1
20
9
-
https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/5db24f9062978c3cb3ac367788f0837b.pdf
5499c94435baef11855853b3b0cd8ab9
PDF Text
Text
ABSTRACT OF
PROBLEMS and SOLUTIONS in DEEP ECOPOLITICAL THEORY
A reshaping of social and political institutions, which are often outmoded or suboptimal
and certainly commonly anti-environmental, is now prominent on theoretical agendas, at least in
Australia. One such project is the multi-million dollar "Reshaping Australian Institutions^^
project at the Australian National University.
At the same time there is widespread
disenchantment with prevailing politics in Australia. Accordingly there is an opportunity to put
radical green themes on agendas for real political and institutional change.
A deep change, however, which is what deep green theories require, encounters several
problems. For one, there appears to be a contradiction between demands for, on the one side,
increasing environmental regulations and welfare arrangements, characteristically dependent
upon bureaurcratic centralisation and economic growth, and on the other, decentralized lower
impact organisation, which halts anti-environmentally industry and economic growth. A
functional resolution, partially dissolving a central state, is outlined, along with a theory of
encephaletic organisation.
Further problems to surmount include human chauvinism and present-time bias, even in
present t4best practice” democratic institutions. Deep demarchoidal resolutions of these
problems are sketched and defended.
R. Sylvan
RMB 683
Bungendore Australia 2621
�
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Notes, Correspondences and Marginalia
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ABSTRACT OF
PROBLEMS and SOLUTIONS in DEEP ECOPOLITICAL THEORY
A reshaping of social and political institutions, which are often outmoded or suboptimal
and certainly commonly anti-environmental, is now prominent on theoretical agendas, at least in
Australia. One such project is the multi-million dollar "Reshaping Australian Institutions^^
project at the Australian National University.
At the same time there is widespread
disenchantment with prevailing politics in Australia. Accordingly there is an opportunity to put
radical green themes on agendas for real political and institutional change.
A deep change, however, which is what deep green theories require, encounters several
problems. For one, there appears to be a contradiction between demands for, on the one side,
increasing environmental regulations and welfare arrangements, characteristically dependent
upon bureaurcratic centralisation and economic growth, and on the other, decentralized lower
impact organisation, which halts anti-environmentally industry and economic growth. A
functional resolution, partially dissolving a central state, is outlined, along with a theory of
encephaletic organisation.
Further problems to surmount include human chauvinism and present-time bias, even in
present t4best practice” democratic institutions. Deep demarchoidal resolutions of these
problems are sketched and defended.
R. Sylvan
RMB 683
Bungendore Australia 2621
Dublin Core
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Box 18, Item 1225: Abstract of Problems in deep ecopolitical theory
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<a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&range=&collection=&type=&user=&tags=&public=&featured=&exhibit=&geolocation-mapped=&geolocation-address=&geolocation-latitude=&geolocation-longitude=&geolocation-radius=10&submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a>
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<span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&pageSize=20&sortBy=score&sortDirection=Desc&searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span>, Box 18, Item 1225
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<a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a>
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This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>.
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Australian National University - Typing Table at End of Desk
Australian National University Office
Australian National University Office > Typing Table at End of Desk
Box 18: Green Projects in Progress
-
https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/d75844da363477e0a040dc1548e6e077.pdf
6e902a860ae1f5d903cbe328de2a2e37
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A dialethic approach to paradoxes of social and political theory
Conspectus: The rough working idea is this: These paradoxes get treated in
the same way as moral dilemmas in deontic theory. Namely they are
accepted, so theory and assumptions do not require revision and excision.
Rather is required is elaboration, additions to say what do when a dilemma is
encounter (e.g. proceed to fall back on rational decision theory, as modified).
Thus it is with voters paradoxes, inconsistent preferences, Arrow’s theorem,
and so on: STET! let them stand. If they are encountered head-on, then work
through them using alternative methods. It is an important point that methods
do not give out, as things do not go haywire when consistency is
encountered.
Let us start with desires and preferences, which are the basic items in much theory (eg.
stock economics). Although standard theory smooths out—removes—inconsistencies in
agents’ desires and preferences, it is widely appreciated that they can both be inconsistent. A
person can both want something for one set of reasons or urges and not want it perhaps for
another (e.g. because moral constraints enter).
The so-called empirical “problem” of
nontransitive preferences is, turned around, simply a case of inconsistency. A simple case (like
that of voting paradoxes) is where an agent has circular preferences. Over some loop, which
may be quite large an agent prefers a to bi, bi to b2, ... bn-i to bn and bn to a. So by
transitivity this agent prefers a to bi and bi to a, and similar, which preferences are
inconsistent. Given the usual assumption that a Pb implies ~bPa, these circular preferences are
explicitly inconsistent. Yet such preference ordering are frequently observed, especially in
children (who are often keen to exhibit preferences).
A theory admitting explictly inconsistent preferences has to be paraconsistent, on pain of
triviality otherwise. Certainly a theory where inconsistency was not exposed, but is to say
locked up in preference relations need not be paraconsistent, but such a theory would be only
partial, not a sufficiently full theory revealing what was transpiring. A normal modal theory
would, for instance, be worthless in the presence of inconsistent preferences or desires,
because it would yield such results as that any such agent desires everything. (For instance, by
virtue of systematic requirements for D, desire, it follows that Dp & D~p -» DB. The system
requirements are A -* B/DA -» DB and DA & DB -> D(A & B).)
The state of an agent with inconsistent preferences or desires need not run out of control.
Consistency is not the only constraint, the only limit on logical licence, but a special, often
excessively powerful one. In these cases control can be provided by agents not processing
trivial preferences or desiresi, by some, sufficiently many, things not being preferred or
desired. More comprehensively, a rather minimally adequate agent will have both a logically
organised set of inclusions, preferences that obtain or are held, etc., and of exclusions, items
that are not desired etc. Thus a more satisfactory logic for this sort of area will exhibit both
acceptances and rejections. For example: i- DA & DB -> D(A & B) usual coounterexamples to
�which assume inconsistent desire cannot obtain explicitly. Normally where h DA then i- D(A&
B); but of course an agent may not desire something on its own, which would be differently
formulated. Most important, h Dp. That is necessary, though far from sufficient for a coherent
agent (and it as with coherents agents, as distinct from consistent agents, that we are now
primarily concerned). Now it is not difficult to show that there are paraconsistent logical
theories that can combine all these sorts of features with inconsistency in desires or preferences,
e.g. with i- D (qo & ~qo) for some qo (for some agent).
If individual agents can have inconsistent motivational states, so, still more, can groups
of agents. Broadly, many sorts of pooling induce inconsistency: of information, knowledge,
and so on, as is now well appreciated. But if of beliefs why not of desires, if of information
why not of preferences, which, for one thing, are based on information? Such inconsistency
induced by aggregation is what manifests itself in voting paradoxes.
Now we can adapt an argument from what do in case of individual agent situation to
apply to what do in group case. Namely, not revise and elide, but proceed on through an
inconsistency; proceed by further available methods, e.g. further voting differently arranged.
(Compare perhaps a football match which results in a draw or stalemate. Do not go back and
try to start over. Play on into extra time, with new rules to give a more rapid outcome.)
To the extent that it can be carried out on the basis of received preference theory, standard
economic theory can be simulated on the basis of paraconsistent preference theory. For there
are, in general, simply more preferences to start with, for instance in extending to utility
functions, expanding typically in complete preference orderings. Indifference curves can be
constructed in the standard way, the only difference being that there will be some singularities,
as regards where items are both preferred and not.
A conundrum for green theory over democracy, which it typically supports, is put in a
sharp form as follows1: Democracy concerns procedures, environmentalism certain outcomes.
What guarantee can there be that the procedures will deliver the outcomes? That democracy will
yield a way of protesting environments?
First greens are not seeking guarantees, which they could not in general expect.
1
Goodin under way So-wind p.168.
�a
ABSTRACT OF
PROBLEMS and SOLUTIONS in DEEP ECOPOLITICAL THEORY
A reshaping of social and political institutions, which are often outmoded or suboptimal
and certainly commonly anti-environmental, is now prominent on theoretical agendas, at least in
Australia. One such project is the multi-million dollar “Reshaping Australian Institutions”
project at the Australian National University.
At the same time there is widespread
disenchantment with prevailing politics in Australia. Accordingly there is an opportunity to put
radical green themes on agendas for real political and institutional change.
A deep change, however, which is what deep green theories require, encounters several
problems. For one, there appears to be a contradiction between demands for, on the one side,
increasing environmental regulations and welfare arrangements, characteristically dependent
upon bureaurcratic centralisation and economic growth, and on the other, decentralized lower
impact organisation, which halts anti-environmentally industry and economic growth. A
functional resolution, partially dissolving a central state, is outlined, along with a theory of
encephaletic organisation.
Further problems to surmount include human chauvinism and present-time bias, even in
present “best practice” democratic institutions. Deep demarchoidal resolutions of these
problems are sketched and defended.
R. Sylvan
RMB683
Bungendore Australia 2621
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Draft Papers
Description
An account of the resource
Sylvan's literary executor encountered an archive in which “all his projects were current", since manuscripts were undated and unattributed.
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Text
Any textual data included in the document
A dialethic approach to paradoxes of social and political theory
Conspectus: The rough working idea is this: These paradoxes get treated in
the same way as moral dilemmas in deontic theory. Namely they are
accepted, so theory and assumptions do not require revision and excision.
Rather is required is elaboration, additions to say what do when a dilemma is
encounter (e.g. proceed to fall back on rational decision theory, as modified).
Thus it is with voters paradoxes, inconsistent preferences, Arrow’s theorem,
and so on: STET! let them stand. If they are encountered head-on, then work
through them using alternative methods. It is an important point that methods
do not give out, as things do not go haywire when consistency is
encountered.
Let us start with desires and preferences, which are the basic items in much theory (eg.
stock economics). Although standard theory smooths out—removes—inconsistencies in
agents’ desires and preferences, it is widely appreciated that they can both be inconsistent. A
person can both want something for one set of reasons or urges and not want it perhaps for
another (e.g. because moral constraints enter).
The so-called empirical “problem” of
nontransitive preferences is, turned around, simply a case of inconsistency. A simple case (like
that of voting paradoxes) is where an agent has circular preferences. Over some loop, which
may be quite large an agent prefers a to bi, bi to b2, ... bn-i to bn and bn to a. So by
transitivity this agent prefers a to bi and bi to a, and similar, which preferences are
inconsistent. Given the usual assumption that a Pb implies ~bPa, these circular preferences are
explicitly inconsistent. Yet such preference ordering are frequently observed, especially in
children (who are often keen to exhibit preferences).
A theory admitting explictly inconsistent preferences has to be paraconsistent, on pain of
triviality otherwise. Certainly a theory where inconsistency was not exposed, but is to say
locked up in preference relations need not be paraconsistent, but such a theory would be only
partial, not a sufficiently full theory revealing what was transpiring. A normal modal theory
would, for instance, be worthless in the presence of inconsistent preferences or desires,
because it would yield such results as that any such agent desires everything. (For instance, by
virtue of systematic requirements for D, desire, it follows that Dp & D~p -» DB. The system
requirements are A -* B/DA -» DB and DA & DB -> D(A & B).)
The state of an agent with inconsistent preferences or desires need not run out of control.
Consistency is not the only constraint, the only limit on logical licence, but a special, often
excessively powerful one. In these cases control can be provided by agents not processing
trivial preferences or desiresi, by some, sufficiently many, things not being preferred or
desired. More comprehensively, a rather minimally adequate agent will have both a logically
organised set of inclusions, preferences that obtain or are held, etc., and of exclusions, items
that are not desired etc. Thus a more satisfactory logic for this sort of area will exhibit both
acceptances and rejections. For example: i- DA & DB -> D(A & B) usual coounterexamples to
which assume inconsistent desire cannot obtain explicitly. Normally where h DA then i- D(A&
B); but of course an agent may not desire something on its own, which would be differently
formulated. Most important, h Dp. That is necessary, though far from sufficient for a coherent
agent (and it as with coherents agents, as distinct from consistent agents, that we are now
primarily concerned). Now it is not difficult to show that there are paraconsistent logical
theories that can combine all these sorts of features with inconsistency in desires or preferences,
e.g. with i- D (qo & ~qo) for some qo (for some agent).
If individual agents can have inconsistent motivational states, so, still more, can groups
of agents. Broadly, many sorts of pooling induce inconsistency: of information, knowledge,
and so on, as is now well appreciated. But if of beliefs why not of desires, if of information
why not of preferences, which, for one thing, are based on information? Such inconsistency
induced by aggregation is what manifests itself in voting paradoxes.
Now we can adapt an argument from what do in case of individual agent situation to
apply to what do in group case. Namely, not revise and elide, but proceed on through an
inconsistency; proceed by further available methods, e.g. further voting differently arranged.
(Compare perhaps a football match which results in a draw or stalemate. Do not go back and
try to start over. Play on into extra time, with new rules to give a more rapid outcome.)
To the extent that it can be carried out on the basis of received preference theory, standard
economic theory can be simulated on the basis of paraconsistent preference theory. For there
are, in general, simply more preferences to start with, for instance in extending to utility
functions, expanding typically in complete preference orderings. Indifference curves can be
constructed in the standard way, the only difference being that there will be some singularities,
as regards where items are both preferred and not.
A conundrum for green theory over democracy, which it typically supports, is put in a
sharp form as follows1: Democracy concerns procedures, environmentalism certain outcomes.
What guarantee can there be that the procedures will deliver the outcomes? That democracy will
yield a way of protesting environments?
First greens are not seeking guarantees, which they could not in general expect.
1
Goodin under way So-wind p.168.
a
ABSTRACT OF
PROBLEMS and SOLUTIONS in DEEP ECOPOLITICAL THEORY
A reshaping of social and political institutions, which are often outmoded or suboptimal
and certainly commonly anti-environmental, is now prominent on theoretical agendas, at least in
Australia. One such project is the multi-million dollar “Reshaping Australian Institutions”
project at the Australian National University.
At the same time there is widespread
disenchantment with prevailing politics in Australia. Accordingly there is an opportunity to put
radical green themes on agendas for real political and institutional change.
A deep change, however, which is what deep green theories require, encounters several
problems. For one, there appears to be a contradiction between demands for, on the one side,
increasing environmental regulations and welfare arrangements, characteristically dependent
upon bureaurcratic centralisation and economic growth, and on the other, decentralized lower
impact organisation, which halts anti-environmentally industry and economic growth. A
functional resolution, partially dissolving a central state, is outlined, along with a theory of
encephaletic organisation.
Further problems to surmount include human chauvinism and present-time bias, even in
present “best practice” democratic institutions. Deep demarchoidal resolutions of these
problems are sketched and defended.
R. Sylvan
RMB683
Bungendore Australia 2621
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
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Box 18, Item 1225: Draft of A dialethic approach to paradoxes of social and political theory ; Abstract of Problems in deep ecopolitical theory
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<a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&range=&collection=&type=&user=&tags=&public=&featured=&exhibit=&geolocation-mapped=&geolocation-address=&geolocation-latitude=&geolocation-longitude=&geolocation-radius=10&submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a>
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
<span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&pageSize=20&sortBy=score&sortDirection=Desc&searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span>, Box 18, Item 1225
Publisher
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<a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a>
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This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>.
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For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library.
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<a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:f3409b4">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:f3409b4</a>
Australian National University Office
Australian National University Office > Typing Table at End of Desk
Box 18: Green Projects in Progress
-
https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/2f6dabd2b76b0e39c93150be86c837bf.pdf
3b6452d1e3793a5073876a489e21484a
PDF Text
Text
29.5.95
PROBLEMS IN DEEPER GREEN
POLITICAL ORGANIZATION:
an Australian perspective on radical institutional change.
... people are ready for change and the impending debate will result in
constitutional change. We should, therefore, explore all options ... J
As elsewhere, there is growing dissatisfaction with Australia's political institutions, and
increasing demand to change them. This demand, hiding co-optative elements, has been
initiated and fostered in a conspicuously top-down fashion, by politicians and by academics.
There is so far little surge of political enterprise at grass-roots levels, little pressure for the
usually very limited changes proposed. Nonetheless, along with apathy, there is widespread
popular disenchantment with present political arrangements. There is now an opportunity
(although still only a small window no doubt) to put green and radical themes on the agenda for
real political change in Australia. That opportunity should not be missed, within Australia, or
elsewhere. While the exposition that follows concentrates upon Australia, as a convenient
advanced example, much of what is argued and urged applies or adapts elsewhere.
1. Disenchantment with politics, and political proposals for change.
There is now evident in Australia, what is variously described as disillusionment and
anxiety, cynicism and pessimism about the state of politics—a loss of confidence in it, and a
retreat from commitment. As much and more, Mackay has nicely exposed in a survey of the
Australian situation:
anxiety about the nature and quality of Australian politics [has] increased. ...
Widespread anxiety about the state of politics is based [in part] on an uneasy feeling
that, if the parties are not going to stand for some identifiable philosophy, and the
leaders are going to be chosen on the basis of their potential as television performers
or even as head-kickers, then the only appropriate response is cynicism.
That cynicism is reflected in a turning away from support for the major parties ... and
revealed in the attitudes of young Australians ...12
who often cannot be bothered registering to vote, or voting (though voting is legally
compulsory).
1
Hon. Ian Macphee, ‘A new constitution?’. Of course Macphee did not really mean all options, nor
even all constitutional options. Furthermore, his claim about preparedness of people for change is
incompatible with Mackey’s data (mentioned below) on exhaustion with change.
2
Mackay pp. 174-177. For all the Australian casualness of Mackay's presentation, his sociological
findings are nonetheless fairly solidly survey and interview based (if occasionally stretching the
data). Main findings are replicated by other sociologists.
�2
♦>
Lack of confidence is beginning to show not only as cynicism about politicians, but
also as doubt about the integrity of Australia's political institutions.3
In a recent survey, ‘62 percent of [Australians] expressed either little or no confidence in the
political system. Such a figure accurately reflects the mood of the Australian community’.4
Australian loss offaith in conventional politics is attributed to a mix of factors. A first
explanatory factor as regards this disenchantment comes from the changes in politics already
remarked (ranging from policy issues to media performers) and from resultant uncertainty. ‘...
the Australian electorate is confused about which party stands for what, and about whether any
party has a long-term commitment to any particular point of view’ .5
A complex ‘second factor ... concerns the adversarial nature of two-party politics’.6
How can this ‘two party, adversarial approach ... continue to be appropriate when the
distinctions between the two parties themselves are so hard to define’? But ‘redefinition of
party politics implies the possibility of a redefinition of the whole parliamentary process itself’.
Why ‘when parties seem quite capable of stealing each other's policies or of invading each
other's traditional philosophical territory, [can not] politicians work together in a more co
operative and harmonious spirit’?7 ‘Adversarial politics may have made sense ... when ...
distinctions between the parties were stark and when arguments about principle could be
justified; today, the idea that politicians would be arguing over a point of principle or
philosophy is almost unthinkable.... [They] are much more likely to be arguing over matters of
personality, prejudice and power than over issues which effect the long-term health of the body
politic’.8
‘The quality of parliamentary debate is regarded not only as a symptom of the
adversarial nature of the institution, but also as a symptom either of the poor quality of
politicians ..., or of the effect of the system on those who are enmeshed in it’.9 Unless there is
3
Ibid, p.178
4
Ibid. The figure is the more surprising inasmuch as such disillusioning factors as corruption and
graft are not features of overt political life in Austral-asia by comparison with elsewhere in the
hemispherical region.
5
Ibid. pp. 178-179.
6
Ibid. The adversarial character of dominant State legal systems is also becoming subject to more
and more criticism. It appears likely that significant movement towards different inquiratorial
systems will occur, not least because of the huge expense and growing unaffordability of
adversarial systems.
7
Ibid.
8
Ibid, p.180.
9
Ibid, p.179. It is a symptom of both, the latter especially.
�3
marked improvement in party philosophies, programs and performance, ‘the call to re-examine
the nature of the parliamentary process will gather momentum’.1011
A third relevant factor contributing to loss of faith is the impression of Australians that
‘they are overgoverned ’H, with too many expensive bureaucracies and too many houses of
parliament.
Conflicts between State and Federal parliaments — and between the various State
parliaments themselves — are regarded as a particularly unproductive expenditure of
political energy, and Australians question whether 15 houses of parliament may be
too many for the efficient government of 18 million people. The sheer number of
parliaments is often blamed for the problem of too many bureaucracies and for many
duplications of bureaucratic and political activity between State and Federal
governments.
... Whilst there is little love felt in the Australian community for Canberra and for the
idea of more centralised government even that is beginning to appear preferable ....
The widespread support for the idea of a republic which emerged during 1992 is
closely related to the underlying sense that Australia is overdue for some kind of
reexamination of its political institutions, and even the notion of Federation itself. ...
As debate about the idea of a republic proceeds ... it has begun to incorporate the idea
that Australian's political structures and systems might be quite significantly
reformed.12
Such disaffection reflects too a growing awareness that Australia’s political arrangements
owe more to historical accident than to rational design. Even though the main proposals for
change no doubt remain reformist in character and could lead in unfortunate directions, some of
them are far-reaching by normal standards. Both the extensive disenchantment with present
political arrangements and the felt need for significant change further suggest political times are
not altogether normal. Elements underpinning a political paradigm shift are already present, as
are features supporting rational redesign, to which radical additions are now feasible.
So far there have been, along with normal inertial resistance to change, two main
responses to growing pressure for change: political, from politicians, ex-politicians and political
commentators, and academic from intellectuals, academic entrepreneurs and academic
journalists. By and large, political responses have been grander, more sweeping and vaguer;
10
Ibid, p.181.
11
Ibid, p.181, itals added. The problem has now surfaced strikingly in the heavily indebted
Australian Capital Territory (“toy town” as its is facetiously called locally) which is swamped by
bureaucracy, where it has been discovered that there is one expensive bureaucrat for every fifteen
persons.
12
Ibid. p. 181-2. Republican proposals have been circulating for some time. But the cause was
finally taken up by prominent politicians, who made it their own, after which it became a popular
issue. Mackay's accurate presentation of popular support for political change contrasts drolly with
the first part of his book which depicts an Australian populace exhausted by change and longing for
the old ease and somnolence.
�4
academic responses more theoretical and cautious, piecemeal and detailed. But there are no
grand detailed plans.
Under the leading proposal so far for political change, Australia's constitutional
monarchy will be displaced by a constitutional republic with its own head of state displacing the
monarch, but with perhaps minimal adjustments otherwise.
Nonetheless, as a result,
republicanism is in the air. Politicians have begun to contemplate other practical reforms, while
academics have begun to embroider theories around republicanism and institutional reform.
What happens to the Australian federation of states is one of the many unresolved issues
presently being debated.
The main reason for reform offered by the political camp can be summed up simply as
changing geopolitical circumstances. The camp tends not to acknowledge what would reflect
adversely upon it, the poorness of federal political practice. Rather it tends to attribute popular
dissatisfaction to economic circumstances and uncertainties: declining real standards of living,
extensive unemployment, persistent recession until recently, problems to be surmounted by
full-steam ahead untrammelled economic growth, to be attained by recoupling Australia to the
Asian economic express. Meanwhile an orchestrated republican movement can help divert
popular political attention from poor political management and a gloomy economic predicament.
Much has changed in the century since present antiquated political arrangements were
hammered out, arrangements making the newly-fashioned Commonwealth of Australia,
politically a federation of states, into a constitutional monarchy coupled to Britain, arrangements
of convenience fashioned for very different circumstances. Most non-symbolic linkages with
Britain, which has been inching towards a place in a united Europe, have already been severed.
Australia has gradually begun to appreciate its geo-political position in the Indian-Pacific region
(and the money-making opportunities for a sagging resource-based economy in allegedly
booming parts of Asia). Whence the main idealistic proposal: for an independent republic,
decoupled from Europe, assuming its own (prominent) place in its geo-political regions. In
principle at least, place and region begin to assume, or resume, some of their neglected, but
historic, significance (however that is not how it is yet seen).
Most proposals for constitutional and federal reform fit within that limited idealistic
conception. One important proposal, advanced by established political players, their most
radical proposal so far, includes abolition of the present states. Such a proposal would clearly
represent a welcome step in anarchist directions, were it not regularly offset by the idea of a
strengthened central state.13 Supposing this latter unfortunate idea is bracketed for the moment,
13
Anarchists can even rest (if uneasily) with a constitution, so long as it provides for an
organisation, Australia Inc. even, sufficiently different from a state and its authoritarian trappings.
�5
♦>
then what is being seriously considered already starts to look like a much more rational
regionalism than what presently prevails.
The present states of Australia are undoubtedly an anachronism, based on accidental
boundaries of a contingent colonial history. They are ecologically irrational management units,
utterly failing to reflect ecological regions. Yet the states possess extensive environmental and
other management powers, inappropriate ‘powers which derive from what was largely a
political bargaining process conducted a century ago.’ Another effect of inapposite state-federal
arrangements, especially ‘funding arrangements, has been to lock out local government and,
more importantly, local communities. ... local communities must be given greater control over
those decisions of government which effect their lives ...’; the opportunity ‘to design and
provide the services which are needed locally.’14
At this stage of the dialectic McPhee slides easily and naturally from localism to
regionalism.
A glance at the map reveals natural regions for local government on a viable scale [an
optimistic contention]. Some cross State boundaries, and I would envisage that State
governments would be replaced with regional governments. These would be more
akin to larger local governments and would certainly not have the trappings of the
States. They should not have parliaments and the expensive, unwieldy and inefficient
bureaucracies which characterise our States. They should have a small number of
full-time councillors ... Regional governments should be solely accountable to their
ratepayers ...15 .
So far so good: however McPhee thereupon begins to infiltrate stock (small Z) liberal
management assumptions. Nonetheless the basic idea to retain is simple: that of ecologicallyrational local and regional rearrangement of anachronistic state partitions.
regionalization should be greened, as reform should be radicalized.
But that
More generally,
opportunites now present themselves to insert more radical ideas throughout the debate about
Australia’s future directions.
For much has been left off political agendas for change, not merely environments and
habitats of their less prominent or noisy inhabitants, but also such issues as rights and liberties,
transformation of antiquated legal and executive frameworks, and so on. Omission of (human)
rights is especially remarkable in states such as Australia, whose constitutions astonishingly do
not mention at all (what is however often supposed to justify states) individual rights, such
rights only being ensured, so far as they are, assumptions from uncodified common law, by
14
All quotes in this paragraph are drawn from McPhee. An address along similar lines to the Hon.
Ian McPhee, also proposing abolition of the states, was delivered by the former Prime Minister
R.G. Hawke. Hawke's speech, by contrast with McPhee's, attracted much media attention, and
though facilely dismissed as “unrealistic” by some practicing politicians, appeared to gain a good
deal of support.
15
McPhee ibid.
�6
indirect routes (statutes regarding treatment of minorities and the like). Nor do the political
camps pushing limited change speak of rights or liberties; a very limited conception of
adjustments required prevails (though without rights and liberties and a generous public sphere
there is little, and little prospect of, justification for a state at all). Accordingly political agendas
for change need to be conspicuously broadened, to accommodate a decidedly more ambitious
range of constitutional and institutional redesign.
2. A project within a project: radically reshaping Australian institutions.
Academic entrepreneurs have also responded quickly to proposals for constitutional and
institutional changes. Early to scramble on the bandwagon was the institution to which I am
affiliated, the Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, with its
ambitious decade-long project, Reshaping Australian Institutions: Towards and Beyond
2001.16 One small part of this project does connect with the republican push, which no doubt
helped inspire it and gain its funding. The academic version of republicanism furnishes an
institutional and historic setting, tracing its roots back to ancient Rome, and thereby linking in,
what admits much modem adaptation, notions of citizenship and civic virtues. But most of the
project is independent of any republican reorganisation.
The Reshaping Australian Institutions project is presented in predominantly reformist
fashion, unsurprisingly. It is supposed, for instance, to ‘provide major input into evaluation
and reform of Australia's institutions’; indeed it is explicitly ‘aimed at contributing to Australian
constitutional reform’.17
Nothing however precludes consideration of reshaping or
transforming Australian institutions — those of the whole ecological region — in a unreformist
and possibly unconstitutional way, in a radical way.
Admittedly, the rough boundary between reformist and radical routes becomes even more
blurred when the constitution of a country is open for possible major reconsideration and much
political infrastructure may be altered. Nonetheless, from the perspective of a strong central
state, the stock boundary stands intact. For reformist changes would amount to comparatively
small adjustments leaving the state substantially intact. For example, a minimal transformation,
16
A recent brief description of this two million dollar project, now outlined in several places, is
given in Tynan, pp.17-19. Fuller descriptions are available from a main coordinator of the project,
J. Braithwaite, Law, RSSS, ANU. One of the many strands (17 at last count) of this project is an
environmental (or green) strand.
The immediate predecessor of this article was presented in a workshop at RSSS on green political
theory, arranged under the project. That accounts for some of the otherwise puzzling structure of
what has eventuated. Another earlier version was tried out at Ecopolitics VIII, Pacific Visions,
held at Lincoln University, Christchurch, New Zealand, in July 1994.
17
‘Reshaping Australian institutions: towards and beyond 2001’ in Tynan , p.17, italics added.
�7
of the sort presently much favoured, from constitutional monarchy to Australian republic,
though entailing non-negligible constitutional redrafting, need only amend the roles of a few
elite power- and position-holders. By contrast, radical changes would substantially alter that
strong central state, perhaps (as will be proposed) eliminating it altogether.
There are appealing reasons for attempting wider, more radical investigations. For,
firstly, there may be more satisfactory institutional structures not accessible, or even visible,
along normal constitutional reform routes. Secondly, there is a demand, a small but growing
demand from green directions for instance, for radical institutional change. It would be
prudent, then, to make some investigation of the options, to assess their prospects. Thirdly,
reflection on such structures would certainly be part of a more comprehensive study of and
theory of institutional design, which the Reshaping project also presents as an objective.
Fourthly, much more controversially, major environmental problems cannot be satisfactorily
solved along merely reformist paths. For states, what are reformed, states themselves are
ecologically dysfunctional. In practice this appears obvious enough. Simply reflect upon their
environmental records; these are even worse than those abysmal records compiled for human
rights. But the practical case can be argued in detail in a state by state way, or less laboriously,
through the familiar rough classification of states into first, second and third world states. In
main third world regions, the rise of the state has seen the serious decline of environments.
Those third world states that have not largely destroyed their natural environments are in rapid
process of doing so. The activities involved are, furthermore, not merely tolerated by these
states but are usually actively encouraged (e.g. with state participation or by state concessions,
as through taxation advantages, subsidies, export incentives, etc.).
Further, the role of
exploitation and plunder of remaining natural “resources”, and depletion of “biological capital”,
by third world states, most of which are now trapped in debt and structural adjustment, has
increased many-fold in the last two decades.
How destructively second world states of eastern
Europe treated their own (and also other regions’) environment, how they over-expoited and
polluted them, has recently been much publicized. While the recent record in first world states
is no doubt marginally better, many of these states dominated their natural environments and
their wild inhabitants in the past, and have heavily polluted and congested their urban and
industrial regions. Nor does their present record gain an environmental pass. For example,
those that have any natural forests (similarly fisheries) left are in the process of eliminating or
degrading most of what remains; most are failing seriously in meeting (their own) targets on
greenhouse emissions, and so on. More theoretically, it is unlikely that states, increasingly
focussed narrowly upon shallow and short-term economic agendas, will or can deliver
satisfactorily environmentally. A prime reason is this: states are ineluctably committed, more
and more as their populations expand, to high levels of economic activity characteristically to
�0
economic growth of sorts which impact heavily environmentally, inducing inevitable
degradation.18
Accordingly, there are then, or should be, two bands to any green (or environmental)
strand of a restructuring Australian institutions project: not merely an important reformist side,
but as well a radical spread. It is part of this underfunded and undersupported radical spread
which forms the main object of investigation in what follows, that part that relinquishes present
state structures, in favour of more environmentally benign institutions - which no doubt can be
designed, even if not so readily brought into practical operation.19
In order to reach radical redesign ideas quickly, let us touch only lightly upon some of the
more distinctively green reasons for this anarchoid quest (familiar anarchist reasons stand: the
illegitimacy of present states, the undesirability and severe disutility of states, which typically
are highly destructive and corrosive institutions based on concentration of power, hierarchical
authority, massive coercion, manipulation by economic elites, technobureaucracy, utilitarian
rationality, and sundry other evils.20) As indicated, present states are incompatible with stock
ecologically sustainable practices, because of their heavy unrelenting commitments to shallow
economic growth. More generally, standard states and their practices comprise very significant
parts of environmental problems, but quite insufficient parts of any solutions. Moreover, states
constitute an enormous and destructive drain on regional environments, a feature particularly
evident in smaller states which are always looking out for revenue-raising expedients for their
own expensive running.
Apart from those greens who have recognised the excessive environmental costs of states
and their heavy demands on environments, and thus or otherwise have come to recognise the
desirability of their withering away, there are many more who have become ambivalent about
states, who appreciate their very problematic character and very questionable legitimacy, but do
not see yet how to get along altogether without them, or more exactly (to indicate thereby a
partial resolution) without certain functions that they serve. Indeed to point immediately
towards a resolution of this crucial problem, the functional dissolution idea advocated is this:
that the functioning parts may be separately utilized without the colossal whole. The state is not
18
This theme, that states are normally ecologically dysfunctional, is documented and argued in detail
elsewhere; see e.g. Carter and especially Sylvan 96. On the dismal environmental records of
particular states see Ponting. For shocking figures and illustrations as regards environmental
exploitation in third world states, see Bello, pp. 57-65.
19
Nonetheless practical revolutionary displacement of the state is not so remote, or difficult, as is
generally supposed.
20
To adapt a referee’s trenchant summary. For detail on some familiar anarchist reasons, see Burnheim
and above all Marshall.
�9
an organism the functioning parts of which must fail without the whole. So it may well be the
enormous fat of state can simply be shed, to great advantage.
In any event, ‘the State is a social institution’, always ‘within’, Marxists continue, ‘a
concrete historic setting’.21 Granted, it is an institution. For an institution in the relevant sense
is ‘a society or association for the organisation or promotion of some particular object or
function’.22 Institutions include therefore the state, the central state. So it too is up for
reshaping, radical slimming, and possible removal in a concrete historical setting, such as late
twentieth century Australia. Whittling away the state means in turn dismantling corporate
capitalism, which now dwells in symbiosis with the bureaucratic state, and also much else,
often environmentally undesirable, that the state affords a supportive framework for and enables
to flourish.
Ideas and schemes for radical redesign are already available from rich anarchist and
socialist sources, those for green design and reshaping from growing and diverse
environmental sources. In main part, then, radical ecoredesign is a matter of convivially
meeting (not joining) the two, an intersection that favours anarchist inputs. Something of the
sort has already been attempted, in an environmentally shallower way, in eco-anarchism, alias
social ecology, and in a deeper way, in deep-green social theory.23 Moreover, it could be
attempted in other kinds of deeper green theory—itself really a plurality of theories, which
however does not itself force radical ecoredesign, though most variants would support it. Thus
Naess's “deep ecology” for example, which is not so far politically radical, only strongly
reformist, could (and should) be given a radical turn.24
Concentrating upon the radical spread of deeper green theory does not preclude
concomitant reformist investigation and activity. Both sides of the green street should be
played. Reformist opportunities should of course be pursued—incremental change, social
engineering, “ecologizing” economics, greening bureaucrats, lobbying politicians, and like
activity (but better really to cut through much such pleading and obiesance and be rid of
politicians and bureaucrats). There are many reformist proposals being advanced for the
greening of Australian federal institutions—with but few so far having much impact on
21
Thus, Green p.61, who adds quite wrongly that Proudhon and his disciples do not see it that way
‘but as an abstraction and aberration’.
22
Adaptation of the Oxford English Dictionary. An institution is, so to say, an organitution.
23
On social ecology, see Bookchin 90, and for information on deep-green social theory, see Sylvan
and Bennett 94 and Routleys 80.
24
As to the political character of deep ecology, and why it should be turned, see Sylvan and Bennett
94, where an expose of the political theory of Naess's ecosophy is presented.
�practice.25 Nonetheless, more limited, more constrained, proposals of this sort certainly have a
better chance, within the prevailing paradigm, of making a difference than radical redesigns, too
smartly dismissed as “unrealistic” or “utopian”. No doubt the normal “reshaping institutions”
investigations are rightly focussed then upon institutional reform, not upon revolutionary
reshaping, where much freer scope for redesign is offered. However the real possibility of
radical change should not be excluded; green radicals should be prepared. There have been
various opportunities for revolutionary change in Australian history, the last occurring,
according to some historians, with the ignominious fall of the Whitlam government. There
may well be opportunities again both in the near and intermediate future, especially should some
solid work be put into propagating the prospect. In the near term there is economic disarray,
social fragmentation, and constitutional destabilization; in the longer term increasing ecological
problems and expanding eco-catastrophes loom.
Under present incremental reform and regression, for all the spasmodic environmental
rhetoric, comparatively little in the way of radical green change occurs or can be expected.
Witness, for comparison, the snail pace of the establishment movement towards a rather
minimal grey republicanism in Australia, or differently away from meeting carbon-reduction
commitments. It is increasingly doubtful, given prevailing responses to economic and other
difficulties, that present structural and systematic problems confronting Australia, for example,
will be satisfactorily addressed, environmental problems such as extensive and expanding land
and water degradation not least. Furthermore, under more incremental reform, the sorts of
problems concerning reorganising society in deeper green ways, problems that provide
subsequent topics, would likely not arise. So in getting beyond more muddling along, do
imagine fairly free scope for institutional eco-redesign is somehow dispensed. One nice
corollary is that once it is worked out where to go organisationally, it is much easier to ascertain
how to arrive there.
3. A basic problem of structure: central or decentralised organisation?
There are large and immediate advantages in pursuing a problem-oriented approach to
redesign. That approach, which will tend towards anarchoid outcomes, will be anarchistically
guided in this respect: Unless there is a genuine problem, already causing difficulties or
developing, nothing need be done; otherwise let things alone, let Being be.26 On this non
25
There are many many narrower economic and technological proposals. One of the more interesting
wider proposals comes from an Opposition not noted for its green initiatives and commitments, for
an overseeing Department of Sustainable Development, a Department that could see to the
greening of all federal institutions.
26
To echo also Heideggerian wisdom. The non-prejudicial term ‘anarchoid’ is deployed, not because
what emerges will not be anarchistic (as characterized in Marshall and in Sylvan 94), but because it
�11
managerial low-work approach a good deal of structure presently inoperational, and of idle
regulation presently enacted, can be removed; organisational arrangements can be very
significantly down-sized.
The leading methodological idea is that enough relevant
(biodegradable) structure is introduced to resolve organisational problems, but not substantially
more. Organisational oversupply and waste is thus avoided. Moreover, much structure that
keeps so much environmentally destructive industry in business is likewise shed.
Among basic problems for deeper green theory are those of political reorganisation and so
of organisation. Evidently institutions, and their types, are critical to such organisation. And a
major organisational problem for any putative green society concerns structure', to take a critical
case, whether society is centrally organised (concentrated, bureaucratised, hierarchical, large-
scale and so on) or decentralised (dispersed, non-hierarchical, small-scale and supposedly
beautiful, and so on).
This focal problem, to centralise or not to centralise, is sometimes presented as a serious
dilemma for concerned green theorists.27 The binary horns of this dilemma are respectively: on
the one hom, the pull (or push) to localisation and regionalisation, to non-anonymous smallscale low-impacting environmentally-friendly arrangements, to diffusion of power and
dismantling of the incubus of a central state with its crippling costs and unfriendly practices; and
on the other horn, the need for continuing and further central income generation and welfare
(re)distribution, central regulation and control, and the pressures to environmental reliance upon
and use of the central state.28
The dilemma has been trenchantly posed as follows:
... the demands of the Greens sometimes appear contradictory, in seeking increasing
environmental regulation and welfare measures... alongside a halt to industrial
expansion, the very source of income for the welfare state. Yet the expansion and
further centralization of the bureaucratic state apparatus is neither their overt goal nor
covert motivation. Quite the contrary. Their genuine long term vision is of a
decentralized, steady state society of self-sufficient, relationally autonomous (albeit
interlinked) regions.29
departs from standard forms of anarchism in significant respects, not least in planned political
organization. In this exercise organization is of the essence.
27
As by Jacobs of The Green Economy, who has posed the problem sharply, as part of an argument
however for retaining the central state (and much of present status quo arrangements).
28
Environmental reasons for favouring small-scale bioregional organisation are nicely gathered in
McLaughlin, chapter 10.
29
Unknown source.
�12
As it happens, not only does the theoretical and utopian literature run both ways, towards and
away from centralisation, but so does practice and experience. As to theory, anarchisticallyinclined presentations tend to favour decentralisation, perhaps with some central compensation
through federation (thus recent Blueprints, ecotopias, and so on), whereas socialisticallyinclined presentations invariably opt for powerful central states (to control and redistribute
grander social programs, etc.).
As to practice, there are local councils, community
organisations, residents' groups aiming to keep out, or to remove, the state-sponsored nuclear
plants, toxic waste incinerators, waste dumps or super-highways, on the one horn; and, on the
other, central states blocking, modifying, or regulating local or regionally promoted schemes
for large dams (e.g. Tasmania's Franklin), forest exploitation, pulp mills, strip mining, and so
on.30
To some extent, the way the problem has often been re-presented, in terms of a dilemma
between top-down and bottom-up structure and power transmission, already points towards a
theoretical resolution: namely, both, or rather enough of both. But how is this combination to
be achieved? An answer does not fall out by pure reason, operating in isolation from other
problems. By taking advantage of information gathered from other connected problems, a
promising answer can be teased out. Neither standard socialism nor anarchism afford answers,
socialism because it leaves the central institution of state intact. But standard anarchism, much
more promising, does not resolve the problem either, because federation, as usually explained,
does not leave enough structure; it may not even concede sufficient power to delegates to
constrain exploitative local communities.
A solution to such dilemma lies through a combinational strategy, which includes partial
dissolution of the central state, into its actual organisational functions in each region. While
removing the state, itself source of several environmental and social problems, and its
concentration of power, invariably under environmentally unfriendly control, functional
dissolution nonetheless retains its apparently essential services, including (where necessary)
those of environmental regulation. Relevant continent-wide functions would persist or be
introduced: for example, services controlling inflow into Australia of damaging forms and
materials such as toxic wastes and exotic pest species, or regulating outflow from Australia of
native wildlife and flora. In part, ecoregional functionalism offers a radical continuation of the
separation ofpowers of recent historical process, of church and state, legislature and executive,
and so forth. As these functions come to operate separately while remaining coordinated, so
would those functional arrangements and institutions dissolving the state.
30
Much turns on the exploitative character of certain local and regional communities, their get-richquick schemes, what they are prepared to do to survive in old or superficially affluent ways, and so
on.
�13
It is a major illusion of modem political theory that a central state, ceded monopolies on
coercion, currency, taxation and so on, is necessary in order to secure adequate supply of
public goods, including public order and environmental regulation. To the contrary, the most
that appears required, the most that arguments would support, is some network of specific
organisations functioning to look after specific kinds of goods and services, those necessary for
this or that, that are not otherwise supplied. There is no inherent reason why communities
should not institute and regulate specialised bodies coordinated among themselves (by
negotiations or, failing that, through recognised arbitrators) to ensure the adequate maintenance
or production of various types of public goods, including control of damaging crime. Each
such institution could gain community standing from its support base, for instance through
achieving democratically-generated recognition. Such an institution would aim to secure
execution of its recommendations and decisions by sanctions and like admissible means, and in
doing this it could mobilize in co-operation with communities and with other recognised
institutions.
There are many examples of such institutions operating successfully both
regionally and internationally; for instance, those for postal and communicational arrangements,
international sporting bodies, international academies and clubs, environmental and consumer
organizations.31
4.
Selecting satisfactory political arrangements within the span of anarchoid
options.
Anarchoid options come in a wide variety of forms, including, among others, both right
leaning individualistic or capitalistic varieties, and left-leaning social or communitarian
varieties.32 A suitably generous political pluralism will allow for all these forms, while not
encouraging all, as they are of very different merit. For example, some may be neglectful or
repressive of some of their inhabitants, or destructive of their environments; others, superior in
31
This passage borrows from the summary in Burnheim 86 p.221 of Burnheim 85. For much fuller
elaboration see Burnheim 85 and Sylvan 94.
The critical issue of funding administration, without a coercive taxation system, is also broached in
these places (and developed in Sylvan 96). The broad proposal is that low-cost administration,
much of which would be volunteer, could be funded by rents (there would be no property in land
and resources), use charges, and fines.
32
There are many more varieties of political systems than much recent theory has cared to concede.
For example, to take right-leaning dimensions, all of individualism, market-organization and
capitalism function substantially independently. There can be markets without capitalism
(characterised through opportunities to accumulate capital), and conversely, capitalism without free
market arrangements. And so on. Most historic and modern systems, upon which political theory
has tended inadmissibly to concentrate almost exclusively, are hybrid arrangements with mixes of
different elements drawn from both “left” and “right”.
�14
these socio-environmental regards, may not be. Dismantling or deconstructing a state does not,
on its own, make a sharp selection between alternatives. No doubt the hope is, what can be
striven for, that adequate designs are sought and adequate selections made, that inadmissible
forms rapidly perish. Those remaining forms that are admissible can be ranked; for instance,
they might be graded according to defeasible criteria based upon “pillars” of German green
movement such as environmental sensitivity, democratic institutions, and nonviolent practices.
While right-leaning anarchoid arrangements could work in theory (e.g. under what is
improbable, benevolent capitalism), they are unlikely to succeed in practice, for several reasons.
Consider, to illustrate in outline, why that much promoted rightist form, market (or “liberal”)
capitalism is unlikely to serve. For one reason, an intrusive state is likely to emerge, with state
controlled and state funded standing military and police forces, needed to defend capitalist
interests and accumulation, to protect private property, to uphold endemic social inequalities,
and to enforce particular market and trade structures, with a substantial and heavy taxation
system to fund these forces and a corresponding bureaucracy needed to administer and regulate
these and other institutions, such as those required to guarantee that capitalist liabilities are
strictly limited and to keep markets (far from self-regulating) unclogged, “free” and competitive.
Not only are anarchoid conditions thus violated, so are those for benign green societies. In
normal practice, market capitalism tends to be highly environmental exploitative, as modern
history demonstrates all too plainly (plainly too it is not alone in this propensity, so are other
modem statist systems). Furthermore, given the sorts of humans these systems tend to elevate,
and exalt, and the sorts of practices (including extravagant consumption for all that can afford it)
they encourage and sometimes even enforce, extensive exploitation is to be expected and liable
to persist. At least that is so without, what is thereupon required in a self-reinforcing spiral,
further state intervention to distort “natural” capitalistic incentives and institutions, to limit
practices on private property (thereby effectively altering the institution), to establish new
instruments and commodities such as pollution licences, green investments and futures, and so
forth.33 Even though a shallow greenness can also be sprayed upon parts of market capitalism
(factories in fields, forest reserves retained for tourists, and so on), and some green showcase
exhibits tacked on, environmental depth cannot. Shallowness is both an inevitable consequence
of the justifying socio-economic theory, and also an expected best outcome of practice.
Accordingly in institutional design it is much more promising to look in democratic left
leaning directions. For, as argued, it would be rash to gamble upon any bright new dawn of
environmentally and socially benign market capitalism, which in any event could easily revert
back towards dark industrial times. However, very similar arguments to those sketched could
33
Infiltrated, along with propaganda on behalf of such instruments, is much mythology, including
acclaimed environmental virtues of private property and privatization generally.
�15
be developed as regards centralised socialism, especially as untempered by democratic
procedures. While island communities of a wide range of varieties are naturally not excluded
under anarchoidal pluralism, brighter continental prospects lie through modifications of
democratic sociality, which appears to permit much of what is sought in design.
Under duly decentralized social organization, each requisite function would be carried out
by some association of agents comprising operative and support staff (that is, as regards bare
formal structure, more or less as now, in institutions like departments and corporations). For
direct accountability downwards, and also to ensure desirable separation and dilution of power,
upper operatives, those of a directing or steering committee (the nervous system of the
organisation), would be democratically selected (from a relevant lower level constituency, and
from the whole people of an ecoregion in case of a typical bottom level institution). Note well
that selection is not election: election is but one method of democratic selection, and often
enough not an altogether satisfactory method. The point of some sort of democratic selection,
as a guiding though not invariant rule, is manifold: it is in part to ensure due accountability, in
part to prevent unethical accumulation of power in special classes, and in part for reasons that
devolve from the very notion of democracy itself.
In brief, certain forms of democracy offer promising prospects for green reorganisation,
particularly within complementing left-leaning settings where those forms can function in
favour of sustainability. However even with an informed democracy in place, there are few
guarantees. Some structure, such as limited executive power separated from judicial and
administrative functions, needs to be set in place to block or retard worse eventualities (such as
mob actions, selection of tyrants, mistreatment of noncitizens and so on). Even then several
thorny problems remain for any deeper green political reorganization.
5.
Problems of chauvinism and present-time bias in democratic political
institutions.
In modem usage of the motherhood term democracy, two main lines are visible: included
are not only forms of political organisation where ‘power [is presumed to] reside in the people
as a whole, and is exercised either directly by them ... or by officers [selected] by them’, but
‘often more vaguely denoting a social state in which all have equal rights, without hereditary or
arbitrary differences of rank or privilege’34. It is on the basis of this second line that the call for
democracy has operated to remove chauvinism and discrimination of a range of forms: against
unpropertied minorities, nonconformists, women, blacks, tribals, and so on. Even so pursuit
34
Oxford English Dictionary entry 1, main entry. These two lines are by no means the only
distinctive lines now visible: increasingly conspicuous in calls for “democracy”, notably in Asia,
are calls to freedom and rights: not merely for basic legal freedoms such as free assembly, fair
process and so on, but for freedom to access information (the “right to know”).
�16
of the line, where successful, has not generally conferred adequate representation and rights on
several of these groups; but, more important, pursuit has stopped short in its inclusions at
certain humans, such as those granted citizenship—though relevant interests of many other
creatures and welfare of many of other items may be affected by what those citizens elect to do.
While democratic voters can perhaps be entrusted to take some account of those near and dear
(within remarkably sharp limits, as the situation of women in many regions still shows), such
as those deemed incompetent to vote: the young, deranged, and so on, much evidence reveals
that they cannot be relied for what is less near or dear (and indeed are easily herded into casting
their votes in accord with a shallow mercantilism). Consider what gets left out, outcasts of
even perfect democratic control:• spatially distant agents. For example, the interests of many humans outside USA are much
affected by practices of the US government, which however is outside their democratic reach.
• temporally distant agents. Since the past is past, it is future agents who would be affected,
often drastically affected, by present practices, that matter. Some way of taking due account of
future agents, their interests and welfare, is required, even under shallow long-term ecology,
that is under lighter green positions. Sustainable development has been regularly diverted
into—what is part of what it is about—such a way, an indirect and so far utterly ineffectual
way.
Much more of importance is also excluded according to deep-green theory:
• creatures with interests, other than present human citizens, and
• items with welfare, but perhaps lacking interests. The category includes items with intrinsic
value, whose value can be effected, made to fare worse or better.
