only the better ones - should be passed on to posterity, and that
we should strive to make the world a better place, if not eventually an ideal one.
12 This is not the only philosophically important issue in environmental ethics on which
Passmore is inconsistent. Consider his: 'over-arching intention: to consider whether the
solution of ecological problems demands a moral or metaphysical revolution' (p. x),
whether the West needs a new ethic and a new metaphysics. Passmore's answer in [1] is
an emphatic No.
Only insofar as Western moralists have [made various erroneous suggestions] can
the West plausibly be said to need a 'new ethic'. What it needs, for the most part, is
not so much a 'new ethic' as adherence to a perfectly familiar ethic.
For the major sources of our ecological disasters - apart from ignorance - are
greed and shortsightedness, which amount to much the same thing. . . There is no
novelty in the view that greed is evil; no need of a new ethic to tell us as much. (p. 187)
'The view that the West now needs. . . a new concept of nature' is similarly dismissed (p.
186, cf. p. 72). But in his paper [1*] (i.e. 'Attitudes to Nature', Royal Institute of
Philosophy Lectures, Vol. 8, Macmillan, London 1975), which is said to be an attempt to
bring together and to reformulate some of the basic philosophical themes of [1], Passmore's answer is Yes, and quite different themes, inconsistent with those of [1], are
advanced:
176 R. and V. Routley
[T]he general conditions I have laid down . . . have not been satisfied in most of the
traditional philosophies of nature. To that degree it is true, I think, that we do need a
'new metaphysics' which is genuinely not anthropocentric. . . . A 'new metaphysics', if it is not to falsify the facts, will have to be naturalistic, but not reductionist.
The working out of such a metaphysics is, in my judgement, the most important task
which lies ahead of philosophy. ([1*], pp. 260-1)
A new ethic accompanies this new metaphysics.
The emergence of new moral attitudes to nature is bound up, then, with the emergence of a more realistic philosophy of nature. That is the only adequate foundation
for effective ecological concern. ([1*], p. 264)
This is a far cry from the theme of [1] that ecological problems can be solved within the
traditions of the West.
13 Put differently, the causal linkage can bypass intermediate generations, especially given
action at a temporal distance: the chain account implies that there are no moral constraints in initiating such causal linkages. The chain picture accordingly seems to presuppose an unsatisfactory Humean model of causation, demanding contiguity and excluding
action at a distance.
14 Golding we shall concede to Passmore, though even here the case is not clearcut. For
Golding writes towards the end of his article ([12], p. 96):
My discussion, until this point, has proceeded on the view that we have obligations
to future generations. But do we? I am not sure that the question can be answered in
the affirmative with any certainty. I shall conclude this note with a very brief
discussion of some of the difficulties.
All of Passmore's material on Golding is drawn from this latter and, as Golding says,
'speculative' discussion.
15 There is no textual citation for Bentham at all for the chapter of [1] concerned, viz. Ch. 4,
'Conservation'.
16 As Passmore himself at first concedes ([1], p. 84):
If, as Bentham tells us, in deciding how to act men ought to take account of the
effects of their actions on every sentient being, they obviously ought to take account
of the pleasure and pains of the as yet unborn.
17 Neither rightness nor probable lightness in the hedonistic senses correspond to these
notions in the ordinary sense; so at least [13] argues, following much anti-utilitarian
literature.
18 On this irrationality different theories agree: the rational procedure, for example according to the minimax rule for decision-making under uncertainty, is to minimize that
outcome which maximizes harm.
19 Discount, or bank, rates in the economists' sense are usually set to follow the market (cf.
P. A. Samuelson, Economics, 7th ed., McGraw-Hill, New York 1967, p. 351). Thus the
rates have little moral relevance.
20 Cf. Rawls [5], p. 287: 'From a moral point of view there are no grounds for discounting
future well-being on the basis of pure time preference.'
21 What the probabilities would be depends on the theory of probability adopted: a Carnapian theory, e.g., would lead back to the unconstrained position.
Obligations to the Future 177
22 A real possibility is one which there is evidence for believing could eventuate. A real
possibility requires producible evidence for its consideration. The contrast is with mere
logical possibility.
23 Thus, to take a simple special case, economists dismiss distant future people from their
assessments of utility, welfare, etc., on the basis of their non-existence; cf. Ng ('the utility
of a non-existent person is zero') and Harsanyi ('only existing people [not even ""nonexisting potential individuals""] can have real utility levels since they are the only ones
able to enjoy objects with a positive utility, suffer from objects with a negative utility, and
feel indifferent to objects with zero utility') (see Appendix B of Y. K. Ng, 'Preference,
Welfare, and Social Welfare', paper presented at the Colloquium on Preference, Choice
and Value Theory, RSSS, Australian National University, August 1977, pp. 24, 26-27).
Non-existent people have no experiences, no preferences; distant future people do not
exist; therefore distant future people have no utility assignments - so the sorites goes. But
future people at least will have wants, preferences, and so on, and these have to be taken
into account in adequate utility assessments (which should be assessed over afuture time
horizon), no matter how much it may complicate or defeat calculations.
24 There are problems about formulating universalizability satisfactorily, but they hardly
affect the point. The requisite universalizability can in fact be satisfactorily brought out
from the semantical analysis of deontic notions such as obligation, and indeed argued for
on the basis of such an analysis which is universal in form. The lawlikeness requirement,
which can be similarly defended, is essentially that imposed on genuine scientific laws by
logical empiricists (e.g. Carnap and Hempel), that such laws should contain no proper
names or the like, no reference to specific locations or times.
25 Such a principle is explicit both in classical utilitarianism (e.g. Sidgwick [11], p. 414), and
in a range of contract and other theories from Kant and Rousseau toRawls ([5], p. 293).
How the principle is argued for will depend heavily, however, on the underlying theory;
and we do not want to make our use depend heavily on particular ethical theories.
26 See esp. R. Lanoue, NuclearPlants:The MoreTheyBuild, The More You Pay, Centerfor
Study of Responsive Law, Washington DC 1976; also [14], pp. 212 ff.
27 On all these points see R. Grossman and G. Daneker, Guide to Jobs and Energy,
Environmentalists for Full Employment, Washington DC 1977, pp. 1-7, and also the
details supplied in substantiating the interesting case of Commoner [7]. On the absorption
of available capital by the nuclear industry, see as well [18], p. 23. On the employment
issues, see too H. E. Daly in [9], p. 149. A more fundamental challenge to the poverty
argument appears in I. Illich, Energy and Equality, Calder & Boyars, London 1974,
where it is argued that the sort of development nuclear energy represents is exactly the
opposite of what the poor need.
28 For much more detail on the inappropriateness see E. F. Schumacher, Small is Beautiful,
Blond & Briggs, London 1973. As to the capital and other requirements, see [2], p. 48, and
also [7] and [9].
For an illuminating look at the sort of development high-energy technology will tend to
promote in the so-called underdeveloped countries, see the paper of Waiko and other
papers in the Melanesian Environment (ed. by J. H. Winslow), Australian National
University Press, Canberra 1977.
29 This fact is implicitly recognized in [2], p. 56.
30 A useful survey is given in A. Lovins, Energy Strategy: The Road Not Taken, Friends of
the Earth Australia, 1977 (reprinted from Foreign Affairs, October 1976); see also [17],
[6], [7], [14], pp. 233 ff., and Schumacher, op. cit.
31 This is also explained in [2], p. 56.
32 An argument like this is suggested in Passmore [1], Chs. 4 and 7, with respect to the
question of saving resources. In Passmore this argument for the overriding importance
of passing on contemporary culture is underpinned by what appears to be a future-
178 R. and V. Routley
directed ethical version of the Hidden Hand argument of economics - that, by a coincidence which if correct would indeed be fortunate, the best way to take care of the future
(and perhaps even the only way to do so, since do-good intervention is almost certain to
go wrong) is to take proper care of the present and immediate future. The argument has
all the defects of the related Chain Argument discussed above and others.
33 See [14], p. 66, p. 191, and also [7].
34 For such arguments see esp. M. Flood and R. Grove-White, Nuclear Prospects. A
Comment on the Individual, the State and Nuclear Power, Friends of the Earth, Council
for the Protection of Rural England and National Council for Civil Liberties, London
1976.
35 For a recent sketch of one such alternative which is outside the framework of the
conventional option of centralized bureaucratic socialism, see E. Callenbach's novel,
Ecotopia, Banyan Tree Books, Berkeley, California 1975. For the outline of a liberation
socialist alternative see Radical Technology (ed. by G. Boyle and P. Harper), Undercurrents Limited, London 1976, and references therein.
36 Some earlier contract theories also did. Burke's contract (in E. Burke, Reflections on the
Revolution in France, Dent, London 1910, pp. 93-94) 'becomes a partnership not only
between those who are living, but between those who are living, those who are dead and
those who are not yet born'. Thus Burke's contract certainly appears to lead to obligations to distant future generations. Needless to say, there are metaphysical difficulties,
which however Burke never considers, about contracts between parties at widely separated temporal locations.
37 Several of the preceding points we owe to M. W. Jackson.
38 Resources such as soil fertility and petroleum could even be a primary social goods on
Rawls's very hazy general account of these goods ([5], pp. 62, 97): are these 'something a
rational man wants whatever else he wants'? The primary social goods should presumably be those which are necessary for the good and just life -which will however vary with
culture.
39 We have benefited from discussion with Ian Hughes and Frank Muller and useful
comments on the paper from Brian Martin and Derek Browne.
REFERENCES
[1] J. Passmore, Man's Responsibility for Nature, Duckworth, London 1974.
[2] Ranger Uranium Environmental Inquiry First Report, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra 1977.
[3] A. M. Weinberg, 'Social Institutions and Nuclear Energy"", Science, Vol. 177 (July 1972),
pp. 27-34.
•
[4] R. Routley, 'Exploring Meinong's Jungle II. Existence is Existence Now', Notre Dame
Journal of Formal Logic (to appear).
[5] J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass. 1971.
[6] Nuclear Power and the Environment. Sixth Report of the British Royal Commission on
Environmental Pollution, London 1976.
[7] B. Commoner, The Poverty of Power, Knopf, New York 1976.
[8] G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1903.
[9] B. Commoner, H. Boksenbaum and M. Corr (Eds.), Energy and Human Welfare - A
Critical Analysis, Vol. III, Macmillan, New York 1975.
Obligations to the Future 179
[10] J. Bentham, The Works of Jeremy Bentham, Vol. 1, published under the superintendence of J. Bowring, with an intro. by J. H. Burton; William Tait, Edinburgh 1843.
[11] H. Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, Macmillan, London 1962 (reissue).
[12] M. P. Golding, 'Obligations to Future Generations', Monist, Vol. 56 (1972), pp. 85-99.
[13] R. and V. Routley, 'An Expensive Repair Kit for Utilitarianism', presented at the
Colloquium on Preference, Choice and Value Theory, RSSS, Australian National
University, August 1977.
[14] R. Nader and J. Abbotts, The Menace of Atomic Energy, Outback Press, Melbourne
1977.
[15] B. L. Cohen, 'The Disposal of Radioactive Wastes from Fission Reactors', Scientific
American, Vol. 236 (June 1977), pp. 22-31.
[16] S. McCracken, 'The Waragainst the Atom' .Commentary (September 1977), pp. 33-47.
[17] A. B. Lovins and J. H. Price, Non-Nuclear Futures: The Case for an Ethical Energy
Strategy, Friends of the Earth International, San Francisco 1975.
[18] A. Roberts, ""The Politics of Nuclear Power', Arena, No. 41 (1976), pp. 22-47.
",,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/6ef0b9e2ef93f843eb517882e681cbb3.pdf,Text,"Published Papers",1,0
89,https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/show/89,"Metaphysical fallout from the nuclear predicament",,,"Richard Routley",,"Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy",1984,"This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, Dr. N.A.J. Taylor.","For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library.",,Manuscript,,"Journal Article",,,"RICHARD ROUTLEY
metaphysical fallout from
nuclear predicament
the
string of nuclear prophets has produced a series of philosophically oriented works on nuclear war ’ The series is
important for its deeper penetration mto the main nuclear predicament, down to metaphysical levels; m this, the series contrasts with the superficialities of much of the political commentary. The most widely circulated and influential text of the
series is undoudbtedly that of the slightest of the ’prophets&dquo;,
A
Schell’s The Fate of the Earth. This skillful piece of mediasome of the apparently
Anders So, conveniently,
main assumptions of Schell and Anders can often be considered together. To criticize their assumptions is not of course
to belittle their work. In particular, Schell’s little book, for all its
political shortcomings, is having a significant and much
needed effect m shifting attitudes towards nuclear arrangements. It is especially valuable for its vivid and horrifying scenarios of the aftermath of nuclear attack Unfortunately it also
exhibits, both philosophically and factually, severe defects.
philosophy unncannily redeploys
deep phenomenological themes of
Some of it is simply rubbish- to take one example, consider
the claim that &dquo;without ... a worldwide program of action
for preserving the [human] species, .. nothing else that
we undertake together can make any practical or moral
sense ...&dquo; (p.173, rearranged). This should certainly be rejected philosophically; for there is no separate moral issue of
such overwhelming importance that all other issues become
morally neutral. Moral issues remain moral issues they do
not cease to be so when compared with more important moral
issues (as Schell effectively acknowledges elsewhere, e g
p.130). And the claim should be questioned on more factual
grounds. Humans form a highly resilient species, like rats a
survivor species, unlikely to be entirely exterminated under
presently arranged nuclear holocausts.
The example was selected, however, because it leads into,
indeed presupposes, two of the major defective assumptions
in the work of Schell and Anders:
S 1. Nuclear war will eliminate I~fe, human life at least,
(the extinction assumption) and
on
earth
S2. In the absence of humans, very many notions, not only
those of mortality and values, but those of time and space for
example, make no sense: or, to put it mto a more sympathefic
philosophical form, these notions depend for their sense on
an actual human context (the extravagant anthropocentric
assumption).22
of S2 which gave Anders’ and Schell’s works
of their apparent philosophical depth, and certainly induce much philosophical puzzlement through the paradoxical
propositions generated. But the frequent applications of S2
It
is
applications
some
S1.3
For without total extinction there
will be humans about, to make past and future, to do good
end evil, and to go on making sense!
depend essentially
on
Granted, assumption S1
by no means ruled out as a real
possibility, as the technological means appear available to
make it true (to render Homo Sapiens extinct).4 Granted, the
prospect of large-scale nuclear war does threaten leading
is
centers of Western civilization with obliteration. Even so, S1
unlikely m the light of present-admittedly inadequate-information Even m Canada, which lies on the polar
appears
route of Soviet missiles, human life should be able to continue
in certain northern areas (according to Canadian medical
studies). Schell’s argument to S1 is extremely flimsy. It de-
pends, for example,
20
on an unjustified extrapolation from the
Northern to the Southern Hemisphere, but for the most part it
does that very North American thing of contracting the world
to North America. (All that matters, all worthwhile civilization,
is in the USA, or at least, to be more char~table, in North
America and Europe, which will also be wiped out, e , its
entire human population will be eliminated in a nuclear holocaust.) Some of the data Schell relies upon, for example the
effect of nuclear explosions on the ozone layer, was significantly out of date even when he wrote Other effects than
ozone destruction, such as variations in the ultraviolet radiation and temperature levels, apparently extrapolate even less
well from North to South A factually superior study of nuclear
produced at about the same time as Schell’s, by
and others, indicates that part of the Southern Hemisphere, such as New Zealand and southern latitudes of Latin
Amenca, could escape relatively unscathed from even the
most massive northern exchanges.
disaster
Preddy
Doomsday prophets may appear to have gained new purchase through recent (if belated) scientific forecasts of a nuclear winter following upon nuclear war But although these
forecasts certainly add a new, and alarming, ecological dimension to the very damaging consequences of large-scale
nuclear war, they do not sustain the extinction assumpt~on.55
On the available evidence, human life will continue, though no
doubt with new complications and simplifications, for example
in many southern mid-latitude coastal regions outside zones
of radiation fallout More generally, life will go on, though likely
seriously and irreversibly impoverished through loss of valuable nonhuman systems and creatures.
Nuclear prophets usually see the world (though with most of it
carried along) as already set, in crucial respects, on the route
to nuclear catastrophe. Much of the way taken is seen as both
inevitable and irreversible Thus both Anders and Schell insist
upon the &dquo;impossibility of unlearning&dquo; the means of manufacturing nuclear bombs. It would seem that extinction,
which they both foresee, would furnish a good medium for
unlearning nuclear technology (something very like this
emerges from van Damken’s theory of an earlier &dquo;h~gh&dquo; technology). In virtue of S2, they would, however, exclude such a
possibility as a case of unlearning, contending wrongly that
the notion no longer made sense. But what they again want to
suggest with the i m possibility-of -u n learning message is the
inevitability of the development and eventual use of the
technology-as if having learned the means all else was determined, and manufacture and use ceased to be a matter of
choice. Certainly such views have been advanced6, but they
are not tenable There are many examples of technological
advances that have not been taken advantage of, and there
are even cases of technological developments that have
been manufactured but not marketed or used. There is not
something very special about nuclear apparatus that puts it
beyond the scope of such generalizations.
Both Schell and Anders do claim that there are very special
things about nuclear weapons, notably that they do not allow
Even if this were true just of nuclear
11 experiment
it
is certainly not of smaller weapons-it
weapons-and
would not rebut the previous argument against the inevitability of nuclear weapons. And in fact Anders and (even) Schell
&dquo;
21
hedge their claims about testing, and the limits to nuclear
scientific work, to large-scale weapons and independent experiments which do not interfere with observers and those
outside the &dquo;laboratories.&dquo; Again they have latched onto major prints, m particular, we have at present no way of testing
the cumulative effects of large-scale nuclear weapons in concert, e.g. for more holistic effects, such as fireballs or firestorms, or changes m coupled atmospheric circulation and
radiation fields. Short of a large-scale nuclear war, and likely
enough with it, these crucial effects must remain largely untested and hypothetical in character. Nontheless enough data
can be assembled to carry through informative modellings,
which point to the improbability of S1, and so undermine applications of S2.
The penetration of human chauvinism, as
thing peculiar to Schell and Anders, but is
m
S2,
a
product of West-
is
not some-
philosophy, European philosophy especially. This
chauvinism is unfortunately alive and still well, Anders version of S2 being just one striking illustration (cf. AA p. 252ff.).
It has also deeply penetrated Anglo-American philosophy,
and has been extended under the influence of Wittgenstein’s
ern
work, where
even the necessary truths of mathematics are
taken to be a product of human conventions, and would vanish with humans! Such are the alleged implications of extinction : but the fact is that the truths of arithmetic are m no way
dependent on the existence of humans or humanoids or of
gods or giraffes. As with necessary truths and falsehoods so
with contingents ones: very many propositions about the
world do not depend upon in any way for their truth-value or
content on humans or their communities.
_
22
In Schell, human chauvinism is dished up in a particularly
powerful and obnoxious Kantian form. Thoughts and propositions, time and tenses, history and memories, values and
morality all depend on the life-giving presence of human
beings-past or future or merely potential humans are not
enough. Thus, according to Schell (p 140, e.g), &dquo; . the
thought ’Humanity is now extinct’ is an impossible one for a
rational person, because as soon as it is, we are not In
imagining any other event, we look ahead to a moment that is
still within the stream of human tame....&dquo; The thought is however perfectly possible for humans; we can have it right now.
Though we no doubt have it falsely, a later rational creature
may well be able to have it truly. Schell erroneously denies
that: there is no &dquo;later&dquo; &dquo;outside the human tenses of past,
present, and future ... &dquo; (p 140) .7 Human extinction eliminates &dquo;the creature that divides time into past, present and
future&dquo;
annihilation cannot &dquo;come to pass&dquo; (p.143). But it
false
that the tenses are human: the tenses depend
simply
on a local time ordering (perceptible to many creatures other
than humans, but not depending at all on that perceptibility for
its viability) relating other times to the present, to now (also a
human-independent location, evident to other creatures, and
borne witness to by such sequences as the passing seasons). Annihilation may also too easily come to pass, for
many humans m the North at least, as it came to pass in
recent geological times that humans began to exist upon
earth Before that there was a time before there were any
human beings.
so
is
Anders’ argument for the demise of time, that &dquo;what has been
will no longer be even what has been,&dquo; is also explicitly (and
narrowly) verificatiomst: &dquo;for what would the difference be between what has only been and what has never been, if there
is no one to remember the things that have been (AA p.245).
There would still remain many sorts of differences; for one,
the history recorded m many other organisms would be different Temporal themes do not lack wlegitimacy because not
registered [or verified] by anyone&dquo;; truth, significance, still
less meaning, are not matters of human verification.
elsewhere, the human chauvinism is mixed with
distorting metaphysical assumptions of our Western
heritage, m particular, verificationism and ontological
assumptions (to the effect that there are severe difficulties m
talking about what does not exist Thus, for example, Schell
takes over dubious metaphysics from Freud, according to
whom ’nt is mdeed impossible to imagine our own death: and
whenever we attempt to do so, we can perceive that we are m
fact still present as spectators&dquo; (p 138) The second clause
goes a good distance towards refuting the first In fact there is
no great difficulty in describing counterfactual situations
which undermine both of Freud’s claims. The same goes for
Schell’s extensions of human chauvinism into one of its main
traditional strongholds, value theory: &dquo; . the simple and
basic fact (sic!) that before there can be good or evil, service
or harm, lamenting or rejoicing, there must be life.&dquo; human
life (p.171 ) These are no facts, but deeply entrenched philosophical dogmas (which have been exposed and criticized
elsewhere, e.g , HC).
Here,
as
other
will disappear with the extinction of
humans: trivially there will be no more humans (unless humans re-evolve or are recreated), and thus no more human
communities, human institutions, human activities, human
emotions, and so forth But it is already gomg too far to sug-
Naturally
23
many
things
gest,
as
no
Anders does, that there will
accordingly
be &dquo;no
love, no struggle, no pain, no hope, no comfort,
sacrifice, no image, no song...&dquo; For there are, and may
thought,
no
continue to exist, other creatures than humans with emotion,
struggles, songs... Nor will the ending of all such human
ventures, if it comes to pass, show that all past human ventures have been &dquo;all in vain,&dquo; meaningless, and already so to
say dead The decay of the solar system, or the heat-death of
the universe even, will not show that worthwhile human activities were not worthwhile.9 Several of the other notions and
themes common to Schell and Anders derive from their
shared assumptions S1 and S2. It is these that underlie the
biblical notion (in Revelations) of a Second Death, redeployed
by both. &dquo;The death of mankind,&dquo; under S1 , is reckoned a
&dquo;second death,&dquo; because by S2 and S1 remamng life is rendered meaningless and already ’ seems to be dead (AA
p.244, S p 166) and is already overhung with death&dquo; (S
p.166). Thus, too, more trivially, a person faces &dquo;a second
death,&dquo; not merely one’s own but m addition that greater
death of the species and all future generations (S p 166.
p.1 15). However, even if nuclear extinction came to pass, the
stronger notion would not be vindicated, because it depends
on the fallacious inference to the meaninglessness of preceding life and on the very questionable representation of this
meaninglessness as a sort of death. There is no such Second
Death: creatures die just once, perhaps all at about the same
time. The idea of a Second Death lacks even a solid metaphysical base.
From S1 ,
together with the minor principle that the extinction
absolute
does not differ m degree, comes the unibeing
versality of peril theme that &dquo;we are all exposed to peril m
the same degree,&dquo; which is accordingly &dquo;d~sgmsed~ and &dquo;difficult to recognize,&dquo; because there is no contrast (AE p 64;
S p.150). This theme falls with S1. In any event, not all peoples are equally imperilled by the nuclear situation, the Indians of southern Patagonia being rather better placed than
the Germans of northern Europe Nor are all people equally
locked into the situation or incapacitated by it; the prospects
are different in different countries and places.
an
Nor, likewise,
are
all
people equally responsible,
a
pernicious
theme which Schell (m contrast to Anders) repeatedly
filtrates. This is the Pogo theme, according to whichS3.
co,
24
in-
Responsibility for the present nuclear predIcament (flasreally) dlstnbutes onto everybody, It belongs to every hu-
man lií
the world
’o
...i
But there is also, mixed in, a weaker, more plausible claim
that gives the lie to the stronger one, namely, that we have
some responsibility (the Nazi situation is compared) An especially blatant example of the Pogo theme’ runs as follows:
&dquo;... the world’s political leaders
though they now menace
the earth with nuclear weapons, do so only with our permission, and even at our bidding. At least, this is true for democracies&dquo; (pp.229-30). The theme is elaborated elsewhere:
&dquo;... we are the authors of that distinction (For the populations of the superpowers this is true in a positive sense,
since we pay for extinction and support the governments that
pose the threat of it, while for the peoples of the non-nucleararmed world it is true only m the negative sense that they fail
to try to do anything about the danger)&dquo; (p.152). But this is
...
of an argument indicting representative government, by
revealing its insensitivity and unresponsiveness to many of
the populace they allegedly govern, not to mention those
affected by its activities who are not represented at all (namely foreigners). But Schell conveniently neglects all such
points: &dquo;... we are all potential mass killers. The moral cost of
more
nuclear armaments is that it makes all of us underwriters of
the slaughter of hundreds of millions&dquo; (p 152) And again [at]
perpetrators ... we convey the steady message .. that life
not only is not sacred but it is worthless; that ... it had been
judged acceptable for everyone to be killed&dquo; (p 153) Little of
this is true. Those who campaign against nuclear arrangements, vote against nuclear-committed parties so far as is
possible, and the like, are certainly not the authors of potential
destruction, and responsibility for the nuclear situation does
not simply distribute onto them. Nor does the responsibilityor the unlikely opinions as to worth Schell illegitimately attributes to everyone-fall on those who have done less.
Responsibility for decisions taken in &dquo;literal democracies&dquo;
even by representatives (m the unlikely event of this happening m the case of anything as important as defense) cannot
be traced back to those represented, since among many
other things, a representative is only representative of a party
which offers a complex and often ill-characterized package of
policies, and a voter may vote for zero or more policies of this
package. Only m the (uncommon) event of a clear single
issue referendum, which is adopted, can responsibility, still of
a qualified sort, be sheeted home, to those who voted for it,
not to everyone in the community. While S3 is false, there is
an important related theme that is much more plausible,
namely, that the present nuclear situation generates
responsibilities for every socially involved person.
25
When
moreover
the
Pogo assumption
is
disentangled
from
the accompanyng themes, part of what results
along the right lines: namely,
is
decidedly
S4 The controllers [not to be confused, in Schell’s fashion,
with all of us] have failed to change our pre-nuclear mstltutlons. The sovereign system Is out of step with the nuclear age, the one-earth system, etc. (the whole earth
theme).
Though Schell remains relatively clear about the serious defects of the state and the frequently immoral purposes for
which the state is used, unfortunately he often loses sight of
this important theme (indicated pp.187-8) Yet S4 forms part
of Schell’s critique of the state which is, by and large, scattered and fragmentary. Schell arrives at the conclusion that
the nation-state has outlasted its usefulness, and that new
political institutions more &dquo;consonant with the global reality&dquo;
are required as a matter of urgency. But he evades what he
admits is the major task, making out viable alternatives. 12 At
most he makes some passing gestures, some pointing
towards the Way Up to world political control
Solutions to the nuclear arms dilemma come, if not easily, m a
similar simplistic way, from Top Down: those who can must
appeal to the Top, to those who govern (cf. p.230). Schell
places his hope m treaties for arms reduction and limitations,
such as SALT, and m world government, through the United
Nations (see p.225ff. and especially p 227, bottom paragraph) Given the record of these organizations and treaties,
the negotiations and regulators, it is by now a pathetic faith.
Nor is a serious need felt for further analysis of the nuclear
situation, to investigate the origins of nuclear technology, to
explore the roots of nuclear blindness, to consider effective
changes to military-mdustrial organization and ways of life.
26
But some of the requisite deeper analysis of the nuclear situation and, more generally, of the roots of war can be found in
Anders and elsewhere. 13 The roots of the nuclear predicament are not confined to the ideologically-aligned arrangements of nation-states, but penetrate also into key components of those states, their military, their controlling
classes, and their supporting bureaucracies Both within the
arrangements of states, what accounts in part for the arrangements, and in key components of the states, a conspicuous
and crucial feature is the drive for power and domination (and,
often, the accompanyng privilege). 14 Thus the push for [nuclear] superiority by the super-states, to be achieved through
military-oriented science and technology, which involves and
enables domination,in several interrelated forms The main
the large nation-state, where enough surplus
be accumulated (from at home and from abroad,
and bled from nature) to proceed with military and bureaucratic ambitions and to found the high-technology research
and development means to ever more expendable power and
power-base
product can
is
energy. 15
In
changing the
structural arrangements to eliminate the proof
nuclear
war, it is not ultimately enough just to downspect
the
main
power-base, the nation-state: it is also imporgrade
tant to alter key components of the state, and, more
sweepingly, to remove trouble-making patterns embedded m
all these social and political arrangements, namely, patterns
of domination-patterns manifested not only in state political
organization, but in white-coloured relations, male-female relations, human-animal relations, human-nature relations-to
remove, m short, chauvinistic relations. However, not everything needs to be accomplished at once: the cluster of
damaging power and domination relations tied into war can
be tackled separately There the problems can largely be
narrowed to certain problems of states and certain key components of states
In what analysis he does offer of the problem with states,
Schell repeats the familiar false contrast of state expediency
with morality, as a contrast between &dquo;raison d’etat&dquo; and the
Socratic-Christian ethics The teaching that &dquo;the end justifies
the means is the basis on which governments, in all times,
have licensed themselves to commit crimes of every sort&dquo;
(p 134). So &dquo;states may do virtually anything whatever m the
name of [their] survival.&dquo; Schell then argues, however, that
extinction nullifies end-means justification by destroying
every end; but again the argument is far from sound, and
depends on human chauvinism (as under S2) combined with
ontological assumptions. Even if all humans were extinguished (as under S1 ) ends could remain, for instance, for
nonhumans such as animals and extraterrestrials, actual or
not. The end-means argument can, however, be repaired to
remove such objections: instead it is claimed that extinction
27
nullifies end-means justification by frustrating the realization
of every relevant end-meaning by &dquo;relevant,&dquo; in this context, those ends the realization of which the state appeals to
m justification of its nuclear policies. 16 A nuclear war, even
without human extinction but with severe enough losses,
would undoubtedly frustrate the realization of relevant state
ends So even from an expediency perspective, super-state
policies are open to severe criticism, for example, as motivationally irrational in the nuclear risks taken.
As to the part of the state and (state) sovereignty m war,
Schell leaves us in no doubt. A sovereign state is virtually
defined as one that enjoys the right and power to go to war m
defense or pursuit of its interests (p 187) War arises from
how things are, from the arrangement of political affairs via
jealous nation-states (p.188). Indeed there is a two-way linkage between having sovereignty and capacity to wage
war. On the one side, sovereignty is, Schell contends, necessary for people to organize for war. On the other side, without
war it is impossible to preserve sovereignty Neither of these
contentions is transparently clear as it stands. The first is
damaged by civil war and the like, the second by the persistence of small nonmilitary states. Now that the macro-state
system is entrenched, it is, however, easy for conservatives
(m particular) to argue from the &dquo;realties&dquo; of international life,
which includes self-interest, aggression, fear, hatred. It is on
this basis that peace arrangements are readily dismissed as
unrealistic, utopian, even (amusingly) as extremist (cf. p.185).
Schell’s further theme that nuclear war is not war threatens,
however, to undermine his case against the sovereign state:
for example, his ends-means argument and the argument
based on its nuclear-war making capacity. Fortunately the
not-war theme needs much qualification, and starts out from
an erroneous characterization of war as &dquo;a violent means
employed by a nation to achieve an end&dquo; (p.189): but this is
neither necessary nor sufficient for war. What is correct is that
nuclear wars are very different from previous conventional
(cf. WP). Schell goes on to claim that war requires an
end which nuclear &dquo;war&dquo; does not have. But nuclear attacks
can certainly have ends (even if large nuclear wars cannot be
won in the older sense: but not all wars or games are won). It
is also claimed that war depends on weakness, on one side
being defeated on a decision by arms. But in a nuclear &dquo;war&dquo;
this doesn’t happen, &dquo;no one’s strength fails until both sides
have been annihilated&dquo; (p.190). But what these sorts of considerations contribute to showing is again not that nuclear
wars are not wars, but that they are not wars of certain sorts,
e.g., not just wars (because they fail on such criteria as reasonable prospect of success and improvement), not rational
wars (in a good sense), and so on. That conventional wars
have persisted into nuclear times does damage to Schell’s
argument that nuclear weapons have also ruined &dquo;conventional&dquo; wars, and his connected theme that the demise of
war has left no means to finally settle disputes between nations, for the final court has been removed (pp 192-193). The
theme depends on a pair of mistaken propositions: that conwars
28
cerning the demise of conventional war, and the idea that war
of some sort has to be the final &dquo;court of appeal&dquo; between
nations (for there are other types of contests that could serve,
and there is also the possibility of more cooperative behaviour, e.g. joint referenda) The theme also imports the
social-Darwinian assumption of Clausewicz (the &dquo;log~c of
war&dquo; theme) that war has to proceed to the technological
limit-as if war and violence were thoroughly natural activities, independent of recognized social settings (for winning,
surrender, etc.), and ruleless activities. On the contrary, wars
are parasitic on social organizations such as states and are
governed by a range of understandings, conventions and
rules. They are a social phenomenon, with a rule structure, if
not a
29
logic.
Much capital has been made not merely from the logic of
war&dquo; but from what is now called &dquo;the logic of deterrence&dquo; and
the &dquo;logic of nuclear [strategic] planning.&dquo; The message that
is usually supposed to emerge is that the massive arrangements the world is now entangled in are perfectly logical,
sound, rational. However, this represents little more than a
cheap semantical trick. Logic in no way justifies the present
arrangements, or anything like them, or renders them reasonable. There are logics of decision (as presented, e.g., for the
classical case in Jeffrey) which can be applied in strategic
planting; but they do not yeld specific results without desirability measures being assigned to alternative outcomes,
that is without values being pumped in, extralogically. There
are various ways these value assignments may be determined, to meet moral requirements or not: but in nuclear
strategic planning they have invariably been settled on the
basis of expediency 17 . For the most part, however, &dquo;logic of&dquo;
tends to be used very loosely, as a word of general commendation, to cover something like &dquo;reasomng and rational
considerations entering into the policy or strategy of.&dquo; In these
terms, Schell, who like others enjoys playing with the term
&dquo;logic of,&dquo; should write of &dquo;the illogic of deterrence,&dquo; for he
emphasizes its unreasonableness. For instance, he stresses
(p.213) the disparity between the supposed rationality of
threatening use of nuclear weapons and the irrationality
(even from a national interest viewpoint) of actually using
them should the threat fail- 18 yet the success of deterrence
doctrine depends on the credibility of the threat of this unjustifiable and irrational use. Indeed Schell wants to go still
further and locate a contradiction in deterrence (e g. pp.2012) ; but the argument depends on an interesting confusion of
contradiction with cancellation,’9 along with the assumption
that deterrence involves cancellation. Nuclear deterrence
may well be irrational, it is immoral, but it is not inconsistent.
The Australian National University
NOTES
*This is a revised version of ""Appendix 1 On the fate of mankind and the
earth, according to Schell, and to Anders"" of my monograph referred to as
WP, where several points, only touched upon in this review, are further
developed References are by way of authors names or else through
obvious acronyms, given in the list of references which follows
1 The distinguishing term is from Foley’s Nuclear Prophets. where many
leading anti-nuclear prophets are assessed One well-known prophet not so
considered there is Jaspers, presumably because his main work comes out
in entirely the wrong direction It gives heavy philosophical attire to the
better-dead-than-red abomination A main argument against Jaspers so
presented is simple However bad being red might become (at present it is
debatably worse than living under some of the totalitarian regimes the free
West props up), it still gives humans a further chance for good lives, since
regimes fall or can be toppled but the total annihilation removes that all-
important opportunity
2 A detailed comparison of Schell and Anders’
of S2 is made in Foley JS
remarkably
similar
versions
3 Should S2 appeal, as it may. to suitable communities of humans. S1 will
require reformulation in similar terms, and the argument that follows needs
minor adjustment, with appropriate groups replacing individuals
4. Thus the Last Person
environmental ethics (as HC
for instance, the remote death of the Sun, but assumes new urgency It is this sort of argument
that connects environmental ethics and nuclear ethics. at a deeper
metaphysical level The Bomb and Bulldozer are out of the same technological Pandora’s box.
explams),
is no
argument, important
in
longer merely hypothetical, awaiting,
Nuclear
technology is not the only route to human extinction, nor the only
Pandora’s box. Biological and chemical means are perhaps even more
effective, and certainly can be more selective in what gets extinguished.
Nuclear extinction would presumably require a different and more massive
30
exchange than is usually assumed in nuclear war scenarios. with heavy
targeting in particular of Southern Hemisphere sites (including
internationally-recognized nuclear-free zones).
5 Nor do recent scientific studies claim
as much The most intrepid of these
studies, Erlich and others, only contends that in certain worst-case circumstances, ""the possibility of the extinction of Homo sapiens cannot be excluded"" (p 1299). The study admits that, in the scenario described, ""it
seems unlikely
Homo sapiens would be forced to extinction immediately,"" and the difficulties indicated in the way of long-term human
survival are exaggerated
In
many of the drastic effects predicted for Northern midlatitudes
very much milder forms in equivalent Southern latitudes For
example, temperatures for regions with maritime climates appear likely to
vary by only a few degrees and perhaps negligibly for many agricultural
purposes after 100 days (cf. Turco and others, p 1287 case 29, and p 1286)
Similarly the extent of nuclear darkness and of surface ultraviolet radiation
will be appreciably less in the South and perhaps minor for many crucial
purposes. such as photosynthesis and human outdoor activity. after 100
days (cf the data in Benton and Partridge)
particular,
are
reflected
in
No doubt
some scientifically respectable sections of the environmental and
peace movements have an interest in exaggerating the probable effects of
nuclear holocaust for life on earth, much as many heads of states and
strategists have an interest in minimizing them And there is certainly substantial margin for error and for variation in conclusions drawn For Crutzen
(p 59) is right that ""analysis of the environmental effects of a global thermonuclear war remain
uncertain
because of a lack of information on
various important processes [among other things]
The environment
might become extremely hostile, because of hitherto overlooked changes in
the composition of the atmosphere,"" again among other things Such uncertainty bodes considerable caution as rational The way to err is clear
6 Not
worth,
military
merely by technological determinists of Marxist persuasion Hackformer US general, argues by straight induction that if the US
a
has
a
weapon it will
use it
appalling theme that humans create past, present and
repeated elsewhere, e.g . p 173.
7 The
8 For
a
detailed refutation of these assumptions,
is here (AA pp
perseverance, criticized
9 Anders
see
future (etc )
is
JB
244-5) relying upon a version of the argument from
in detail in Routley and Griffin
interesting converse of this theme is sometimes advanced, that no
responsible. the whole thing is out of control The technological
version of this no-responsibility theme is discussed below (fn 15) More
satisfactory is the theme that nuclear arrangements are out of political
10 An
one is
in terms of vested interests in keeping nuclear
going, which enable responsibility to be distributed The vested interests, which bear considerable responsibility. include the military weapons
industry, and research and academic communities (cf Barnaby) Under
pressures for re-election especially, politicians give in to these powerful
groups, so losing control of political processes The argument is flawed at its
final stage For many influential politicians either belong to or represent
vested interests Thus. though there is no doubt some ""lack of control,""
political processes tend rather to reflect vested interests than to run out of
political control
control, but for reasons,
things
31
11 Another example of spreading the responsibility runs as follows ""The
self-extinction of our species is not an act that anyone describes as sane or
sensible, nevertheless, it is an act that, without quite admitting it to ourselves, we plan In certain circumstances to commit (p 185) Even for most
of the planners, extinction is presumably not part of ""the plan,"" but an
unintended consequence, and most of us have little or no role in the planning : enough of us even campaign against the planning. Further ""the world
chose the course of attempting to refashion the system of sovereignty to
accommodate nuclear weapons"" (p 194) the world? This connects the
course with the faulty ideological argument from defence of fundamentals,
e g , for liberty, for the ""free enterprise"" (USA) nation, and against socialism
12. A more detailed discussion is given in WP8, where too the
the state from nuclear dilemmas is elaborated
case
against
explanation is elaborated in Foley, some of the themes are
straightforwardly in Martin The incomplete list of items
given, to be investigated in a deeper analysis of the nuclear situation, paraphrases Foley JS p.164
13 Anders’
presented
more
These motivating drives form a part of a larger integrated package.
comprising maximization drives for power, knowledge, control, wealth, enfor the ""newer"" Enlightenment (but Faustian)
ergy, speed, satisfaction,
virtues. Frequently there are attempts (the human failing for excessive neatness and simplicity manifested) to reduce the package to one main component, preference-satisfaction. for instance, or utility And the type of drive
is justified (especially for those who have it, but also as rational, which again
it is not) Rationality, the deeply entrenched myth has it, consists in
maximization of a suitable mix of these virtues
14
Maximization of the objects of the drives runs, however, into limitation
theorems and associated paradoxes The maximization of self-interest (individual or national) runs into Newcomb’s paradox and special cases of it
such as Prisoner’s Dilemma situations The maximization of power, as symbolized in the Christian-Islamic God. encounters the paradox of omnipotence, the parallel maximization of knowledge, paradoxes of omniscience.
There are no consistent objects which are omnipotent or omniscient The
drive for maximum consistency, often taken to be the epitome of rationality.
also leads to inconsistency in the case of more important theories, such as
arithmetic and set theory (by virtue of Godel s theorem and associated
limitative theorems)
15 R & D,
drives the
though directed by military requirements and the arms race, also
arms race Its role is partly disguised by the myth of neutral
science
32
There have been attempts, not only by those committed to technological
determinism, to involve technology more deeply as the main, or single,
source of the nuclear fix (thus especially Mumford, in part thereby anticipating Commoner’sparallel indictment of technology-choice in the ecological
fix) It is technology, the mega-machine, running out of control, that has
brought us to this predicament, the nuclear abyss. Sometimes this serves to
exonerate states and their key components and those who control them, for
they are simply caught up by this out-of-control machine, but sometimes the
state itself is seen as a machine also running out of control But the technological determinism, like other varieties of stronger (nonanalytic) determinism, is false Nuclear technology was selected and proceeded with,
after a well-known political dispute involving distinguished scientists, it was
deliberated, funded and promoted, while other alternatives were not
of the nuclear age were not inevitable. but dechosen
certain
liberately
by
components of the large nation-states And
much as they need not have been chosen, so they do not have to be
persisted with The fashionable inevitability determinism themes admit not
only of refutation by bringing out the many choices made in persisting with
often recalcitrant technologies They also admit of being made to look
ridiculous If the Bomb is determined, as part of human evolution, then if it
functions (as it probably will, a matter also determined), it will serve as a
human population control device, a matter also determined That is. the
Bomb has its fixed evolutionary place in human population regulation
1
Damaging technologies
16 This reformulation
main
17
qualification
can
proposed by N Griffin, who suggested that the
be inferred from Schell’s context
was
the usual game theory setting sees to this almost autothen assumed that each player plays to maximize his or her
matically,
own advantage Thus too the presumption in Walzer, p.277, that ""the logic
of deterrence"" is based on eye-for-eye and tooth-for-tooth assumptions
Selecting
for it
is
18 Even the irrationality of retaliatory (or first-strike) use has been contested, e.g., it has been wishfully thought that America will rise like a phoenix
from the radioactive ashes.
There is moreover a simple solution to Schell’s problem of the ""missing
motive"" for retaliating to a large strike (p 204), namely, not a future retributive one, but an ideological one eliminate the prospect of the future dominance of the rival ideology. Such a motive has been offered for the conjectured targeting of Latin America
19 An
appears
confusion of negation with cancellation or obliteration
thinking, where US missiles are supposed
incoming USSR missiles
analogous
in
recent US ""star-war""
to "" negate""
Moral paradoxes of deterrence take a different direction For although inupon perhaps questionable interconnections
of intensional functors. One type of paradox (considered in WP 5, where the
immorality of deterrence is argued) derives from a policy of credibly
threatening war without, however. intending to proceed to war. though credible threats [appear to] imply an intention to proceed Another style derives
from acclaimed intention to reduce the number of nuclear missiles when the
persistent practice, which implies an intention, is to increase the number
This paradox is technically removed—how satisfactorily is another matter—
by a distinction between long-term aims and immediate practice, a timehonoured method of removing contradictions by conveniently discerned
temporal distinctions
volving negation, they depend
REFERENCES
33
G Anders, Die Antiquiertheit des Menschen, C H Beck. Munchen, 1956,
referred to as AA.
G Anders, Endzeit und Zeitenende: Gendanken
tion, C H Beck, Munchen, 1972, referred to as AE
F.
Barnaby,
""Will there be
a
Nuclear War,""
in
zur
atomaren Situa-
Australia and Nuclear War,
(ed M Denborough), Croom Helm, Australia, 1983, 2-37.
I J Benton and G W
Partridge,""’Twilight
at Noon
Overstated,"" Ambio 13
(1984) 49-51
B. Commoner, The
New York, 1972
Closing Circle: Nature,
PJ Crutzen, ""Darkness after
a
Man and
Technology, Knopf,
Nuclear War,"" Ambio 13
(1984)
52-4.
M. Denborough (ed ), Australia and Nuclear War Croom Helm, Australia,
1983.
P R Erlich and others, ""Long-term Biological Consequences of Nuclear
War,"" Science 222 (1983) 1293-1300
Jonathan Schell Genius—Philosopher—Rewrite Man,"" type1982, referred to as JS
Brisbane,
script,
G
Foley,
G Foley, Nuclear Prophets. The True and the False, typescript, Brisbane,
1983
D. Hackworth, ""A Soldier’s Report,"" Australia and Nuclear War, (ed M
Denborough), Croom Helm, Australia, 1983, 209-12
K
Jaspers. The Future of Mankind. (trans
Chicago
E B Ashton).
University of
Press, 1961
B Martin, Grass Roots
ham, 1984
L Mumford, The
1970
Myth
Strategy Against War,
Freedom Press,
Notting-
of the Machine, 2 vols., Harcourt Brace. New York,
Preddey and others, Future contingencies 4. Nuclear Disasters. A
Report to the Commission for the Future, Government Printer, Wellington,
G F
New Zealand, 1982
Routley and N. Griffin. ’’Unravelling the Meanings of Life,"" Discussion
Papers in Environmental Philosophy 3, Australian National University, CanR.
berra, 1982
R Routley, Exploring Meinong’s Jungle and Beyond, Research School
of Social Sciences. Australian National University, 1980, referred to as JB
R Routley. War and Peace I. On the Ethics of Large-Scale Nuclear War
and Nuclear Deterrence and the Political Fall-Out, Discussion Papers in
Environmental Philosophy 5, Australian National University, 1984, referred
to as WP
R and V Routley, ""Human Chauvinism and Environmental Ethics,"" in Environmental Philosophy (ed D Mannison and others), Research School
of Social Science, Australian National University, 1980, referred to as HC
J Schell, The Fate of the
Knopf,
Earth,
New York, 1982, referred to
K P Turco and others, ""Nuclear Winter, Global Consequences of
Nuclear Explosions."" Science 222 (1983) 1283-92
34
M Walzer, Just and
Unjust
as
S F
Multiple
Wars Basic Books, New York, 1977.
",,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/ed8352051a1e549600f0284f6200d6d0.pdf,Text,"Published Papers",1,0
90,https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/show/90,"On the ethics of large-scale nuclear war and nuclear deterrence and the political fall-out",,,"Richard Routley",,"Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy",1984-01-01,"This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, Dr. N.A.J. Taylor.","For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library.",,Manuscript,,Report,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/6ac75cab884e6903e8ca85828a326c92.pdf,Text,"Self-published Papers",1,0
93,https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/show/93,"Box 14, item 2064: Gaean Greenhouse, Nuclear Winter, and Anthropic Doomsday
","Typescript of paper published in Australian National University. Department of Philosophy (1990) Research series in unfashionable philosophy, 4.
","Title in collection finding aid: RS: Gaean Greenhouse, Nuclear Winter, Anthropic Doomsday ts.
","Richard Routley","The University of Queensland's Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291, Box 14, item 2064","Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy","1990-01-01.
","This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, Dr. N.A.J. Taylor.","For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library.
",,"[27] leaves. 18.58 MB. ",,"Manuscript
","",,"GAEAN GREENHOUSE, NUCLEAR WINTER,
AND ANTHROPIC DOOMSDAY.
... climate change, like no other issue, calls the whole notion of human progress
into question. The [ever promised] benefits of newer technologies, more
efficient economics, and improved political systems could be overwhelmed by
uncontrolled global warming.
... the pace of climate change will soon overwhelm natural variability in the
earth's climate. Indeed, it can be improved with nuclear war for its potential to
disrupt a wide range of human and natural systems, [severely] complicating the
back of moneying economics and coping with other problems. Irrigation
works, settlement patterns, and food production [among others] would be
tragically disrupted ... (Worldwatch 89, p.ll, p.10)
There are many approaches to the Greenhouse problematique, upon which this philosophical
investigation focuses. These approaches, range from playing the issue down entirely,
dismissing it as not a problem, not something anyone should worry about, at the one end of
the range, to playing it up at the other. Those who play it up may even foresee the demise of
the human race, the substantially new socio-economic arrangements soon eventuate.
There is certainly plenty of room for different approaches, and for some eclecticism.
For what is being relied upon, in every case, comprises shaky and contestable arguments,
from flimsy forecasting models lacking many apparently relevant details. No one of sound
judgment, aware that weather reports for twelve hours ahead can be wildly astray, would
place a very high level of confidence on climatic forests for fifty years ahead down a very
hazardous track. But there is enough information to act; and there is information rationally
requiring action.
For things in the future are not going to be the same. It is very doubtful that they are
going to be any better (though much important economic theorizing presupposes as much,
such as the monetary discounting of the future). They are not going to be similar even,
because so many parameters important to life are changing, several at exponential rates.
Significant in these changes are likely climatic changes. The Greenhouse effect is among
those, a result of the increases of “greenhouse” gases, especially carbon dioxide and
methane, in the Earth's atmosphere, which have followed exponential paths since the highenergy phase of industrial culture. The growth in gas concentration produces, what it is
lagged by, but is now apparent, a significant increase in mean global temperatures. This has
major implications for much of life on Earth.
2
Diagram 1. Spectrum of approaches:
Course of action
Reasons offered
Short response
No problem
Refutable
No certainty
Irrational
Adaptive capacity
Exaggerated
High tech resolution
Wishful thinking
Severe dislocation
otherwise
Utopian
Individual
survival
Pointless
No action1
Moderate action
Considerable action
These very condensed responses will be expanded and explained as we proceed.
Breifly too the outcome is that there is no easy path; future humans should expect a hard
landing.
1. Investigative philosophy, argument and rational decision
The role of philosophy in such a complex problematique as that of Greenhouse is not
difficult to state briefly. Philosophy, Anglo-American philosophy especially, is concerned
above all with argument. Investigative philosophy is applied philosophy, investigating
arguments, their features - assumptions, reliability, etc. - and their generalisation to rational
processes, but outside normal philosophical topics. The generalisation to rational processes
comprehends a wider range of philosophical throughput than the orthodox range of argument
typically addressed in logic courses; to probabilistic and plausibilistic reasoning, to decision
processing and making.
A main objective in this piece of investigative philosophy is to consider certain
arguments for severe dislocation pprobabilities, as a result of Greenhouse effects, and the
resulting impact on rational decision formation and action. There are certain arguments of
particular interest radical decision and action: various neo-Malthusian arguments, and
doomsday arguments.
1
Taoist no-action would be different. It would not have undertaken excessive industrial action in
the first place.
3
The main run of arguments to considerable action are neo-Malthusian in character. The
general form of these arguments is simply this: growth in some parameter encounters limits,
with severe effects. A characteristic graphic representation is as follows:
limits
growth
parameter
time
exponential growth
pattern
J
encountering
limits
subsequent
varying unstable
behavior
The limits are often imposed just by finitude, e.g. finiteness of a resource or a sink. But
other limits can be important, for instance where new phenomena or thresholds come into
play. General Malthusian arguments loom in the background in what follows.
But a different argument, of especial concern as regard climatic changes, is the
following anthropic doomsday argument:• There is some probability that the Gaean “greenhouse effect”, generated by human
activity, will get out of control, that Gaean control mechanisms will fail, and that the Earth
will, for example, overheat (Runaway Greenhouse, or Lesser Venus Prospect, premiss).
• That result would be disastrous for human activities, and indeed for humans (Catastrophe
Prospect).
• Because of the unusual, and unusually precarious, position of humans, such a probability
of disaster is not in fact small but decidedly large
As a consequence then, the human species will probably sharply decline, and even become
extinct (Catastrophe Probability).
That is, by a rectified version of Murphy's law - that if something can go wrong then in
appropriate unusual conditions, it very probability will - an incrementally small probability is
inflated into a very large probability.
4
It would be a mistake to conclude that because the argument itself is an unlikely one,
everyone can stop worrying. The argument is but one of a substantial raft of arguments that
should have everyone worried; it is but a final intellectual string, so to say, from the
inconspicuous cosmological tail.
Such a doomsday argument no doubt puts together, in one more exact form, some of the
sorts of considerations that are troubling many people, especially concerned youth, about the
Greenhouse business: that humans (including themselves) are on a decline or extinction path.
It is no doubt not the only consideration that should be troubling them or us. For whether or
not doomsday warnings are warranted, there are other matters that should be sufficiently
worrisome, to anyone of moral integrity:• Future times are likely to be exceedingly uncomfortable for very many creatures, as
habitats are destroyed, food producing regions are eliminated, and environments seriously
impoverished.
(Many of these creatures are nonexistents, mere future existents, i.e.
creatures that do not yet exist or participate in market or voting rituals, but who -will exist and
may participate. But, despite their presently unfavourable ontological status, they are entitled
to fair and decent treatment.)
• Given such future prospects, present practices which do nothing or vanishingly little to
ameliorate these prospects, are decidedly irrational. Indeed a main message that will emerge
from the present exercise is the moral irrationality of critical large-scale human practices.
The irrationality, morally-weighed-down irrationality, of present large-scale human
practices is already conspicuous from the wintry downside of climatic prospects of which
Greenhouse warming is the upside.
Diagram 2. Macro-climatic setting.
Bands: all
boundaries fuzzy
mean
global
temperature
(degrees C)
escalating
emissions
Disequilibrium:
Venus prospect
increasing dislocation
possible adaptation
increasing dislocation
thermonuclear
war
disequilibrium: Mars
prospect
5
1860
1990
The apparatus for conducting a world-wide nuclear wars is entirely in place and indeed
on alert. The probability of such a war, even if small, is not zero. Among the many awful
effects of a large nuclear war is that of nuclear winter, which would bring about the demise
of present human civilisation, and would at the very least mean enormous dislocation for
most surviving humans and other creatures. A sufficiently diabolical chemo-nuclear war,
reaching into all inhabited parts of the globe, could indeed drive the human species close to
extinction.
The decidedly dubious rationality and morality of these nuclear arrangements - both
through what they are in themselves for what purposes, and through their moral opportunity
costs - are widely appreciated. The thesis that the arrangements and practices are immoral,
irrational, and ought to be dismantled - already much argued, and also contested2 - is not the
present concern. The thermonuclear downside is, by comparison, a very easy case to
examine philosophically, and argue, as compared with the greenhouse upside.3 For there is,
for instance, a case of sorts, for much increased use of greenhouse gases, such as CFCs in
refrigerators, a case that hardly extends very plausibly to nuclear weapons. It is a case
heavily pressed by some “developing” nations, for polluting devices already in widespread
use in more affluent places, as necessary for local standards of living.
Greenhouse and nuclear winter are more intricately connected than being the upside
and downside of meteorological phenomena. One of the high-tech solutions suggestions for
atmospheric overheating, involves the generation of wintering effects - to cool things down -
by flinging enough dust up into the atmosphere, a trick most easily achieved no doubt on the
requisite scale by nuclear explosives. Needless to say, like backburning against out-of-
control fires, artificial winter would be a pretty desperate and, given present expertise,
irrational expedient.
2. The Greenhouse debate, main policy responses, and irrational decision.
The Greenhouse debate, as to what to do, if anything, about forecast Greenhouse
effects on Earth, is intellectually disturbing. For it has revealed, as we shall soon see, that
many of those who have spoken, worse that many who have some role in decision making
For my very small contribution to this, see the War and Peace series in Discussion Papers in
Environmental Philosophy, RSSS, Australian National UniversityGlobal warming, by no means entirely certain, is assumed to be the outcome of increasing
greenhouse gas build up. Of course though some temperatures will rise, cooling will probably
occur also in some localized regions.
6
(including both experts and politicians), lack a firm grasp on decision-making in conditions
of uncertainty or possible risk.4
The main canvassed policy approaches to the Greenhouse problematique lie firmly
within the dominant social paradigm, the high-tech growth and development ideology.
Diagram 2 Broad policy responses to the Greenhouse problematique.
Dominant paradigm
Alternative paradigm
Procrastination (wait-and-see)
Soft energy paths and
alternative regulation
Adaptation (sink-or-swim)
Socio-economic
transformation
Regulation
Intervention (star wars)
We will briefly outline, and find wanting, all the dominant approaches.
• Procrastination, the prevailing response. In fact the main gooon mental and conservative
response thus far has been procrastination, or “wait-and-see” as it is more benignly known.5
The approach makes much of the uncertainties, of the shortcomings in even the most
elaborate general circulation models, of the high noise-to-signal levels. On such bases, it
contends that it is too early to do anything, except staging some meetings, organising some
review committees, undertaking some monitoring, and funding a little more “research”. It
obviously does nothing to rock the growth ideology boat.
There is the pretence that we do not know enough to act6 But it is known that carbon
dioxide, methane and other greenhouse gases are fast increasing. The main causes and
enough likely consequences are also known. Theoretical consideration, have already been
partially confirmed by rising temperatures in the eighties. Outlines of rising temperatures are
also known in broad outline, rising sea levels, and so forth. In addition, there are partial
Following Knight, some economists (try to) distinguish between uncertainty and risk. Risk is
said to obtain when some more or less objective numberable probabilities can be assigned to
outcomes, a situation not obtaining as regards the global greenhouse effect. Bayesians, who can
always assign subjective probabilities tend to eschew the distinction, e.g. Cyert and DeGroot,
also say that ‘decision making under uncertainty refers to situations in which the outcome of the
decision is not precisely predictable’ (p.3). Either way, Greenhouse involves uncertainty.
There is significant rhetorical art in the choice of classificatory labels, a rather philosophically
neglected art. A PR person must have been hired to produce the Greenhouse adaptation of
‘adaptation’.
Part of the problem is that scientists have been caught out (e.g. crying wolf) and have become
ultra-cautious. With the advent of thermodymumies, for instance, scientists begin ‘threatening
mankind with a rather swift “bad death’” as the universe random ‘Thus m. Aber, on ‘balant
ideological use of science even by scientists themselves’ (Bernard p.9).
7
small-scale models of the Greenhouse effect in action. For example a city such as MexicoCity, which is situated in the bowl-like valley is placed in an environment traps heat as well
as pollution. The ecological affects, like the human affects, are pretty dramatic even at this
small level, and hardly to be sought, or amelated elsewhere.
There is a pretence, fostered also by many scientists, that Greenhouse difficulties have
only just been discovered; a date commonly set for that watershed even is the Villiers
conference and statement of 1986 (e.g. Pittoch ....). Actually there have been Greenhouse
warmings for more than a decade, and there has been a corresponding decade of inaction.
Nor is any action of much significance presently seriously contemplated.
Back in 1979 Bernard wrote at length about and reported the substantial concern of
climate logists about Greenhouse effects. Even the magazine Nature, not noted for its green
sympathies, recorded that ‘the release of carbon dioxide to the atmosphere by the burning of
fossil fuels is, concemally, the most important environmental issue in the world today’ (May
? 1975). Bernard quotes many other concerned scientists, several asserting that ‘the
government must start dealing with this problem now’. They meant the United States
government. “The” government didn't take the hint. For more than a decade then scientists
have been emphasizing that the greenhouse threat is a major environmental problem, and that
action should be taken immediately. Over 10 years nothing of real significance to counter the
problem has happened. There has been more than a decade of inaction , during which
matters have got worse, and the time frame for evasive action disturbingly shorter. It is
already evident that requisite decision making under uncertainty is not taking place. On
straight inductive grounds, it would be reasonable to expect nothing will be done. While
there are theoretical grounds to bark up such an assessment, still it is only just beginning to
get through to a much wider public (which can exercise a marginal influence on what
politicians say) that there is - or may be, as some more reactionary modal-managering
academics would have - a problem or two.
Many scientists have joined the wait-and-see queue, with their begging bowls, hoping
for more hand-outs for research. They assume, rightly enough, that more information would
assist with rational decision-making, and also, quite wrongly, that “scientific activity” is
required for action to be taken. Physical scientists are not done in their misapprehension of
rational decision methods.
Although there is a good deal of practical experience available of statistical-type decision
making order uncertainty, for instance as regards insurance coverage and engineering
projects, decision theory, especially as regards unreputable situations, has not penetrated
very far into standard scientific methodology or much into mainstream parts of social
sciences. ‘Economists in particular have shown a talent for bringing ever problem back to a
world of certainty where all solutions are known or can be easily found.’ Natural scientists
including dematologists are, for the most part, on the same erroneous-reduction-toconlittainable-certainty trip. ‘This is not to say that economists have not worked on
uncertainty. ... however ... uncertainty is introduced and then taken out by assumption’
(Cyort and DeGroot p.l). But there are several classes of problematic situations, where
decision and action may be required, where uncertainty cannot be discarded by first,
reduction strategeness or otherwise, notably:• inheritantly probabilistic situations, such as those of indeterminacy in quantum theory;
• essentially unpredictable situations (which may be deterministic) such as those now under
investigation chaos theory;
• presently uncertain situations and outcomes, which may eventually resolve into certain
cases, or may turn into some of the above classes, where there is not time to wait for
resolution.
The Greenhouse problem is regularly put into the latter class, a standard assumption being
that with enough money and research effort thrown at it, it will resolve to decent certainty.
But it may well not; there are grounds for supposing that critical parts of climatology will fall
into the essentially unpredictable class. The standard approach of too many research
scientists is a pathetic begging-bowl posture: Supply more funding so we can go on
researching until we obtain certainty.7
There are some severe problems with this standard response. Firstly, it is irrational.
Certainty if achieved may be achieved too late. What was required for rationality was
decision making in advance of certainty. Secondly, certainty may be unobtainable. The
meteorological equations may be non additive (non additive) and so incapable of delivering
stable results over slightly fluctuating in strict data. The standard response is
methodologically unsound.
• Adaptation, learning to live with and love the Greenhouse. The policy ‘that tends to be
favoured by most economists’ is an adaptive strategy: “Let society adjust to environmental
changes without attempting to mitigate or prevent the changes in advance” We could adapt to
climate change for example, by planting alternative crop strain [themselves] ... more widely
adopted... ’ (Schneider p.8). Observe, however, that it is a decidedly restricted “adaptation”
that is being proposed, that humans adjust to the results of present economic and industrial
practices, rather than adjusting them. It is assumed that economic growth comes first, that
we do not change (e.g. through decent regulation) high energy industrial practices. A fuller
and smarter adaptation would adapt these practices. The policy is like a pernicious
agriculture policy that says, “Let farmers adjust to the results of soil erosion, salination and
7
It does not seem to have occurred to most research scientists demanding more money (even more
per article) that an important reason why they are not obtaining the funding they expect is
because their research results could, if unfavorable, act a serious drag on the industrial
establishment. They are not going to be funded to delegitimize modem industrial society.
9
so on, without attempting to mitigate or prevent these deleterious changes in advance.” Such
“adaptative agriculture”, the present predominant practice in advanced agriculture, is antienvironmental, but is given a spurious air of evolutionary inevitability and evolutionary
redistributive justice; you can't back natural evolution, which is entirely natural, can you.
Let us condense such far-from-inevitable and highly artificial mal-adaptation in the neologism
badaptation. Greenhouse adaptation, like nuclear adaptation, is badaptation (some, less
kind, would say medaptation).
There is a pragmatic, if cynical, political argument for badaptation, namely, that
unilateral action to prevent a warning is unfeasible and requisite international cooperation
unattainble. Both contentions open to doubt. Unilateral action by the USA, by far the
World's heaviest resource and energy consumer (per capita and on several other relevant
domains) backed up by pressure (familiar from other settings, such as the narcotics war) on
other nations and through the United Nations could make a major difference. Unfortunately
the USA is also the world's largest supplier of influential grown economists. In any case,
international agreements such as those in whaling and Antarctica, are attainable, and
sometimes effective. The ozone protocols, limiting production of CFCs show that results
can be achieved to limit trace gas emissions.
The adaptation proposal is presently compatible with wait-and-see; both mean no
hauling back on trace gas production. Indeed procrastination will force societies towards
badaptation. Typical of adaptation, like procrastination, is an (over-)emphasis on the
uncertainties of Greenhouse forecasts, and on the decision-theoretic paralysis such
uncertainties are alleged to produce. Characteristic of adaptation too is a minimisation of the
extent of Greenhouse modification. No doubt the impression that things won't be so very
different, or far removed from what has already been experienced, is important in getting
adaptationism more readily accepted, as a rational course of action (instead of the seemingly
irrational course it is). Thus badaptation tends to play with figures at the law end of
projected ranges of temperature increase, such as 1.5°C for 2050, when in fact present data
indicates something rather in the vicinity of 4°C - in a setting, furthermore, where fractions
of a degree centigrade may well be linked ot macro-physical and macro-biological change.
Recent modellings deliver, an average, on increase in 2°C attributable to carbon dioxide, and
it is widely thought that other trace gases will double the CO2 effect, yielding a 4°C
temperature increase.8
8
Sources. Note that methane is beginning to rival carbon dioxide as a gas where atmospheric
propostems really matter and whose present increase is excessive.
10
The colossal extent of future human dislocation has correspondingly been deliberately
underemphasized. The adaptive capacities of human arrangements, when humans are living
at the margin, to massive natural shifts, has been grossly exaggerated.
Consider agriculture alone - set aside flooded cities, sunken atoll islands, and all the
rest. Some of the Earth's major grain producing regions - upon which famine relief projects
depend - could be pushed substantially out of business. The conditions which prevailed
during the American dust-bowl experience of the nineteen-thirties were benign indeed
compared with those which threaten with mid twenty-first century Greenhouse conditions.
The mid continental summer temperatures were only 1-2° C warmer than the present
average, under greenhouse conditions they could be more than 3-4° C warmer. In the dustbowl rainfall only slipped at critical growing times (e.g. July for northern com) to 80% of
the contemporary norm; but under Greenhouse conditions it could be significantly less again.
A super dust-bowl is not improbable (for much more detail, see Bernard). Similarly for
other similar latitude Northern grain producing regions. But the high-energy industrial
superstructure is crucially based upon sufficient cheap food (bread) for the urban masses.
• Intervention, high-tech Gaean engineering. Interventionist proposals so far floated include
• New oceans in parts of the Earth's land surface lying below, at, or near sea level. These
projects would make the mega-dams of recent times look like childrens' play.
• Wintering effects. Production of sufficient dust in the atmosphere, achieved for instance
by nuclear detonations, to mitigate heating effects. Such enterprise would make modification
of the weather by cloud seeding look like childs' play.
Fortunately these and other expensive and grandiose proposals, which would call for
considerable international cooperation, are far down the planning track; with these schemes
procrastination is rational.
• Regulation, controlling free(-wheeling) enterprise.
Regulation itself, not so bureaucratically popular under that presentation in these latter days
of economic irrationalism, is of course transparadigmatic, where it belongs depend on what
measures (what sorts of constraints, rights, etc.) are proposed and how they are imposed or
enforced. If it is, for example, some industrial law-and-order, smokestack scrubbing
regulations or Greenhouse polluting rights, within the status quo, that is one thing, but if a
minimally-constrained growth paradigm is questioned and alternative socio-economic
arrangements advocated, that is quite another, and falls outside the dominant paradigm.
Such policies involving regulations controlling fossil fuel emissions especially, are
negatively labelled prevention in the predominantly American policy literature, though there
is now no preventing some Greenhouse effects; but the worse to follow could still be
prevented. What is usually covered under the label is however some regulation within
prevailing political arrangements. So energy efficiencies and savings for investment in
11
growth elsewhere is comprehensible, straight growth-curtailing non-consumption is not
contemplated. But the latter is just what alternatives do contemplate.
Democratic political arrangements do not exclude such alternatives both the power
bases of political leaders and economic prescriptions do. Adequate regulation within
prevailing socio-economic arrangements is going to prove impossible, without adjustment of
power structures and economic imperatives, in effect without far-reaching systems and a
devological adjustment. While such adjustment may be rational, it is unlikely. Power
structures have too much to lose.9
This is an opposite point to record the chauvinism and environmental shallowness of
the Greenhouse debate. Like heart disease and cancer, the Greenhouse effect is gaining
much discussion and some funding because it just may severely effect the affluent, affluent
people and affluent nations, that have a good deal to lose, in North America especially. The
impact will, however, be at least as severe in some third world nations, whose lands or much
of them will be flooded, countries which cannot afford extensive expensive dyking (or where
such effort would be in the longer term, as seas rise, pointless), countries such as Pacific
coral atoll nations and delta states like Bangladesh. But the really serious losers will no
doubt be, not humans , rich or poor, but nonhumans.
Biological diversity, already being reduced by various human activities, may be
one of the chief casualties of global worming. Massive destruction of forests,
wetlands, and even the polar tundra could irrevocably destroy complex ecosystems that have existed for millennia. Indeed, various biological reserves
created in the past decade to protect species diversity could become virtual death
traps as wildlife attempt to survive in conditions for which they are poorly
suited. Accelerated species extinction is an inevitable consequence of a rapid
warming (Worldwatch p.10).
3. Arguments to dislocation and for a Lesser Venus Prospect.
There is at least a small probability that predicted increase in mean atmospheric
temperatures will seriously interfere with most remaining natural environments and result in
the degeneration or destruction of many of them, especially forests wetlands, maritime
environments. Nor will adaptationism help here; for natural evolution is much too slow for
adaptationism to succeed (cf. Keeton pp.763-4).
Natural ecosystems will not adapt effectively to rapid climatic change,... With
regard to forests, habitats for plants and animals cannot be re-created or
transplanted rapidly. Continuing climatic changes would strain the capabilities
Holistic problems are too extensive for individuals, or even small collectives, to make much
difference acting or their own. Some are too beg even for large collectives or states, but would
require whole regions of the Earth acting in concerte. But of course some state players, such as
the superpowers, as regards nuclear winter, can make a substantial difference, or even all the
difference.
12
of management practices even in commercial tree plantations (Beijer Institute
Report pp.21-3).