A major problem, little addressed, is how to take due account of such democratically
excludeds. It is a problem especially for deeper green theories: that deep problem is, so to say,
how to obtain satisfactory representation of all that is of value in the natural world? That way of
putting it, while a little misleading, does point to a particular type of resolution.
Problems special to deep ecopolitical theory, include, that is, issues as to adequacy of
representation of items of value outside those humans that are represented, representation of
their interests, where they have them, of their welfare otherwise, of favourable conditions for
their sustenance, continuation and retention of value. Democracy of discussed modem sorts,
whether representative or participative, will not serve these purposes at all satisfactorily. For
instance, insofar as party-political representative democracies represent anything (even human
“bottom lines” as is sometimes erroneously supposed), they appear to represent primarily
interests of certain business-allied elites. Among the issues are of course those as to adequacy
of retention and protection of nonhuman items of intrinsic value, tropical forests and their
inhabitants and elements for instance.
�17
As observed, there is really no organisational alternative to proceeding with and through
agents, preferably well-disposed and quality agents. It is hard to guarantee either politically.
As agents are but a subclass of what requires democratic representation and what should have
its welfare or interests considered, how are the rest to be taken care of satisfactorily? There are
significant older responses to like problems, through totems and taboos, guardians and
constraints. Looked at one way the problem repeats, more or less, a familiar problem: namely,
how in larger constituencies do decision-making agents represent the whole mass of agents and
others in the constituency? A main democratic answer, designed to avoid many shortcomings
of alternatives, was: by representative means—only “representation” was almost never taken
seriously or literally enough. The sorts of considerations that made representation a promising
resolution make what is to be proposed—where representation has, in any case, to be expanded
—also promising. A key principle is this: all relevant items are to be represented. Relevance
criteria enter importantly. Steering committees of lower level institutions among the main
decision-making bodies should be appropriately representative of all items whose welfare is
affected by their decisions (principle of deepened demanarchy).
Under more equitable
arrangements, then, some decision-engaged agents will have to be selected as representative of
relevant classes of excludeds. Electoral arrangements do not so readily allow for such;
sortition, well-designed selection by lot, does.35 Of course, however good the selection
processes, however disinterested and well-intentioned the agents selected, some bias may
remain. Nonetheless prejudice and maltreatment can be much reduced.
As already hinted, deepened representation is not the only promising resolution of the
present problem that might be tried. Another, which could be attempted either separately or
concurrently, operates through the directive of ecologically sustainable development, requiring
as a constraint, not only intergenerational equity but also preservation of items of ecological
value.36 It might be suggested that such a directive be made mandatory, applying to all relevant
steering committees. But, as already evident, there are severe obstacles to getting such a
directive properly implemented. (In prevailing oligarchical circumstances, even very dilute
versions are worth pressing for however, as they would offer definite improvements upon what
presently happens.)
6.
A fundamental dilemma for deeper green organization: democratic or
authoritarian procedures?
35
No doubt there are electoral approximations; e.g. candidates in separate classes for each category to
be represented.
36
For elaboration of this option, see Sylvan and Bennett 94 and its sequel.
�18
There is strictly no logical space for a deeper green democracy, according to Saward for
one. For there is a clash, an essential tension, between democratic procedures and deeper green
values and commitments, notably to intrinsic values in nature. The main drift of the argument is
that green values, which are mandatory for deeper greens, require for their implementation anti
democratic, indeed authoritarian procedures; otherwise they cannot be guaranteed.
This nasty conundrum for green theory over democracy, which the theory typically
sponsors, is put in
sharper form as follows:37
Democracy concerns procedures,
environmentalism certain outcomes. What guarantee can there be that the procedures will
deliver the outcomes? What guarantee that democracy would yield a way of protecting
environments?
However the type of situation is worse than a matter of guarantees, which greens are not
really seeking and could not in general expect. (For here as almost everywhere else, things can
go wrong. Anarchism especially supplies few absolutes and little certainty.) It is a type of
situation, moreover, which effects not only environmentalism but any sort of social and other
amelioration, and even democracy itself. For democratic procedures may yield unsatisfactory
and even anti-democratic outcomes.
Unfortunately there are few or no guarantees that
meritorious forms will eventuate or persist. Political history itself copiously illustrates that.
But it can be argued theoretically. For example, succession of regimes must occur (owing to
finite lifetimes of power-holders, etc.), and in successional transitions deterioration can occur;
nor are there effective mechanisms that can exclude decline absolutely. Democratic procedures
of certain sorts offer better controls, and better prospects of satisfactory transition than most
others available, but even they afford no cast-iron guarantees of adequacy, and they are beset by
paradoxes of their own. With inadequate democratic structures plausible scenarios are easily
designed where just such outcomes occur, for instance as in what has been called a “paradox of
democracy” where a constituency elects an anti-democratic tyrant.38
A concerned attempt is made by Saward to mount a destructive version of such a paradox
against deep-green political theory (which he darkly calls ‘dark green’). The version is based
upon holism and intrinsic value requirements, coupled with democratic demands, of deeper
green theory. In clearest form, the version runs as follows: Holism implies consistency or
compatibility. But intrinsic value maintenance and democracy are not compatible, under evident
conditions (e.g. democratic procedures result in diminution or destruction of intrinsic value).
Firstly, partial confirmation for this explication:
37
Goodin, condensing Saward, p. 168.
38
Such paradoxes of democracy, and variants thereupon, are presented trenchantly by Popper, and
presumed nullified in Sylvan and Bennett 90. Improved structures can undoubtedly much reduce the
likelihood and problematicness of paradoxical overthrows.
�19
[The green imperative] usually contains a number of elements, variously
economic, political, social, geographical, religious, and so on. Its force
comes partly from the holism it embodies, and partly from its basis in the idea
of the ‘intrinsic value’ of nature. Holism implies that the various elements
which make up the imperative are compatible. The elements of the imperative
gain their importance, and their links with each other, by being referable back
to a common, intrinsic value of nature. It is at this point that we can pick up
the position of democracy or ‘direct democracy’ in lists of basic values set out
by greens. [These goals are the elements of the overall green imperative, and
gain their importance from both the holistic nature and intrinsic merit of the
values which the imperative represents]39
*
As should now be plain, and is becoming plainer, consistency is not an invariant desideratum,
and not to be insisted upon; coherence is what is “implied” and what supersedes consistency.40
As more than a century of Hegelian theory should have revealed, there can be inconsistent
wholes.
A further key assumption in the argument is that guaranteeing that intrinsic value is
protected (or like absolutes sustained) will require undemocratic procedures, such as
authoritarian ones.
An underlying assumption (soon to be rejected, for instance as
incorporating an offensive false dichotomy) is that only undemocratic, authoritarian procedures
fit with deeper green imperatives or givens.41 Several illustrations are offered of inconsistency
of green imperatives with types of democratic procedures—none of which tell, without testing
adaptation, specifically against deeper green positions.
A first illustration is directed against Porritt:
A direct democratic procedure (is not) compatible with imperative goals like
‘local production for local need’, ‘low consumption’, ‘labour-intensive
production’, and ‘voluntary simplicity’ (other items from Porritt’s list).42
Against this and other illustrations, it is worth emphasizing goals resemble objectives and
targets; goals are goals which are not mandatory and by no means always achieved, especially if
the achievers, like present humans, fall short (e.g. in ecological sensitivity) or their
organisational means and opportunities are inadequate. Observe too the oppositional attempt to
convert or to twist (since it is an up-grading by high redefinition) goals and programs and
principles—through ‘imperative goals’ and the like—into ‘imperatives’, ‘prescribed outcomes’,
undeniable principles, ultimates. That attempt should be resisted.
A second example looks at an alleged
39
G. Saward, p.65; square bracketed sections are taken from an earlier circulated version of this
article.
40
See Priest and others.
41
G. Saward, p.63
42
Saward, p.66.
�20
contradiction in the programme of the German Green Party. ‘Grassroots
democracy’ is one of the four ‘basic principles’ of the party’s ‘global
conception’. Another is the ‘ecological’: ‘Proceeding from the laws of nature,
and especially from the knowledge that unlimited growth is impossible in a
limited system, and ecological policy means understanding ourselves and our
environment as part of nature’. In effect, this means that certain outcomes are
proscribed from decision-making procedures. Such proscribed outcomes
must surely go well beyond any plausible list of outcomes which must be
proscribed in the interests of defending a direct democratic decision
procedure. Therefore, there is a clear contradiction between elements of the
value-set, whereas given the holism the green imperative is based on we
would have the right to expect these goals and values to be thoroughly
compatible.43
The last charge repeats the critical point already rejected, that holism implies consistency. A
further critical point should also be rejected: the flawed inference that ‘certain outcomes are
proscribed’. A political party in a democratic system has to be prepared to see its principles,
however spendid, overridden, certainly by other parties if they gain or hold political power.
There is a misconception too about principles (especially higher level principles) and their roles:
‘principles [too] can only be akin to [givens and] “laws of nature”, against which democratic
procedures must inevitably be traded off the board’. Sets of principles, which may themselves
turn out to be inconsistent, are hardly akin to natural laws; consider for instance reasons for
their revision, procedures for rechecking and revision, and so on. In any case, democratic
procedures are not traded away against laws of nature, which they may try to upset or suppress.
(Rather effort should be directed at informing the electorate and the like.)
To reinforce his case, Saward appeals to other authors who have advanced similar claims
(it is like appealing for confirmation of a newspaper report to other newspapers).
Boris Frankel accuses Rudolf Bahro of an ‘anti-democratic ’ vision of an
ecological society, given that politics as conflict will have no place in a sea of
‘givens’. He sees the dilemma as being similar to that of socialists—deeming
certain things as desirable in an ultimate sense, but proclaiming attachment to
democracy and the diversity it implies. Ophuls has stated the matter especially
clearly. The basic question about politics, he writes, is ‘Is the way we
organize our communal life and rule ourselves compatible with ecological
imperatives and other natural laws? ... how we run our lives will be
increasingly determined by ecological imperatives’44
In an ecological society, enough of the demos (members of democratic constituency) will hold
ecological attitudes and vote or select accordingly, almost by definition. Problems of effecting
change lie with unecological communities, which may not support ecological principles under
instituted democratic procedures (as presently in many places). Principles, and ecological
“givens”, stand, they remain ‘desirable in an ultimate sense’, but they are not followed and
43
Saward, p.66.
44
Saward, p.67. Note that only a very streamlined version of Saward’s case is being presented.
�21
implemented, while revealed democratic preferences go unchanged. There need be no ‘anti
democratic vision’, but rather an unecological praxis, which principled greens will work to
change.
The route is accordingly barred to Say ward’s
important conclusions...: that at best direct democracy[, and for that matter
indirect forms of democracy,] can only be at or near the bottom of value-lists
of greens. A commitment to democracy must clash with core green values
which, if taken on board, limit the range of acceptable policy outcomes
beyond these self-binding constraints that democracy logically requires.45
What Saward proposes instead is depressingly familiar: pragmatism, jettison intrinsic value.
Out therewith go deep-green positions.
... greens should not think in terms of overriding principles or [green]
imperatives. Indeed, it suggests that to think in terms of imperatives based on
arguments about intrinsic merit is unjustifiable.46
Fortunately the argument developed does not sustain the proposals. There is, to iterate a
central point, no internal or latent contradiction between (deep-)green policy objectives and
democratic procedures. Rather, green objectives would fail to be achieved without well-
disposed decision makers, who may not straightforwardly reflect any “will” of the demos. A
logical requirement on a realistic set of political objectives is that there are accessible
circumstances where they are realisable, where all elements of the whole would obtain. It
should not be required that there are are no situations where they may conflict, become
inconsistent.
It is certainly not required that they are realised, by whatever means.
A
community, as variously represented, can choose better or worse. There are many means
available, which it may shun (again there are no absolute guarantees), enabling it to choose
better, including improved structures, attitudinal change and consciousness raising, and so on.
In the end Saward too recognises the popular power of attitudinal change, thereby
himself removing his previous imposition of authoritarian means upon greens. There
45
Saward, p.68. The lead-in to Saward’s proposal was clearer in the earlier circulated version, which
ended in more precise (and dubious) form:
A commitment to democracy must clash with values that are inherent to
ecologism—and ecologism is about inherency, intrinsic values, laws of nature and
holism. Things—like democracy—that can only have instrumental value must lose
out to imperatives backed by inescapable canonical force.
46
Saward, p.75. Of course it is now put in terms of “imperatives”; it would be better expressed
simply in terms of (what did not figure in the earlier version) principles, policy objectives or the
like.
Opposition to deeper green political approaches often derives, as in Saward and in Goodin, from a
underlying shallow utilitarianism. The differences concern not only depth; they also concern the
rejection of individual interest bases, in favour of welfare bases and holism of deeper approaches.
�22
*
needs, from a green perspective [and others], to be a change in political
culture such that it will be compatible with sustainability. This, of course, is a
familiar theme from green writing. How[?] ... It can only be the case that
‘political change will ony occur once people think differently or, more
particularly, that sustainable living must be prefaced by sustainable thinking’.
By abandoning foundationalist myths of intrinsic merit, greens abandon the
implicit arrogance that have made democracy such a tenuous part of green
political theory.47
But he overstates the attitudinal point, with ‘only...the case’. People can be politically led
(retardation, however, as distinct from genuine advancement, is more familiar); they could just
elect a green government which instituted, under permissible democratic methods, sustainable
living or the like. Worse still, his final ungrammatical sentence is a complete non-sequitur.
Attitudinal change may include coming to appreciate intrinsic merit in natural things other than
humans, and seeing through pragmatic utilitarianism.
7. Ecoregional demanarchoid reshaping of Australian political institutions: one
beginning.
Is such a radical restructuring as that suggested feasible? Initial investigations hold out
the hope that major problems for deeper green theory can be solved, at least in theory.
Investigations accordingly suggest that the project within the Reshaping Australian Institutions
project is viable and worth pursuing. A logical next stage offers sketches for a radical political
reorganisation of Australia.48 Evidently there would be many designs (thereby removing facile
jeers against “the blueprint”, a part of co-optative strategy for persistence with prevailing statist
arrangements). Among the many designs, some few, conforming to favoured principles,
would be selected for detailed study. If the study were attempted, most appropriately through
systems modellings, then flexibility could be built into modellings, so that even though only a
few basic designs were examined, many variations would be feasible. Not only .is systems
modelling particularly well suited to modelling network designs; it also further offers prospects
for computing simulation and implementation, and even some simulated political
experimentation. Furthermore, such modellings begin to give some grasp on the size and
47
Saward, p.77. There are further defects in this passage than those noted in the text. For one,
admission of intrinsic merit does not entail foundationalism. For another, such recognition of
merit—which is less liable to disturb democracy, or render it tenuous, than adherence to
Christianity—need carry no tinges of arrogance; to the contrary, by contrast with humanism it may
yield a certain humbleness.
48
Such design, well accomplished, would help considerably in revealing what is possible, thereby
providing a seriously neglected contribution to politics, itself sometimes presented, with undue
licence, as the art of the possible.
�23
complexity of the task (a useful comparison is with World 3 modelling of the on-going “Limits
to Growth” project49, or, better, with a regionalized version of it).
To get started on such ecoregional design, for Australia, two broad classifications and
associated maps and charts are required:
• 1. an ecoregional classification, with partitions and overlays, for Australia and its continental
shelf. Observe that this classification would be hierarchical, as smaller regions merge into
larger regions; but it is a benign hierarchy of levels (it facilitates no accumulation of power or
wealth). Observe too that any such classification is far from unique. Plurality has already set
in, and a choice of classification (or a few choices) would have to be made, taking due account
of political organisational principles and objectives. Fortunately some of the preliminary
classificatory work has already been accomplished in Environmental Regionalisations of
Australia, where 3 broad classifications are presented and procedures for generating many more
given.50 For political purposes further classification attributes (e.g. demographic features) need
to be included.
Ecoregions provide the basis for spatially linked administrative and community units.
(Not all units need be of this sort; many contemporary arrangements are spatially unlinked). At
this stage a basic principle of decentralization and distributed and smaller-scale organization can
be invoked, namely
• subsidiarization: organisational functions should be allowed to fall down to (or to be pushed
down to) the lowest level compatible with their satisfactory performance. Thus, for instance,
most matters concerning such things as sewerage and primary education would be localized.
This subsidiarization principle, drawn from classical anarchism, has been widely adopted in
green planning proposals.
(It is said to have been applied by the Catholic Church in
administration of the Holy Roman Empire, whence the not altogether apt title derives. It is
presently being reassessed for use in that successor organisation, united Europe.) No doubt the
principle is open to challenge, for instance on grounds of efficiency, that larger size may prove
more efficient, of duplication, and so on.
But, the objective is not maximization of
technological values such as efficiency factors; instead it aims to satisize on a wider framework
of values, including holistic social arrangements. Presumably, however, undue duplication of
expensive administrative bodies is to be avoided.
Coupled with subsidiarization is another principle,
• direct accountability downwards: units should answer directly to regional constituencies. This
49
See e.g. Meadows.
50
See Thackway and Cresswell. Rudiments of a politically useful classification begin to emerge on
their 30 Group Regionalisation.
�*
24
.contrasts with prevailing accountability (such as it is) upwards, through some indirect and
tenuous, centralized circuiting chain.
Naturally much more gets comprehended under
accountability, for instance openness of environmental accounting.
There are also principles interrelating smaller with larger regions, both bottom-up and topdown (or centre-down) principles. Among these will be
• representation of smaller regions in relevant planning institutions of more comprehensive
regions. Representation, appropriately regulated, would often replace anarchistic federation,
which as observed appears too weak for requisite environmental control.
The point needs no labouring that the classifications and principles are open to challenge
at every step; for instance, there is nothing rock-hard about the type of ecoregional classification
preferred, nor about social functions to be addressed.
At a theoretical stage that is
unproblematic: there are other (less preferable) models; elaborate your own if you want to and
can. In any case, it is to be hoped that a diversity in theory might be to some extent reflected in
some diversity in practice—with different regions and continents trying different arrangements,
with much less of the sort of cosmopolitan political monoculture that we are presently being
harassed toward, with much more resilient political biodiversity. Of course, not all political
forms (including stateless types) are equally desirable or satisfactory, and some (including
present state examples) are unacceptable. So there are bounds upon diversity. Moreover, what
suits one community or region well may not suit another to be satisfactory for it. So too there
are limits upon successful transfer of organisational structure; what works in one region may
require much modification in another, or may substantially resist transfer.
• 2 a social function classification, of those community matters that require explicit organisation
at some level. An initial listing can be compiled by consulting Australian metropolitan telephone
directories, especially the government sections that used to feature in the front (until a year ago).
What results under redesign and reorganisation would, of course, look very different from what
is listed. Parliaments, parties and all their supporting apparatus would vanish; the Australian
Bureau of Statistics will assume a new significance and independent role, and so on. But
which institutions are retained, which adapted, and so on, would depend on further social
organisational features, not yet considered here. The result would be a levelled pyramidal
structure, a flat-untopped network as depicted in the structural diagram below, not a power
hierarchy.
�25
Structural diagram: a schematic depiction of organisational structure
(with some sample components indicated, but not all their network interlinkages displayed).
statistics
bureau
upper levels:
administrative,
executive,
research
ground level:
functional
selectoral
college
Australian
region
(federal)
immigration
control of
materials
inflow
super
regions
(a to k)
interregional
transport
(local)
regions
(1 to n)
arbitration
bureau
upper
levels
rental
entitlements
office
resources
income
office
ground
level
water
systems
sewer
systems
hospital
systems
region 1
region n
While some requisite research has been undertaken upon how the various functional
bodies and decision-making committees can be selected and can operate51, insufficient
investigation has been made of the interrelations and adequate funding of the bodies and
institutions involved — whichever they are! For little such detailed anarchoid modelling has
apparently been attempted for any region anywhere. Evidently there is much to be done
51
Thus e.g. Burnheim 85. The present article is not only heavily indebted to Burnheim's work, but
overlaps on-going investigations on his part.
�26
theoretically. Detailed modellings could bring issues down to earth, without setting things in
concrete; no doubt too they would disclose many further problems hidden in the detailing,
problems to which anarchoid solutions can however reasonably be expected.
Nonetheless comparatively little is likely to be done, unless requisite support is
forthcoming, support in the shape of researchers (research volunteers and students) and
research infrastructure (from research gifts, donations and the like). For such support, support
for investigating its own demise, a state is hardly likely knowingly to supply; nor are its
established research institutions. Insofar then as it is done visibly, it will probably have to be
accomplished largely outside state-supported and state-supporting infrastructure, such as
prominent university projects (like Reshaping Australian Institutions). Fortunately there are
now other structures, such as internet and radio communicational channels, that can facilitate
interconnections and interchanges of researchers, both regionally and internationally. On these
sorts of anarchoid communicational bases, networks of groups interested in elaborating such
alternative political modellings, both in theory and in practice, could be formed. Given the
dismal state of present political arrangements, almost everywhere terrestial, there is a great
need, as a very minimum, for networks of innovative researchers who share such goals.52
Richard Sylvan
References.
Bello, W., Dark Victory, Pluto Press, London, 1994.
Bookchin, M., Remaking Society: Pathways to a Green Future, South End Press,
Boston, 1990.
Burnheim, J., Is Democracy Possible?, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1985.
Burnheim, J., ‘Democracy, nation states and the world system’, New Forms of
Democracy, (ed. D. Held and C. Pollitt) London, Sage, 1986, pp.218-239.
Carter, A., ‘Towards a green political theory’, in The Politics of Nature. Explorations
in green political theory (ed. A. Dobson and P. Lucardie), Routledge, London, 1993,
pp.39-62.
Goodin, R., Green Political Theory, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1992.
Green, G., The New Radicalism: Anarchist or Marxist?, International Publishers, New
York, 1971.
52
To echo one referee. My sincere thanks to demanding referees for several helpful suggestions and
many improvements.
�27
Jacobs, M., The Green Economy: environment, sustainable development, and the
politics of the future., Pluto Press, Concord, Mass, 1991.
Mackay, H., Reinventing Australia: the mind and mood of Australia in the 90s,
Hugh Mackay, Pymble, NSW, Angus & Robertson, 1993.
Macphee, I., A new constitution?’ (excerpts from an opening address) NILEFA Newsletter,
Griffith University School of Law, June 1993.
Marshall, P., Demanding the Impossible: a history of anarchism, London, Harper
Collins 1992.
Me Laughlin, A., Regarding Nature, SUNY Press, Albany NY., 1993.
Meadows D., and others, Beyond the Limits, Chesley Green, Vermont, 1992.
Naess, A., Ecology, community and lifestyle (trans, and ed. D. Rothenberg),
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1989.
Ponting, C., A Green History of the World, Sinclair-Stevenson, London, 1991.
Priest, G., Routley, R. and Norman, J. (eds), Paraconsistent Logic, Philosophia Verlag,
Munich, 1989.
Routley, V. and R., ‘Social theories, self management and environmental problems’, in
Environmental Philosophy (ed. D Mannison and others), RSSS, Australian National
University, 1980.
Saward, M., ‘Green Democracy’, in The Politics of Nature: Explorations in green
political theory (ed. A. Dobson and P. Lucardie) Routledge, London, 1993 pp. 63-80.
Sylvan, R. and Bennett, D., Utopias, Tao and Deep Ecology, Green Series , RSSS,
Australian National University, 1990.
Sylvan, R. and Bennett, D., The Greening of Ethics, White Horse Press, Cambridge,
1994.
Sylvan, R., ‘Anarchism’, in Contemporary Political Theory (ed. R. Goodin and P.Pettit)
Blackwell, Oxford, 1993.
Sylvan, R., Green Anarchism, to appear, 1996.
Thackway, R. and Cresswell, I.D., Environmental Regionalisations of Australia,
Environmental Resources Information Network, Australian National Parks and Wildlife
Service, 1992.
Tynan, L., The Institute of Advanced Studies, The Australian National University, May
1993.
�
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29.5.95
PROBLEMS IN DEEPER GREEN
POLITICAL ORGANIZATION:
an Australian perspective on radical institutional change.
... people are ready for change and the impending debate will result in
constitutional change. We should, therefore, explore all options ... J
As elsewhere, there is growing dissatisfaction with Australia's political institutions, and
increasing demand to change them. This demand, hiding co-optative elements, has been
initiated and fostered in a conspicuously top-down fashion, by politicians and by academics.
There is so far little surge of political enterprise at grass-roots levels, little pressure for the
usually very limited changes proposed. Nonetheless, along with apathy, there is widespread
popular disenchantment with present political arrangements. There is now an opportunity
(although still only a small window no doubt) to put green and radical themes on the agenda for
real political change in Australia. That opportunity should not be missed, within Australia, or
elsewhere. While the exposition that follows concentrates upon Australia, as a convenient
advanced example, much of what is argued and urged applies or adapts elsewhere.
1. Disenchantment with politics, and political proposals for change.
There is now evident in Australia, what is variously described as disillusionment and
anxiety, cynicism and pessimism about the state of politics—a loss of confidence in it, and a
retreat from commitment. As much and more, Mackay has nicely exposed in a survey of the
Australian situation:
anxiety about the nature and quality of Australian politics [has] increased. ...
Widespread anxiety about the state of politics is based [in part] on an uneasy feeling
that, if the parties are not going to stand for some identifiable philosophy, and the
leaders are going to be chosen on the basis of their potential as television performers
or even as head-kickers, then the only appropriate response is cynicism.
That cynicism is reflected in a turning away from support for the major parties ... and
revealed in the attitudes of young Australians ...12
who often cannot be bothered registering to vote, or voting (though voting is legally
compulsory).
1
Hon. Ian Macphee, ‘A new constitution?’. Of course Macphee did not really mean all options, nor
even all constitutional options. Furthermore, his claim about preparedness of people for change is
incompatible with Mackey’s data (mentioned below) on exhaustion with change.
2
Mackay pp. 174-177. For all the Australian casualness of Mackay's presentation, his sociological
findings are nonetheless fairly solidly survey and interview based (if occasionally stretching the
data). Main findings are replicated by other sociologists.
2
♦>
Lack of confidence is beginning to show not only as cynicism about politicians, but
also as doubt about the integrity of Australia's political institutions.3
In a recent survey, ‘62 percent of [Australians] expressed either little or no confidence in the
political system. Such a figure accurately reflects the mood of the Australian community’.4
Australian loss offaith in conventional politics is attributed to a mix of factors. A first
explanatory factor as regards this disenchantment comes from the changes in politics already
remarked (ranging from policy issues to media performers) and from resultant uncertainty. ‘...
the Australian electorate is confused about which party stands for what, and about whether any
party has a long-term commitment to any particular point of view’ .5
A complex ‘second factor ... concerns the adversarial nature of two-party politics’.6
How can this ‘two party, adversarial approach ... continue to be appropriate when the
distinctions between the two parties themselves are so hard to define’? But ‘redefinition of
party politics implies the possibility of a redefinition of the whole parliamentary process itself’.
Why ‘when parties seem quite capable of stealing each other's policies or of invading each
other's traditional philosophical territory, [can not] politicians work together in a more co
operative and harmonious spirit’?7 ‘Adversarial politics may have made sense ... when ...
distinctions between the parties were stark and when arguments about principle could be
justified; today, the idea that politicians would be arguing over a point of principle or
philosophy is almost unthinkable.... [They] are much more likely to be arguing over matters of
personality, prejudice and power than over issues which effect the long-term health of the body
politic’.8
‘The quality of parliamentary debate is regarded not only as a symptom of the
adversarial nature of the institution, but also as a symptom either of the poor quality of
politicians ..., or of the effect of the system on those who are enmeshed in it’.9 Unless there is
3
Ibid, p.178
4
Ibid. The figure is the more surprising inasmuch as such disillusioning factors as corruption and
graft are not features of overt political life in Austral-asia by comparison with elsewhere in the
hemispherical region.
5
Ibid. pp. 178-179.
6
Ibid. The adversarial character of dominant State legal systems is also becoming subject to more
and more criticism. It appears likely that significant movement towards different inquiratorial
systems will occur, not least because of the huge expense and growing unaffordability of
adversarial systems.
7
Ibid.
8
Ibid, p.180.
9
Ibid, p.179. It is a symptom of both, the latter especially.
3
marked improvement in party philosophies, programs and performance, ‘the call to re-examine
the nature of the parliamentary process will gather momentum’.1011
A third relevant factor contributing to loss of faith is the impression of Australians that
‘they are overgoverned ’H, with too many expensive bureaucracies and too many houses of
parliament.
Conflicts between State and Federal parliaments — and between the various State
parliaments themselves — are regarded as a particularly unproductive expenditure of
political energy, and Australians question whether 15 houses of parliament may be
too many for the efficient government of 18 million people. The sheer number of
parliaments is often blamed for the problem of too many bureaucracies and for many
duplications of bureaucratic and political activity between State and Federal
governments.
... Whilst there is little love felt in the Australian community for Canberra and for the
idea of more centralised government even that is beginning to appear preferable ....
The widespread support for the idea of a republic which emerged during 1992 is
closely related to the underlying sense that Australia is overdue for some kind of
reexamination of its political institutions, and even the notion of Federation itself. ...
As debate about the idea of a republic proceeds ... it has begun to incorporate the idea
that Australian's political structures and systems might be quite significantly
reformed.12
Such disaffection reflects too a growing awareness that Australia’s political arrangements
owe more to historical accident than to rational design. Even though the main proposals for
change no doubt remain reformist in character and could lead in unfortunate directions, some of
them are far-reaching by normal standards. Both the extensive disenchantment with present
political arrangements and the felt need for significant change further suggest political times are
not altogether normal. Elements underpinning a political paradigm shift are already present, as
are features supporting rational redesign, to which radical additions are now feasible.
So far there have been, along with normal inertial resistance to change, two main
responses to growing pressure for change: political, from politicians, ex-politicians and political
commentators, and academic from intellectuals, academic entrepreneurs and academic
journalists. By and large, political responses have been grander, more sweeping and vaguer;
10
Ibid, p.181.
11
Ibid, p.181, itals added. The problem has now surfaced strikingly in the heavily indebted
Australian Capital Territory (“toy town” as its is facetiously called locally) which is swamped by
bureaucracy, where it has been discovered that there is one expensive bureaucrat for every fifteen
persons.
12
Ibid. p. 181-2. Republican proposals have been circulating for some time. But the cause was
finally taken up by prominent politicians, who made it their own, after which it became a popular
issue. Mackay's accurate presentation of popular support for political change contrasts drolly with
the first part of his book which depicts an Australian populace exhausted by change and longing for
the old ease and somnolence.
4
academic responses more theoretical and cautious, piecemeal and detailed. But there are no
grand detailed plans.
Under the leading proposal so far for political change, Australia's constitutional
monarchy will be displaced by a constitutional republic with its own head of state displacing the
monarch, but with perhaps minimal adjustments otherwise.
Nonetheless, as a result,
republicanism is in the air. Politicians have begun to contemplate other practical reforms, while
academics have begun to embroider theories around republicanism and institutional reform.
What happens to the Australian federation of states is one of the many unresolved issues
presently being debated.
The main reason for reform offered by the political camp can be summed up simply as
changing geopolitical circumstances. The camp tends not to acknowledge what would reflect
adversely upon it, the poorness of federal political practice. Rather it tends to attribute popular
dissatisfaction to economic circumstances and uncertainties: declining real standards of living,
extensive unemployment, persistent recession until recently, problems to be surmounted by
full-steam ahead untrammelled economic growth, to be attained by recoupling Australia to the
Asian economic express. Meanwhile an orchestrated republican movement can help divert
popular political attention from poor political management and a gloomy economic predicament.
Much has changed in the century since present antiquated political arrangements were
hammered out, arrangements making the newly-fashioned Commonwealth of Australia,
politically a federation of states, into a constitutional monarchy coupled to Britain, arrangements
of convenience fashioned for very different circumstances. Most non-symbolic linkages with
Britain, which has been inching towards a place in a united Europe, have already been severed.
Australia has gradually begun to appreciate its geo-political position in the Indian-Pacific region
(and the money-making opportunities for a sagging resource-based economy in allegedly
booming parts of Asia). Whence the main idealistic proposal: for an independent republic,
decoupled from Europe, assuming its own (prominent) place in its geo-political regions. In
principle at least, place and region begin to assume, or resume, some of their neglected, but
historic, significance (however that is not how it is yet seen).
Most proposals for constitutional and federal reform fit within that limited idealistic
conception. One important proposal, advanced by established political players, their most
radical proposal so far, includes abolition of the present states. Such a proposal would clearly
represent a welcome step in anarchist directions, were it not regularly offset by the idea of a
strengthened central state.13 Supposing this latter unfortunate idea is bracketed for the moment,
13
Anarchists can even rest (if uneasily) with a constitution, so long as it provides for an
organisation, Australia Inc. even, sufficiently different from a state and its authoritarian trappings.
5
♦>
then what is being seriously considered already starts to look like a much more rational
regionalism than what presently prevails.
The present states of Australia are undoubtedly an anachronism, based on accidental
boundaries of a contingent colonial history. They are ecologically irrational management units,
utterly failing to reflect ecological regions. Yet the states possess extensive environmental and
other management powers, inappropriate ‘powers which derive from what was largely a
political bargaining process conducted a century ago.’ Another effect of inapposite state-federal
arrangements, especially ‘funding arrangements, has been to lock out local government and,
more importantly, local communities. ... local communities must be given greater control over
those decisions of government which effect their lives ...’; the opportunity ‘to design and
provide the services which are needed locally.’14
At this stage of the dialectic McPhee slides easily and naturally from localism to
regionalism.
A glance at the map reveals natural regions for local government on a viable scale [an
optimistic contention]. Some cross State boundaries, and I would envisage that State
governments would be replaced with regional governments. These would be more
akin to larger local governments and would certainly not have the trappings of the
States. They should not have parliaments and the expensive, unwieldy and inefficient
bureaucracies which characterise our States. They should have a small number of
full-time councillors ... Regional governments should be solely accountable to their
ratepayers ...15 .
So far so good: however McPhee thereupon begins to infiltrate stock (small Z) liberal
management assumptions. Nonetheless the basic idea to retain is simple: that of ecologicallyrational local and regional rearrangement of anachronistic state partitions.
regionalization should be greened, as reform should be radicalized.
But that
More generally,
opportunites now present themselves to insert more radical ideas throughout the debate about
Australia’s future directions.
For much has been left off political agendas for change, not merely environments and
habitats of their less prominent or noisy inhabitants, but also such issues as rights and liberties,
transformation of antiquated legal and executive frameworks, and so on. Omission of (human)
rights is especially remarkable in states such as Australia, whose constitutions astonishingly do
not mention at all (what is however often supposed to justify states) individual rights, such
rights only being ensured, so far as they are, assumptions from uncodified common law, by
14
All quotes in this paragraph are drawn from McPhee. An address along similar lines to the Hon.
Ian McPhee, also proposing abolition of the states, was delivered by the former Prime Minister
R.G. Hawke. Hawke's speech, by contrast with McPhee's, attracted much media attention, and
though facilely dismissed as “unrealistic” by some practicing politicians, appeared to gain a good
deal of support.
15
McPhee ibid.
6
indirect routes (statutes regarding treatment of minorities and the like). Nor do the political
camps pushing limited change speak of rights or liberties; a very limited conception of
adjustments required prevails (though without rights and liberties and a generous public sphere
there is little, and little prospect of, justification for a state at all). Accordingly political agendas
for change need to be conspicuously broadened, to accommodate a decidedly more ambitious
range of constitutional and institutional redesign.
2. A project within a project: radically reshaping Australian institutions.
Academic entrepreneurs have also responded quickly to proposals for constitutional and
institutional changes. Early to scramble on the bandwagon was the institution to which I am
affiliated, the Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, with its
ambitious decade-long project, Reshaping Australian Institutions: Towards and Beyond
2001.16 One small part of this project does connect with the republican push, which no doubt
helped inspire it and gain its funding. The academic version of republicanism furnishes an
institutional and historic setting, tracing its roots back to ancient Rome, and thereby linking in,
what admits much modem adaptation, notions of citizenship and civic virtues. But most of the
project is independent of any republican reorganisation.
The Reshaping Australian Institutions project is presented in predominantly reformist
fashion, unsurprisingly. It is supposed, for instance, to ‘provide major input into evaluation
and reform of Australia's institutions’; indeed it is explicitly ‘aimed at contributing to Australian
constitutional reform’.17
Nothing however precludes consideration of reshaping or
transforming Australian institutions — those of the whole ecological region — in a unreformist
and possibly unconstitutional way, in a radical way.
Admittedly, the rough boundary between reformist and radical routes becomes even more
blurred when the constitution of a country is open for possible major reconsideration and much
political infrastructure may be altered. Nonetheless, from the perspective of a strong central
state, the stock boundary stands intact. For reformist changes would amount to comparatively
small adjustments leaving the state substantially intact. For example, a minimal transformation,
16
A recent brief description of this two million dollar project, now outlined in several places, is
given in Tynan, pp.17-19. Fuller descriptions are available from a main coordinator of the project,
J. Braithwaite, Law, RSSS, ANU. One of the many strands (17 at last count) of this project is an
environmental (or green) strand.
The immediate predecessor of this article was presented in a workshop at RSSS on green political
theory, arranged under the project. That accounts for some of the otherwise puzzling structure of
what has eventuated. Another earlier version was tried out at Ecopolitics VIII, Pacific Visions,
held at Lincoln University, Christchurch, New Zealand, in July 1994.
17
‘Reshaping Australian institutions: towards and beyond 2001’ in Tynan , p.17, italics added.
7
of the sort presently much favoured, from constitutional monarchy to Australian republic,
though entailing non-negligible constitutional redrafting, need only amend the roles of a few
elite power- and position-holders. By contrast, radical changes would substantially alter that
strong central state, perhaps (as will be proposed) eliminating it altogether.
There are appealing reasons for attempting wider, more radical investigations. For,
firstly, there may be more satisfactory institutional structures not accessible, or even visible,
along normal constitutional reform routes. Secondly, there is a demand, a small but growing
demand from green directions for instance, for radical institutional change. It would be
prudent, then, to make some investigation of the options, to assess their prospects. Thirdly,
reflection on such structures would certainly be part of a more comprehensive study of and
theory of institutional design, which the Reshaping project also presents as an objective.
Fourthly, much more controversially, major environmental problems cannot be satisfactorily
solved along merely reformist paths. For states, what are reformed, states themselves are
ecologically dysfunctional. In practice this appears obvious enough. Simply reflect upon their
environmental records; these are even worse than those abysmal records compiled for human
rights. But the practical case can be argued in detail in a state by state way, or less laboriously,
through the familiar rough classification of states into first, second and third world states. In
main third world regions, the rise of the state has seen the serious decline of environments.
Those third world states that have not largely destroyed their natural environments are in rapid
process of doing so. The activities involved are, furthermore, not merely tolerated by these
states but are usually actively encouraged (e.g. with state participation or by state concessions,
as through taxation advantages, subsidies, export incentives, etc.).
Further, the role of
exploitation and plunder of remaining natural “resources”, and depletion of “biological capital”,
by third world states, most of which are now trapped in debt and structural adjustment, has
increased many-fold in the last two decades.
How destructively second world states of eastern
Europe treated their own (and also other regions’) environment, how they over-expoited and
polluted them, has recently been much publicized. While the recent record in first world states
is no doubt marginally better, many of these states dominated their natural environments and
their wild inhabitants in the past, and have heavily polluted and congested their urban and
industrial regions. Nor does their present record gain an environmental pass. For example,
those that have any natural forests (similarly fisheries) left are in the process of eliminating or
degrading most of what remains; most are failing seriously in meeting (their own) targets on
greenhouse emissions, and so on. More theoretically, it is unlikely that states, increasingly
focussed narrowly upon shallow and short-term economic agendas, will or can deliver
satisfactorily environmentally. A prime reason is this: states are ineluctably committed, more
and more as their populations expand, to high levels of economic activity characteristically to
0
economic growth of sorts which impact heavily environmentally, inducing inevitable
degradation.18
Accordingly, there are then, or should be, two bands to any green (or environmental)
strand of a restructuring Australian institutions project: not merely an important reformist side,
but as well a radical spread. It is part of this underfunded and undersupported radical spread
which forms the main object of investigation in what follows, that part that relinquishes present
state structures, in favour of more environmentally benign institutions - which no doubt can be
designed, even if not so readily brought into practical operation.19
In order to reach radical redesign ideas quickly, let us touch only lightly upon some of the
more distinctively green reasons for this anarchoid quest (familiar anarchist reasons stand: the
illegitimacy of present states, the undesirability and severe disutility of states, which typically
are highly destructive and corrosive institutions based on concentration of power, hierarchical
authority, massive coercion, manipulation by economic elites, technobureaucracy, utilitarian
rationality, and sundry other evils.20) As indicated, present states are incompatible with stock
ecologically sustainable practices, because of their heavy unrelenting commitments to shallow
economic growth. More generally, standard states and their practices comprise very significant
parts of environmental problems, but quite insufficient parts of any solutions. Moreover, states
constitute an enormous and destructive drain on regional environments, a feature particularly
evident in smaller states which are always looking out for revenue-raising expedients for their
own expensive running.
Apart from those greens who have recognised the excessive environmental costs of states
and their heavy demands on environments, and thus or otherwise have come to recognise the
desirability of their withering away, there are many more who have become ambivalent about
states, who appreciate their very problematic character and very questionable legitimacy, but do
not see yet how to get along altogether without them, or more exactly (to indicate thereby a
partial resolution) without certain functions that they serve. Indeed to point immediately
towards a resolution of this crucial problem, the functional dissolution idea advocated is this:
that the functioning parts may be separately utilized without the colossal whole. The state is not
18
This theme, that states are normally ecologically dysfunctional, is documented and argued in detail
elsewhere; see e.g. Carter and especially Sylvan 96. On the dismal environmental records of
particular states see Ponting. For shocking figures and illustrations as regards environmental
exploitation in third world states, see Bello, pp. 57-65.
19
Nonetheless practical revolutionary displacement of the state is not so remote, or difficult, as is
generally supposed.
20
To adapt a referee’s trenchant summary. For detail on some familiar anarchist reasons, see Burnheim
and above all Marshall.
9
an organism the functioning parts of which must fail without the whole. So it may well be the
enormous fat of state can simply be shed, to great advantage.
In any event, ‘the State is a social institution’, always ‘within’, Marxists continue, ‘a
concrete historic setting’.21 Granted, it is an institution. For an institution in the relevant sense
is ‘a society or association for the organisation or promotion of some particular object or
function’.22 Institutions include therefore the state, the central state. So it too is up for
reshaping, radical slimming, and possible removal in a concrete historical setting, such as late
twentieth century Australia. Whittling away the state means in turn dismantling corporate
capitalism, which now dwells in symbiosis with the bureaucratic state, and also much else,
often environmentally undesirable, that the state affords a supportive framework for and enables
to flourish.
Ideas and schemes for radical redesign are already available from rich anarchist and
socialist sources, those for green design and reshaping from growing and diverse
environmental sources. In main part, then, radical ecoredesign is a matter of convivially
meeting (not joining) the two, an intersection that favours anarchist inputs. Something of the
sort has already been attempted, in an environmentally shallower way, in eco-anarchism, alias
social ecology, and in a deeper way, in deep-green social theory.23 Moreover, it could be
attempted in other kinds of deeper green theory—itself really a plurality of theories, which
however does not itself force radical ecoredesign, though most variants would support it. Thus
Naess's “deep ecology” for example, which is not so far politically radical, only strongly
reformist, could (and should) be given a radical turn.24
Concentrating upon the radical spread of deeper green theory does not preclude
concomitant reformist investigation and activity. Both sides of the green street should be
played. Reformist opportunities should of course be pursued—incremental change, social
engineering, “ecologizing” economics, greening bureaucrats, lobbying politicians, and like
activity (but better really to cut through much such pleading and obiesance and be rid of
politicians and bureaucrats). There are many reformist proposals being advanced for the
greening of Australian federal institutions—with but few so far having much impact on
21
Thus, Green p.61, who adds quite wrongly that Proudhon and his disciples do not see it that way
‘but as an abstraction and aberration’.
22
Adaptation of the Oxford English Dictionary. An institution is, so to say, an organitution.
23
On social ecology, see Bookchin 90, and for information on deep-green social theory, see Sylvan
and Bennett 94 and Routleys 80.
24
As to the political character of deep ecology, and why it should be turned, see Sylvan and Bennett
94, where an expose of the political theory of Naess's ecosophy is presented.
practice.25 Nonetheless, more limited, more constrained, proposals of this sort certainly have a
better chance, within the prevailing paradigm, of making a difference than radical redesigns, too
smartly dismissed as “unrealistic” or “utopian”. No doubt the normal “reshaping institutions”
investigations are rightly focussed then upon institutional reform, not upon revolutionary
reshaping, where much freer scope for redesign is offered. However the real possibility of
radical change should not be excluded; green radicals should be prepared. There have been
various opportunities for revolutionary change in Australian history, the last occurring,
according to some historians, with the ignominious fall of the Whitlam government. There
may well be opportunities again both in the near and intermediate future, especially should some
solid work be put into propagating the prospect. In the near term there is economic disarray,
social fragmentation, and constitutional destabilization; in the longer term increasing ecological
problems and expanding eco-catastrophes loom.
Under present incremental reform and regression, for all the spasmodic environmental
rhetoric, comparatively little in the way of radical green change occurs or can be expected.
Witness, for comparison, the snail pace of the establishment movement towards a rather
minimal grey republicanism in Australia, or differently away from meeting carbon-reduction
commitments. It is increasingly doubtful, given prevailing responses to economic and other
difficulties, that present structural and systematic problems confronting Australia, for example,
will be satisfactorily addressed, environmental problems such as extensive and expanding land
and water degradation not least. Furthermore, under more incremental reform, the sorts of
problems concerning reorganising society in deeper green ways, problems that provide
subsequent topics, would likely not arise. So in getting beyond more muddling along, do
imagine fairly free scope for institutional eco-redesign is somehow dispensed. One nice
corollary is that once it is worked out where to go organisationally, it is much easier to ascertain
how to arrive there.
3. A basic problem of structure: central or decentralised organisation?
There are large and immediate advantages in pursuing a problem-oriented approach to
redesign. That approach, which will tend towards anarchoid outcomes, will be anarchistically
guided in this respect: Unless there is a genuine problem, already causing difficulties or
developing, nothing need be done; otherwise let things alone, let Being be.26 On this non
25
There are many many narrower economic and technological proposals. One of the more interesting
wider proposals comes from an Opposition not noted for its green initiatives and commitments, for
an overseeing Department of Sustainable Development, a Department that could see to the
greening of all federal institutions.
26
To echo also Heideggerian wisdom. The non-prejudicial term ‘anarchoid’ is deployed, not because
what emerges will not be anarchistic (as characterized in Marshall and in Sylvan 94), but because it
11
managerial low-work approach a good deal of structure presently inoperational, and of idle
regulation presently enacted, can be removed; organisational arrangements can be very
significantly down-sized.
The leading methodological idea is that enough relevant
(biodegradable) structure is introduced to resolve organisational problems, but not substantially
more. Organisational oversupply and waste is thus avoided. Moreover, much structure that
keeps so much environmentally destructive industry in business is likewise shed.
Among basic problems for deeper green theory are those of political reorganisation and so
of organisation. Evidently institutions, and their types, are critical to such organisation. And a
major organisational problem for any putative green society concerns structure', to take a critical
case, whether society is centrally organised (concentrated, bureaucratised, hierarchical, large-
scale and so on) or decentralised (dispersed, non-hierarchical, small-scale and supposedly
beautiful, and so on).
This focal problem, to centralise or not to centralise, is sometimes presented as a serious
dilemma for concerned green theorists.27 The binary horns of this dilemma are respectively: on
the one hom, the pull (or push) to localisation and regionalisation, to non-anonymous smallscale low-impacting environmentally-friendly arrangements, to diffusion of power and
dismantling of the incubus of a central state with its crippling costs and unfriendly practices; and
on the other horn, the need for continuing and further central income generation and welfare
(re)distribution, central regulation and control, and the pressures to environmental reliance upon
and use of the central state.28
The dilemma has been trenchantly posed as follows:
... the demands of the Greens sometimes appear contradictory, in seeking increasing
environmental regulation and welfare measures... alongside a halt to industrial
expansion, the very source of income for the welfare state. Yet the expansion and
further centralization of the bureaucratic state apparatus is neither their overt goal nor
covert motivation. Quite the contrary. Their genuine long term vision is of a
decentralized, steady state society of self-sufficient, relationally autonomous (albeit
interlinked) regions.29
departs from standard forms of anarchism in significant respects, not least in planned political
organization. In this exercise organization is of the essence.
27
As by Jacobs of The Green Economy, who has posed the problem sharply, as part of an argument
however for retaining the central state (and much of present status quo arrangements).
28
Environmental reasons for favouring small-scale bioregional organisation are nicely gathered in
McLaughlin, chapter 10.
29
Unknown source.
12
As it happens, not only does the theoretical and utopian literature run both ways, towards and
away from centralisation, but so does practice and experience. As to theory, anarchisticallyinclined presentations tend to favour decentralisation, perhaps with some central compensation
through federation (thus recent Blueprints, ecotopias, and so on), whereas socialisticallyinclined presentations invariably opt for powerful central states (to control and redistribute
grander social programs, etc.).
As to practice, there are local councils, community
organisations, residents' groups aiming to keep out, or to remove, the state-sponsored nuclear
plants, toxic waste incinerators, waste dumps or super-highways, on the one horn; and, on the
other, central states blocking, modifying, or regulating local or regionally promoted schemes
for large dams (e.g. Tasmania's Franklin), forest exploitation, pulp mills, strip mining, and so
on.30
To some extent, the way the problem has often been re-presented, in terms of a dilemma
between top-down and bottom-up structure and power transmission, already points towards a
theoretical resolution: namely, both, or rather enough of both. But how is this combination to
be achieved? An answer does not fall out by pure reason, operating in isolation from other
problems. By taking advantage of information gathered from other connected problems, a
promising answer can be teased out. Neither standard socialism nor anarchism afford answers,
socialism because it leaves the central institution of state intact. But standard anarchism, much
more promising, does not resolve the problem either, because federation, as usually explained,
does not leave enough structure; it may not even concede sufficient power to delegates to
constrain exploitative local communities.
A solution to such dilemma lies through a combinational strategy, which includes partial
dissolution of the central state, into its actual organisational functions in each region. While
removing the state, itself source of several environmental and social problems, and its
concentration of power, invariably under environmentally unfriendly control, functional
dissolution nonetheless retains its apparently essential services, including (where necessary)
those of environmental regulation. Relevant continent-wide functions would persist or be
introduced: for example, services controlling inflow into Australia of damaging forms and
materials such as toxic wastes and exotic pest species, or regulating outflow from Australia of
native wildlife and flora. In part, ecoregional functionalism offers a radical continuation of the
separation ofpowers of recent historical process, of church and state, legislature and executive,
and so forth. As these functions come to operate separately while remaining coordinated, so
would those functional arrangements and institutions dissolving the state.
30
Much turns on the exploitative character of certain local and regional communities, their get-richquick schemes, what they are prepared to do to survive in old or superficially affluent ways, and so
on.