The decline or demise of these systems, vast reservoirs for greenhouse gases will accelerate
the warming, and accordingly make matters substantially worse:
Trees are adapted to a narrow range of temperature and moisture levels, and
cannot cope with rapid climate change. A temperature increase of 1 degree
Celsius per decade in mid- to upper latitudes translates into a shift in vegetation
zones of 60-100 miles northward. Terrestrial ecosystems cannot migrate that
fast. Vast numbers of trees are likely to die, and new trees adapted to warmer
temperatures are unlikely to be able to replace them rapidly. During such a
disruption, huge areas of forest could die and, as they decay or bum, send large
quantities of additional CO2 into the atmosphere, accelerating the warming
(Brown p.10).
Of course the immediate climate patterns would be somewhat more complex. If enough soot
and ash from fires were flung into the atmosphere there would be a cooling effect, like that of
a small nuclear winter, before heating accelerated. The present pattern of ecosystemic loss
would also be sharply accelerated. When natural ecosystems get reduced to about 30% of
their initial size, they tend to collapse of themselves.
Moreover, there would be other significant positive feedback from ecosystems other
than the terrestrial forests, from the oceans especially. As the oceans warm, they lose their
capacity to serve as carbon dioxide reservoirs. So they too release additional gases,
including previously absorbed CO2, back into the atmosphere, further accelerating the
warming. A critical question arises as to how much danger such positive feedback poses?
As so often, informed opinions, and so probability estimates differ. However ‘several
scientists working in the area consider that positive feedback effects will force a very bleak
picture to be drawn’ (p.19 ref?)10
Unlike the interim effect of a small nuclear winter, where after a few years at most,
climatic behavior (as distinct from radioactivity levels) would presumably return towards the
previous norm, there will be no similar recovery under greenhouse impact. Technically
then, stability would be lost under the impact,11 disequilibrium induced. An eventual longterm return to some different equilibrium could well be excluded. Under new climatic
regimes plants themselves may be able to do little more than hang on for part of their own
lives. In many places conditions would be too severe for much of the “year” to permit
normal plant functioning, including what is crucial for greenhouse amelioration,
photosynthesis. In most plants, photosynthesis only occurs across a narrow band of
Second order probabilities, probabilities and uncertainties in the light of first order subjective
probabilities, enter importantly.
Stability is defined in physics in terms of return to an initial (inertial) position after small
disturbance.
13
temperatures (e.g. 6 - 34°C); outside that range the plants shut down operations.12 Even
more important, many plants would leave few or no successful successors. Even where
plants set seed, seedlings would not survive under the severe conditions expected; for
instance, they would be killed by hot dry summer conditions, or in other places by frosts to
which they are not adapted, both phenomena already familiar after clearfelling of forests.
The situation at... in southern Sahara, where there is but one ancient tree hanging on in
thousands of square kilometers of desert, a tree with viable seeds which sets no seedlings,
could be more or less replicated in many other places where forests or woody plants once
grew.
In fact we are already witnessing the demise of the trees in much of Australia. Already
dead and dying trees form a predominant feature of the Australian rural landscape. Virtually
whichever way ecologists travel in Australia where trees remain, they are confronted with
dead and dying trees 13 The reasons for the present decline of trees in rural Australia is, for
the most part, not to be attributed to early greenhouse or even pollution effects.14 It is
thought to be due to a complex of factors, including a range of insect predators whose effects
are enhanced on isolated trees left after an excessive zeal for clearing (i.e. holistic effects
enter as regards healthy persistence of trees). The relevant point is that these features are
likely to be accelerated given the additional impact of greenhouse warming on plant
functioning and reproduction.
There are several major ways through which the maintenance structures of the Earth
can be not merely awkwardly disturbed, but thrown right out of kilter - perhaps, given the
delicacy of several critical matters, never to return present norms. Most obvious and
immediately threatening is
• nuclear warfare, and therewith nuclear Winter.
But there are of course other severe shocks the planet could suffer than those chemo-nuclear
warfare, some human induced, some a “chance” matter of the planets' position in space,
namely
• a mini Big Bang, or an undermining of metastability, brought about through very high
energy experimentation (see Leslie)
• a collision with a large meteorite or asteroid.
Such uncertainties, not germane to the main climatic arguments, are listed, not to achieve a
bogus completeness, but to emphasize that complete certainty is not to expected, not
rationally.. Should we obtain it, should we obtain easy relatively unproblematic lives, then
we have, by world standards, been rather lucky. Moreover, these latter uncertainties do
The upper bound may be difficult to appreciate in most of Aotearoa. But in much of Australia,
during the summer, many plants close down their operations for much of the day.
Reported by Recher on Earthworm.
Thus coastline vegetational destruction through detergents in sewerage waters.
14
appear negligible compared with those bound up with climate, ascribable to:
• excess economic development. The practices involve a complex and sustained assault on
most of the Earth's major ecosystems, forests, seas, etc, along with the alteration of
atmospheric composition by greenhouse gases. For example, the forests are cut down,
burnt, poisoned by herbicides and acid rain, or otherwise removed or destroyed. (Therewith
too a great deal more carbon dioxide is released into the atmosphere and major sinks of
carbon dioxide are removed.) As a result of these concerted growth-and-development
activities such systems are driven to limits, and breakdown occurs. Once it occurs at some
weak point it can escalate elsewhere, like a conflagration.; thus again ecosystemic collapse
for example.
Quite apart from breakdown at or approaching limits, for instance because of systemic
overload, remarkable changes can occur in desiccative systems under stress or strain.
• excess energy or chemical loading. Though such striking examples as the chemical clock,
it has been demonstrated that dissipative systems can suddenly, and often rather
unpredictably, undergo extraordinary changes, as for instance energy flux is increased
(Prigogine and others), [describe briefly]
Such non-additive, or nonlinear, effects, characteristic of more holistic dissipative
systems, are bound to occur within the Earth's atmosphere and oceans as they undergo
compositional changes. Carbon dioxide itself provides a good example.
With small quantities its effect on the temperature of the air is proportional to the
amount added; there is a linear effect. However once the carbon dioxide
concentration in the air approaches 1%, new nonlinear effects come into play
and heating greatly increases. In the absence of a biosphere to fix carbon
dioxide, its concentration in the atmosphere would probably exceed the critical
figure of 1%. The Earth would then heat up rapidly to a temperature near to that
of boiling water. Increasing temperatures would speed up chemical reactions
and accelerate their progress towards chemical equilibrium. ... eventually ...
the Earth would become permanently cocooned in a brilliant white cloud - a
second Venus, although not quite as hot (Lovelock pp.45-6).
Fortunately for Gaean prospects, the percentage of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere is now
nowhere near 1% nor likely to be pushed near 1% by projected doubting of carbon dioxide
levels under economic activity over the next 50 years15. However eventual exponential
growth will lead towards levels, and the side effect of such growth, the release of carbon
dioxide from forests and oceans and the considerable reduction in fixation of carbon dioxide
with the decline of forests, will lead in that disastrous direction rather more rapidly. The 1%
15
In the atmosphere of the very early Earth, CO2 exceeded the critical 1% figure; but solar
luminority was about 25% less than now. With increasing solar flux the Earth would have
overheated had the proposition of CO2 not been much reduced (e.g. see Lovelock 88 p.56).
15
bound constitutes just one of the many serious limits to continuation of present
developmental practices.
Now there can be no rational confidence with respect to complex dissipative systems -
about the behavior of which we presently know comparatively little - that no other
nonadditive effects will no be encountered at a much earlier stage. After all, the Gaean
system, its atmosphere, oceans and ecosystems, will be pushed into essentially
unexperienced and substantially unknown reaches. There is, for example, no experience
from past times of such elevated temperatures as Green house effects will lead to, to draw
upon. ‘There is no evidence that the land-bound glaciers in Greenland and Antarctica have
ever completely melted in the last two million years’. There is experience of much colder
periods. ‘During ice ages, the earth's average temperature has been about 5°C colder than at
present, with glaciers covering major portions of continents’ (Barth p.7). But there is no
similar experience of temperatures 4-5° C warmer than at present (in a warm interglacial
period), ‘a global increase of more than 2°C above present is unprecedented in the era of
human civilization’ (Schneider p.6)
It would accordingly be decidedly rash, rash decision makings, to assign a zero or
negligible probability to the emergence of new or unknown effects of relevance, to assume
all will go smoothly and well. That would presuppose, in any event, a completeness in
present scientific knowledge, contrary to the information we have that present investigation
of holistic systems, among much else, is still in its infancy. The probability of something
critical (e.g. perhaps radicals like hydroxyl) having been left out of estimations, of room
accordingly for something unexpected or for something to go wrong, may be small, though
experience implies it is not always so but it certainly appears to be non-zero.
For the overconfident, with excess faith in the flimsy scientific edifice, there is a
salutary lesson to be drawn from the erratic and stumbling path of the main proponent of
Gaia hypotheses, Lovelock. Lovelock, coming from a working life as an industrial chemist,
part of that time for a giant chemical transnational, had, and retained for a considerable time
after he began his holistic hypothesizing a strong antipathy for environmentalists.16 Even
Gaia was for industry and against the environmentalists; she was going to laughingly soak
up all the pollution, courtesy of the chemical companies especially, that we humans could
throw at her. In particular, we did not really need to worry much about ozone depletion or
greenhouse gas escalation.17 ‘Contrary to the forebodings of many environmentalists,
Coupled with this, there is a certain schizophrenia in Lovelock's attitude to the natural
environment. There is also a matching schizophrenia as to the fragility of life on Earth. On the
one side, it required very delicate settings and fine barring to arise; this is part of the argument for
a Gaia hypothesis. On the other side, life is ‘tough, robust, and [highly] adaptable’, virtually
indestructable (p.90). But though a flawed hero, Lovelock is a hero nonetheless.
See Lovelock 79, p.40ff; and also 88? [detail]
16
finding a suitable’ destructive agent to bring about a ‘doom scenario’ ‘turns out to be an
almost insoluble problem’ (p.40). Lovelock makes it easier for himself by helping himself to
the assumption that a doomsday scenario involves the destruction of all “life”, ‘down to the
last spore of some deep-buried anaerobic bacteria’ (p.40). But even for the least chauvinistic
of environmentalists, destruction of all humans but the select elect would be quite enough for
a decent doomsday. Lovelock's high redefinition of a environmental ‘doomsday scenario’ is
unacceptable. Lovelock does not however stay within the bound of his redefinition. He
proceeds to pooh-pooh the idea that anything much that we humans could accomplish would
make any difference to Gaia (p.41) or even to most humans, including use of nuclear
devices.
Unfortunately for Lovelock's credibility, he was writing three years before the
seemingly obvious wintering effects of a major nuclear war were realised by the accredited
scientific community. Appealing in a common scientific fashion to scientific authority, he
proceeds to minimalize the human and ecological effects of a major war. The report he relies
upon as authoritative was a 1975 (unreferenced) one of ‘the US National Academy of
Sciences ... prepared by an eight-man committee of their own distinguished members,
assisted by forty-eight other scientists chosen from those expert in the effects of nuclear
explosions and all things subsequent to them’ (p.41, italics added). Lovelock draws from
the distinguished expert report the findings that
... if half of all the nuclear weapons in the world's arsenals, about 10,000
megatons, were used in a nuclear war the effects on most of the human and
man-made ecosystems of the world would be small at first and would become
negligible within thirty years. Both aggressor and victim nations would of
course suffer catastrophic local devastation, but areas remote from the battle
and, especially important in the biosphere, marine and coastal ecosystems
would be minimally disturbed (p.41).
Three years later Turco and others proceeded to detail a very different scenario that of
widespread and ecologically damaging nuclear winter.. Not for the first time, Lovelock had
been caught out badly.
As with pollution, Lovelock has more recently shifted ground18 considerably in the
vulnerability of the Earth to human-induced disturbance. When a system such as Gaia in
homeostatis
is stressed to near the limits of regulation even a small disturbance may cause it
to jump to a new stable state or even fail entirely....
Shifting ground may be fine, especially when it is to an improved position. But it should be
done honestly and openly, not stealthily or shiftily. Lovelock proceeds to attribute a caricuture of
his own previous position to critics of the Gaia hypothesis (as a clever ‘fabrication’ which it was
not); that it is ‘an argument developed to allow industry to pollute at will, since mother Gaia will
clean up the mess (85 p.53).
17
It could be that the regulation of the Earth's climate is not far from one of these
limits. Thus if some part of climate regulation is connected with the natural
level of CO2 then clearly we are close to the limits of its regulation. This is
because CO2 cannot be reduced much below the level observed for the last
glaciation, about 180 ppm, without seriously limiting the rate of growth of the
more abundant C3 type plants. If we perturb the Earth's radiation balance by
adding more CO2 and other greenhouse gases to the atmosphere or reduce its
capacity to regulate by decreasing the area of forests or both of these together
then we could be surprised by a sudden jump of both CO2 and temperature to a
new and much warmer steady state; or by the initiation of periodic fluctuations
between that state and our present climate.
The anomalously low abundance of CO2 on Earth when compared with the
other terrestrial planets and especially the fact that the mean temperature of the
Earth is on the cool side of the optimum for regulation, suggests strongly that
the biota is regulating the climate by pumping CO2 from the air. The common
feature of most of our pollutions and of our exploitation of the land surface
seems to be unintentionally to thwart this natural process (Lovelock 85 pp5354).
The argument to the lesser Venus path, to significant disequilibrium with the Earth's
ecological support system destabilized, takes the following lines. The Earth appears to be a
discipative (far-from-equilibrium) system held at its present balance by a combination of an
(increasing) solar flux - a main energy input into the system - and its major ecological
arrangements, especially vegetation complanes and live oceans. The sheer extent to which
the resulting system differs from the stable dead system it could otherwise be is shown by
the following table for atmospheric and oceanic composition.
TABLE 1.
Substance
Carbon dioxide
A
Nitrogen
T
R
Oxygen
Argon
0
C
E
A
N
S
Water
Planetary comparisons
(principal components per cent).
Equilibrium
Earth
Venus
Lifeless
Earth
Mass
Present
Earth
99
0
98
1.9
98
1.9
95
2.7
0.03
79
0
1
trace
0.1
trace
0.1
0.13
2
21
1
63
Salt
3.5
Sodium
nitrate
1.7
96
n.a.
n.a.
3.5
traces
Surface
temperatures (°C)
n.a
477
Total pressure
(bars)
n.a.
90
290±50
60
-53
13
0064
1
The table is based upon tables 1 and 2 of Lovelock 79, pp37 and p.39.
18
The whole Earth system is accordingly far from equilibrium. Unpredictable behavior
as locals increase is therefore almost to be expected. A likely moral is presumably: stress
they system, or destabilize ecosystem controls sufficiently, and the system may be in deep
trouble. It is relevant to inquire into what evidence we have on this case.
To do so let us reconsider some of the array of arguments there are from some sort of
holistic organisation of the Earth (for a modest Gaia hypothesis). But for the participation of
the Earth's ecological support systems, plant complexes especially the Earth would not be
blessed with its present life-benign physical characteristics. The oceans would be much
saltios and too salty for most life, the air would not contain the present rich mixture of
oxygen and carbon dioxide so important for terrestrial life, and so on, perhaps most
important the Earth would be significantly hotter and too hot for most life, for what of what
does the regulating and stabilizing of present conditions. For the solar flux has increased in
intensity about 30% since life appeared on Earth, but the mean global temperatures have
exhibited no corresponding increase, but have remained relatively constant. Such an
expected consistency in the face of disturbing inputs is ascribed, under holistic approaches
that do something to explain it, to the concerted activity of plants, [detail] Lovelock and
collaberaters have devised an elementary daisy world model which reveals how a feedback
system with two types of daisies can, within limits, stabilize temperatures despite increasing
energy input. The limits are important, for as these limits are approached the maintenance
systems break down.
diagram Q
Similarly several of the well-known chemical cycles, such as those for nitrogen,
sulphur, sodium and so forth depends for their maintenance on the adequate operation of
active ecological structures. Plainly if a cycle loops through a component, such as forests,
which is severely disturbed then the cycle itself could be disrupted.
There is some probability furthermore that the foregoing changes will disturb crucial
equilibrium systems and chemical cycles. Some of these feedback systems are in fact
maintained in equilibrium by natural ecosystems (an example is Lovelock's daisy world
model, which becomes unstable when temperature rises too high). Instability could ensue
under disturbance [explain, include Greenhouse holism].
Without doubt these matters are bad enough. Demise of most of the Earth's richness19
is not a minor matter. Worse could follow.
Natural richness is the main richness, much exceeding human artifice.
19
The general tenor of the argument is so far this:- By arguments from physical models,
and because of uncertainties, the probability that something could go badly wrong is
nonzero,20 and indeed far from negligible. Part of the argument can be put as follows: there
is a decent probability that a modest Gaia hypothesis holds. But then, there is a considerable
probability that excessive Greenhouse build up will lead to damaging system destabilization.
So containing probabilities, there at least a nonneglizible probability of such destabilization.
An analogy should now emphasize both the dubiousness of what is being proposed
under adaptationism and the precariousness of the human predicament. The proposal is to
take this ancient craft, now overloaded with human passengers and their heavy baggage, a
cargo it was never organised to carry, out on new routes and run it fast and higher than it has
ever travelled before. Even for an experimental prototype, a now very fast (air-)bus say,
with a select text crew, such a procedure, of running over new uncharted routes at speeds
and heights never attained before, would be risky enterprise. With an ancient craft, with a
heavy nonelite cargo of baggage and passengers (some whom try to interfere with the
controls), the proposal is extremely rash. For the chances that the craft will breakdown and
perhaps crash, with serious consequences to passengers and for the baggage, are greatly
elevated over the risks of proceeding as usual much more slowly. With the costs of crashing
so severe, rational operators and sensible pilots would not take them.21
Unfortunately the analogy is not at all far-fetched, but resembles what is in store for
spaceship Earth, already under significant stress with its excessive human passenger load
and their heavy ecological practices. Not only is the future itself pretty new territory, but it is
a future at terrestrial temperatures, important processes will proceed faster than ever before,
in particular all chemical processes. Simply to take the craft up there, as do-nothing and
adaptation approaches would have is to emulate the risks and hubris of Daedelus; such
approaches are aptly rarely Daedelian
4. The Sting in the Cosmic Tail: the mini-Furphy theorem and the likely
demise of homo sapiens, spp. economicus..
The trouble with the initial formulation of Murphy's law:
if anything can go wrong, it will,
From logical theories of probability such as Carnap's non-zero probabilities are rather easily
reached (perhaps too easily, with the converse feature that natural laws never obtain high
probabilities. The difficulty can be characteristed, to some extent, by restruction to physical
models).
The analogy is an old one, which we exploited before in the nuclear case; for the “bus analogy”,
see Routley and Routley. The analogy admits of much graphic variation. Instead of running the
craft at excess speed, an alternative or additional image is that of destroying the controls of the
craft. Lovelock deploys this opposite image (88 p.63), which corresponds to the demolition of
Gaians control systems.
20
was that it was insufficiently qualified, much too absolutist, and apparently self-refuting..22
Certain crucial qualifications are required:• Replacement of the certain (certainlistic) conclusion by a somewhat weaker probabilistic
one: namely, it probably will.
• Correlative to weakening the conclusion, strengthening the premiss, by rendering it more
specific; namely, in place of ‘anything’ or ‘something’ put ‘some thing ... given a chancy
situation’.
The modified formulation is accordingly the following Mini-Furphy result:23
if some thing can genuinely go wrong, given a relatively chancy situation,
it probably will.
Here ‘chancy’ means more or less what it means according to the dictionaries: doubtful,
decidedly risky, or as we shall construe it, having a comparatively low probability vis-a-vis
its alternatives. The precise extent of relative chanciness will be explained as we go.
To prove this proposition, let us first recast it in appropriate symbolic form. Let D be
some arbitrary bad situation, a suitable disaster. Let the possibility of D's happening something's going wrong - be represented by a non-zero probability, and genuineness by
non-negligible probability. It can be assumed that that probability, P(D), is small, otherwise
the requisite conclusion would follow in any case. Let C represent the features that render
the situation chancy. Then what we aim to show is that where P(D) is small positive, P(D <
C) is probable.
The proof applies a special case of Bayes' theorem, which take the following form
where there are n alternative hypotheses hi,...,hn including h:
Pv(h) x P(i < h)
P(h < i)
X P(hr) X P(i < hr)
r = 1
Here h is the hypothesis, which in our application is D, i is the additional information (or, is
in Carnap, a new observation), which in our case is C.24 P(h < i) is the probability of h
22
23
24
For this and other formulations of Murphy's law, and many loosely associated humorous maxims
with grains of truth encapsulated, see Block. As to the history of the “law”, which originated
with J.M. Chase, editor of Aviation Mechanics, see the Encyclopaedia Americana', Chase's initial
formulation in a 1955 issue read ‘If an aircraft part can be installed in correctly, someone will
install it the way”.
This little theorem was originally more accurately entitled the Murphy-Leslie theorem. It is an
adaptation, suggested by Leslie's work, of Murphy's Law. This section is overwhelmingly
indebted to Leslie; for Leslie's debts, and so the transitive debts of this section, see Leslie
himself, who deserves to be read in defence his legitimate doomsday apprehensions. The next not
indicates the limited extent to which Leslie's arguments are endorsed.
The formulation is a special case of that proved in Carnap, p.331; namely that (absolute) case
where the evidence e is elided, or e set = 1. A similar result follows, subject to slightly more
rigorous conditions, in relevant probability theory; see Routley 79 p.954.
21
given i, or of h on condition i (the backward arrow notation, <, symbolises the condition
involved and shows its direction). For simplicity we shall suppose that all the alternatives to
D are concentrated (as far as symbolic exposure goes) in one, namely D*. Then the form we
seek to apply is simply:
p(D < C)
__________ P(D) x P(C < D)__________
P(D) x P(C < D) + P(D*) x P(C < D*)'
=
The arithmetic details needed can be tabulated in a revealing form as follows:
Cases
D
D*
Initial (or prior) probability
d
1-d
m, say Vd
m/l, say 1/dl
of outcome
relative chance that C
As it is the relative chance of C that matters, we can rescale to set m = 1/d. To make C
relatively chancy, I has some modest size; specifically let I exceed 1-d/d.
Then the probability to be estimated, P(D < C), is
d x 1/d
d x 1/d + (l-d)/dl
where
k
=
•
1
1+k
_
“
That is»
and P(D < C) | y when k < 1, i.e. when I [
p(D
<
C) =
where
k
=
1,
.
Thud D is probable, at least in being more probable than not, given C, when I is of at least
modest size, i.e. given C is relatively chancy. In a merely apparently more general form of
the estimation, where we do not align m to d,
In effect we shall look at the form
P(h < i) =
--------------- < h)------------------------------P(h) X P(i < h) + XP(hr) X P(i < hr)’
n
with the sum excluding the product for h.
Though demonstrable given satisfiable exclusion and exhaustion conditions, Bayes' theorem is
not lacking critics, in part because of the surprises this bit of logic can deliver. Carnap meets the
objection that Bayes' theorem has sometimes ‘been applied to cases where it led to strange or
even absurd results’ thus: ‘This was mostly due to an uncritical use of the principle of
indifference :... [The] theorem is provable ... on the basis of those weak assumptions which
practically all theories of probability seem to have in common’ (p.331, sub 1 elided). Of course
the present applications could (just) be objected to on the grounds that the logical conditions for
the theorem to apply are not fully satisfied.
P(D [ C)
22
d x m
d x m + (1-d) x m/l
1
1 + k’
1
as before. That is m drops out, only the relative chanciness really matters. The little Furphy
theorem follows as before.
Now to put some relevant flesh on these abstract statements and figures. Let D be
some future disaster such as the catastrophic decline, for instance, through summer or winter
phenomena of the human species, from which the enormous present population never
recovers. At worst (from a chauvinistic angle) the population, like many catastrophically
effected by human activities, goes extinct. Suppose, for a bifurcating outcome, there is a
catastrophe stage, before halfway through next century, 2050. If humans do not get their act
together before then, they go into catastrophic decline, as already indicated. If however they
do get their ecopolitical act together then humans, while they hardly live happily ever after
(poverty, inequality, domination, and other evils not being removed), they continue to persist
or even grow in numbers, perhaps fanning out through the solar system ( in the way
envisaged by too many physicists). Suppose further we are optimists, imagining that the
prior probability of D ecodisaster and human decline, is small, say 1%. That is d = .01, and
the initial probability of D*, human “success”, is .99. The figures are pretty notional.
Supreme optimists would want to set d much smaller, pessimists rather at a higher
probability.
Application Table 1.
Cases
D human decline
D* human success
Initial probabilities
1%, i.e. .01
99%, i.e. .99
Relative chanciness,
VlOO, i.e. .01
1/100 x l/l
ofC
Then the probability of human decline given
.01 x ,01
P(D < C)
.01 x .01 + .99 x .01/1
1
!/2
, when I > 99.
23
It remains to fill out C, thereby showing that I is likely much much larger, and
correspondingly human decline so much the more probable in the light of additional
information, i.e. a posteriori probable in the usual jargon.
There are several high risk factors, acting in a certain concert, factors emphasized more
than a decade ago in world systems modellings (such as, most famously that, of the Club of
Rome) Malthusian factors such as human population, economic product, pollution, energy
consumption,.... It is appropriate for estimate posterier probability relative to anyone of
these, any of which can serve as C, in order to expose the riskiness of present gross human
practices. In brief, because there are several high risk factors, so there are several
appropriate relative or reference classes. Thus the posterier probability is assessed relative to
such matters as our being alive, humans being thus and so (Leslie's reference class), this
being present energy use, present wast output, present forest destruction and so forth.25
The anthropic argument considers the environmentally invidious situation of present
humans on the Earth. The argument can be carried through either in terms of sheer
population, gross numbers, or in terms of human resource grabbing, as estimated for
instance through energy consumption.
Let us consider the prospects given additional information as to the present phase of
gross human population. C will be some such proposition as: the proportional
preponderance of humans who have ever lived alive now, or to personalize it: the chance that
you or your family, is alive now.
Chart: Our present population predictment on the two scenerios.
Demise scenerio
“Success” scenerio -
representative
zjs
human numbers
human numbers
On of the weaknesses in the argument may appear to be its dependence on an appropriate choice
of relative class. For, the relative probabilities can fall away if different reference classes, not
exhibiting such growth patterns are taken, e.g. present wattle distribution, birds being thus and
so. On the other hand, probabilities can be elevated even more by selection of more unusual
reference classes cuh as our being scientists, or being computer programmers, etc..
24
Humans have got themselves - to some extent put themselves, though much may be the
result of muddling through - into an extremely dubious, environmentally insidious and
unsustainable position, on a range of critical parameters. Their numbers are excessive, their
high energy use is excessive, their waste and their pollution are both excessive - and all
chose and other excesses are at the steep end of upward exponential curves.
Several relevant graphs are distressingly exponential, with the present in the near
vertical growth phase:
graphs
Many other similarly shaped graphs26 could be added, for instance for growth of
pollution, of waste products, of weapons (in terms of tonnes of explosive power), of other
greenhouse gases such as methane, and so on. The display typifies the accelerating human
roller coaster.
Those curves are tightly interconnected, in criss-crossing fashion. For example, the
productivity of contemporary agriculture which enables the feeding of hugh urbanised human
populations depends on a very high energy use (in term of energy efficiency, contemporary
high-tech agriculture falls below that of much traditional agriculture). The maintenance of
high populations with supplies of cheap food depends in turn on fossil fuel agriculture.
Because of the intertwining of these phenomena, there is no easy way of getting off the
accelerating roller-coaster.
26
All the graphs exhibited are drawn from Boyden.
25
Nor, as observed, is there much effort devoted to slowing the coaster. For politicians
it would be politically risky and inexpedient to try (for them the rhetoric about an ecologically
sustainable future must remain just that, more rhetoric). For many other power holders and
brokers such ideas are ideologically excluded: growth remains the gospel. So a precarious
position becomes ever more precarious. Humans are in a decidedly chancy position, because
of their population situation and other Malthusian factors; they are becoming very disasterprone.
If humans want an acceptable future for themselves - they have virtually ruled out an
acceptable future for many other creatures, through their predominantly selfish thoughtless
greedy practices - then they will probably have to mend their ways, very considerably and
very soon. But, given the nature of the beast, that itself seems improbable.
Humans, if they seek a more assured future, should make a concerted effort to put
themselves into a less precarious position. That could be achieved by proceeding to reduce
relative risks. These relative risks, sharply reducing prospects for a reliable future, fall into
two classes:• manufactured risk factors, including weaponry such as mega-nuclear devices and elements
of biochemical warfard, and experimental equipment such as very high energy particle
accelerators (which could perhaps tunnel under a metastable state or induce a min-Big-Bang;
see Leslie).
• Accumulated risk factors, such as the hugh relative size of human population, energy
consumption, greenhouse gas production, etc..27
Despite the ideological obstacles, enormous political, religious and economic obstacles
blocking the way of requisite change, major efforts should be put into reducing both these
types of risks. Philosophers could have a significant role in breaking down the ideological
barriers and in clarifying and developing the arguments involved.
5. What ought to be done about Greenhouse?
The general result already reached, that humans collectively should reduce their risk
taking, and in particular reduce their gross numbers, extends to rational Greenhouse decision
and action theory. But that large and difficult challenge is not all that there is to try, that
should rationally be attempted.
While some increase in mean global temperatures, and all that implies, can no longer be
averted, the potentially most damaging effects can be: namely, by curtailing human-induced
27
As before, there are various different reasons why these induce risk, neo-Malthusian and
probabilistic in particular.
26
output of Greenhouse gases. Moreover, there is an approximate upper bound upon
temperature of importance, which can serve to supply a significant limit as output. That
bound - which reduces risk taking by confining encountered situations to those where there
is some past experiential basis - is given by estimated temperatures during Altithermal and
Eemian eras. Those temperatures are estimated to have been between about 1/2 a degree and
1 degree Centigrade above contemporary (pre-1980) temperatures; so the upper bound is
about 1°C.
Not only will a continuation of current emission trends take global temperatures clean
through and way beyond that bound, so also will an alternative set-up where emission rates
are fixed more or less at current rates. The only apparent way to remain rationally within an
experiential domain is to curtail sharply trace gas emissions beginning easily in the 1990s.
That means shifting from the dominant growth paradigm; it means expensive re- and deindustrialisation. It is unlikely.
Final corollary: Humans collectively are not (particularly) rational. But we had already
guessed as much from the latest...... in the long history of human wars.
References
H.W. Bernard, The Greenhouse Effect, Ballinger, Cambridge Mass., 1980.
A. Block, Murphy's Law. Book Two, Magnum, Methuen, ...
S. Boyden, Western Civilization in Biological Perspective, Clarendon, Oxford, 1987.
L.R. Brown and others, State of the World 1989, Norton/Worldwatch, New York, 1989;
referred to as Worldwatch.
R. Carnap, Logical Foundations of Probability, Second edition, University of Chicago
Press, 1962.
R.M. Cyert and M.H. DeGroot, Bayesian Analysis and Uncertainty in Economic Theory,
Rowman & Littfield, New Jersey, 1987.
‘Developing policies for responding to climatic change’, Report of the Beijer Institute,
February 1988.
Keeton,
J. Leslie, ‘Risking and World's End’, Bulletin of the Curiadian Nuclear Society 10(3)
(1989) 1-6; all references to Leslie are to this article unless otherwise indicated.
J. Leslie, ‘Is the end of the world nigh?’, The Philosophical Quarterly, to appear; referred to
as PQ.
J.E. Lovelock, Gaia. A new look at life on Earth, Oxford University Press, 1979.
J. Lovelock, ‘Are we destabilising world climate?’, The Ecologist 15(1985) 52-55.
27
J.Lovelock, ‘Man and Gaia’, The Earth Report Monitoring the Battle for Our Environment,
(ed. E. Goldsmith and N. Hilgard) Mitchell Benzley, London, 1988, 51-64.
R. and V. Routley, ‘Nuclear energy and obligations to the future’, Inquirey 21(1978) 133R. Routley, ‘Ultralogic as universal?’ reprinted as an Appendix in Exploring Meinong's
Jungle, RSSS, Australian National University, 1979.
S. Schneider ‘Not to decide is to decide’, in Greenhouse 1988: Planning for Climate Change
(ed. T. Dendy), Department of Environment and Planning, Adelaide, 1989, 5-10.
R.P. Turco and others, ‘Nuclear winter: Global consequences of multiple nuclear
explosions’, Science 222 (1983) 1283-1292.
",,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,"Australian National University Office,Australian National University Office > Miscellaneous,Box 14: Green Projects in Progress",https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/68d29df80f9d20e41a77ef7fdb412966.pdf,Text,"Draft Papers",1,0
105,https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/show/105,"Box 72, Item 3: Two drafts of An alternate angle on the humanities","Two typescript drafts, handwritten emendations.
","Unnumbered paper from collection, item number assigned by library staff.
","Richard Routley","The University of Queensland's Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291, Box 72, Item 3","Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy",,"This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, Dr. N.A.J. Taylor.","For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library.
",,"[15] leaves. 32.46 MB. ",,"Manuscript ","https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:8054ad6",,"AN ALTERNATIVE ANGLE ON THE HUMANITIES
by Richard Routley
Higher education in the humanities, beyond the basics of literacy,
has been under attack for a Long time.
This is partly because it costs
money and public resources that might be otherwise invested (e.g. for
technological education, for industrial assistance or subsidization);
it is also because education in the humanities can lead to dissatisfac
tion with established ways, and criticism of them^i.e. ""rocking the boat .
While it is impossible to develop a definitive argument for extensive
education in the humanities—any more than it is possible to mount a
conclusive argument against it—a telling case can nonetheless be made.
There tends to be little dispute about some of the things
humanities' subjects teach, much better than other areas:
competence
and skills in composition and communication, for example, both essential
for many roles in modern technological society.
University courses Ln
humanities teach these things, mostly as a by—product of the other topics
they rightly focus upon.
It is about subjects and topics beyond this usually conceded
minimal level that questions are asked:
Why should universities teach,
or teach so much of, typical humanities' subjects
English, other
languages and literatures, linguistics, history and philosophy
when a university education in these areas affords direct access to
but few jobs, and is, it is assumed, inessential for most day-to-day
^The social sciences, which are sometimes grouped with the
humanities, have been excluded from consideration; that is, humanities
is being used in its narrower modern sense. This artificial separation
sharpens the issues; for the case for university, or at least polytechnic
education in economics, for instance, is straightforward in much the way
that forestry and engineering is.
2
living?
It is obvious enough why they should be offered and taught:
because they comprise a significant part of knowledge.
But this reply
does not meet the complaint that they are still too much taught.
The older response to this type of challenge appealed to the
importance of culture, to ""the utilization of the intellect as an
end"", to the desirability of having cultivated and civilized men and
women in the community.
Higher education in the humanities was taken
to be distinctively fitted to confer these virtues.
The older response
has force, but it has to meet the tedious objection that much
humanities' education merely delivers ""dreamers who can converse well
over cocktails;"" moreover, it needs supplementation if it is to be
sustained nowadays.
In particular, it requires underpinning by an argument, independently
called for, which counteracts the narrow industrial utilitarianism
into the framework of which answers are all too often supposed to fit.
According to this type of industrial philosophy, university education
is important if it contributes directly to such things as providing
(typically at public expense) a technically skilled but not surplus
workforce, if it helps to enlarge the industrial base, enables
expansion or improvements in sales and marketing of industrial products,
and so on—taking it for granted that all these industrial activities
are worthwhile.
But the further and deeper issue is:
these industrial activities and makes them valuable?
What justifies
To put it
bluntly, these activities are valuable not for the profits they
inequitably distribute, but rather for what they add to the communities
they should serve, in the way of net value (such as a richer life for
members of the community, making some allowance for the costs
involved, by way of pollution, despoiliation of urban, rural and
- 3 -
and natural environments, etc.)-
And it is to these same values that
higher education in the humanities should also answer—not, to consider
a worst case, to the direct demands of a damaging and undesirable
industry furnishing dangerous or alienated jobs.
If we do look at these more ultimate values, the attainment
of rich and rewarding and varied lifestyles, then it is evident, without
much elaboration, that higher education in the humanities has much to
recommend it, that people whose lives are fuller and richer and who
add to the variety and culture of the communities in which they live
will be produced by humanities education at its best., that the older
argument can be pushed through.
There are, however, further responses, reinforcing the older
response, which it is now necessary to indicate.
All the older
response generally implies is that an educated person can simply
be pumped full of a stuff called ""culture""—a supply of allegedly
factual information, views, and prejudices on this or that area.
What higher education in the humanities teach s at its best
is
much more, and more important than this: namely, the acquisition
of a range of critical and analytical skills of practical value.
These include such analytical skills as
being able to dissect an
issue or problem, to break it down to its components and determine
the basic assumptions, to work out the presuppositions made, to draw
out the implications of the matter, and to view the problem from
various angles.
They include such critical skills as the ability
to assess a problem or work analysed; for instance the ability to
criticise the assumptions made and to locate and evaluate alternatives
to them, to weigh evidence, to see faults in arguments and fallacies
when they occur, and so on.
They also include such skills as the
4
ability to obtain further information and to apply the methods, and
to research new areas and new problems independently of a teacher.
In short, the humanities, properly done, teach an analytical and
critical method, and above all the ability ""to reason well in all
matters"".
As an integral part of this, they should teach the awareness
of alternatives, an appreciation of alternative situations, cultures,
and worlds.
A first step in the critical evaluation of an institution,
for example, is often the awareness of alternatives, that things do
not have to be exactly the way the institution is, but that there
are alternative situations where the institution is variously modified
or even eliminated.
It is not difficult to see how depth education
in history or the languages leads to an appreciation of options, by
placing the student in contexts where things are done and seen differently.
Philosophy and parts of modern linguistics, specifically semantics,
take this whole enterprise much further and now, in the explicit
investigation of possible worlds, render it systematic.
Indeed,
a significant part of the history of philosophy has consisted in
the envisaging and following through of certain such alternatives.
And such a devising of alternative situations is tied intimately
to reasoning.
For example, an argument is valid if there are no
alternative situations where its premisses hold but its conclusion
does not.
Finally, the critical method, in particular the ability to
discern alternatives, helps people to become aware of their own
intellectual assumptions, and where necessary to change them.
Thus
too, it leads to an intellectual flexibility and adaptability, which
is increasingly important for modern, practical problem-solving,
- 5 -
and for the adjustments in lifestyle many of us may confront.
Systematic philosophy teaches critical reasoning explicitly;
a central part of philosophy is the assessment of arguments and
the detection of fallacies.
Other humanities' disciplines teach
the analytic and critical method also, though less directly, and
more by example.
English does it through the medium of literary
criticism; languages, in analogous ways, by the analysis and critical
evaluation of ""foreign"" literature and the critical examination of
the practices, customs, and thought of a culture with a different
language and literature.
A good language education can not only
introduce people to alternatives, but can in the process reveal
to them their own cultural assumptions, and so open the way to
alternative possibilities they have not previously considered.
So it is also with history, which involves similar interpretative
skills in the investigation of far-removed societies.
What is the virtue of critical and analytical reasoning,
of being able to think in a concentrated, systematic imaginative
way, of being able to approach problems from several angles?
What,
in particular, is the relevance of these skills to that obtrusive
part of the practical world, business, commerce, etc.?
Not only
will there be many problems for firms and services to handle and
try to resolve, problems often best dealt with using just such
skills, but the problems arising will increasingly be of a different
character, of a type for which purely technological educations are
inappropriate or inadequate, and where new alternatives will have
to be devised, seriously considered, and sometimes adopted.
newer problems include two important overlapping types:
mental problems and resource problems.
These
environ
The resource problems are
- 6 -
due to increasing scarcity and escalating prices of materials,
especially oil^but also lumber, etc.
As a result, industry and
government, as well as the private individual, will have to be re
conciled to, and make, very considerable adaptations and adjustments
(of kinds still to be determined), to adopt alternative practices
and solutions to problems on a wide range of fronts.
The environ
mental problems arise because present and historical practices are
often damaging, sometimes destructive, to the environment or the
people who live in it, and because these practices, such as rapacious
forestry and injurious pollution, are not going to be tolerated^
indefinitely, but will require much modification at the very least.
In each case, resource and environmental, much innovation will be
essential, much new and alternative thinking required, far better
if it is analytical and critical, and so does not lead
to a compounding of old and bad technological fixes.
In sum, the
problems to be faced, many of them of considerable complexity,
are of a different character:
successful resolution of them, where
it can be accomplished, and superior decision-making will more and
more demand substantial and imaginatively-deployed analytical and
critical skills.
The requisite skills are inculcated in a good
education in the humanities.
Of course, some of these skills are acquired in the theore
tical sciences—though the critical skills usually in a lesser way,
much as compositional skills are acquired in a lesser way in the
sciences.
What further distinguishes most of the humanities is the
way they relate to, and take account of, humans—of people as people
and not merely as statistics.
Those educated in the humanities
tend to have a sensitivity to people, and understanding of them,
-7 -
that technologists often lack.
So it is that they can introduce
important elements into problem-solving, due respect for persons
(and not mere fobbing off by public relations exercises), that
technological resolutions of problems frequently, but inadmissibly,
neglect.
A corollary of all this is that there is a sound case for
deploying people well educated in the humanities more widely in
organizations engaged in research and problem solving.
It would be
rash to pretend that either industry, governments, and so on
(the potential employers) on the one side, or the universities (the
potential suppliers of humanities graduates) on the other, are
entirely ready for this already initiated scenario.
It is not that
universities do not always teach humanities at their best (that could
hardly be expected), but that the skills and methods called for,
analytical and critical, are often not sought and are sometimes
deliberately devalued.
Sometimes indeed the critical method is
forgotten and university education—not just in the humanities—
degenerates into something approaching a brainwashing process,
reinforcing prevailing practices, attitudes and ideologies instead
of indicating serious weaknesses in prevailing practices and
revealing the range of alternatives open in one way or another.
Nor do universities make much effort, so far, to prepare students
for the possibility that the critical skills they acquire may be
put into practice outside class assignments, not just in their
day-to-day living, but in the workplace and in their attempts to
enter it (e.g. by being duly prepared for interviews).
There is
also apparently some resistance by humanities' students to
8 -
entering employment in industry, owing to a blanket condemnation
of industry^ instead of a more discriminating attitude which makes due
criticism where it is warranted.
on the other side as well.
Faults of similar magnitude appear
For example, even where senior management
does recognize the modern relevance of the skills humanities'
students acquire, personnel selection staff are usually unequipped
to select for such skills.
A further corollary is that an integral part of a modern
technological education is a training in the humanities.
2
'Both Professor Raymond Bradley of Simon Fraser University
and the Editor of this Newsletter made many useful suggestions
which have been incorporated in the text. The main quotations
are from Cardinal Newman's The Idea of a University.
/
AN ALTERNATIVE ANGLE ON THE HUMANITIES
by Richard Routley*
Higher education in the humanities, beyond the basics of
literacy, has been under attack for a long time, in part because it
costs money and public resources that might be otherwise invested
(e.g. for technological education, for industrial assistance and
subsidization), but also because it can lead to (sometimes warranted)
dissatisfaction with established ways and criticism of them (e.g.
to ""rocking the boat"").
While it is impossible to develop a definitive
argument for extensive education in the humanities—any more than it
is possible to mount a conclusive argument against it—a telling
caye can nonetheless be made.
About some of the things humanities* subjects teach,
much better than other areas such as the sciences and technologies,
competence and skills in composition and communication—essential
for many roles in modern technological society—there tends to be
little dispute.
University courses in humanities teach these things,
sometimes, initially, directly, but more often as a by-product of
the other topics they rightly focus upon.
It is about subjects and topics beyond this usually
conced ed minimal level that questions are asked:—Why should
universities teach, or teach so much of, typical humanities' subjects—
such as English, and other languages and literatures, linguistics,
history and philosophy^—when a university education in these areas
affords direct access to but few jobs, and is, it is assumed,
inessential for most day-to-day living?
It is obvious enough
'""The author is a Fellow of the Australian Academy of Humanities
and Senior Fellow in Philosophy at the Research School of Social
Sciences, Australian National University. He is visiting the University
of Victoria as a Canadian Commonwealth Fellow.
^The social sciences, which are sometimes grouped with the
humanities, have been excluded from consideration; that is, 'humanities'
is being used in its narrower modern sense.
This (artificial) separation
sharpens the issues; for the case for university, or at least polytechnic,
education in economics, for instance, is straightforward in much the way
that forestry and engineering is.
2 -
why they should be offered and taught:
cant part of knowledge.
because they comprise a signifi
But this reply does not meet the complaint that
they are still too much taught.
The older response to this type of challenge appealed to the
importance of culture and of ""the utilization of the intellect as an
end"", of having cultivated and civilized men (and women) in the community,
higher education in the humanities being taken to be distinctively
fitted to confer, at least often, these virtues.
The older response has
force, but it has to meet the %ne^riiag objection that much humanities'
education merely delivers ""god-damn dreamers who can converse well over
cocktails,"" and it needs supplementation if it is to be sustained
nowadays.
In addition, it requires underpinning by a move, independently
called for, which takes on the narrow industrial utilitarianism into
the framework of which answers are all too often supposed to fit.
According to this type of industrial philosophy, university education
is important if it contributes directly to such things as providing
(typically at public expense)
a technically skilled but not surplus
workforce, if it helps enlarge the industrial base, enables expansion
or improvements in sales and marketing of industrial products, and
so on—taking it for granted that all these industrial activities
are worthwhile.
But the further and deeper issue is what justifies
these industrial activities and makes them valuable when they are
(which is far from always the case).
To put it bluntly, they are
valuable not for the profits they inequitably distribute, but rather
for what they add to the communities they should serve, in the way
of net value (such as a richer life for members of the community,
making some allowance for the costs involved, by way of pollution,
despoiliation of urban, rural and natural environments, etc.).
And
it is to these values, that industrial activities themselves have
ultimately to answer, that higher education in the humanities should
also answer—not, to consider a worst case, to the direct demands
of a damaging and undesirable industry furnishing dangerous or
alienated jobs.
If we do look at these more ultimate values, the attainment
of rich and rewarding and varied lifestyles, then it is evident ,
- 3 -
/
without much elaboration, that higher education in the humanities has
much to recommend it., that people whose lives are fuller and richer
and who add to the variety and culture of the communities in which
they live will be produced by humanities education at its best, coat
the older argument can be pushed through.
There are, however, further responses, reinforcing the older
response, which it is now necessary to indicate.
response sometimes says, an educated
For all tae older
person can simply be pumped
full of a stuff called culture, a supply of (allegedly) factual
information, views, and also prejudices, on this or that area.
What higher education in the humanities, at its best, teaches is
much more, and more important than this; namely the acquisition
of a range of crff*Ktal and analytical skills of practical value.
These include such analytical skills as being able to dissect an
issue or problem, to break it down to^components and determine the
basic assumptions; to work out the presuppositions made, and to draw
out the implications of the matter; to view the problem from various
They include such critical skills as the ability to assess
angles.
critically a problem or w^rk analysed, for instance to criticise
the assumptions made and to locate and evaluate alternatives to
them, the ability to weigh evidence, to see faults in arguments and
fallacies when they occur, and so on.
They also include such skills
as the ability to obtain further information and to apply the methods,
to research independently of a teacher in new areas and on new problems.
In short, the humanities, properly done, teach an analytical and
critical method, and above all the ability ""to reason well in all
matters"".
As an integral part of this they (should) t.^ctch the aware
ness of alternatives, an appreciation of alternative situations,
cultures, worlds.
A first step in the critical evaluation of an
institution, for example, is often the awareness of alternatives,
that things do not have to be exactly that way, the way the
institution is, but that there are alternative situations where the
institution is variously modified or even eliminated.
It is not
difficult to see how depth education in history or the languages leads
to an appreciation of alternatives, by placing the student in contexts
where things are done and seen differently.
Philosophy and parts
4
of modern linguistics (specifically semantics) take this whole enter
prise much further and now, in the explicit investigation of (possible)
worlds, render it systematic:
but a significant part of the history
of philosophy has consisted (it can now be seen) in the envisaging
and following through of certain such alternatives.
And such a
devising of alternative situations is tied intimately to reasoning.
For example, whether an argument is valid or not is a matter of
there are not or are alternative situations where its premises hold
but its conclusion does not.
Finally, the critical method, in particular the ability to
discern alternatives, helps people to become aware of their own
intellectual assumptions, and where necessary to change them.
Thus
too it leads to an intellectual flexibility and adaptability, which
is increasingly important for modern, practical problem-solving and
for the adjustments in lifestyle many of us may confront.
Systematic philosophy teaches critical reasoning
explicitly:
a central part of philosophy is the assessment of
arguments and the detection of fallacies.
Other humanities'
disciplines teach the analytic and critical method also, though
less directly, and more by example.
English does it through, for
instance, the medium of literary criticism, languages in analogous
ways, by the analysis and critical evaluation of ""foreign"" literature
and the critical examination of the practices, customs, and thought
of a culture with a different language and literature.
A good
language education can not only introduce people to alternatives,
but can in the process reveal to them their own cultural assumptions,
and so open the way to alternative possibilities they have not
previously considered.
So it is also with history, which often
involves similar interpretative skills, e.g. in the investigation
of some period in the history of a society as far removed from
modern societies as that of ancient Athens.
What is the virtue, or relevance, of critical and analytical
reasoning, of being able to think in a concentrated, systematic
imaginative way, of being able to approach problems from several
angles?
What, in particular, is the relevance to that obtrusive
part of the practical world, business, commerce, etc.
Not only will
there be many many problems for firms and services to handle and
5
try to resolve, problems often best dealt with using just such skills,
but the problems arising will increasingly be of a different character,
of a type for which purely technological educations are inappropriate
or inadequate, and where new alternatives will have to be devised,
seriously considered and sometimes adopted.
These
newer problems
include two important (overlapping) types, environmental problems
and resource problems.
The resource problems are due to increasing
scarcity and escalating prices of materials, especially oil (but
also, e.g., lumber)—as a result of which industry and government
(as well as the private individual) will have to be reconciled to
and niaoke very considerably, adaptations and adjustments of kinds
still to be determined, to adopt alternative practices and solutions
to problems on a wide range of fronts.
The environmental problems
arise because present practices are frequently damaging,
*
-
'
1
destructive, to the environment or the people who live in it (e.g.
through pollution and effects such as cancer), and because these
practices, such as rapacious forestry and ser^oct^s pollution,
are not going to be tolerated indefinitely, but will require much
modification at the very least.
In each case, resource and environmental,
much, innovation will be essential, much new and alternative thinking
required, far better if it is analytical and critical, and so does
not lead, for example, to a compounding of old and bad technological
fixes.
In sum, the problems to be faced, many of them of considerable
complexity, are of a different character:
successful resolution of
them, where it can be accomplished, and superior decision-making
will more and more demand, among other things, substantial and
imaginatively-deployed analytical and critical skills.
The
requisite skills are inculcated in a good education in the humanities.
Of course, some of these skills are acquired in the
theoretical sciences—though usually in a m^rked^-lesser way, piuch
as compositional skills (which typically increase with further
training in the humanities) are acquired in a-de-eideRichard Routley
","The University of Queensland's Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291, Box 57, Item 2","Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy",1983,"This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, Dr. N.A.J. Taylor.","For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library.",,"[40] leaves. 33.04 MB. ",,"Manuscript ","https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:991d123","n/a - location not listed in manuscript finding aid","RBSTRRCT
The proposed syntheses Ls set Mithin generat object-theorg.
tde3
The
undertging
the sgnthesis ts that the 3tternative Mortds sewantics - arrived 3t tn
of
pursuit of a
tnctudtng
senanttes
universat
ones)
retevant
and,
semantics
generat
(a
as
connectedLg,
part
for
of
att
a
Languages,
comprehensive
object-theorg - be apptted atso tn fundamentat phgstcs, Most importanttg to
the
natter of the ortgtn, htstorg, 3nd phgstcat features of the cosmos, but as Mett,
agatn connectedtg,
theorg.
etseMhere,
Ln
particutar Ln the LnterpretatLon of quantum
a
The unLversat semantics Ls a mang Mortds -
theorg.
The
poLnt
of
such
apptgLng
an
mang
nonexistent
Mortds
-
LnterpretatLon Ln cosmotogg atso Ls
exptained bg Mag of examp Les, concernLng the understandLng of the contLngencg of
exLstence
and
of present arrangements.
improbabititg
the
R resotutton of the basLc question,
sketched,
a
as
Marm-up
exerctse
'Nhg does angthLng at
for
exLst?'
att
questions as to Mhg various other
the
prominent features of the universe are as theg are, notabtg Mhg the
constants of phgstcs
appear to have.
have
the
fundamentat
parttcutar surprtstngtg senstttve vatues theg
Chauvinistic ansMers through anthroptc prLnctptes are crLttcattg
Ln
favour
of
resotutLon
bg
Mag
of
Mortd
sgntactLcattg, status quo arguments, MhLch use
setection^ and
gross
rejected,
correspondLng
features
geophgsLcat
thLs and neLghbourLng unLverses to exp La Ln the surprLsLng vatues
of
The character of the Mortd—sgnthests resotutton - reaLLg a resotutton
Ls
ts
of
constants.
frameMork
fLLLed out Ln the course of countering a Mide SMeep of objections, and of
exp La LnLng
Mhg
the
resotutton
frameMork
invotving
seLeet ion
satisfactorg of the main tgpes LLLustrated in the four-fotd:
is
the
most
IMPROVED CO3MO-LOCICRL 3YMTHE3I3
TOWRRD RH
There
Logicai
is
a
foundations
tradition
persistent
-
impiging
simpLe
and
get undiscovered - for the whoLe of cosmoLogg. The
as
tradition, which peaked in modern rationaiism, continues strong in
cosmoLogicai
specuLation.
unassaiiabLe
Thus,
contemporarg
for exampLe, recent rationaiistic theories of
the universe, ambitiousLg aimed at mathematico-iogicai expression and capture of
nature. Thus,
of MheeLer:
for exampLe, the bottom Line to the mang theoreticaL enterprises
LittLe astonishment shouLd there be, therefore, if the description of
nature carries one in the end to Logic, the ethereat egrie at the
center of mathematics. If, as one beiieves, aLL mathematics reduces to
the mathematics of Logic, and aLL phgsics reduces to mathematics, what
aLtemative is there but for aLL phgsics to reduce to the mathematics
of Log ic ? Logic is the ontg branch of mathematics that can think about
itse Lf'.
Logic
reassumes its ancient roLe 3S the fundamentaL science; the Mord expresses
a LogicaL recipe.
Even white abandoning some of
the
it Lus ions
of
grand
reduct ion istic
schemes, and undermining the EnLightenment power guest for the LogicaL
the
theoreticaL
capture
and
can
The sgnthesis outiined in
setting.
contribute
what
foLLows
LiberaLised
bg
are
semantics
and
to the organisation of a unified
fits
into
this
more
modest
It is achieved bg suitabig reLocating cosmoLogg as a part of semantics
(generousig construed, for exampie, to admit contextuaL eLements).
then,
to
controt of the universe, there is much of a more
modest character that recent LogicaL theorg, as
nonstandard sgstematisation,
worid picture.
kegs
universaL
So
unified,
semantics, re Levant semantics and cosmoLogg, as suggested
in a preLiminarg wag in diagram 1.
RCTURL
X
L ORLD(S)
GEOPHYSICRL SYSTEMS SUBSPRCE
PHYSICRL SYSTEMS SUBSPRCE
RELEVRHT SYSTEMS SUBSPRCE
MORLD SPRCE
Comment. The subspaces are Marked out by ctosure and other requirements, that of
by cLosure of each worLd under deducibiLity (reLevant deriva—
systems
reLevant
biLity), that of physicaL systems by cLosure aLso under physicaL Laws
formuLated
terMS
Ln
(suitabLy
of condLtLonaLs) and perhaps factuaL constraints as weLL.
actuaL (or better t3ctuai) worLd Ls a seLect
coMMon
worLd
the
to
nested
spaces.
The underLytng Lde3 of the synthesis is siMpiy this: a subspace of
is aLso a suitabLe framework for cosmoLogy, for an interpret—
semantics
worids
neutrai
*3 L Lon of the Log iceL theory of the universe as a whoLe. In Less condensed
form,
the ide3 is that the aLternative worids semantics arrived at in the pursuit of a
semantics
universaL
part
connectedLy, as
semantics
comprehensive
(a
theory
the
of
aLL
of
for
aLL
be
objects,
Languages)
and,
aLso
appLied
physics - most importantiy to the matter of the origin, history and
fundamentaL
physicaL features of this cosmos, but 3S weLL eLsewhere, in
interpretation
theory.
quantum
of
particuLar
Ln
That
stripping.
ontoLogicai
of
Load
MorLd-ensembLe
terms of nonexistent Mortds. Hot surprisingiy, in the recasting the
in
theory j^s
for
is, the theory can be recast in existentiaLLy neutraL
terms, wcthout the originaL object ionabLe
theory,
the
Rnd in the case of quantum theory there is
aLready, most convenientiy, a many-universe or worLd-ensembLe theory, ready
neutrai
in
(e.g.
changed
unobservabLe
the
spiitting
worLd
of
the
Everett
other
worids
interpretation gives way to future— directed worLd branching).
The
setting
in
terms
of
do
which
objects
not
exist,
especiaLLy, is essentiaL. For one reason, the idea grew out of investigation
(with Griffin for the provisionaL but so far nonexistent book UQ) of what is
normaLLy taken to be a phiLosophicaL question, indeed by some such as
as
the
fundamentaL
question
of metaphysics, nameLy
exist? . Reset in worLd terms this becomes a question
worLd
such
Mhy does anything at aLL
of
seiection
the
-
a
contains
be
to
taken
exist.
For
then
the
oLd
circLe is simpiy reentered, expiaining existence in terms of more
existents. Here the circLe is
metaphysics:
3
much more tractabLe question. But the recasting Loses expLanatory
merit shouLd aLL the worids invoived
objectionabie
of
that we find ourseLves in which contains something existent (us
as
among other existent things) as opposed to an aLternative worLd, which
nothing
Heidegger
cf.
JB
broken,
as
it
is
eLsewhere
(particuLarLy
in
chapter 2), by expiaining what exists by way of what does
not. It is the faiLure to
duty
aLLow
for
and
-2-
acknowLedge
this
pattern
of
expLsnatLons,
though Lt represents coMMon practLce Ln the theoretLcaL sciences,
that has wade Lssues LLke the
Lntractab Le.
In
fact
quest Lons
Lihg
Hetdeggerean
the
concernLng
does
angthLng
quest Lon
onLg
Ls
exLst?
question
LLke
Lt
so
ftrst of a LattLce of
the
the character and nature of the cosMos Ln whLch Me happen
to be, that are LLabLe to be asked , questLons ascendLng to
(Just)
seen
Ls? ;
questLons
Uhg Ls
thLs
cosMos
Mhtch MorLd ModeLLLngs wag fruLtfuLLg be
to
appLLed, as an Lwportant fLrst step Ln eLLcLtLng sone ansMers.
(Bounded) LattLce of questLons.
DIRGRRM 2.
7
Uhg does
Mhg does
angthLng
evergthLng
at aLL exLst?
exLst as Lt
Uhg do
7
Hhg do
eLectrons
Lihg does
Lnte L L Lgent
ex Lst? (Ln
LLf e
LLfe forns
the nunbers
exLst? (Ln the
ex Lst?
theg do?)
forM Lt does?)
In the reorLentatLon of MorLds senantLcs
fron
Languages
to
cosnoLog Les,
f row
Language to
the
MorLd, there are certaLn features that shouLd be kept
fLrriLg Ln vLeM - apart fron such notorLous features as that anong the MorLds of
the node L L Lngs are a range of bLzarre, absurd, LncoMpLete and MaverLck MorLds,
and that each (nonexLstent) MorLd has a
LncLudes
donaLn
of
objects
though
Lt
a subdoMatn (perhaps nuLL) of ent Lt Les, tgpLcaLLg contaLns nonexLstent
objects, both posstbLe and not, phgsLcaLLg reaLLsabLe and
the
MhLch,
feature
of
not.
In
partLcuLar,
MorLd
seLectLon shouLd not be Lost sLght of. For Lnstance, Ln
assessing truth, a factuaL MorLd T Ls seLected - Ln one Mag or' another, but
tgpLcaLLg
bg
a
choLce
functLon
on
a
cLrcunscrLbed
evaLuatLons are Morked out (recursLveLg) at I.
cLass
NaturaLLg
and
ho LdLng
the
assessnent of
truth MLLL generaLLg Lead begond MorLd T LtseLf. For (reLevant) Richard Routley","The University of Queensland's Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291, Box 7, Item 792","Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy",,"This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, Dr. N.A.J. Taylor.","For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library.",,"[4] leaves + [1] leaf. 2.68 MB. ",,"Manuscript ","https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:acc747a",,"IS
The
UNIVERSE
THE
argument
design
HRTERHUTP
existence of a designer, a planner, a God,
the
for
RN
(LIKE)
regularly deploys the model of the universe as an artefact, A noteworthy part of
plants
from
universe,
the
planets on through naturally evolved systems,
If the whole arrangement Is an artefact,
contrasts with artefacts.
'artefact'
has
been
and
Its
contexts,
etc.,
and
to lose both Its normal contrasts, place,
much stretched,
e.g.
of
then, firstly
tools applied by external living
external
creatures, and secondly, the relevant features are extremely well hidden.
In the
face of elaboration of these points the artefact claim Is eroded or weakened to-,
the
universe
like an artefact.
Is
like In having a maker.
Is usually meant,
'like'
some
are
There
It s as If It were an artefact, etc. And by
features
curious
about Wilkinson s argument In his
universe Is artefact'. The usual moves to the artefact model
the
Intelligibility
universe
the
of
e.g.
(thus
premissed
are
Heynell).
But
concentrates on the limits to human knowledge and the apparent extent
the
universe
product
on
Wilkinson
which
to
not Intelligible to us and may never be. Wilkinson however Is
Is
Idealism:
not arguing for design In the universe, but for a kind of
the
The
nature
as
of the human mind! The traditional case for design In the universe
Is strangely subverted Into an argument for Idealism.
God's. Everything Intended by
It Is
our
not
artefact,
tells against this: but redefinition Is
artefact
one order of the day In philosophical argument.
Consider first Mrs. four arguments, none decvscve, but all with
to
limits to knowledge, human limits
severe practical limits to
etc.
equipment,
ascertaining
larger
And
that
limits
1. Levels of detail. There are
Is.
very
the
also,
appeal,
such
Size
small.
as
and
spaceship
cost
earth,
of
men s
lifetimes, etc. (One experiment-careers).
2.
forces?
Variety
The
(and
number) of forces. How many
(1)
Ignorance
lead us Into
l>
super-weak ,
««
super-strong
”
Issue of completeness Is serious here (as with Kant s philosophy).
As with forces, so with objects,
NB.
It
major
laws, etc.
of an (undiscovered) moderating or compensating force could
about
error
features
world,
of
e.g.
Into
postulating
granularity of space and time.
(2)
Classlf Icatlon
of
forces
In
sort of periodic table, and then deeper
explanation.
3.
Limits to human conception? Macro-objects of our dimensions can have no
conceptions of very small (micro seconds)
Involves
a
slide
from
or
very
no real personal experience
large.
to
No??
The
argument
no Imagination of
to
no conception of . Argues for limits to conception In both tIme and space. Goes
on to suggest limits to
description
using
everyday
-1-
household
language,
but
the
argument
Is bad:
It depends on standard (Copenhagen) quantum theory.
Ideas
that limits of' conception tied to limits of language.
4-. Human nature and Its essential prejudice-,
limits to what we are prepared
to accept or understand. Set of prejudices, etc., e.g. prejudices In
of
favour
numbers (In a fuaay world). Our constitution prevents understanding of world.
Wilkinson's further argument Is that In view of limits we humans cannot but
value
to
resort
'in reaching his judgements as to how the natural world Is
-
constructed, man cannot ultimately do more than say
this Is how It has to be
(p.96). Value ImposItIon,
has to be',
lie know that whether or
[whether
'should be',
quarks
No,
(p.98):
Is
here
like Leslie?
not
we
This Is how It
get
can
good'
feel
at
quarks
we shall continue to talk about them and discuss their
exist]
(p.97). Nature Is going to be what the mind
anatomy and domestic economy
It
me
this makes
the
same
makes
of [our] theory with the thing
confusion
theorised that pervades Idealistic approaches.
Wilkinson
also
to
wants
(as above and especially from orthodox
proceed
quantum theory) to reject any theme
of
the
closure
of
nature
to
mind.
He
contends (p.80) that objectivity - looking at nature from outside - dissolves to
be replaced by something Involving man essentially. The natural world depends on
man for Its definition: hence the universe as an artefact. But this Is In no way
established. The argument depends on the fallacy of
of
theory
nature
again,
find
nature
equating
with
the
It makes the erroneous assumption that the only
criteria for theory selection are at bottom those of value or feeling.
R question Wilkinson suggests, but sets aside (In the too-hard basket) Is:
How It Is that we manage to understand the universe, or
It s
e.g.
the
much
of
It?
mostly good luck. Historically rather different answers were favoured,
universe
Intelligible,
Is
natural,
the
world
Is
Intelligible.
It's
Since
sufficiently Intelligent creatures can come to understand It. The
Intelligibility theme Is not lacking for exponents. Here,
In
summary.
Is
Heynell argues for and applies It:
R.
If
the
It would not be that we can In
world were not Intelligible,
principle come to know. But the
world
Is
that
which
we
can
In
principle come to know.
Therefore the world Is Intelligible.
B.
If
Very
like: We don't; or, So far as we
different repsonses quickly suggest themselves,
do
so
there
were not something analogous to human Intelligence In the
constitution of the world? the world would not be Intelligible.
Therefore there Is something analogous to human Intelligence In
constitution of the world (68).
-2-
the
how
The
preMiss
first
of
B is flat out false, but present concern is with fl. The
Minor preMiss of fl is false, by virtue of llMltatlon arguments such as those
Wilkinson
and
elsewhere
take an analytical shape is
suffIclently
(e.g.
a
of
Routley). find the Major preMiss, though it can
distortion.
For
Instance,
the
world
May
be
intelligible for us to come to understand what we do of It without
being completely intelligible.
-3-
f~. i— i— i— r—i f— k i
r^. ez. r- ez. r*--. ez. i -i
H. fl e g n e 11,
London,
The
Intelligible
Universe
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A cosMologlcal arguwent , flacwll I an,
1982.
D.H. Ullklnson,
The universe as an artefact
Models and Han, Clarendon, Oxford,
In
H.
1976, 88-98.
-4-
Harris
(ed. )
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a
",,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,"Australian National University Office,Box 7: Environmental Ethics,Como House > Shelves > Bottom > Pile 3",https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/bc6906f973b58155fcdff1d8fbf5c13e.pdf,Text,"Draft Papers",1,0
141,https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/show/141,"Box 98, Item 1865: Richard Routley to The Editor, ANU Reporter, 10 Feb 1981","Typescript letter, with emendations. Letter on a Australian National University letter head. Richard Routley (later Sylvan) writes about ANU’s ""…abandoned any semblance of neutrality on the issue of nuclear and uranium mining…"", through the promotion of Professor Ringwood and ""his pro-nuclear position"", and the purchase of shares in uranium mining. Sylvan suggests some possible ways staff could protest.",,"Richard Routley","The University of Queensland's Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291, Box 98, Item 1865","Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy","February 10, 1981","This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, Dr. N.A.J. Taylor.","For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library.",,"Letter, [1] leaf. 2.12 MB.",,Correspondences,"https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:2e5219e","Australian National University - Far Bookcase - Second Bay - Second Shelf - Pile 1","The Research Schoot oi Sociai Sciences
Post Office Box 4 Canberra ACT 2600
Telegrams & cables NATUNiv Canberra
Telex AA 62694 sopAC
Telephone 062-49 5111
Department of Philosophy
reference
10 February 1981.
The Editor,
A.N.U. Reporter
Dear Editor,
In the eyes of many the A.N.U. had already abandoned any
semblance of neutrality on the issue of nuclear power and uranium
mining ^me time ago, especially by the use of official university
resources for the promotion of Professor Ringwood and his pro-nuclear
position. Now we have the news that the A.N.U. has even more thoroughly
compromised its neutrality on the issue through the purchase of /2(^0,00^
-weath'TKf shares in uranium mining. In view of the university's use of
its funds and other resources to sponsor nuclear development, the
initials A.N.U. could perhaps be better taken to stand for Australian
Nuclear University.
This suggests some possible ways in which the many people within
the university who object to uranium mining and nuclear development
could protest and express their awareness of and distaste for its pronuclear character, for example:
* Sign published work with the home address to avoid the
embarrassment of being associated with this thoroughly compromised
institution, adding a note to explain why.
* Sign published work 'Australian Nuclear University', appending
a footnote to explain why this name is more appropriate.
* Substitute 'Australian Nuclear University' on letterheads,
envelopes, in letters to colleagues, and in other appropriate places,
so that the character of the university and its political commitments
become more widely known.
No doubt others will be able to think of many appropriate
variations on the theme,
Yours,
Richard Routley.
",,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,"Australian National University Office,Australian National University Office > Far Bookcase > Second Bay > Second Shelf > Pile 1,Box 98: Richard's Professional Work-refereeing - examining - reports etc and Philosophy of Language",https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/a712372fc5eb6f4fbc060ed2fdbafa53.pdf,Text,"Notes, Correspondences and Marginalia",1,1
147,https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/show/147,"Box 59, Item 680: Draft of On the alleged inconsistency and moral insensitivity of pacifism","Computer printout (photocopy), with emendations and annotations. Paper published, Routley R (1984) 'On the alleged inconsistency, moral insensitivity and fanaticism of pacifism', Inquiry (Oslo), 27(1): 117-136. https://doi.org/10.1080/00201748408602030.","Note, one of four papers digitised from item 680.","Richard Routley","The University of Queensland's Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291, Box 59, Item 680","Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy",,"This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, Dr. N.A.J. Taylor.","For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library.",,"[27] leaves. 12.83 MB. ",,Manuscript,"https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:6b11360","Como - Cupboard - Pile 3","ON THE ALLEGED INCONSISTENCY AND MORAL INSENSITIVITY
OF PACIFISM
Pacifism , despite its.revival lit the nonviolent action movement
A
respectable
philooophieg-1 press.
another,
the
within
tradition
Catholic
church ,
It is commonly portrayed
characteristically
as
as
inconsistent.
as
a
continues to have a bad
incoherent
in
one
way
or
Even philosophical defences of
pacifism are liable to be extremely defensive, conceding only that
consistent,
and
pacifism
is
but insisting otherwise that^is as false as a moral position can be
2
and morally insensitive .
What follows challenges the prevailing wisdom put out
in the philosophical press, but using its approved analytic methods.
§1.
Slide arguments to inconsistency;and arguments from irresponsibili ty and
from rights.
In an influential and widely
disseminated
series
of
articles
attacking
.
pacficism3 , Narveson says that the pacifist's
position is
not only that [Tl] violence is evil but also that [T2] it is morally
wrong to use force [violence] to resist, punish, or prevent violence.