13
It is a major illusion of modem political theory that a central state, ceded monopolies on
coercion, currency, taxation and so on, is necessary in order to secure adequate supply of
public goods, including public order and environmental regulation. To the contrary, the most
that appears required, the most that arguments would support, is some network of specific
organisations functioning to look after specific kinds of goods and services, those necessary for
this or that, that are not otherwise supplied. There is no inherent reason why communities
should not institute and regulate specialised bodies coordinated among themselves (by
negotiations or, failing that, through recognised arbitrators) to ensure the adequate maintenance
or production of various types of public goods, including control of damaging crime. Each
such institution could gain community standing from its support base, for instance through
achieving democratically-generated recognition. Such an institution would aim to secure
execution of its recommendations and decisions by sanctions and like admissible means, and in
doing this it could mobilize in co-operation with communities and with other recognised
institutions.
There are many examples of such institutions operating successfully both
regionally and internationally; for instance, those for postal and communicational arrangements,
international sporting bodies, international academies and clubs, environmental and consumer
organizations.31
4.
Selecting satisfactory political arrangements within the span of anarchoid
options.
Anarchoid options come in a wide variety of forms, including, among others, both right
leaning individualistic or capitalistic varieties, and left-leaning social or communitarian
varieties.32 A suitably generous political pluralism will allow for all these forms, while not
encouraging all, as they are of very different merit. For example, some may be neglectful or
repressive of some of their inhabitants, or destructive of their environments; others, superior in
31
This passage borrows from the summary in Burnheim 86 p.221 of Burnheim 85. For much fuller
elaboration see Burnheim 85 and Sylvan 94.
The critical issue of funding administration, without a coercive taxation system, is also broached in
these places (and developed in Sylvan 96). The broad proposal is that low-cost administration,
much of which would be volunteer, could be funded by rents (there would be no property in land
and resources), use charges, and fines.
32
There are many more varieties of political systems than much recent theory has cared to concede.
For example, to take right-leaning dimensions, all of individualism, market-organization and
capitalism function substantially independently. There can be markets without capitalism
(characterised through opportunities to accumulate capital), and conversely, capitalism without free
market arrangements. And so on. Most historic and modern systems, upon which political theory
has tended inadmissibly to concentrate almost exclusively, are hybrid arrangements with mixes of
different elements drawn from both “left” and “right”.
14
these socio-environmental regards, may not be. Dismantling or deconstructing a state does not,
on its own, make a sharp selection between alternatives. No doubt the hope is, what can be
striven for, that adequate designs are sought and adequate selections made, that inadmissible
forms rapidly perish. Those remaining forms that are admissible can be ranked; for instance,
they might be graded according to defeasible criteria based upon “pillars” of German green
movement such as environmental sensitivity, democratic institutions, and nonviolent practices.
While right-leaning anarchoid arrangements could work in theory (e.g. under what is
improbable, benevolent capitalism), they are unlikely to succeed in practice, for several reasons.
Consider, to illustrate in outline, why that much promoted rightist form, market (or “liberal”)
capitalism is unlikely to serve. For one reason, an intrusive state is likely to emerge, with state
controlled and state funded standing military and police forces, needed to defend capitalist
interests and accumulation, to protect private property, to uphold endemic social inequalities,
and to enforce particular market and trade structures, with a substantial and heavy taxation
system to fund these forces and a corresponding bureaucracy needed to administer and regulate
these and other institutions, such as those required to guarantee that capitalist liabilities are
strictly limited and to keep markets (far from self-regulating) unclogged, “free” and competitive.
Not only are anarchoid conditions thus violated, so are those for benign green societies. In
normal practice, market capitalism tends to be highly environmental exploitative, as modern
history demonstrates all too plainly (plainly too it is not alone in this propensity, so are other
modem statist systems). Furthermore, given the sorts of humans these systems tend to elevate,
and exalt, and the sorts of practices (including extravagant consumption for all that can afford it)
they encourage and sometimes even enforce, extensive exploitation is to be expected and liable
to persist. At least that is so without, what is thereupon required in a self-reinforcing spiral,
further state intervention to distort “natural” capitalistic incentives and institutions, to limit
practices on private property (thereby effectively altering the institution), to establish new
instruments and commodities such as pollution licences, green investments and futures, and so
forth.33 Even though a shallow greenness can also be sprayed upon parts of market capitalism
(factories in fields, forest reserves retained for tourists, and so on), and some green showcase
exhibits tacked on, environmental depth cannot. Shallowness is both an inevitable consequence
of the justifying socio-economic theory, and also an expected best outcome of practice.
Accordingly in institutional design it is much more promising to look in democratic left
leaning directions. For, as argued, it would be rash to gamble upon any bright new dawn of
environmentally and socially benign market capitalism, which in any event could easily revert
back towards dark industrial times. However, very similar arguments to those sketched could
33
Infiltrated, along with propaganda on behalf of such instruments, is much mythology, including
acclaimed environmental virtues of private property and privatization generally.
15
be developed as regards centralised socialism, especially as untempered by democratic
procedures. While island communities of a wide range of varieties are naturally not excluded
under anarchoidal pluralism, brighter continental prospects lie through modifications of
democratic sociality, which appears to permit much of what is sought in design.
Under duly decentralized social organization, each requisite function would be carried out
by some association of agents comprising operative and support staff (that is, as regards bare
formal structure, more or less as now, in institutions like departments and corporations). For
direct accountability downwards, and also to ensure desirable separation and dilution of power,
upper operatives, those of a directing or steering committee (the nervous system of the
organisation), would be democratically selected (from a relevant lower level constituency, and
from the whole people of an ecoregion in case of a typical bottom level institution). Note well
that selection is not election: election is but one method of democratic selection, and often
enough not an altogether satisfactory method. The point of some sort of democratic selection,
as a guiding though not invariant rule, is manifold: it is in part to ensure due accountability, in
part to prevent unethical accumulation of power in special classes, and in part for reasons that
devolve from the very notion of democracy itself.
In brief, certain forms of democracy offer promising prospects for green reorganisation,
particularly within complementing left-leaning settings where those forms can function in
favour of sustainability. However even with an informed democracy in place, there are few
guarantees. Some structure, such as limited executive power separated from judicial and
administrative functions, needs to be set in place to block or retard worse eventualities (such as
mob actions, selection of tyrants, mistreatment of noncitizens and so on). Even then several
thorny problems remain for any deeper green political reorganization.
5.
Problems of chauvinism and present-time bias in democratic political
institutions.
In modem usage of the motherhood term democracy, two main lines are visible: included
are not only forms of political organisation where ‘power [is presumed to] reside in the people
as a whole, and is exercised either directly by them ... or by officers [selected] by them’, but
‘often more vaguely denoting a social state in which all have equal rights, without hereditary or
arbitrary differences of rank or privilege’34. It is on the basis of this second line that the call for
democracy has operated to remove chauvinism and discrimination of a range of forms: against
unpropertied minorities, nonconformists, women, blacks, tribals, and so on. Even so pursuit
34
Oxford English Dictionary entry 1, main entry. These two lines are by no means the only
distinctive lines now visible: increasingly conspicuous in calls for “democracy”, notably in Asia,
are calls to freedom and rights: not merely for basic legal freedoms such as free assembly, fair
process and so on, but for freedom to access information (the “right to know”).
16
of the line, where successful, has not generally conferred adequate representation and rights on
several of these groups; but, more important, pursuit has stopped short in its inclusions at
certain humans, such as those granted citizenship—though relevant interests of many other
creatures and welfare of many of other items may be affected by what those citizens elect to do.
While democratic voters can perhaps be entrusted to take some account of those near and dear
(within remarkably sharp limits, as the situation of women in many regions still shows), such
as those deemed incompetent to vote: the young, deranged, and so on, much evidence reveals
that they cannot be relied for what is less near or dear (and indeed are easily herded into casting
their votes in accord with a shallow mercantilism). Consider what gets left out, outcasts of
even perfect democratic control:• spatially distant agents. For example, the interests of many humans outside USA are much
affected by practices of the US government, which however is outside their democratic reach.
• temporally distant agents. Since the past is past, it is future agents who would be affected,
often drastically affected, by present practices, that matter. Some way of taking due account of
future agents, their interests and welfare, is required, even under shallow long-term ecology,
that is under lighter green positions. Sustainable development has been regularly diverted
into—what is part of what it is about—such a way, an indirect and so far utterly ineffectual
way.
Much more of importance is also excluded according to deep-green theory:
• creatures with interests, other than present human citizens, and
• items with welfare, but perhaps lacking interests. The category includes items with intrinsic
value, whose value can be effected, made to fare worse or better.
A major problem, little addressed, is how to take due account of such democratically
excludeds. It is a problem especially for deeper green theories: that deep problem is, so to say,
how to obtain satisfactory representation of all that is of value in the natural world? That way of
putting it, while a little misleading, does point to a particular type of resolution.
Problems special to deep ecopolitical theory, include, that is, issues as to adequacy of
representation of items of value outside those humans that are represented, representation of
their interests, where they have them, of their welfare otherwise, of favourable conditions for
their sustenance, continuation and retention of value. Democracy of discussed modem sorts,
whether representative or participative, will not serve these purposes at all satisfactorily. For
instance, insofar as party-political representative democracies represent anything (even human
“bottom lines” as is sometimes erroneously supposed), they appear to represent primarily
interests of certain business-allied elites. Among the issues are of course those as to adequacy
of retention and protection of nonhuman items of intrinsic value, tropical forests and their
inhabitants and elements for instance.
17
As observed, there is really no organisational alternative to proceeding with and through
agents, preferably well-disposed and quality agents. It is hard to guarantee either politically.
As agents are but a subclass of what requires democratic representation and what should have
its welfare or interests considered, how are the rest to be taken care of satisfactorily? There are
significant older responses to like problems, through totems and taboos, guardians and
constraints. Looked at one way the problem repeats, more or less, a familiar problem: namely,
how in larger constituencies do decision-making agents represent the whole mass of agents and
others in the constituency? A main democratic answer, designed to avoid many shortcomings
of alternatives, was: by representative means—only “representation” was almost never taken
seriously or literally enough. The sorts of considerations that made representation a promising
resolution make what is to be proposed—where representation has, in any case, to be expanded
—also promising. A key principle is this: all relevant items are to be represented. Relevance
criteria enter importantly. Steering committees of lower level institutions among the main
decision-making bodies should be appropriately representative of all items whose welfare is
affected by their decisions (principle of deepened demanarchy).
Under more equitable
arrangements, then, some decision-engaged agents will have to be selected as representative of
relevant classes of excludeds. Electoral arrangements do not so readily allow for such;
sortition, well-designed selection by lot, does.35 Of course, however good the selection
processes, however disinterested and well-intentioned the agents selected, some bias may
remain. Nonetheless prejudice and maltreatment can be much reduced.
As already hinted, deepened representation is not the only promising resolution of the
present problem that might be tried. Another, which could be attempted either separately or
concurrently, operates through the directive of ecologically sustainable development, requiring
as a constraint, not only intergenerational equity but also preservation of items of ecological
value.36 It might be suggested that such a directive be made mandatory, applying to all relevant
steering committees. But, as already evident, there are severe obstacles to getting such a
directive properly implemented. (In prevailing oligarchical circumstances, even very dilute
versions are worth pressing for however, as they would offer definite improvements upon what
presently happens.)
6.
A fundamental dilemma for deeper green organization: democratic or
authoritarian procedures?
35
No doubt there are electoral approximations; e.g. candidates in separate classes for each category to
be represented.
36
For elaboration of this option, see Sylvan and Bennett 94 and its sequel.
18
There is strictly no logical space for a deeper green democracy, according to Saward for
one. For there is a clash, an essential tension, between democratic procedures and deeper green
values and commitments, notably to intrinsic values in nature. The main drift of the argument is
that green values, which are mandatory for deeper greens, require for their implementation anti
democratic, indeed authoritarian procedures; otherwise they cannot be guaranteed.
This nasty conundrum for green theory over democracy, which the theory typically
sponsors, is put in
sharper form as follows:37
Democracy concerns procedures,
environmentalism certain outcomes. What guarantee can there be that the procedures will
deliver the outcomes? What guarantee that democracy would yield a way of protecting
environments?
However the type of situation is worse than a matter of guarantees, which greens are not
really seeking and could not in general expect. (For here as almost everywhere else, things can
go wrong. Anarchism especially supplies few absolutes and little certainty.) It is a type of
situation, moreover, which effects not only environmentalism but any sort of social and other
amelioration, and even democracy itself. For democratic procedures may yield unsatisfactory
and even anti-democratic outcomes.
Unfortunately there are few or no guarantees that
meritorious forms will eventuate or persist. Political history itself copiously illustrates that.
But it can be argued theoretically. For example, succession of regimes must occur (owing to
finite lifetimes of power-holders, etc.), and in successional transitions deterioration can occur;
nor are there effective mechanisms that can exclude decline absolutely. Democratic procedures
of certain sorts offer better controls, and better prospects of satisfactory transition than most
others available, but even they afford no cast-iron guarantees of adequacy, and they are beset by
paradoxes of their own. With inadequate democratic structures plausible scenarios are easily
designed where just such outcomes occur, for instance as in what has been called a “paradox of
democracy” where a constituency elects an anti-democratic tyrant.38
A concerned attempt is made by Saward to mount a destructive version of such a paradox
against deep-green political theory (which he darkly calls ‘dark green’). The version is based
upon holism and intrinsic value requirements, coupled with democratic demands, of deeper
green theory. In clearest form, the version runs as follows: Holism implies consistency or
compatibility. But intrinsic value maintenance and democracy are not compatible, under evident
conditions (e.g. democratic procedures result in diminution or destruction of intrinsic value).
Firstly, partial confirmation for this explication:
37
Goodin, condensing Saward, p. 168.
38
Such paradoxes of democracy, and variants thereupon, are presented trenchantly by Popper, and
presumed nullified in Sylvan and Bennett 90. Improved structures can undoubtedly much reduce the
likelihood and problematicness of paradoxical overthrows.
19
[The green imperative] usually contains a number of elements, variously
economic, political, social, geographical, religious, and so on. Its force
comes partly from the holism it embodies, and partly from its basis in the idea
of the ‘intrinsic value’ of nature. Holism implies that the various elements
which make up the imperative are compatible. The elements of the imperative
gain their importance, and their links with each other, by being referable back
to a common, intrinsic value of nature. It is at this point that we can pick up
the position of democracy or ‘direct democracy’ in lists of basic values set out
by greens. [These goals are the elements of the overall green imperative, and
gain their importance from both the holistic nature and intrinsic merit of the
values which the imperative represents]39
*
As should now be plain, and is becoming plainer, consistency is not an invariant desideratum,
and not to be insisted upon; coherence is what is “implied” and what supersedes consistency.40
As more than a century of Hegelian theory should have revealed, there can be inconsistent
wholes.
A further key assumption in the argument is that guaranteeing that intrinsic value is
protected (or like absolutes sustained) will require undemocratic procedures, such as
authoritarian ones.
An underlying assumption (soon to be rejected, for instance as
incorporating an offensive false dichotomy) is that only undemocratic, authoritarian procedures
fit with deeper green imperatives or givens.41 Several illustrations are offered of inconsistency
of green imperatives with types of democratic procedures—none of which tell, without testing
adaptation, specifically against deeper green positions.
A first illustration is directed against Porritt:
A direct democratic procedure (is not) compatible with imperative goals like
‘local production for local need’, ‘low consumption’, ‘labour-intensive
production’, and ‘voluntary simplicity’ (other items from Porritt’s list).42
Against this and other illustrations, it is worth emphasizing goals resemble objectives and
targets; goals are goals which are not mandatory and by no means always achieved, especially if
the achievers, like present humans, fall short (e.g. in ecological sensitivity) or their
organisational means and opportunities are inadequate. Observe too the oppositional attempt to
convert or to twist (since it is an up-grading by high redefinition) goals and programs and
principles—through ‘imperative goals’ and the like—into ‘imperatives’, ‘prescribed outcomes’,
undeniable principles, ultimates. That attempt should be resisted.
A second example looks at an alleged
39
G. Saward, p.65; square bracketed sections are taken from an earlier circulated version of this
article.
40
See Priest and others.
41
G. Saward, p.63
42
Saward, p.66.
20
contradiction in the programme of the German Green Party. ‘Grassroots
democracy’ is one of the four ‘basic principles’ of the party’s ‘global
conception’. Another is the ‘ecological’: ‘Proceeding from the laws of nature,
and especially from the knowledge that unlimited growth is impossible in a
limited system, and ecological policy means understanding ourselves and our
environment as part of nature’. In effect, this means that certain outcomes are
proscribed from decision-making procedures. Such proscribed outcomes
must surely go well beyond any plausible list of outcomes which must be
proscribed in the interests of defending a direct democratic decision
procedure. Therefore, there is a clear contradiction between elements of the
value-set, whereas given the holism the green imperative is based on we
would have the right to expect these goals and values to be thoroughly
compatible.43
The last charge repeats the critical point already rejected, that holism implies consistency. A
further critical point should also be rejected: the flawed inference that ‘certain outcomes are
proscribed’. A political party in a democratic system has to be prepared to see its principles,
however spendid, overridden, certainly by other parties if they gain or hold political power.
There is a misconception too about principles (especially higher level principles) and their roles:
‘principles [too] can only be akin to [givens and] “laws of nature”, against which democratic
procedures must inevitably be traded off the board’. Sets of principles, which may themselves
turn out to be inconsistent, are hardly akin to natural laws; consider for instance reasons for
their revision, procedures for rechecking and revision, and so on. In any case, democratic
procedures are not traded away against laws of nature, which they may try to upset or suppress.
(Rather effort should be directed at informing the electorate and the like.)
To reinforce his case, Saward appeals to other authors who have advanced similar claims
(it is like appealing for confirmation of a newspaper report to other newspapers).
Boris Frankel accuses Rudolf Bahro of an ‘anti-democratic ’ vision of an
ecological society, given that politics as conflict will have no place in a sea of
‘givens’. He sees the dilemma as being similar to that of socialists—deeming
certain things as desirable in an ultimate sense, but proclaiming attachment to
democracy and the diversity it implies. Ophuls has stated the matter especially
clearly. The basic question about politics, he writes, is ‘Is the way we
organize our communal life and rule ourselves compatible with ecological
imperatives and other natural laws? ... how we run our lives will be
increasingly determined by ecological imperatives’44
In an ecological society, enough of the demos (members of democratic constituency) will hold
ecological attitudes and vote or select accordingly, almost by definition. Problems of effecting
change lie with unecological communities, which may not support ecological principles under
instituted democratic procedures (as presently in many places). Principles, and ecological
“givens”, stand, they remain ‘desirable in an ultimate sense’, but they are not followed and
43
Saward, p.66.
44
Saward, p.67. Note that only a very streamlined version of Saward’s case is being presented.
21
implemented, while revealed democratic preferences go unchanged. There need be no ‘anti
democratic vision’, but rather an unecological praxis, which principled greens will work to
change.
The route is accordingly barred to Say ward’s
important conclusions...: that at best direct democracy[, and for that matter
indirect forms of democracy,] can only be at or near the bottom of value-lists
of greens. A commitment to democracy must clash with core green values
which, if taken on board, limit the range of acceptable policy outcomes
beyond these self-binding constraints that democracy logically requires.45
What Saward proposes instead is depressingly familiar: pragmatism, jettison intrinsic value.
Out therewith go deep-green positions.
... greens should not think in terms of overriding principles or [green]
imperatives. Indeed, it suggests that to think in terms of imperatives based on
arguments about intrinsic merit is unjustifiable.46
Fortunately the argument developed does not sustain the proposals. There is, to iterate a
central point, no internal or latent contradiction between (deep-)green policy objectives and
democratic procedures. Rather, green objectives would fail to be achieved without well-
disposed decision makers, who may not straightforwardly reflect any “will” of the demos. A
logical requirement on a realistic set of political objectives is that there are accessible
circumstances where they are realisable, where all elements of the whole would obtain. It
should not be required that there are are no situations where they may conflict, become
inconsistent.
It is certainly not required that they are realised, by whatever means.
A
community, as variously represented, can choose better or worse. There are many means
available, which it may shun (again there are no absolute guarantees), enabling it to choose
better, including improved structures, attitudinal change and consciousness raising, and so on.
In the end Saward too recognises the popular power of attitudinal change, thereby
himself removing his previous imposition of authoritarian means upon greens. There
45
Saward, p.68. The lead-in to Saward’s proposal was clearer in the earlier circulated version, which
ended in more precise (and dubious) form:
A commitment to democracy must clash with values that are inherent to
ecologism—and ecologism is about inherency, intrinsic values, laws of nature and
holism. Things—like democracy—that can only have instrumental value must lose
out to imperatives backed by inescapable canonical force.
46
Saward, p.75. Of course it is now put in terms of “imperatives”; it would be better expressed
simply in terms of (what did not figure in the earlier version) principles, policy objectives or the
like.
Opposition to deeper green political approaches often derives, as in Saward and in Goodin, from a
underlying shallow utilitarianism. The differences concern not only depth; they also concern the
rejection of individual interest bases, in favour of welfare bases and holism of deeper approaches.
22
*
needs, from a green perspective [and others], to be a change in political
culture such that it will be compatible with sustainability. This, of course, is a
familiar theme from green writing. How[?] ... It can only be the case that
‘political change will ony occur once people think differently or, more
particularly, that sustainable living must be prefaced by sustainable thinking’.
By abandoning foundationalist myths of intrinsic merit, greens abandon the
implicit arrogance that have made democracy such a tenuous part of green
political theory.47
But he overstates the attitudinal point, with ‘only...the case’. People can be politically led
(retardation, however, as distinct from genuine advancement, is more familiar); they could just
elect a green government which instituted, under permissible democratic methods, sustainable
living or the like. Worse still, his final ungrammatical sentence is a complete non-sequitur.
Attitudinal change may include coming to appreciate intrinsic merit in natural things other than
humans, and seeing through pragmatic utilitarianism.
7. Ecoregional demanarchoid reshaping of Australian political institutions: one
beginning.
Is such a radical restructuring as that suggested feasible? Initial investigations hold out
the hope that major problems for deeper green theory can be solved, at least in theory.
Investigations accordingly suggest that the project within the Reshaping Australian Institutions
project is viable and worth pursuing. A logical next stage offers sketches for a radical political
reorganisation of Australia.48 Evidently there would be many designs (thereby removing facile
jeers against “the blueprint”, a part of co-optative strategy for persistence with prevailing statist
arrangements). Among the many designs, some few, conforming to favoured principles,
would be selected for detailed study. If the study were attempted, most appropriately through
systems modellings, then flexibility could be built into modellings, so that even though only a
few basic designs were examined, many variations would be feasible. Not only .is systems
modelling particularly well suited to modelling network designs; it also further offers prospects
for computing simulation and implementation, and even some simulated political
experimentation. Furthermore, such modellings begin to give some grasp on the size and
47
Saward, p.77. There are further defects in this passage than those noted in the text. For one,
admission of intrinsic merit does not entail foundationalism. For another, such recognition of
merit—which is less liable to disturb democracy, or render it tenuous, than adherence to
Christianity—need carry no tinges of arrogance; to the contrary, by contrast with humanism it may
yield a certain humbleness.
48
Such design, well accomplished, would help considerably in revealing what is possible, thereby
providing a seriously neglected contribution to politics, itself sometimes presented, with undue
licence, as the art of the possible.
23
complexity of the task (a useful comparison is with World 3 modelling of the on-going “Limits
to Growth” project49, or, better, with a regionalized version of it).
To get started on such ecoregional design, for Australia, two broad classifications and
associated maps and charts are required:
• 1. an ecoregional classification, with partitions and overlays, for Australia and its continental
shelf. Observe that this classification would be hierarchical, as smaller regions merge into
larger regions; but it is a benign hierarchy of levels (it facilitates no accumulation of power or
wealth). Observe too that any such classification is far from unique. Plurality has already set
in, and a choice of classification (or a few choices) would have to be made, taking due account
of political organisational principles and objectives. Fortunately some of the preliminary
classificatory work has already been accomplished in Environmental Regionalisations of
Australia, where 3 broad classifications are presented and procedures for generating many more
given.50 For political purposes further classification attributes (e.g. demographic features) need
to be included.
Ecoregions provide the basis for spatially linked administrative and community units.
(Not all units need be of this sort; many contemporary arrangements are spatially unlinked). At
this stage a basic principle of decentralization and distributed and smaller-scale organization can
be invoked, namely
• subsidiarization: organisational functions should be allowed to fall down to (or to be pushed
down to) the lowest level compatible with their satisfactory performance. Thus, for instance,
most matters concerning such things as sewerage and primary education would be localized.
This subsidiarization principle, drawn from classical anarchism, has been widely adopted in
green planning proposals.
(It is said to have been applied by the Catholic Church in
administration of the Holy Roman Empire, whence the not altogether apt title derives. It is
presently being reassessed for use in that successor organisation, united Europe.) No doubt the
principle is open to challenge, for instance on grounds of efficiency, that larger size may prove
more efficient, of duplication, and so on.
But, the objective is not maximization of
technological values such as efficiency factors; instead it aims to satisize on a wider framework
of values, including holistic social arrangements. Presumably, however, undue duplication of
expensive administrative bodies is to be avoided.
Coupled with subsidiarization is another principle,
• direct accountability downwards: units should answer directly to regional constituencies. This
49
See e.g. Meadows.
50
See Thackway and Cresswell. Rudiments of a politically useful classification begin to emerge on
their 30 Group Regionalisation.
*
24
.contrasts with prevailing accountability (such as it is) upwards, through some indirect and
tenuous, centralized circuiting chain.
Naturally much more gets comprehended under
accountability, for instance openness of environmental accounting.
There are also principles interrelating smaller with larger regions, both bottom-up and topdown (or centre-down) principles. Among these will be
• representation of smaller regions in relevant planning institutions of more comprehensive
regions. Representation, appropriately regulated, would often replace anarchistic federation,
which as observed appears too weak for requisite environmental control.
The point needs no labouring that the classifications and principles are open to challenge
at every step; for instance, there is nothing rock-hard about the type of ecoregional classification
preferred, nor about social functions to be addressed.
At a theoretical stage that is
unproblematic: there are other (less preferable) models; elaborate your own if you want to and
can. In any case, it is to be hoped that a diversity in theory might be to some extent reflected in
some diversity in practice—with different regions and continents trying different arrangements,
with much less of the sort of cosmopolitan political monoculture that we are presently being
harassed toward, with much more resilient political biodiversity. Of course, not all political
forms (including stateless types) are equally desirable or satisfactory, and some (including
present state examples) are unacceptable. So there are bounds upon diversity. Moreover, what
suits one community or region well may not suit another to be satisfactory for it. So too there
are limits upon successful transfer of organisational structure; what works in one region may
require much modification in another, or may substantially resist transfer.
• 2 a social function classification, of those community matters that require explicit organisation
at some level. An initial listing can be compiled by consulting Australian metropolitan telephone
directories, especially the government sections that used to feature in the front (until a year ago).
What results under redesign and reorganisation would, of course, look very different from what
is listed. Parliaments, parties and all their supporting apparatus would vanish; the Australian
Bureau of Statistics will assume a new significance and independent role, and so on. But
which institutions are retained, which adapted, and so on, would depend on further social
organisational features, not yet considered here. The result would be a levelled pyramidal
structure, a flat-untopped network as depicted in the structural diagram below, not a power
hierarchy.
25
Structural diagram: a schematic depiction of organisational structure
(with some sample components indicated, but not all their network interlinkages displayed).
statistics
bureau
upper levels:
administrative,
executive,
research
ground level:
functional
selectoral
college
Australian
region
(federal)
immigration
control of
materials
inflow
super
regions
(a to k)
interregional
transport
(local)
regions
(1 to n)
arbitration
bureau
upper
levels
rental
entitlements
office
resources
income
office
ground
level
water
systems
sewer
systems
hospital
systems
region 1
region n
While some requisite research has been undertaken upon how the various functional
bodies and decision-making committees can be selected and can operate51, insufficient
investigation has been made of the interrelations and adequate funding of the bodies and
institutions involved — whichever they are! For little such detailed anarchoid modelling has
apparently been attempted for any region anywhere. Evidently there is much to be done
51
Thus e.g. Burnheim 85. The present article is not only heavily indebted to Burnheim's work, but
overlaps on-going investigations on his part.
26
theoretically. Detailed modellings could bring issues down to earth, without setting things in
concrete; no doubt too they would disclose many further problems hidden in the detailing,
problems to which anarchoid solutions can however reasonably be expected.
Nonetheless comparatively little is likely to be done, unless requisite support is
forthcoming, support in the shape of researchers (research volunteers and students) and
research infrastructure (from research gifts, donations and the like). For such support, support
for investigating its own demise, a state is hardly likely knowingly to supply; nor are its
established research institutions. Insofar then as it is done visibly, it will probably have to be
accomplished largely outside state-supported and state-supporting infrastructure, such as
prominent university projects (like Reshaping Australian Institutions). Fortunately there are
now other structures, such as internet and radio communicational channels, that can facilitate
interconnections and interchanges of researchers, both regionally and internationally. On these
sorts of anarchoid communicational bases, networks of groups interested in elaborating such
alternative political modellings, both in theory and in practice, could be formed. Given the
dismal state of present political arrangements, almost everywhere terrestial, there is a great
need, as a very minimum, for networks of innovative researchers who share such goals.52
Richard Sylvan
References.
Bello, W., Dark Victory, Pluto Press, London, 1994.
Bookchin, M., Remaking Society: Pathways to a Green Future, South End Press,
Boston, 1990.
Burnheim, J., Is Democracy Possible?, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1985.
Burnheim, J., ‘Democracy, nation states and the world system’, New Forms of
Democracy, (ed. D. Held and C. Pollitt) London, Sage, 1986, pp.218-239.
Carter, A., ‘Towards a green political theory’, in The Politics of Nature. Explorations
in green political theory (ed. A. Dobson and P. Lucardie), Routledge, London, 1993,
pp.39-62.
Goodin, R., Green Political Theory, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1992.
Green, G., The New Radicalism: Anarchist or Marxist?, International Publishers, New
York, 1971.
52
To echo one referee. My sincere thanks to demanding referees for several helpful suggestions and
many improvements.
27
Jacobs, M., The Green Economy: environment, sustainable development, and the
politics of the future., Pluto Press, Concord, Mass, 1991.
Mackay, H., Reinventing Australia: the mind and mood of Australia in the 90s,
Hugh Mackay, Pymble, NSW, Angus & Robertson, 1993.
Macphee, I., A new constitution?’ (excerpts from an opening address) NILEFA Newsletter,
Griffith University School of Law, June 1993.
Marshall, P., Demanding the Impossible: a history of anarchism, London, Harper
Collins 1992.
Me Laughlin, A., Regarding Nature, SUNY Press, Albany NY., 1993.
Meadows D., and others, Beyond the Limits, Chesley Green, Vermont, 1992.
Naess, A., Ecology, community and lifestyle (trans, and ed. D. Rothenberg),
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1989.
Ponting, C., A Green History of the World, Sinclair-Stevenson, London, 1991.
Priest, G., Routley, R. and Norman, J. (eds), Paraconsistent Logic, Philosophia Verlag,
Munich, 1989.
Routley, V. and R., ‘Social theories, self management and environmental problems’, in
Environmental Philosophy (ed. D Mannison and others), RSSS, Australian National
University, 1980.
Saward, M., ‘Green Democracy’, in The Politics of Nature: Explorations in green
political theory (ed. A. Dobson and P. Lucardie) Routledge, London, 1993 pp. 63-80.
Sylvan, R. and Bennett, D., Utopias, Tao and Deep Ecology, Green Series , RSSS,
Australian National University, 1990.
Sylvan, R. and Bennett, D., The Greening of Ethics, White Horse Press, Cambridge,
1994.
Sylvan, R., ‘Anarchism’, in Contemporary Political Theory (ed. R. Goodin and P.Pettit)
Blackwell, Oxford, 1993.
Sylvan, R., Green Anarchism, to appear, 1996.
Thackway, R. and Cresswell, I.D., Environmental Regionalisations of Australia,
Environmental Resources Information Network, Australian National Parks and Wildlife
Service, 1992.
Tynan, L., The Institute of Advanced Studies, The Australian National University, May
1993.
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Australian National University Office
Australian National University Office > Typing Table at End of Desk
Box 18: Green Projects in Progress
-
https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/e1a2873a54fce7557cfbc89ada6c8b1c.pdf
cf6cba564af11d9dbcc31c7e0159ae37
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Text
MOVEMENTS
New social movements along with, and in partial contrast with, new politics and past
materialism as a quasi-technical term in political science and sociology. Like the others, it is
an ill-defined term. Among the problems is the extreme slackness of identity criteria, so it is
too often impossible to know when one has one.1 The terms are regularly introduced as if it
was known what was meant (this is a widespread intellectual sin; the legitimate end of
Wittgenstein's campaign against technical terms in philosophy).
A major problem with the political social science investigations so far is that the
classification of movements is too coarse-grained, and that when subclassifications are made
there are not in terms of movements. For example, the broad environmental movement, the
level movements is sifted down to, jets analysed in a typology, of shades of green, not into
submovements.
A movement involves action and/ or a diseration to action in a concerted direction by a
group of engaged members
type of intensional set-like objects
OED. ‘series of actions and endevours of a body of persons for special object’
WRONG CATEGORY, otherwise Not bad.
What is the movement though?
Extent of doctrine socialism/ anarchism without doctrine
knowing how
without knowing that or theory
practice
without
theory
e.g. golf, most stickingls language.
Deep ecology attempt to shed doctrine; empasis on movement. Doctrine involved that of sub
social paradigm (model).
Further features of a movement:
• a certain duration. An action group that form for a short time purpose, holds a
single parade, achieves its objective and dissolves, it not a movement. These are numerous
short-lived action groups that do not rate as movement, and which need not be categorised or
listed.
• a certain integration. of members. Although there is now a widespread push for
sustainable development (and attempts by many governments to coopt and neutralise
environmental activity in this way), there is no sustainable development movement. That is
not just because of the multiplicity of objectives subsumed under the smooth synthesized
“objective”, but because there is no due integration, no appropriate organisation of adherents.
Deep ecology is now a movement; it was it when Naess first presented it as one.
1
A hyporduct is that post-materialism, usually taken as a single stock-of-affairs, splits into
several.
�2
Environmental movements in Australia. The Australia-wide environmental organisations are
not movements, but there are movements within or associated with them. The big four
organisations, of which ACF is still the largest are
ACF
range of objects
Greenpeace
branches
local
Wilderness Society
specific object
WWOrganisation
Friends of the Earth which used to be a significant organisations, and still runs a national
journal Chain Reaction, for fullen into decline. All these organisations are presently under
pressure from declining membership and declining funding.
Advocacy groups
• Regionally - linked “advocacy” groups: Some of these groups are spread (e.g. over
a whole state); perhaps zeroing in on local issues in campaigns, some are local, sare are in
between. Examples include: National Parks, Wilderness Societies, Heritage Groups, Forestry
coalitions (e.g. SE forestry coalition which is composed of smaller local movements). Anti
freeway and public transport groups,...
• Non-rigionally-linked groups. These are of course contingently tied to actiosn and
campaigns at various locations. Important examples include animal-concerned groups:
animal preservation and conservations groups, animal liberation.
Practice groups
• Lifestyle groups. There are several strands within the broad commune movement,
which is alive and for the most part thriving in Australia (by contrast with other countries
where is was initiated).
• Issue groups, include
^forestry, forest restoration and tree planting groups, such as nationally Greening
Australia regionally bush regeneration groups and independently many local planting and
restoration schemes from local councils down to ornamental rainforest gardens. Earlier there
was a native garden movement, fostered by organisations for growing native plants.
• sustainable and organic agriculture groups. There are several different groups,
depending on the (production) methods allowed*.
Prominent among these is the permaculture (abbreviating “permanent agriculture”)
movement, which plans an integrated agrucultural system perannual food producing plants
rather than annuals.
• alternative energy groups
• ‘Spiritual’ with ritual and ceremony, worship of the Earth, including Council of AllBeing, Re Earthly Homage to Gaia.
�
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Draft Papers
Description
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Sylvan's literary executor encountered an archive in which “all his projects were current", since manuscripts were undated and unattributed.
Text
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MOVEMENTS
New social movements along with, and in partial contrast with, new politics and past
materialism as a quasi-technical term in political science and sociology. Like the others, it is
an ill-defined term. Among the problems is the extreme slackness of identity criteria, so it is
too often impossible to know when one has one.1 The terms are regularly introduced as if it
was known what was meant (this is a widespread intellectual sin; the legitimate end of
Wittgenstein's campaign against technical terms in philosophy).
A major problem with the political social science investigations so far is that the
classification of movements is too coarse-grained, and that when subclassifications are made
there are not in terms of movements. For example, the broad environmental movement, the
level movements is sifted down to, jets analysed in a typology, of shades of green, not into
submovements.
A movement involves action and/ or a diseration to action in a concerted direction by a
group of engaged members
type of intensional set-like objects
OED. ‘series of actions and endevours of a body of persons for special object’
WRONG CATEGORY, otherwise Not bad.
What is the movement though?
Extent of doctrine socialism/ anarchism without doctrine
knowing how
without knowing that or theory
practice
without
theory
e.g. golf, most stickingls language.
Deep ecology attempt to shed doctrine; empasis on movement. Doctrine involved that of sub
social paradigm (model).
Further features of a movement:
• a certain duration. An action group that form for a short time purpose, holds a
single parade, achieves its objective and dissolves, it not a movement. These are numerous
short-lived action groups that do not rate as movement, and which need not be categorised or
listed.
• a certain integration. of members. Although there is now a widespread push for
sustainable development (and attempts by many governments to coopt and neutralise
environmental activity in this way), there is no sustainable development movement. That is
not just because of the multiplicity of objectives subsumed under the smooth synthesized
“objective”, but because there is no due integration, no appropriate organisation of adherents.
Deep ecology is now a movement; it was it when Naess first presented it as one.
1
A hyporduct is that post-materialism, usually taken as a single stock-of-affairs, splits into
several.
2
Environmental movements in Australia. The Australia-wide environmental organisations are
not movements, but there are movements within or associated with them. The big four
organisations, of which ACF is still the largest are
ACF
range of objects
Greenpeace
branches
local
Wilderness Society
specific object
WWOrganisation
Friends of the Earth which used to be a significant organisations, and still runs a national
journal Chain Reaction, for fullen into decline. All these organisations are presently under
pressure from declining membership and declining funding.
Advocacy groups
• Regionally - linked “advocacy” groups: Some of these groups are spread (e.g. over
a whole state); perhaps zeroing in on local issues in campaigns, some are local, sare are in
between. Examples include: National Parks, Wilderness Societies, Heritage Groups, Forestry
coalitions (e.g. SE forestry coalition which is composed of smaller local movements). Anti
freeway and public transport groups,...
• Non-rigionally-linked groups. These are of course contingently tied to actiosn and
campaigns at various locations. Important examples include animal-concerned groups:
animal preservation and conservations groups, animal liberation.
Practice groups
• Lifestyle groups. There are several strands within the broad commune movement,
which is alive and for the most part thriving in Australia (by contrast with other countries
where is was initiated).
• Issue groups, include
^forestry, forest restoration and tree planting groups, such as nationally Greening
Australia regionally bush regeneration groups and independently many local planting and
restoration schemes from local councils down to ornamental rainforest gardens. Earlier there
was a native garden movement, fostered by organisations for growing native plants.
• sustainable and organic agriculture groups. There are several different groups,
depending on the (production) methods allowed*.
Prominent among these is the permaculture (abbreviating “permanent agriculture”)
movement, which plans an integrated agrucultural system perannual food producing plants
rather than annuals.
• alternative energy groups
• ‘Spiritual’ with ritual and ceremony, worship of the Earth, including Council of AllBeing, Re Earthly Homage to Gaia.
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Box 18, Item 1225: Movements
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Printout, undated.
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One of seven papers digitised from item 1225.
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<a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&range=&collection=&type=&user=&tags=&public=&featured=&exhibit=&geolocation-mapped=&geolocation-address=&geolocation-latitude=&geolocation-longitude=&geolocation-radius=10&submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a>
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<a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a>
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This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>.
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Australian National University Office
Australian National University Office > Typing Table at End of Desk
Box 18: Green Projects in Progress
-
https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/0676c48af777c619b101988ff9a41178.pdf
53eba82362d3d0a5d4703f83b8621f45
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Text
RATIONAL DECISION THEORY WITHOUT PARADOXES
The uniform strategy applied to remove paradoxes in several other arenas - implication,
confirmation, conditionality, explanation, logic itself — will be adapted to defuse all the usual
paradoxes vexing supposedly rational decision theory. That strategy comprises, essentially,
changing the underlying logic (which is the source of central rationality principles of logical—
type) to a modest relevant logic. It yields two important components: removal of irrelevance,
particularly in derivatives of the logical theory, for instance in this case probability and
preference theory; and reduction of excessive strength, not merely in the logical theory and its
derivatives, but especially in this case in maximization principles.
Decision theory hitherto has been, virtually without exception, classical: it has
unquestioningly assumed classical principles of consistency and maximality. Well it might be
claimed that these principles - which derive from the very classical Great Chain of Being -
serve, with but few further impeccable principles, to deliver classical logic, its derivatives such
as standard probability theory, and much else. The universality of these formative principles is
however a myth, one of the pervasive myths of modem rationality (see MR).
1. Common (i.e. equivalent) consequences arguments, and Allais' paradox.
Common consequences arguments depend upon the substitution of common, i.e.
equivalent, consequences. It is evident that what substitutions are permitted will depend not
merely upon admissible logical substitution principles, but above all upon the underlying notion
of equivalence.
A basic substitution principle takes the form
A<-*B,
F(A) /
F(B)
(S<->).
It yields, as derived cases, such further inference principles as
A<->B
f(A) = n
/
f(B) = n
and
A~B
/
G(A) = G(B),
given requisite vocabulary. But critical features of the resulting logics and theories depend
upon what the co-implication relation, <-», permits; its strength.
Over dinner at a Paris cafe one evening during an international colloquium on risky
choice, Allais asked Savage a pair of now very famous questions. First Allais asked Savage to
choose between prospects A and B:
A
complete certainty of a good outcome
$lm
B
0.10 probability of a very good outcome
$5m
0.89 probability of a good outcome
0.01 probability of a bad outcome
$lm
$0.
Savage preferred A to B. Allais next asked him to choose between prospects C and D:
C
0.89 probability of bad outcome
$0
�D
2
0.11 probability of good outcome
$lm
0.90 probability of bad outcome
$0
0.10 probability of very good outcome
$5m.
Savage preferred D to C. Subsequent researchers quickly discovered that most of their
seemingly rational subjects responded initially to Allais' pair of questions as Savage had.1
The problem with these responses is that they violate classical expected utility theory, and
are accordingly classically irrational, that theory affording necessary conditions for
“rationality”. Therein too lies the Allais' paradox, that seemingly rational responses by
seemingly rational subjects are ruled irrational by the theory. For conjoint preferences of A
over B and D over C contradict the deliverance of the dominant theory, which specifies what is
rational here, according to which C over D is equivalent to A over B, and so the conjoint
preferences are inconsistent. The situation certainly supplies a paradox in the standard sense,
that preanalytic claims (that so and so definitely does not imply, does not confirm, such and
such) are contradicted by results of the dominant theory covering those claims.
The (too) brief argument to inconsistency of the seemingly rational preference rankings
under the dominant theory runs as follows:- Where U symbolizes the relevant utility function
(to which probabilities are immaterial in the present context), the preference for A over B can be
represented as
(1)
U($lm)
>
0.10U(%5m) + 0.89U($lm) + 0.01U($0),
Now it is assumed that an equivalent ranking - sometimes said to be the same ranking - results
by either adding common consequences to each side of the inequality (introduction or
combination rule) or by deleting common consequences from either side of the inequality
(elimination or deletion rule). These procedures are after all distinguishing features of dominant
expected utility theory.2 Let us then add the common consequences of a 0.89 probability of
receiving $0, and delete the common consequences of a 0.89 probability of receiving $lm.
That is, putting these operations together, let us add to each side of (1) the combination
1
The presentation follows Pope's adjustment of Allais' original account (in his 79 p.354). For
detail of subsequent research on initial responses, see also Pope 89. (Note however that Pope
tends to conflate acting rationally with acting consistently.)
2
The names given to these features of the expected utility procedure - with the different names
linked with their various axiomatic derivations - include Neumann and Morgenstern's rule for
equivalent classes, presented in their 47, p.24 and Malinvaud 52, Samuleson's independence
axiom, presented in his 53, Luce and Raiffa's substitution principle, presented in their 52,
p.26, the “combination” and “cancellation” property in Tversky and Kahneman 86 and the
joint result of “ordering” and the “reduction principle” in Fishburn 87. These critical
principles, especially their negative (reduction) forms or outputs, will come in for close
scrutiny in what follows.
�(2) + 0.89U($0)
0.89U($lm).
Then the preference for A over B can be equivalently represented by the result of this
(monotonic) addition, namely,
U($lm) + 0.89 U($0) - 0.89U($lm) > 0.10U($5m) + 0.89U($lm) + 0.01U($0) +
0.89U($0) - 0.89U($lm),
whence follows by utility arithmetic,
(3)
0.11U($lm)
+ 0.89U($0m)
>
0.10U($5m) +
0.9U($0).
But (3) represents nothing but the preference of C over D. Hence, given adherence to the
dominant theory and its procedures, preference for (or choice of) A over B is equivalent to
preference for C over D, not D over C. So whoever prefers one and adheres to the procedures
is rationally obliged to prefer the other, and is rationally inconsistent in preferring its converse.
Short of postponement (Savage's immediate move, in asking for time to think, in
response to Allais), these are two main strategies:
A. Dominant options, which involve explaining away pre-analytic responses. Savage's further
moves went this this theory-saving way, through the “sure-thing” principle. From a logical
perspective, the sure-thing principle is applied in transforming cases like assessment of D vis a
vis C, which are put out of intuitive bounds, into equivalent canonical forms, which are
(intuiively) decidable. The dominant theory is sho3red up, in a typical way, by psychological
work; those who do try to assess complex non-canonical cases like C vs. D are subject to
“framing illusions”.3
A*. Subversive options, which accept the pre-analytic responses, at more or less face value,
and modify the dominant theory. There are various ways modification can take place:
B. Reject the formalisation of the argument offered as too simple, because omitting
decisive information. Such an approach is taken by Pope, who contends that an occasionally
glimpsed but generally omitted time dimension is crucial. On that approach, which certainly
does not rule out fuller formalisation, a dynamic theory is regarded as essential.
B*. Accept the style of formalisation, as not overly simplistic, but reject specific
principles used in establishing equivalence of preferences. Such an approach, though of a fully
systematic kind, is of course that course pursued here. A rival relevant static theory is
elaborated. Although a static theory is adequate, so it is claimed, to remove paradox, dynamic
implementation naturally is not excluded. While it is not essential in the present setting, in other
settings it may well be required.
We now proceed to what breaks down on the B* approach, namely subtraction principles
fail. The result is that we can have both A over B and C over D. To establish the point
3
For one fuller account of those dominant strategies, see Pope.
�4
convincingly, we should supply a requisite model, [do model].
The relevant resolution sits very happily with significant empirical material which
Kahneman and Tyersky (K & T hereafter) have adduced contrasting combinative or additive
procedures with eliminative or substractive procedures,
[detail and reference].
Such
differences are strikingly exhibited not only in empirical practice (including the arithmetic
without zero of earlier human societies), but in logical theory. Two logical examples are these:
Gentzen methods, where there may be significant differences between introduction and
eliminative procedures, and, nearer to the present issue, relevant arithmetic, where negative
operations such as subtraction and division induce difficulties not encountered with
corresponding positive operatives.
K & T's positive assistance in distinguishing positive and negative diverences at work in
choice procedures is however utterly overwhelmed by their predominant (classical theory
saving) contentions. These attempt to remove all differences between ways of rectifying
classical decision theory. All are equally based on framing illusions, [work through examples,
detail this epistemological escape-chute]. Framing is a theory-solving device par excellence.
A highly favoured strategy for distancing rational decision theory from empirical
information consists in presentation of inconsistent preferences alleged to violate transitivity.
The argument runs like this: there can be no rational theory without transitivity, but actual
preferences, empirically recorded, may violate transitivity; so rational theory must discount
such empirical information. Such information is set aside, for instance as involving “framing”
distictions. There have been heroic attempts to slip around the first premiss, to design
nontransitive preference theories. No doubt something of this sort can be done; but in order to
gain a theory of some strength postulates much less pausible than transitivity are infiltrated. (In
any event, the major project of founding economic on aggregated preference theory depends
heavily, and approvently essentially on transitivity.) What should have been questioned,
however, is the second premiss, that transitivity is violated. Experimenters and other who
arrive at such a result have typically assumed consistency of subjects. Without consistency
nothing stops both the preferences empiricially found and transitivity. Such subjects have
inconsistent preferences. But, to exaggerate a little, nothing is more common than inconsistent
preferences or devises. Often, at least, preference sets are overdetermined, rather than, what
has highterto been supposed must be the case, logically underdetermined.
To allow properly for inconsistent preferences, as it is proposed to do, the underlying
logic must be paraconsistent. Otherwise, as with a classical base, the theory will trivialize
preferences. But the most satisfactory types of paraconsistent logics are relevant ones.
2. Rational decision theory and rational belief revision.
Consider the classical expansion principle - A
(A & B) V (A & ~B) and its extensions
to further parameters. - This principle is at the core of standard Bayesianism:
�5
• Jeffrey's derivability axiom requires it for its generality
• causal decision theories require it for building ultimate partitions of outcomes
• standard conditional expected utility requires it, e.g. U(A) = U(A & B) + U(A &
~ B), leading to U(A / B) = U(A & B) (on which see Malinas).
The same expansion principle is critical in Lewis's triviality proof. Likewise belief revision
theory, there are negative results where similar expansion principles play a major part.
But expansion is intricated in implicational paradox, indeed it plays a crucial part in C.I.
Lewis's “independent” proof of the inevitability of positive paradox in entailment theory. That
simple argument proceeds as follows:
A-». (A & B) V (A & ~B)
(A & B) V (A & ~B)
A&(B V ~B)
A->. A & (B V ~B)
A & (B V ~B)
B V ~B
A->.B V ~B
Expansion
Distribution
by Rule Transitivity
Simplification
by Transitivity again
That is, positive paradox, and irrelevance since B may have nothing to do with A. For this
reason among other, Expansion is rejected in relevant logic (see further RLR). With its rejection
a mass of established theory, implausible theory, crumbles.
3. Conditional preference theory (Bayesian style).
Therewith much relevant relocationis required.
Relevant relocation enables the wholesale removal of much of the surrounding belt of
idealisations which shield standard theory from criticism but at the same time prevents its
practical application to real-life agents and situations. Examples of idealisation in belief and
theory revision normative theory, sharing their disabling extents are as follows: It is assumed
that
• agents are perfect (classical) reasoners
• agents have determinate (real) degrees of belief
• agents have determinate conditional degrees of beliefs for every pair of propositions
expressible in their language [ - maintenance of probabilistic coherence].