This further step makes pacifism a radical moral doctrine.
What I
shall try to establish below is that it is in fact, more than merely
radical - it is actually incoherent because self-contradictory
(p.408, italics added).
Subsequently (p.414) he characterises pacifism by way of T2, though it would
better characterised by
P2.
be
A
It is morally wrong to use violence.
However T2 captures the cases that
orthodox
opposition.
The
separate
comprehensive
pacifism
from
the
main form of pacifism under investigation is called
'comprehensive' to distinguish it from standard pacifism, in the usual
1
narrower
sense
which
is
restricted to certain theses concerning (state) order, notably
opposition to (violence in) war, and does
not
rule
necessarily
out
violence
elsewhere.
Narveson's location of incoherence in pacifism depends on several connected
slides,
all
of
which the pacifist should resist - without force.
The initial
slide is from the theme T2 italicised above to what results by deletion
the
of
crucial phase 'to use force', or as it should be 'to use violence', namely
R2.
It is morally wrong to resist, punish, or prevent violence -
and similarly from special and related cases of T2 to special and related
of
R2 (e.g.
from T2S, It is forbidden to use force to resist violence, to R2S,
forbidden
It is
cases
to
violence).
resist
The
slide
is
illegitimate
because
commitment to T2 does not entail commitment to the rejected proposition R2;
for
one thing there are many ways of confronting, reducing and controlling violence,
worked
out
by
pacifists
and others, which do not involve use of violence (or
perhaps force).
The initial slide is however that
assault
on
pacifism
(after
clearing
Narveson
several
exploits
confusions,
explain the popularity of pacifism, out of the way).
irresponsibility
of
pacifism,
in
This
his
first
main
which he takes to
argument,
from
the
does not actually lead to contradiction, but it
does suggest that there is a serious tension between pacifism and any method
maintaining social order, so serious that pacifism is socially irresponsible:
... to hold the pacifist position as a genuine full-blooded moral
principle is to hold nobody has a right to fight back when attacked
...
It means that we are all mistaken in supposing that we have the
right of self-protection ...
It appears to mean, for instance, that
we have no right to punish criminals,
that all our machinery of
criminal justice is, in fact, unjust.
Robbers, murderers, rapists, and miscellaneous delinquents ought, on
2
of
this [irresponsible] theory, to be let loose (pp.415-6).
Since one can protect oneself and avoid and resist aggression
back
violence),
(with
pacifism
unless a slide is made.
(tentatively)
by
Nor
does
T1
and
theses
does
without
fighting
not mean what Narveson claims it means,
comprehensive .pacifism,
T2 , imply
that
we
as
characterised
have no right to punish
criminals, but simply that such punishment will not apply violent methods.
Nor
does it imply that all the conventional machinery of criminal justice
therefore
is unjust, but only that some - perhaps a good deal - of that machinery is.
One
hardly needs to be a comprehensive pacifist to coherently think the latter.
All
this provides some confirmation for the key point, which is that
far
at
there
is,
so
least, no inconsistency evident in maintaining that those who hold that
violent methods are morally legitimate are mistaken.
The next slide is closely connected with, and really generalises upon,
initial
slide.
The
stunt
is to imbue a range of more neutral terms with the
connotation of -------------------------------------violence, or at least of -----------------------force which Narveson proceeds to
with
violence.
Thus
from among admissible pacifist methods.
of force is taken to by implied in R2.
resist
cannot
excluded
be
Hence the conflation of T2 and R2;
Hence too Narveson’s assumption
Hence
(p.415).
also
Narveson’s
that
against attack' (pp.417-8).
use
a
unwarranted
""recharacterisation"" of pacifism as the position that 'no one ought ever
defended
equate
such activities as resisting, punishing, preventing, and
defending are taken to imply (use of) force or violence, and so to
pacifist
the
to
be
If the stunt were got away with, it would
deprive pacifism of, for instance, the general methods of nonviolent action
and
defensible position.
But
resistance,
and
so
render
pacifism
a
much
less
positions can be defended, as in this paper or on the field,
3
without
violence.
Things
be
can
resisted,
even
things like arrest, without violence (e.g.
sliding out of handcuffs and running away).
by
Force can be applied, as in opening
Violence implies force, but not vice versa;
and
it is violence, not all applications of force, that.comprehensive pacifists
are
a
jam
jar, without violence.
bound to exclude.
The attempt
nonviolent
castrate
to
depriving
It enjoys some popularity even
any case indefensible.
and
by
it
of
among
those
of
advocating
expansion of nonviolent methods, who no doubt want: to distance
themselves from older standard pacifism, whose methods they see as
confined
to
mediation, negotiation, and including the granting of concessions .
compromise,
But nothing in
standard,
range
the
is not confined to those who (want to) think pacifism in
practices,
development
pacifism,
so
the
characterisation
its
limits
of
pacifism,
admissible methods:
whether
comprehensive
or
nothing exclude^ uncompromising
methods and imposition of sanctions which offer no concessions. ?
It
is
simply
that standard pacifism has not yet developed its fuller potential, especially in
conflict resolution.
Subsequent slides in the elaboration of the argument against
just
variations
qualifier.
in
those
pacifism
are
given, writing violence-involving in as an internal
Thus the measure of a person’s opposition to something in
terms
of
’the amount of effort he is willing to put forth against it’ is taken - somewhat
perversely - to be violence-involving effort or opposition in the
pacifist’s
’opposition
to
violence'.
If
this
slide
were
pacifist would be caught in an elementary inconsistency since in
case
of
the
permissible any
being
opposed
to violence, by definition, he is prepared to use violence and so is not opposed
Even Narveson ’cannot make too much* of this inconsistency, though
to violence.
it
not so far removed from the alleged inconsistencies he does want to make
is
much of in his main inconsistency argument.
A similar slide, together with a further slide, Is made in the argument
based
inconsistency
the
on
to
notion of rights, especially as it figures in the
pacifist’s thesis as transformed to the claim that no one has a right to indulge
in
violence
(p.418).
Narveson
violence in the notion of right.
tries
to incorporate the right to indulge in
The initial move is to work in assumptions
of
defence from breaches of a right and of preventative action against infringement
Because ’a right just is a status
of it.
preventative
action
...
does follow logically is that one has a right to whatever may be necessary
what
to
justifying
prevent
necessary’
infringements
of
right'
his
(p.419).
That
'whatever
may
be
out to include force, now very generously construed - here is
turns
the further slide - to incorporate such things as social pressure.
Moreover ’it
is a logical truth, not merely a contingent one, that what might be necessary is
force’ (p.421).
of
preventative
For the presupposed logical transformations to work, the notion
action
must
have
the notion of violence built into it.
argument accordingly begs the question against pacifism.
it
enough
is
for
preventative
To block the
The
argument
action associated with rights to be, or to be
limited to, nonviolent action.
How the argument from rights leads
to
inconsistency
is
summed
up
thus
(p.421):
SAI.
’If we have any rights at all then we have a right to use force to prevent
the deprivation of the thing to which we are said to have a right’.
SA2.
We have, according to the pacifist ’the right not to have violence done to
us’,
as
have
the
a consequence of the obligation to avoid violence.
right
self-contradictory,
to
use
both
violence,
granting
so
the
pacifist’s
position
Narveson
is
that 'our standard concept of rights' yields SAI (cf.
right can be sustained by right-supporting or right-defending
require that that action is violent.
is
and not granting the right to use violence.
The argument fails because SAI is readily rejected.
claiming
But, therefore, we
mistaken
p.423).
action
in
That a
does
not
Pacifists can provide an adequate analysis
of rights - essentially the usual one - without letting themselves in for SAI by
6
simply rejecting the Narveson slide .
What appears in place of SAI is something
like
SAI#.
If we have any rights at all then we have a right to uphold them.
But the right to uphold them, defend them, protect them, etc.,
give
facto,
an entitlement to the use of violence.
no dilemma for the pacifist.
does
not,
ipso
Without the slide there is
The ""pacifist's dilemma"" and Narveson’s slide
are
two aspects of the one thing.
The arguments from lesser
§2.
argument
violence
and
evil.
lesser
In
outline
the
- which is independent of the notion of rights - is that the pacifists
must admit, in terms of their own principles, that there are cases where the use
of
violence
those
where
Inconsistency
would be morally permissible and morally justified.
some
is
use
of
immediate
violence
by
T2.
would
prevent
evil,
some
greater
violence.
More explicitly, and in Narveson’s terms
which also import the notion of evil, pacifists have
lesser
much
The cases are
to
admit
both
that
the
use of evil, is admissible, in preventing greater evil, and
that it is not admissible, because it involves violence.
6
Narveson summarizes an
argument like this as follows
It seems to me logically true, in any moral theory whatever, that [LI]
the lesser evil must be preferred to the greater.
If the use of force
by me, now, is necessary to avoid the use of more physical force (by
others, perhaps) later, then to say that physical force is the supreme
(kind of) evil is precisely to say that under these circumstances I am
committed to the use of physical force'7.
Now there are several somewhat different arguments snarled up in these sketches,
p
It is important to get them unsnagged , especially if a clearer view of the
ethical role pacifism can assume is to result.
lesser
The basic argument, from
violence, goes as follows
Cl.
There are cases where use of violence would prevent greater violence.
C2.
One ought to minimize violence.
Therefore
C3.
There are cases where one ought to use violence, since in this way, in
any
arbitrary one of the cases indicated, violence is minimized.
Therefore
~P2. It is not (always) morally wrong to use violence,
contradicting the pacifist principle, P2,
according
which
to
it
is
morally
wrong, always, to resort to violence.
All the ingredients
premisses,
can
be
of
argument,
this
together
with
pulled together from Narveson’s work.
support
for
He not only expouses
C2, but suggests two distinct arguments for it, the first of which connects
argument with the lesser evil argument
El.
(Use of) violence is an evil.
E2.
Evil should be minimized.
9
The second argument to C2 is simply from the pacifist premiss, varying P2,
7
the
the
E3.
One ought not to undertake violence
-
period;
that
the
is,
level
of
violence ought to be zero.
Neither argument is decisive;
of
that
reference
both in fact begin easing.pacifists into a
should
they
resist, where moral absolutes are warped into
moral relatives, where obligations give, way to obligations
all, and says nothing about minimizing it when one
compatible
being
does
it.
into
got
has
E3
is
directives quite different from minimization where violence is
with
involved, e.g.
E3
things
other
In any event E3 only directs one not to get involved in violence at
equal, etc.
Thus
frame
rooting it out which may
involve
strategies.
non-minimization
not entail E2, and commitment to E3 does not commit pacifists to
C2.
Nor do El and E2 entail C2;
so neither does commitment, by
to El and E2 oblige them to accept C2.
instance,
10
,
e.g.
evil-perpetrating
but
argument
Narveson's
well-known
Such
nonviolent
fails
for
similar
some
as
cases
hypothetical
dictators.
for
For in particular violence is
not the only evil and (so) evil may sometimes be reduced by
violence
pacifists
Regan’s
increases
in
slaying
of
the
reconstruction
of
Regan argues from premisses
reasons.
concerning the ranking of evil and a premiss like E2, specifically
3.
4.
The use of force is a substantive evil.
Therefore, a lesser quuantity of force must
great quantity of force (Rp.79).
The argument is invalid:
ordering
of
an
ordering
of
evils
force, even though force is an evil.
increasing force may still reduce evil, and so, on
be preferrable \
8
does
be
preferred
not
induce
to
a
a
similar
It is enough to observe that
Regan-Narveson
assumptions,
Resort to the theme that
Elt,
Violence is an irredeemable evil
in
(proposed by Regan
by
investigated
his
Narveson,
Np.118)
irredeemable evil is figuratively
(lesser
or
evils)
whites
pacifism,
of
""defence""
promises
so
black
Rp.80,
and
subsequently
a way around the difficulty.
that
no
combination
(goods) will lighten its hue;
with
An
grays
it always dominates.
Elt together with E2 will yield C2, but now the problem with Che argument shifts
to
What are the grounds for that?
Elt.
not widely acceptable, most people being
amount
of
As Narveson points out (Np.119), it is
prepared
to
countenance
violence in exchange for considerable goods.
some
(But then, not so long
ago, most people were tolerant of cruelty to animals so long as it was
gross.)
small
/not
too
Moreover, so Narveson implies, appeal to Elt does not get. pacifists out
of the argument from lesser violence;
underwriting C2.
indeed it seems to get them in deeper, by
for it removes Cl and, more importantly,
It does not however;
the corresponding premiss of the more difficult argument from lesser evil, which
starts from
DI.
There are cases where the use of violence would avoid greater evil.
For given, by Elt, that use of
greater
evil
than
that
cases such as DI requires.
Rp.80ff.),
which
however
violence
is
irredeemably
with violence;
tainted
evil,
there
is
no
and there are accordingly no
This is the core of Regan's defence in pacifism (see
he
sees
as converting pacifism into a 'bizarre and
vaguely ludicrous’ position (Rp.86), extreme pacifism, some of the
12
which he outlines
9
features
of
The approach through
violence
as
an
irredeemable
evil
is
mistaken
a
(utilitarian inspired) attempt to get at moral absolutes, which is what pacifism
is, like other deontological positions, grounded upon.
But such
absolutes
expressed in such commandments as, One ought not to commit violence,
adequately
meaning thereby, as it says, ought not, not just for the time being, or so
as
reasons
prima
are
facie,
otherwise don’t arise, or other things being equal, or
acting
for
ought
but
long
come
not
what
may,
period.
old-fashioned
Such
deontological, moral absolutist positions such as pacifism is at bottom, collide
head-on
with
utilitarianism
both
that
pacifism'.
For
the
moral
’utilitarianism
'that
utility
will
be
...
who
is
incompatible
brought out by doing some
violence may be greater than that produced by any alternative'
he
like
positions
and Regan (at the time) were working from.
Narveson
The reason for collision is simply that
with
malleable
highly
fashionable,
more
(Np.121)
13
.
So
acccording to the utilitarian-commandment to maximize utility may
acts
sometimes commit violence, contravening pacifist principles.
On its own inconsistency with a false doctrine such as utilitarianism shows
little:
position
every
suffers inconsistency with very many false doctrines.
Narveson does have another (small) argument to the effect that pacifism is
at
odds
with
contractarianism.
correct,
if
other
the
the
ethical
positions
he
presents, libertarianism and
But this argument would only carry weight, were it.
positions
were
suitably
exhaustive;
including no deeper ecological position for instance.
is
more
also
otherwise
however they are not,
What has
happened
which
insidious, however, is that utilitarian thinking has permeated much of
the rest of ethical thought, thus helping to establish a climate unfavourable to
incompatible
ethical
positions
such as pacifism.
10
There are two more specific
features.
damaging
consequentalist
Firstly,
as
more
approaches
have
we
of
consequentialist
Secondly,
facie
prima
principles
positions
out
utilitarianism,
of
This is entirely
mistaken.
The
is a theory-saving device, designed to get
difficulties
such
dilemmas.
moral
as
consequentialist positions tend to suggest that only consequentialist
reasons carry argumentative weight, and so try to ease rival positions, such
pacifism,
and
generally, have made it seem as if no deontic
principle were firm, but all are provisional.
theory
seen,
into
as
sometimes incongruous consequential support for their
offering
themes.
Narveson takes such procedures a
assumptions
upon
violence is that it
These
(p.425).
thus
pacifists:
produces
stage
further,
and
foists
utilitarian
says that the pacifist's 'objection to
he
suffering,
unwanted
pain,
in
the
recipients'
incongrous utilitarian grounds are something of a travesty of
pacifists' reasons for objecting to violence, which concern rather the
action
involved
and
what
it
does,
not
astonishing
such
of
only or always at all in the way of
suffering, to the perpetrators as well as those in whom it is
more
type
inflicted.
Even
utilitarian-style considerations are supposed to commit
the pacifist to the follow three statements, one of which however he
must
deny
(!):
[N]l.
To will the end (as mostly good) is to will the means to it (at
least pjotTce prima facie).
[N]2.
Other things being equal, the lesser evil is to be preferred to
the greater.
[N]3.
There are no ""privileged"" moral persons ...
(p.425^ ' .
'These three principles' which appear in Narveson's 'sum up [of] the
problem',
11
pacifist's
among them imply, as far as I can see, both the commitment to force
when it is necessary to prevent more violence and also the conception
of a right as an entitlement to defense.
And they therefore leave
pacifism, as a moral doctrine, in a logically untenable position
(p.425).
consequences
out
of
the
substantive terms such as
implicans;
otherwise
but
logic,
It would take not merely
statements
’violence’
the
deal
good
a
of
magic,
coax
to
given.
For implications to hold the
, /''I
<<<- ,■/""
<
F^
and
’right’ must also figure , in the
just
fail
implications
on
formal
grounds.
intended argument to the ""commitment to force” conclusion appears however to
some
for
e.g.
The
be
of variant, on the lesser violence argument, with N2 replacing, as it
sort
may C2.
such
(N3 and N1 then have oblique roles, N3 to stop
exceptions
being
made
oneself, N1 to ensure that violence adopted as a means has its full import,
in
as reflected in Cl,
construction
work
the
ethical
an
end).
But,
without
need not worry pacifists;
arguments
much
further
they hardly leave
pacifism as untenable.
Much more threatening is the argument from lesser evil, which has yet to be
This
countered.
is
argument from DI (cases of violence to avoid greater
the
evil) and N2 or E2 (minimization of evil) to C3 (admissibility of violence)
inconsistency
in
comprehensive
stock examples concern murder,
What are these cases^?
pacifism.
one
of
them
being
the
Narveson’s
situation
where
(Narveson in fact) must kill the (potential) mass-murderer B (Np.119).
is the moral situation here?
Narveson ought to prevent
but
mass-murder,
that
of
a
paradigmatic
moral
In fact the example is
dilemma,
that
of
very
similar
also
The
to
Pedro and Jim, where Pedro
volunteers to call off his firing squad about to shoot several captives
12
one
But what
Narveson ought not to kill B, because that is murder and involves violence.
situation is that of a moral dilemma.
and
if
Jim
one
shoots
Now almost everything turns on what account is given of
What a comprehensive pacifist does
moral dilemmas.
trouble,
coherence
.
of them
is
to
take
do,
not
inadequate utilitarian line of trying to
the
explain moral dilemmas away, as if they didn’t ever, occur
an
than
initial
intuitive
negotiable, etc., etc.
is
as
level),
wants
he
unless
if
(at
at
least
other
all obligations were prime facie,
The conflicting obligations stand.
What is to
done
be
however a very consequentialist thing, to try to determine the best thing to
do in the circumstances.
action
In trying to determine what
circumstances
is
a
satisfied.
violent
sense
this
the
best
e.g.
Narveson
had
better
a
fix.
Narveson
dilemma,
but
no
B.
shoot
(not a deontic one) evil should be minimized;
not
ought
circumstances, he had better do so
moral
of
17
.
to
the
in
course
Granted, it is preferable to minimize
follow that Narveson ought to resort to violence.
remains
course
best
that
Suppose
one,
inconsistency in pacifism follows.
in
the
principles like N2 and its mate, N2M, that it is preferrable to minimize
evil, will presumably be
and
is
evil,
it does not
On the contrary the situation
shoot
B,
but
in
the
appalling
There is the real-life complication of
inconsistency
No
a
through arguments like that from lesser
evil.
Narveson’s jackpot question, entangled in his discussion
from rights, can now be met.
of
the
argument
The question presents a dilemma:
If force is the only way to prevent violence in a given case,
use justified in that case? (p.420)
is
its
Narveson is thinking of cases where one is about to be murdered, Regan where one
is to be raped.
qualified No:
Given that force again entails violence, the pacifist answer is
No, it is not
deontically
13
justified
18
.
It
is
certainly
not
morally
it is not justified in the sense of ’justified* which
and
obligatory,
reflects its deontic origin in ’making right*.
may
and
because
just
some
might
force
in
solution,
a
making
to
amount
dilemma
be
out
But justification is
The response is qualified then
a case.
consequentially
situation.
ambiguous,
as
justified,
a
second-best
Narveson, proposes on the contrary, that
enough violence for the given occasion is morally justified - it can go at least
as
as killing another person - but he presents no back-up argument, taking
far
his proposal as evident.
jackpot
the
question
As it is not - the pacifist can simply
does
not
dispute
it
to a decisive a^rument against pacifism
lead
(though Narveson gives the impression that it does, e.g. , p.423).
What
it
can
lead to is the argument from lesser evil over again.
The charge of moral insensitivity.
§3.
This
is
less
argument
an
than
a
damaging charge:
A person committed to an extreme pacifism,
though he need make no
logical mistake, yet lacks a fully developed moral sensitivity to the
vagaries and complexities of human existence (Rp.86).
The smear is not without basis.
is
applied
avert
to
greater
Regan is envisaging situations
evil;
where
violence
and he points to what he takes to be the
evident moral permissibility of a woman's using ’what physical power she has
free
herself
from
an
Interestingly, Regan has not
aspiring rapist* (Rp.86).
described the situation in a way which is incompatible with
there
is
violence,
which
implies
What is at issue
the
intentional,
non-negligible damage, including pain, injury or
(cf.
a
pacifist
stand:
nothing in that to prevent a woman wriggling free (even in a way that
involves some force) and fleeing.
using
to
is
(or
death,
the
permissibility
of
infliction
of
wilful)
by
forceful
means /
Np.110), that is, which involves much more than mere use of physical force
And it is by no means so
or power.
violence
inflict
upon
evident
A
rapist.
aspiring
the
the
that
woman
is
entitled
to
can hardly now be
pacifist
accused, in a way that can be made to stick, of crass moral insensitivity.
More generally, arguments
pacifism,
the
on
like
Regan’s
the
to
insensitivity
moral
of
basis of pacifists' not taking obvious steps to prevent evil
I
occurrences, depend upon a confusion of passivity and pacifity.
Narveson
p.425)
(e.g.
Both Regan
and
assume that pacifism is a passive do-nothing position.
20
This is far from true, as the variety of
nonviolent
action
methods
groups has made plain.
comprehend the real possibilities of
considered
or
adopted
by
Neither Regan nor Narveson correctly
nonviolent
action.
Otherwise,
Narveson
would hardly be able to assert, in the automatic (but carping) way he does, that
the pacifist is
Narveson's
standing
negative
later
'not
by
doing
assessment
does not change the situation:
anything
about’
violence
(p.425).
of what he calls 'poslLlve nonviolence'
for this positive approach is simply nonviolence
practised in an exemplary way, as by Christ, in the hope that others will follow
suit, and fails to recognise the potential of nonviolent training and the
and
effectiveness
when
assembled
21
,
of nonviolent practices.
much
reduce
the
impact
scope
Fuller details of these practices,
of
the
argument
from
social
irresponsiblity, which is part of what lies behind the change of insensitivity.
Pacifism, however, like most positions, has
them
22
its
weaknesses,
one
of
undoubtedly derives from the fact that violence is a quantitative matter
and there is no sharp cut-off point at the bottom end of the
amounts
and
of
violence
greater
than
zero.
Yet
scale
with
minute (non-foot-in-the-door )
amounts do not seem to matter all that much morally, at least compared with
15
small
the
that
evils
gross
us
confront
on most sides when we look.
Morally sensitive
pacifists will not focus or fixate on small quantities of violence to the
of
exclusion
larger
moral
They
problems.
give
certainly
will
understood that by ’violence' in principles such as. P2
mean
they
it
undue
to be
'non-trivial
violence'.
§4.
and
The argument from radical political corollaries
The
corollaries.
out war by definition.
so clear.
Although
War
situations?
normally
would
Standard
war
always
would
be
what
excluded,
be
morally
counted
brought
progressively
then
second
dilemma
the
impermissible,
best
but
in
thing
to
closer
to
Comprehensive pacifism can of course
extreme
principles emphasizing the evil of violence.
weighing
of
Comprehensive pacifism thus does not include standard
A strange pacifism!
pacifism, in contrast to extreme pacifism.
be
pacifism
But the position of comprehensive pacifism is not
exceptional extenuating circumstances it might be the (second-)
do.
awkward
of extreme pacifism would certainly eliminate war.
practice
For war involves violence, typically on an extensive scale.
takes
other
from
best
choices
will
pacifism, in
practice, through
If evil is given a suitably
yield
the
large
same results as extreme
A
pacifism does (deontically), and entirely exclude war.
Now it can hardly be cogently argued that it tells against pacifism that it
would
eliminate wars, since wars are exchanges that should certainly be avoided
at all reasonable costs;
nor therefore can an
argument
Wz/Acuf
desirability
fHur/l
of war as an institution against pacifism,!
mounted from the
or Cldc.
However wars are by no
be
means the only social arrangements or institutions which dispense^ or rely u
violence
extensively.
The
state and many of its institutions, most obviously
police
inadmissibility
of
characteriscally are
contraposition
do.
also
forces,
coercive
23
institutions
and hence
;
pacifism
Comprehensive
it
as
such
implies
police
anarchism
provides no refutation of pacifism..
the
implies
24
moral
forces and states
But
once
again
For anarchism itself is (to
25
stick with a bold claim) irrefutable
Pacifism as an
ideal
brought
not
is
.down by its political corollaries.
Pacifism yields not only a qualified anarchism but qualified vegetarianism.
While
does
it
not
eating of meat, it does morally forbid violence to
forbid
animals.
At least it does this so long as what normally counts as violence,
animals,
continues to rank as valence, and is not removed from the category by
restriction of the application of violence to humans
little
good
for
however
basis
corollaries naturally
spread
suicide,
capt^al
euthenasia,
(or
such a chauvinistic restriction.
several
into
punishment,
controversial
indeed
There
persons).
is
The radical
moral,
wherever
to
e.g.
areas,
violence
plays a
significant role in many cases'1. The sheer moral power of pacifism is one reason
/7j Qc4>
for giving it some pause. And there are others.
/
One is that, like vegetarianism, it runs counter to ""natural"" behaviour
of
creatures to which the principles are supposed to apply. Aggression is a fairly
S' X
common feature of animal and human behavioZur, and it sometimes (though by no
means so often is as made out) involves violence. /Ze /cVXC o/1 //>£
Ao'jje.tjw
enable
ct/ony
Ac
/Aggression is assumed to be an evolutionary adaption
/ZeSG-
creatures
offspring) in their
artificial
h
to
be
better
natural
environments
fitted
environment.
substantially
17
developed
to
for survival (of themselves and their
most
humans
removed
from
now
live
situations
in
for
rather
which
there is no way they are
evolution gradually adapted their features:
adapt in time to absorb massive doses of radiation for instance.
have
substantially
living
their
adjusted
adjust
environment,
along
so
with
^oing
to
Much as humans
should
they
it
their social practices - including aggressive and violent
practices, now ill-adapted to their situation and mostly counter productive.
There is a residual problem,
practices
of
living
creatures
like
in
that
confronting
natural
(relatively)
vegetarianism.
conditions, such as
predators and tribal people, to be condemned as morally wrong when they
Sometimes,
violence?
involve
when the violence grossly exceeds what is required
yes,
Though a way can be beaten around the
given the end to be attained; but always?
edge of this problem
Are
26
it is an unsatisfactory way. What this suggests is that
where the point is put in terms of absolute evil.
That way of putting it already starts to give the game away, since Narveson
is all too evidently interested in negotiable evil which can be traded off
against other evils.
10.
An argument like the argument from lesser violence itself would appear to
undercut the argument for
El and E2 to premiss 02 for the argument for
lesser violence.
11.
That is by no means the onlyelement in Regan's torturous reformulation
of
Narveson's argument that can
be faulted. Consider, for example, premiss '5.
If any given action, A, is necessary to bring about a lesser rather than a
greater quantity of qualitatively equivalent evil, then one's obligation is
to do A.' While the premiss has considerable appeal as a principle of
supererogation, there is little reason to accept it as one supplying
obligations.
20
12.
Extreme pacifism can be seen as taking the rule that one ought never to use
violence as having priority over all other moral rules - which Is indeed an
extreme position even if a consistent one.
Such a priority rule is an
unsatisfactory way to deal with moral dilemmas.
13.
To show what Narveson goes on to claim that people are sometimes justified
in using force rather more is required, as Regan points out, Rp 85, n.18.
It has also to be shown that there are cases of these types (as in Cl) and
that agents can know that use of force will increase utility, reduce evil,
etc. A pacifist, rightly sceptical of utilitarian tracing of consequences,
and fond of noting that violence begets violence, could, with a small dose
of scepticism also, dig in at this point and claim that because no one can
be sure that use of force will reduce evil, so no one is justified in using
force. This is sceptically-based pacifism.
14.
Narveson also wants to contend that ’all of these may be defended on purely
logical or ""meta-ethical"" grounds’. This is likely false, especially the
claim as to logical status, since some of the principles are rejected in
substantive ethical theories.
15.
A surprising feature of Narveson’s argument, also Regan’s ""reconstruction"",
is that these cases are nowhere in sight, as if again one got to conclusions
logically out of the air, without any of the hard work the cases involve.
16.
The example was first discussed in B.
17.
This terminology matches the account of moral dilemma, given in much more
technical detail in R.
Routley and V.
Plumwood ’Moral dilemmas and the
logic of deontic notions’ in Paraconsistent Logic (ed.
G.
Priest and
others) 1983, to appear.
18.
An extreme pacifist would answer with an unqualified No.
19.
Directed against other creatures and more generally against ecological
systems such as ecosystems which can be hurt. There is a difference here
between live(go al-direct ed"")~systerns and property, and comprehensive pacifism
does not necessarily exclude wilful damage to property. Thus eco-pacifists
may destroy, or at least disable, bulldozers but not harm those who use
bulldozers to destroy habitat.
However sensitive eco-pacifists will not
condone ""violent"" destruction of property either: disab^ling of equipment
is different.
20.
The methods also include anticipatory action, e.g., the policemen going off
to enact violence find their vehicles won’t start, e.g. because components
have been removed
21
the peace movement should be preparing for
B. Martin ’How
See e.g
of
Peace
Proposals 13 (1982) 149-159, and references
Bulletin
war
’
nuclear
cited therein pp.152-3.
Williams,
//.( Zc (V, /, ( 1
J n l »'
/? o C-, /
/ /'
/\ <. ?
/
< / / i ’'i
*7 z*
//4
’Conflict: of values’.
22.
Another comes from the necessary circumscription of permissible nonviolent
action, to ensure that it does not include actions worse than nontrivial
violent action.
23.
These organisations may be ruled out directly as violence-dispensing or else
because they have individuals, delegates, who effect violence on their
behalf.
24.
In the sufficiently comprehensive form that the coercive state is without
moral basis or legitimacy.
Of course the ""state"" may have nonviolent
methods available to it; it may not be a purely voluntary arrangement.
25.
See R. Routley and V.
Alternatives, (1982).
26.
As Singer has in the analogous case of vegetarianism.
27.
The position has been called 'pacificism*.
Plumwood 'The irrefutability of
22
anarchism’,
Social
On the alleged impracticality of pacifism in the real world.
Appendix §5.
Even if it is conceded that pacifism is a viable moral ideal, that it
does
not fall down as incoherent or ludicrous, still the feasibility of pacifism as a
sensible practice to live by will bo contested - despite, or perhaps because of,
major
examples
such
as Christ and Gandhi.
And it has to be admitted that the
real world, with all its horror and squalor, does put pacifism to severe tests.
Nowhere is the practice of
nonviolence
than in replacing war \
succeed
usually
been
given
a
dress rehearsal.
defence of a region can vary
convention
observed
is
or
less
likely
to
Yet nonviolent defence methods, to replace the
2
detail ,
usual violent methods, have been described in some
never
thought
though
they
have
The prospects for success of nonviolent
significantly,
depending
upon
whether
the
war
If the convention Is observed then pacifism
not.
stands reasonable prospects of success.
The difficult cases are where the war convention
unleashed,
perhaps
broken,
is
in massive ways, on noncombatants.
his superficially sympathetic sketch and assessment of
resistance,
'success ...
may
all
sorts
of
this:
According to Walzer, in
nonviolent
defence
and
This is presumably false.
that
The invaders may give up and depart
reasons, some of them irrelevant, e.g., they needed a quick
decisive victory, they got homesick.
like
is
attained - there is never any guarantee of it, without or with
be
war - even if some conventions are flouted.
for
violence
is possible only if the invaders are committed to the
3
war convention - and they won’t always be’ (Wp.331~).
Success
and
sufficiently
What Walzer no doubt
ruthless
invaders
sufficient time and sufficient support lines, etc.
23
means
is
something
in sufficient numbers with
can eventually succeed.
But
sort of thing is also true even if the defending side resorts to violence.
that
The difference lies in the pattern of events;
is
more
difficult
and
costly
for
if the defence is
invaders
the
to
well-armed
it
with and easier
start
afterwards than with well-prepared civil resistance-.
Walzer is thinking, however, like many who
jump
to
the
that
conclusion
nonviolent defence cannot succeed when the war convention is abandoned, in terms
of inappropriate examples.
command,
total
in
the
He is thinking of an extreme totalitarian state,
way
the
Nazis
were
in Germany, the Jews of Germany
The
providing the model of the enslaved population, the ’‘resistance"".
is
highly misleading.
picture
The Nazis, who never invaded Germany, were in control of
all the infrastructure and had the cooperation (at least) of
the
bulk
of
the
For Walzer‘s comparison to work, there would have to be an enormous
population.
occupying army which took over and managed all key infrastructure.
island
With
such as Australia it is not even so clear that this is logistically
territories
feasible against a largely united and actively resisting
of
impression
in
the
acquiscence (e.g.
resistance
Walzer's
population.
fragmenting and the populace moving into dulled
Wp.332) might have got things
the
wrong
way
around,
the
test
with
4
disbelieving and frustrated soldiers ready to leave .
Nonviolent resistance is however unlikely to be put
adequate
way
in
present
state-determined
prepared to risk training its populace
(civil
defence
the police:
is different).
in
to
any
No state would be
circumstances.
full
in
action
nonviolent
techniques
It would then be. all to easy for them to ""rout""
civil obedience, for example, could no longer
customary violent means.
24
be
ensured
by
the
FOOTNOTES
The replacement of the state is considered
op.cit.
For example, in Sharp, op.cit.
given there.
See also
in
Routley
Martin,
All page references prefixed by ’W’ are to M.
Allen Lane, London, 1977.
and
op.cit.,
Plumwood,
and
82,
references
Walzer, Just and Unjust: Wars,
The argument suggested in Walzer (e.g. p.333) that nonviolent methods would
increase evil, or at least its distribution, is weak.
It is countered by
Sharp’s observation that the suffering likely to be induced is less than in
comparable wars.
§6.
On the positive case for pacifism.
defensive,
meeting
itself is revealing.
deviations
enough:
a
The argument thus far has been largely
That in
of objections to comprehensive pacifism.
range
Pacifism
is
the
rest
position
from it are what require explanation.
and
state)
(inertial
-The reason for this is simple
violence is, on most ethical systems, at least a prima facie
evil,
so
use of it has to be justified.
Positive arguments for pacifdism
position
and
merely
try
supposed to be justified.
violent
opponent:
to
can
advantage
take
of
privileged
dispose of ""exceptional cases"" where violence is
The favourite exception
is
self-defence
against
a
the case is curious in that the defender (person or nation)
is already in a morally-excluded situation, since the attacker
moral bounds.
its
has
overstepped
Still the defender is not normally committed to violence whatever
he does - as in a dilemma situation.
And since
it
is
at
least
facie
prima
wrong, and he does not have to use it, he should not resort to it.
An elementary syllogistic argument, given by Narveson (Np.117), can
be
adapted
to give a similar result:Violence is (intrinsically) wrong
Violence in any excepted cases (e.g.
self-defence) is still violence
Violence in any excepted cases is still (intrinsically) wrong.