References
Allais,M., ‘The so-called Allais paradox and rational decision under uncertainty’, in M. Allais
and O. Mazen (eds), Expected Utility and the Alluis Paradox, Reidal, Dordrecht 1979, 437681.
Fishbum, P., ‘Reconsiderations in the foundations of decision under uncertainty’, Economic
Journal 97(1987) 825-841.
Lace, R., and Ruiffa, H. Games and Decisions, John Wiley, New York, 1957.
Malinvaud, E., ‘A note on von Neumann - Morgenstern's strong independence axiom’,
Econometrica 20(1952) 679.
von Neumann, J., and Morgenstern, O., Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour, Princeton
University press, New Jersey, 1947.
�Pope, R., ‘The delusion of certainty in Savage's some-thing principle’ typescript Duntroon,
1989.
Routley, R., and others, Relevant Logics and Their Rivals, Ridgeview, California, 1982;
referred to as RLR.
Samuelson, P., ‘Probability, utility and the independence axiom’, Econometrica 20(1952) 670678.
Sylvan, R., ‘Modem myths concerning rationality’, ; referred to as MR.
Tversky, A., and Kahneman, D., ‘Rational choice and the framing of decisions’, Journal of
Business 59(1986) s251-s278.
�
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RATIONAL DECISION THEORY WITHOUT PARADOXES
The uniform strategy applied to remove paradoxes in several other arenas - implication,
confirmation, conditionality, explanation, logic itself — will be adapted to defuse all the usual
paradoxes vexing supposedly rational decision theory. That strategy comprises, essentially,
changing the underlying logic (which is the source of central rationality principles of logical—
type) to a modest relevant logic. It yields two important components: removal of irrelevance,
particularly in derivatives of the logical theory, for instance in this case probability and
preference theory; and reduction of excessive strength, not merely in the logical theory and its
derivatives, but especially in this case in maximization principles.
Decision theory hitherto has been, virtually without exception, classical: it has
unquestioningly assumed classical principles of consistency and maximality. Well it might be
claimed that these principles - which derive from the very classical Great Chain of Being -
serve, with but few further impeccable principles, to deliver classical logic, its derivatives such
as standard probability theory, and much else. The universality of these formative principles is
however a myth, one of the pervasive myths of modem rationality (see MR).
1. Common (i.e. equivalent) consequences arguments, and Allais' paradox.
Common consequences arguments depend upon the substitution of common, i.e.
equivalent, consequences. It is evident that what substitutions are permitted will depend not
merely upon admissible logical substitution principles, but above all upon the underlying notion
of equivalence.
A basic substitution principle takes the form
A<-*B,
F(A) /
F(B)
(S<->).
It yields, as derived cases, such further inference principles as
A<->B
f(A) = n
/
f(B) = n
and
A~B
/
G(A) = G(B),
given requisite vocabulary. But critical features of the resulting logics and theories depend
upon what the co-implication relation, <-», permits; its strength.
Over dinner at a Paris cafe one evening during an international colloquium on risky
choice, Allais asked Savage a pair of now very famous questions. First Allais asked Savage to
choose between prospects A and B:
A
complete certainty of a good outcome
$lm
B
0.10 probability of a very good outcome
$5m
0.89 probability of a good outcome
0.01 probability of a bad outcome
$lm
$0.
Savage preferred A to B. Allais next asked him to choose between prospects C and D:
C
0.89 probability of bad outcome
$0
D
2
0.11 probability of good outcome
$lm
0.90 probability of bad outcome
$0
0.10 probability of very good outcome
$5m.
Savage preferred D to C. Subsequent researchers quickly discovered that most of their
seemingly rational subjects responded initially to Allais' pair of questions as Savage had.1
The problem with these responses is that they violate classical expected utility theory, and
are accordingly classically irrational, that theory affording necessary conditions for
“rationality”. Therein too lies the Allais' paradox, that seemingly rational responses by
seemingly rational subjects are ruled irrational by the theory. For conjoint preferences of A
over B and D over C contradict the deliverance of the dominant theory, which specifies what is
rational here, according to which C over D is equivalent to A over B, and so the conjoint
preferences are inconsistent. The situation certainly supplies a paradox in the standard sense,
that preanalytic claims (that so and so definitely does not imply, does not confirm, such and
such) are contradicted by results of the dominant theory covering those claims.
The (too) brief argument to inconsistency of the seemingly rational preference rankings
under the dominant theory runs as follows:- Where U symbolizes the relevant utility function
(to which probabilities are immaterial in the present context), the preference for A over B can be
represented as
(1)
U($lm)
>
0.10U(%5m) + 0.89U($lm) + 0.01U($0),
Now it is assumed that an equivalent ranking - sometimes said to be the same ranking - results
by either adding common consequences to each side of the inequality (introduction or
combination rule) or by deleting common consequences from either side of the inequality
(elimination or deletion rule). These procedures are after all distinguishing features of dominant
expected utility theory.2 Let us then add the common consequences of a 0.89 probability of
receiving $0, and delete the common consequences of a 0.89 probability of receiving $lm.
That is, putting these operations together, let us add to each side of (1) the combination
1
The presentation follows Pope's adjustment of Allais' original account (in his 79 p.354). For
detail of subsequent research on initial responses, see also Pope 89. (Note however that Pope
tends to conflate acting rationally with acting consistently.)
2
The names given to these features of the expected utility procedure - with the different names
linked with their various axiomatic derivations - include Neumann and Morgenstern's rule for
equivalent classes, presented in their 47, p.24 and Malinvaud 52, Samuleson's independence
axiom, presented in his 53, Luce and Raiffa's substitution principle, presented in their 52,
p.26, the “combination” and “cancellation” property in Tversky and Kahneman 86 and the
joint result of “ordering” and the “reduction principle” in Fishburn 87. These critical
principles, especially their negative (reduction) forms or outputs, will come in for close
scrutiny in what follows.
(2) + 0.89U($0)
0.89U($lm).
Then the preference for A over B can be equivalently represented by the result of this
(monotonic) addition, namely,
U($lm) + 0.89 U($0) - 0.89U($lm) > 0.10U($5m) + 0.89U($lm) + 0.01U($0) +
0.89U($0) - 0.89U($lm),
whence follows by utility arithmetic,
(3)
0.11U($lm)
+ 0.89U($0m)
>
0.10U($5m) +
0.9U($0).
But (3) represents nothing but the preference of C over D. Hence, given adherence to the
dominant theory and its procedures, preference for (or choice of) A over B is equivalent to
preference for C over D, not D over C. So whoever prefers one and adheres to the procedures
is rationally obliged to prefer the other, and is rationally inconsistent in preferring its converse.
Short of postponement (Savage's immediate move, in asking for time to think, in
response to Allais), these are two main strategies:
A. Dominant options, which involve explaining away pre-analytic responses. Savage's further
moves went this this theory-saving way, through the “sure-thing” principle. From a logical
perspective, the sure-thing principle is applied in transforming cases like assessment of D vis a
vis C, which are put out of intuitive bounds, into equivalent canonical forms, which are
(intuiively) decidable. The dominant theory is sho3red up, in a typical way, by psychological
work; those who do try to assess complex non-canonical cases like C vs. D are subject to
“framing illusions”.3
A*. Subversive options, which accept the pre-analytic responses, at more or less face value,
and modify the dominant theory. There are various ways modification can take place:
B. Reject the formalisation of the argument offered as too simple, because omitting
decisive information. Such an approach is taken by Pope, who contends that an occasionally
glimpsed but generally omitted time dimension is crucial. On that approach, which certainly
does not rule out fuller formalisation, a dynamic theory is regarded as essential.
B*. Accept the style of formalisation, as not overly simplistic, but reject specific
principles used in establishing equivalence of preferences. Such an approach, though of a fully
systematic kind, is of course that course pursued here. A rival relevant static theory is
elaborated. Although a static theory is adequate, so it is claimed, to remove paradox, dynamic
implementation naturally is not excluded. While it is not essential in the present setting, in other
settings it may well be required.
We now proceed to what breaks down on the B* approach, namely subtraction principles
fail. The result is that we can have both A over B and C over D. To establish the point
3
For one fuller account of those dominant strategies, see Pope.
4
convincingly, we should supply a requisite model, [do model].
The relevant resolution sits very happily with significant empirical material which
Kahneman and Tyersky (K & T hereafter) have adduced contrasting combinative or additive
procedures with eliminative or substractive procedures,
[detail and reference].
Such
differences are strikingly exhibited not only in empirical practice (including the arithmetic
without zero of earlier human societies), but in logical theory. Two logical examples are these:
Gentzen methods, where there may be significant differences between introduction and
eliminative procedures, and, nearer to the present issue, relevant arithmetic, where negative
operations such as subtraction and division induce difficulties not encountered with
corresponding positive operatives.
K & T's positive assistance in distinguishing positive and negative diverences at work in
choice procedures is however utterly overwhelmed by their predominant (classical theory
saving) contentions. These attempt to remove all differences between ways of rectifying
classical decision theory. All are equally based on framing illusions, [work through examples,
detail this epistemological escape-chute]. Framing is a theory-solving device par excellence.
A highly favoured strategy for distancing rational decision theory from empirical
information consists in presentation of inconsistent preferences alleged to violate transitivity.
The argument runs like this: there can be no rational theory without transitivity, but actual
preferences, empirically recorded, may violate transitivity; so rational theory must discount
such empirical information. Such information is set aside, for instance as involving “framing”
distictions. There have been heroic attempts to slip around the first premiss, to design
nontransitive preference theories. No doubt something of this sort can be done; but in order to
gain a theory of some strength postulates much less pausible than transitivity are infiltrated. (In
any event, the major project of founding economic on aggregated preference theory depends
heavily, and approvently essentially on transitivity.) What should have been questioned,
however, is the second premiss, that transitivity is violated. Experimenters and other who
arrive at such a result have typically assumed consistency of subjects. Without consistency
nothing stops both the preferences empiricially found and transitivity. Such subjects have
inconsistent preferences. But, to exaggerate a little, nothing is more common than inconsistent
preferences or devises. Often, at least, preference sets are overdetermined, rather than, what
has highterto been supposed must be the case, logically underdetermined.
To allow properly for inconsistent preferences, as it is proposed to do, the underlying
logic must be paraconsistent. Otherwise, as with a classical base, the theory will trivialize
preferences. But the most satisfactory types of paraconsistent logics are relevant ones.
2. Rational decision theory and rational belief revision.
Consider the classical expansion principle - A
(A & B) V (A & ~B) and its extensions
to further parameters. - This principle is at the core of standard Bayesianism:
5
• Jeffrey's derivability axiom requires it for its generality
• causal decision theories require it for building ultimate partitions of outcomes
• standard conditional expected utility requires it, e.g. U(A) = U(A & B) + U(A &
~ B), leading to U(A / B) = U(A & B) (on which see Malinas).
The same expansion principle is critical in Lewis's triviality proof. Likewise belief revision
theory, there are negative results where similar expansion principles play a major part.
But expansion is intricated in implicational paradox, indeed it plays a crucial part in C.I.
Lewis's “independent” proof of the inevitability of positive paradox in entailment theory. That
simple argument proceeds as follows:
A-». (A & B) V (A & ~B)
(A & B) V (A & ~B)
A&(B V ~B)
A->. A & (B V ~B)
A & (B V ~B)
B V ~B
A->.B V ~B
Expansion
Distribution
by Rule Transitivity
Simplification
by Transitivity again
That is, positive paradox, and irrelevance since B may have nothing to do with A. For this
reason among other, Expansion is rejected in relevant logic (see further RLR). With its rejection
a mass of established theory, implausible theory, crumbles.
3. Conditional preference theory (Bayesian style).
Therewith much relevant relocationis required.
Relevant relocation enables the wholesale removal of much of the surrounding belt of
idealisations which shield standard theory from criticism but at the same time prevents its
practical application to real-life agents and situations. Examples of idealisation in belief and
theory revision normative theory, sharing their disabling extents are as follows: It is assumed
that
• agents are perfect (classical) reasoners
• agents have determinate (real) degrees of belief
• agents have determinate conditional degrees of beliefs for every pair of propositions
expressible in their language [ - maintenance of probabilistic coherence].
References
Allais,M., ‘The so-called Allais paradox and rational decision under uncertainty’, in M. Allais
and O. Mazen (eds), Expected Utility and the Alluis Paradox, Reidal, Dordrecht 1979, 437681.
Fishbum, P., ‘Reconsiderations in the foundations of decision under uncertainty’, Economic
Journal 97(1987) 825-841.
Lace, R., and Ruiffa, H. Games and Decisions, John Wiley, New York, 1957.
Malinvaud, E., ‘A note on von Neumann - Morgenstern's strong independence axiom’,
Econometrica 20(1952) 679.
von Neumann, J., and Morgenstern, O., Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour, Princeton
University press, New Jersey, 1947.
Pope, R., ‘The delusion of certainty in Savage's some-thing principle’ typescript Duntroon,
1989.
Routley, R., and others, Relevant Logics and Their Rivals, Ridgeview, California, 1982;
referred to as RLR.
Samuelson, P., ‘Probability, utility and the independence axiom’, Econometrica 20(1952) 670678.
Sylvan, R., ‘Modem myths concerning rationality’, ; referred to as MR.
Tversky, A., and Kahneman, D., ‘Rational choice and the framing of decisions’, Journal of
Business 59(1986) s251-s278.
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Text
RATIONAL DECISION THEORY WITHOUT PARADOXES
The uniform strategy applied to remove paradoxes in several other arenas - implication,
confirmation, conditionality, explanation, logic itself — will be adapted to defuse all the usual
paradoxes vexing supposedly rational decision theory. That strategy comprises, essentially,
changing the underlying logic (which is the source of central rationality principles of logical—
type) to a modest relevant logic. It yields two important components: removal of irrelevance,
particularly in derivatives of the logical theory, for instance in this case probability and
preference theory; and reduction of excessive strength, not merely in the logical theory and its
derivatives, but especially in this case in maximization principles.
Decision theory hitherto has been, virtually without exception, classical: it has
unquestioningly assumed classical principles of consistency and maximality. Well it might be
claimed that these principles - which derive from the very classical Great Chain of Being -
serve, with but few further impeccable principles, to deliver classical logic, its derivatives such
as standard probability theory, and much else. The universality of these formative principles is
however a myth, one of the pervasive myths of modem rationality (see MR).
1. Common (i.e. equivalent) consequences arguments, and Allais' paradox.
Common consequences arguments depend upon the substitution of common, i.e.
equivalent, consequences. It is evident that what substitutions are permitted will depend not
merely upon admissible logical substitution principles, but above all upon the underlying notion
of equivalence.
A basic substitution principle takes the form
A<-*B,
F(A) /
F(B)
(S<->).
It yields, as derived cases, such further inference principles as
A<->B
f(A) = n
/
f(B) = n
and
A~B
/
G(A) = G(B),
given requisite vocabulary. But critical features of the resulting logics and theories depend
upon what the co-implication relation, <-», permits; its strength.
Over dinner at a Paris cafe one evening during an international colloquium on risky
choice, Allais asked Savage a pair of now very famous questions. First Allais asked Savage to
choose between prospects A and B:
A
complete certainty of a good outcome
$lm
B
0.10 probability of a very good outcome
$5m
0.89 probability of a good outcome
0.01 probability of a bad outcome
$lm
$0.
Savage preferred A to B. Allais next asked him to choose between prospects C and D:
C
0.89 probability of bad outcome
$0
�D
2
0.11 probability of good outcome
$lm
0.90 probability of bad outcome
$0
0.10 probability of very good outcome
$5m.
Savage preferred D to C. Subsequent researchers quickly discovered that most of their
seemingly rational subjects responded initially to Allais' pair of questions as Savage had.1
The problem with these responses is that they violate classical expected utility theory, and
are accordingly classically irrational, that theory affording necessary conditions for
“rationality”. Therein too lies the Allais' paradox, that seemingly rational responses by
seemingly rational subjects are ruled irrational by the theory. For conjoint preferences of A
over B and D over C contradict the deliverance of the dominant theory, which specifies what is
rational here, according to which C over D is equivalent to A over B, and so the conjoint
preferences are inconsistent. The situation certainly supplies a paradox in the standard sense,
that preanalytic claims (that so and so definitely does not imply, does not confirm, such and
such) are contradicted by results of the dominant theory covering those claims.
The (too) brief argument to inconsistency of the seemingly rational preference rankings
under the dominant theory runs as follows:- Where U symbolizes the relevant utility function
(to which probabilities are immaterial in the present context), the preference for A over B can be
represented as
(1)
U($lm)
>
0.10U(%5m) + 0.89U($lm) + 0.01U($0),
Now it is assumed that an equivalent ranking - sometimes said to be the same ranking - results
by either adding common consequences to each side of the inequality (introduction or
combination rule) or by deleting common consequences from either side of the inequality
(elimination or deletion rule). These procedures are after all distinguishing features of dominant
expected utility theory.2 Let us then add the common consequences of a 0.89 probability of
receiving $0, and delete the common consequences of a 0.89 probability of receiving $lm.
That is, putting these operations together, let us add to each side of (1) the combination
1
The presentation follows Pope's adjustment of Allais' original account (in his 79 p.354). For
detail of subsequent research on initial responses, see also Pope 89. (Note however that Pope
tends to conflate acting rationally with acting consistently.)
2
The names given to these features of the expected utility procedure - with the different names
linked with their various axiomatic derivations - include Neumann and Morgenstern's rule for
equivalent classes, presented in their 47, p.24 and Malinvaud 52, Samuleson's independence
axiom, presented in his 53, Luce and Raiffa's substitution principle, presented in their 52,
p.26, the “combination” and “cancellation” property in Tversky and Kahneman 86 and the
joint result of “ordering” and the “reduction principle” in Fishburn 87. These critical
principles, especially their negative (reduction) forms or outputs, will come in for close
scrutiny in what follows.
�(2) + 0.89U($0)
0.89U($lm).
Then the preference for A over B can be equivalently represented by the result of this
(monotonic) addition, namely,
U($lm) + 0.89 U($0) - 0.89U($lm) > 0.10U($5m) + 0.89U($lm) + 0.01U($0) +
0.89U($0) - 0.89U($lm),
whence follows by utility arithmetic,
(3)
0.11U($lm)
+ 0.89U($0m)
>
0.10U($5m) +
0.9U($0).
But (3) represents nothing but the preference of C over D. Hence, given adherence to the
dominant theory and its procedures, preference for (or choice of) A over B is equivalent to
preference for C over D, not D over C. So whoever prefers one and adheres to the procedures
is rationally obliged to prefer the other, and is rationally inconsistent in preferring its converse.
Short of postponement (Savage's immediate move, in asking for time to think, in
response to Allais), these are two main strategies:
A. Dominant options, which involve explaining away pre-analytic responses. Savage's further
moves went this this theory-saving way, through the “sure-thing” principle. From a logical
perspective, the sure-thing principle is applied in transforming cases like assessment of D vis a
vis C, which are put out of intuitive bounds, into equivalent canonical forms, which are
(intuiively) decidable. The dominant theory is sho3red up, in a typical way, by psychological
work; those who do try to assess complex non-canonical cases like C vs. D are subject to
“framing illusions”.3
A*. Subversive options, which accept the pre-analytic responses, at more or less face value,
and modify the dominant theory. There are various ways modification can take place:
B. Reject the formalisation of the argument offered as too simple, because omitting
decisive information. Such an approach is taken by Pope, who contends that an occasionally
glimpsed but generally omitted time dimension is crucial. On that approach, which certainly
does not rule out fuller formalisation, a dynamic theory is regarded as essential.
B*. Accept the style of formalisation, as not overly simplistic, but reject specific
principles used in establishing equivalence of preferences. Such an approach, though of a fully
systematic kind, is of course that course pursued here. A rival relevant static theory is
elaborated. Although a static theory is adequate, so it is claimed, to remove paradox, dynamic
implementation naturally is not excluded. While it is not essential in the present setting, in other
settings it may well be required.
We now proceed to what breaks down on the B* approach, namely subtraction principles
fail. The result is that we can have both A over B and C over D. To establish the point
3
For one fuller account of those dominant strategies, see Pope.
�4
convincingly, we should supply a requisite model, [do model].
The relevant resolution sits very happily with significant empirical material which
Kahneman and Tyersky (K & T hereafter) have adduced contrasting combinative or additive
procedures with eliminative or substractive procedures,
[detail and reference].
Such
differences are strikingly exhibited not only in empirical practice (including the arithmetic
without zero of earlier human societies), but in logical theory. Two logical examples are these:
Gentzen methods, where there may be significant differences between introduction and
eliminative procedures, and, nearer to the present issue, relevant arithmetic, where negative
operations such as subtraction and division induce difficulties not encountered with
corresponding positive operatives.
K & T's positive assistance in distinguishing positive and negative diverences at work in
choice procedures is however utterly overwhelmed by their predominant (classical theory
saving) contentions. These attempt to remove all differences between ways of rectifying
classical decision theory. All are equally based on framing illusions, [work through examples,
detail this epistemological escape-chute]. Framing is a theory-solving device par excellence.
A highly favoured strategy for distancing rational decision theory from empirical
information consists in presentation of inconsistent preferences alleged to violate transitivity.
The argument runs like this: there can be no rational theory without transitivity, but actual
preferences, empirically recorded, may violate transitivity; so rational theory must discount
such empirical information. Such information is set aside, for instance as involving “framing”
distictions. There have been heroic attempts to slip around the first premiss, to design
nontransitive preference theories. No doubt something of this sort can be done; but in order to
gain a theory of some strength postulates much less pausible than transitivity are infiltrated. (In
any event, the major project of founding economic on aggregated preference theory depends
heavily, and approvently essentially on transitivity.) What should have been questioned,
however, is the second premiss, that transitivity is violated. Experimenters and other who
arrive at such a result have typically assumed consistency of subjects. Without consistency
nothing stops both the preferences empiricially found and transitivity. Such subjects have
inconsistent preferences. But, to exaggerate a little, nothing is more common than inconsistent
preferences or devises. Often, at least, preference sets are overdetermined, rather than, what
has highterto been supposed must be the case, logically underdetermined.
To allow properly for inconsistent preferences, as it is proposed to do, the underlying
logic must be paraconsistent. Otherwise, as with a classical base, the theory will trivialize
preferences. But the most satisfactory types of paraconsistent logics are relevant ones.
2. Rational decision theory and rational belief revision.
Consider the classical expansion principle - A
(A & B) V (A & ~B) and its extensions
to further parameters. - This principle is at the core of standard Bayesianism:
�5
• Jeffrey's derivability axiom requires it for its generality
• causal decision theories require it for building ultimate partitions of outcomes
• standard conditional expected utility requires it, e.g. U(A) = U(A & B) + U(A &
~ B), leading to U(A / B) = U(A & B) (on which see Malinas).
The same expansion principle is critical in Lewis's triviality proof. Likewise belief revision
theory, there are negative results where similar expansion principles play a major part.
But expansion is intricated in implicational paradox, indeed it plays a crucial part in C.I.
Lewis's “independent” proof of the inevitability of positive paradox in entailment theory. That
simple argument proceeds as follows:
A-». (A & B) V (A & ~B)
(A & B) V (A & ~B)
A&(B V ~B)
A->. A & (B V ~B)
A & (B V ~B)
B V ~B
A->.B V ~B
Expansion
Distribution
by Rule Transitivity
Simplification
by Transitivity again
That is, positive paradox, and irrelevance since B may have nothing to do with A. For this
reason among other, Expansion is rejected in relevant logic (see further RLR). With its rejection
a mass of established theory, implausible theory, crumbles.
3. Conditional preference theory (Bayesian style).
Therewith much relevant relocationis required.
Relevant relocation enables the wholesale removal of much of the surrounding belt of
idealisations which shield standard theory from criticism but at the same time prevents its
practical application to real-life agents and situations. Examples of idealisation in belief and
theory revision normative theory, sharing their disabling extents are as follows: It is assumed
that
• agents are perfect (classical) reasoners
• agents have determinate (real) degrees of belief
• agents have determinate conditional degrees of beliefs for every pair of propositions
expressible in their language [ - maintenance of probabilistic coherence].
References
Allais,M., ‘The so-called Allais paradox and rational decision under uncertainty’, in M. Allais
and O. Mazen (eds), Expected Utility and the Alluis Paradox, Reidal, Dordrecht 1979, 437681.
Fishbum, P., ‘Reconsiderations in the foundations of decision under uncertainty’, Economic
Journal 97(1987) 825-841.
Lace, R., and Ruiffa, H. Games and Decisions, John Wiley, New York, 1957.
Malinvaud, E., ‘A note on von Neumann - Morgenstern's strong independence axiom’,
Econometrica 20(1952) 679.
von Neumann, J., and Morgenstern, O., Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour, Princeton
University press, New Jersey, 1947.
�Pope, R., ‘The delusion of certainty in Savage's some-thing principle’ typescript Duntroon,
1989.
Routley, R., and others, Relevant Logics and Their Rivals, Ridgeview, California, 1982;
referred to as RLR.
Samuelson, P., ‘Probability, utility and the independence axiom’, Econometrica 20(1952) 670678.
Sylvan, R., ‘Modem myths concerning rationality’, ; referred to as MR.
Tversky, A., and Kahneman, D., ‘Rational choice and the framing of decisions’, Journal of
Business 59(1986) s251-s278.
�
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RATIONAL DECISION THEORY WITHOUT PARADOXES
The uniform strategy applied to remove paradoxes in several other arenas - implication,
confirmation, conditionality, explanation, logic itself — will be adapted to defuse all the usual
paradoxes vexing supposedly rational decision theory. That strategy comprises, essentially,
changing the underlying logic (which is the source of central rationality principles of logical—
type) to a modest relevant logic. It yields two important components: removal of irrelevance,
particularly in derivatives of the logical theory, for instance in this case probability and
preference theory; and reduction of excessive strength, not merely in the logical theory and its
derivatives, but especially in this case in maximization principles.
Decision theory hitherto has been, virtually without exception, classical: it has
unquestioningly assumed classical principles of consistency and maximality. Well it might be
claimed that these principles - which derive from the very classical Great Chain of Being -
serve, with but few further impeccable principles, to deliver classical logic, its derivatives such
as standard probability theory, and much else. The universality of these formative principles is
however a myth, one of the pervasive myths of modem rationality (see MR).
1. Common (i.e. equivalent) consequences arguments, and Allais' paradox.
Common consequences arguments depend upon the substitution of common, i.e.
equivalent, consequences. It is evident that what substitutions are permitted will depend not
merely upon admissible logical substitution principles, but above all upon the underlying notion
of equivalence.
A basic substitution principle takes the form
A<-*B,
F(A) /
F(B)
(S<->).
It yields, as derived cases, such further inference principles as
A<->B
f(A) = n
/
f(B) = n
and
A~B
/
G(A) = G(B),
given requisite vocabulary. But critical features of the resulting logics and theories depend
upon what the co-implication relation, <-», permits; its strength.
Over dinner at a Paris cafe one evening during an international colloquium on risky
choice, Allais asked Savage a pair of now very famous questions. First Allais asked Savage to
choose between prospects A and B:
A
complete certainty of a good outcome
$lm
B
0.10 probability of a very good outcome
$5m
0.89 probability of a good outcome
0.01 probability of a bad outcome
$lm
$0.
Savage preferred A to B. Allais next asked him to choose between prospects C and D:
C
0.89 probability of bad outcome
$0
D
2
0.11 probability of good outcome
$lm
0.90 probability of bad outcome
$0
0.10 probability of very good outcome
$5m.
Savage preferred D to C. Subsequent researchers quickly discovered that most of their
seemingly rational subjects responded initially to Allais' pair of questions as Savage had.1
The problem with these responses is that they violate classical expected utility theory, and
are accordingly classically irrational, that theory affording necessary conditions for
“rationality”. Therein too lies the Allais' paradox, that seemingly rational responses by
seemingly rational subjects are ruled irrational by the theory. For conjoint preferences of A
over B and D over C contradict the deliverance of the dominant theory, which specifies what is
rational here, according to which C over D is equivalent to A over B, and so the conjoint
preferences are inconsistent. The situation certainly supplies a paradox in the standard sense,
that preanalytic claims (that so and so definitely does not imply, does not confirm, such and
such) are contradicted by results of the dominant theory covering those claims.
The (too) brief argument to inconsistency of the seemingly rational preference rankings
under the dominant theory runs as follows:- Where U symbolizes the relevant utility function
(to which probabilities are immaterial in the present context), the preference for A over B can be
represented as
(1)
U($lm)
>
0.10U(%5m) + 0.89U($lm) + 0.01U($0),
Now it is assumed that an equivalent ranking - sometimes said to be the same ranking - results
by either adding common consequences to each side of the inequality (introduction or
combination rule) or by deleting common consequences from either side of the inequality
(elimination or deletion rule). These procedures are after all distinguishing features of dominant
expected utility theory.2 Let us then add the common consequences of a 0.89 probability of
receiving $0, and delete the common consequences of a 0.89 probability of receiving $lm.
That is, putting these operations together, let us add to each side of (1) the combination
1
The presentation follows Pope's adjustment of Allais' original account (in his 79 p.354). For
detail of subsequent research on initial responses, see also Pope 89. (Note however that Pope
tends to conflate acting rationally with acting consistently.)
2
The names given to these features of the expected utility procedure - with the different names
linked with their various axiomatic derivations - include Neumann and Morgenstern's rule for
equivalent classes, presented in their 47, p.24 and Malinvaud 52, Samuleson's independence
axiom, presented in his 53, Luce and Raiffa's substitution principle, presented in their 52,
p.26, the “combination” and “cancellation” property in Tversky and Kahneman 86 and the
joint result of “ordering” and the “reduction principle” in Fishburn 87. These critical
principles, especially their negative (reduction) forms or outputs, will come in for close
scrutiny in what follows.
(2) + 0.89U($0)
0.89U($lm).
Then the preference for A over B can be equivalently represented by the result of this
(monotonic) addition, namely,
U($lm) + 0.89 U($0) - 0.89U($lm) > 0.10U($5m) + 0.89U($lm) + 0.01U($0) +
0.89U($0) - 0.89U($lm),
whence follows by utility arithmetic,
(3)
0.11U($lm)
+ 0.89U($0m)
>
0.10U($5m) +
0.9U($0).
But (3) represents nothing but the preference of C over D. Hence, given adherence to the
dominant theory and its procedures, preference for (or choice of) A over B is equivalent to
preference for C over D, not D over C. So whoever prefers one and adheres to the procedures
is rationally obliged to prefer the other, and is rationally inconsistent in preferring its converse.
Short of postponement (Savage's immediate move, in asking for time to think, in
response to Allais), these are two main strategies:
A. Dominant options, which involve explaining away pre-analytic responses. Savage's further
moves went this this theory-saving way, through the “sure-thing” principle. From a logical
perspective, the sure-thing principle is applied in transforming cases like assessment of D vis a
vis C, which are put out of intuitive bounds, into equivalent canonical forms, which are
(intuiively) decidable. The dominant theory is sho3red up, in a typical way, by psychological
work; those who do try to assess complex non-canonical cases like C vs. D are subject to
“framing illusions”.3
A*. Subversive options, which accept the pre-analytic responses, at more or less face value,
and modify the dominant theory. There are various ways modification can take place:
B. Reject the formalisation of the argument offered as too simple, because omitting
decisive information. Such an approach is taken by Pope, who contends that an occasionally
glimpsed but generally omitted time dimension is crucial. On that approach, which certainly
does not rule out fuller formalisation, a dynamic theory is regarded as essential.
B*. Accept the style of formalisation, as not overly simplistic, but reject specific
principles used in establishing equivalence of preferences. Such an approach, though of a fully
systematic kind, is of course that course pursued here. A rival relevant static theory is
elaborated. Although a static theory is adequate, so it is claimed, to remove paradox, dynamic
implementation naturally is not excluded. While it is not essential in the present setting, in other
settings it may well be required.
We now proceed to what breaks down on the B* approach, namely subtraction principles
fail. The result is that we can have both A over B and C over D. To establish the point
3
For one fuller account of those dominant strategies, see Pope.
4
convincingly, we should supply a requisite model, [do model].
The relevant resolution sits very happily with significant empirical material which
Kahneman and Tyersky (K & T hereafter) have adduced contrasting combinative or additive
procedures with eliminative or substractive procedures,
[detail and reference].
Such
differences are strikingly exhibited not only in empirical practice (including the arithmetic
without zero of earlier human societies), but in logical theory. Two logical examples are these:
Gentzen methods, where there may be significant differences between introduction and
eliminative procedures, and, nearer to the present issue, relevant arithmetic, where negative
operations such as subtraction and division induce difficulties not encountered with
corresponding positive operatives.
K & T's positive assistance in distinguishing positive and negative diverences at work in
choice procedures is however utterly overwhelmed by their predominant (classical theory
saving) contentions. These attempt to remove all differences between ways of rectifying
classical decision theory. All are equally based on framing illusions, [work through examples,
detail this epistemological escape-chute]. Framing is a theory-solving device par excellence.
A highly favoured strategy for distancing rational decision theory from empirical
information consists in presentation of inconsistent preferences alleged to violate transitivity.
The argument runs like this: there can be no rational theory without transitivity, but actual
preferences, empirically recorded, may violate transitivity; so rational theory must discount
such empirical information. Such information is set aside, for instance as involving “framing”
distictions. There have been heroic attempts to slip around the first premiss, to design
nontransitive preference theories. No doubt something of this sort can be done; but in order to
gain a theory of some strength postulates much less pausible than transitivity are infiltrated. (In
any event, the major project of founding economic on aggregated preference theory depends
heavily, and approvently essentially on transitivity.) What should have been questioned,
however, is the second premiss, that transitivity is violated. Experimenters and other who
arrive at such a result have typically assumed consistency of subjects. Without consistency
nothing stops both the preferences empiricially found and transitivity. Such subjects have
inconsistent preferences. But, to exaggerate a little, nothing is more common than inconsistent
preferences or devises. Often, at least, preference sets are overdetermined, rather than, what
has highterto been supposed must be the case, logically underdetermined.
To allow properly for inconsistent preferences, as it is proposed to do, the underlying
logic must be paraconsistent. Otherwise, as with a classical base, the theory will trivialize
preferences. But the most satisfactory types of paraconsistent logics are relevant ones.
2. Rational decision theory and rational belief revision.
Consider the classical expansion principle - A
(A & B) V (A & ~B) and its extensions
to further parameters. - This principle is at the core of standard Bayesianism:
5
• Jeffrey's derivability axiom requires it for its generality
• causal decision theories require it for building ultimate partitions of outcomes
• standard conditional expected utility requires it, e.g. U(A) = U(A & B) + U(A &
~ B), leading to U(A / B) = U(A & B) (on which see Malinas).
The same expansion principle is critical in Lewis's triviality proof. Likewise belief revision
theory, there are negative results where similar expansion principles play a major part.
But expansion is intricated in implicational paradox, indeed it plays a crucial part in C.I.
Lewis's “independent” proof of the inevitability of positive paradox in entailment theory. That
simple argument proceeds as follows:
A-». (A & B) V (A & ~B)
(A & B) V (A & ~B)
A&(B V ~B)
A->. A & (B V ~B)
A & (B V ~B)
B V ~B
A->.B V ~B
Expansion
Distribution
by Rule Transitivity
Simplification
by Transitivity again
That is, positive paradox, and irrelevance since B may have nothing to do with A. For this
reason among other, Expansion is rejected in relevant logic (see further RLR). With its rejection
a mass of established theory, implausible theory, crumbles.
3. Conditional preference theory (Bayesian style).
Therewith much relevant relocationis required.
Relevant relocation enables the wholesale removal of much of the surrounding belt of
idealisations which shield standard theory from criticism but at the same time prevents its
practical application to real-life agents and situations. Examples of idealisation in belief and
theory revision normative theory, sharing their disabling extents are as follows: It is assumed
that
• agents are perfect (classical) reasoners
• agents have determinate (real) degrees of belief
• agents have determinate conditional degrees of beliefs for every pair of propositions
expressible in their language [ - maintenance of probabilistic coherence].
References
Allais,M., ‘The so-called Allais paradox and rational decision under uncertainty’, in M. Allais
and O. Mazen (eds), Expected Utility and the Alluis Paradox, Reidal, Dordrecht 1979, 437681.
Fishbum, P., ‘Reconsiderations in the foundations of decision under uncertainty’, Economic
Journal 97(1987) 825-841.
Lace, R., and Ruiffa, H. Games and Decisions, John Wiley, New York, 1957.
Malinvaud, E., ‘A note on von Neumann - Morgenstern's strong independence axiom’,
Econometrica 20(1952) 679.
von Neumann, J., and Morgenstern, O., Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour, Princeton
University press, New Jersey, 1947.
Pope, R., ‘The delusion of certainty in Savage's some-thing principle’ typescript Duntroon,
1989.
Routley, R., and others, Relevant Logics and Their Rivals, Ridgeview, California, 1982;
referred to as RLR.
Samuelson, P., ‘Probability, utility and the independence axiom’, Econometrica 20(1952) 670678.
Sylvan, R., ‘Modem myths concerning rationality’, ; referred to as MR.
Tversky, A., and Kahneman, D., ‘Rational choice and the framing of decisions’, Journal of
Business 59(1986) s251-s278.
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Box 18: Green Projects in Progress
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13.6.96
GREEN POLITICAL THEORY:
a different account
Green political theory is divided according to one of our guides1, rather like Gaul
according to Caesar, into three parts:
—a green theory of value,
—a subordinate green theory of agency, and
—a green lifestyle program, portrayed as a set of altogether dispensible lifestyle
recommendations.
While it is the high-handed insistent dismissal of green lifestyles by this guide, Goodin, that has
captured the attention of critics and been highlighted, the brash partitioning of green political
theory, and the surreptitious dismissal therewith of significant parts of it, should not pass
unnoticed. To the contrary, virtually the whole of what political theory is taken to treat comes up
for reassessment once green lights are played upon it, certainly under deeper green illumination.
That bogus exhaustiveness taken for granted, that all there is to it amounts to value and action,
no doubt derives largely from an underlying utilitarianism, according to which other theoretical
matters can be subsumed under these.2
In short, partly through dispensing with lifestyle considerations, primarily by virtue of a
background utilitarianism operating within a conventional state-setting, Goodin can suppose that
green political theory reduces to these two parts: a theory of value and a subordinate theory of
agency. Such a reduction is however much too simple, leaving out, as it does, much of ethics of
political relevance, as well as a large slab of politics. For example, ethical omissions include the
fields of deontology (environmental permissions, prescriptives, directives; environmental
justice, rights and so on), of virtue theory, and of accountability. Among political omissions
most striking is the absence of any due consideration of institutional and ideological alternatives
to what now prevails. Prevailing Western political arrangements—with staged elections, urban
bureaucratic control, incremental reformism (often environmentally regressive), and so on—are
simply taken for granted. Above all, there is no critique of the state, an increasingly important
part of radical green politics. One reason for this gross omission— f radical green theory from
what is presented as green political theory—is that Goodin does not question the conventional
political assumption that the appropriate objective of green political activity consists in gaining
power or influence within established statist arrangements, for example at best through electoral
1
R. Goodin Green Political Theory, Polity Press, Cambridge 1992. This was undoubtedly a book
worth criticizing.
2
See the appendix.
�2
success enabling control of some of the administrative and executive functions of state (we shall
encounter this conventional “political realism^^ again later). However significant strands of
green political theory no longer accept this assumption. A related reason, reaching deeper, is
that Goodin likewise does not question, as strands of green theory now do, what helps
undergird the conventional political assumption and reformist utilitarianism, an Enlightenment
ideology with its faith in reason and science, technologically-based progress, overall human
goodness and dominance, and so on.3
The bold overstatement of claims, along with misrepresentation as to what green political
theory comprises, is symptomatic of much of the book: overstatement and undersubstantiation.4
Virtually all main themes of the book are false, indeed rather patently so once exhibited
unadorned, because limited truths are overextended; and they are undersupplied with cogent
support. So it is with the green theory of value, which inflates what is a significant factor in
green evaluation into the supposed total green theory. So it is with the green package, which is
presented as having an absolutely tight integration, which it in fact lacks. And so on, as will
appear. Not only are main themes seriously defective; more disappointing, a salvage operation
will not yield a lode of green gold.
As troubling is the anti-subversive character of the work. Goodin has wheeled another
Trojan horse into green territory, a horse bringing a number of anti-green academic warriors
armed with anti-green ideas and sentiments, and engaged in and advocating anti-green lifestyles,
(as will emerge).5 Of course, 'Green political theory' is a clever title, which is complemented by
a politically clever introduction on the crises which are not minimized or marginalised but given
considerable weight—all of which suggest that the text might be of much more interest to
politically inclined greens than the usual academic fare. But the title does not say how the green
theory is to be treated, explained and encouraged, exposed and condemned. Neither really. The
text is not written for greens (though the publishers obviously hope they may buy it,6 or be
3
For an exposition and criticism of Enlightenment Ideology, see Sylvan TM.
4
In part because these sorts of deficiencies have not been addressed in reviews of the book, I
decided to persevere with this less charitable critique (a tiresome exercise bound to alienate).
Regrettably most of the reviews appear to derive from a political science orientation. They trip
lightly by philosophical fundamentals, where the book is noticeably weak, and vulnerable.
And they tend to be very light on argument.
5
Trojan horses are in extensive use by academics, particularly in green regions. We will
encounter a number of these horses. They are evident from sociology to biogeography and
climatology, and particularly prominent around economic enslaves.
6
They form part of the intended audience for the book according to accompanying publishers'
work and flyers. Indeed the publishers have participated in the deception, supplying a cover
featuring a boss of the Green Man from the cloisters of Norwich cathedral, which sends, as they
�3
tricked into buying it), but for a cohert of academic colleagues—for colleagues who form part of
the prevailing system, of politics-more-or-less-as-usual and so on.
Deapite its character, there are several useful and attractive features of Goodin's book,
which do make it worthwhile reading for awake greens of theoretical bent (one of these features
is an Appendix, putting together succinctly a green political program). It is a smoothly written
book, encouraging readers to glide along, glossing over the underlying content and messages,
and not grasping the enormity of some of what is presented, for instance even as green gospel.
It may be just the style that is attractive (the cut of the book, the easy flow, an appealingly simple
structure, and other stylish features), rather than details of the real content. If the book has a
weakness from the PR angle, it may lie in its flippancy, and failure to take several green issues
seriously, both of which sometimes enter irritatingly and will turn off some committed greens.
But, by and large, it is a splendidly packaged work; it is what is packaged and what is pushed on
greens that is the trouble.
For a book purportedly on green theory, treatment of greens is extraordinary
condescending. Not much notice is going to be taken of 'what self-styled greens... happen to
believe', 'what positions greens actually do take' (p.vii). (How then does he justify the green
attributions he proceeds to make, e.g. 'green theory of value5? Evidently his procedure is
methodologically unsound). No, it is 'an attempt to saves greens from themselves5 (p.viii). To
rescue them,4to tidy up' their slovenly positions—while throwing away critical features of green
approaches, such as green lifestyles—Goodin is particularly concerned that green lifestyles
should not be seen as part of a rectified green political package. Green lifestyle
recommendations are entirely dispensible (so he and others can look and indeed be green without
deffort, without making any green contribution; they are conveniently absolved from any
relevant action, or lifestyle adjustment).
At one stage Goodin claims that the theory is 'moderately deep'. But elsewhere he has
more accurately said that it is a pale green theory, very pale green given the attitude taken to
green lifestyles. Green Political Theory it may be called: deeper green political theory, at least, it
certainly is not, even genuine green it but dubiously is. However Goodin's aim, he regularly
informs us, is once again not 4to describe what positions greens actually do take5. His project is
a normative one, aimed instead to show what positions greens should take, given their core
concerns... what they have to say given their core values'?. In this attempt he should be seen to
remarks, 'precisely the contrary signal concerning the nature of the author's project in there
behind the Green Man's work*.
7
P. viii - p.vii, itals added.
�4
fail entirely. He is astray not merely on the core concerns of many of them (which concerns are
far from uniform), but also in loosely coupled resultant positions. Greens are under no such
obligations as Goodin would load them with; they are not boxed in as he would suppose.
The approach is not only condescending towards greens; it is a touch arrogant. The aim is
said to be 'to show greens how to cast their position in the strongest possible form\8 This will
turn out to be not a strong theoretical form, by any means, but merely a strong form
pragmatically, given a raft of assumptions about prevailing electoral arrangements, an interests
theory of voting and human behaviour, and so on. According to many a green however, thereby
made are some of the assumptions that have to be turned around if humanly undesirable features
are to be avoided, if social collapse of one sort or another is to be avoided.
At the very outset, Goodin does something to offset such concerns, as those concerning
limits of growth.9 He rolls out a familiar quasi-inductive argument, beloved of economists, that
past predictions of limits have been riotously astray (e.g. Jeavons on coal, Meadows and others
in Limits of Growth on tin). Granted some predictions have, those regularly offered as
illustrations; though others have not, naturally such examples are not emphasized.
Not only is the inductive base for the quasi-inductive argument defective, the argument
itself exhibits some flaws. That it has been claimed before and shown wrong is hardly decisive
evidence that it will not be right a next time. Recall not only the boy who cried "wolf' too often
and was eventually consumed, but also the turkeys who every week approaching Christmas
triumphantly announced that everything was proceeding just fine.
[Simple enumerative
induction is not reliable in such settings.]
On this-here green theory of value.
Much of Goodin's text, that segment that is not pleasant enough "ecopolitical fiir5 (stock
descriptions of ecological problems, green movement and their platforms, and so on), is
occupied in one way or another with what he is pleased call to 'a green theory of value', quickly
to become 'the green theory of value'. Most of the remainder develops from a complementing
4green theory of action5.10 This green theory of value is pushed in a surprisingly deontological
fashion, likely to arouse immediate suspicions: as what greens should adopt and wear, if they
know what is good for them.
A theory of value is just a theory of the good, so it is engagingly asserted at the outset.
Not so, unless the rest
of what is considered to belong to value theory (standing,
8
P.viii.
9
See the beginning of the main text p.l.
10
This theory of value is also presented in a much published paper, 'A green theory of value'. As
to the definite formulation, the green theory, see many places in the text, e.g. p.87.
�5
considerability, worth, rating, and so on) reduces. It does not (and Goodin makes no effort to
effect a reduction).
It will become plain that Goodin is rather good at presenting topics as what they are not.
The practice goes beyond introductory and presentational matters to what is taken to be central,
value theory. 'A theory of value is, quite simply, a theory of the good', so we are engagingly
informed.11 A theory of value is much more comprehensive than a theory of the good (as a
perusal of Austrian value theory will quickly confirm), and does not contract, without extensive
and dubious reductions (there is the 'quite simply5), to a theory of the good. Do not anticipate
then what is promised: a green theory of value. As it turns out, not only are greens short
changed on value, they get a very small serve of theory, and again a very pale green offering at
that.
There are certain peripheral obstacles to this purported green theory of value. In particular,
does it even measure up to admittedly lax standards for a theory as to value? As is readily
ascertained, the "theory” does not even say what a value is like and is, what kind of object, what
identity criteria it satisfies, what postulates it conforms to. Let us call what is presented a
pseudo-theory. Perhaps it can be upgraded to a theory, but requisite work is so far lacking.
Is this "green pseudo-theory" green? This sort of challenge Goodin is aware of and aims
to deflect. Granted the pseudo-theory is admittedly shallow, all politically acceptable theories
have to be, he suggests, for instance to seize wide common ground, etc. But this too is astray,
because of pluralistic alternatives.
According to this green pseudo-theory, not only is naturalness a source of green value,
naturalness is the source of value (i.e. goodness).
How does Goodin arrive at this
identification? By various unsound moves. Most simply, he invalidly concludes, from a
consideration of 'naturalness as a source of (green) value', that it is the source of value.12 Such
an inference from an indefinite to a definite description is invalid unless uniqueness conditions
are independently ensured. Less simply, there is a simplistic derivation of "theories of value"
from the three conventional factors of economic production: land (or resources), labour, and
capital, each of which is schematically linked to corresponding theories of value. No doubt the
land ethic and the labour theory of value just could suggest as much, but it is dubious that
anyone much, green or otherwise disposed, would rest content for long with such a “pure"
theory, as the factors operate together, not separately. Moreover, the economic “derivations" of
these theories should be enough to raise serious green doubts about them.
11
P.19. This claim is also made in several other overlapping Goodin productions.
12
Ibid. p.30.
�6
The core theme resulting from the identification is that natural objects are valuable, i.e.
good, because they are the result of natural processes and not artificial or human ones. What
gives natural objects their value is precisely their naturalness.13
In support of his green theory, Goodin produces a rather nauseating sociological argument,
along the following lines: 'humans' have a deeply felt need to find meaning in their lives, i.e. to
see their lives as set within a larger context with which they can feel linked. Such a context is
provided by nature. In fuller presentation, it is claimed that people want coherence 'between
their inner worlds and the external world'; that 'whatever makes people strive for harmony
within their own lives would also lead them to strive to lead their lives in harmony with the
external world'; and that 'natural processes provide just such a larger context... within which we
can set out our own life plans and projects5.14 The argument is entirely shallow, appealing to
what some humans want (if they do, not even to what might be good for them); it is utterly
instrumental, with nature an instrument for human wants and needs; it is extraordinarily weak,
each step being highly contestable; and it does not lead to the intended conclusion, uniqueness of
naturalness not being shown. Moreover, for what it is worth, the argument also commits the
naturalistic fallacy, purportedly arriving at an identification of value, as what is natural, on the
basis of "natural" human wants and needs.15
Observe that this is Goodin's theory as to green theory, an ultimately shallow theory,
reached in a shallow economic way, defended in a shallow sociological way, hardly likely to be
reflective of deeper green thought. However, it is made to look in some places as if it were
some sort of descriptive account; while at other places it appears as a normative account, as if it
13
find quote
14
Ibid p.3&
15
An identification of that Moorean nonnatural feature as natural furthermore.
It is worth appending a relevant point from Brennan (pp.805-6):
For theorists like Goodin, the status of environmental systems, species and
non-human animals appears to be problematic. Although he regards them as
proivind a large, independent context within which human life makes sense, it
seems that he at the same time regards them as akin to consumer goods, to be
displayed, consumed or prozed according to our informed preferences. For
those influenced by the resource economists, it can be hard to understand the
challenge posed by environmental ethics»>. Once nature is thought of as a
resource, a standing reserve, a set of processes and objects that have the
potential to satisfy human desires, it is easy to think of it as a nothing more
than that. And the challenge posed by any ethic which is properly called
'environmental' is to find a way of articulating the attitude that nature is
indeed a great deal more than that.
�7
were a very reasonable thing for greens to expouse. But really it is of neither sort; it is neither
descriptive of green positions, nor something they should, or would reasonably, adopt; rather it
is a theory foisted on greens. It might be pretended that Goodin has offered a "reconstruction”,
a rational reconstruction even, of green theory; but such a pretence fails as the construction fails,
to meet even basic adequacy conditions, as will appear.
As regards descriptive elements, no solid evidence is assembled that most, or even some,
greens adopt this green theory, with naturalness as the sole source. Indeed Goodin offers no
evidence that any do, and perhaps none of any standing do.16
Furthermore, as but little investigation reveals, there is not a single green "theory" of value,
but various different, sometimes competing, positions.
Nor could a single essence be
satisfactorily distilled from those positions, and even what could be distilled would not resemble
Goodin's construction. For some conspicuous green positions, such as ecofeminism or deep
ecology, would in no way underwrite naturalness as the source of value, or for that matter a
single source of value. More generally, the principles and arguments advanced within green
critiques of reductionist science—including that central lesson of ecology, that meaning is to be
found in connections, in patterns, in relations—similarly militate against any reductionist
grounding of value.
Conveniently Goodin appears to absolve us from more detailed fieldwork on green
positions. His intention, he boldly announces, is to make it clear to greens and others not what
greens in fact think, but what they should think. Indeed he pushes this normative tack to
amazing length; only if greens change in the direction he indicates will they be able to make any
practical difference to public policies! That rash claim has already been resoundingly falsified.
But as regards prescriptive aspects, no intellectually alert greens would adopt Goodin's
theory, either. It is not simply because they have other objectives on their agendas, than directly
influencing party politics. It is because the theory is seriously defective, and open to evident,
damaging objections. So it should not be sought by greens.
A central reason why no aware greens should adopt the theory, and why it should be
rejected is that it is open to a range of fairly decisive counterexamples. There are many natural
items, natural objects or processes, that are not, either on the face of it or after reflection,
valuable, as they are or were or where they are. Much that is natural is at least very problematic,
some is downright bad. A first class of problematic examples, not involving life in a direct way,
16
It is suggested, by Achtenberg, that McKibben may, but a reading of The End of Nature does
not support such a suggestion. As it happens, the situation with McKibben is more than a
little curious. For what McKibben want to insist upon—adopting an inadmissibly high
redefinition of natural—is that realy nothing is natural any more (hence The End) whence
courtesy of Goodin, nothing is valuable any more. But that is not what McKibben wants to
say, or says.
�8
are those occurrences clustered together as natural disasters, catastrophes, and the like. Included
therewith are earthquakes, landslides, soil erosion, meteorite collisions, volcanic eruptions, tidal
waves, cyclones, ice ages, and so on. These examples include dramatic and damaging (natural)
variations in the natural more stable course of events, variations with climatic or geophysical
origins. Consider the devastating Lisbon earthquake of 1775 which so shocked European
intellectuals (and was construed by Voltaire as evidence that Gthe natural world is farm from the
best of all possible). By contrast, Goodin would be obliged to maintain that it was a good event,
because natural (just as good as the new arrival of a passenger pigeon on a splendid autumnal
morning) and presumably not at all shocking because of the natural beneficence of the whole
disaster. No doubt the problems with global warming, ozone depletion, and so forth, that so
exercise Goodin at the outset of his text, are that these are not natural (being induced by human
activity which falls outside what is natural, under one conventional ruling); no doubt these
would be valuable, and unproblematic, processes were they to proceed naturally without human
intervention or assistance. So it was with the volcanic eruptions that demolished the splendid
pink and white terraces and laid waste much beautiful New Zealand forest last century; so it was
with the earlier ice-age which much reduced the richness of New Zealand flora, eliminating 3 of
4 groups of palms; these were good, even admirable, events.
Similar ridiculous outcomes issue when we turn to life (life forms somehow still achieve a
privileged role in Goodin, though they are no more natural). Consider the wide range of
monsters, cripples, sports, freaks, and so on that natural processes, such as birth, regularly
deliver: deformities, malignant mutations, and so on, outcomes that are still generally hidden
away, put out of general sight, or quietly removed, at least in the case of more hideous outputs.
It is very difficult to see that all these objects are good, even just as good as the most splendid
products of nature.17 Roughly Goodin has landed in a similar awkward position to the theist
17
It seems admissible to record that I put several such counterexamples to Goodin well before he
undertook final revision of his working typescript. Here is his response on these and connected
issues (Goodin, personal communication, numbered and reordered with [1] now proceeding [2]):
[1]
[2]
A somatic organism in a natural environment is a (nonmoral) normative system.
Whatever has that much complexity, richness, self-organization, telos has
(presumptively) value.
I think I still incline to say (despite your chastening) that a sponaneous biological
life is always of prima facie value (intrinsic). Though I recognize at once that such
value can sometimes be overridden and become in some environmental contexts a new
disvalue. And here I just hold in abeyance what the overlay of moral agency with the
moral (past biological) life in humans does to the presumption.
�9
who announces that all the natural works of God are good, and is then confronted by awful
work such as monstrosities or catastrophes. He can try, like the theist, to fall back to some
larger valuable setting of which these prima facie nonvaluable components are an integral part; in
Goodin's case there is a wider encompassing theory available, namely evolutionary theory (with
variation required for natural selection).18 But already this means significant qualification and
modification of Goodin's original theory, and shift to a different and so far undeveloped theory.
Better to abandon the original theory, given that superior alternatives are on offer namely
multiple factor theories, with naturalness one factor in the mix.19
There remain many other lesser difficulties for theories like Goodin's which try to reduce
value-making factors to one, such as naturalness (or biological life, richness, or whatever). For
naturalness, difficulties arise with pests and weeds, which may be quite natural objects, but
objects which are located in the wrong places, notably outside their natural range. No doubt
Goodin's theory can be elaborated to take account of such exceptions, but elaborated it needs to
be. Other difficulties arise with natural objects which are in natural places, but which are in
some way out of balance with their natural environment, for instance through excess numbers,
excessive predation (leading to population collapses, etc.). Consider, for example, members of
a natural herd of elephants, grown too large for their natural environment, who become
destroyers, demolishing significant forests in their range. Again this is natural enough in the
circumstances, but the outcomes are certainly not good, nor praiseworthy or the like.
The deficiencies of the approach as offering a “theory” of value are accentuated by the
specific narrow recipe Goodin tries to impose on greens. In particular, it appears to supply only
an on-off qualitative assessment. An item is either good or not according as it is natural, and that
[3]
I will have to interpet monstrosities, mutation, deformities as struggling life,
somehow a necessary part of the process, even though they are in some respects failures.
Anyway, more on that some other time.
[4]
I also hold that (geo) physical nature can sometimes have intrinsic value, so that life,
while sufficient for value prima facie, is not necessary for it.
A few comments:- Paragraph [1] already points to a more satisfactory, sophisticated theory than
greens are saddled with, with a mix of factors (of which naturalness is surely one) yielding
presumptive value. Paragraphs [2] and [3] also indicate elements of a more sensitive theory,
again at substantial odds with that presented in the book. Paragraph [3] suggest the sort of
theological or evolutionary escape discussed in the text below; it does nothing to counter the
counterexamples.
18
Also the theist's problems concerning maximization are perhaps reduced in this setting.
19
See e.g. EE or FF.
�10
is all. But not all items are of the same value, which is all this allows: valuable because natural.
Some, while not being “more natural”,are much more valuable than others. It is well known
that comparative assessments, such as bettemess, and likewise quantitative assessments cannot
be directly defined in terms of mere quantitative assessments, and it is sufficiently appreciated
that a satisfactory axiological theory should account at least for comparative assessments. In this
respect too, Goodin's pseudo-theory falls far short of adequacy. On the other side of the
qualitative divide, even the best art museums and the best painings within them are not valuable,
not good, because not natural. Even if Goodin should say, what his text sometimes suggests,
that his green "theory" applies only to natural objects, artifacts are left out, then the theory is at
best seriously incomplete. Greens will have some more comprehensive theory of value which
covers all items, and integrates a range of assessments of artifacts with natural objects:
naturalness will properly disappear as sole criterion, becoming but one factor.
It is noteworthy that much of the subsequent development of green political theory in
Goodin's text does not depend upon the excessively strong value theory he tries to load upon
greens; it does not require—r always, for that matter, use—naturalness as sole criterion. Much
of what comes later, all that appears right enough, will "go through" will naturalness as a critical
factor. Where appropriate call this the alternate scheme, according to which naturalness is only
one critical, but not always decisive, factor in a mix. The alternate scheme is an integral part of
that different green account alluded to above.
On the touted tightly-integrated Green package, and strong holism.
Certain extraordinarily bold claims are advanced, under the banner of 'a unified moral
vision5 in the chapter advertised as 4the unity of the green programme\ Notably
the green theory of value...[as] elaborated... is what underlies and
unifies the entire green political programme .... It is what makes it
illogical and inconsistent for other, more established parties to try
picking and choosing some bits off that agenda, without accepting all
the rest of its demands as well.20
The claims are never established, would not be established by what is suggested, and indeed
cannot be satisfactorily established, because the claims do not stand up. The arguments outlined
are seriously wanting. Even what is said would make good the claims would not (traces are not
enough for "making good^^); but in any case Goodin does not attempt these things, opting to
proceed 'more impressionistically *.
20
p.87. The same sort of theme is reiterated (with but minor variations) subsequently, e.g. p.92.
Note the ascent from an everyday theory of the good to a unified moral vision.
�11
Even impressionistically little works satisfactorily. For 'the green theory of value' of
Goodin is not 'uniquely able to account for the coherence of the green public-policy
proposals\2122Apart from the critical features, to be considered below,
that green proposals do not enjoy the sort of coherence alleged, and that
established parties can, and do, pick over green programs selectively,
the uniqueness claim, the special position of Goodin's theory, is quietly dropped in the
impressionistic "argument". All that is used is the alternate scheme, that a concern for nature
informs, directly or indirectly, all the connected 'plants in the green programme'.22
Evidently a variety of concerns for nature can motivate and justify attitudes and procedures
regarding pollution, waste, environmental destruction, and so forth. Uniqueness lapses.
Worse, the more remote, less directly environmental parts of the green agenda do not fall out
eith of Goodin's theory or from the alternate scheme. In a note, Goodin concedes as much; but
these (decentralization, grass roots democracy, nonviolence, and much else) derive so he
claims, from the subsidiary, but logically separate, green theory of agency.23 Whether they do
so derive or not (they do not), they do not derive indirectly from a green theory of value,
because of the separation of agency from value. For similar reasons, the "integrated" green
programme (outlined in an Appendix) begins to unravel.
All that Goodin tries to make out, then only suggestively, is that the alternative scheme
helps in explaining certain green attitudes that appear anomalous or otherwise problematic.
Even should this exercise succeed (and its success is at best mixed), it would not achieve what
is required.
Interestingly, the Appendix, 'The Green Political Programme5—far from demonstrating
that the narrow green theory of value runs through all green policy, not just the overly
'environmental5 parts—helps in revealing what a patchwork the presented programme is really,
a patchwork from which separate patches can be unsewn. A basic problem with the whole
approach is this: that there is not a single green program, different green groups have different
programms. Witness the many internal disputes, the very public conflicts between social and
deep ecology, between animal liberationists and nature greens, between luddites and smart new-
age technologists, between spiritual and secular greens, and son. Granted various loose
conalitions may be stitched together; but they are various, not unique, and the stitching is very
loose, and may easily be undone, for different repackaging. In short, there are many green
packages, corresponding to different green theories of value and agency and so on. As there is
21
Ibid p.87.
22
Ibid. p.87. Goodin himself slides back to the indefinite, to a green theory of value, e.g. p.88.
23
Note & p.8&
�12
no single green theory, so there is no such tightly unified single package, which is what
empirical evidence also seems to show. Moreover, established parties have drawn very
selectively upon these sorts of packages, and filched elements selectively. Witness the fate of
the early Values party in New Zealand.
'The prima facie wrongness of ... piecemeal borrowing from the greens is easily
explicated. It derives straight forwardly from the logic of consistency. It would be simply
wrong to embrace a theory of value... for some purposes while shunning it for others. The
truth status of value theories just does not flicker on and off like that/2425Embedded therein, in
this strong holism, is one basic confusion that pervades the book, a confusion between a theory
and what derives from it, between a source and its outputs. Nothing in logic stops selective
borrowing from what derives from a program, however tightly integrated. Strong holism is far
too strong; it would imply that we cannot adopt, or even toy with, one part of some value
theory, or ethical theory on Goodin's account of the matter, without embracing the lot. We
cannot accept some on Moore's claims, some of Spinoza's analyses, part of Aristotle without
being stuck with the whole. Eclecticism, at least as regards a theory of value, is impossible.
Which is absurd, and a reductio thereto of a seriously defective argument.
The conclusion has to be that yet another of Goodin's main themes is seriously astray and
should be rejected: that 'greens make (radical) demands on an all-or-nothing basis525, that
greens 'might reasonably demand that we implement their political program on an all-or-nothing
basis5.26
On the misadvertised green theory of agency: green collective organization・
The title 'The Green Theory of Agency5 is something of a misnomer. Most of the chapter
consemed (chapter 4) is taken up with what is inaccurately headed 'Principles of green political
structures*, which treats not agency but certain elements of macro-political organisation,
notably decentralization and policy coordination (itself headed, misleadingly, 'think globally, act
locally5). Most of the remainder of the chapter is occupied with what is headed, generally,
'Principles of green political action', but reduces to 'democratic participation5 and
'nonviolence5, and with 'Principles of green party organisation', cut down to 'grassroots
democracy5 and 'nrotation in office*, both something of travesties, given the indicated sweep
and generality.
The theory of "agency" is itself rather a part of a theory of collective action. Virtually
nothing on agency in the usual sense of individual action theory enters, except a footnote
24
p.92, partly reiterating the integrated package theme.
25
p.168? [check, locate]
26
Back cover.
�13
referring to some work on the topic, and no theory at all of green individual agents (their
lifestyles, etc.). The relevant part of collective action theory looks not so much at the roles of
operative agents and their individual instrumentality, as at the character and corodinating
mechanisms of collective action, namely that needed or designed to realize green values. And
really, what is considered is green collective organization, which comprises not only action and
practices, but also associated political procedures and structures. Into this expanded account,
furthermore, some large assumptions are written, assumptions not accepted by many greens:
roughly, reduction of the political to the collective, and of the collective to aggregated
individuals, i.e. themes of individualism.2728These reductive assumptions, which are inserted
and infiltrated unargued, come to matter in the material on policy coordination, which adopts a
standard game-theory approach drawn from the received reductive theory of collective action, a
theory unlikely to gain much green applause, for all its academic fashionability.
The case for green engagement in coalitions is less straightforward than depicted. No
doubt greens who opt for this course of action—what Goodin tries to insist upon, involvement
in the politics of the established system—do not then have the option of spuming power-sharing
opportunities when those opportunities present themselves. Our guide is, however, too
optimistic about how often such opportunies are like to occur, and too sanguine about how they
are likely to operate to green advantage. For one thing, greens are not the only political forces
within conventional politics who have a theory of value. Furthermore, just as greens seeking to
enter into a coalition with a party of the electoral left (at present the only plausible option) must
look askance at the likely ttincohe^ence^^ of the compromise reached, so too must the other
coalescing party. If, under such circumstances, 'the blame for the logical incoherence would lie
with the parties that insisted on adulterating the green programme528, so too, from the
perspective of the party of the left, must *the blame for the logical incoherence lie with the
greens who insisted on adulterating the pink programme'. It should come as little surprise then,
that the evidence suggests that parties of the moderate left are every bit as reluctant to enter into
coalitions with the greens as the greens are with them.29
Green agents: their lifestyles, their commitments, their changed consciousness.
These matters feature large in American deep ecology; they are neglected or dismissed in
Goodin. His rejection of green personal lifestyles is indicative, in these terms, of personal
green consciousness and commitment, and of but subdued or diminished green values. It seems
fair to remark that only weak environmental commitments are displayed in the book (however
27
See e.g. p.l 14 top.
28
To cite Goodin p.179.
29
Hay op.cit., where various examples confirming the final claim are assembled.
�14
even weak commitments, typical of much academic literature, are better than none, typical of
former academic literature); or, more provocatively, to infer that Goodin has not really absorbed
genuine green values (else he would act personally). What does come through from the book is
that Goodin remains something of an outsider to green activism. That he is not together at the
cutting edge of things green is betrayed by occasional telling slips, as with what greens worry
about in different places (esp. pp. 180-1). It is not that what he asserts is wrong; it is that
emphases and contrasts are different.
Reasons offered for rejection of green lifestyles are, where clear, extraordinarily weak.
Consider what is offered:
• living too close to nature, too much in harmony with it, might cause it to lose its valued role
for us30一which is (remember) to provide us with a larger context in which we can see our lives
as being set! Test the force of the argument by comparing living in the vicinity of other valued
items: worthy lives, art, music, intellectual accomplishments. Moreover, there are counter
arguments and considerations: that closeness brings respect and awe, and can enhance
appreciation of value. Consider the idea of Christians distancing themselves from Cathedrals
and Churches, ritual and practice.
• to achieve political change, greens should make every effort to minimise the perceived distance
between themselves and the “orthodox” community一whereas the association of 'alternative
lifestyling5 with 'green' has exactly the opposite effect. Such a claim reveals much as regards
subcontests, such as: claimants commitments and seriousness, type and extent of change
envisaged, and so on. Christians, feminists, revolutionaries and others would not be too
impressed. As in other reaches where orthodoxy may be morally or otherwise amiss, so with
regard to green lifestyles: There is a case for a politics of “exemplary practice”; for whilst some
people will treat those who so engage as objects of scorn and ridicule, it is evident that many
people have been recruited to green values through positive contact with experiments in "right
living”,or with elements of green lifestyles. It is important too that at least some people
endeavour to demonstrate how green principles might be put into practice at the level of daily
living.
• Bizarre examples, selective unfavourable examples, advanced under the heading 'green
heresies5.31 Granted 'some of this “exemplary practice” might be so outlandish that it reflects
negatively on larger green projects. But the influence of this can be overstated; this sort of game
can be played with many things that have features to recommend parts of them. After all, every
social movement and every tradition of political philosophy, has its fringe-dwellers, even its
30
Thus p.81ff.
31
pp.78-81.
�15
practitioners of a particular reductio ad absurdum extracted from a larger coherency.32
• local lifestyle set the focus astray. It should be on grander issues, on global environmental
problems, fate of earth, etc. But plainly more regional and local problems also matter, esp. for
preservation of habitats, creatures, etc. And here personal and local things can be very
important.
Finally, there are other reasons for green lifestyles. For example, for the structural
changes necessary for environmentally satisfactory societies of one sort or another, something
like internalization of green values and adoption of a green lifestyle proves highly advantageous.
To this end and others, committed green subcultures and inspiring individual examples are
extremely valuable.
APPENDIX: a defective setting.
Many productions that may look new and interesting in fact prove conservative, brushing
off and wheeling out old ideas as if they would accomplish all requisite work. That is, it is
implicitly claimed, under conservative approaches, that prevailing paradigms offer all necessary
resources for capturing what has (wrongly) been presented as radically new.33 In environmental
philosophy a classical exercise of this sort, well received by an environmentally conservative or
reactionary establishment, was Passmore's text. Passmore's (and was followed, in a slightly
expanded and apparently more liberal setting by Attfield, in a series of broadly consequentialist
productions. Now the exercise repeated in environmental political theory by Goodin, who
simply imports utilitarianism as supplying a unique and unquestionable rationality, in place of
Passmore's vague utilitarianism of humans interests.
It does not bode well for a genuinely green theory that its presentation lies virtually entirely
within a shallow utilitarian setting, the setting of the dominant economic and public policy
paradigm. For just such a setting is what has assisted significantly in getting the Earth into the
present environmental mess. Consider what Goodin tries to insist upon in his section (s.1.3) on
the arguments (and also elsewhere):- He assumes, in so trying to preempt the range of
arguments, both that
—the case for environmental protection has to be made in utilitarian terms if it is to prove
effective
—the most telling arguments concern the ways environmental protection measures are required
to further human interests (and intertwined items: people, profits, property, resources, etc.).
It is worth commencing erosion of these commonplace assumptions immediately. As for what
arguments "work”,are telling or effective, that depends heavily on the context, who is engaged
32
This paragraph borrows heavily from Hay.
33
Brennan's third reductive trend(p.800.
�16
in a dialogue, and so on. Those with deep green sympathies are not going to be vastly
impressed by a sheaf of utilitarian and human interests (first and only) arguments, any more than
by other privileged class arguments. Goodin seems to have rather assumed that, in effect, we
are always paired with our political masters, who are and will remain shallow utilitarians. Even
now this is by no means uniformly so, and there are grounds for hope that things could be much
ameliorated in the future. Accordingly there is little reason to accept Goodin's further excessive
claim that the 'essence' of the arguments (all satisfactory arguments he really wants to have us
concede) remains the same: 'inadequate protection of the human environment, seriously
compromised human interests\34
Pretty much the same problematic ethos is likewise taken for granted for proposed
remedies: a standard economic public policy framework, with the essence of the remedy
consisting in correcting market failure. From deeper green perspectives this is extraordinarily
tired stuff, with "remedies" that have been tried and tried and continue to fail.
As part of his case, he tries the stock shallow strategy of rubbishing the idea of admitting
interests beyond humans (to grant animals interests is hardly to ''widen'' or ttextend^^ interests).
The arguments are all very cheap, and the counter-case is not properly addressed. Regrettably, a
shallow utilitarianism raises its ugly head all over the place. A few examples: 'it is more
important that the right things be done than that they be done in any particular way or through
any particular agency * (p.120). But it is unnecessary to document utilitarian imput as Goodin
himself has provided it in susequent work.
A main orientation of Goodin's work一which help explain several of its features一 is
towards policy-makers or would-be policy-makers. Among such audiences utilitarian and
economic rationales contue to be greeted enthusistically. For one reason, such rationales seem
made to order when policy makers, or "bureaucratic rationality,5, require 'a means of justifying
decisions that may be unpopular with large members of people5. For through these rationales
they have seemed
able to give principled reasons for action. The policy-maker can claim
to have weighed up all the relevant considerations for and against a
course of action; each consideration was in some way commensurable
with every other—perhaps because each had a dollar value associated
with it—and so it was possible to reach a determinate conclusion, by
fair and objective means. The appearance of determinacy, fairness and
objectivity is an important tool for those who wield and manipulate
power in business, government, and even universities. But this
rationalizing use of economic approaches should be resisted by
everyone, including economists themselves.35
34
Ibid p.8 (check).
35
Brennan p.807.
�17
The reasons are now entirely familiar ones.
References
Achtenberg, W., Review of Goodin, Environmental Values, (1994).
Foucault, M., 'What is Enlightenment5
Goodin, R., Green political Theory, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1992.
Habermus, J., 'Modernity—an incomplete project*, in Postmodern Culture (ed. H. Foster),
Pluto Press, London, 1987.
Hay, P., Review of Goodin typescript, University of Tasmania, 1994.
McGowan, J., Postmodernism and Its Critics, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 199x.
Osborne, P, 'Modernity is a qualitative, not a stromological, category: notes on the dialectics of
differential historical time', in Postmodernism and the re-reading of modernity (ed. F. Barker
and others) Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1991/2.
Priest, G., 'On alternative geometries, arithmetics, and logics; a tribute to Lukasiewicz5,
typsescript, 1996.
Routley, R. and V., “Human chauvinism and environmental ethics' referred to as EE
Routley, R. and V., The Fight for the Forests,referred to as FF.
�
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13.6.96
GREEN POLITICAL THEORY:
a different account
Green political theory is divided according to one of our guides1, rather like Gaul
according to Caesar, into three parts:
—a green theory of value,
—a subordinate green theory of agency, and
—a green lifestyle program, portrayed as a set of altogether dispensible lifestyle
recommendations.
While it is the high-handed insistent dismissal of green lifestyles by this guide, Goodin, that has
captured the attention of critics and been highlighted, the brash partitioning of green political
theory, and the surreptitious dismissal therewith of significant parts of it, should not pass
unnoticed. To the contrary, virtually the whole of what political theory is taken to treat comes up
for reassessment once green lights are played upon it, certainly under deeper green illumination.
That bogus exhaustiveness taken for granted, that all there is to it amounts to value and action,
no doubt derives largely from an underlying utilitarianism, according to which other theoretical
matters can be subsumed under these.2
In short, partly through dispensing with lifestyle considerations, primarily by virtue of a
background utilitarianism operating within a conventional state-setting, Goodin can suppose that
green political theory reduces to these two parts: a theory of value and a subordinate theory of
agency. Such a reduction is however much too simple, leaving out, as it does, much of ethics of
political relevance, as well as a large slab of politics. For example, ethical omissions include the
fields of deontology (environmental permissions, prescriptives, directives; environmental
justice, rights and so on), of virtue theory, and of accountability. Among political omissions
most striking is the absence of any due consideration of institutional and ideological alternatives
to what now prevails. Prevailing Western political arrangements—with staged elections, urban
bureaucratic control, incremental reformism (often environmentally regressive), and so on—are
simply taken for granted. Above all, there is no critique of the state, an increasingly important
part of radical green politics. One reason for this gross omission— f radical green theory from
what is presented as green political theory—is that Goodin does not question the conventional
political assumption that the appropriate objective of green political activity consists in gaining
power or influence within established statist arrangements, for example at best through electoral
1
R. Goodin Green Political Theory, Polity Press, Cambridge 1992. This was undoubtedly a book
worth criticizing.
2
See the appendix.
2
success enabling control of some of the administrative and executive functions of state (we shall
encounter this conventional “political realism^^ again later). However significant strands of
green political theory no longer accept this assumption. A related reason, reaching deeper, is
that Goodin likewise does not question, as strands of green theory now do, what helps
undergird the conventional political assumption and reformist utilitarianism, an Enlightenment
ideology with its faith in reason and science, technologically-based progress, overall human
goodness and dominance, and so on.3
The bold overstatement of claims, along with misrepresentation as to what green political
theory comprises, is symptomatic of much of the book: overstatement and undersubstantiation.4
Virtually all main themes of the book are false, indeed rather patently so once exhibited
unadorned, because limited truths are overextended; and they are undersupplied with cogent
support. So it is with the green theory of value, which inflates what is a significant factor in
green evaluation into the supposed total green theory. So it is with the green package, which is
presented as having an absolutely tight integration, which it in fact lacks. And so on, as will
appear. Not only are main themes seriously defective; more disappointing, a salvage operation
will not yield a lode of green gold.
As troubling is the anti-subversive character of the work. Goodin has wheeled another
Trojan horse into green territory, a horse bringing a number of anti-green academic warriors
armed with anti-green ideas and sentiments, and engaged in and advocating anti-green lifestyles,
(as will emerge).5 Of course, 'Green political theory' is a clever title, which is complemented by
a politically clever introduction on the crises which are not minimized or marginalised but given
considerable weight—all of which suggest that the text might be of much more interest to
politically inclined greens than the usual academic fare. But the title does not say how the green
theory is to be treated, explained and encouraged, exposed and condemned. Neither really. The
text is not written for greens (though the publishers obviously hope they may buy it,6 or be
3
For an exposition and criticism of Enlightenment Ideology, see Sylvan TM.
4
In part because these sorts of deficiencies have not been addressed in reviews of the book, I
decided to persevere with this less charitable critique (a tiresome exercise bound to alienate).
Regrettably most of the reviews appear to derive from a political science orientation. They trip
lightly by philosophical fundamentals, where the book is noticeably weak, and vulnerable.
And they tend to be very light on argument.
5
Trojan horses are in extensive use by academics, particularly in green regions. We will
encounter a number of these horses. They are evident from sociology to biogeography and
climatology, and particularly prominent around economic enslaves.
6
They form part of the intended audience for the book according to accompanying publishers'
work and flyers. Indeed the publishers have participated in the deception, supplying a cover
featuring a boss of the Green Man from the cloisters of Norwich cathedral, which sends, as they
3
tricked into buying it), but for a cohert of academic colleagues—for colleagues who form part of
the prevailing system, of politics-more-or-less-as-usual and so on.
Deapite its character, there are several useful and attractive features of Goodin's book,
which do make it worthwhile reading for awake greens of theoretical bent (one of these features
is an Appendix, putting together succinctly a green political program). It is a smoothly written
book, encouraging readers to glide along, glossing over the underlying content and messages,
and not grasping the enormity of some of what is presented, for instance even as green gospel.
It may be just the style that is attractive (the cut of the book, the easy flow, an appealingly simple
structure, and other stylish features), rather than details of the real content. If the book has a
weakness from the PR angle, it may lie in its flippancy, and failure to take several green issues
seriously, both of which sometimes enter irritatingly and will turn off some committed greens.
But, by and large, it is a splendidly packaged work; it is what is packaged and what is pushed on
greens that is the trouble.
For a book purportedly on green theory, treatment of greens is extraordinary
condescending. Not much notice is going to be taken of 'what self-styled greens... happen to
believe', 'what positions greens actually do take' (p.vii). (How then does he justify the green
attributions he proceeds to make, e.g. 'green theory of value5? Evidently his procedure is
methodologically unsound). No, it is 'an attempt to saves greens from themselves5 (p.viii). To
rescue them,4to tidy up' their slovenly positions—while throwing away critical features of green
approaches, such as green lifestyles—Goodin is particularly concerned that green lifestyles
should not be seen as part of a rectified green political package. Green lifestyle
recommendations are entirely dispensible (so he and others can look and indeed be green without
deffort, without making any green contribution; they are conveniently absolved from any
relevant action, or lifestyle adjustment).
At one stage Goodin claims that the theory is 'moderately deep'. But elsewhere he has
more accurately said that it is a pale green theory, very pale green given the attitude taken to
green lifestyles. Green Political Theory it may be called: deeper green political theory, at least, it
certainly is not, even genuine green it but dubiously is. However Goodin's aim, he regularly
informs us, is once again not 4to describe what positions greens actually do take5. His project is
a normative one, aimed instead to show what positions greens should take, given their core
concerns... what they have to say given their core values'?. In this attempt he should be seen to
remarks, 'precisely the contrary signal concerning the nature of the author's project in there
behind the Green Man's work*.
7
P. viii - p.vii, itals added.
4
fail entirely. He is astray not merely on the core concerns of many of them (which concerns are
far from uniform), but also in loosely coupled resultant positions. Greens are under no such
obligations as Goodin would load them with; they are not boxed in as he would suppose.
The approach is not only condescending towards greens; it is a touch arrogant. The aim is
said to be 'to show greens how to cast their position in the strongest possible form\8 This will
turn out to be not a strong theoretical form, by any means, but merely a strong form
pragmatically, given a raft of assumptions about prevailing electoral arrangements, an interests
theory of voting and human behaviour, and so on. According to many a green however, thereby
made are some of the assumptions that have to be turned around if humanly undesirable features
are to be avoided, if social collapse of one sort or another is to be avoided.
At the very outset, Goodin does something to offset such concerns, as those concerning
limits of growth.9 He rolls out a familiar quasi-inductive argument, beloved of economists, that
past predictions of limits have been riotously astray (e.g. Jeavons on coal, Meadows and others
in Limits of Growth on tin). Granted some predictions have, those regularly offered as
illustrations; though others have not, naturally such examples are not emphasized.
Not only is the inductive base for the quasi-inductive argument defective, the argument
itself exhibits some flaws. That it has been claimed before and shown wrong is hardly decisive
evidence that it will not be right a next time. Recall not only the boy who cried "wolf' too often
and was eventually consumed, but also the turkeys who every week approaching Christmas
triumphantly announced that everything was proceeding just fine.
[Simple enumerative
induction is not reliable in such settings.]
On this-here green theory of value.
Much of Goodin's text, that segment that is not pleasant enough "ecopolitical fiir5 (stock
descriptions of ecological problems, green movement and their platforms, and so on), is
occupied in one way or another with what he is pleased call to 'a green theory of value', quickly
to become 'the green theory of value'. Most of the remainder develops from a complementing
4green theory of action5.10 This green theory of value is pushed in a surprisingly deontological
fashion, likely to arouse immediate suspicions: as what greens should adopt and wear, if they
know what is good for them.
A theory of value is just a theory of the good, so it is engagingly asserted at the outset.
Not so, unless the rest
of what is considered to belong to value theory (standing,
8
P.viii.
9
See the beginning of the main text p.l.
10
This theory of value is also presented in a much published paper, 'A green theory of value'. As
to the definite formulation, the green theory, see many places in the text, e.g. p.87.
5
considerability, worth, rating, and so on) reduces. It does not (and Goodin makes no effort to
effect a reduction).
It will become plain that Goodin is rather good at presenting topics as what they are not.
The practice goes beyond introductory and presentational matters to what is taken to be central,
value theory. 'A theory of value is, quite simply, a theory of the good', so we are engagingly
informed.11 A theory of value is much more comprehensive than a theory of the good (as a
perusal of Austrian value theory will quickly confirm), and does not contract, without extensive
and dubious reductions (there is the 'quite simply5), to a theory of the good. Do not anticipate
then what is promised: a green theory of value. As it turns out, not only are greens short
changed on value, they get a very small serve of theory, and again a very pale green offering at
that.
There are certain peripheral obstacles to this purported green theory of value. In particular,
does it even measure up to admittedly lax standards for a theory as to value? As is readily
ascertained, the "theory” does not even say what a value is like and is, what kind of object, what
identity criteria it satisfies, what postulates it conforms to. Let us call what is presented a
pseudo-theory. Perhaps it can be upgraded to a theory, but requisite work is so far lacking.
Is this "green pseudo-theory" green? This sort of challenge Goodin is aware of and aims
to deflect. Granted the pseudo-theory is admittedly shallow, all politically acceptable theories
have to be, he suggests, for instance to seize wide common ground, etc. But this too is astray,
because of pluralistic alternatives.
According to this green pseudo-theory, not only is naturalness a source of green value,
naturalness is the source of value (i.e. goodness).
How does Goodin arrive at this
identification? By various unsound moves. Most simply, he invalidly concludes, from a
consideration of 'naturalness as a source of (green) value', that it is the source of value.12 Such
an inference from an indefinite to a definite description is invalid unless uniqueness conditions
are independently ensured. Less simply, there is a simplistic derivation of "theories of value"
from the three conventional factors of economic production: land (or resources), labour, and
capital, each of which is schematically linked to corresponding theories of value. No doubt the
land ethic and the labour theory of value just could suggest as much, but it is dubious that
anyone much, green or otherwise disposed, would rest content for long with such a “pure"
theory, as the factors operate together, not separately. Moreover, the economic “derivations" of
these theories should be enough to raise serious green doubts about them.
11
P.19. This claim is also made in several other overlapping Goodin productions.
12
Ibid. p.30.
6
The core theme resulting from the identification is that natural objects are valuable, i.e.
good, because they are the result of natural processes and not artificial or human ones. What
gives natural objects their value is precisely their naturalness.13
In support of his green theory, Goodin produces a rather nauseating sociological argument,
along the following lines: 'humans' have a deeply felt need to find meaning in their lives, i.e. to
see their lives as set within a larger context with which they can feel linked. Such a context is
provided by nature. In fuller presentation, it is claimed that people want coherence 'between
their inner worlds and the external world'; that 'whatever makes people strive for harmony
within their own lives would also lead them to strive to lead their lives in harmony with the
external world'; and that 'natural processes provide just such a larger context... within which we
can set out our own life plans and projects5.14 The argument is entirely shallow, appealing to
what some humans want (if they do, not even to what might be good for them); it is utterly
instrumental, with nature an instrument for human wants and needs; it is extraordinarily weak,
each step being highly contestable; and it does not lead to the intended conclusion, uniqueness of
naturalness not being shown. Moreover, for what it is worth, the argument also commits the
naturalistic fallacy, purportedly arriving at an identification of value, as what is natural, on the
basis of "natural" human wants and needs.15
Observe that this is Goodin's theory as to green theory, an ultimately shallow theory,
reached in a shallow economic way, defended in a shallow sociological way, hardly likely to be
reflective of deeper green thought. However, it is made to look in some places as if it were
some sort of descriptive account; while at other places it appears as a normative account, as if it
13
find quote
14
Ibid p.3&
15
An identification of that Moorean nonnatural feature as natural furthermore.
It is worth appending a relevant point from Brennan (pp.805-6):
For theorists like Goodin, the status of environmental systems, species and
non-human animals appears to be problematic. Although he regards them as
proivind a large, independent context within which human life makes sense, it
seems that he at the same time regards them as akin to consumer goods, to be
displayed, consumed or prozed according to our informed preferences. For
those influenced by the resource economists, it can be hard to understand the
challenge posed by environmental ethics»>. Once nature is thought of as a
resource, a standing reserve, a set of processes and objects that have the
potential to satisfy human desires, it is easy to think of it as a nothing more
than that. And the challenge posed by any ethic which is properly called
'environmental' is to find a way of articulating the attitude that nature is
indeed a great deal more than that.
7
were a very reasonable thing for greens to expouse. But really it is of neither sort; it is neither
descriptive of green positions, nor something they should, or would reasonably, adopt; rather it
is a theory foisted on greens. It might be pretended that Goodin has offered a "reconstruction”,
a rational reconstruction even, of green theory; but such a pretence fails as the construction fails,
to meet even basic adequacy conditions, as will appear.
As regards descriptive elements, no solid evidence is assembled that most, or even some,
greens adopt this green theory, with naturalness as the sole source. Indeed Goodin offers no
evidence that any do, and perhaps none of any standing do.16
Furthermore, as but little investigation reveals, there is not a single green "theory" of value,
but various different, sometimes competing, positions.
Nor could a single essence be
satisfactorily distilled from those positions, and even what could be distilled would not resemble
Goodin's construction. For some conspicuous green positions, such as ecofeminism or deep
ecology, would in no way underwrite naturalness as the source of value, or for that matter a
single source of value. More generally, the principles and arguments advanced within green
critiques of reductionist science—including that central lesson of ecology, that meaning is to be
found in connections, in patterns, in relations—similarly militate against any reductionist
grounding of value.
Conveniently Goodin appears to absolve us from more detailed fieldwork on green
positions. His intention, he boldly announces, is to make it clear to greens and others not what
greens in fact think, but what they should think. Indeed he pushes this normative tack to
amazing length; only if greens change in the direction he indicates will they be able to make any
practical difference to public policies! That rash claim has already been resoundingly falsified.
But as regards prescriptive aspects, no intellectually alert greens would adopt Goodin's
theory, either. It is not simply because they have other objectives on their agendas, than directly
influencing party politics. It is because the theory is seriously defective, and open to evident,
damaging objections. So it should not be sought by greens.
A central reason why no aware greens should adopt the theory, and why it should be
rejected is that it is open to a range of fairly decisive counterexamples. There are many natural
items, natural objects or processes, that are not, either on the face of it or after reflection,
valuable, as they are or were or where they are. Much that is natural is at least very problematic,
some is downright bad. A first class of problematic examples, not involving life in a direct way,
16
It is suggested, by Achtenberg, that McKibben may, but a reading of The End of Nature does
not support such a suggestion. As it happens, the situation with McKibben is more than a
little curious. For what McKibben want to insist upon—adopting an inadmissibly high
redefinition of natural—is that realy nothing is natural any more (hence The End) whence
courtesy of Goodin, nothing is valuable any more. But that is not what McKibben wants to
say, or says.
8
are those occurrences clustered together as natural disasters, catastrophes, and the like. Included
therewith are earthquakes, landslides, soil erosion, meteorite collisions, volcanic eruptions, tidal
waves, cyclones, ice ages, and so on. These examples include dramatic and damaging (natural)
variations in the natural more stable course of events, variations with climatic or geophysical
origins. Consider the devastating Lisbon earthquake of 1775 which so shocked European
intellectuals (and was construed by Voltaire as evidence that Gthe natural world is farm from the
best of all possible). By contrast, Goodin would be obliged to maintain that it was a good event,
because natural (just as good as the new arrival of a passenger pigeon on a splendid autumnal
morning) and presumably not at all shocking because of the natural beneficence of the whole
disaster. No doubt the problems with global warming, ozone depletion, and so forth, that so
exercise Goodin at the outset of his text, are that these are not natural (being induced by human
activity which falls outside what is natural, under one conventional ruling); no doubt these
would be valuable, and unproblematic, processes were they to proceed naturally without human
intervention or assistance. So it was with the volcanic eruptions that demolished the splendid
pink and white terraces and laid waste much beautiful New Zealand forest last century; so it was
with the earlier ice-age which much reduced the richness of New Zealand flora, eliminating 3 of
4 groups of palms; these were good, even admirable, events.
Similar ridiculous outcomes issue when we turn to life (life forms somehow still achieve a
privileged role in Goodin, though they are no more natural). Consider the wide range of
monsters, cripples, sports, freaks, and so on that natural processes, such as birth, regularly
deliver: deformities, malignant mutations, and so on, outcomes that are still generally hidden
away, put out of general sight, or quietly removed, at least in the case of more hideous outputs.
It is very difficult to see that all these objects are good, even just as good as the most splendid
products of nature.17 Roughly Goodin has landed in a similar awkward position to the theist
17
It seems admissible to record that I put several such counterexamples to Goodin well before he
undertook final revision of his working typescript. Here is his response on these and connected
issues (Goodin, personal communication, numbered and reordered with [1] now proceeding [2]):
[1]
[2]
A somatic organism in a natural environment is a (nonmoral) normative system.
Whatever has that much complexity, richness, self-organization, telos has
(presumptively) value.
I think I still incline to say (despite your chastening) that a sponaneous biological
life is always of prima facie value (intrinsic). Though I recognize at once that such
value can sometimes be overridden and become in some environmental contexts a new
disvalue. And here I just hold in abeyance what the overlay of moral agency with the
moral (past biological) life in humans does to the presumption.
9
who announces that all the natural works of God are good, and is then confronted by awful
work such as monstrosities or catastrophes. He can try, like the theist, to fall back to some
larger valuable setting of which these prima facie nonvaluable components are an integral part; in
Goodin's case there is a wider encompassing theory available, namely evolutionary theory (with
variation required for natural selection).18 But already this means significant qualification and
modification of Goodin's original theory, and shift to a different and so far undeveloped theory.
Better to abandon the original theory, given that superior alternatives are on offer namely
multiple factor theories, with naturalness one factor in the mix.19
There remain many other lesser difficulties for theories like Goodin's which try to reduce
value-making factors to one, such as naturalness (or biological life, richness, or whatever). For
naturalness, difficulties arise with pests and weeds, which may be quite natural objects, but
objects which are located in the wrong places, notably outside their natural range. No doubt
Goodin's theory can be elaborated to take account of such exceptions, but elaborated it needs to
be. Other difficulties arise with natural objects which are in natural places, but which are in
some way out of balance with their natural environment, for instance through excess numbers,
excessive predation (leading to population collapses, etc.). Consider, for example, members of
a natural herd of elephants, grown too large for their natural environment, who become
destroyers, demolishing significant forests in their range. Again this is natural enough in the
circumstances, but the outcomes are certainly not good, nor praiseworthy or the like.
The deficiencies of the approach as offering a “theory” of value are accentuated by the
specific narrow recipe Goodin tries to impose on greens. In particular, it appears to supply only
an on-off qualitative assessment. An item is either good or not according as it is natural, and that
[3]
I will have to interpet monstrosities, mutation, deformities as struggling life,
somehow a necessary part of the process, even though they are in some respects failures.
Anyway, more on that some other time.
[4]
I also hold that (geo) physical nature can sometimes have intrinsic value, so that life,
while sufficient for value prima facie, is not necessary for it.
A few comments:- Paragraph [1] already points to a more satisfactory, sophisticated theory than
greens are saddled with, with a mix of factors (of which naturalness is surely one) yielding
presumptive value. Paragraphs [2] and [3] also indicate elements of a more sensitive theory,
again at substantial odds with that presented in the book. Paragraph [3] suggest the sort of
theological or evolutionary escape discussed in the text below; it does nothing to counter the
counterexamples.
18
Also the theist's problems concerning maximization are perhaps reduced in this setting.
19
See e.g. EE or FF.
10
is all. But not all items are of the same value, which is all this allows: valuable because natural.
Some, while not being “more natural”,are much more valuable than others. It is well known
that comparative assessments, such as bettemess, and likewise quantitative assessments cannot
be directly defined in terms of mere quantitative assessments, and it is sufficiently appreciated
that a satisfactory axiological theory should account at least for comparative assessments. In this
respect too, Goodin's pseudo-theory falls far short of adequacy. On the other side of the
qualitative divide, even the best art museums and the best painings within them are not valuable,
not good, because not natural. Even if Goodin should say, what his text sometimes suggests,
that his green "theory" applies only to natural objects, artifacts are left out, then the theory is at
best seriously incomplete. Greens will have some more comprehensive theory of value which
covers all items, and integrates a range of assessments of artifacts with natural objects:
naturalness will properly disappear as sole criterion, becoming but one factor.
It is noteworthy that much of the subsequent development of green political theory in
Goodin's text does not depend upon the excessively strong value theory he tries to load upon
greens; it does not require—r always, for that matter, use—naturalness as sole criterion. Much
of what comes later, all that appears right enough, will "go through" will naturalness as a critical
factor. Where appropriate call this the alternate scheme, according to which naturalness is only
one critical, but not always decisive, factor in a mix. The alternate scheme is an integral part of
that different green account alluded to above.
On the touted tightly-integrated Green package, and strong holism.
Certain extraordinarily bold claims are advanced, under the banner of 'a unified moral
vision5 in the chapter advertised as 4the unity of the green programme\ Notably
the green theory of value...[as] elaborated... is what underlies and
unifies the entire green political programme .... It is what makes it
illogical and inconsistent for other, more established parties to try
picking and choosing some bits off that agenda, without accepting all
the rest of its demands as well.20
The claims are never established, would not be established by what is suggested, and indeed
cannot be satisfactorily established, because the claims do not stand up. The arguments outlined
are seriously wanting. Even what is said would make good the claims would not (traces are not
enough for "making good^^); but in any case Goodin does not attempt these things, opting to
proceed 'more impressionistically *.
20
p.87. The same sort of theme is reiterated (with but minor variations) subsequently, e.g. p.92.
Note the ascent from an everyday theory of the good to a unified moral vision.
11
Even impressionistically little works satisfactorily. For 'the green theory of value' of
Goodin is not 'uniquely able to account for the coherence of the green public-policy
proposals\2122Apart from the critical features, to be considered below,
that green proposals do not enjoy the sort of coherence alleged, and that
established parties can, and do, pick over green programs selectively,
the uniqueness claim, the special position of Goodin's theory, is quietly dropped in the
impressionistic "argument". All that is used is the alternate scheme, that a concern for nature
informs, directly or indirectly, all the connected 'plants in the green programme'.22
Evidently a variety of concerns for nature can motivate and justify attitudes and procedures
regarding pollution, waste, environmental destruction, and so forth. Uniqueness lapses.
Worse, the more remote, less directly environmental parts of the green agenda do not fall out
eith of Goodin's theory or from the alternate scheme. In a note, Goodin concedes as much; but
these (decentralization, grass roots democracy, nonviolence, and much else) derive so he
claims, from the subsidiary, but logically separate, green theory of agency.23 Whether they do
so derive or not (they do not), they do not derive indirectly from a green theory of value,
because of the separation of agency from value. For similar reasons, the "integrated" green
programme (outlined in an Appendix) begins to unravel.
All that Goodin tries to make out, then only suggestively, is that the alternative scheme
helps in explaining certain green attitudes that appear anomalous or otherwise problematic.
Even should this exercise succeed (and its success is at best mixed), it would not achieve what
is required.
Interestingly, the Appendix, 'The Green Political Programme5—far from demonstrating
that the narrow green theory of value runs through all green policy, not just the overly
'environmental5 parts—helps in revealing what a patchwork the presented programme is really,
a patchwork from which separate patches can be unsewn. A basic problem with the whole
approach is this: that there is not a single green program, different green groups have different
programms. Witness the many internal disputes, the very public conflicts between social and
deep ecology, between animal liberationists and nature greens, between luddites and smart new-
age technologists, between spiritual and secular greens, and son. Granted various loose
conalitions may be stitched together; but they are various, not unique, and the stitching is very
loose, and may easily be undone, for different repackaging. In short, there are many green
packages, corresponding to different green theories of value and agency and so on. As there is
21
Ibid p.87.
22
Ibid. p.87. Goodin himself slides back to the indefinite, to a green theory of value, e.g. p.88.
23
Note & p.8&
12
no single green theory, so there is no such tightly unified single package, which is what
empirical evidence also seems to show. Moreover, established parties have drawn very
selectively upon these sorts of packages, and filched elements selectively. Witness the fate of
the early Values party in New Zealand.
'The prima facie wrongness of ... piecemeal borrowing from the greens is easily
explicated. It derives straight forwardly from the logic of consistency. It would be simply
wrong to embrace a theory of value... for some purposes while shunning it for others. The
truth status of value theories just does not flicker on and off like that/2425Embedded therein, in
this strong holism, is one basic confusion that pervades the book, a confusion between a theory
and what derives from it, between a source and its outputs. Nothing in logic stops selective
borrowing from what derives from a program, however tightly integrated. Strong holism is far
too strong; it would imply that we cannot adopt, or even toy with, one part of some value
theory, or ethical theory on Goodin's account of the matter, without embracing the lot. We
cannot accept some on Moore's claims, some of Spinoza's analyses, part of Aristotle without
being stuck with the whole. Eclecticism, at least as regards a theory of value, is impossible.
Which is absurd, and a reductio thereto of a seriously defective argument.
The conclusion has to be that yet another of Goodin's main themes is seriously astray and
should be rejected: that 'greens make (radical) demands on an all-or-nothing basis525, that
greens 'might reasonably demand that we implement their political program on an all-or-nothing
basis5.26
On the misadvertised green theory of agency: green collective organization・
The title 'The Green Theory of Agency5 is something of a misnomer. Most of the chapter
consemed (chapter 4) is taken up with what is inaccurately headed 'Principles of green political
structures*, which treats not agency but certain elements of macro-political organisation,
notably decentralization and policy coordination (itself headed, misleadingly, 'think globally, act
locally5). Most of the remainder of the chapter is occupied with what is headed, generally,
'Principles of green political action', but reduces to 'democratic participation5 and
'nonviolence5, and with 'Principles of green party organisation', cut down to 'grassroots
democracy5 and 'nrotation in office*, both something of travesties, given the indicated sweep
and generality.
The theory of "agency" is itself rather a part of a theory of collective action. Virtually
nothing on agency in the usual sense of individual action theory enters, except a footnote
24
p.92, partly reiterating the integrated package theme.
25
p.168? [check, locate]
26
Back cover.
13
referring to some work on the topic, and no theory at all of green individual agents (their
lifestyles, etc.). The relevant part of collective action theory looks not so much at the roles of
operative agents and their individual instrumentality, as at the character and corodinating
mechanisms of collective action, namely that needed or designed to realize green values. And
really, what is considered is green collective organization, which comprises not only action and
practices, but also associated political procedures and structures. Into this expanded account,
furthermore, some large assumptions are written, assumptions not accepted by many greens:
roughly, reduction of the political to the collective, and of the collective to aggregated
individuals, i.e. themes of individualism.2728These reductive assumptions, which are inserted
and infiltrated unargued, come to matter in the material on policy coordination, which adopts a
standard game-theory approach drawn from the received reductive theory of collective action, a
theory unlikely to gain much green applause, for all its academic fashionability.