Naturally those opposed to pacifism will challenge
the
first
premiss,
and
a
dialectic already glimpsed will begin.
None of the
arguments
are
arguments
for
pacifism
are
conclusive,
since
even
where
deductively tight assumptions can be challenged (as above).
are all the arguments for pacificism particularly good ones.
26
One of the
Nor
poorer
positive arguments for pacifism, for example, makes similar assumptions to those
of the classic theory of war, namely that once war is embarked upon it cannot be
limited,
the
e.g.
that
hope
or
nuclear
selectively and restrictively is an illusion,
(moral)
limits
in
Although
the
chances
overstated.
war
-
of
whatever
they
eXcalation
are
exchanges
Limited
escalation
are
be
used
inevitable.
The
weapons
chemical
is
will
- are bound to be overstepped.
often
real
enough,
and confrontation are possible.
more social arrangements and much more conventional than
the
the
case
is
Wars are much
theory
classical
Wars can, for example, be started and stopped in midstream should more
allows.
important
things
intervene
(e.g.
pollution
a
crisis
affecting
other
neighbouring states).
The main reasons for pacifism are, inevitably, those for nonviolence.
They
include (as support for the first premiss above) a range of consequentialist and
practical reasons, e.g.
suffering
of modern industrial societies, the broader popular
avoidance
and
anguish
of
support
base
obtained
None of these well-known
types
are separately decisive, but their cumulative effect is considerable.
' Cz/
//
Z'1
1
Is Ct' i
L>
) s' *4
/
/
27
— >
A
by
of violence, the desirable social consequences of nonviolence such as
a more open, less furtive, society.
)
violent
futility and counterproductiveness of violence within the setting
the
methods,
the cost in pain,
? . z.. z .
of
reason
",,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,"Box 59: Nuclear,Como House,Como House > Cupboard > Pile 3",https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/581b87e4d67a33473f084886196c0964.pdf,Text,"Draft Papers",1,0
148,https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/show/148,"Box 59, Item 681: Notes and cuttings on predation (for Cannibalism II)","Typescripts and handwritten notes. Includes copies of published works by other authors and letters.","Published works and letters redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions.","Richard Routley","The University of Queensland's Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291, Box 59, Item 681","Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy",,"This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, Dr. N.A.J. Taylor.","For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library.",,"[119] leaves. 30.57 MB. ",,"Notes and cuttings","https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:de64185",,"-
•
00681
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'
{; /) f¼i:<:LL I
f ~sif0l
J
IN DEFENCE OF CANNIBALISM
I.
TYPES OF ADMISSIBLE AND INADMISSIBLE
CANNIBALISM
Richard Routley
Philosophy Department
Research School of Social Sciences
Australian National University
and
Environmental Studies
University of Victoria
Canada
IN DEFENCE OF CANNIBALISM~
It is a commonplace of mainstream Western thought that
cannibalism - the eating of human flesh by humans, and, more
generally, the feeding of animals on members of their own species is, at least in the human case, morally outrageous.
© Ri chard Routley, 1982
This repugnan cy
thesis appears to be a legacy especially (but not only) of Christianity,
probably derived from Jewish teaching, which went much further and
excluded the eating of pig, for instance, as well as ""long pig"".
Also in this series:
It is a thesis reinforced by the substitution of Man for God of the
World rainforest destruction - the social factors
""Enlightenment"" and consequent elevation and separation of humans
Semantical foundations for value theory
from other creatures.
Unravelling the meanings of life
substantially undermined, have for the most part been observed to
Nihilisms and nihilist logics
rest on a tangle of false views and prejudices about the world, its
Nuclear power - ethical, social and political
dimensions
origin, evolution and purposes , and about the creatures that inl~bit
Now that all these positions have been
it, their separateness, and their order (in an a lleged chain of be in g )
Disappearing species and vanishing rainforests:
wrong directions and the philosophical roots
of the problem
with humans at the apex, it is past time that major moral theses that
these positions have sustained are re-examined and reassessed.
The irrefutability of anarchism, enlarged
Up for re-examination are, in particular, all theses that
Roles and limits of paradigms in environmental
thought and action
depend essentially on the common but mistaken assumption that there
is something morally very special or distinctive about simply being
a human, that Homo sapiens
as a species deserves special treatment.
On the contrary, there is no morally relevant distinction between
humans and all other creatures.
Of course there are various morally
relevant distinctions between things, but none concerns the
biological species Homo sapiens.
What holds rather is an annular
1
model which can be depicted schematically as follows:-
3
instance in removing the idea that the wrongness of such practices
2
as cannibalism is not even open to question 3 .
Diagram 1:
High in a list of inherited moral assumptions that are ripe
ANNULAR PICTURE OF MORAL RINGS IN OBJECT SPACE (and the
position of humans).
of
sapiens
for reassessment are those concerning the almost universal ~oral
prohibition of and repugnance to cannibalism, a practice that used
to be extremely widespread, but that has now been almost e;.tirely
extirpated
4
with the very successful cultural conquest of the world
by Western thought.
But instead of the re-examination that should
follow the intellectual erosion of mainstream Western social thought,
the growing recognition of its theoretical inadequacy, not to say
~:Notional labels for the interiors of such
morally relevant rings (or ellipses), from outer
to inner:
Objects of value, objects of moral concern
Objects having well-being
Preference havers, choice makers
Rights holders
Obligation holders, responsibility bearers
Contractual obligation makers
poverty, what has followed is the often shoddy defence of many of its
leading moral theses, mostly on anthropocentric grounds, but sometimes
on other grounds, some of them drawn from contemporary philosophy
(e.g. the conventionalistic rejection of cannibalism of Diamond,
considered below).
Many of the defences preferred of total prohibition of
There are also more comprehensive philosophical reasons
cannibalism are ludicrously weak, and withstand little examination.
for the periodic intellectual review of deeper assumptions (and
Consider, to illustrate, the main argument in (what was until very
prejudices), reasons furnished by dialectics in combination with
recently one of the few books in English on cannibalism) Hogg,
the theory of objects.
namely 'the innate repugnance of contemporary man to touch human
According to the theory of objects there
is no assumption that has to be held,that cannot be disbelieved,
flesh' (p . 188, also earlier) .
while according to dialectics proper every assumption is open to
represented as a matter of fact, it does not appear to hold generally,
questioning and reconsideration by its methods , and assumptions in
and may be largely a matter of background and conditioning.
order to be rationally maintained should withstand such critical
scrutiny.
imply
2
Naturally these (methodological) considerations do not
that assumptions under examination do not (frequently) withstand
critical discussion, or that there are not (or never could be) good
reasons for adhering to them.
But the considerations are important
in opening larger moral assumptions to due reconsideration, for
Insofar as the repugnance is
There
is no evidence that - what seems unlikely given the former prevalence
of cannibalism - it is innate;
and insofar as it is a matter of fact
it does not support moral prohibition of eating human flesh, any more
than the apparently very widespread repugnance of urban Americans
5
4
as observed, it has recently been argued, successfully, that this
to eating raw snake underwrites a moral prohibition on consumption
of raw snake meat.
distinction will not carry very much of the moral weight that has
been imposed upon it. 7
On the other hand, if the repugnance in
With the breakdown of this sharp moral distinction
question is (intended to be) warranted moral repugnance, then the
argument is trivially circular, the premiss assuming the point at
between humans and other species.orthod ox anthropocentr ic options,
which sanction human consumption of animals other than humans but
issue.
never humans, collapse.
One reason why the proferred defences look weak is that it
has not been thought necessary to provide any defence;
for 'Directly
daylight falls on the habit it withers away' 5 - the ""daylight"" is
that of contemporary Western civilization.
appears in Langton (initial page):
A similar theme
cannibalism is 'a custom that
of civilization' - or, one might say, before the triumph of human
(pure) vegeta!ian options and on the other, cannibal(istic ) options
(mixes of these options which allow some human flesh eating will
it will be seen that by no means all forms of cannibalism are
morally inadmissable.
present exercise.
Showing as much is the main object of the
Though the results arrived at are part of the
process of elaborating a non-chauvinis tic ethics, and accordingly have
implications for policy, no policy conclusions are drawn in what
no recommendatio ns for the implementation , or institution-
The vegetarian options face, it
certainly seems, insuperable difficulties, especially concerning
such issues as animal predation (which is an important, immensely
frequent, and often _
Fx.
But such a principle
It is clear
Though letting die differs significan tly, then, from killing,
conditions upon when it is wrong may be reached in similar ways.
How the condition for letting die correspond ing to AP should go becomes
rather more obvious if the righthand side of AP is expanded to:
taking (the) action which terminates x's life is maximally unjust.
what is evident in such cases, some equivalent of the omission/c
ommission
The parallel passive condition can th en presumably be formulated
distinctio n is needed .
thus:-
ad FM2. But the thesis that the distinctio n is needed and is morally
DP.
significan t in many, or at l e a s t ~ , cases must be clearly dis-
which continues x ' s life is maximally unjust. 26
tinguished from the very much stronger thesis that all omissions
are blameless, and that any commission s are morally open ~o blame
- or praisewort hy.
This thesis is, rather plainly, indefensib le,
yet has been responsibl e for much of the bad light in which appeal
to distinctio n appears .
ad FMJ.
Then in turn, substituti on principles again yield clauses EDP and CDP,
correspond ing to EAP and CAP, special cases of which yield conditions
under which cannibalism is wrong where it involves letting die.
Principle CDP which supplies this condition, where x and y are of
the same species, runs as follows:-
The principle of moral symmetry between omissions and
commission s is in fact refutable.
Letting x die is wrong iff refraining from taking (the) action
It appears to be based on an
CDP.
y ' s letting x die for eating purposes is wrong iff y's refraining
from taking (the) action which continues x's life, for purposes of
eating x, is maximally unjust.
Since letting die is, for the most
32
part, less heinous than killing, cannibalism involving letting die
33
i s more widely permissible than cannibalism involving killing . 27
§4 .
The matter of predation, and important cases of l egit imat e
killing and letting die for food.
One tempting model that underlies the conflict picture of
Paradigmatic examples of legitimate
predation, of predation as basically undesirable but an unavoidable
killing are provided by predation, where bis prey of a and a depen ds
fact, a model that leads to human vegetarianism, is the following
(essentially) for its livelihood, indeed for its survival, on eating
kind of atomistic axiological theory (or utilitarianism):-
bs.28
Such predat ion i s a n essential part of any su ffici e ntl y rich
ecosystem .
Essential pr eda tio n i s pre dation which is essent i a l to
according
to the initial positive value thesis, every living creature (every
sentient creature , every higher animal , etc .) has an initial positive
the nor,~11 livelihood of tl1e predat or , and where the prcd alor takes
non-instrumental value which it retains unless it does something to
for itself no more than it requires for it s livelihood.
forf eit that value.
carn.ivores , such as the big cats , but some humans, such
traditional Eskimos, are essential predators.
Not only
ilS
some
(On the even simpler position of biospheric
egalitarianism, discussed below, all living things have equal worth,
The fact that humans
ar e part of the natural predatory food chains should not be lost s i g ht o[ .
Observe that the argument to permissibility of essential pre-
in some nontrivial sense.)
These positive values just sum ; and
maximisation of value (or suitably averaged value) is, of course , the
(or an) ethical objective .
Then killing is generally undesirable ,
dation does ~ take the invalid form:
such predation is a fact (a fact
because it results in a reduction in net value, and survival is generally
of life), therefore it is permissible.
That arguments of this type ,
desirable.
29
The exceptions occur when a creature has forfeited its
selectively relied upon by Diamond and (earlier) Hegel, are inval id is
value, e . g . it per sists in value-reducing behaviour, so that killing
well-enough known (they commit a prescriptive fallacy), and is evident
it would prevent a further decline in net value or lead to increase in
from such fallacious arguments as the diplomacists' argument, e.g. it is
total value .
a fact of life that Indonesia has occupied (absorbed) East Timar;
when it leads to an overall reduction in value .
the re-
The underlying theme is that killing is unjustifiable
The onus of proof,
fore it is pe rfectly alright that Indonesia occupied (absorbed) East Timar.
when it can be assigned, lies with those who make the exceptions, who
Naturally it would be decidedly awkward if the fact of essential predation
do or license the killing .
turned out to be impermissible:
since, with one item of value consuming another item of value, it
trouble.
the whole natural order would be in moral
This brings us to another defect of the argument from· ""facts"",
Predation now appears as an awkward fact ,
leads to an overall reduction in value.
Since inessential preda tion
that it suggests that essential predation is really, at base, something
is inessential, it is ruled out as inadmissible.
pretty undesirable, but nonetheless something we have to live with - in
(nonindigenous) humans for whom predation is, it is plausibl~ argu ed ,
Thus in particular,
contrast with predation, in its associated meaning, as plunder, which we
iness en tial, are not entitled to kill for f ood :
do n't, or rather oughtn 't to, have to live with morally, and which is
usual rai si ng of animals for food, etc . are all excluded in one st r oke ,
commonly reprehensible.
and a l eading feature of vegetarianism imposed .
therewith hunting,
34
35
Essential predation is not so satisfactorily dispos ed o f,
but introduces conflict.
For either one creature, the prey, is
sacrificed or another creature, the predator, is:
value de c lines .
Similar objections apply against biological egalitarianism,
either way tot 8 1
In the interim, while vegetarian scientists work
even when it is qualified as in Drengson and Naess by an in principle
30
on new diets and new lifestyles for predators, there is an obvious
clause.
recipe to be applied, which while not eliminating conflict, minimises
that predation is rather suboptimal:
its effe c t:
is strictly ruled out as a general practice.
just as steam gives way to sail, so the less valuable
gives way to t h e ~ valuable.
Thus if humans are reckoned to be
It is not (or not only) that it is taken for granted
the trouble is that predation
Since each lion and
each antelope is assigned one unit of whatever is assigned equally,
mo re valuable than polar bears - the usual human evaluation - then
there is no way of justifying the lifestyle of a lion that consumes
polar bea rs are not going to be entitled to prey on humans, in the sens e
several antelopes.
at least that their predation is not justified.
Any equalitarian approach that is E££ atomistic is liable
Application of the recip e
31
presupposes a value ranking on creatures under which some are more valuabl e
to further incoherence, as Drengson's holism reveals.
than others:
some living system of living things, e.g . the Earth as on the Gaia
otherwise if all are equal, predation is never admissible, and
Lets be
essential predators just die out - at least that is the simple ethical pic t -
hypothesis (p. 233).
ure.
least of the living things that comprise it, has the same value as
This points up one of the many problems for biological egaltarianism.
But the picture presented so far is too simple, and tl1e
recipes suggested dubious.
Then s, which should(?) have the value at
each of them (in effect 1 = n, for n>l).
Some of t~e ecological consequences of implementing the
For if the matter is properly considered
not at a given time, but over a time interval, dynamically and not
suggested recipes, and reform of essential predators, can now be
just statically, it is not so simple, and a rather different result
gauged.
emerges .
the chains of predation are long and complex;
One predator takes, over a typical lifetime, rather a
lot of prey .
Unless the predator ranks very much more highly than
Massive environmental interference would be required, since
distortions especially in lower-level prey would occur, with resulting
the prey, the value of the sum of the prey will exceed that of the
ecological instability and often catastrophe.
predator.
that is, are ecologically highly undesirable.
These considerations, in combination with a positive
and gross population
The consequences,
What this and the
value thesis, suggest a very different result, that predators should
summation problems begin to reveal is that the initial atomistic
be allowed to, or encouraged to, die out - unless they are somehow,
value distribution picture is inadequate because it leaves out systems
what seems improbable for predators that remain wild, converted to
and systemic connections such as a more ecological approach would
vegetarianism,
include,
The dynamic picture resorted to is still too simple in one
important respect, that over a time interval, prey, which would often
exceed natural (and sometimes reasonable) population levels without
predation, are replaced.
Where population of a preyed-upon species
of creature is at an ecological limit, and minor culling of the sort
36
natural predation induces does not, owing to replacement, reduce
37
population levels significantly below that limit, predation has no
significant effect on total value,
So results yet another, different,
recipe, one which is a little nearer the
ecologica l mark. 32
farm animals (all of them) can be appropriately filled out, to
Some utilitarians, Singer in particular, have recognised
exclude replacement of animals with unusual or special properties,
the role of replacement a·,1d made some allowance for it (at a serious
cost to Singer ' s vegetarianism , it should be added),
e.g. those carrying valuable genes, and to allow slaughter, without
Singer now allows
for killing and replacement of nonselfconscious life, but advances a
nonreplaceabllity thesis for self-conscious life.
Furthermore, even if a replacement thesis for free-range
shorter-term replacement, of those carrying damaging diseases or
genes - as it no doubt can, in a modified replacement thesis - still
For the basic division
Singer appeals to 'Tooley 's distinction' between
a nonreplacement thesis fails to allow even for essential predation
of selfconscious creatures, and accordingly should be scrapped,
beings that are merely conscious and ••• those that
Since this pronouncement is likely to be disputed, at least
are also self -conscious, in the sense of being able to
conceive of themselves as distinct entities, existing
by some vegetarians, it is worth trying to indicate why essential
over time with a past and a future (Sp.151),
At the same time it can be
In fact most of the sorts of free-range farmyard animals that Singer
predation is perfectly admissible,
seems to be envisaging as nonselfconscious, and accordingly replaceable,
explained what is still wrong with the tempting dynamic picture and
creatures, for instance geese and hens, appear to satisfy Tooley's
the initial positive value thesis.
tests for selfconsciousness.
what is put in as what is left out,
Geese are certainly aware of themselves
they value members of their own community ;
trees, and inanimate such as rocks and buildings,~ have initial
and they remember
value, but that complexes and wholes, in particular ecosystems, may
elements of their past and, in things like nest building (practice),
anticipate the future.
More important, what has selfconsciousness (reflex-
ive consciousness), or consciousness to do with the moral dimension?
Until
well have initial value,
The reduction assumptions underlying value decomposition
thereof,
itself, because by no means all consciousness of conscious life is _ 32 a
to atoms fail ,
Singer's theses lack foundation and look, while perhaps convenient for
that it cannot be duly explained;
There are grounds for anticipating
for instance, being too valuable to be
Such wholes may have value furthermore
which is not dissolvable into values of component parts, or atoms
this is duly explained - it is not satisfactorily explained as valuable in
some traditional farmers, rather ad hoe,
What is left out is not just that
objects other than living creatures, both animate such as plants and
as distinct entities, and of geese as distinct from (and superior to)
hens;
What is wrong is not So much
In terms of the value of wholes such as ecosystems, one
of the arguments for essential predation is disarmingly elementary .
It takes the form:
(sufficiently) rich (natural) ecosystems are
Predation is an essential part of these systems .
simply replaced, in the sense of having irreplaceable experiences, worth-
very valuable,
while projects, etc., does not have the requisite linkage with self-
What is an essential part of what is very valuable is admissible.
consc iousness.
Therefore, predation is admissible.
Such predation, which may be argued for in other ways ,
admits of extension by the following principle :
38
EP.
If something is entitled to kill for food under certain
39
conditions, e.g. respectfully and when in need, then so are others
under the same conditions.
§5.
The argument for EP is of the same type as that for other
Postscript .
The paper is very incomplete .
It fails to address
several issues intimately connected with cannibalism, such as hunting
similar indifference, or interchangeability, principles in ethics.
of humans and other animals, in particular for food, and as raising
It follows from EP and essential predation that, since a tiger may
humans and other animals, especially defective infants, for food.
when in need kill a cow to eat, then so may humans in need.
If
Worse,
it is evasive on some fundamental issues, and it fails to penetrate very
taking the cow's life is not maximally unjust in the one case, nor
deeply into some of the issues it does begin to consider, such as
is it in the other, since the circumstances are similar.
predation, or as the necessary and/or sufficient conditions for admiss-
The results
reached may be alternatively argued for using principle CP. 33
Perhaps Singer is also on the right track, though he has
latched onto the wrong distinction.
Perhaps there is a (descriptive)
condition q (or a condition qs for each sorts of agent), appropriately
ible killing.
position.
It is little consolation that others are in the same
Hopefully some of these deficiencies will be compensated
for in subsequent parts.
At the same time several themes will be developed that may
tied with causing to die, such that while killing creatures without q
not have been evident so far, e.g. that in
under suitable conditions is permissible, killing creatures with q
is far too much killing taken much too lightly, but far too little
is not, except under special conditions . 34
general experience of killing and death when it does occur, that is
Given that q is
11
modern 11 societies there
appropriately morally connected such a procedure would fit into the
except usually among small groups mostly of inured professionals,
annular picture (given earlier: q would mark out the interior of the
which ""shield"" most humans from the phenomena involved.
dotted elipse).
Nor need the distinction be chauvinistic, because
it cuts across species in a morally defensible way.
anything, is q?
located?
made good?
But, what, if
Can a suitable morally-unloaded category-based distinction
And how disconcerting would it be if some such distinction could no
Wait for the next exciting episode . 35
'
40
FOOTNOTES
41
It was singularly appropriate that this paper should have otained
its first (and only) public presentation at the Alfred E. Packer
Memorial Center, University of Colorado. I am indepted to
several members of the audience for comments and references, and
in particular for the first extension of the base case .
It is noticeable how people who have never been
cannibals despise the horrible thing; and how
quickly it disappears when a cannibal tribe
comes into contact with a wider world than that
Directly
merely of their own bush village.
daylight falls on the habit, it Withers away .
This is remarkable when we remember the sanctity
The cannibal
of it in primitive man's eyes .
is not necessarily a hopelessly degraded brute,
but-;-man who has not yet lived out of the dark
obscurity of bush tribalism, and so had bli~dly_
followed a practice deep-rooted in the sacrificial
These themes are defended, and the annular model explained, in
The themes are also defended in
HC, p. 103ff., and in AHC.
other recent work, e.g. by Tooley and Singer.
As the schematic diagram shows, humans do not occupy a central
ring.
Thus adoption of the model does not imply, what Pickering
assumes (p. 374), that 'humans are more~ntral ' or, for that
matter, that 'humans are owed more extensive moral consideration
Nothing in the model itself depends on humans .
than plants'.
The model is not species based, or biologically based, but
category basect"";-and designed to reflect the different sorts of
things there are, e . g. things capable of entering into contracts
conferring obligations, and things not so capable, things that
can have preferences and make choices as opposed to things that
cannot (truly, or significantly), things, including systems and
Nor, therefore,
organisations, with a telos and things without.
does the model write in a new type of chauvinism, or confer
privilege or moral advantage on things in more central rings.
Indeed, things in central rings will have obligations and
commitments, and be subject to limitations on what they do, in
ways that things further out cannot be; so there will be some
As this
moral disadvantages in occupying a more central place.
indicates, the categories selected are intended to have moral
And different sorts of behaviour are morally
linkages .
appropriate with respect to the different categories of objects.
2.
3.
4.
The popular view that dialectics and adoption fraction of assumption
themes are dangerous is partly based on a modal fallacy,
For the fallacy
e.g. that what can be believed is believed .
in operation in more intellectually respectable quarters see
WW.
the Epilogue of Harris
Some dialectics are accordingly recommended for anyone
convinced that cannibalism must be wrong. The investigations
undertaken in this paper alwshare other features with
(classic) dialectics: there are many loose ends, and in
several crucial areas firm conclusions are not reached. Later
parts of the paper will take care of some of these things.
Thus Hogg (p. 188),
Cannibalism . .. can hardly be said to exist in
There may be isolated
the world of today.
pockets of survival in the heart of New Guinea
and among some of the tribes in the remotest
corner of South America or African jungles; but
they will be no more than the rarest of phenomena.
5.
Hopkins, given the last word by Hogg, p. 192.
quote from Hopkins is of passing interest:
The whole
ideas common to man the world over from his
earliest days.
6.
Some of the advantages of institutionalisation of certain
cannibalistic practices are evident, e.g. a_much enh~nced
Various disadvantages if not evident should
supply of protein.
become so in the course of the text.
7.
See again in HC and similar.
Although the human/nonhuman distinction
is not, so it is argued, one of moral significance, not all
Other distinctions of moral importance
distinctions vanish.
- those of the annular model - naturally remain.
8.
Of coures, this practice is (still) controversial, and
But a
offensive to various religious and other groups.
great advantage of a pluralistic society is t~at it can
acconnnodate (better than alternatives) such differences
Issues such as human_ .
over the morality of practices .
burial and restricted cannibalism, however, make the limits
of present pluralism evident .
9.
Or else did not incur official establishment disapproval,
though the acts strictly appeared to infringe the
Every s~~ond_ra~onteur has
prevailing law of the land.
examples of cannibals not brought to Justice .
10.
.
This clearly anticipates an initial argument of this
My thanks to W. Berryman for drawing my attention
paper.
to the attitude of the Catholic Church, as presented in
Read.
11.
Consent in principle will carry the requisited load, and
for this it is normally enough that the person would consent.
This indicates one logical route to the liberalisation,
and removal, of the consent clause.
12.
There would (so far) be no trophies, e.g. Z's head ~n the hall,
Y's skull on a stand, because trophies involve hunting and
killing (for which see below).
13.
As some vegetarians would freely admit;
other
11
vegetar i ans II
f rther and regard the killing of certain (nonself) an1•mals for food as admissible provided no suffering
u,
go
i
conscious
is incurred and that the animals are replaced. . But it s
true that usually 'vegeta;ians do not touch the issue of
our attitudes to the dead
(D., p.9) .
42
14.
15.
In a like vein it is suggested that Singer and Regan do not
see that 'a cow is not something to eat; (for them) it is
only that one must not help the process along' (D., p. 468).
The latter incidentally would not exclude the use of dead
creatures for food, leather goods, etc.; things that
animal liberationists like Singer definitely exclude.
43
21.
Diamond recognizes this objection, p. 471, but does not meet
Pace
K. Bell, according to whom,
Men have always hunted in the fields around Potigny
and Falaise .
They still do, but no longer their
it.
own species.
16.
17.
18.
In similar ways we are said to gain the concept of an
animal; s~~ p. 476.
-Diamond introduces this piece of serious confusion in the
course of emphasizing why the 'assumption that we all agree
that it is morally wrong to raise people for meat ... is not,
or not merely, ... too weak' (D.• p . 469).
Diogenes Laertius, vol. 11, p. 297.
Some of the complex issues concerning hunting will be considered
in subsequent parts, others elsewhere.
22.
See, e.g., Henson, and also Ewin and RKU .
23.
A notable piece of male chauvinism also slides through, in the
suggestion that, in Lhe absence of more weighty moral backing,
the expressed wish of a pregnant woman is morally trivial.
And Sayre reports (p. 25),
Cannibalism (uv0pwno~ayCa) is alleged to have been
a practice of the Cynics by Philodemus and by
Theophilus Antiochenus; but, if so, it must have
been confined to their early history, for they had
a number of critics during the Christian era who
would have mentioned it if they had known of it.
Both Philodemus and Theophilus were biassed and we
must remember that similar stories were told of the
early Christians.
However, cannibalism is said
to have been authorized by the Republic and Thyestes
(or Atreus) attributed to Diogenes and also by the
Republic of Zeno and by Cleanthes and Chrysippus
(Philodemus, On the Stoics; Theophilus Antiochenus,
Ad. Autolycum 3, 5; D.L. 6, 73; Ibid. 7, 188;
cf. 28th Letter of Diogenes; Dio Chrysostom 8, 14).
As Diogenes Laertius goes on to explain, that 'Chrysippus did
countenance the eating of dead humans was one of the points
brought against him by those who 'ran him down as having
written much in a tone that was gross and indecent'. As regards
such attitudes to the dead, times have not changed that much.
The (idea of) eating ""the dead"" (dead humans, of course), under
~ circumstances, is still widely regarded as scandalous, and
highly newsworthy (see Read, p . 296 ff).
19.
Cannibalism which involves explicit killing for food is a kind
of reflexive predation, but generally (cases of) cannibalism
and predation only properly overlap.
20.
An example would be where some of the survivors of a crash or
wreck hunt other ""survivors"" in order to survive; cf. W. Golding,
Lord of the Flies.
24.
But one's life-purposes are diminished lhow can this be on
Young's picture?)
if they jeopDrdise those of others. Hence
Young's preparedness to let Amin be killed by the stampeding
horses, Yp. 527.
25 .
Indeed it leads, as Young interprets it, to a more sensible
vegetarianism than Singer's initial position (in Animal
Liberation, not as significantly modified in Sp.153).
neither culling nor predation are simply ruled out.
26.
For
Action and taking action should be construed in a wide, but
common enough fashion, e.g. the action taken may amount to
doing nothing or getting-the-hell-out-of-it.
27.
It is tempting to try to prove this on the basis of a proper
inclusion assumption, that where letting die is wrong so is
killing, but not conversely.
The assumption may, however, need
qualification; e . g. killing may sometimes be preferable to
letting died in a lingering way .
28.
'Predation"" is a singularly unfortunate word to be stuck with
to describe this universal phenomenon. It is unfortunate both
because of its etymology, and because of its other meaning .
At to the first, ' predation' derives from praedari, 'to plunder',
which derives in turn from praedo, 'booty',
As to the second,
'predation' also means a 'practice or addiction to plunder or
robbery'.
Both carry strong negative connotations.
There is
a similar damaging duality in the expressions 'prey' and 'prey
upon'.
29.
These defective considerations also lead to a maximisati~n of
population of creatures of the base class assigned values, up to
the limit - if any (on frontier philosophers there are none)
where declining returns set in .
Where, further, humans are
typically, but erroneously, assigned greater value than other
creatures, the considerations support the rapid biassing of
terrestial fauna! population in favour of humans that we are
witnessing.
The second point does not apply, in that form,
.
against biol0gical egalitarianism, and the first objection fails
where total value is replaced, as under some utilitarianisms (with
what justification is less clear, since surely we want to maximise
value so far as constraints permit: see RKU), by average value,
average value per (base class) life lived, etc.
44
The argument in the text is not affected materially by switching
from value analogues of total utilitarianism to analogues of some
form of average utilitarianism.
On some of the serious problems
with these utilitarianisms, see Jamieson.
30.
Drengson, following Naess and others, espouses 'biospheric
egalitarianism and the intrinsic value of all life' (p. 222).
According to the theory, each (living) being has intrinsic value
(pp.233-4), and hence each presumably has equal worth (and is
entitled, in Singer's terms, to equal consideration , if not equal
treatment).
In Naess and Drengson this biospheric egalitarianism
is qualified by an in principle clause. According to Naess, 'The
'in principle' clause is inserted because any realistic praxis
necessitates some killing, exploitation and suppression' (p.95),
and according to Drengson, 'This qualification is made with the
simple recognition that we cannot live without affecting the
world to some degree' (the latter claim is inadequate, because
it is not just 'we' who are involved).
31.
Axiological approaches that are atomistic have other problems,
some reminiscent of those Wittgenstein discusses
for logical atomism.
In particular, how do we locate the atoms
to which value is supposed to adhere fundamentally.
A first bad
feature of this approach is invariance failure: it matters for
final summations how the atoms are chosen, for different choices
will assign complexes quite different values.
Secondly (Wittgenstein's
question), why are some things said to be atoms not complexes, and
vice versa.
A third group of problems, brought out in HC, concerns
the choice of a base class.
32.
An
environmental ethic s:1oul.:l. also be an ccologic:1 I et!dc,
sense of an ecologically realistic ethic.
facts are certainly relevant.
32a. A detailed case for this claim
33.
j:1 t lH·
In this resepct too the
appears in Routley and Griffin.
Thus rp can be made to yield a good deal more than Young's
application of his proposal (for which he offers no proper justification):
A creature is entitled to kill another creature of
lesser value when its life (and so all its functions,
prospects, etc.) depends on it and when it does not
kill more creatures than it needs for these purposes.
And the dubious business of imposing such order rankings on
creatures can be bypassed.
34.
The qualifications are necessary.
If the latter exceptional
conditions clause were not adjoined, the prospe ct of finding a
condition q would be wiped out by such cases of essential predation
as exceptional human cannibalism.
The qualifications, although
they enhance the prospects of locating such a q, do not appear to
make it analytic or near analytic that such a descriptive q can be
found.
45
35.
Not only are there many proposals for q to sift through - most
of which however seem to fail for reasons already indicated in the
text - but also there are apparent options to finding such a
distinction, such as resetting the problem, in a less individualistic way, in the framework of (ecological) communities.
REFERENCES
K. Bell, Not in Vain, University of Toronto Press, 1973,
REFERENCES CONTINUED
P.E, Devine, 'The moral basis of vegetarianism ', Philosophy 53 (1978)
· 481-505 . (all references prefixed with 'V' are to this article) ,
C. Diamond, ' Eating meat and eating people', Philosophy
(references hereto are prefixed by 'D').
53 (1978) 465-77,
Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers (edited, with English
translation, by R. D. Hicks), Heinemann , London, 1925,
A.R . Drengson, ' Shifting paradigms: from the Technocratic to the PersonPlanetary', Environmental Ethics 2 (1980) 221-40,
R. E. Ewin, ' What is wrong with killing people? ' Philosophical Quarterly
tl..<. (197;t) 126-39.
M, Harris, Cows, Pigs, Wars and Witches, Fontana, London , 1977
(hereafter
prefixed by 'W.W.').
M, Harris, Cannibals and Kings , Collins , London, 1978 (hereafter prefixed
by ' CK '),
R. Henson, ' Utilitarianism and the wrongness of killing', Philosophical Review
80 (1971) :1.u,- n7.
D. Jamieson,'Utilitarianis m and the value of life', typescript, University of
Colorado, 1981.
J, Glover, Causing Death and Saving Lives, Penguin, Middlesex, England, 1977 .
L.P. Pickering, Review of ' Ethics and Problems of the 21st Century ',
Environmental£.£,.~-~ 2 (1980) 373-78 .
G. Hogg , Cannibalism and Human Sacrifice, Robert Hale, London, 1958.
(references hereto are prefixed by 'H'),
R. and V. Routley, 'Against the inevitability of human chauvinism ' in Ethics
and Problems of the 21st Century, eds , K, E. Goodpaster and K. M. Sayre,
University of Notre Dame Press, 1979, (Hereafter prefixed by ' AHC') .
J. Langton, Cannibal Feast, Herbert Joseph, London, 1937.
L, Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, Blackwell, Oxford, 1953.
A. Naess, 'Self-realisation in a mixed community of humans ·, bears, sheep and
wolves', Inquiry
22 (1971) 231-41 ,
A. Naess, ' The shallow and the deep . long-range ecology movement.
Inquiry
A
s11mmr1ry'~
16 (1':173) 95-100.
P.P, Read, Alive, Avon, New York, 1974.
R. and V. Routley, 'An expensive repair kit for utilitarianism', typescript
1976 (hereafter referred to as ' RKU ' ).
R. and V, Routley, ' Human chauvinism and environmental ethics' in Environmental
Philos~ (ed. D. Mannison, M. McRobbie and R. Routley), RSSS ,
Australian National University , 1980 (the article is referred to as
' HC' , the book as ' EP ' ),
F. Sayre, Diogenes of Sinope , A study of Greek Cynicism, Johns Hopkins
University , Baltimore, 1938.
P. Singer, 'Killing humans and killing animals', Inquiry 22 (1979) 146- 56,
(references hereto are prefixed by ' S ').
R. Tannahill, Flesh and Blood. A History of the Cannibal Complex ,
Hamilton , London, 1975 .
Hamish
M. Tooley , Abortion and Infanticide, typescript, Australian National University,
1980,
R. Young, ' What is so wrong with killing people?' Philosophy 5¥ (1979)
(all references prefixed with ' Y' are to this article) ,
515-528
R. Routley and N. Griffin, 'Unravelling the meanings of life', available in
this series , 1982.