The case for green engagement in coalitions is less straightforward than depicted. No
doubt greens who opt for this course of action—what Goodin tries to insist upon, involvement
in the politics of the established system—do not then have the option of spuming power-sharing
opportunities when those opportunities present themselves. Our guide is, however, too
optimistic about how often such opportunies are like to occur, and too sanguine about how they
are likely to operate to green advantage. For one thing, greens are not the only political forces
within conventional politics who have a theory of value. Furthermore, just as greens seeking to
enter into a coalition with a party of the electoral left (at present the only plausible option) must
look askance at the likely ttincohe^ence^^ of the compromise reached, so too must the other
coalescing party. If, under such circumstances, 'the blame for the logical incoherence would lie
with the parties that insisted on adulterating the green programme528, so too, from the
perspective of the party of the left, must *the blame for the logical incoherence lie with the
greens who insisted on adulterating the pink programme'. It should come as little surprise then,
that the evidence suggests that parties of the moderate left are every bit as reluctant to enter into
coalitions with the greens as the greens are with them.29
Green agents: their lifestyles, their commitments, their changed consciousness.
These matters feature large in American deep ecology; they are neglected or dismissed in
Goodin. His rejection of green personal lifestyles is indicative, in these terms, of personal
green consciousness and commitment, and of but subdued or diminished green values. It seems
fair to remark that only weak environmental commitments are displayed in the book (however
27
See e.g. p.l 14 top.
28
To cite Goodin p.179.
29
Hay op.cit., where various examples confirming the final claim are assembled.
14
even weak commitments, typical of much academic literature, are better than none, typical of
former academic literature); or, more provocatively, to infer that Goodin has not really absorbed
genuine green values (else he would act personally). What does come through from the book is
that Goodin remains something of an outsider to green activism. That he is not together at the
cutting edge of things green is betrayed by occasional telling slips, as with what greens worry
about in different places (esp. pp. 180-1). It is not that what he asserts is wrong; it is that
emphases and contrasts are different.
Reasons offered for rejection of green lifestyles are, where clear, extraordinarily weak.
Consider what is offered:
• living too close to nature, too much in harmony with it, might cause it to lose its valued role
for us30一which is (remember) to provide us with a larger context in which we can see our lives
as being set! Test the force of the argument by comparing living in the vicinity of other valued
items: worthy lives, art, music, intellectual accomplishments. Moreover, there are counter
arguments and considerations: that closeness brings respect and awe, and can enhance
appreciation of value. Consider the idea of Christians distancing themselves from Cathedrals
and Churches, ritual and practice.
• to achieve political change, greens should make every effort to minimise the perceived distance
between themselves and the “orthodox” community一whereas the association of 'alternative
lifestyling5 with 'green' has exactly the opposite effect. Such a claim reveals much as regards
subcontests, such as: claimants commitments and seriousness, type and extent of change
envisaged, and so on. Christians, feminists, revolutionaries and others would not be too
impressed. As in other reaches where orthodoxy may be morally or otherwise amiss, so with
regard to green lifestyles: There is a case for a politics of “exemplary practice”; for whilst some
people will treat those who so engage as objects of scorn and ridicule, it is evident that many
people have been recruited to green values through positive contact with experiments in "right
living”,or with elements of green lifestyles. It is important too that at least some people
endeavour to demonstrate how green principles might be put into practice at the level of daily
living.
• Bizarre examples, selective unfavourable examples, advanced under the heading 'green
heresies5.31 Granted 'some of this “exemplary practice” might be so outlandish that it reflects
negatively on larger green projects. But the influence of this can be overstated; this sort of game
can be played with many things that have features to recommend parts of them. After all, every
social movement and every tradition of political philosophy, has its fringe-dwellers, even its
30
Thus p.81ff.
31
pp.78-81.
15
practitioners of a particular reductio ad absurdum extracted from a larger coherency.32
• local lifestyle set the focus astray. It should be on grander issues, on global environmental
problems, fate of earth, etc. But plainly more regional and local problems also matter, esp. for
preservation of habitats, creatures, etc. And here personal and local things can be very
important.
Finally, there are other reasons for green lifestyles. For example, for the structural
changes necessary for environmentally satisfactory societies of one sort or another, something
like internalization of green values and adoption of a green lifestyle proves highly advantageous.
To this end and others, committed green subcultures and inspiring individual examples are
extremely valuable.
APPENDIX: a defective setting.
Many productions that may look new and interesting in fact prove conservative, brushing
off and wheeling out old ideas as if they would accomplish all requisite work. That is, it is
implicitly claimed, under conservative approaches, that prevailing paradigms offer all necessary
resources for capturing what has (wrongly) been presented as radically new.33 In environmental
philosophy a classical exercise of this sort, well received by an environmentally conservative or
reactionary establishment, was Passmore's text. Passmore's (and was followed, in a slightly
expanded and apparently more liberal setting by Attfield, in a series of broadly consequentialist
productions. Now the exercise repeated in environmental political theory by Goodin, who
simply imports utilitarianism as supplying a unique and unquestionable rationality, in place of
Passmore's vague utilitarianism of humans interests.
It does not bode well for a genuinely green theory that its presentation lies virtually entirely
within a shallow utilitarian setting, the setting of the dominant economic and public policy
paradigm. For just such a setting is what has assisted significantly in getting the Earth into the
present environmental mess. Consider what Goodin tries to insist upon in his section (s.1.3) on
the arguments (and also elsewhere):- He assumes, in so trying to preempt the range of
arguments, both that
—the case for environmental protection has to be made in utilitarian terms if it is to prove
effective
—the most telling arguments concern the ways environmental protection measures are required
to further human interests (and intertwined items: people, profits, property, resources, etc.).
It is worth commencing erosion of these commonplace assumptions immediately. As for what
arguments "work”,are telling or effective, that depends heavily on the context, who is engaged
32
This paragraph borrows heavily from Hay.
33
Brennan's third reductive trend(p.800.
16
in a dialogue, and so on. Those with deep green sympathies are not going to be vastly
impressed by a sheaf of utilitarian and human interests (first and only) arguments, any more than
by other privileged class arguments. Goodin seems to have rather assumed that, in effect, we
are always paired with our political masters, who are and will remain shallow utilitarians. Even
now this is by no means uniformly so, and there are grounds for hope that things could be much
ameliorated in the future. Accordingly there is little reason to accept Goodin's further excessive
claim that the 'essence' of the arguments (all satisfactory arguments he really wants to have us
concede) remains the same: 'inadequate protection of the human environment, seriously
compromised human interests\34
Pretty much the same problematic ethos is likewise taken for granted for proposed
remedies: a standard economic public policy framework, with the essence of the remedy
consisting in correcting market failure. From deeper green perspectives this is extraordinarily
tired stuff, with "remedies" that have been tried and tried and continue to fail.
As part of his case, he tries the stock shallow strategy of rubbishing the idea of admitting
interests beyond humans (to grant animals interests is hardly to ''widen'' or ttextend^^ interests).
The arguments are all very cheap, and the counter-case is not properly addressed. Regrettably, a
shallow utilitarianism raises its ugly head all over the place. A few examples: 'it is more
important that the right things be done than that they be done in any particular way or through
any particular agency * (p.120). But it is unnecessary to document utilitarian imput as Goodin
himself has provided it in susequent work.
A main orientation of Goodin's work一which help explain several of its features一 is
towards policy-makers or would-be policy-makers. Among such audiences utilitarian and
economic rationales contue to be greeted enthusistically. For one reason, such rationales seem
made to order when policy makers, or "bureaucratic rationality,5, require 'a means of justifying
decisions that may be unpopular with large members of people5. For through these rationales
they have seemed
able to give principled reasons for action. The policy-maker can claim
to have weighed up all the relevant considerations for and against a
course of action; each consideration was in some way commensurable
with every other—perhaps because each had a dollar value associated
with it—and so it was possible to reach a determinate conclusion, by
fair and objective means. The appearance of determinacy, fairness and
objectivity is an important tool for those who wield and manipulate
power in business, government, and even universities. But this
rationalizing use of economic approaches should be resisted by
everyone, including economists themselves.35
34
Ibid p.8 (check).
35
Brennan p.807.
17
The reasons are now entirely familiar ones.
References
Achtenberg, W., Review of Goodin, Environmental Values, (1994).
Foucault, M., 'What is Enlightenment5
Goodin, R., Green political Theory, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1992.
Habermus, J., 'Modernity—an incomplete project*, in Postmodern Culture (ed. H. Foster),
Pluto Press, London, 1987.
Hay, P., Review of Goodin typescript, University of Tasmania, 1994.
McGowan, J., Postmodernism and Its Critics, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 199x.
Osborne, P, 'Modernity is a qualitative, not a stromological, category: notes on the dialectics of
differential historical time', in Postmodernism and the re-reading of modernity (ed. F. Barker
and others) Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1991/2.
Priest, G., 'On alternative geometries, arithmetics, and logics; a tribute to Lukasiewicz5,
typsescript, 1996.
Routley, R. and V., “Human chauvinism and environmental ethics' referred to as EE
Routley, R. and V., The Fight for the Forests,referred to as FF.
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PREFACE
Part 1
ill
ECOLOGICA L ETHICS & ECOLOGICA L POLITICS:
TURNING JOHN MCCLOSKE Y'S CHALLENGE
i
Conservative, reformative and radical responses to the impacts
of ecology on ethics
1
ii
A confused and confusing response: supplemented intuitionism
3
iii
On the supposedly dim prospects for new environmental ethics
especially that deep-green upstart
8
iv
Extending ecological ethics, inadequately, to ecological politics
12
V
Structuring ecological ethics and politics: towards an improved
classification of environmental problems
19
vi
Population impact: the fact of human consumption
21
vii
On limiting human populations: some neglected considerations
24
viii On animal rights and supposed political implications thereof
ix
Part 2
Two other critical features of dominant political ways:
the shibboleths of extensive private property and high technology
26
31
A CRITIQUE OF (WILD) WEST DEEP ECOLOGY: A RESPONSE TO
w ARWICK
Fox's RESPONSE TO AN EARLIER CRITIQUE.
i
Approaching deep ecology and understanding plurallism
39
ii
Value in deep ecology
42
iii
The extent of values-in-nature
46
iv
A biocentric ethic?
49
V
Biospheric egalitarianism revisted
51
vi
The uneasy position of value theory, or axiology within deep ecology
and the condemned environmental axiological route
53
vii
The 'case' against environmental axiology: 'the inadequacies or
repugnant conclusions that attend the environmental axiological
approach
viii Fox's 'Deep Ecological Territory': transpersonal identification
ix
Problems of Self and Self-realisation: the intrusion of value and the
issue of evil
57
62
65
�11
X
Deconstruction and reselection of self
68
xi
More troubles with Self as foundation
73
xii
Liquidating Fox's 'deep ecological territory
75
xiii
Justifying 'extreme interpretations' of and 'extreme reactions' to
wild West deep ecology
77
xiv
Transpersonal logic and methodology
82
xv
More rubbish removal, especially that borrowed from pop science
86
Part 3
ANOTHER 'REFUTATION' OF ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS:
JANNA THOMPSON'S CRITICISMS
i
The newer destructive phase: overtaxing requirements for
(environmental) ethics
94
ii
Satisfying duly modified requirements, environmentally
98
iii
The former constructive phase: a new anthropocentric
environmental ethic?
105
�PART 1.
CRITICAL EXPOSITION
Chapter 1. AT THE PYRAMIDS' JUNCTION.
THE BASICS AND CREED OF DEEP ECOLOGY
Deep ecology in both a movement and an ideological position. Thus in significant respects it
resembles a new religion, which has a creed as well as an organisational structure, practices and so
on; a political party, which has a platform as well as organisation, objective and so forth; and an
intellectual school, which aim to propagate a philosophy, gain converts and adherents, etc. Like a
religion in a literate society, there is a set of texts, DE texts as we shall call them, which present
elements of the faith: doctrine, themes, parables, heroic figures, warnings, and so on. The DE texts
have not so far been arranged into any authoritative form.
Although the movement may have come first, and the theory been but gradually extracted (the
historical and pseudo-sociological impression given by the DE texts), it makes for neater
characterisation and easier exposition to consider the theoretical structure J first. The very looselyknit movement, subsequently considered, essentially the genuine environment movement (excluding
those just in it for human ends), is in any case clustered around this structure - as older cities are
around their centre. The theoretical structure is itself conveniently organised in the following
(double) pyramidal diagram (now called by Naess, who devised it, "the Apron"):-
�Diagram 1.
Basic Double Pyramid
LEVELS
UPPER (INVERTED) PYRAMID
C
B
p
1. Sources, or
ultimate bases
2.Core
Principles
DE PLATFORM
R
E
E
D
REGULAR PRACTICE
PARTICULAR PRACTICES
POLICIES
LIFESTYLES
3. General
themes & norms
4. Particular
norms and
concrete
decisions
LOWER (COMPLEX) PYRAMID
The theoretical centre of DE is to be found at level 2, where the upper and lower pyramid join.
The various sources of the central part, such doctrines as those of Buddhism (B) and Christianity (C)
and of philosophic cast (P) at level 1, are not usually a part of DE at all. But there is a preferred
philosophical source, ecosophy - another theory elaborated by N aess, who again coined the term which does enjoy a closer connection with DE, and is sometimes considered almost part of it. Levels
3 and 4, which are supposed to derive from the central creed, and in turn inductively inform it, are
parts of DE, but less central parts, parts of the varying practice. It is level 2 then that is crucial for
�understanding DE. While the upper pyramid givgs the theoretical or intellectual content and sources
of DE, the lower pyramid supplies working DE, and core principles and the practice.
1. The Central level, level 2, and the standard DE platforms
Deep Ecology is structured around level 2, the central operational level. The main distinctive
principles of DE are set on level 2, the platform level. These principles may be grouped as shown in
the following diagram:CREED
LEVEL2
BASIC CREED
wider
platform
8 point
platform
further
and
more
peripheral
principles
The reason for distinguishing the 8-point platform from the wider platform is simple this:- The 8point platform, as variously presented in DE texts, omits some of the standard articles of the core DE
position, and fails to develop others. 1 There is accordingly a real point in distinguishing "the"
platform from the more comprehensive and better rounded core or creed.
DE is a decidedly vague object, with vague parts. Perhaps the most definite things about it are
its 8-point platform and its diametric opposition to features of the mainstream Western ideology, and
dominant social paradigm as it otherwise known.
The core position is something discerned from the DE texts, in much the way the platform is. But
whereas the 8 point platform is explicitly presented, though in different and incompatible terms, the
core has to be winnowed and from an array of more peripheral material (as is shown in part II).
�Box 1 The 8-point platform, in capsule form. 2
I. Both non-human and human life have intrinsic value:
The well-being and flourishing of
human and non-human life on earth
have intrinsic value, inherent value,
etc. These value are independent of
the usefulness of the non-human
world for human purposes.
2. Richness and diversity intrinsic virtues:
Richness and diversity of lifeforms contribute to a realisation
themselves
these values and are also values in
of
3. Humans unjustified in reducing such natural virtues:
Humans have no right to reduce this
richness and diversity except to
satisfy vital needs.
4. Human interference with natural world excessive:
Present human interference with
the
and the situation is rapidly worsening.
non-human world is excessive
5. Policies and basic structures must be changed:
Policies must therefore be changed.
These policies will affect our basic
economic, technological and
ideological structures.
6. Human (values compatible with) population decrease:
The flourishing of human life and
culture is compatible with a substantial
population. Flourishing of nonhuman life requires such a decrease.
decrease of the human
7. Quality of life should supplant economic standard of living:
The change in our attitudes will
bring an appreciation of the quality of
life rather than adhering to an
increasingly higher standard of living.
There will be a profound awareness
of the difference between big and
great. We will have a great society
with no bigness.
8. Obligation to attempt implementation:
Those who subscribe to the
foregoing points have an obligation
directly or indirectly to try to
implement necessary changes.
2
The 8-point platform is perhaps the most repeated exhibit in the DE texts. The present formulation
adopts the presentation of Naess in Resorg ; the brief formulation on the left does not occur in Naess.
A slightly different formulation of the platform under heading 'Basic Principles' is given in DS p.70.
�The principles have been rendered, and grJuped, to make their structure and interconnections a
little clearer. Principles / and 2 concern intrinsic values; principles 3-7 concern human practices and
policies. Principle 5 elaborates in principle 3; principle 6 draws the policy consequence of this. The
most important of the general policy changes is listed in principle 4; but another crucial policy change
is indicated in principle 7: decreased production and consumption. The prime terrestrial policy
objectives (that should have obtained separate listing) can in fact be derived from the impact formula:
roughly,
human environmental impact = human population x personal consumption x available technology.
Reducing excessive interference thus requires at least some of, and no doubt all of, human
population reduction, consumption reduction, and appropriate technology improvements. Finally,
principle 8 supplies a commitment principle. Observe that some of the principles of this 8-point
platform, 8-point principles as we may conveniently call them, provide linkages with other levels of
the DE pyramid. For example most of the principles, principles 3-7 especially, have implication for
policy at level 3, and thence for day-to-day practice at level 4. 8-point principle 8 has direct
application to level 4, individual lifestyles.
Before the incomplete 8-point platform was devised (as part of a political conciliation and
unification attempt), DE was rather differently characterised: primarily through listing of principles
countering assumptions of the conventional socioeconomic wisdom, resistance principles. Indeed,
in many respects DE is marked out through reaction and resistance: by its opposition the prevailing
ideology of industrial society, especially by those elements of it that have lead to the assault on the
natural environment, but also by elements that have led to breakdown of connected features of the
social fabric. It gives a clearer picture of what DE is about if we tabulate are principles in opposition
to those of the dominant Western ideology (or social paradigm), and as compared with those of
shallow or reform environmentalism:
�TABLE 2 DE PRINCIPLES AS CONTRASTED, ON THE ONE SIDE, WITH THOSE OF THE
DOMINANT PARADIGM AND SHALLOW ECOLOGY, ON OTHER, WITH ONE OF ITS
SOURCES, TAOISM.
DOMINANT
SHALLOW
(WESTERN)
ECOLOGY
DEEP ECOLOGY
TAOISM
(DE)
PARADIGM (DE)
Domination over
nature
Stewardship of
Nature
Nature an exploitable
resource: intrinsic
value confined to
As for, but
with nature a
manager resource
Natural environment
valued for itself
Human
supremacy
Human
ascendency
Biocentric
egalitarianism
Harmony with
Nature
Elaboration of
DE
Much as for DE;
''humanism''
rejected
Differs from
DE; wide
impartiality
Ample resources
substitutes
Some resource
limitations
Earth supplies
limited
Supplies
Material economic
growth a predominant
goal
Sustainable
development
Non-material goods
especially
self-realization
Following
Tao-te
Consumerism
Optimised
consumerism
Doing with enough/
recycling
Doing with
enough
(recycling
inappropriate)
Competitive
lifestyle
As for DP
Cooperative
lifeway
Much as for DE:
voluntary
simplicity
Centralised/urbancentred/national focus
As for DP
Decentralized/
bioregional/
neighborhood focus
As for DE
Largely as for
DP
Non-hierarchical/
Grassroots democracy
Hierarchy
without
structure
More careful
high technology
Appropriate
technology
Limited
technology
Power structure
hierarchical
High technology
ample
Power
�7
Shallow ecology, or reform environmentalism as it can to be called3 , differs from the
dominant paradigm primarily in its emphasis on stewardship, on long-term management, on
sustainable development. DE, while it reacts against the dominant paradigm primarily on
environmental grounds, stands opposed to shallow ecology, which it correctly sees as not going
nearly far enough, in particular to satisfy genuine environmental values. Of course the dominant
paradigm resisted is not itself a uniform or static position; some of the in determining of DE
flows from this very feature. For example, until very recently DP used to support dominance as
a throughgoing feature: not just over Nature, but of the male, white, Western, Protestant, rich,
powerful, free, adult, etc., over their opposites. Domination of the latter sorts, within the
human species, is, for the most part, no longer a part of the progressive ideology, having been
gradually shed over the last century; but such domination still remains part of much practice (as
well as of cultural ideologies).
Some of the most distinctive, and most controversial, principles of DE, are omitted from
the 8-point platform, as is evident from the opposition/resistance principles. These include the
principles regularly, and pontifically, claimed to distinguish deep ecology. Moreover without
these further principles, DE amount to nothing more than a slightly less shallow environmental
position (indeed apart from principle 1 and perhaps 2, all the principles of the 8-point platform
can be adopted by reform environmentalism and in fact often are enough espoused therefor).
These additional principles, part of the wider platform (and the creed) include these:9. Biospheric egalitarianism [in principle]: 'all things in the biosphere have an equal right to live
and blossom'. The principle is presented in this unqualified form (in DS) as one of the two
ultimate norms, the other being self-realisation. Fir fact Devall and Sessions proceed to tack on
a self-realisation component to this principle, of biocentric equality as they call it: namely 'and
to reach their own individual forms of unfolding and self-realisation with the larger Selfrealisation' (DS p.67). But, they immediately add, the 'basic intuition is that all organisms and
entities in the ecosphere, as parts of the interrelated whole, are equal in intrinsic worth' (p.67,
continuing, italics added). This italicised value-formulation is straightforward, and has the
advantage of moving rights out of the formulation (No doubt, if equal intrinsic value
guarantees an equal right to live and blossom, it yields the "equal rights to" formulation.) But it
encounters immediate difficulties, because in the process of continuing to live and blossom some
organisms interfere with others, for instance through basic demands for food and shelter, most
conspicuously in predation. To try to escape these difficulties, Naess at least regularly adds the
rider: in principle . 'Naess suggests that biocentric equality as an intuition is true in principle,
3
For example in D & S. The alternative, shallow ecology, was set aside because of the negative
conditions of the word 'shallow'.
�8
although in the process of living, all species use each other as food, shelter, etc.' (DS p.67).
10. Self-realisation . This involves the realisation - growth, development and maturity - of the
self, becoming a whole and full person, but not merely in isolation or in a social setting as in
older models of self-realisation, but within a biospheric setting, taking due account of other
forms of life. It 'can be summarised symbolically as the realisation of "self-in-Self' where
"Self' stands for organic wholeness' (DS p.67).
Intimately linked with self-realisation in this wider ecological sense is the next principle.
11 Biospheric identification . The procedure, again a personal one, consists in suitably
identifying with parts or wholes of the larger surrounding biosphere. The underlying notion
here is one of partial identity, sharing certain salient features with, which permits a qualified
substitutivity of an imaginative person into the position of another creature, ecoobject or
ecosystem. Such "identification" is a significant method of heightening
12. Ecological consciousness . Less grandiosely this covers environmental awareness,
appreciation, and concern, and thus responsiveness to environmental depredation. Engendering
ecological consciousness is regarded as a crucial part of spreading the deep ecological message.
13. Holism. On DE precepts, this amounts to more than the modem holism according to which
there are nonadditive wholes, wholes or objects which amount to more than the sums of their
parts. But as to what else holism demands, there is some disagreement within deep ecological
circles.
2. Further principles of the DE creed and important optional extras
Beyond the standard platform there are further principles, not enunciated at all, or until
very recently, or else more peripheral. Some of the further themes help in deciding what clarity
DE had; that is one reason why they presumably do not feature in the 8-point platform.
Among the principles not enunciated are these:•
Non violence.
The new themes, several of them periphical to the main concerns of DE include the
following:• Deep ecology offers a green synthesis. It 'combines the "Social Greens" with the "Natural
Greens" avoiding the extremes of both' (Naess R p.6). This is a surprising theme for a position
that has itself been regularly castigated as extreme. What N aess means, above all, is that DE
does not neglect humans, and their legalerate social concerns and aspirations, in the way that the
�9
Natural-greens have been (generally erroneously) accused of doing; nor does it neglect or
devalue nature and its features in the way that many social-greens are inclined to do.
Among the important optional extras that may be coupled with DE are principles of a more
through-going animal liberation, such as:• a severe reduction oforend to the enclavement, confinement and slaughter of animals.
• vegetarianism (of some form).
Some deep ecologists are vegetarians (e.g. Bennett), some are not (e.g. Drengson), and some
are in between (e.g. Naess). Unless they undergo a conversion, Northerness brought up in the
hunting-fishing-shooting tradition eschew these optimal principles. But evidently there is a
tension here; there is pressure coming from other principles, especially nonviolence, to limit
sharply slaughter of other creatures.
3. The creed, the basic creed, and the movement.
Like many a religious creed, the DE creed is an elaborate concoction (as well as a dubious
and rather arbitrary one). Adoption of it, knowledge of it even, cannot be expected of all
adherents, especially given its features: its vagueness, its inaccessibility, and so on. It is not
surprising that, again like many another creed or ideology, many of the faithful do not know too
well what it comprises, still less do many of the fellow-travellers (and DE has many). The most
that can perhaps be expected of adherents is adoption of some simpler creed, a basic creed more
or less in the vicinity of the 8-point platform. But it is apparent from DE texts that not even all
of that platform is demanded: enough will do, especially if other DE principles are adopted. The
platform represents 'what most supporters have in common at a deep level' 4 No doubt
supporters who eschew part of the platform compensate by adherence instead of other DE
principles or practice. Hence the depiction of the basic creed in diagram 2. A basic creed
comprises enough of the 8-point platform plus enough other principles at least to compensate for
omissions.
But not even a basic creed is always demanded. At its most generous and laxest, the DE
movement includes everyone who professes a concern for some part of the natural environment
and does not demolish a manifestation of concern or interest by blatantly anti-environmental
activity or involvement therewith. Inclusion in the movement does not even require strict
adoption of, or adherence to the DE platform, though it involves some vague recognition of
parts of it. Talk of membership of the movement would be somewhat inapposite; there is no
paid-up or recorded membership (or even rewarding as would be done in a voting system).
4
Naess R p.3, italics added.
�10
It is sometimes said that the DE movement was born in Europe and adopted elsewhere,
US and Australia especially. But such a claim confuses the movement with quasi-sociological
extraction of the principles involved and the platform assembling them. The movement itself
emerged as a late 1960's affair, substantially under way before it was reported upon and labelled
(as usual, academics, like politicians, reacted to, rather than led, more popular movements).
Such a movement involves some "mass" of people; it must therefore be anticipated by some
smaller groups and likely some initiating individuals. So it was with the DE movement. There
were prominent individuals in several countries where environmental groups with deep leanings
formed or operated, in the 60s and before; and before that there were many isolated individuals.
In USA, where the DE movement no doubt grew to substance first, before that in Europe or
Australia, there is a significant chain of deep ecologists, or rather deep ecological thinkers,
reaching back to the beginning of the century and perhaps into the previous century; for
instance, in reverse temporal order, Carson, Leopold, Muir, perhaps Thoreau. 5 Muir is
regularly alluded to as an early deep ecologist by Americans. 6
There are deeper-seated motives for vagueness about the basic creed and uncertainty about
the basic requirements to be deep ecologist and who makes the hororific status. One is a dislike
of criticism, and resulting vacillation among the high bishops of DE as to what extent critics, and
those who declare themselves not to be deep ecologists, should be included in the fold, and
consequently as to who exactly is a deep ecologist. (From outside the issue can look rather
trivial, but gangs are gangs whether ecological or more generally not..) A main reason for the
omission of central doctrines of DE from the 8-point platform is of course related: the desire to
increase the flock, to turn away no-one who might be decently admitted. 7 Another motive,
linked also with trying to enlist support, in order to mobilize democratic forces and like people
power, concerns the pluralistic drive that is an important aspect of authentric DE. It concerns the
insertion of pluralistic elements within level 2 itself (rather than confining these elements to other
levels, where there are conspicuous, as later exposition will show). As Naess explains the idea
5
6
7
In Australia there were, in reverse order, Dunply, Griffin, Stead; there were of course many others
with very considerable environmental concerns (e.g. Ratcliffe), who apparently lacked however the
requisite feature of depth, and world count only as reform environmentalistser conservationists. But,
quite evidently, there are serious problems in discerning whether some environmentalist or other is
deep (there is generally only indirect evidence, as the category was not clearly recognised). The issue
as to whether some deep environmentalist is a (prota)-deep ecologist is even more vexed because of
the muddiness of DE. It is important to observe that little reliance can be placed, in such issues, on
standard and applauded histories, such as Nash's Wilderness and the America Mind, because these are
written from a shallow perspective and fail to realise the significance of depth; See further Devall's
report on Nash's third edition, Ecorotes, pp23-9.
See, for instance, Devall Ecorates. Devall also suggests that St. Francis is a deep ecologist, but
given what is now known about St. Francis there is room for considerable doubt.
Or othersie admitted. But may be excluded by ignored or incompetance, or deterred by qualms about
significent propositions (human populations restraint esp.).
�11
is avoid the 'devastating' 'tendency to dogmatism': 'there is not one, definite, deep ecology
philosophy, not one definite one kind of green society'. Likewise there is no definite or
definitive basic creed. For many purposes this does not matter; we can still normally assert such
and such, so and so, definitely deep ecological, such and such, so and so, is definitely not.
In an attempt to evade criticism, DE is nowadays sometimes represented as a grass-roots
movement, one but loosely associated with philosophical views 8 But such movements have
intellectually-shaped objectives, offer at least a set of slogans and elementary principles. And
DE is this and more; it verges on the dishonest to try to portray DE as such a movement, when
in large measure it is the work of intellectuals, initiated by reporting, rather inaccurately it seems,
on the supposed attitudes of field ecologists and like workers - hardly typical grass-roots people.
8
In a different respect, in term of moral of ideas and change of themes, DE is no doubt a movement. It
has moved (and with Fox shedding critical principles, it continues moving). Such movement is not
good for the types of virtues that stable positions may acquire, such a replenity, reliability,
assessibility etc; but it does make life difficult for critics.
�PART II
CRITIQUE OF DEEP ECOLOGY
Chapter 5.
THE INITIAL PROBLEM: WHAT ON EARTH IS DEEP ECOLOGY?
WHO IS AND ISN'T A DEEP ECOLOGIST?
Deep ecology appears , on a preliminary reading, to be some elaboration of the position
that natural things other than humans have value in themselves, value sometimes exceeding that of
or had by humans. So much appears to follow from the first part of the 8-point platform. But
even this much is denied by some of the never philosophers (e.g. Fox). Moreover which
elaboration is quite another matter, and decidedly controversial. Indeed DE has not just been
rapidly converted (in part through overuse) into a conceptual bog, but is well on the way to
becoming all things to all interested parties. This is undoubtedly a drawback; it makes
communication, and theoretical and persuasive use of the notion, that much more difficult though it does not condemn an afflicted notion, such as deep ecology undoubtedly is, out of
hand. For several important and fruitful notions, which have survived, have encountered very
much of this sort of problem - force, mind, energy, differential, infinitesimal, to take some older
examples, paradigm and culture to take relevant recent examples.O On the other hand, many
notions no more afflicted than deep ecology, such as societism, timocracy and ungrund, have
been assigned to the historical scrap-heap. These include the sort of neo-Hegelian panpsychism
which deep ecology of the American texts will tum out to resemble.
What is evidence of conceptual murkiness and degeneration? The trouble begins with the
very introduction of the terminology. Naess, - when first setting down in one preliminary
codification what was already in the air,* wrote only of the 'Deep Ecology movement' and set
down what he has subsequently described as a 'Deep Ecology platform'. The suggested notion
of deep ecology, the underlying notion that informed the loosely-knit and open-ended movement
and platform, was not extracted; that subtraction task fell primarily to West Coast American
intellectuals, and it was done differently by different proponents of deep ecology. The trouble
was accentuated through rapid evolution of the notion. Thus Naess's account of the movement in
0
*
In case it is supposed this sort of conceptual muddiness is limited to less exact science, consider such
recent notions as anthropic principle, from physics, and nonmonotonic logic, from computer science.
See Naess 73, p.98ff. While slogans and preliminary formulations are fine, particularly in campaigns,
philosophy cannot rest at the level of slogans or platforms, as too much of DE continues to do.
�2
1983 is significantly different from the account he outlined in 1973; seven principles are replaced
by six different themes, only two or so of which have much in common with the original
principles. t
Although DE is introduced in the 8-point platform as a value theory, basically concerned
with environmental values 1 , it has been presented as a metaphysics, as a consciousness
movement (and as primarily psychological), and even as a sort of (pantheistic) religion. Popular
Australian sources will begin to indicate some of the spread. The Deep Ecologist , a network
newsletter, sees deep ecology as metaphysical at base, as part of a natural philosophy of humans'
place in nature (though many of its correspondents see it as a matter of deep experiences , often
of a religious cast, too often decidedly anthropocentric, obtained in or through Nature).
According to its manifesto, carried in each issue on its title page,
Deep ecology is the search for a sustaining metaphysics of the environment; it
represents "a deep understanding of our unity with other beings and livings
processes" (Drengson); it is biocentric, not anthropocentric.
Though we shall come to modify or reject this manifesto phrase by phrase (deep ecology is not a
search, but on one level a position or theory, on another a movement; sustaining should concern
the environment, not the metaphysics; depth lies elsewhere than understanding; unity too is a
metaphor for integration; biocentric is misleadingly restrictive), the present enterprise, illustrating
the degenerative spread of deep ecology, is different. Let us hasten on to the strikingly different
explanation John Seed prefers in introducing and advertising his anthology Deep Ecology 2 , a
person - and consciousness-oriented souffle (drawn from Devall):
"What I call deep ecology ... is premised on a gestalt of person-in-nature [an image
Naess had rejected at the very outset of the enterprise 3]. The person is not above or
outside of nature. The person is part of creation on-going. The person cares for and
about nature, shows reverence towards and respect for nonhuman nature, loves, and
lives with nonhuman nature, is a person in the "earth household" and "lets beings
be", lets nonhuman nature follow separate evolutionary destinies. Deep ecology,
unlike reform environmentalism, is not just a pragmatic, short-term social movement
with a goal like stopping nuclear power or cleaning up the waterways. Deep ecology
first attempts to question and present alternatives to conventional ways of thinking in
the modern West. Deep ecology understands that some of the "solutions" of reform
environmentalism are counter-productive. Deep ecology seeks transformation of
values and social organisation.
t
2
3
The claim is documented in the Appendix to this chapter.
Thus according to Naess (73, p.99), ' ... the significant tenets of the Deep Ecology movement are
clearly and forcefully normative . They express a value priority system ... '. But even this core claim
is now challenged, by Fox, who sees the primary focus of deep ecology as ontological and not
evaluative.
This is one of three different collections with this title which have been circulated or announced
recently: see references.
See Naess 73, p.95; but Naess's rejection is rejected below.
�•
3
Deep ecology is liberating ecological consciousness ... Consciousness is knowing.
From the perspective of deep ecology, ecological resistance will naturally flow from
and with a developing ecological consciousness (Devall, 'The Deep Ecology
Movement').
Again, while informative, much of this will have to be rejected or rectified (for example, the
gesalt theme is problematic, and the deep person need do part only of what is specified; shallow
or reform ecology need not be short-term, insofar as it may take account of many future
generations of humans; it may well not be pragmatic; shallow ecology is better pluralistically
combined with deep ecology, as in Naess's original platform, than denigrated; etc.) It is to Bill
Devall, more than anyone, that we are indebted for a confusing myriad of formulations of the
driving notion, several of them however extending Naess; for instance, deep ecology is first of all
deep questioning, deep ecology is ultimately self-realisation and biocentrism, in deep ecology the
most important ideas are 'the wholeness and integrity of person/planet together with biological
egalitarianism'; it is also however much else - that again we shall come to modify or reject including a new psychology and new philosophical anthropology. 4 But Devall has been much
encouraged by George Sessions, and it is Sessions especially who has tried to convert deep
ecology into a new religion, with main texts drawn from pantheism, Spinoza and Buddhism.
Thus according to Sessions,
If the promise of American pantheism and nature mysticism is to be fulfilled, it will
occur in the deep ecology social paradigm which is based upon pantheism and the
idea of ecological egalitarianism in principle (Ecophilosophy ill).
But although Sessions refers immediately to Naess, there is nothing in Naess about American
pantheism and nature mysticism. At most Naess would allow that pantheism, along with other
comprehensive positions, like Christianity or ecosophy, can be an underlying base for the deep
ecology platform.
Small wonder that John Passmore (hardly one to be philosophically baffled given his
immense experience in comprehending Continental philosophy) goes astray in yet another
account, in which he conveniently pushes the shallow-deep contrast into the unsatisfactory
conservation/preservation boxes (of his 74):
Deep ecophilosophers ... are mainly interested in the preservation of species and
wilderness even when preserving them is not immediately and advantageous to
human interest. In order to provide intellectual support for such preservation they
are prepared to break with traditional Western ethical principles and metaphysical
beliefs (Passmore 83).
4
Devall 79, 83; for a synopsis, see Appendix 1, figure 7B.
�4
Again, most of this will have to be rectified, since the presentation is decidedly misleading, not to
say biassed. As initial explanations of the deep ecological movement straightaway show, and
applications reveal, deep ecology has always concerned, and deep ecophilosophers have always
been interested in, much else as well, especially in human population levels and human
interference, and in quality of life and technological and organisational structures. While this of
course requires breaking with some Western traditions - which are in no way sacrosanct Wes tern tradition is far from uniform, and there are other tradition: deep ecology can remain, and
is, rooted in tradition, though much about it is as new and fresh as anything of this sort can be.
As a broad label for something rather environmentally different, and no doubt better, than
most vague ideologies that preceded it, 'deep ecology' is no doubt rather fine. That is broad
vague way is how the label often functions, honorific ally. That is, for instance how it functions
in the collection under that label edited by Tobias, which gives deep ecology none but a nebulous
content, and which indeed contains many articles (such as the interview with Soleri) in diametrical
opposition to the more detailed platform promulgated by the intellectual "leaders" of the deep
ecology movements. In fact, a good deal of the more popular appeal of deep ecology has been
obtained by vacillation between the more discerning authentic forms and the slack or nebulous
forms. The nebulous use of the label has also given cover to some of those who calls themselves
'deep ecologists', enabling them to shed awkward but crucial themes from the more detailed
platform (thus e.g. Fox, as explained below).
Many are those who are now pleased to march under the rather fashionable nebulous
banner. 5 Many are not deep, in theory or practice, deeply committed, or deeply changed by the
march. Attending a consciousness - raising weekend, purchasing or growing organic vegetables,
having spiritual experiences in a special natural place, or practising some oriental art or exercise
routine, does not ensure a deepened environmental position, though it can be a step on the way.
While nebulous deep ecology is compatible with much that is neither deep nor even
significantly ecologically oriented, such as minor lifestyle adjustments within the industrial
paradigm, authentic deep ecology, which is not so slack, remains a defective doctrine, itself
oscillating between an overpermissive environmental assembly point, fast growing its radical
potential, on the one side, and an impermissive, unduly narrow doctrine, dubious or defective in
5
I too am happy to march under the nebulous banner, though since my first critique I am no longer
particularly welcome. Initially I was cut by about half those individuals and institutions loosely
associated with deep ecology, since my critique began circulating. While I am become accustomed to
this sort of phenomenon in intellectual areas (criticism induces cool and long at least, even in logic), I
didn't expect so much of this given the Christian character of DE.; and such isolation does seriously
reduce information sources.
�5
several of its leading themes, on the other side. Some of the worst of these themes, such as
biological egalitarianism, have already been subject to much criticism, deserved criticism as will
soon appear. But other features of authentic deep ecology have hitherto been left largely
untouched, and new features have emerged. So an ongoing critique is needed.
Recently 6 , it has been become more difficult, if anything, to grasp what DE is all about.
New themes are introduced, older ones withdrawn or whittled away. Even Naess, the finder of
the movement, who now tends to adhere much more closely to the (nonetheless adjustible)
platform than other self-proclaimed deep ecologists, is inclined to make apparently large
concessions to opposition charges, which however he subsequently more surreptitiously
withdraws (of course this is familiar philosophical practice). At other times, he withdraws with
one hand what he is offering, some sort of olive branch, with the other. The oscillation can be
partly ascribed to conflicting motivation. On the one side, there is the desire, stronger in the
finder-founder, Naess, than in his American and Australian prophets, to create a wide
constituency, to tum no one away if doing so can in any way be avoided. But, on the other, there
is an evident desire, among the prophers, to make deep ecology a very select position, a place for
a chosen few, a place to be achieved only after a journey crossing some arduous terrain and
involving some difficult life adjustments i.e. after an appropriate testing pilgrimage. Deep
ecology, however, lacks the other-worldly and after-life resources which, in some of its religious
sources, appear to make for an easy resolution of this type of conflict.
There is a considerable lack of discrimination among the pace-setters of the movement over,
and marked differences between them as to, who and what is accounted within deep ecology, and
some unwarranted discrimination from this exclusive club (e.g. of Rodman). Many of the people
classed as within or associated with deep ecology are shallow. And some who are excluded are
not. For example, Naess (in 75) presents a long list of people he associates with the movement,
many of whom are rather or even entirely shallow in their environmental orientation. Elsewhere
(in 83) Naess proceeds to identify with deep ecology several other positions or movements which
only overlap it, and which may be substantially shallow (such as green politics and new natural
philosophies). Some of the predominantly American lists Devall and Sessions assemble are not
so artless. To some extent, this combined discrimination and lack of discrimination again reflects
the conceptual murkiness of deep ecology; to some extent it is symptomatic of other oldconsciousness malignancies, both within the notion and as regards its use.
6
Since the first critique was produced
�6
Still more damaging to the movement is that several of the advertised prophets of deep
ecology verge on the shallow, and some of these have denied DE.7 A striking example is
Bookchin who has recently denounced DE, and written ranging declamations much of
Bookchin's main, windy, bringin-it-together book, The Ecology of Freedom, said to be a "book
of deep ecology" is very far from that; it is yet another, is a celebration of humans in very much
the old (enlightenment) style. Insofar as it gets to grips with deeper environmental issues,
Bookchin's material amounts to an extension of shallow ecology. 8 Ecologically Bookchin, like
other of the prophets, buys into vitalism by way of extended consciousness. Ecological ethics is
said to render nature self-conscious; the mechanistic alternative is presented as deadness, thus
making an entirely false contrast. Indeed, part of the problem with the selection of prophets, is
that mechanism is seen as the main bogy - when it is only one of the forms metaphysically
underpinning shallower positions, Cartesian dualism being another - with the result that work that
simply attacks mechanism and its variants and also advocates some sort of environmental way,
gets accounted deep.
N aess has cast the net of deep ecology too wide, catching therewith not only many remote
"supporters", but a number of hostile critics as well, such as latterly the antagonistic Bockchin
(RS p.6). Naess now considers the 8-point platform, formulated by himself and Sessions and
published in several slightly different forms, as tentatively setting down the 'basic principles of
Deep Ecology' - though it leaves out what Devall and Sessions assert are the two essential
features of DE, biospheric egalitorionism and self-realisation, and though it does not require
depth (immediate positions conforming to the platform). Even so Naess 'look[s] upon the
formulations as tentatively expressing the most general and basic views which almost all
supporters of the movement have in common ' (letter 23.6.88). Thus the 8-point platform
provides, in a still vague and tentative sort of way, the distinguishing platform, of DE. To get
around a small obstacle, let us call those who would adhere to an approved minimum of the
principles of the distinguished platform (in some approved formulation) adherents of DE. They
are adherents in (simply and literally) holding to that much of the platform. They may not be
members of the movement in any ordinary sense, in any but the set-theoretical sense, because
appropriate intentionality is lacking, for instance they may never have heard of the movement, let
alone made any effort to join. Nor need adherents be supporters in the usual sense; support is
neither necessary nor sufficient for adherence. A critic such as Bockchin, or Routley, can be an
7
8
See, e.g., B. Devall and G. Sessions, 'The books of deep ecology', Earth First! 4(8) (1984). Several
of these books do not penetrate very deep ecologically or otherwise.
See especially p.344, with remarks like 'and wherever possible the wildlife they may support on their
fringes'. The paragraph portrays a very human-centered (and conquered-land) picture. See also p.342,
middle.
�7
adherent without being a supporter, without being supportive. Conversely, a supporter may not
be an adherent. The Salvation Army has many supporters, including atheists, who are not
adherents. The DE movement has many supporters, some of whom call themselves 'deep
ecologists', who do not adhere to the platform, even "more or less". Many of these supporters
are shallow environmentalists, who do not accept the key first point, of intrinsic value outside
humans, or else try to evade it (e.g. by redefinition, or by wrapping up value inextricably in
relations to valuers). Since there are, in my experience, many supporters and indeed enthusiasts
who tum out to be of this shallow sort, Naess's view is a little puzzling: what does he mean here
'almost all supporters'? Also which isolated exceptions does he have in view?
With the rise of environmentism, most of the distinguishing platform is no longer
demanding; indeed it is deliberately lax with a view to increasing the following. Moreover, none
of it, except for the last point, specifying an obligation to attempted implementation, requires any
commitment in the past of adherents. Plainly adherence to DE, as well as support for DE, could
be very considerably increased were this requirement evaded. A neat strategy, common to
ecomonical practice and sociological research, readily presents itself. Let us speak of silent
adherents as those who adhere to the platform, more or less, except that they make no requisite
effort to implement it (they may of course have some vague feeling of obligation, should they
ever reflect on the matter). Even without the benefit of scholarly survey work, it is evident that
DE would now have a large number of silent adherents, many of whom are not however
adherents, being either oblimovish, situated in repressive regions or social situations, or simply
uninformed (like indigenous peoples who think here are excessively many excessively
interferring humans of Caucasian stock).
The core platform represents a surprisingly incomplete and rather ill-organised collocation
of principles. The incompleteness is most conspicuous in point 6, which advances no details as
to envisaged structural changes. In extenuation N aess pleads that he has 'not has courage to go
into detail and define what these different structures will be, because we are going to have a lot of
different Green varieties. We shouldn't have one set of structures imposed' 9 • The reasoning
does not hold up. A range of structures, rather than a unique structure, can easily be defined by
constraints well-known ones as it happens. Naess should certainly be encouraged to go on and
delimit the structural and policy changes. It is easy to give him a start, drawing upon DE and
neighbouring environmental positions. For instance,
6a. The policy objective of maximizing state economic growth should be abandoned in favour of
9
RS p.7. But elsewhere. Naess did go into some detail (e.g. Book). Furthermore, if Naess - old,
famous, unorthodox, courageous enough on difficult mountains - doesn't get down to requisite details
of structural change, who will? Well, even some rather shallow theorists do.
�8
a highly selective approach to such growth. Evidently, there are many different ways such a
change in policy can be implemented. Some such change may be suggested by, but is not
implied by, point 7.
6b. Technology selection should be reoriented to appropriate technology, and away from risky
and polluting technology.
6c. Population policies should be directed at decreasing human populations in overpopulated
regions.
Principle 6c complements point 4, which does not actually enjoin any decrease in human
population. And so on, through a well-known list of constraints, with several of them regularly
included in principles of alternative social paradigms. Point 5 requires similar elaboration.
Another surprising feature is how mild most of these elaborations are, like the lax
distinguishing platform itself, which is pretty wishy-washy when contrasted with what is
happening out there environmentally. Many environmentalists now wish to proceed much
further, and to witness some real curtailment of heavy broad-acre assaults upon environments,
such as extensive clear-cutting of forests, over-fishing of shelves, and over-grazing of rangelands, extensive strip and beach mining, broad-acre pollution, and so on. Even
deindustrialization is not explicitly part of the DE creed, though some of the text enjoin it (e.g.
DS); but the issue is (no doubt wisely) avoided by leading prophets of DE familiar with the
demands of socialism. Yet deindustrialization - a considerable reduction in the levels of industrial
activity, particularly the undesirable dangerous destructive polluting types of industry that
conspicuously contributed to the first industrial revolution - would emerge from all the alternative
futures deep ecologists prefer to imagine, along with a much smaller, less consumption-oriented,
terrestrial human population. In any case, deindustrialization is an important environmental
objective, for both shallower and deeper ecology. It would assist, most materially, in obtaining
some better control on major environmental risks and problems, notably such matters as
greenhouse effects, atmospheric ozone destruction, and acid rain and its fall-out.
The idea of progress is, like that of more industrialisation, also under a cloud. It is now
naive to assume that progress per se is automatically to be applauded, and that a telling criticism
of something is that it would block progress. People are these days a little more discriminating
(in some respects); there is progress and progress, growth and growth, coke and coke. Much
that was progress, and still is in many quarters, is no longer universally regarded as such, as, for
instance, elimination of wetlands, pollution growth, assimilation of indigenous peoples. The
'previously ... dominant [assumption], that non-industrial society would and should progress
towards the industrial state and the scientific world view' was challenged, and is increasingly
rejected (cf. Naess, on the "status of mythology").
�9
So wishy-washy is the core characterisation of deep ecology that it lets in as deep ecologists
all sorts of environmental philosophers who would not previously have made that select band,
philosophers whom main disciples of deep ecology previously did or would have excluded,
philosophers whose positions are not deep. If DE is to be more exclusive, it will require more
careful, tighter formulation. Only clearly ruled out among environmental philosophers, i.e. those
who philosophize about environments and environmental problems, are hard-line human
chauvinists, led in the textbook stakes by Australians, Passmore (in his main conservative
persona) and McCloskey, but recently joined by some Americans Many of these excluded
philosophers would, moreover, subscribe to most of the points in the core platform, as weakly
interpreted. It is nowadays a rare thinking person who does not consider that there are severe
environmental problems, local and global, about which something, fairly far-reaching by
conservative political standards, should be done. It is a rare philosopher, who becomes
immersed in some spread of these problems (though it is still a rather rare professional
philosopher that does), and who does not develop some environmental commitments - even if a
liberalish social agenda still continues to dominate an environmental one (even so it is fast
becoming hard to avoid observing the interprenetration of social with broadly environmental
problems). While environmental philosophy has, by contrast with economics 10 , tended to
become progressively more accommodating to what was only a short time ago radical
environmental throught, as the magnitude of environmental problems is revealed, deep ecology
has moved in the opposite direction, has tried be excessively conciliatory, confusing pluralism
with broad consensualism, and has lost much of its radical flare. A wide environmental pluralism
is just fine; but it does not have to be achieved through consensus, or at the cost of a deep or an
ecological platform. A pluralism can be achieved by the linking of different positions, not their
mergence.
Among the diverse and motley groups of philosophers who now gain entry as adherents of
deep ecology, too generously construed, are apparently included those examples:Example 1. Moral extensionists, both utilitarians and rationalists 11 . Among utilitarians are
Singer, and perhaps even Smart on some days. Most turns on how point 1 is construed.
Utilitarians in the Benthamite tradition assign intrinsic value to all creatures with preferences,
sentience or the like, and are concerned with the well-being and flourishing of such creatures.
Accordingly they satisfy point 1 if it is read, as it may well be, 'much human and much nonhuman life'. It all depends upon how the terms 'human' and 'non-human' are quantified. If both
are quantified with 'all', the theses becomes implausible (admitting e.g. lab-manufactured
10
11
Now benchmark of reaction rareness, but itself beginning to exhibit some restlessness and unpass and
signs of change.
The useful category of moral extensionism derives from Rodman. It is critically examined also in EE.
�10
abominations as intrinsically valuable), and would exclude some acknowledged deep ecologists.
If the terms are more weakly quantified, then environmentally aware and active Benthamites are
admitted. An evident dividing line, provided by particular quantification, with 'some', is enough
to exclude shallow philosophers. But no quantification will serve to exclude either intermediate
positions which do not adopt a deep value theory, or individualism, such as moral extension
positions, almost invariably a spouse. Extensionists more patently included are those of
rationalistic persuasion, grouped loosely around Regan in the American South, who have
gradually move away from utilitarian prescriptions, to the view that ethical principles, including
those of vegetarianism, can be reached by rational means, by clear, consistent and coherent
thinking (thus, the broad position is really a coherence theory of morality).