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Cutting, Scholfield B (17 August 1988) 'A human role for the pig', The Weekly Times, 14. (1 leaf)
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•
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Typescript, with handwritten emendations and annotation. Two reference reports on
Cannibalism I. (2 leaves)
Cutting (photocopy) of 'Necessity as a common law doctrine? [6.40] R v Dudley and
Systems', The system of criminal law: cases and materials, 544-551. (4 leaves)
The following have been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions.
•
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Cutting (photocopy) of 20 pages from unidentified publication on Pioneers-Donner
Party-The Mormons, 526-545. (10 leaves)
Letter, Bill to Richard, 7 Oct 1981 re feedback on Richard Sylvan's paper on cannibalism.
(2 leaves)
Letter, Robert to Richard, 7 Oct 1981 re feedback on Richard Sylvan’s paper on
cannibalism. (2 leaves)
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§5
.
Raising humans and other animals for food.
Humans have lit tle
compuncti on, for the most part, in rearing other animals for food .
Since healthy animals that are raised for food often excell humans,
especially humans that are ""defective "" in one way or another ,
little , except considera tions of species , seems to stand in the
way of raising such humans for food .
We are in the region of
Swift ' s modest proposal again .
What distinguis hes creatures humans
(and other creatures
capable of animal husbandry) are entitled to raise for food from
creatures that they are not?
It is not difficult to state some
constrain ts on t he solution of this problem, which also rule out
usual solutions .
First , the distinctio n should be independe nt of
reference to particula r species , especially of reference to the
human species , and also indirect reference thereto, by way of
phrases such as ' standard ... ' ,
' normal ... . '
'potential ... ' .
Secondly - and this furnishes the ground of the first requireme nt the basis of the distinctio n should be morally relevant i n the way
that mere zoologica l distinctio ns are not:
otherwise chauvinism
is not avoided . ' The replaceme nt principle Singer adopts for benign
farmyard husbandry fails on this score , among others (the others
being that many farmyard animals seem to satisfy the requireme nts
for being selfconsci ous beings) .
Not being selfconsc ious , which
is supposed to justify replaceme nt, under ideal farming condition s ,
lacks requisite moral linkage .
Singer ' s move does however emphasi ze
'
31.
two important things .
First , the familiar objections to animal
husbandry, e.g. on grounds of cruelty or deprivation to animals,
are remove.e\
by considering only (ideal) free-range individualised
farmyard husbandry .
Secondly, some distinction (fit to take its
place in the annular picture) with requisite moral linkage is
what is sought .
Any distinction that is going to work will have
to involve the capacities of the creatures concerned , in such a
way that the capacities tie with moral features .
The capacities
concerned are, obviously, capacities connected with being aware
of being raised for food .
But this is not sufficiently general,
being raised for killing or for cartage or for skin or fur or feathers
would be similar, and similarly bad or whatever;
lacks moral connection .
and it still
What all the cases have in common which
is general, one which has (as already noted) moral connections ,
is being used as a means .
The sought distinction is accordingly
made in terms of creatures that are capable of being aware of
their case primarily as means for other, for their food , etc. U-creatures, say, as opposed to A-creatures . 21
no means all, are A-creatures:
infants are not .
Many humans, but
Why this
distinction?
21
There are probably other requir e ments as we ll:
e . g. that
not in midst of present worthwhile projects; e.g. Mrs. Goose
is not raising young, etc.
The following have been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions.
•
•
•
•
•
Photocopy of Young R (1979) 'What is so wrong with killing people?', Philosophy,
54(21):515-528, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0031819100063531. (8 leaves)
Cutting, Ewin R (1972) 'What is so wrong with killing people?', The Philosophical
Quarterly, 22(87): 126-139, https://doi.org/10.2307/2217540. (14 leaves)
Typescript (carbon copy) of untitled paper attached to Ewin cutting. (18 leaves)
Photocopy of Singer P (1979) 'Killing humans and killing animals', Inquiry, 22:1-4, 145156, https://doi.org/10.1080/00201747908601869. (6 leaves)
Photocopy of one page (157) from Lockwood M (1979) 'Singer on killing and the
preference for Life', Inquiry, 22:1-4, 157-170,
https://doi.org/10.1080/00201747908601870. (1 leaf)
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Photocopy of Diamond C (1978). 'Eating meat and eating people', Philosophy, 53(206):
465-479, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3749876. (8 leaves)
Photocopy from The Encyclopedia Americana (1978) 'Cannibalism', The Encyclopedia
Americana, 2: 543-544. (2 leaves)
Photocopy from Britannica Encyclopedia (1969) 'Cannibalism', Britannica Encyclopedia,
4: 785. (1 leaf)
Photocopy from Chambers's Encyclopaedia (1966) 'Cannibalism', Chambers's
Encyclopaedia, 3: 50. (1 leaf)
Photocopy of Naess A (1979) 'Self‐realization in mixed communities of humans, bears,
Sheep, and Wolves', Inquiry, 22:1-4, 231-241,
https://doi.org/10.1080/00201747908601874. (6 leaves).
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154,https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/show/154,"Box 149, Item 3: War and peace II - on the alleged inconsistency, moral insensitivity and fanaticism of pacifism","Series: Discussion papers in environmental philosophy ; number 9. Published by Australian National University. Department of Philosophy. Published under Richard Sylvan's previous name Richard Routley.","One of two copies in collection. Annotation on cover: Part corrected.","Richard Routley","The University of Queensland's Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291, Box 149, Item 3","Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy",1983,"This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, Dr. N.A.J. Taylor.","For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library.",,"[31] leaves ; 25 cm. 58.71 MB. ",,Manuscript,"https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:4d46fce",,"Discussion Papers
in environmental phiiosophy
_.
Phitosophy Departments
The Australian National University
PO Box 4, Canberra, Australia 2600.
NUMBER 9
WAR AND PEACE. II
ON THE ALLEGED INCONSISTENCY, MORAL INSENSITIVITY
RICHARD ROUTLEY
FOR CIRCULATION AND
EVENTUAL LIBRARY DEPOSIT
WAR AND PEACE.
II
ON THE ALLEGED INCONSISTENCY, MORAL INSENSITIVITY AND
FANATICISM OF PACIFISM
by
R. Routley
Number 9
Discussion Papers in Environmental Philosophy
Department of Philosophy
Australian National University
1983
ON THE ALLEGED INCONSISTENCY, MORAL INSENSITIVITY AND
FANATICISM OF PACIFISM
Pacifism,
despite
its
limited
revival
through
the
nonviolent
action
1
movement
and
as a respectable tradition within the Catholic church , continues
to have a bad philosophical press.
one
way
or
another,
It is commonly portrayed
characteristically
as inconsistent.
as
incoherent
Even philosophical
defences of pacifism are liable to be extremely defensive, conceding
pacifism
is
in
only
that
consistent, but insisting otherwise that it is as false as a moral
2
position can be, bizarre, and morally insensitive .
What follows challenges the
prevailing wisdom put out in the philosophical press, but using its own analytic
methods.
§1.
Slide arguments to inconsistency;
from
rights.
an
In
influential
and
and arguments from irresponsibility and
widely
disseminated
set
of articles
3
attacking pacifism , Narveson says that the pacifist's position is
not only that [Tl] violence is evil but also that [T2] it is morally
wrong to use force [violence] to resist, punish, or prevent violence.
This further step makes pacifism a radical moral doctrine.
What I
shall try to establish below is that it is, in fact, more than merely
radical - it is actually incoherent because self-contradictory ...
(p.408, italics added).
Subsequently (p.414) he characterises pacifism by way of T2, though it would
be
better characterised by the more sweeping
1.
According to the US Catholic Bishops, pacifism is
'a valid Christian
position', with a long tradition going back to Christ and the early
Christians who were committed to a nonviolent lifestyle:
see Origins 12
(1982) pp.310-311.
The revival in the nonviolent action (NVA) movement is a somewhat qualified
one (as will emerge), many in that movement wishing to distance themselves
from traditional pacifism.
2.
In particular, T. Regan 'A defence of pacifism', Canadian Journal of
Philosophy 11 (1972) 73-86. Page references to this article are prefixed
by R.
Regan ends by saying 'To regard the pacifists'
belief
vaguely ludicious"" is, perhaps, to put it mildly'.
as
""bizarre
and
P2.
It is morally wrong to use violence.
However T2 captures the cases that
orthodox
opposition.
The
separate
comprehensive
pacifism
from
main form of pacifism under investigation is called
'comprehensive' to distinguish it from standard pacifism, in the usual
sense
which
is
narrower
restricted to certain theses concerning (state) order, notably
opposition to (violence in) war, which does not necessarily
elsewhere.
the
But
if
violence
Pacifism, as a
universally and not merely in war.
violence
is impermissible, then it should be so
what
is
out
rule
position,
moral
should
be
comprehensive.
On its own showing, it is contended,
proper
action
to
preventative action
commitment
to
prevent,
what
would
involve,
it
use
in
the
case
Narveson's
or
of
pacifism.
of
incoherence Narveson and others find in pacifism:
claims
prohibits,
acclaimedly
sometimes,
precluded
from
taking
violence;
But
force.
genuine
actively
defend
on
them,
pain
Hence
the
initial
that it cannot underwrite its
of
inconsistency.
However
location of incoherence in pacifism depends, essentially, on several
connected slides, all of which the pacifist should resist - without force.
initial
for
a moral position must allow action to back up commitment, action
of a type logically excluded
own
is
pacifism
The
slide is from the theme T2 italicised above to what results by deletion
of the crucial phrase 'to use force', or as it
should
be
'to
use
violence',
namely
J. Narveson 'Pacifism: a philosophical analysis', Ethics 75 (1968) and
'Is pacifism consistent', Ethics 78 (1968). The first article is reprinted
in War and Morality (ed. R. Wasserstrom) Wadsworth, Belmont, California,
1970, pp.63-77. The first article is also rewritten and combined with part
of the second in 'Pacifism: a philosophical analysis', Moral Problems (ed.
J.
Rachels), Third Edition, Harper & Row, New York, 1979, pp.408-425.
Page references without further citation are to this latter article.
Narveson's theme that pacifism is incoherent is headlined and further
elaborated in his 'Violence and war', Matters of Life and Death (ed.
T.
Regan), Temple University Press, Philadelphia, 1980, pp.109-147. Page
references prefixed by 'N' are to this article.
2
It is morally wrong to resist, punish, or prevent violence -
R2.
and similarly from special and related cases of T2 to special and related
of
R2 (e.g.
It is
cases
from T2S, It is forbidden to use force to resist violence, to R2S,
forbidden
to
resist
The
violence).
slide
is
illegitimate
because
commitment to T2 does not entail commitment to the rejected proposition R2;
for
one thing there are many ways of confronting, reducing and controlling violence,
worked
out
pacifists
by
and others, which do not involve use of violence (or
4
perhaps force).
The initial slide is however what
assault
on
pacifism
Narveson
clearing
(after
several
exploits
confusions,
explain the popularity of pacifism, out of the way).
irresponsibility
of
in
This
his
first
main
which he takes to
argument,
from
the
does not actually lead to contradiction, but it
pacifism,
does suggest that there is a serious tension between pacifism and any method
of
maintaining social order, so serious that pacifism is socially irresponsible:
... to hold the pacifist position as a genuine full-blooded moral
principle is to hold nobody has a right to fight back when attacked
... It means that we are all mistaken in supposing that we have the
right of self-protection ... It appears to mean, for instance, that
we have no right to punish criminals, that all our machinery of
criminal justice is, in fact, unjust.
Robbers, murderers, rapists, and miscellaneous delinquents
this [irresponsible] theory, to be let loose (pp.415-6).
Since one can protect oneself and avoid and resist aggression
back
violence),
(with
unless
a
slide
(tentatively)
by
is
without
fighting
pacifism
does
not mean what Narveson claims it means,
Nor
does
comprehensive
made.
theses
on
ought,
T1
T2,
and
imply
that
pacifism,
characterised
we have no right to punish
criminals, but simply that such punishment (or the imposition of penalties) will
not
apply
violent
methods.
Nor
therefore
does
it
imply
that
all
conventional machinery of criminal justice is unjust, but only that some,
good
4.
deal,
of
that
machinery
is.
One
hardly
the
or
a
needs to be a comprehensive
Pacifism, as involving the active use of defensive methods, can be traced
back as far as the Mohist philosophers of ancient China. On modern methods
see especially G. Sharp, Exploring Nonviolent Alternatives, Boston,
1971.
As will emerge, there is a point in distinguishing (as Narveson does not in
his earlier work) force from violence; they are not equivalent.
3
pacifist to coherently think the latter.
the
This provides
confirmation
some
for
key point which is that there is, so far at least, no inconsistency evident
in maintaining that those who hold that violent methods are
legitimate
morally
are mistaken.
The next slide is closely connected with, and really generalises upon,
initial
slide.
The
is to imbue a range of more neutral terms with the
stunt
connotation of violence or at least of force which
equate with violence.
use of force is taken to by implied in R2.
cannot
here
resist
Hence
(p.415).
violence,
or
force
and
to
so
Hence
the
against attack' (pp.417-8).
also
Narveson's
and
so
to
a
much
less
can
be
resisted,
But
without
violence.
things like arrest, without violence (e.g.
even
by
Force can be applied, as in opening
sliding out of handcuffs and running away).
a jam jar or pulling a person out of danger, without violence.
force, but not vice versa;
and
defensible position.
positions can be defended, as in this paper or on the field,
Things
be
If the stunt were got away with, it would
pacifism
render
a
unwarranted
deprive pacifism of, for instance, the general methods of nonviolent action
resistance,
be
that
assumption
""recharacterisation"" of pacifism as the position that 'no one ought ever
defended
to
proceeds
Hence the conflation of T2 and
excluded from among admissible pacifist methods.
pacifist
Narveson
Thus such activities as resisting, punishing, preventing,
and defending are taken to imply (use of)
R2;
the
Violence implies
and it is violence, not all applications
of
force,
that comprehensive pacifists are bound to exclude.
The attempt
nonviolent
to
castrate
practices,
any case indefensible.
development
and
themselves
from
compromise,
pacifism,
by
depriving
it
of
the
range
of
is not confined to those who (want to) think pacifism in
It enjoys some popularity even
among
those
advocating
expansion of nonviolent methods, who no doubt want to distance
older
mediation,
pacifism,
whose
methods
they
see
as
confined
to
negotiation, and involving the granting of concessions.
The newer (nonviolent) activists have justification;
for
pacifism
has
often
by an unsympathetic opposition, as confined to passive methods
jeen
presented,
(cf.
even the Concise English Dictionary account, where it is erroneously
4
said
of
pacifism
'positively, it holds that all disputes should be settled by
that
negotiation', and, negatively, that it is 'the
hostilities
added).
and
of
total
doctrine
of
non-resistance
non-cooperation with any form of warfare':
But nothing in the characterisation of pacifism, whether
or standard, need so limit its admissible methods:
to
italics
comprehensive
nothing excludes resistance,
uncompromising methods, and imposition of sanctions which offer no concessions.^
It
is
simply
that
comprehensive
pacifism
has
not yet developed its fuller
potential, especially in conflict resolution.
Subsequent slides in the development of the argument against
just
variations
qualifier.
on
those
pacifism
are
given, writing violence-involving in as an internal
Thus the measure of a person's opposition to something in
terms
of
'the amount of effort he is willing to put forth against it' is taken - somewhat
perversely - to be violence-involving effort or opposition in the
pacifist's
'opposition
to
If
violence'.
this
slide
were
pacifist would be caught in an elementary inconsistency since in
case
of
the
permissible any
being
opposed
to violence, by definition, he is prepared to use violence and so is not opposed
to violence.
it
is
Even Narveson 'cannot make too much' of this inconsistency, though
not so far removed from the alleged inconsistencies he does want to make
much of in his main inconsistency argument.
5.
In the way Sharp, for example, has illicitly assumed in several works: see
for instance the unduly narrow definition of pacifism given in his Social
Power and Political Freedom, Porter Sargent Publishers, Boston,
1980,
p.198.
Again, however, there is some historical basis for dissociating nonviolent
action from pacifism;
and given the difficulties comprehensive pacifism
can lead to, there are philosophical reasons as well.
But even without much in the way of organised sanctions, worthwhile
positive results can often be obtained, as the case of international law
reveals: cf. H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, Oxford University Press,
1961, p.212.
5
A similar slide, together with a further slide, is made in the argument
on
based
inconsistency
pacifism theme,
the
to
notion of rights, especially as it figures in the
transformed to the claim
No one has a right to indulge in violence (p.418).
P2(R).
For Narveson tries to incorporate the right to indulge in violence in
notion
The
right.
of
very
initial move is to work in assumptions of defence from
breaches of a right and of
Because
the
against
action
preventative
infringement
'a right just i_s a status justifying preventative action ...
it.
of
what does
follow logically is that one has a right to whatever may be necessary to prevent
infringements of his right' (p.419).
That 'whatever may be necessary' turns out
to
to include force, now very generously construed - here is the further slide
such
incorporate
things
as social pressure.
Moreover 'it is a logical truth,
not merely a contingent one, that what might be
For
action must have the notion of violence built into it.
the
against
question
nonviolent
(p.421)!
quite indefensibly strong.
him
To block the argument it is enough for
rights
with
The argument accordingly
to
be,
to
or
be
to,
limited
In any case the 'whatever may be necessary' requirement is
action.
entitle
pacifism.
associated
preventative action
not
force
logical transformations to work, however, the notion of preventative
these
begs
is
necessary
to
For example, D'Agostino's right to his umbrella does
kill a person who is trying to steal the umbrella even if
such action is necessary in the circumstances to
prevent
infringement
his
of
right.
to
How the argument from rights leads
inconsistency
is
summed
up
thus
(p.421):
SAI.
'If we have any rights at all then we have a right to use force to prevent
the deprivation of the thing to which we are said to have a right'.
SA2.
We have, according to the pacifist's 'the right not to have violence
done
to us', as a consequence of the.o&f^e&i^fi to avoid violence.
But, therefore, we have the right to use violence, so the pacifist's position is
self-contradictory,
both
granting
and not granting the right to use violence.
The argument fails because SAI is readily rejected.
claiming
Narveson
that 'our standard concept of rights' yields SAI (cf.
6
is
mistaken
p.423).
in
That a
right can be sustained by right-supporting or right-defending
require that that action is violent.
action
does
Pacifists can provide an adequate analysis
of rights - essentially the usual one - without letting themselves in
by
simply
rejecting
the
Narveson
not
slide^.
What
for
SAI,
appears in place of SAI is
something like
If we have any rights at all then we have a right to uphold them.
SAI#.
But the right to uphold them, defend them, protect them, etc.,
give
facto,
an entitlement to the use of violence.
no dilemma for the pacifist.
not,
does
ipso
Without the slide there is
The ""pacifist's dilemma"" and Narveson's slide
are
two aspects of the one thing.
The arguments from lesser
§2.
violence
and
In
evil.
lesser
outline
the
argument - which is independent of the notion of rights - is that pacifists must
admit, in terms of their own principles, that there are cases where the
violence
would
where
those
Inconsistency
be
some
is
morally
use
of
immediate
permissible
violence
by T2.
and morally justified.
would
prevent
evil,
of
The cases are
greater
violence.
More explicitly, and in (Narveson's) terms
which also import the notion of evil, pacifists have
lesser
much
use
to
admit
both
that
the
some use of force, is admissible, in preventing greater evil, and
that it is not admissible because it involves violence.
An argument
like
this
as gets summarized as follows
It seems to me logically true, in any moral theory whatever, that
[E2'J the lesser evil must be preferred to the greater. If the use of
force by me, now is necessary to avoid the use of more physical force
(by others, perhaps) later, then to say that physical force is the
6.
Narveson, in responding to a suggestion of Armour (pp.423-4), sees nothing
between (1) forceful defence of rights, with the slide to violence in, and
(0) nothing really answering to rights at all, where words like 'rights'
occur without stuffing.
This shows a serious blindspot. What lies in
between are a range of notions which do not guarantee the slide to
violence.
An account of rights which will serve is given in R.
and V.
Routley
'Human chauvinism and environmental ethics' in Environmental Philosophy
(ed. D.
Mannison and others), Research School of Social Sciences,
Australian National University, 1980; see especially p.l75ff.
7
supreme (kind of) evil is precisely to say that under
circumstances I am committed to the use of physical force .
these
Now there are several somewhat different arguments snarled up in these sketches.
It
is
important
to
them unsnagged 8, especially if a clearer view of the
get
ethical place of pacifism
is
to
The
result.
from
argument,
basic
lesser
violence, goes as follows:—
Cl.
There are cases where use of violence would prevent greater violence.
C2.
One ought to minimize violence.
Therefore
C3.
There are cases where one ought to use violence,
the
since in this way, in any arbitrary one of
minimized.
""""P2.
indicated,
cases
violence
is
Therefore
It is not (always) morally wrong to use violence,
contradicting the pacifist principle, P2,
according
to
it
which
is
mora
y
wrong, always, to use violence.
All the ingredients
premisses,
can
be
of
this
argument,
together
with
pulled together from Narveson's work.
support
for
the
He not only espouses
C2, but suggests two distinct arguments for it, the first of which connects
the
argument with the lesser evil argument:-
El.
(Use of) violence is an evil.
E2.
Evil should be minimized.
The second argument to C2 is simply from the pacifist premiss, varying P2,
E3.
One ought not to undertake violence
-
period;
that
is,
the
level
of
violence ought to be zero.
J.
8
9.
Narveson, 'Is pacifism inconsistent', Ethics 78 (1968) p.148.
Without getting into the level of complication, not to say epicycling, that
Regan lands himself in:
he is obliged to distinguish three mirage-like
senses of 'lesser evil': quantitative, qualitative, and resultant (Rp.78).
See Np.127 where it is asserted that violence as a source of evil should be
minimized, and Np.119, where the point is put in terms of absolute evil.
That way of putting it already starts to give the game away, since Narveson
is all too evidently interested in negotiable evil which can be traded off
against other evils.
8
Neither argument is decisive;
of
reference
that
they
both in fact begin easing pacifists into a
resist, where moral absolutes are warped into
should
moral relatives, where obligations give way
to
obligations-other-things-being-
In any event E3 only directs one not to get involved in violence at
equal, etc.
all, and says nothing about minimizing it when one
compatible
frame
got
into
it.
E3
is
directives quite different from minimization where violence is
with
involved, e.g.
has
rooting it out, which may
involve
nonminimization
strategies.
Thus E3 does not entail E2, and commitment to E2 does not commit pacifists to 02
- a principle nonviolent activists usually do not accept either, being
to
accept
prepared
violence perpetrated against them, for example, as a means to social
justice.
Nor do El and E2 entail 02;
so neither does
principles like El and E2 oblige them to accept C2.
by
commitment
evil-perpetrating
Narveson's
such
e.g.
violence
but
argument
some
increases
well-known hypothetical cases as the slaying of an
dictator.
non-violent
fails
to
For in particular, violence
is not the only evil, and (so) evil may sometimes be reduced by
in
pacifists
for
similar
reasons.
Regan's
reconstruction
of
Regan argues from premisses
concerning the ranking of evil and a premiss like E2', specifically
3.
The use of force is a substantive evil.
4.
Therefore, a lesser quantity of force must
quantity of force (Rp.79).
The argument is invalid:
be
preferred
to
a
great
an ordering of evils does not induce a similar ordering
force, even when force is an evil.
of
It is enough to observe that increasing force may
still reduce evil, and so, on Regan-Narveson assumptions, be preferrable.
Resort to the theme that
Elt.
Violence is an irredeemable evil
(proposed by Regan in his ""defence"" of pacifism, Rp.80, and
by
Narveson,
Np.118) promises a way around the difficulty.
subsequently
considered
An irredeemable evil is
figuratively so black that no combination with grays (lesser evils) or whites (goods)
10.
An argument like the argument from lesser violence itself would appear to
undercut the argument from El and E2 to premiss C2 for the argument for lesser
violence.
9
will lighten its hue;
now
it always dominates.
Elt together with E2 will yield C2,
but
What are the grounds for that?
the problem with the argument shifts to Elt.
As
Narveson points out (Np.119), it is not widely acceptable, most people being prepared
to
countenance
some
small
amount
of violence in exchange for considerable goods.
(But then, not so long ago, most people were tolerant of cruelty to animals providing
it
was
not
too
Moreover, so Narveson implies, appeal to Elt does not get
gross.)
pacifists out of the argument from lesser violence;
deeper,
It does break the argument however;
underwriting C2.
by
indeed it seems to get
them
in
for it removes Cl
and, more importantly, the corresponding premiss of the more difficult argument
from
lesser evil, which starts from
DI.
There are cas^s where the use of violence would avoid greater evil.
For given, by Elt, that use of violence is irredeemably evil,
evil
than that tainted with violence;
requires.
however
pacifism
is
no
of
pacifism
(see
into a 'bizarre and vaguely ludicrous
(utilitarian
through
as
violence
an
irredeemable
evil
which
Rp.80ff.),
position (Rp.86),
extreme pacifism, some of the (problematic) features of which Regan outlines
But the approach
greater
and there are accordingly no cases such as DI
This is the core of Regan's defence
converts
there
is
a
.
mistaken
inspired) attempt to get at moral absolutes, which is what pacifism is,
like other deontological positions, grounded upon.
But such absolutes are adequately
expressed in such commandments as, One ought not to commit violence, meaning thereby,
as it says ought not, not just for the time being, or so long as reasons
otherwise
don't
arise,
or
for
acting
other things being equal, or prima facie, but ought not
11.
That is by no means the only element in Regan's torturous reformulation of
Narveson's argument that can be faulted. Consider, for example, premiss 5. If
any given action, A, is necessary to bring about a lesser rather than a greater
quantity of qualitatively equivalent evil, then one's obligation is to do A.
While the premiss has considerable appeal as a principle of supererogation,
there is little reason to accept it as one supplying obligations.
12.
Extreme pacifism can be seen as taking the rule that one ought never to use
violence as having priority over all other moral rules - which is indeed an
extreme position even if a consistent one.
Such a priority rule is an
unsatisfactory way to deal with moral dilemmas: see further below.
10
Such old-fashioned deontological, moral absolutist positions,
come what may, period.
such
is
pacifism
as
collide
bottom,
at
more fashionable, highly
with
head-on
malleable moral positions like utilitarianism, which both Narveson and Regan (at
time) were working from.
The reason for collision is simply that 'utilitarianism ...
for the utility 'that will be brought out
is incompatible with pacifism':
some
one who acts
by
may be greater than that produced by any alternative' (Np.121)
violence
the
according
to
the
to
utilitarian-commandment
maximize
doing
13
So
.
utility
may
sometimes commit violence, contravening pacifist principles.
On its own inconsistency with a false
little:
position
every
doctrine
inconsistency
suffers
such
with
very
many
false doctrines.
Narveson does have another (small) argument to the effect that pacifism
odds
the
with
contractarianism.
correct,
other
ethical
positions
But this argument would
only
position
insidious,
is
however,
for
have
Firstly, as we
generally,
have
provisional.
theory-saving
seen,
made
also
libertarianism
were
it
at
and
otherwise
however they are not, including
has
which
happened
is
more
it
utilitarianism,
seem
as
climate
unfavourable
to
incompatible
There are two more specific damaging features.
and
consequentialist
approaches
more
no deontic principle were firm, but all are
if
The theory of prima facie principles
This is entirely mistaken.
is
a
device, designed to get consequentialist positions out of difficulties
such as moral dilemmas.
13.
weight,
is
that utilitarian thinking has permeated much of the rest of
such as pacifism.
positions
What
instance.
ethical thought, thus helping to establish a
ethical
carry
if the positions were suitably exhaustive;
no deeper ecological
presents,
he
shows
utilitarianism
as
Secondly, consequentialist positions tend
to
suggest
that
To show what Narveson goes on to claim that people are sometimes justified in
using force rather more is required, as Regan points out, Rp. 85, n.18. It has
also to be shown that there are cases of these types (as in Cl) and that agents
can know that use of force will increase utility, reduce evil, etc. A pacifist,
rightly sceptical of utilitarian tracing of consequences, and fond of noting
that violence begets violence, could, with a small dose of scepticism also, dig
in at this point and claim that because no one can be sure that use of force
will
reduce
evil,
so no one is justified in using force.
This is
sceptically-based pacifism.
11
only consequentialist reasons carry argumentative weight, and so try
such
positions,
as
pacifism,
into
offering
to
ease
rival
incongruous consequential
sometimes
support for their themes.
Narveson
assumptions
takes
such
procedures
upon pacifists:
a
stage
further,
and
utilitarian
foists
thus he says that the pacifist's 'objection to violence
is that it produces suffering, unwanted pain,
in
the
(p.425).
recipients'
These
incongruous utilitarian grounds are something of a travesty of pacifists' reasons for
objecting to violence, which concern rather the type of action involved and
what
it
does - though not only or always at all in the way of suffering - to the perpetrators
as
well
as
those
on
whom
it
is
inflicted.
Even
more
astonishing,
such
utilitarian—style considerations are supposed to commit the pacifist to the following
three statements, one of which however he must deny (!):
[N]l.
To will the end (as morally good) is to will the
it
(at
Other things being equal, the lesser evil is to be preferred to
the
means
to
least prima facie).
[N]2.
greater.
[N]3.
There are no ""privileged"" moral persons ...
(p.425)^.
'These three principles' which feature in the summation of 'the pacifist's problem',
among them imply, as far as I can see, both the commitment to force when it
is necessary to prevent more violence and also the conception of a right as
an entitlement to defense. And they therefore leave pacifism, as a moral
doctrine, in a logically untenable position (p.425).
It would take not merely logic, but a good deal of magic, to coax
out
of the statements given.
consequences
such
For implications to hold the substantive terms such as
'violence' and 'right' must also figure, in one way or
otherwise the implications fail just on formal grounds.
another,
in
the
implicans;
The intended argument to the
""commitment to force"" conclusion appears however to be some sort of
variant
on
the
lesser evil argument, with N2 replacing E2' (N3 and N1 have more oblique roles, N3 to
stop exceptions being made for oneself
and
one's
group,
and
N1
to
ensure
that
14. Narveson also wants to contend that 'all of these
may be
defended on purely
logical or ""meta-ethical"" grounds'. This is likely false, especially the claim
as to logical status, since some of the principles are rejected in substantive
ethical theories.
12
violence adopted or even required as a means has its full import, e.g.
in
in
Cl,
ethical
an
end.
for one thing, principle Nl, which is at least
But,
dubious unless 'prima facie' is unbracketed,
which
is
reflected
as
the
begs
bound morally to shun violent means.
pacifism,
against
question
Under pacifist reformulation Nl will
give way to something more like
To choose an end as morally good is to choose (only) morally
Nl#.
acceptable
means
to it.
For another, without much further construction work the suggested arguments need
pacifists since nothing damaging emerges;
worry
not
the three principles duly adjusted;
they hardly leave pacifism as untenable.
More threatening is the argument from lesser evil itself, which has
countered.
This
and
E2
N2
or
inconsistency
is
of
evil)
comprehensive
to
pacifism
Narveson's stock examples concern murder, one
what is the moral situation here?
to
(admissibility
What
of
are
them
these
being
of
violence)
dilemma,
Indeed the example is very similar to
the
turns
that
on
Jim
shoots
one
of
what account is given of moral dilemmas.
pacifist does not do, unless he wants coherence trouble, is to
utilitarian
line
and
where
situation
N
But
ought
The situation is that
of
a
paradigmatic
that of Pedro and Jim, where Pedro volunteers to call off his firing
squad about to shoot several captives if
everything
be
cases
difficult
N ought to prevent mass murder, but also
kill B, because that is murder and involves violence.
of a moral dilemma.
moral
03
N (Narveson in fact) must kill the (potential) mass-murderer B (Np.119).
person
not
to
the argument from DI (cases of violence to avoid greater evil)
(minimization
in
yet
of
trying
them^.
almost
Now
What a comprehensive
take
the
inadequate
to explain moral dilemmas away, as if they didn't ever
occur (at least at other than an initial intuitive level), as if all obligations were
prima
facie, negotiable, etc., etc.
No, the conflicting obligations stand.
to be done is however a very consequentialist thing, to try
to
determine
What is
the
best
15.
A surprising feature of Narveson's argument, also Regan's ""reconstruction"", is
that these cases are usually nowhere in sight, as if again one got to
conclusions logically out of the air, without any of the hard work the cases
involve.
16.
The example was first discussed in B. Williams, 'Conflict of values', reprinted
in his Moral Luck, Cambridge University Press, 1981, 71-82.
13
thing (or a sufficiently good thing) to
in
the
In
circumstances.
trying
N2M, that it is preferrable to minimize evil, will presumably be satisfied.
the best course in the circumstances is a violent one, e.g.
that
B.
No inconsistency in pacifism follows.
minimize
that
Even granted
it does not follow that N ought to resort to violence.
N had better shoot
is
preferable
to
On the contrary the situation
N ought not to shoot B, but in the appalling circumstances, he had
fix.
a
it
Suppose
and that in this sense (not a deontic one) evil should be minimized,
evil,
remains
to
is the appropriate course of action principles like N2 and its mate,
what
determine
do
There is the real-life complication
better do so^.
of
a
dilemma,
moral
but
no
inconsistency through arguments like that from lesser evil.
the
Narveson's jackpot question, entangled in his discussion of
rights, can now be met.
argument
The question presents a dilemma:
If force is the only way to prevent violence in a given case,
justified in that case? (p.420)
its
is
use
Narveson is thinking of cases where one is about to be murdered, Regan where
to
be
No, it is not deonticly justified^.
is a qualified No:
and
amount to making out a case.
But
justification
on
proposes
is
solution,
back-up
ambiguous,
in
p.423).
against
may
just
situation.
dilemma
a
another
argument, taking his proposals as evident.
pacifist can simply dispute it - the jackpot question does not
argument
and
the contrary, that enough violence for the given occasion is
morally justified - it can go at least as far as killing
no
It is certainly not morally
The response is qualified then because some force might
be consequentially justified, as a second-best
presents
is
it is not justified, in the sense of 'justified' which reflects its
deontic origin in 'making right'.
Narveson,
one
Given that such force again presupposes violence, the pacifist answer
raped.
obligatory,
from
pacifism
person
-
but
he
As it is not — the
lead
to
a
decisive
(though Narveson gives the impression that it does, e.g.
What it can lead to is the argument from lesser evil over again.
17.
This corresponds to the account of moral dilemma, given in much more technical
detail in R. Routley and V. Plumwood 'Moral dilemmas and the logic of deontic
notions' in Paraconsistent Logic (ed. G. Priest and others) 1983, to appear;
also available in this Discussion Paper series.
18.
An extreme pacifist would answer with an unqualified No.
14
The accusation of fanaticism, and the charge of moral
its
adherence
to
principles
unexceptionable
Insofar
fanaticism, so Hare contends.
such
manages
Hare
as
as
insensitivity.
P2,
to
Through
pacifism is a form of
get
his
remarkable
accusation off the ground, he does by conflating pacifism with extreme pacifism:
the
pacifist ... solves the conflict of principles, not by critical thought,
but by elevating one principle quite irrationally, over all the others
(p.174).
Comprehensive pacifism in not always resolving the conflict of principles, in letting
moral
stand, does neither of these things, and so does not fit into Hare's
dilemmas
deceptively neat two-level
critical.
thought,
into
intuitive
himself
to,
without
any
Hare
of the requisite supporting argument, according to
which pacifist principles are inappropriate in many places at the present time,
violence is apparently fine for countries like Israel (cf.
Hare s
redefinition,
a
Harey—fanatic,
e.g.
p.175).
Hare's accusation turns on an extravagant redefinition of fanaticism.
on
and
pacifism is not, as standard pacifism is not, extreme
Nor it is the particular ""critical thinking"", anti-pacifist solution
pacifism.
helps
comprehensive
But
moral
of
classification
A fanatic
is a person who adheres to ideals which
diverge from what utilitarianism (in approved form) recommends (cf.
Since
p.170)!
comprehensive pacifism is committed to principles and ideals of nonviolence which, as
already observed, diverge from where utilitarianism (as massaged by Hare or Narveson)
tends,
namely
the
towards
pacifists are Harey—fanatics.
usual
sense:
whether
position
their
bigoted .
they
whether
The
idea
appropriateness
violence
This does not of course make
are
'wild
in many situations, such
them
or
extravagant
opinions'
of
some
pacifist principles
of
.
the
or
(OED)
is
pacifism consists of such opinions can be removed by an
appeal to history:- A great many of the sages, especially Eastern thinkers,
founders
in
fanatics,
depends on the very different matter of
fanatics
comprises
that
of
and
the
the world's main religions, have been pacifists, committed to
But the relevant opinions
hardly be, all of the condemned type.
of
such
thinkers
Whence the conclusion follows.
are
not,
can
By this simple
syllogism, the accusation of fanaticism is rebutted.
19.
R.M. Hare, Moral Thinking, Clarendon Press, Oxford,
1981,
p.173.
references to Hare's work without further citation are to this text.
15
All
page
Nor do comprehensive pacifists come out at fanatics under Hare's
satisfactory, though seriously incomplete, account of fanaticism:
is treating something that is not morally relevant, such as
being
Jewish,
as
relevance
is
completed,
it
there^ fanaticism
wearing
beads
Naturally, given that using of characterising
can
or
moral
hardly exclude the violence is a morally relevant
matter, so are other procedures with similar damaging results to
violence:
blue
For however the sensitive task matter of using
morally relevant.
violence as morally irrelevant.
more
earlier,
those
applying
of
this does lead to a residual problem for comprehensive pacifism (taken up
at the end of §4).
Does it really matter then that
fanatics?
it
Although
argument that it does.
homework
appears
pacifists,
that
though
Harey-fanatics are bigots, inasmuch as had
guess
what,
they
their
done
the
Thus, e.g.
go
over
to
Hare's
As one might anticipate, Hare's argument, upon which he sets great
store, 'from universal perscriptivism to utilitarianism ...
20.
Harey-
properly, had they performed their critical thinking adequately, they would
utilitarianism).
of
are
it does not matter in the least, Hare has an
abandon the principle they are fixated upon (and,
logic
fanatics,
not
concepts
A.
based [entirely] on
involved' (p.176), is unsound, and in fact fails at several
Naess, Gandhi and Group
Conflict,
Universitetsforlaget,
p.15:
...among the generally acknowledged moral leaders from the time of
ancient China and India down to present day, the principle of
nonviolence has been the rule, and the condoning of violence, even in
defence, the exception.
21.
the
R.M. Hare, Applications of Moral Philosophy, Macmillan, London,
1972,
p.78.
Note that the elegant prototype argument Hare develops in this
article on peace - from universalisation, directed against fanaticism and
nationalism, there presented as the main causes of war - does not lead to
utilitarianism (though the seeds of the later, more obscure, route are
present, e.g. on p.79) and does not tell against pacifism. What has gone
wrong in Hare's later argument to the much more sweeping conclusions just
alluded to, can be seen by comparing the later argument with the clearer
prototype argument developed against nationalism.
16
Oslo,
crucial points.
objectionable
getting
Before
feature
some
to
these
of
The
theory.
highly
a
Hare's procedure that deserves comment, namely the way in
of
which the whole highly informal argument is set within the framework
two-level
is
there
details,
procedure
adopted
methodologically
is
Hare's
of
own
radically unsound
because it takes for granted the adequacy of Hare's theory, a matter that is open, at
the very least, to serious doubt, since it supposes a quite particular, and eminently
rejectable (utilitarian) way of handling and resolving moral dilemmas, a way
rejected
above.With that rejection goes a rejection of the standard deontic logic
Hare presupposes, which he assumes any serious opponent must adopt.
which
logic,
already
But
that
since
Hare assumes uniquely determined, rules out any approach what, go over
As one might anticipate, Hare's the question against some
to Hare's utilitarianism).
important opponents of utilitarianism.
In his arguments Hare divides fanatics into pure and
comprise
moral
intuitionists
and
pure
impure.
deontologists,
fanatics
Impure
who stick to their deontic
principles, who 'cling to their intuitions' (p.176), and do not advance to what
calls
'critical
thinking'.
Hare's dismissal of ""impure fanatics"", such as extreme
pacifists, 'because of [their] refusal
clearly'
Hare
or
inability
to
face
facts
or
to
think
involves a quite illicit shift in the notion of critical thinking,
(p.170)
originally introduced to account for a particular (primarily utilitarian) fashion
accommodating
ff.).
But
cases
this
comprehensive
bit
intuitive
principles
conflict, of moral dilemmas (p.28
dirty-trick
philosophy
can
where
of
pacifists
are
presumably
""pure
willing to think critically, but somehow survived
opinions
different
from
be
here
fanatics"";
the
ordeal
those of the utilitarian' (p.171).
set
inconsistent with utilitarianism, as we have seen.
any fanatics of this type, if
his
argument
is
for they are 'able and
still
holding
moral
They are in fact ""pure
to
be
According to Hare there cannot be
correct
argument is not correct.
See further, again, Routley and Plumwood, ibid.
17
since
aside,
fanatics of the first type"", since they go on holding opinions which turn out
22.
of
(p.171).
Therefore,
his
One sufficient reason for incorrectness we have already glimpsed, namely failure
to
consider
the
possibility
that
a Harey-fanatic operates with different logical
assumptions and concepts from those of utilitarians
reasons.
other
substitution,
preferences
For
which
can
be
one,
argument (e.g.
Hare's
requires
a
base
class
intersubstituted.
representation
to
ff.).
are
There
p.177 ff.) depends on preference
the
of
course
whom
among
preference-havers,
in
Hare,
chauvinistically contracts this base class
whole
of
p.176
(cf.
his
discussion
humans.Differently,
certain
the
of moral matters by way of preferences of this type is open to
familiar objection, even by utilitarians of a different cast.
As to the moral insensitivity of pacifism, this
an
less
is
argument
a
than
damaging charge:
A person committed to an extreme pacifism, though he need make no logical
mistake, yet lacks a fully developed moral sensitivity to the vagaries and
complexities of human existence (Rp.86).
The smear is not without basis.
applied
to
avert
greater
Regan is envisaging
violence
where
situations
and he points to what he takes to be the evident
evil;
moral permissibility of a woman's using 'what physical power she has to free
from
an
aspiring
rapist'
is
Interestingly,
(Rp.86).
has
Regan
situation in a way which is incompatible with a pacifist stand:
herself
not described the
there is nothing
in
to
prevent a woman wriggling free (even in a way that involves some force) and
fleeing.
What is at issue is the permissibility of using violence, which implies the
(perhaps
wilful)
that
infliction
death, by forceful means^ (cf.
mere
use
of
of
damage,
non-negligible
Np.110);
that is, which
physical force or power (or energy).
including pain, injury or
involves
much
more
than
And it is by no means so evident
that the woman is entitled to
inflict
violence
from force, a pacifist can hardly be accused, in a way
is
duly
separated
violence
upon
the
aspiring
rapist.
Once
that can be made to stick, of crass moral insensitivity.
23.
On the defectiveness of such contractions of the base
Routley, op. cit., especially the concluding section.
18
class,
see
R. and
V.
But
a
straightforward
action
violence
disentangling
abounds
as
It
with
is
subcase
matter as may at first seem.
defective
of
not
depend
force
is
by
means
no
violence.
of
on
tight
a
Fortunately
characterisation
what
indicate
some
done, in the way of inflicting damage.
constraints
Firstly,
presupposed.
force:
is
legalised force,
violence,
so
violence,
a
on
satisfactory
violence
is
not
applied
on
behalf
adequately
of
of
account
some
violence,
where no force is applied.
violence.)
24.
supposed
that
and
are
which
distinguished as illegitimate
""legitimate""
authority,
long as it is physically similar to acts not so legitimated.
so often mistakenly
of
However it is important to
is not removed by the imprimatur of the law.2$ Secondly, violence is not
of
the
enough, for main purposes, that violent actions are a subclass of
actions by forceful means, a subclass picked out both through the forcible means
through
so
Indeed the literature on nonviolent
characterisations
arguments developed in this paper do
violence.
a
the
is
Violence
threat
(This only needs emphasizing because it is
threats,
intimidation
and
the
like,
involve
Thirdly, violence can be perpetrated without intention to inflict damage.
Directed against other creatures and more generally against ecological systems
such as ecosystems which can be hurt. There is a difference here between live
(goal-directed) systems and property, and comprehensive pacifism does not
necessarily exclude wilful damage to property. Thus eco-pacifists may destroy,
or at least disable, bulldozers but not harm those who use bulldozers to destroy
habitat. However sensitive eco-pacifists will not condone sabotage or ""violent""
destruction of property either: disabling of equipment may be different.
It follows from the account of violence sketched that intimidation, threats of
violence, and ""psychological violence"" are not violence, because they do not
involve forcible means: violence is physical violence. Naturally, intimidation
and psychological violence are open to moral criticism and censure on grounds
related to those that tell against violence proper.
For similar reasons,
""economic violence"" and ""structural violence"" are also not violence: such
procedures are generally open to criticism on other grounds and hardly need to
be covered under the blanket charge of violence. Nor is poverty, e.g., violence
or violence-involving, except figuratively, in the way that war is an obscenity.
Even given the warranted restriction of violence to physical force, many
difficult cases remain; e.g. questions as to when usually approved surgical
practices involve violence.
19
There can be unintentional violence, e.g.
the women may have applied violent
without intending to, in escaping the rapist.
Fourthly, such matters as the distance
at which force is applied and the indirectness of
military operations, are irrelevant.
modern
means,
the
for
as
means,
instance
in
The submarine operator who, by causally
pressing a button, fires a missile at a distant Russian
city
instigates
a
violent
By contrast, an adjacent blockade of a city, which results in hardship but not
act.
in direct damage, may be affected by nonviolent
confined
to
action
done
against
persons,
means.
but
can
violence
Finally,
be
directed
not
is
against
other
life-forms, as will soon emerge.
Pacifism, like most positions, has its weaknesses, and
from
the
fact
that
one
of
derives
them^
violence (like pain) is a partly quantitative matter, and that
there is no sharp cut-off point at the bottom end of the scale with small amounts
violence greater than zero.
of
Yet minute (non-foot-in-the-door) amounts do not seem to
matter all that much morally, at least compared with the gross evils that confront us
on
most sides when we look.
Morally sensitive pacifists will not focus or fixate on
small quantities of violence to the undue exclusion of larger moral
will
certainly
problems.
They
give it to be understood that by 'violence' in principles such as P2
they mean 'nontrivial violence'.
Arguments to the moral insensitivity of pacifism, on the basis of pacifists' not
taking
obvious
steps
passivity and pacifity.
to
prevent evil occurrences, depend also upon a confusion of
Both Regan and Narveson (e.g.
p.425) assume
that
pacifism
25.
The point is explained in more detail in G. Sharp, Social Power and Political
Freedom, op.cit., p.288n.
Note however that Sharp's account of 'political
violence' is defective in various other respects.
It is curious,
but
understandable, that in his major, and massive, texts on nonviolent action,
Sharp never really gets to grips with the problem of characterising violence,
and indeed appears tempted by such defective equations as that of violence with
force and threat with use.
26.
Another comes from the necessary circumscription of permissible nonviolent
action, to ensure that it does not include actions worse than nontrivial violent
action.
20
is a passive do-nothing position.
This is far from true, as the variety of methods
or adopted by nonviolent action groups has made plain.
considered
Narveson correctly comprehend the real scope or possibilities of
Narveson
Otherwise,
would
negative
later
Narveson's
nonviolent
action.
hardly b<- able to assert, in the automatic (but carping)
way he does, that the pacifist is standing by 'not
(p.425).
Neither Regan nor
doing
assessment
nonviolence' does not change the situation:
for this
of
anything
about'
violence
what
calls
'positive
he
positive
is
approach
simply
nonviolence practised in an exemplary ;.&y, as by Christ, in the hope that others will
follow suit, and fails to recognise the potential
or effectiveness of nonviolent practices.
extent
when
reduce
assembledmuch
the
of
training
and
the
Fuller details of these practices,
of
impact
nonviolent
the argument
from
social
irresponsibility, which is part of what lies behind the charge of insensitivity.
§4.
The
argument from
corollaries.
The
radical
practice
political
by
definition.
But
from
other
awkward
of pacifism would certainly tend to eliminate war.
For
Standard pacifism takes
out
war involves violence, typically on an extensive scale.
war
and
corollaries
the
position
Although normally war would be excluded,
of comprehensive pacifism is not so clear.
what
of
dilemma
situations?
War
would
always be counted morally impermissible, but in exceptional extenuating circumstances
it might be the (second-) best thing
27.
to
do.
A
strange
pacifism!
Comprehensive
The methods also include anticipatory action, for instance, the policemen going
off to enact violence find their vehicles won't start, e.g. because components
have been removed.
As to variety, Sharp has distinguished 197 methods falling into 3 broad types:
protest, noncooperation and intervention;
op.
cit.
pp.32-3.
Of course
pacifisms and nonviolent action postions need not coincide: the interrelations
are those of overlap (see. e.g. Sharp, Politics, p.68).
28.
See e.g. B. Martin 'How the peace movement should be preparing for nuclear
war' Bulletin of Peace Proposals 13 (1982) 149-159, and references cited therein
pp.152-3, especially G.
Sharp, The Politics of Nonviolent Action, op.cit.,
(referred to as Politics) and V.
Coover and others, Resource Manual for a
Living Revolution, New Society Publishers, Philadelphia, 1981.
21
pacifism thus does not include standard pacifism, in contrast
extreme
to
pacifism.
Comprehensive pacifism can of course be brought progressively closer, in practice, to
extreme pacifism through principles emphasizing the evil of violence.
is
given
a
large
suitably
If
that
evil
weighting then second-best choices will yield the same
results as extreme pacifism does (deontically), and entirely exclude war.
Now it can hardly be cogently argued as telling against pacifism that
eliminate
since
wars,
are
war
of
an
as
or
mounted from
rely
the
institutions.
exchanges that should certainly be avoided at all
upon
only
arrangements
social
and
nation-states
particular,
obviously police and military forces but
of
violence-underpinned
many of their institutions, most
state
legal
arrangements,
States are however desirable social institutions,
typically depend on violent means.
and war is a by-product of nation-state arrangements (in the case of just
comprehensive
pacifism
implies
the
of
inadmissibility
institutions, such as police forces and states typically are;
be ruled out either
individuals,
directly
delegates,
as
violence-dispensing
effect
who
forces,
by
nonviolent
nonviolent means.
state;
but
it
substitutes,
recently
or
such organisations may
because
else
their behalf.
evolved
will
which
is
nonviolent
methods
Pacifism
institutions concerned with
does
not
public
that
order
have
Pacifism does not
organisations
maintain
they
by
fully
as
police
alternative
nonviolent
will be applied, where necessary, to
The force of the objection should thus not
entail
order,
sweeping charges of social irresponsibility.
22
the
and
are
coercive
actively
Law and authority can still operate then in the
back-up authority and ""enforce"" laws.
overestimated.
on
violence
however exclude the replacement of such
wars,
A more telling objection, then, is
no doubt further evils to prevent greater evils).
that
which
institutions
these
directly
less
or
and a more general argument may be
inevitability,
or
not without much further ado.
least
extensively:
violence
desirability,
In
at
institution,
However wars are by no means the
dispense
would
nor therefore can an argument be mounted against pacifism from the
reasonable costs;
desirability
wars
it
elimination
accordingly
of
does
Nor is it true that
prominent
not
be
social
succumb
to
pacifism ... would also entail anarchism, that is,
the illegitimacy of
government. For a purely voluntary ""government"" is not a government in the
sense that defines a state at all (Np.127).
or (differently)
A government or administration can certainly operate by nonviolent,
political
noncoercive,
arrangements.
arrangements not of this sort are morally impermissible.
imply
the
absence
or
illegitimacy
of
government,
political community organised under a government.
state
with
authority
and
not
necessarily
pacifism does not entail anarchism.
main
Accordingly,
that
implies
not
does
it
or therefore of a state, of a
Nor does
even
it
that
imply
a
certain coercive institutions may not be a second-best solution to moral
dilemmas of political organisation.
and
only
pacifism
Comprehensive
objective,
not
attained,
was
Since it admits of states with frameworks of law
based
on
the free agreements of individuals,
Gandhi's practice affords a counterexample:
a
nonviolent
Indian
state;
replacement of British India by a stateless or anarchist society.
his
it was not the
Granted there
are
genuine interconnections between pacifism and nonviolent anarchism 2"", they are not so
simple as derivability.
Nor is comprehensive pacifism as a
moral
so
ideal
easily
brought down by its political corollaries.
Comprehensive pacifism upsets other widely accepted social practices than
concerning
like:
external
and
internal state relations, such as war, civil order and the
it also tells against the received treatment of
example.
While
other
species,
animals
for
it does not entail vegetarianism, while it does not prohibit eating
of meat, it does morally forbid violence to animals.
29.
those
At least it does this
so
long
Both hold that the coercive state which relies upon violent methods is without
moral basis or legitimacy. Both involve pretty tall orders, the replacement of
violence-dispensing political organisations by alternative arrangements (on
replacement in the case of anarchism, see R. Routley and V. Plumwood 'The
irrefutability of anarchism', Social Alternatives, 2(3) (1982) 23-8). But they
differ as to what justifies these arrangements and what means can be applied
(see further Sharp, op. cit., under index headings to anarchism, especially
Politics, p.67). Roughly, while pacifism pushes removal of violence to a limit,
anarchism pushes removal of authority (especially state
authority)
and
restrictions on liberty, to a limit.
Naturally the interconnections did not escape Gandhi:
'The ideally nonviolent
state will be an ordered anarchy'
(unreferenced citation at the end of the
Ecophilosophy Newsletter, #5, p.24).
23
as what normally counts as violence, to animals, continues to rank as
is
There is little good basis
humans (or persons).
restriction.^
controversial
euthanasia,
any
in
And,
moral
areas
concerning
the
corollaries
killing
a
such
for
however
similar
case,
spread
humans,
of
At
violence?
the
suicide,
But
must
creatures does not have to take overtly violent forms.
the new ""abattoirs"" or hospitals a creature
simply
killing
of
No force need be applied:
in
a
eats
and dies painlessly and without a struggle.
The
or
pill
is
given
life is extinguished, are not pacifist ones, which focus on violence?
technical
purely
arrangements
pacifist
will
to
objections
solve,
in
eating
meat
worthwhile
On the face of
obtained.
so
New
any rate, the disruption of
at
principle
an
Then the proper objections to
such practices, for example that consent may not have been obtained, that
it, there are no
they
risk of opening a hornet's nest, consider what examples
like euthanasia may suggest, the possibility of nonviolent killing.
injection
several
into
e.g.
So long as these involve violence, pacifism excludes such practices.
involve
chauvinistic
indeed wherever violence plays a significant role.
punishment,
capital
and
the category by restriction of the application of violence to
from
removed
not
violence,
practices threatened by vegetarian corollaries.
But suppose now that the new technology
is
extended
scientists, working in their accustomed military role:
as the anti—neutron bomb, which selectively destroys
devices
which
much
but
clever
'weapons , such
newly devised
property
by
further
not
people,
or
""dissolve"" people, enable ""wars"" to be fought without violence.
just
Even a pacifist who goes as far as countenancing nonviolent killing can however avoid
these
reaches
of
technological
fantasy.
For ""dissolving"" people requires energy,
which (since reflecting force) can stand in for force in
violence:
Was
(upgraded)
account
of
that is, the new wars will still involve violence.
there
old-fashioned
however
violent
anything
methods
so
such
wrong
as
with
hunting
eating
meat
obtained
by
more
or raising and killing one's own?
Pacifism, like vegetarianism, runs counter to ""natural""
M.
an
behaviour
of
creatures
to
See R. and V. Routley, 'Human chauvinism and environmental ethics', op.
cit.
Such a restriction to persons is however imposed by Sharp, op. cit. (e.g.
Politics,
p.608), and it does remove the problems of vegetarianism and
predation.
24
which the principles are supposed to apply.
Aggression is a fairly common feature of
and human behaviour, and it sometimes (though by no means so often is as made
animal
The force of the
out) erupts in violence.
various
for
ways,
example
along
these
argument
lines.
can
however
Aggression
assumed to be an
is
evolutionary adaption developed to enable creatures to be better fitted for
themselves
(of
their offspring) in their natural environment.
and
ir
mitigated
be
survival
But most humans
for
now live in rather artificial environments substantially removed from situations
which
evolution
gradually adapted their features (there is no way they are going to
adapt in time to absorb massive doses of radiation, for instance).
as
Much
humans
have adjusted their living environment in nonevolutionary ways, so along with it they
should substantially adjust their social practices - including aggressive and violent
practices,
ill-adapted
now
to
their
and mostly counterproductive.
situation
So
argues the pacifist.
There is a residual problem,
practices
like
that
vegetarianism.
the
Are
creatures living in (relatively) natural conditions, such as predators
of
and tribal people, to be condemned as morally
Sometimes,
confronting
yes,
be attained:
when
wrong
these
violence?
involve
when the violence grossly exceeds what is required given the end to
Though a way
but always?
can
problem 3 1, it is a rather unsatisfactory way.
be
beaten
the
around
of
edge
this
What this suggests is that nonviolence
is not an absolute, but at best a qualified ideal.
The arguments for
nonviolence
-
which are mostly practical arguments which do not exclude occasional uses of violence
and do not strictly apply to creatures in natural surroundings -
sort
of
But
conclusion.
exclude.
nonviolent
what
is
called
charge
for
state,
is
is much more investigation aimed, among other things, at
This is^ to concede
an
of moral insensitivity against comprehensive pacifism so long as
P2 remains unqualified.
31.
would
The further suggestion that emerges upon granting that moral
sharper, more sensitive, and less blanket principles than P2.
attentuated
similar
approaches
thinking and associated principles in this area are in a pretty primitive
that
a
the suggestion is a dangerous one, practically at least,
since it opens the door a chink to other options which
categorically
suggest
The sheer moral power of such pacifism
As Singer has in the analogous case of
Liberation, Jonathan Cape, London, 1975.
25
vegetarianism:
is
one
see
reason
e.g.,
for
Animal
There is no reason however why
giving its adoption some pause.
a
genuine
pacifism
(making for real peace) should not be built on a modified version of P2 which permits
such natural phenomena as predation.
Nothing logically rules out such a genuine
and
more sensitive pacifism.
There are other requirements the position to be worked out should meet as
In
particular, a rationality requirement implies that pacifists go on to oppose acts
similar to those using violence:
This
is
a
of
requirement
otherwise they could have a case made against them.
in a different sense from the pure logical
consistency
sense, namely that of keeping to the same story.
for
well.
pacifism,
Again there need be no deep problem
so long, this time, as it is not erroneously supposed that there must
be a single principle
just
(e.g.
P2)
-
as
distinct
from
bundle
a
of
moral
principles, others of which serve to oppose acts accounted similar to those involving
violence.32 io meet the rationality requirement the position should,
be
integrated
into
a
in
larger framework of nondestructive practices, which are of a
piece with nonviolent practices.33 For, except metaphorically, practices
to the environment, for instance, do not involve violence, e.g.
mining in a fertile valley, damaging a wild river, dumping toxic
and
oceans.
In
an
does
not
destructive
such things as strip
wastes
in
streams
extended sense, which gets beyond the confines of the property
picture, all these practices are environmental vandalism.
vandalism
particular,
cover
violence
But
even
metaphorically,
against persons (and certainly not nonphysical
violence such as ""psychological violence"").
What is sought then
is
an
appropriate
of these notions covering destructive practices;
and also an accompanying
synthetic term, better than the umbrella term 'vandolence'.
Then P2 is superseded by
synthesis
an appropriately qualified
P2#.
It is morally wrong to use vandolence.
It remains to characterise
the
cluster
of
destructive
practices
that
count
as
vandolence and to try to justify the principle - no easy tasks.
32.
It is important that pacifism, like other deontological positions, reject
assessments of similarity simply in terms of similar damaging consequences.
Features of the means deployed, for example, also matter.
13.
The position has been called 'pacifism.
26
APPENDICES
§5.
The
from
arguments
impracticality
impracticality
and
pacifism in the real world.
of
the
reality:
social
alleged
Even if it is conceded that pacifism
is a viable moral ideal, that it does not fall down as incoherent or ludicrous, still
the
feasibility
of
pacifism
as a sensible practice to live by will be contested -
And it has
despite, or perhaps because of, major examples such as Christ and Gandhi.
to
be
admitted
the
that
real
world,
with
all its horror and squalor, does put
But in this regard pacifism is not an exception.
pacifism to severe tests.
Nowhere is the practice of nonviolence usually thought less
than in replacing war^.
prepared
or
for
succeed
Yet nonviolent social defence methods, to replace the usual
violent methods, have been described in some detail^, though they
properly
to
likely
given
a
dress rehearsal.
have
been
never
The prospects for success of
nonviolent defence of,a region can vary significantly, depending upon whether the war
is
convention
observed
or not.
If the convention is observed then pacifism stands
reasonable prospects of success.
The difficult cases are where the war convention
perhaps
unleashed,
in
broken,
is
massive ways, on noncombatants.
and
violence
is
According to Walzer, in his
superficially sympathetic sketch and assessment of nonviolent defence and resistance,
'success
is possible only if the invaders are committed to the war convention -
...
and they won't always be' (Wp.331^^).
attained
-
there
is
conventions are flouted.
reasons,
some
got homesick.
ruthless
of
This is
presumably
be
never any guarantee of it, without or with war - even if some
The invaders may give
them irrelevant, e.g.
up
and
depart
for
all
sorts
or
they needed a quick decisive victory, they
What Walzer no doubt means is something like this:
invaders
may
Success
false.
that
sufficiently
in sufficient numbers with sufficient time and sufficient support
34.
The more sweeping replacement of the state (of the main source of
considered in Routley and Plumwood, in Social Alternatives, op.cit.
35.
Again for example, in Sharp, Politics, op. cit.
references given there.
36.
All page references prefixed by 'W' are to
Allen Lane, London, 1977.
27
See also
M. Walzer,
Martin,
Just
and
war)
op.cit.,
Unjust
is
and
Wars,
lines, etc., can eventually succeed.
defending
The difference lies in the pattern of events;
to violence.
resorts
side
But that sort of thing is also true even if the
is
if the defence ""forces"" are well-armed it
to
invaders
start
and
with
difficult
more
civil
well -prepared
with
than
afterwards
easier
the
for
costly
and
resistance.
Walzer is
inappropriate examples.
in
command,
model
the
of
way
the
Jews,
The
way.The
Nazis,
to
jump
who
that
conclusion
the
He is thinking of an extreme totalitarian
the
enslaved
misleading
many
like
cannot succeed when the war convention is abandoned, in terms of
defence
nonviolent
however,
thinking,
who
in
state,
total
Nazis were in Germany, the Jews of Germany providing the
the
population,
by
The
""resistance""
picture
is
highly
and large, did not resist extermination in an organised
never
invaded
Germany,
were
in
control
all
or
the
infrastructure and had the cooperation (at least) of the bulk of the population.
Walzer's comparison to work, there would have to be an enormous occupying army
took
over
and
managed
all
key
Australia it is not even so clear
largely
united
and
actively
resisting
this
is
which
With island territories such as
infrastructure.
that
For
logistically
population.
Walzer's
feasible
against
impression
resistance fragmenting and the populace moving into dulled acquiscence (e.g.
a
of the
Wp.332)
might have got things the wrong way around, with disbelieving and frustrated soldiers
ready to leave.
Non violent resistance is however unlikely to be put to the test in any adequate
present
state-determined circumstances.
No state would be prepared to risk
way
in
37.
It has been argued, moreover, that when church leaders, Christian or Jewish,
opposed the deportations, most of the Jews were saved (when country by country
comparisons are made). See, for one of many treatments of this sensitive issue,
R.L.
Rubenstein, The Cunning of History:
the Holocaust and the American
Future, Harper, New York, 1978, chapter 5.
38.
The argument suggested in Walzer (e.g. p.333) that nonviolent methods would
increase evil, or at least its distribution, is weak. It is countered by
Sharp's observation that the suffering likely to be induced is less than in
comparable wars.
28
training its
populace
different).
It
full
in
techniques
(civil
is
defence
all too easy for them to ""rout"" the police:
be
then
would
action
nonviolent
civil
obedience, for example, could no longer be ensured by the customary violent means.
thus
The argument
initial sketchings.
far
§6.
On the positive case for pacifism:
has
been largely defensive, meeting a range of objections to comprehensive pacifism.
That in itself is revealing.
deviations
from
are
it
Pacifism is the
require
what
rest
position
(inertial
and
state)
The reason for this is simple
explanation.
violence is, on most ethical systems, at least a prima facie evil, so use of
enough:
it is what has to be justified.
Positive arguments for pacifism can take advantage of
and
merely
justified.
case
try
dispose of ""exceptional cases"" where violence is supposed to be
in
that
the
defender
(person
or
nation)
is
morally-excluded situation, since the attacker has overstepped moral
the
position
privileged
The favourite exception is self-defence against a violent opponent:
curious
is
to
its
already
the
in
bounds.
a
Still
defender is not morally committed to violence whatever he does - as in a dilemma
And since it is at least prima facie wrong, and he does not have
situation.
to
use
it, he should not resort to it.
An elementary syllogistic argument, given by Narveson (Np.117), can
be
adapted
to give a similar result:-
Violence is (intrinsically) wrong
Violence in any excepted cases (e.g.
self-defence) is still violence
Violence in any excepted cases is still (intrinsically) wrong.
Naturally those opposed to pacifism will challenge the first premiss, and a dialectic
already glimpsed will begin.
None of the arguments for pacifism is conclusive, since even where arguments are
deductively
tight
assumptions
can
be
challenged
arguments for pacifism particularly good ones.
for
pacifism,
(as
above).
Nor
One of the poorer positive
are all the
arguments
for example, makes similar assumptions to those of the classic theory
29
of war, namely that once war is embarked upon it cannot be limited,
nuclear
that
or
chemical
hope
weapons will be used selectively and restrictively is an
illusion, escalation is inevitable.
are bound to be overstepped.
case is overstated.
the
e.g.
The (moral) limits in war - whatever they are
-
Although the chances of escalation are real enough, the
Limited exchanges and confrontation are possible.
Wars are much
more social arrangements and much more conventional than the classical theory allows.
Wars can, for example, be started and stopped
things intervene (e.g.
support
(as
midstream
more
should
the
for
first
inevitably,
premiss
for
those
mixture
a
above)
suffering
and
anguish
violent
of
methods,
the
They
nonviolence.
injustice
characteristically works, the futility and counterproductiveness of
means-ends
of
the
consideration, a range of consequentialist and practical reasons, e.g.
pain,
important
a pollution crisis affecting other neighbouring states).
The main reasons for pacifism are,
include
in
cost
that
in
violence
violence
within
the setting of modern industrial societies, the broader popular support base obtained
by avoidance of violence, the desirable social consequences of nonviolence such as
more
less furtive, society.
open,
the why of
pacifism)
considerable.
These
are
None of these well-known types of reason (giving
separately
decisive,
but
their
cumulative
affords a model for one way of proceeding^;
Mill's
defence
Mill's
procedure
works
(at
least
As was pointed out by F. D'Agostino in discussion.
30
of
liberty
nonviolence,
it works as well as it works for
liberty).
39.
is
it is enough (a nonelementary exercise)
to adapt Mill's consequentialist arguments for liberty to arguments for
otherwise
effect
reasons can be put together, in various ways, to make a strong
positive case for pacifism, as principled nonviolence.
as
a
A
more
decisive
consequentialist
data ,
argument,
takes
a
but
making
semantical
preference rankings on worlds, and these worlds
modelling
nonviolence
Again
principles.
use
of
route.
are
similar
practical
and
The data is used to arrive at
then
pacifism
in
applied
is
derived
semantically
as
principled
nonviolence.^0
R.
40.
Routley*
*
The details of such an esoteric defence of moral principles are outlined in R.
and V.
Routley, op.cit.: a fuller account may be found in their 'Semantical
foundations for value theory', Nous (1983), to appear.
* With thanks to R. Beehler, F. D'Agostino, B. Martin, L. Mirlin, R. Goodin, and
participants in the Philosophy Seminar, Research School of Social Sciences,
Australian National University.
The main outlines of the paper were drafted
associate at Simon Fraser University.
31
while
the
author
was
a
research
OTHER PUBLICATIONS OF THE PHILOSOPHY DEPARTMENT, RESEARCH SCHOOL OF SOCIAL
SCIENCES, AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY
School publications:
R. and V. Routley, The Fight for the Forests, First edition 1973, Second
edition 1974, Third edition 1975.
Departmental publications:
M.K. Rennie, Some Uses of Type Theory in the Analysis of Language, 1974.
D. Mannison, M.A. McRobbie, and R. Routley, editors, Environmental
Philosophy, 1980.
R. Routley, Exploring Meinong's Jungle and Beyond, 1980.
Yellow series (Research Papers of the Logic Group):
1. R.K. Meyer, Why I am not a relevantist, 1978.
2. R.K. Meyer, Sentential constants in R, 1979.
3. R.K. Meyer and M.A. McRobbie, Firesets and relevant implication, 1979.
4. R.K. Meyer, A Boolean-valued semantics for R, 1979.
5. R.K. Meyer, Almost Skolem forms for relevant (and other) logics, 1979.
6. R.K. Meyer, A note on R-^ matrices, 1979.
7. R.K. Meyer and J.K. Slaney, Abelian logic (from A to Z), 1980.
8^ C. Mortensen, Relevant algebras and relevant model structures, 1980.
9. R.K. Meyer, Relevantly interpolating in RM , 1980.
10. C. Mortensen, Paraconsistency and C^, 1981.
11. R.K. Meyer, De Morgan monoids, 1983.
12. R. Routley, Relevantism and the problem as to when Material Detachment
and the Disjunctive Syllogism Argument can be correctly used,
and N. da Costa, Essay on the foundations of logic, 1983.
13. R. Routley and G. Priest, On Paraconsistency, 198314. R. Routley, Research in logic in Australia, New Zealand and Oceania, 1983
15.
R.K. Meyer, Where y fails, 1983.
Green series (Discussion papers in environmental philosophy):
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
R. Routley, Roles and limits of paradigms in environmental thought and
action, 1982.
R. Routley, In defence of cannibalism I.
Types of admissible and
inadmissible cannibalism, 1982.
moo
R. Routley and N. Griffin, Unravelling the meaning of life?, 1982.
R. Routley, Nihilisms, and nihilist logics.
R. Routley, War and Peace. I. On the ethics of large-scale nuclear war
and war-deterrence and the political fall out.
R. Routley and V. Plumwood, Moral dilemmas and the logic of deonti
R°""ouU.y and V. Plumwood, A. expensive repair-kit for utilitarianism.
7.
10.
R. Routley, Maximizing, satisficing, satisizing:
rational behaviour under rival paradigms.
the difference 1
",,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,"Box 149: Publications (to como)",https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/4bdf0fc19be362d2a697b5695b65a2df.pdf,Text,"Self-published Papers",1,0