Example 2. More far-reaching intermediate positions, which do assign intrinsic value less
stingily throughout nature, to some non-preference-havers, such as trees, and to some nonindividuals, such as forests, but which still adopt a greater value assumption, according to which
human values always take precedence over non-human assignments. Positions of this sort are
delineated (so far in insufficient theoretical detail) by Rolston and Attfield. In fact the positions so
far elaborated of this type typically, but hardly inevitably, draw on an enlightened Christian
backdrop heavily laced with science (a religious American naturalism, so to say, in Ralston's
case). They amount to nonsecular moral extensionisms, by contrast with the secular moral
extensionisms of example 1 (to try to squeeze these positions into Rodman's nonexhaustive
classification of positions).
Example 3. Deep-green theorists reject the biocentric restriction sometimes built into point 1,
though not in big formulation given above. This formulation certainly admits Sylvan as an
adherent of DE, despite what some deep ecologists have said. According to strict biocentrism
however, only what has life (in some sense) can have value. Deep-green theorist see this
restriction as very like that imposed by utilitarians, to sentience as unwarranted, unnecessary,
unenforceable and arbitrary.
Deep-green theorists, like environmental resisters, ecodefenders and Earth-Firsters, now
see the DE platform as much too moderate and quite insufficiently radical. The earlier radicalism
of DE has been excessively pruned back, on a mix of dubious grounds: the drive for an
environmental consensus (in place of a genuine pluralism), the religio-political quest for a large
support base (which could however be environmentalism broadly, with DE in the vanguard), and
the input of conservatizing academic thought and the aim of intellectual respectability. In fact DE
which has not gained much ground or good grades academically, as compared with its success
outside academia, especially with book-reading environmentalists, would better forget academic
success, where it has made progress only among outsiders, not power-players, and return to its
�11
more radical mission. Academics, after all, form only a tiny minority, though one dangerously
and influentially supportive, on the whole, of most past environmental excesses and assaults.
We have proceeded to cut through the problem of what DE is or may be by formulating a
specific version, authentic deep ecology, and by taking explicit account of main alternatives
proposed. Authentic deep ecology follows, for the most part, Naess's account of deep ecology.
But insistence on authentic deep ecology leaves several casualties, nebulous deep ecologists who
prove not to be authentically deep. An important test is offorded through the greater value
assumption, and the associated special place reserved for humans in the scheme of things, assent
to which serves to expose the inadequate depth of more nebulous 'followers of deep ecology'.
For (after proper preparation) they make the wrong responses on the crucial tests of depth. A
conspicuous casualty who fails to negotiate 'these tricky slopes' is Drengson, behind whose
genuine ecological sensibility lies a human supremacist position with humans occupying 'a
unique position ... in the scheme of things', at the summit of that old-consciousness hierarchy,
"the great chain of being" .12 According to Drengson, circumstances
Might force us, sometimes, to choose between the life of a fish or a cow and that of
a human child. We do not hesitate to choose the child. Our priorities are a result of
our position in the scheme of things, with a spectrum of species (p.7).
Not even followers of medium-depth ecology need respond in this reflex fashion, for instance
where the child is seriously defective. Certainly, faced with a range of duly-elaborated imagined
circumstances of difficult or forced choice, deeper thinkers would hesitate - since such situations
tend to pose moral dilemmas. And sometimes at least their priorities would be different from
Drengson's; for example, the fish is rare and the child ordinary, the cow occupies a unique place
in an important ecosystem.13
Even Naess himself, who vacillates considerably in what he has to say and occasionally
lapses badly from the authentic way. 14 It is worth examining some of Naess's logics, not for
nonphilosophical reasons (or even to reveal N aess as a further flaws doyen, typical of the heroes
12
13
14
See The Trumpeter 1(4) (1984), 6-7. Drengson is not the only casualty; Berry, whose criticism
Drengson is trying to meet, is another.
Differently, the child is Hitler or the President who chooses to press the nuclear button. Such cases,
which in some settings permit of a traditional treatment, were considered from a deeper perspective in
Routley 2 79.
A most striking example is Naess's Rescequence article, 'The basis of deep ecology', which departs
considerably from the spirit and themes of DE. Even Naess, who is not significantly hang-up in
doctrinal purity and doctrinal divergence, felt obliged to circulate a note correcting, "reformulating",
what he had said and written (the article was originally a Sub ...... lecture). 'Some ... may find some of
its sentences not quite in forming with what I usually tend to say. Therefore I offer some
reformulations ... I still stick to my views recently expressed in various articles and books' (Nute,
italics added).
�12
of DE), but because these show committing about DE, they are indicative of its doctrical
instability, lack of clarity, and scope for improvement.
• Any society worthy of the name Green is a deep ecological one. 15 Given that there are a range
of ........... societies that are green but not deep green, such a claim must fail. Even if 'deep
green' were substituted for 'green' it could not be contained, because DE policies exclude some
deep green alternatives. Accordingly, it is false that explication of DE is 'articulation of the
fundamental positions that are presupposed in Green societies' (p.4); DE societies are but part of
that rich and variety plurality.
What does Naess say by way of rectification? Frankly, not nearly enough. He proceeds to assert
that in his opinion, a 'society that does not operate in harmony with [the 8-point platform of DE
... is not] worthy of being called Green! But a genuinely Green society may well reject or violate
several of the points emanciated, e.g. the wide intrinsic value assumption (of point 1), the
obligation to action (of point 8).
•
'We should never engage in any discussion on technicalities without asking, "What do we
basically need in life?" Always ask the basic question. This is what I mean by the term Deep
Ecology Movement' (p.5). Naess does nothing whatever to complenish for presentation of the
basic technical question in this (biospherically) chauvinistic way. Do we need a DE which tells us
that the bottom line is "What's in it for us?"! Doesn't part of deep environmentalism consist in
seeing through and explaining what is wrong with this pernicious bottom line. As regard the
'This is what I mean by ... ' blunder, Naess tries to exonerate himself by use of the well-worn
criterion/definition distinction.1 6 But on its own it hardly helps; such bottom line inquiry is not a
criterion for DE either. Nor is following inquiry through to ultimate ends a distinctive feature of
DE; the shallowest sorts of hedonism, for example, may adopt similar procedures. In fact N aess
lands himself in further trouble in trying to extricate himself. To try to make the criterion offer
look tempting (a comprehensive test for depth), he claims that 'when supporters of the shallow
ecology movement are seriously asked about ultimate ends they tend to affirm the same ones as
supporters of the deep movement'. Not only would this be a most unlikely outcome of a
satisfactory questionaire; but worse, if it were the outcome, it would render shallow ecology
supporters deep; so the criterion would eliminate a fundamental contrast for, and for making out,
DE. In any event, too many humans, especially powerholders, remain outside the orbit of
15
16
This follows from what Naess asserts given on that a society that adapts 'policies characteristic of
Deep Ecology' is a deep ecological one.
There is at least a touch of arrogance (or is it part Naess's disdain for conceptual nicety?) in Naess's
introduction of this shabby exoneration attempt: The damaging sentences, - those quoted - 'might be
reformulated (in honor of my conceptually interested friends) in the follow way:'. Maybe Naess was
serious in his (otherwise ab sure) opening remarks in the R ......... article about looking forward to
hobnobbing with the aristocracy.
�13
shallow ecology, often attached to the pernicious bottom line (it is doubtful that 'most people
dwell in shallow ecology', p.5 heading).
•
Articulation of DE principles gives a total view. (An amazing contrast with the ....... .
juxtaposed doctrine of ignorance which suggest we can never obtain a total view.) By contrast
with 'shallow ecology which (avoids) the basic questions ... the Deep Ecology Movement
concerns itself with basic beliefs and assumptions about the universe. If you articulate the
principles of the Deep Ecology Movement you get a total view . The term "total view" is
essential. The Deep Ecology Movement is a total view. It covers our basic assumptions, our life
philosophy and our decisions in everyday life' (Res ,p.6.italics added). In first place, the alleged
contrast with shallow ecology do not stand up to much examination. A dedicated shallow
Christian or capitalist may practice the same depth of questioning and reflection or a deep
ecologist, or rather more; such a person may have a well-integrated lifestyle, with a fairly
comprehensive philosophy (as these thing go) covering it. Secondly, N aess takes what seems to
be asserted back in commentary. 'If we articulate the principles of the deep ecology movement, -- you do not get a total view' (p.3); but that apparently directly contradicts the above italicized
passage. There is an escape from contradiction offered - distinguish the principles, by filling in
the dashes by "in the sense of principles of the DE platform" - but it leads a severe problem - what
are the principles of DE? What is DE? Naess's commentary implies that the principles of DE
required for a total view are those of all levels of the double pyramid. Such an idea lands the
articulation of DE in hopeless difficulties. Firstly, we do not, and cannot, know what the
principles are, because they now include principles applied and decisions taken at the bottom level
which refers to particular situations, including 'particular direct actions at a particular date'; but
these will vary, in ......... ways, over-future times. Secondly, since there are various different,
and compating, principles at the top level, DE will either be damagingly inconsistently
characterised, or else it will be far from uniquely characterised. For DE will include Christianity
of this and that sect, Buddinism of this and that form, and so on. In fact Naess accepts such an
outcome (but in his misdirect attempt to avoid dogmatism): 'There is not one, definite, deep
ecology philosophy, not one definite "ecosophy", no definite set of green policies' (p.3) and, he
should have added on this line of thinking no definite deep ecology or set of DE principles.
But there is a set of central principles, those at level 2. They do not present a total view.
But nor in general do those of all four levels of deep ecology. There is much, a mass of opinion
(for instance, concerning scientific speculation) which would form part of a more comprehensive
(world) view that is not reflected at any of the four levels. It is indeed entirely unclear what
would present a total view? Spiniza's philosophy perhaps? But it is easy to ...... of topics it
does not cover, such as city architecture and factory farming, on which a total view could have an
angle. It is certainly doubtful that lesser mentals than Spinaza, such as typical supporters of DE,
�14
operate in a total view. N aess claims that they do, but adduces no evidence; testing is much more
likely to reveal how pragmentory the ecological view of most deep ecologists are. Not only is the
noton of a "total view", drawn from Naess's earlier philosophizing muddy; the desirability of the
notion is open to (damaging) questioning. "Total view" comprehends too much, fixes too much
that perhaps should be left open; it sails too close to "totaliterian view" for real pluralistic comfort.
There is, then, quite evidently, a serious problem with deep ecology, and in finding out
exactly what it is, that even the clearer accounts offered differ in significant subjects face similar
difficulties, philosophy for one. With movements, which is what deep ecology is often presented
as, the situation is normally much worse. Consider the difficulties in saying, with much
precision, what some political movement (such as green politics) represents, what some party
stands for and against. And despite the accelerating diversity of accounts there appears to be
substance to the deep ecology notion. Several important interconnected distinctions, which look
to be worth disentangling, are marked out, and an important group of ideas is assembled. Rather
than being simply junked (something my conservative inclinations rise against with notions, as
with the premature discarding of material "goods"), the notions involved should at least be
disentangled and, if feasible, renovated or recycled.
More generally, it is not merely valuabe, but quite essential in senous intellectul
assignments, to indicate what deep ecology is and isn't - for lots of purposes, including
explaining it, arguing from it, and applying it. What can be done? One resolution can be
obtained along the lines of critical rationalism. The fuller formulations of deep ecology, after
reorganisation into more tractable form, are subject to severe criticism, with a view to obtaining
thereby an improved, more satisfactory, thinner and fitter formulation, which at the same time
meets other desirable criteria. Among these is a desideratum often lost sight of in the ferment of
environmental action, the need for environmental pluralism.
A start on this rather analytic approach involves separating out the different components of
the deep ecology messages, and isolating core themes of deep and shallow ecology from wider
positions and paradigms which they inform. The core is (as Naess indicated) essentially
normative. Fortunately the core themes have already been isolated, in a previous application of
deep ecology to population theory 17 , and this work can be taken over largely intact. For the
extensive remainder, the following pretty complicated sort of picture starts to emerge (upon
organising themes and claims of several supporters of deep ecology, in a way explained in the
Appendix to this chapter):-
17
In Routley 84.
�Figure 5.1.
SHALLOWER AND DEEPER POSITIONS, AND THEIR ACCLAIMED ASSUMPTIONS, PARTLY
SCHEMATIZED.
SHALLOW
VALUE
CORE
ENVIRONMENT AL
SUBJECT
SOLE
(INTRINSIC)
K,' ALUE ASSUMPTION
VALUES-IN-NATURE
GREATER VALUE ASSUMPTION BIOSPECIES IMPARTIALITY
FURTHER PHILOSOPHICAL BASES
GROUNDOF
VALUE
DEEP
(separable theoretical underpinning)
FEATURES OF
HUMANS
DIVERSITY, RICHNESS OF
NATURAL(LIFE)FORMS
ii. METAPHYSICAL
INDIVIDUAL
REDUCTION. NATURE
AS BACKDROP
IRREDUCIBLE SYSTEMS.
NATUREAS
IN1EGRAL
m EPISTEMIC
REDUCTIONIST/ANALYTIC
SUBJECT-OBJECT ACCOUNT
HOLISTIC/GESTALT /FIELD
ACCOUNT
LARGER
ENCOMPASSING
AND INFORMING
THEORY
EMPIRICISM,IDEALISM,
ECOSOPHY, PANTHEISM,
POSITIVISM
AMERICAN NATURALISM
+- DIFFERENT FACETS ➔
OF CHRISTIANITY, BUDDHISM, ...
VALUE (DEONTIC
AND ACTION)
COLLARIES
EXTENSIVE
INTERFERENCE
FOR HUMAN INTERESTS
AND PURPOSES
1.
ACTION
(META-) PRINCIPLE
APPLICATIONS
(AS COROLLARIES)
LIMITED INTERFERENCE
AND RIGHTS THEREfO
ETHICS
ASETHETICS
METAPHYSICS
EPISTEMOLOGY
IDEOLOGY/
RELIGION
LIFESTYLE
+-OBLIGATION TO IMPLEMENT COMMITMENTS➔
To population, (individual) consumption,
(individual) impact, resources, technology, pollution,
economic growth and quality-of-life, culture, organisation,
science, education; and to the variety of natural (and
some artifical) forms, such as land, oceans, atmosphere,
arctic regions, swamps, forests, soils, ...
POLICY
ECONOMICS
POLITICS
Given the picture some major and serious sets of problems with deep ecology begin to
appear at once. First, the value core arrived at already substantially transforms that suggested by
the literature, with, for instance, biospecies impartiality improving on biospheric egalitarianism.
Secondly, both the bases and the encompassing theories usually indicated (those diagrammed) are
not just highly problematic but are detachable from the core and can be avoided. For example, the
various, rather different, epistemic and metaphysical theories that have been proposed as
�16
supporting, or even essential to, deeper positions are, to say the least, very dubious. So it is
fortunate that the deeper value core is independent of them all - though that is not to say that it is
independent of every account, since some (plausible) story of value qualities in the natural world,
and our perception and knowledge of them, has to be told, sooner or later.
But one weaker parts of the larger deep ecological story as usually told concerns the
embedding of deep ecology in a broader philosophical theory, such as Naess's system ecosophy
T, or Buddhism, or nature mysticism, or whatever. This much is true: as it is with shallow
positions, which can be supported by most of the mainstream, more comprehensive,
philosophical theories (for what they are worth), so it is with deeper positions, which can be
supported by very different, though unorthodox, philosophical theories, for instance, by (a
modification of) Whitehead's process theory or by (an adaption of) Meinong's object theory.
But, for reasons we shall come to, such theoretical frameworks as ecosophy, pantheism,
Christianity and Buddhism do not include thorough-going deep positions, but sustain only
shallower positions, and a properly deep picture is not derivable from them. This suggests that
the proposed derivation of deep ecology from ecosophy is substantially astray (and that so, more
sweepingly, is the whole derivational pyramid regularly presented by Naess in his four-level
picture). So it will prove to be: the success of these derivations would depend upon importing
analogues of shallowness into deep ecology.
APPENDIX
1. Survey methods as a way of pinning down deep ecology. How does the sort of
picture shown in figure 5.1 - which is worth persevering with, elaborating and applying - fit in
with the burgeoning deep ecological literature? It is surely not just tangential to that, so that we
should look elsewhere to grasp the deeper features of deep ecology?
In fact the core themes, and philosophical basis, and extension themes, were assembled in a
quite impressionistic fashion, namely working through much of the literature, and all the more
basic work, and setting down the themes which on reflection seemed to be presented or emerge.
Something like this is still a main method of research in the humanities, e.g. in history, history of
ideas, and philosophy.
�Figure 7a Schematic picture of elementary procedures
Source 1
T
H
Source 2
Source n
i
INTERSECTION
(COMMON
CORE)
E
M
E
s
UNION
t
DISCOUNTED
But here, with deep ecology, there were prospects of doing better than such impressionistic
methods, or so one might have thought. Empirical, or at least quasi-empirical, methods (of the
sort favoured by Naess in his earlier days) could be employed. The main idea is that the set of
relevant sources is assembled, and then some statistical and set-theoretic work is done on the
themes extracted from these sources; so the method is an elaboration of the sort of technique
larger dictionaries such as the Oxford adopt in pinning down the standard senses of a term. The
hope was that analysis of the serious philosophical literature (pretty rough selection criteria these,
to be sure) on deep ecology would lead, not to despair, but in particular in two directions:Firstly, to what is more or less common to the positions presented - the intersection of theories,
giving the substantial core or basic theory. And secondly, to what results when all the theories
are put together - the union of themes, giving an approximation, after some sifting, to a deep
ecological paradigm.
As you might have anticipated by now, this thematic method hardly worked to perfection.
Still it is worth explaining the method in a little more detail since, despite its limited success, it
�18
reveals much. First a set of sources is assembled. Here there is scope for sampling and statistical
methods, so beloved of social scientists; but in the case of deep ecology it seemed feasible, back
in 1984, to gather for winnowing all more serious texts accessible in Australia. That latter
limitation (all too familiar in environmental research) imposes a perhaps unfortunate parochial
geographical constraint; but it induces no violation of such adequacy requirements as that sources
introducing the notion be included in the bundle, as are all sources referred back to in several
other sources. With the rise of networking magazines concerned with deep ecology, there are
many references to deep ecological thinking and experience which get discounted, as not
appropriately serious. Increasingly often, any sort of deeper experience or thought gets assigned
under the "deep" heading, no matter how anthropocentric. This is one of the many problems
with the depth notion and deep terminology, rather counteracting the valuable idea of penetrating
below the conventional surface of received environmental assumptions, that it is important to
think deeper than the assumption of Environment Z-land, for instance, that the environment
should be managed for present and future generations of humans - a typical governmental surface
assumption, often announced, but much less often put into practice.
Once the sources are assembled, a beginning can be made on unscrambling themes,
something that calls for a good deal of judgement also, especially in such matters as deciding
whether themes from different sources come to the same or not. Here and elsewhere care is
required not to penetrate too deeply, to expose only so much of surface themes as is necessary (a
well-known principle in logical analysis). When the themes are duly marked out, there is some
smoothing of the thematic data; for instance, evidently remote and irrelevant themes in one source
may be deleted. (It is like the judging of a diving contest or the massaging of statistics, where
isolated wild elements are removed from the sample used for assessment.) Then the elementary
set operations of union and intersection are applied, again subject to some qualification. In
particular, if a very prominent theme in some formulations is omitted from, or only approximated
in, one formulation, then that theme will be put, initially at least, in the intersection. (Logicians
and mathematicians, for example, sometimes omit intended or assumed axioms; e.g. Parry in
analytic implication, Maclean in category theory.) A striking example concerns the very
introduction of the notion of deep ecology into the philosophical literature (Naess 73), which fails
to present the fundamental value thesis, that intrinsic value is not confined solely to humans or
human features. While it can be argued that rejection of the sole and greater value assumptions is
implied by what is said concerning biospheric egalitarianism (the equal right to live and
blossom), the argument is not decisive, since value is only involved indirectly and perhaps only
instrumentally (as Naess's appeal to effects on the 'life quality of humans' and to our ecological
dependence might suggest).
�19
The results are tabulated, as follows:
Figure 7b. Actual results, in not form, of a survey of some main sources.
Naess 73
Naess 83
Naess-Sessions 84
Intrinsic value
Intrinsic value of
life (1)
(1)
Biological
egalitarianism (2)
Diversity/richness(3)
Complexity not
complication (6)
Diversity/
richness (2)
Diversity/
richness ( 1)
Total field holism (1)
No negative
interference
rights, excepting
vital needs (3)
No negative
interference,
etc. (3)
Devall 79
ROUGH
CLASSIFICATIONS
VALUE
CORE
Diversity (10
GROUNDSAND
BASES
New person/planet
metaphysics (1)
Objective approach to
nature 2
Earth wisdom,
VALUEAND
limited interference ACTION
COROLLARIES
More leisure (13)
Action obligation
6
Present interference
excessive (4)
Policy adjustments
to economic and
ideological structures
(5)
Anti-pollution/
resource depletion
(5)
Local autonomy/
decentralisation (7)
Anti-class posture
4
Action obligation
8
Present human
interference
excessive (5)
Policy adjustments,
etc. [Also to
technological
structures (6)
Objective life
quality rather than
higher living
standard (7)
World population
reduction (4)
POLICY AND
LIFESTYLE
APPLICATIONS
Interim policy
steady state (15),(18)
Soft Technology ( 11)
Life quality
rather than quantity
of products (6)
Reduction of population
to optimum (7)
Emphasis on pollution
and like topics
counterproductive (8)
Local autonomy/
decentralisation (11),(14)
New psychology (3)
DISCOUNTED AREAS:
with rejection of
NEW
SUBJECTS
dualisms: man/nature,
subject/object, etc
New philosophical
anthropology (9)
New objective
�20
Embedding in
ecosophy
NOTES:
science (4)
New education (12)
? Embedding in
updated Spinoza (2)
EMBEDDJNG
PHrr,OSOPHY/RELIGION
1. Bracketed numerals indicate theses numbers in the sources.
2. The disappointing absence of core themes can to some extent be compensated for
by appeal to statements of them or implying them elsewhere in accompanying texts
and commentaries.
3. Naess-Sessions 84, also Naess 84, became the 8-point platform, now widely
reintensted.
Naturally one does not attempt this sort of analysis entirely in the dark, but in the partial
expectation that certain kinds of results will emerge, these three especially:
•
The substantial core represents a significant deviation from mainstream assumptions, a
deviation which has been encountered before.
•
The total theory, or union, is not simply a jumble of theses, but has some reasonable
coherence.
• There are ways of getting from the substantial core toward the total theory.
In the case of deep ecology it would have been pleasant to report triumphantly that these
expectations, and more, are fulfilled; indeed the theory is so well integrated it represents a
(sub)cultural paradigm. Unfortunately it did not work out that way, as is evident. What is more,
the situation has become markedly worse, as presentations of deep ecology have burgeoned since
1984.
Partly the thematic enterprise did not succeed because of the poor calibre of the leading
presentations of "the" deep ecology intuition, and because exponents had and have different
intuitions, messages and objectives. Partly, however it did not work because the idea of
obtaining a substantial core and a coherent union was misconceived. Taking the union, in
particular, assumed that there was much wider common ground - something that could be called
the deeper ecological paradigm which could be approached in this sort of way - rather than as a
plurality of positions. Pluralism is fine and feasible, and worth encouraging much more widely;
but taking the union of themes of some pluralistic system of positions is likely to lead only to
intractable inconsistent sets, and perhaps to trouble. Consider, to illustrate, the United Religion,
about to sweep California, a pluralist grouping made up of representations of the World's great
religions. While the refined common core of these positions is likely to be interesting, the union
is not: it will contain, for example, all of the following inconsistent triad: Many gods exist (from
e.g. Hinduism); Exactly one god exists (e.g. Islam); no gods exist (from e.g. Buddhism). There
is analogous trouble in combining deep ecological sources with such results as that stones and
mountains both do and do not have inherent value; there both are and are not detachable intrinsic
values; and so on. The picture is then as shown:-
�21
putative
substantial core
inconsistent
elements of putative union
What all this emphicizes once again is that deep ecology has to be treated differently, not as
a coherent position but as a loose pluralistic grouping of position. To obtain a clearer authentic
starting position, we shall have to discount since of what paradox as deep ecology. It is for this
sort of reason of course that we chose to follow Naess before other prophets. Once an authentic
position has been made out other prositions can be clustered around it. Such a pluralistic outcome
does not show that the notion of a deeper ecological paradigm is illusory. It only reveals some of
the pluralistic features, mostly not duly recognised at the deeper ends of ecological movements.
And it only indicates that a different route should be taken in getting to a deeper paradigm. For
the alternative environmental, and deep ecological, paradigm covers a spread of positions, much
as the contrasting dominant social paradigm does.
�A CRITIQUE OF (WILD) WESTERN DEEP ECOLOGY:
a response to Warwick Fox's Response to an earlier Critique.
Western deep ecology differs in important respects from the deep ecology originated
and pursued by Naess, what I now call authentic deep ecology, at which my Critique of
Deep Ecology was mainly, but by no means entirely, directed. Western deep ecology, also
known as transpersonal ecology (though the ecology has largely dropped out), is very
roughly a doctrine of the west of those new world continents where environmental
philosophy functions; it has been advanced primarily by West Coast Americans (Devall,
Drengson, Sessions and others) and associated West Australians (Fox, now of Tasmania,
also Hallem and others). Unlike authentic deep ecology, Western deep ecology is hostile to
environmental ethics, which it tends to dismiss as mere axiology; and it is excessively
enthusiastic about trans personal experience, spiritual "paths" and "ways", and unitarian
metaphysics - in which there are no ontological divides, no dualisms (of subject/object,
subjective/objective), and no separation of things.
Consider what Drengson 'take[s] to be at the heart of deep ecology as Devall and
Sessions present it', and which he enthusiastically endorses:
What deep ecology directs us towards ... is neither an environmental
axiology or a theory of environmental ethics nor a minor reform of
existing practices. It directs us to develop our own sense of self until it
becomes Self, that is, until we realise through deepening ecological
sensibilities that each of us forms a union with the natural world, and
that protection of the natural world is the protection of ourselves ....
reality lies not in the imaginative, subjective dualism of the dominant
outlook, with its self-destructive exploitation of nature and overkill
nuclear weapons. Reality is to be found in a quite different way: by a
path that is nonaggressive, humble, compassionate, and knows itself as
ultimately embedded in the Self of nature. The sacred is immanent in
the profane, the spirit pervades and is the world, the cosmos. It is the
formed and formless as a unity. This ecosophy is at hand for each of us
[ecosophical salvation]. Its realisation is always personal, firsthand
experiential understanding. It is an I-Thou, not an I-it relationship
(Review pp.87-8).
Fox's Response to my Critique develops similar themes, in considerably more detail, so
they become rather more open to assessment. That is why my further critique will
concentrate on his Responses. (On its own, I doubt that his Response would have
sufficient intrinsic interest to warrant an extensive reply.)
In Western deep ecology, the focus is upon, or even (as in Fox 89) contracts to, that
of self and Self (or what it might almost as well be, soul and Soul/Anima sive Natura, or
spirit and World Spirit). For example, Drengson pontificates upon
�•
38
the crux of the issues raised by deep ecology [as follows]. We are
challenged to move to genuinely ecological modes of perception,
conception, and practice. If we do this, we will do it to the degree that
we realise that our self is part of a larger Self for which we must care.
This is part of the ecology of self-Self in the cosmology of deep
ecology' (p.89).
Fox goes further, making this type of stuff coextensive with "deep ecology":
Stated rather formally ... the deep ecological framework ... proceed[s]
from two basic hypotheses and one ultimate norm [all concerning self
and Self]. The hypotheses are (i) that "the self is as comprehensive as
the totality of our identifications. Or, more succinctly: Our Self is that
with which we identify" ... ; and (ii) that the self can and does
grow/develop/mature (i.e. widen its sphere and intensity of
identification over time). The norm is that the ideal state of being is one
that sustains the widest (and deepest) possible identification and, hence,
sense of Self.... this ideal state of being is referred to as "Selfrealisation" by N aess and as "ecological consciousness" by Devall and
Sessions" and its cultivation - effective a spiritual discipline - is
considered to be the "real work" of deep ecology (pp. 86-7).
This self-Self cultivation of Western deep ecology, which will be severely criticised, is far
removed from the deep ecology platform upon which authentic deep ecology is centred, a
mundane, secular platform concerned with real environmental issues, which is not a
predominantly human psychological exercise and which does not mention 'self' or 'Self'.
On the strength of the variant presentation of "deep ecology", of this elaboration of
Western deep ecology, Fox feels entitled to assert that 'Sylvan has seriously misunderstood
what deep ecology is about. ... Sylvan's criticisms miss their mark ... Sylvan's critique
leaves deep ecology ... largely untouched' (p.5). Drengson feels entitled to enlarge this
unfounded assertion: 'the critiques of deep ecology that have appeared so far have been
based on misconceptions of what deep ecology is all about, and they have therefore been off
the mark, or at best superficial' (p.89). The critiques that are substantial, not substantially
tirades or shallow, have been substantially directed at authentic deep ecology, not at its
different Western analogue. There has been no misconception or misunderstanding by such
critics; they have aimed at a different target in the same broad field.
On a personal level, I am quite attracted by authentic deep ecology; but I am
substantially repelled by Western deep ecology. I subscribe, more or less, to the 8-point
platform of deep ecology, and accordingly should be accounted a supporter of deep ecology
(for all that critics are not very welcome). Though I do not care for some features of
Naess's system Ecosophy T, which does provide a rickety bridge ·to Western deep ecology,
N aess has always insisted that this was but one of several optional background ideological
frameworks. Western deep ecology is another matter. Too much of it strikes me as like an
evangelic cult, much too incidentally coupled to deep environmentalism; too much is a
�39
celebration of self, human self, an expanded egoism; too much is essentially a good oldfashioned celebration of things human, a comparatively shallow celebration disguised in
new environmental and avant-gard attire.
Drengson has the ability to lay on these
obnoxious, chauvinistic features disagreeably thick. Consider a bit of his poetic outpouring
on that jumbled text, Deep Ecology:
Sessions and Devall see humans as beings who are an expression of a
nature deeper, more mysterious, and creative than any of our abstract
theories appreciate .... it is hoped that [our] experiential encounter with
the otherness of Nature transformed as Self will help us to live in such a
harmonious way as to continually discover ever new wonders and value
inherent in wild nature and in the natural human self. ... The book,
thus is dedicated to ... presenting a philosophy of life that resolves
some of our most fundamental questions, the central one of this is: how
can we live truly in authentic, harmonious relationships with all beings
so as to realise a maximum of intrinsic goodness? This is a question,
ultimately, of what it means to become a complete, mature, fully Selfrealised human being (pp.94-5 rearranged).
The statement could almost have come straight out of modem romanticism; all the same
elements are there down to the maximization of human self-realisation. So presented, the
new environmental paradigm of Western deep ecology is the old anti-Enlightenment
movement in contemporary gear.
Though I am substantially turned off by some of Western deep ecology, though I am
disappointed by its apparent shallowness, by its reversion to human chauvinism, though I
try to take cover when its heavy evangelism blows through, I am far from suggesting that
more than critical intellectual action be taken against it. It is, after all, generally for the right
sorts of things environmentally, even if it has invested too heavily in dominant notions,
such as the exalted human self that a radical environmentalism should be escaping; and it is
no worse intellectually than predominant creeds that are far less kind to natural
environments, such as Vatican christianity and American pragmatism. Live and let live.
1. Approaching deep ecology and understanding plurallism.
Well is Fox's response to Sylvan's critique of deep ecology entitled 'Approaching
Deep Ecology'; for it does no more than approach deep ecology, it does not reach the
authentic article. Instead Fox converts deep ecology into a related concoction, largely of his
own (now called transpersonal ecology*). Having thus commandeered deep ecology for
*
Transpersonal ecology is an extreme variant of Western deep ecology, which tries, for
instance, to jettison what Drengson and others retain: intrinsic goodness, intrinsic value, and
the like.
�40
his own purposes, it is easy for Fox to feel confident in his charge that 'Sylvan has
seriously understood what deep ecology is about' (p.5).
Fox's main accusation is indeed that I have seriously misunderstood what deep
ecology is about, that my criticism is misdirected, and that deep ecology emerges largely
unscathed. We shall see about that. But first, I want to lodge a counter-charge: Fox
appears to have misunderstood a good deal of what I was about. My critique was not
concerned with his position, except - in so far as it purported to be deep ecology - in
passing; it was addressed to the mainstream of deep ecology. Fox's own transpersonal
ecology does not belong to the mainstream of deep ecology; indeed it is doubtful that it is
deep ecology at all. It tries to throw away central parts of deep ecology, the value theory in
particular, and to revert to what appears, to all intents and purposes, to be a rather shallow
position. But, most remarkable, it has very little to do with the natural environment; much
of it is but expanded self adulation.
Both Fox and N aess, in their responses to my critique, try to make some easy initial
capital by pointing to the different ending of a working draft of the critique from the pluralist
ending of the published version. 1 Naess uses the different endings to ground his allegation
that Sylvan is uncertain what he is about, an ad hominem strategy which he presumably
hopes will help to defuse substantial criticisms of deep ecology which he does not address
(see his 84 and 85). Fox makes much of the different endings (almost 5 pages worth) in
order to reveal an uncharitable interpretation: that already indicated, of misunderstanding,
and that my 'critique leaves deep ecology .... largely untouched' (p.5).
Naess and Fox seem to think that it counts against a critique that it may enjoy more
than one ending, that it can leave room for doubt as to whether something should be
restored or abandoned. Yet these are very much the sort of outcome a more tolerant and
careful assessment may yield. Consider an old building seriously defective in main
structural detail, yet with many worthwhile period features. It may be a hard question,
over which there is room for uncertainty, whether it should be restored or demolished. So
it is often with intellectual systems, such as deep ecology and ecosophy. By and large I am
in favour of rehabilitation (see e.g. Routley 74), though from a favoured nonpluralistic
1
Though I feel a bit used, I'm not going to make anything of incomplete working drafts
I naively handed out not being a fair target for commentary (it is obvious that one can
be even more stupid and so forth in drafts than in more considered final versions).
Much of the interesting work in and around deep ecology appears only in working draft
form or in what academic snobs describe as semi-published form.
�41
stance such systems as ecosophy include material destined for the intellectual scrap heap.
But, in any event, I am in favour of recycling of rubbish wherever this is feasible.
For anyone who adheres to a select position within an also conceded pluralistic
setting, there is always more than one presentation, and more than one ending: a monistic,
or singular, ending deriving from the select position, and a pluralistic ending from the
setting. There is nothing particularly remarkable about this, for all that it baffles Fox. On
the singular ending (of the limited edition "penultimate version" of my critique) many major
themes of deep ecology go down, not because they are ' insubstantial or vacuous' (what
Fox finds it convenient to infer p.2ff.), but because they are all defective, all substantially
astray. So much had already been argued in the main body of the work; for instance, one
sustained development aimed to demonstrate the substantial falsity of the principle of
biospheric egalitarianism and its inconsistency with other principles of deep ecology. What
of the last words, drawn from Eliot's Four Quartets, 'there is no one to bury'? By this, I
meant: no correct doctrine, not: nothing substantial. It is true that from the singular position
I did look upon several main 'ideas of deep ecology ... not even as if they were once useful
... but rather that upon closer scrutiny there is ... nothing ... [correct in] them in the first
place' (p.3); from that stance I still look upon them in that way.
On the final pluralistic ending what remains 2 are not the trumpeted major themes,
which still go down, but a good many of the less heralded points and themes, such as
departure principles in the 8-point platform of deep ecology. What can be added,
furthermore, are significant variations upon some of the major themes; for instance
ecospheric impartiality in place of biospheric egalitarianism. Now both Naess and Fox
assume that a pluralistic ending diminishes, or ought to weaken, the force of the criticism.
Not so. Naess ends his response to the critique with a relativistic complaint: 'if you have
your own philosophy from which you generate the [core] position of deep ecology, ... why
object to ecosophy T?' (Naess pp.3-4 reordered, also quoted in Fox). The short answer is
because system T is seriously intellectually flawed. A pluralist may let such material stand,
but, unlike a relativist, doesn't have to let it alone; its weaknesses can be exposed, its
inferiority exhibited. Fox goes on to claim that under pluralism, which he also confuses
with relativism, my 'critique loses much of its original sting and no longer constitutes the
challenge to deep ecology that was formerly intended' (p.5). Again, not so; the challenge
and sting remain as before. But now deep ecology is regarded more benignly; and more
future work will be directed at restoration, etc. As you might now anticipate, Fox finds 'a
2
Fox's surprise about this (p.3) can be attributed to his failure to appreciate the force of
'acclaimed major themes' in the theories to be put to rest.
�42
strong tension between such a pluralistic position' and the singular position which he
regards as 'essentially argumentative' (p.5). But there is no tension; the singular position
slots neatly into the pluralistic array. Further, both are argumentative, though neither
essentially so. 3
2. Value in deep ecology
Fox's 'most fundamental objection to [my] critique' is that it offers, is based upon, an
'environmental axiological interpretation of deep ecology' (p.29, p.53). Given what Fox
intends by 'environmental axiological interpretation' (his never properly explained
terminology, not mine), which involves axiological reductionism and a certain axiological
priority and hegemony throughout environmental philosophy (p.52) 4 , I deny this. My
critique neither offers nor is based upon such an interpretation; and, as inspection will
confirm, my other work will not bear such an interpretation 5 , I do not 'pursue
environmental philosophical discussion almost entirely at the level of environmental
axiology'. What I do ascribe to deep ecology is "a value core", features of which I explain
in some detail (and to which we shall have to return). But a large transformer (or similar
item) does not reduce to its cores, there is much to such an item besides the core; nor do the
cores pervade, dominate or guide all the rest. The core, which was introduced primarily as
part of an organising structure, does not support what Fox tries to read out of it, namely an
axiological reduction (back in 84, Naess thought 'core' was a 'good expression' for a quite
proper part of deep ecology). In fact, I am not hooked on the term 'core'; substitution of
'value part' for 'value core' would make very little difference to the substance of my critique
of deep ecology, but it would quite adversely effect Fox's response.
An early example of the feebleness of Fox's reconstruction is his attempt to make my
treatment of deep ecological theory outside the value core look as if it too was part of an
axiological interpretation. He proceeds to argue from a title of a later section, 'Beyond the
value core: metaphysical and epistemological "intuitions" of deep ecology', thus: 'as this
title suggests, it is Sylvan's environmental axiological interpretation of deep ecology that
underpins his criticisms there (as elsewhere)' (p.29). The title was not intended to suggest,
and would not normally suggest, such an interpretation; it indicated a separation of parts and
3
For much more detail on all these pluralistic matters, see my Deep Plurallism.
4
For fuller illustration of such undesirable phenomena at work in philosophy, see
Edwards, Ethics without Philosophy.
5
For one example, see the jointly authored The Fight for the Forests.
�43
the upcoming contents. As an argument (to be slack with this term), Fox's move is a nonsequitur. 6
Now to get down to the real adjudicational business (of this section), I claim to have
been verballed by Fox.7 While I am becoming pretty accustomed to serious
misrepresentation, I see Fox as ascending to new heights in this regard. For he proceeds to
attribute to me major derivative theses which I nowhere presented, which do not derive
from what I did present, and to which I should not, in any case, accede. Let's look straight
away at some of what Fox proceeds to foist upon me. 'Sylvan assumes from the outset and
proceeds upon the basis that deep ecology is ... primarily a value-in-nature position' (p.30),
that is the 'primary claim' (p.31). I do not assume that deep ecology is primarily that, but
that it is that among other things; 8 I do not proceed on that basis, and I never did suppose
that deep ecology was primarily or only a values-in-nature position. As I say, in a clause
Fox left out in the selective quotation of his indictment, deep ecology 'has been presented as
a metaphysics, as a consciousness movement (and a primarily psychological), and even as a
sort of (Pantheist) religion' (and in an accompanying note I mention Fox's alternative
ontological focus). I am not committed to such a primacy claim (what Fox refers to as
6
As the text reveals, Fox is rather fond of making passages suggest not what they were
intended to suggest or prima facie do suggest, but what he would have them "suggest"
conveniently for his own unscrupulous purposes (we might even label this the
suggestive fallacy). He is not averse either to considerable distortion. For example
(also on p.29) he makes it look, by a clever use of sectional divisions, as if the bulk
of my critique was concerned with the value part of deep ecology, when in fact I get
beyond that part on p.26 in a critique of 60 pages. Of course it would not show that
much even if I had devoted virtually the whole critique to the value part rather than less
than a third; it could just mean that that was the part of deep ecology that interested me
most, or that I ran out of energy and patience thereabouts, etc.
In the present critique I ran out of these commodities and time before I had finalized a
section on fallacious methodological practices in deep ecology, perhaps to be called
'fallacies of transpersonal ecology'. Next edition, perhaps.
7
Verbal is an Australian verb, alluding to fabricated evidence made up by police or
official prosecutioners. Verballing was a common practice in Queensland, and is
certainly used by police gangs in some other states.
8
I do begin the first "problem" section of the critique 'Deep ecology appears to be some
elaboration of the position that natural things other than humans have value in
themselves .. .' (Cp.1 ). But that says nothing more offensive than what can be inferred
from point 1 of the 8-point platform of deep ecology, and nothing about primacy.
Moreover I go on to say that the elaboration is extensive (e.g. Cp.4), a claim well
illustrated by Figure 1 (Cp.5), where the "value core" comprises but a small part of the
deep position.
�44
'Sylvan's primary claim', p.31, p.33, p.34, p.47, p.48, p.57, p.70 and many other pages,
sometimes obliquely as 'Sylvan's claims' and the like, e.g. 'Sylvan says', p.86).
'Moreover', Fox continues (p.30), 'for Sylvan, it is an objective position since its
"core theme" of "values-in-nature suggests ... that natural items have value qualities
independently of perceivers"'. Firstly there is a misquotation; I refer to 'core themes',
which furthermore extend beyond the value part. 9 Secondly, no objectivist claim is made or
follows for Sylvan. 10 On the basis of the primacy claim, in conjunction with the objectivist
claim (in the case of D2 at least), Fox proceeds to foist upon me 'two derivative claims':
Dl. 'deep ecology does not proceed from a general vision of reality or "underlying
perception of the way things are" ' 11 , and
D2. 'deep ecology is not at all concerned with the way in which we experience the world'
(p.31, Fox's italics).
Firstly, I do not present such claims; indeed I present a substantial amount of material
incompatible with such claims, for instance in the discussion of the theme of extreme holism
as regards D 1, and of cosmic identity as regards D2. Secondly, I did not and do not adhere
to such claims; indeed I have put a good deal of effort into exposing the metaphysical and
epistemological parts of deep ecology. Thirdly, as should be thus evident, they do not
derive from what I did present in the critique. Fourthly, in particular, they do not derive
from the primacy and objectivist claims. Indeed readily available counter-models will show
as much. Consider a values-in-nature objectivist position such as that of Holmes Rolston,
which we can conveniently call 'R(olston)'s deep ecology' (there is not even any cheating
here, as Ralston's position has a better claim to be accounted deep ecology than some of the
positions admitted to the club). Now simply substitute 'R's deep ecology' for 'deep
ecology' throughout the "derivation" of the claims. The premiss or grounds hold, as R's
deep ecology satisfies both primacy and objectivist claims; but the claims supposed to be
derived do not hold, both RD 1 and RD2 fail. For example, Ralston's deep ecology is very
9
It seems to be on the basis of efforts like this misquotation that Fox feels himself
justified in writing of 'Sylvan's "core claim" that deep ecology is primarily a valuesin-nature position ' (p.34). That is remote from what I do. For example, I am in
trouble for dismissing a sizeable chunk of core deep ecology as rubbish; but a valuesin-nature position is not rubbish.
10
The point was explained in considerable detail in EE p.154ff, where the ugly term
nonjective was deliberately introduced to remove illusions as to objectivity or
subjectivity.
11
The context makes it look as if the internal quotation is drawn from me, but it is not
as perusal of fn.44 will show. DI gains no support from anything I assert.
�45
much concerned with the way we experience the world, as a reading of Rolston quickly
discloses. Or if a clearer deep example than Rolston is demanded, there is N aess himself.
Finally, unsurprisingly now, Fox has made elementary mistakes in his alleged
derivations. Consider D2 first. 'This follows', Fox says, 'since value-in-nature are held to
exist "out there" independently of perceivers' (p.31). But again it just does not follow, as a
topic can be deeply concerned with something that enjoys some independence. You might
almost as well try to say that epistemology is not at all concerned with the way in which we
experience the world since primary properties are "out there" independent of perceivers.
Consider next D1, where there is considerably more distortion to be exposed. Fox's
"derivation" really consists of two separable parts. In the first part, Fox's thoroughly
fallacious strategy is to replace 'concerned with' by 'only concerned with' and 'because' by
'simply because', as textual comparisons, of my text with what Fox draws from it, make
plain. His strategy certainly makes for terrific derivations. For example, from "the Prime
Minister is concerned with his sex life" we obtain the startling result that the Prime Minister
is only concerned with his sex life. From the premiss that a man likes his wife because of
her body we obtain without any further ado the familiar worry that he likes her simply
because of her body. 'Beyond this', in a second part, there is an argument based on
independence (apparently involving some misunderstanding of the notion). The argument
appears to be of the form: A is independent of B, therefore A does not proceed from B. The
defectiveness of such an argument is obvious enough once its form is exposed. And the
defectiveness of the case in hand should have been evident to Fox. For Naess has
explained many times how a person can be a deep ecologist (e.g. can adhere to the platform)
without adopting (or even being aware of) the general metaphysical vision from which it
proceeds.
The felling of Fox's derivations brings down, like trees felled in a rainforest, a good
part of the rest of the structure. For instance, there cease to be the problems Fox supposes
he has found (p.32 ff.), such as difficulties of consistency in accounting for the
metaphysical 'sources that supporters of deep ecology draws upon' (p.33).
With that small exercise in logic, the remainder of Fox's "response" to my critique
(pages 31-89 of text and miles of footnotes) is disposed of in main essentials. For pages
53-84 constitute a largely separate essay on wider identification, an essay which only bears
obliquely on my critique; and most of the rest turns upon lumbering me with the claims just
off loaded, the claims which 'constitute [my] very poor understanding of deep ecology'
(p.31). Thus, for example, Fox expends a good deal of space upon citing authorities from
deep ecology (who too often supply extremely dubious statements) directed at contradicting
D 1 and D2. Obviously that is beside the point. But while my main work on Fox's dismal
response is done, and I could stop here, I don't intend to, as there is a lot more heavily
�46
polluting rubbish to be despatched, or recycled. One's rubbish may be another's input
(therein for Moore lay the whole challenge of philosophy).
3 The extent of values-in-nature.
Even a casual reader of Fox's Response will have observed the following: that Fox is
very quick off the mark with (largely unsubstantiated) accusations like 'so and so has failed
to grasp', 'has misunderstood', 'has ignored', 'has missed the point'; that the evidence for
these ad hominem claims is often quite insubstantial; and that that 'so and so' often happens
to be Sylvan. One of the many things Sylvan allegedly 'fails to grasp' is 'that (a position)
deep ecology can be normative (i.e. offer prescriptive proposals) without that necessarily
meaning that it is prescriptive [of this or that,] of a values-in-nature position'. Well, I
thought I had a reasonable grasp upon, and had made use in print of, the distinction
between prescription and evaluation (likewise deontology and axiology), and had in the
critique sufficiently emphasized that shallow positions were normative but decidedly not
prescriptive of values-in-nature. So what evidence does Fox present for his charge? Well,
none really. True he begins his next sentence with a 'Thus', but he then rambles on with
quotations of material (he has previously tried to flog to death) concerning deep ecology and
value theory. But, as nearly everyone appreciates, a position may include a value theory
without that theory being a values-in-nature position; shallow positions are such.
Now 'Sylvan takes Naess's statement that deep ecology is normative as direct
support ... the only support that Sylvan provides ... for his own ... "claim" that deep
ecology is ... a value-in-nature position' (p.36 rearranged, prejudicial terms deleted). Well,
he didn't take that as direct support; what he did take as support is Naess's oft-repeated
assertion (quoted by Fox on the very page) that 'the significant tenets of ... Deep Ecology
... express a value priority system' (many places, e.g. 73 p.99, my italics). So it includes a
value framework. Furthermore further evidence is adduced or alluded to both for the claim
that deep ecology involves a value framework and that it includes a values-in-nature tenet
(e.g. 'deep ecology seeks a transformation of values' Cp.29, quoting Devall; an 'egalitarian
principle of equal value of all life, is "an intuitively clear and obvious value axiom"' Cp.13
quoting N aess; the restriction of this axiom to cases 'when genuine conflicts of value are
absent 'Cp.14 quoting Fox; etc).
Fox issues the challenge: 'where is the (objectivist) values-in-nature "core claim"?'
(p.36). Of course it is right there in the platform, in the very first point which duly
�47
distributes intrinsic value much more widely than humans and human features; it is also
implied by the biocentric egalitarian principle; and so on. 12
What is more, although I have at long last (late 1989) read Fox's tactless Response, I
am sticking to my claim that deep ecology has a value core. As it happens, I think as much
is evident from Naess's recent publications (esp. 89 chapters 2 and 3). But the claim can be
argued, for example as follows:- Firstly, Deep ecology has a value part. Secondly, that part
is a core part. As to the first, I should begin by appealing to the value themes of the deep
ecology platform, particularly points 1 and 2 which amounts values-in-nature points.
Curiously, when several of the points in the platform are value themes, Fox proceeds to
assert that 'biocentric ... egalitarianism ... is the deep ecological notion that most lends itself
to interpretation as a value-in-nature position' (pp.31-33). Perhaps this is a diversionary
tactic. It seems that it would be most convenient for Fox's anti-axiology and unauthentic
view of deep ecology if critics forgot about the platform of deep ecology.
The value part of deep ecology is reasonably taken as a core, i.e. as a central or inner
part (to use dictionary accounts of 'core'). A number of arguments can be advanced for
adopting it as a core, of which I'll indicate one 13 . The 8-point platform is a central part of
deep ecology, what more or less distinguishes deep ecologists; value themes comprise a
central part of this platform (the first three points as well as others such as point 7); what is
a central part of a central part is indeed central.
It is no doubt 'somewhat unfortunate that the 8-principles start with ethical terms ... '
(quoting Sessions p.49). Fox tries to wriggle out of that unfortunate predicament, that the
8-point platform of deep ecology - one of the few hitherto stable parts of the whole jerrybuilt structure - begins with value themes and a values-in-nature claim, by an expansion of
the same shabby tactic he has already tried to use to defuse biological egalitarianism and
displace apparently ethical principles of deep ecology (such as the important obligation to
implement environmental commitments): Namely, the formal-axiological waste-disposal is
replaced by an even grander formal-philosophical disposal - down which goes my
criticism. 'Sylvan ... takes the "neutral"' (i.e. variously: literal, nontechnical,
12
It is only anomalous that the intrinsic value theme is missing Naess's early paper
because it features so prominently in the platform and in parts of Naess's later work,
both characterising deep ecology. Fox tries to twist the anomaly into a contradiction
in my evidence (pp.36-7), but it is a shabby effort, entirely neglecting the evidence I
assemble in Appendix 1 (which he quotes from however) for Figure 1 of the Critique
which indicates the value core.
13
Thereby doing in, by example, another of Fox's unpleasant shotgun accusations, p.6.
�48
understandable to most persons) 'formulation of basic principles as a formal philosophical
position .... Thus, even such limited support for his "core claim" as Sylvan is able to find
turns out to be due to mistaking an everyday language 8-point list for an ultimate expression
of deep ecology in formal philosophical terms' (p.51) That I find, I confess, a ridiculous
accusation and defence. I wasn't taking the basic principles at other than face value, as
other than principles in a "neutral" formulation; I was, and am, 'using the word "value" in a
metaphorical or everyday sense' (p.49), namely in the literal everyday non-metaphorical
sense where it signifies worth. I frankly don't really know what it would be like to take
deep ecology in the way Fox alleges I do, as a 'formal philosophical position' (p.49, p.51).
It is not just that we are far removed from 'the ultimate expression of deep ecology in formal
philosophical terms'; deep ecology is not, in the hands of Fox and friends, the sort of
position that looks at all likely to obtain such formulation ever.
Until it is properly made out, then, Fox's "defence" lapses. He owes us an account
of what a 'formal philosophical expression' would be, by contrast with what we have, and
to provide requisite evidence that Sylvan (whatever his actual intentions) was "taking" the
platform in that "mistaken" way. I'm not surprised that Fox has not attempted the requisite
philosophical work; I am surprised he got Session to go along with him in the intellectually
disreputable ploy.
I freely confess, then, my astonishment that Sessions states that he and N aess would
not agree philosophically to the principles of the deep ecology platform (p.50,p.51 ). What
on earth does he mean? In his own book (with Devall), these principles are presented as
'basic principles of deep ecology' (in boldface capitals, p.69), they are supplemented by a
detailed commentary of a type appropriate for serious philosophical principles, and they are
introduced as having 'summarized fifteen years of thinking on the principles of deep
ecology' (p.69). If that doesn't make them philosophical, what in the deep ecological
scheme of things would? In any case, Sessions has elsewhere been prepared, in highly
philosophical contexts to ascribe intrinsic values to parts of nonhuman Nature (e.g. p.236).
For Naess too there is no easy escape. Firstly, the platform is said to derive from his
Ecosophy T; secondly Ecosophy T itself assigns 'intrinsic value to every life form' (89
p.164ff).
But I should make an admission; deep ecology is bound to be a values-in-nature
position, at least as I characterised those things. It follows from the way I explained depth
and what is meant by 'values-in-nature'.
That is one reason why I claim Fox's
�49
transpersonal ecology is not deep ecology, because it is explicitly not a values-in-nature
position. 14
Fox himself has tried various ways of avoiding values-in-nature; but, needless to say,
value expressions of "in-nature" cast creep into much of his discourse. For example, the
shallow/deep distinction is now "explained" (in 89 p.33), not directly in terms of value, but,
to begin with, through an anthropocentric/ecocentric distinction. The trouble is that, in
explaining the intended senses of contrasting terms, value slips back again (as in 'use value
for humans (e.g. its scientific, recreational, or aesthetic value)'). But Fox's main chance is
the "value constellation" idea, which tries to lock values away in a complex involving a
valuer and a valuing relation. But nothing stops analyses of this complex, examination of
components of the constellation; and for many logical purposes (such as quantification of
the value end of the complex) some separation is required.
4 A biocentric ethic?
It has been widely thought that deep ecology supplies 'a biocentric ethic as opposed to
an anthropocentric one' 15 , that it includes at least rudiments of a value theory and leading
features of an environmental ethics. But now whether deep ecology is, among other things,
an environmental ethic is in increasing doubt. There are now many, not merely on the
margins of deep ecology, who would question the role or significance of ethics or even
dispense with it altogether. On these issues, as on others, deep ecology speaks not just
with many tongues, but forked tongues as well. Fox does something to assemble the
diverse voices from the deep ecology multitude (p.42ff.). Let us classify - in a preliminary
way:
A. Getting rid of ethics altogether. This appears to be a position taken by Livingston and
by Shepard, at least in the quotes Fox supplies. There is nothing new and exciting, still less
of new paradigmatic cast, about this. It is as old as ethical nihilism and scepticism, which is
to say, very old, reaching back to classical Greek thought. 16 Nor are the entirely dubious
supporting considerations adduced in any way new: 'ethics and morals were ... invented by
one species to meet the needs of that species' p.42, or, more cynically, for the advantage of
certain classes or pressure groups within that species; ethics are at best mischievous, more
14
See e.g. p.85. The matter is further discussed below.
15
Thus Bradford 89,p.10. The authentic deep ecology (of. Naess, on reliable days)
certainly does.
16
For preliminary notes on the history of moral nihilism, see Hinckfuss p.17.
�50
likely damaging; ethics are unsuccessful and even counterproductive in their effects (p.43);
'ethics and morals are unknown in nature' (p.42); and similar.
A*. Retaining ethics, hardly intellectually revolutionary either, but
B. Downgrading the whole enterprise. Such appears to be one of Naess's newer
tactics, where ethics, now of minor importance, becomes an experiential epiphenomenon.
'I'm not much interested in ethics or morals. I'm interested in how we experience the
world .... Ethic follows from how we experience the world' (p.46, also Naess 89 p.20 and
elsewhere). Naess is doing more in this much quoted passage (which involves clear
commission of the prescriptive fallacy 17 ) than expressing personal idiosyncracies; he is
saying, he is taken as saying, by those who quote him, how things now stand for deep
ecology (of which he is still, though losing ground, the chief guru).
B*. While ethical enterprise is perhaps not downgraded,
C. Ethics as usually conceived is displaced or superseded. According to Fox,
"conventional ethics", which combines a code of conduct with a set of values, is displaced
by an 'experientially grounded state of being' (p.41). 18 That state of being is none other
than ecological consciousness, which 'precedes and preempts the search for an
"environmental ethic"' (Devall quoted p.45, similarly Sessions, who also goes further,
suggesting we should abandon the search for an environmental ethics' p.44). But surely it
is foolish to discard useful tools (if admittedly due for repair) because something that may
look brighter and shinier and does something for some agents, attracts attention; in these
critical times everything that works at all is needed. A bit differently, Rodman suggests
superfessions of conventional ethics (though perhaps not of a more expansive ethics),
because it is an integral part of the former moral/legal stage of consciousness, conventional
ethics - if not actually in the process of being superseded (in the dominant culture it is not)
by a later and higher stage, of appropriate new experience - ought to be superseded, since
the moral/legal stage is 'now more part of the problem than its solution' (p.43). Again all
17
Elsewhere however (e.g. Naess 89 p.24) explains how values go beyond "facts".
18
Later Fox proceeds differently, with 'deep ecology ... described as ... a position within
... "foundational ethics'" (p.86). "Foundational ethics", another exceedingly illexplained notion, is ethics as 'concerned with "understanding ourselves"' (p.86, p.113),
and so part of the egocentric self nexus; it is also said to be ethics as 'concerned with
development of a state of being' (p.113), the being of selves no doubt. Does
"foundational ethics" supply principles and some values? If not, how does it manage
to be an ethic? If so, how does it escape Fox's objections to environmental ethics? In
any case, "foundational ethics" which we are supposed to search for (along with
"understanding ourselves"), is intended to be an environmental ethic!
�51
decidedly questionable, both historically and systematically, particularly given the prospect
of a plurality of integrated techniques.
C*. Instead, a radically new ethic is designed. This is of course part of what deepgreen and other radical, not merely reformist, alternatives to prevailing ethics and nature
philosophies are about. It was, once upon a time, an objective of deep ecology also; it
apparently no longer invariably is. But just as there is no definite position offered by deep
ecology on several critical issues (esp. in ecological politics), so there is now no definite
position on the place of ethics (pace p.41), as the tentative classification serves to reveal.
No doubt Fox had a particular message that he wanted to be drawn from the quotations and
needed for his arguments - explicit rejection of an ethical approach in favour of experience
in the shape of ecological consciousness (p.47) - but what he has supplied is an entertaining
pot pourri of positions, countering or jamming the message.
It is ironic that Western deep ecology should have tried to opt out of ethics, at exactly
the time that ethics is making a major come back, when ethics are becoming again a
significant force in business and the world. Or in terms of a different image, at the very
time when the ship of ethics is returning to harbour after a long period on high rough seas,
Fox and friends decide to jump overboard; we hope they are strong swimmers. With ethics
returned, a renewed force, what we need is not no ethics but new ethics, not to concede the
power of renewed ethics over to conservative power-holders or restrictive do-gooders, but
to put ethics to expansive tolerant good environmental and social works.
5. Biospheric egalitarianism revisited.
The notion is terminally ill, but I fear we shall keep revisiting it until it is buried under
heavy concrete. So far, for all its problems, it lives on (with apologists, Fox included,
shifting ground accordingly; similarly N aess, e.g. 85 p.6). It just keeps reappearing in
strong unqualified form, for instance in Sessions (recently): 'one of the first clear
statements' of ecosophy 'that all individuals, species (including humans), and ecosystems
have EQUAL inherent value (the ecocentric position) was made by Arne Naess when he
proposed the principle of BIOSPHERICAL (ECOLOGICAL) EGALITARIANISM ... ' (89, p.11).
So represented it simply succumbs to all the previous criticism (in my Critique and
indirectly in EE p.139 ff.). Interestingly then both Fox and Naess appeal to 'Sessions'
interpretation of biocentric egalitarianism as "a statement of non-anthropocent ricism"'
(p.39), to which Fox adds, in all seriousness, 'rather than as a formal environmental
axiological position'. In a revealing passage, Sessions puts it rather differently, 'Biocentric
egalitarianism is essentially a rejection of human chauvinistic ethical theory and the criteria
�52
used to ascribe rights and value; it is a reductio ad absurdum of conventional ethics.
Biocentric egalitarianism is essentially a statement of non-anthropocentricism' 19 . This
statement does not hang together. For instance, non-anthropocentricism is weaker than
rejection of human chauvinism, which on its own is not a reductio ad absurdum of all
conventional ethics (because, first off, not an argument, and because, second, of the
character of some "conventional" ethics such as intuitionism). Without the logically
inadmissible loop through anti-human chauvinism (the deep-green position) the situation is
worse still; for, on the contrary, rather conventional British utilitarianisms such as Smart's
and Singer's are robustly nonanthropocentric. By so excessively eroding its egalitarian
principles, deep ecology loses much depth.
In a passage which Fox says 'greatly clarifies the confusion that has surrounded
Naess's notion', Naess too, again over-influenced by his minders, takes a similar pathetic
course. The principle had previously 'suggest[ed] a positive doctrine, and that is too
much'!
'The importance of the intuition' contracts to 'its capacity to counteract' certain
chauvinistic hubris. What Fox manages to draw out of these counteracting principles are,
however, not principles at all, but an orientation to or general attitude of non-interference,
"Letting be", etc. This is not just considerably removed from what N aess offers; it is pretty
remote from egalitarianisms. For one can let inferiors, and what is of no inherent value, be,
spare and preserve them, perhaps for later exploitation. But what Fox is really concerned to
draw from his authorities is the concession (they do not make, nor did he himself formerly)
that the principle of biospherical egalitarianism is not a principle, not a position at all (a
curious thing to think it was), but something much less definite, less positive, less specific,
less open to criticism, a more general attitude, no doubt underlying ethical practice, but
definitely not part of an environmental axiology. Poor deluded critics like Sylvan who
supposed that a principle is a principle have 'missed' 'the extremely important point' that for
supporters of deep ecology a "principle" is but a general attitude. These supporters indeed
feel that treating a principle as a principle can do more harm than good, 'and so have
deliberately chosen not to take the environmental axiological route' (p.41). There ends
Fox's diversion on biospheric egalitarianism. What it comes to is this:- Had the principle
been a principle, within environmental axiology, the criticism made of the principle would at
19
Quoted by Fox in a quote that never ends (p.39). In this mismash, Session proceeds
to draw upon our material against human chauvinism and conventional ethics, having
first dismissed us, referring to EE p.139, as 'mistak[ing] what Naess is up to. Naess's
position is not ... "an extension of conventional Western ethics"'. As it happens, we
don't mention Naess at all either on p.139 or in our discussion of extensionalism: how
do we mistake what Naess is up there to when we don't consider what he is up to?
Back in the 70s deep ecology was, after all, not a significant position.
�53
the very least constitute a powerful challenge (p.38); but fortunately it is not, "positive
doctrines" are too open to criticism! It is only a general attitude concerning reluctance to
harm other living beings (p.40). 20 Egalitarianism, of value as well as principle, has
dropped out in this rather shallow evasion.
6. The uneasy position of value theory, or axiology within deep ecology
and the condemned "environmental axiological route".
Fox wants to distance deep ecology from value theory but is also aware, from time to
time, that this is not really possible. As a result his position on the relation of deep ecology
to value theory is decidedly ambiguous at best, and at worst inconsistent. The tensions
appear within the space of a single page (e.g. p.85). We are told both that 'deep ecology is
not [a] position within environmental axiology' and that 'it could be quite mistaken to think'
that deep ecology 'stands outside ... value theory'. Whence inconsistency results, given
that axiology has its normal technical sense. 21 But there is evidence that Fox intends
significantly more by 'axiology' than normal - as well as adopting the normal sense: so that
behind the initial inconsistency stands another inconsistency. What precisely Fox does
intend remains however obscure, scandalously obscure.
For one of Fox's main accusations against critics of deep ecology 22 , is that critics are
committed to 'environmental axiological reductionism', they 'pursue environmental
philosophical discussion almost entirely at the level of environmental axiology', so they are
blind to what 'deep ecology thinkers are really on about', which (negatively) consists in
'rejection of the "environmental axiological route"' (pp.51-53). Among these critics, mired
in "ethical reductionism", blind to the new paradigmatic character of deep ecology which
20
Or presumably otherwise negatively interfere with other natural things - otherwise the
reformulation, though apparently platitudinous, is too narrow, discriminating against
some parts of nature. The harm reformulation is borrowed from Devall and Session,
who try to make biospherical egalitarian and Self-realisation interpenetrate: 'Biocentric
equality is intimately related to the all inclusive Self-realisation in the sense that if we
harm the rest of Nature then we are harming ourselves' (p.56). Unfortunately in the
ordinary sense of 'harm' the latter claim is entirely false; as I previously remarked, it is
all too easy to harm parts of Nature without harming ourselves, with but negligible
impact on ourselves.
21
The word 'axiology' does not appear in the Oxford English Dictionary. But no doubt
it means the investigation, study and theory of value or worth, and is thus tantamount
to value theory, as contrasted however with deontology. What it means will soon
become an issue: see below.
22
Yes, it remains an unduly adversial intellectual game, part of the long Britishscholastic history of philosophy.
�54
has taken as a guiding star precisely avoidance of the "axiological route", is the hapless
Sylvan; the tenacity with which he sticks to his indefensible account of deep ecology is
largely explained through these features (p.52).
For explanation of some of the operative abusive terminology we are referred
elsewhere, to other writings of Fox. But the source is scarcely more informative, and
indeed relevant parts of it have, in any case, been lifted for Fox's Response. 23 The promise
of explanation is not fulfilled. 'Ethical reductionism' is, like its successor 'environmental
axiological reductionism', explained by Fox on the run, which is to say it is not explained.
Nor is the reductionist charge sustained. For what is offered, what 'the vast majority of
environmental philosophers' are alleged to do, the pursuit of 'environmental philosophical
discussion almost entirely at the level of environmental ethics/axiology', may well reflect
undue concentration, but it is not reductionism. Fox is decidedly adept in the fallacious
business of sliding terms around (otherwise known as Humpty Dumptyism).
'Reductionism' and 'axiology' are not the only terms that suffer at his hands; so, relevant to
our purposes, does 'ontology'. At least in the context of his "guiding stars" paper, parts of
which are shunted into his Response, Fox uses 'ontology' to mean, not what it does mean,
roughly 'the general study of what exists', but very differently, the 'underlying perception
of the way things are', which, among other things, epistemologizes what was part of
metaphysics.
In those terms, 'deep ecology's guiding star ... [which] is (and should be) ... this
attempt to shift the primary focus of environmental philosophical concern from ethics to
ontology' becomes an epistemological diversion: a regressive attempt to move
environmental philosophy to anthropic experiential concerns (Fox 84 p.204 rearranged). It
is evident, by the way, who is attempting to do this shifting. If epistemologists focus their
efforts on a tiny number of tiny epistemological problems, if logicians discuss only
quantificational logic, they cannot be significantly accused of reductionism; they would have
23
While many sorts of recycling are of course commendable, reservations should be held
about academic recycling of earlier papers, especially when no improvements are
attempted. Fox does at least attempt some "improvements" to get around the obvious
objection that deep ecology is itself a normative and hence ethical route; but the
adjustments he infiltrates actually make other matters worse. For they consist of the
replacement of 'ethical' by 'axiological' or 'environmental axiological' or similar. So
now, for instance, the journal Environmental Ethics is charged with reflecting
environmental axiological reductionism (p.106); but as examination quickly shows the
journal carries much ethical material which is not axiological (e.g. on rights and
obligations) - evidently it also carries much that is not reductionistic and even some
that concerns philosophy of nature rather than ethics. Fox's charges are without proper
foundation.
�55
also to claim that is all there is to their enterprise, and to make some attempt to show how
the apparent remainder comes down to that. These further necessary conditions are not
fulfilled in the case of 'the vast majority of environmental philosophers'; apart from a small
minority of philosophers associated with the "ethics without philosophy" idea here is
nothing approaching a requisite reduction framework. No doubt there is an axiological
reduction program, pursued by consequentalists of various brands, but that is
predominantly a program within ethics. As well the long-running naturalistic reduction
program grinds on unsuccessfully. But there is no recognisable environmental philosophy
reduction program; nor could such a program hope to succeed.
There are suitably many counter-instances to Fox's large accusations; among them,
conveniently, is that main target, Sylvan, who does not take an "environmental axiological
route". In print I have come out against reduction of deontic notions and normative
discourse generally to axiological terms; and have, in any case, made it perfectly plain that
environmental philosophy comprises much more than ethics, certainly including parts of
politics, philosophy of nature, metaphysics and so on. 24 Thus Sylvan, so far from
'criticis[ing] deep ecology on the erroneous basis of it being a position or approach within
environmental axiology' (p.101), does not himself take the alleged "environmental
axiological route", as the record shows. Rather than rely on my record (a political expedient
that should engender but little philosophical enthusiasm), I'm tempted to issue a countercharge: insofar as Sylvan is committed to an "environmental axiological route" so also is
(authentic) deep ecology, as elaborated by Naess. Consider, for instance, Naess's
elaboration of the deep ecological platform. But in sustaining this counter-charge (the
detailed support involves a comparison, made in Bennett and Sylvan, of deep-green theory
with authentic deep ecology), we come up once again against the problem of what is meant
here by 'axiology'.
Unremarkably Fox deploys the fallacious method of redefinition. By 'axiology' and
its compounds, Fox both means what is normally meant and also means significantly more.
Hardly necessary by now to add, he manages to slide from one to the other. In the normal
way, axiology, or value theory, is the philosophical study of virtue and values, 'their
meaning, characteristics, origins, types, criteria and epistemological status (p.100, quoting
Angeles).
24
So far so good.
But now for the first twist and slide.
'In the area of
See EP, e.g . p.188, p.222, and several works in the Green series. In the early 70s
when there was briefly some glimmer of hope that the Australian National University
might interest itself in environmental philosophy, I sketched out a perspective of what
it might comprise, which I reproduce as an Appendix (if I can find it!).
�56
environmental ethics, the axiological concept of intrinsic value plays a fundamental role. 25
. . . On this understanding, environmental ethics is more accurately described as
environmental axiology ... ' (p.100). This is a major non-sequitur. It would almost as well
be said that because induction plays a fundamental role in philosophy of science,
philosophy of science is more accurately described as induction-theory, and even amounts
to induction-theory! Plainly it is quite inaccurately described as induction-theory, since
there is much else to philosophy of science; what makes matters still worse is that there are
schools which contend that induction drops out as a method and so as a problem. Rather
similarly environmental ethics is much more inaccurately redescribed as environmental
axiology because, but not only because, there is much more to ethics than axiology, the
whole matter of proper conduct for example. For value only impacts on action and proper
conduct by way of further principles which are not themselves part of value theory. It is
obvious that value theory does not in general exclude what is not (without further ado) a
part of it, such as deontic theory, moral epistemology, and so on; but the obvious gets lost
sight of, as when Fox assumes that environmental axiology rules out experiential and
empathetic procedures.
Fox attempts rather more than adjustment and exclusion in his "redescription" of
normal environmental ethics as environmental axiology; he has to if his charges against
environmental axiology (on the face of it a harmless enough study), and the importance of
avoiding it, are to begin to stand up.
25
Fox backs up this claim with themes drawn from Callicott and Regan, with which it
is said 'most environmental philosophers would agree', (p.100). Maybe others do; but
I doubt that they should, not without significant qualification. Regan states that 'the
development of what can properly be called an environmental ethic requires that we
postulate inherent value in nature'. Firstly, that is only one way to try to develop an
environmental ethic (which may not be deep). There are other feasible starting points
and primitives: rights, justice, respects, fairness, empathy, identification, utility,
vandalism, evil, and so on, in terms of which value may (or may not) be subsequently
be defined (e.g. along lines that tempted former philosophers: what it is fitting/right,
for any rational being to prefer/desire). Secondly, the term 'postulate' at best grates, at
worst gets the picture seriously wrong: value may not be self-evident, assumed
without proof, imposed as a demand, ... . Callicott describes 'the problem of intrinsic
value in nature ... as the most critical and most recalitrant theoretical problem of
environmental ethics'. That already presupposes that an ethics starts out in Regan's
sort of way. Even if a deep ethics does take value as primitive, that is but one
problem among several, a problem blown up to critical exaggerated size, primarily by
opponents of environmental ethics and infiltrators of the ranks. For other major
problems for any ethics, and a more balanced view, see Broad's final chapter.
�57
We can glean further information as to what is loaded into the terminology from what
Fox tries to do. An environmental axiology is the same as a (formal) environmental
axiological position, and that as a formal value theory (pp.40-41; the word 'formal' can be
inserted or left out, in Fox it appears to function primarily as a con-term). Such theories,
which are "theoretical" and "definite", contain as well as
• a value theory, and perhaps also a rights theory (e.g. p.35), both
• exact principles, offering specific positional guidance, which are
• positively formulated
• which apply to all situations, and
• a code of conduct, no doubt made up from the principles. 26
Some of Fox's criticisms of environmental axiology turn on these further, and
excessively exacting, features he has tried illegitimately to incorporate into axiology. At this
stage, there are two main confusions:- first, as to the extent of ethics and moral theory that
axiology comprehends, and secondly as to the character of the principles axiology (and, for
that matter, deontology and praxis) is supposed to include. A value theory on it own yields
neither a rights' theory nor a code of conduct. Even a highly and objectionably reductive
theory such as consequentialism requires principles drawn from outside value theory, such
as that one ought to act so as to maximize value or utility, in order to arrive at principles of
conduct and actionable rights. A value theory may include principles but these are
principles concerning value. Like other principles, like those of deontology, they may well
not measure up to the excessive standards Fox tries to impose. In particular, the principles
may be defeasible, may include or presuppose unspecified and unlistable exceptions; they
may include ceteris paribus clauses; and so they may well not apply in all situations. They
may fall far short of supplying necessary and/or sufficient conditions; they may not be
positively formulated (prohibitions in such forms as 'Don't ... ' are commonplace in ethics);
and so on.
26
As well, it seems to be assumed that an axiology, and indeed an Anglo-American
ethics, must be atomistic and individualistic; they are but 'means of structuring the
interactions of atomistic individuals' (p.112). Not so. It is worth remarking that
deep-green theory assumes neither atomism nor individualism (see EP). Nor does it
pursue or assume any of the following reductive practices: deontic to axiological, or
vice versa; environmental philosophy to environmental ethics, or vice versa;
axiological notions to a unique set of primitives, or the single primitive value. As
there are several ways to disable a bulldozer, so there are many ways to enable an
environmental philosophy: value is but one starting point.
�58
7. The "case" against environmental axiology: 'the inadequacies or
repugnant conclusions that attend the environmental axiological approach'
(p.82).
Among the 'serious problems' encountered are said to be those, now hoary, issues
concerning intrinsic value, which Fox tosses up in a substantially shallow way.
For most environmental ethicists, it is difficult to see how something
can have value in itself (i.e. intrinsic value) if it isn't valuable to itself,
and to be valuable to itself it must be able to matter to itself or, in other
words, be sentient, by which is meant that it must possess the capacity
to suffer (p.73)27_
This contention is at least dubious clause by clause, and overall profoundly mistaken. The
critical transformation, for deep environmentalism, is centred on that of value in to valuable
to (or of value to). It is difficult to see why any environmental thinker would accede to such
a transformation, in itself and to itself being so very different in meaning (e.g. consider
them coupled respectively with such terms as conspicuous, unusual, etc.) But, in any
event, there are several sorts of evident counter-examples to such transformations. Firstly,
there are examples from outside environmental territory such as works of art, intellectual
theories, and transcendental metaphysical gems. A beautiful theory or a resplendent form
can be intrinsically valuable without being of value to itself, without being able to matter to
itself, etc. Secondly, there are examples like rare seed, embryonic valuables, and the like.
Thirdly, there are sentient or conscious items of intrinsic value that are not valuable to
themselves, and do not matter to themselves, such as great but utterly modest people. There
is much else wrong in the connections Fox delivers up 28 , but we can bypass most of them
(e.g. sentience does not mean a capacity to suffer, as shown by perceptually aware creatures
who do not suffer because they have no pain receptors and the like; nor is sentience
required, as consciousness will serve for mattering; and so on).
27
It is hard to credit that someone fronting up as a deep environmental thinker could
present such stuff, but of course various reasons can be found. While the argument is
very bad, there is no doubt, what is no excuse, that worse can be found. For instance,
what is intrinsically valuable is valuable in itself, so it must have a self, so it must be
sentient, etc.
28
Fox subsequently announces the 'link between something not mattering to itself ...
and the conclusion that we can do as we will with it ... sacred in the Environmental
Axiological Orthodox Church of Intrinsic Value' (p.80). It is a Church of his own
fabrication, at which no respectable deep environmentalist would worship or even be
found.
�59
Fox runs straight on to an old paradigm assertion by Frankena, from whom he
borrowed the argument, which he again proceeds to ascribe (without any evidence offered
or, I suspect, any research basis)to most environmental ethicists 29 : 'I do not see, however,
how anything can have intrinsic value except the activities, experiences, and lives of
conscious sentient beings (persons, etc.)' (Frankena, quoted p.73). Frankena's assertion,
as it stands utterly unsupported, 'is a powerful one', according to Fox, again displaying his
shallow proclivities: 'What difference does it make how I treat something if it cannot matter
to itself?' (p.78) Big differences, not merely to those in a region for whom it may matter,
but in the region, if Fox dams the last wild river in the region, cuts down the last lowland
rainforest. Fox tops his astounding move by dignifying this shallow rubbish by the title
'powerful argument'. Its power 'is evidenced by the fact that those who want to say rocks
or trees have intrinsic value often do so by pure assertion rather than providing an argument
for their view (140)' (p.78). That's no evidence, it's irrelevant; and I wouldn't pursue it,
were not such a familiar utterly shallow complaint built into the alleged evidence, and were
Sylvan not roped in again in a footnote as 'another case in point' (p.112 note 140). It may
come as news to Fox (who seems to have read little of what I have written before he rushed
out his Response), but I do provide arguments, including those built on examples like the
Last Person and the Last Sentient Creatures, examples which have obtained a fair bit of
exposure (for some of these, see e.g. EP pp.121-132; and in fact a general argument can be
developed from the semantical analysis of value).
The certainties of Frankena's dogmatic assertion can be whittled away, first by
separating conscious from sentient (after all many people can now see that animals that are
not conscious persons can have intrinsic value), second by assembling marginal cases and
analogies in a now familiar way, then by counter-arguments, and so on. But, in any case,
insofar as environmental ethicists (as distinct from conventional ethicists) continue to side
with Frankena that reveals them as a rather reactionary lot, significantly lagging popular
thinking. 30 As Naess and others report, many non-philosophers have no difficulty in
recognising value-in-itself outside persons, in living creatures and natural objects.
29
There is evidence that these ascriptions are mere desk-chair speculation, in fact of little
value; e.g. at the bottom of p.78 where Fox says, of Frankena's position, 'I think it
represents the dominant position within ... environmental axiology'. I suspect that,
once again, Fox is not duly separating environmental axiology from conventional
axiology.
30
The chauvinism of traditional ethical systems is enough to explain the comparative
lack of intellectual interest in such moribund systems, and the resulting much wider
search for roots, ideas, etc. There is accordingly no serious puzzle as to the sources of
deep environmentalism (pace Fox p.74).
�60
In the course of trying to get his attack on the environmental axiological framework
airborne Fox resorts to some extraordinary distortion and falsification. The looseleaf insert
(page 79), where some disenchanted thinkers make an abrupt unexplained entry, affords a
good illustration. First we are told that what those in the business (except no doubt some
enlightened deep ecologists) 'typically fail to realise is that the environmental axiological
framework of discourse so dominates the discussion of our relationship with the natural
world that it is mistakenly taken to be the only possible approach' (p.79). This claim is, it
seems to me, roundly refuted by the history of the discussion and some of the literature it
encompasses. Among other approaches there are, for instance, extended rights (e.g.
Stone), environmental justice (e.g. Wenz), extended interests (e.g. Johnson), and
negatively ethical nihilism (e.g. Hinckfuss).
Fox continues unabashed: 'In other words [!], the hegemony of the environmental
axiological framework is such that it has led almost everybody involved in the
ecophilosophical debate to think that we have an obligation to care for something if and only
if it "has" intrinsic value' (p.79). There's some prime rubbish for you. The charge is
manifestly false, seriously flawed, plucked from thin air, and unnecessary except for Fox's
misguided mission. Even if an axiological approach were the only approach, no such
obligation-to-care principles would follow, and certainly not principles as dubious or
refutable as those given. The if -half of the unabashed claim is at, the very, least dubious
and would be rejected on some popular positions: suppose, for instance that the intrinsic
value of the thing is small, or that it is overridden by the intrinsic value of some competitor
for our attention. The only-if-half (which wins Fox's italics, he is going to make much of
it) would be rejected by almost everyone who thought about the matter, because of course
obligations apply to what has merely instrumental value. If I have borrowed a friend's tools
then I have an obligation to care for them though these tools have no intrinsic value.
Differently, I am under obligations to behave generally in certain sorts of ways whether the
things encountered have intrinsic value or not; accordingly I'm not entitled to treat them any
old way (e.g. to vandalise them) or even as I will or, more ambiguously, as I 'see fit'.
Combining the pernicious principles Fox has unearthed yields the following
ridiculous result: if a thing has no value to itself, for instance has ceased to be of value to
itself, then we have no obligation to care for it, we can do what we like with it. The
applications of this result are remarkable. There is no doubt that Fox has thereby provided a
simple - if appalling - solutions to such major social problems as those of drug and alcohol
abuse; victims who are so far down the track that they have ceased to be of value to
themselves, can simply be vanished, or dealt with in whatever other way we find
convenient. Then too human slavery and sacrifice, never entirely vanquished, could be
widely reinstated: Oh brave new world that Fox has lead us into!
�61
Fox tries to make a lot out of these odious obligation-to-care principles he has
attempted to foist upon environmental axiology. He suggests they indicate the need to
abandon rather than broaden the notion of intrinsic value; he suggests they may 'reflect the
inherent limitations of the environmental axiological approach' (p.79); he suggests that we
need to find instead 'another framework of discourse that can articulate' our feelings about
what we ought to care about. This alternative framework - from the many and various that
might have been selected - is none other than the wider self identification framework. The
obvious course, which should be pursued anyway, of seeking an obligation-to-care
principle that does measure up better to our emotional presentations, does not seem to have
occurred to Fox, so preoccupied is he with attacking what he sees as "the environmental
axiological route" and getting to self immersion.
Finally, Fox runs out some examples which are supposed to show the repugnant
conclusions to which the axiological approach leads. Unfortunately for Fox's case, the
arguments involved do not succeed without further assumptions beyond those Fox
enumerates, assumptions smarter adherents of an axiological approach do not make. The
examples involve comparisons of groups of individuals, which, it is alleged, exponents of
intrinsic value cannot discriminate, though the group situations are very different. One
example runs as follows: ' ... the loss, by human interference at least, of the last members of
a species ... is somehow "worse" than the loss by human interference of an equivalent
number from an abundant species ... . Yet, in terms of intrinsic value, those losses are
equivalent since the same "amount" is lost in both cases' (p.80). Fox then argues against
more holistic assignments of value on the basis of another dogmatic pronouncement from
'Frankena that communities (such as species ... ) do not "have intrinsic value over and
above that contained in ... [their] members"' .31 But he goes on to assert that, irrespective
of Frankena's position, 'the point ... applies generally to any atomistic environmental
axiological position i.e. to any position that sees intrinsic value as exclusively adhering in or
attaching to individual entities' (p.81). Fox is dead wrong. The case assumes, without
warrant or mention, equality of the value adhering or assigned to individuals. Plainly the
loss of the last members of the species is worse (where it is, e.g. the species is not a
diabolical laboratory concoction) because the members of the species are individually more
valuable than those of the abundant species. Consider, for comparison, the razing by fire of
31
Fox's second example actually contains the elements of an interesting argument
(perhaps, to be uncharitable, the only example in his whole Response). This example,
of monoculture vs diversity (p.81), does introduce, if not much of holism, at least
relational features of the individuals assembled. There is no reason, of course, why
axiology should not take account of those features. Contrary to Fox, there is no need
to 'separately posit' that the principle of diversity is 'valuable in and of itself' (p.82).
�62
two art galleries containing the same numbers of individual art works, one containing rare
art works, the other containing selections from the abundant works of relatively indifferent
crafters. The amount, assessed in monetary value even, lost in the first fire is much greater,
and so the loss much worse, than in the second fire.
Fox not only proceeds to state what his examples would show without due
qualification. But he goes on, quite inadmissibly, to general claims which leave off even
the qualifications he had earlier introduced (thus later on, p.82, he drops the essential
restriction to atomistic positions). Environmental axiology accordingly emerges
substantially unscathed; it does not need to be replaced by something else, such as wider
identification, only rendered smarter, and supplemented or merged into a fuller
environmental philosophy.
8.
Fox's 'Deep Ecological Territory': transpersonal identification.
But Wes tern deep ecology is now bent upon replacement. Devall, for example, now
maintains that 'the unique contribution that deep ecology makes to ecophilosophy is its
emphasis on ecological self and affirmation.
Subscribing to similar ideas Fox has
suggested changing the label "deep ecology" to "transpersonal ecology".' Devall (in 89
again) has deep ecology as, above all, discovering 'an aspect of our self' which has been
culturally neglected.
Such a reorientation is significantly at variance with Naess's
introduction and initial elaboration of deep ecology; for his original summary (in 73) of deep
ecology, which is ecologically focussed, contains no allusion to self, ecological or other. It
is also at variance with Devall and Sessions of but three years earlier, where nature, ecology
and biological systems still appeared fundamental to deep ecology, these entering through
the other ultimate norm (besides Self-realisation) of deep ecology, that of biocentric equality
(see their p.66). As it happens, Devall, by contrast with Fox, vacillates between a more
authentic deep ecology in the style ofNaess (chapter 1 of Devall 89) and the Western variant
of transparent ecology (e.g. pp.39-57), which would displace the original theory.
There is much speaking with many tongues, much inconsistency, in deep ecology.
We have already witnessed such deep ecology doubletalk in the matter of value and the
status of ethics. We see it again with transpersonal or expanded-self identification. We
only enter 'the real territory of deep ecology' according to Fox (p.53ff.) with such
expanded identification. Yet one can be a deep ecologist, much literature explains, without
any identification efforts at all (for example by adopting the platform which does not
mention identification). So one can be a deep ecologist without ever 'entering deep
ecological territory'. Deep ecology without deep ecology - another wonder, or just more
double talk? Like Fox's parting flourish: there are sketch maps for deep ecological territory
(p.89), yet it is 'ultimately mapless' (see Devall 89 p.39).
�63
Fox tries to explain "the search" of deep ecology 'for such things as "ecological
consciousness" (Devall and Sessions) and "Self-realisation" (Naess)' through expanded
identification. Most conveniently he can take ready-made from Devall and Sessions
reductive explications:- 'Ecological consciousness is the result of a psychological expansion
of the narrowly encapsulated sense of self as isolated ego, through identification with all
humans (species chauvinism), to finally an awareness of the identification and
interpenetration of self with ecosystem and biosphere' (Sessions, quoted pp.53-4). 'The
essence of ecological consciousness ... [is] to overcome this illusory dichotomy [between
Humans and N ature 32 ]' for which 'the important task is ... the psychological development
from narrow egotistical "self' to identification with the whole' (Devall as quoted p.53).
But, once again, it is one thing to have on authority such explication; it is quite another thing
whether such reductions work. I submit that they do not, for the simple reason that
ecological consciousness may be had or attained without any such self expansion
developments.
Consider, first, Professor Flatpan who is a devoted but unimaginative ecological field
worker. All his practice, behaviour and so on, shows him as utterly committed to
ecological causes, preservation of wilderness and so on, and fully conscious of its
importance. But he makes no identification of himself with what he works with or for. It
may be that he is some sort of empirical separatist; or it may not. Perhaps he even rejects
identification suggestions when they are put to him, e.g. on grounds of hubris, nonsense,
... , or he simply doesn't identify, etc. In Professor Flatpan and his variants we seem to
have a tribe of people with strong ecological consciousness and affiliations but without
identification. Consider next, the interesting Wombat tribe, superb in their tribal treatment
of their environment, who have not developed the notion of self or, for that matter, that of
identification. The tribe exhibits a high ecological consciousness (in our ordinary
understanding of that non-technical notion, in terms of a strong perception or awareness of
environmental matters) but lacks even the conceptual apparatus for self expansion
developments.
Expanded identity or self developments may serve as useful or powerful tactics for
raising ecological consciousness in people raised and hooked on a narrow self-interested
self, but they are neither necessary nor sufficient for explaining or understanding ecological
consc10usness. Analogous points apply against the attempt to drag Self-realisation into the
picture.
32
Naess, in a regressive move, now asserts that humans are unique (e.g. in 89), whence
the dichotomy ceases to be illusory. More inconsistency.
�64
There are in fact at least three separable notions which deep ecology has tended to
fuse: ecological consciousness, widened identification and wider Self-realisation. Confusion is made so much the easier because those notions are, for the most part, not decently
introduced. The whole deep ecological theory of expanded identification and Self remains
exceedingly poorly explained (thus e.g. identification in Fox, esp. p.60; dimensions of
Self, p.83). As ecological consciousness has already been distinguished, it remains to
begin on unscrambling identification and self-realisation, and therewith the many senses of
self
In the first place, identification is independent of self, its manifestation or
"realisation", at least to this extent: that discourse concerning identification can be explained
and can proceed satisfactorily without any introduction of or notion of selves. A theory
may well include identification, and even expanded identification with remote items, without
selves or expanded selves. Early Taoism appears to illustrate the point well. Differently, an
ontologically modest account of acting can afford a good example of how identification can
operate without persona or selves. In fact, a case can be argued that such theories proceed
better in this fashion, because they avoid problematic commitments to selves.
It may look as if Fox, following Naess and Wilber, can escape these problems, and
separation, simply by defining 'self' through identification (and perhaps conversely):
'succinctly: Our Self is that with which we identify' (p.54). There are serious obstacles to
such a stratagem.
d
Elsewhere Fox makes quite a fuss about ontological commitments; on the matter of
cluttering up the universe with Selves he is strangely silent. Yet there are rather a lot of
these strange selves. Assuming selves do not reproduce themselves, in a universe where
there are n objects, and so 2n -1 complexes, and m individuals with selves (with m << n),
there are, at first estimate, m x (2n -1) larger selves. Of course some of these larger selves
may be the same, nonetheless the number of selves is huge where n is large. Moreover, if a
person can identify with nonexistent, with Sherlock Holmes or Pegasus or Satan if not with
the form of the Good and the set of all sets, then the numbers shoot right up, into the big
infinities. Yet nothing is more common in this arena than for people to identify with
fictional objects, of books, TV and so on. Indeed the art of acting depends heavily upon it.
A character actor works to identify with the character being portrayed; a good actor enjoys
more success in this identification enterprise.
d
It does not in any case evade ontic issues, because the definition requires that which
abstraction which a modest theory would not have generally available.
d
There are questions as to the adequacy of such an explicative definition of self:
whether, for example, it answers duly to prevailing senses of 'self'. The proposal does not.
Consider, to bring out just one deficiency, two different but closely integrated creatures,
�65
Arthur and Martha say, who identify with the same class of items including themselves and
each other. Then on the Naess-Fox definition, it follows, counter-intuitively, that Arthur's
Self = Martha's Self, though Arthur @ Martha. Part of what has gone wrong is evident
from recent philosophical investigations, namely that the first person point of view, crucial
to such items as a self or a spirit or a soul or an ego, has got omitted; a widened self
involves some sort of (concentric) expansion from, or focused upon, a first-person self. 33
Normally in religious settings, it is furthermore expansion outwards from an inner personal
locus by restrictive identification or selective identification (as Wilber has it), not arbitrary
identification.
9. Problems of Self and Self-realisation: the intrusion of value and the
issue of evil.
Restrictive practices can remove a serious problem for identification theory, the
problem of evil identifications, but they raise an equally serious problem, how the
re intrusion of value is to be avoided. Fox is vaguely aware that 'the concept of intrinsic
worth' may intrude in discussions of Self-realisation. But he assumes, much too facilely,
that it can be simply removed (p.56). Devall's later writings should have alerted him to the
problems of those who identify with anti-environmental objects or causes, such as beach
buggies, symbols of power like bulldozers or tanks , or sand mining opportunities.
Identification is not always with the good, with good guys or good causes, as selective deep
ecology examples invariably suggest (e.g. p.60, with sea turtles, tigers and gibbons).
Spinoza, one of the progenitors of the theory, avoided the problem of evil attachments and
causes by envisaging primarily identification with Nature or God, assumed ipso facto to be
good. But Naess and Sessions allow for a much wider range of identifications, with the
whole human race, which may overall be evil (for all that conventional ethics assert), or
with undoubtedly evil human groups or organisations (e.g. the German S.S. or the Mafia).
Such expanded identification is hardly to be recommended or encouraged.
33
The person touch is too narrow, unless animals are persons. For there appear to be no
serious difficulties in ascribing selves to animals. Of course, if consciousness (or
circularly self-consciousness) is written into the notion of self, as with some of the
dictionary senses, then selves will be restricted to those animals that enjoy
consciousness, a quite extensive class overlapping humans. In a different sense, tied to
an original meaning of 'self as same, or one and the same used esp. prepositionally in
referring back, there is no difficulty in ascribing selves much more widely. Thus we
naturally say of a forest, 'It looks after itself', of an automata or even boomerang, 'It
came back itself'. The broad philosophical sense (first part of sense 3 in OED) in
terms of individual essences, what a thing really and intrinsically is, haecceity,
certainly admits selves for forests!
�66
There are criticisms, yet to be answered (though initiated in my Critique), that the
"widened identification route" introduces virtually as many problems as it would resolve,
and that it cannot proceed independently of what it is supposed to offer an alternative to
(p.53), the pernicious "environmental axiological route". In a passage quoted from Seed
part of the problem is glimpsed, though Fox who emphasizes the relevant passage fails to
observe it: 'It is only by identification with the whole process that correct values will
emerge' (p.63). Why? Because, as in Spinoza, "the whole process" is assumed Good,
while anything less may not be; a distribution of value is presupposed. How furthermore
does a disciple ensure that a proper totalising identification is made? By confirming that
correct values do emerge. In brief, then, identification theory is no substitute for valuation
theory, but an addition to it. Moreover, it is not an entirely essential addition, however
psychologically useful. With the reintrusion of value or the like, the acclaimed superiority
of the wider identification approach over the environmental axiological approach lapses.
The claim, for which Fox offers initial but unpersuasive defence (p.77 on), is based on
another mistake: the mistake, already observed, of thinking that value theory excludes
identification. But it need not: selective identification can complement intrinsic value.
Very selective identification reveals as well how a theory of heightened Self can be
substantially independent of widened (unrestrictive) identification. In showing
independence Hinduism, as sometimes presented (e.g. by Smith), affords an admirable
example. Hinduism supposes a diminution or deepening of the self to the underlying Self,
a route of self-abnegation; but that is taken to be equivalent, by inversion, to a unique
expansion of self to approximate a God's eye viewpoint (of things sub specie aeternitas ). 34
34
Whereas Western approaches aim to enlarge the self - as with stock aggrandizement, or
Western deep ecology expansion - Indian approaches are concerned primarily with
contracting upon the self, to reduce individual expectations, aspirations, wants (to
nothing on some accounts). For a resolution of life with disappointments, the
(negative) suggestion is: 'if the ego were to have no expectations, there would then be
nothing to disappoint' (Smith p.26). But interestingly, there is supposed to be a
positive inversion of self abnegation which turns it into self expansion. Expand 'the
interests of the self ... to the point of approximating a God's-eye view .. . . Seeing,
thus, all things "under the aspect of eternity", would not one become completely
objective towards oneself, accepting failure as being as natural an occurrence as success
... . How can defeat disappoint if one feels the joy of the victor as if it were one's
own?' (p.26). 'Detachment from the finite self or attachment to reality as a whole ... positive or negative ... ' (p.27).
One path to God, to oneness with the Godhead (Brahman), that through knowledge,
jnana yoga, strikingly resembles Western deep ecology in some of its features and
terminology. The 'Yoga of knowledge is said to be the shortest path to divine
realisation (to God). It is also the steepest' (p.35). For intellectuals, introverts and
the like 'Hinduism proposes a series of meditations and logical demonstrations
�67
While Hinduism does also make room for expansions of selves through time, so as to 'rise
above the present and even above present lifespans' (p.28) these expansions are tied to lifelines of single creatures (perhaps as reincarnated). There is no technical provision for
unlimited wider identification, for instance identification with inanimate items, with a
motorcycle or nuclear reactor. Thus Hinduism can serve to show the independence of
unrestrictive expanded identification from self-Self theories. Evidently, too, variations on
self-Self (e.g. with more ascetic theories of big Self) can strengthen this result.
designed to convince the thinker that there is more to him than his finite self; ... [to]
shift his central concern to the deeper reaches of his being ... the larger self that lies
behind ... ' (p.33).
One 'must pierce and dissolve the innumerable layers of manifest personality until all
strata of the mask [all roles of the persona] are at length cut through, [to] arrive finally
at the anonymous and strangely unconcerned actor [Atman] who stands beneath. The
distinction between self and Self can come through another image' (p.34) however than
that of the removal of roles and personae; thus there is the image of the game of life
upon a chess-board and the image of the charioteer. Through exercise with such
images and such practices it is claimed that a practitioner can 'build up a lively sense
of an abiding Self that underlies his phenomenal personality' (p.34). The further 'step
consists in shifting his self-identification from the passing to the eternal part of his
being. The most direct way of doing this ... is simply to [contemplate] one's identity
with the Eternal Spirit ... ' (p.35).
Of course analogous self-improvement, self-abnegation and self-expansive elements
feature in other religions than Indian, where they were especially early and
conspicuous. In Zen, for instance, 'the dualisms of self and object, of self and other,
are transcended' (p.134). In Christianity too, the circle of self can be broken, and
release experienced from the cramping confines of ego (Smith again, p.280).
Analogous elements made their way into Western philosophies, such as that of
Spinoza, early romanticism (e.g. Schegel), German idealism and T.H. Green, and
directly or indirectly into Western deep ecology (Fox, p.57). As Marxism is
sometimes seen, crudely, as obtained by upending Hegelianism and replacing God by
Man, so transpersonal ecology can be regarded as similarly varying elements of
Hinduism, replacing God by Nature (rather than identifying them as in Spinoza).
Ideological tradition does not however point uniformly in one direction, with self
elevation as invariant. According to Buddhism, here too more enlightened than
alternatives, that is a wrong direction. 'Strong emotions, however lofty [including
those of ecological consciousness], tend to emphasize and strengthen the fatal illusion
of the ego, which it is the whole aim and purpose of religion to transcend'. For the
'idea of a Self is at the root of every evil passion (and through its action Salvation
becomes impossible)' (both quoted in Perrett, p.72). Instead Buddhism offers the
tantalizing doctrine of "no self', which at least denies the existence of a substantial
self. Further there is allusion to "'the two kinds of non-self': that means there is no
ego in humans and no Self in Nature'.
�68
Features of Hinduism also show up deficiencies in the Western Enlightenmentsponsored objective of Self-realisation. These include the already remarked problem of
evil, which afflicts unrestricted Self-realisation in much the way it plagues closely related
hedonism (often a main goal of Self-realisation, and out of an adjacent intellectual stable).
To avoid promotion of evil and the like, ethical or similar controls need to be inserted. It
should be realisation of an ethical Self, just as elsewhere it should be ethical happiness and
ethical profit, not happiness and profit at the expense of other creatures or the Earth. There
is worse to come. For there is a scurrilous bigger-is-better element to big Self expansion
and realisation, and to often announced, but thoroughly dubious, goals of maximization.
Without ethical constraints, the supreme goal of ecosophy, of maximizing Self-realisation,
can be decidedly anti-environmental, as too many maximizers proceed to aggrandize
themselves, maximize their consumption, or their identification with false chauvinistic
Gods, or their dominance, and so on. Such maximal Self-realisation is evidently antithetical
to deep environmentalism, which like high-path Hinduism and Taoism, is opposed to selfelevation and self-aggrandizement, especially in material consumption, and favours some
self-restraint, self-effacement, self-domination, even selflessness and self-abnegation. But
such unconstrained maximization is also in conflict with other features of ecosophy, such as
simplicity of, and restraint in, material means, implying a certain Self-contraction. In brief,
unrefined ecosophy is liable to be inconsistent.
10.
Deconstruction and reselection of self.
The problems run deeper however. The theory of expanded self and Self-realisation
has ecologically defective starting points: it takes as given what should be investigated and
rejected. For instance, Naess simply assumes that the process of heightened Self-realisation
starts with the 'development of the narrow ego of the small [Western] child into the
comprehensive structure of a Self which comprises all human beings' (quoted p.55; egoism
is also assumed p.64 ). Of course deep ecology aims to induce a further development,
beyond the anthropic limitations of standard trans personal psychology, 'a deep
identification of individuals with all of life' (p.55 again). 35
While it is plain enough that ego is a theoretical notion, elaborated especially by
Freud, it is less plain that self too is a folk-theoretic term of certain folk cultures, and it is
quite insufficiently appreciated that narrow egos and individual selves are not culturally
independent items (artifacts some would now say), but are acquired concepts,
35
Both developments parallel ascents in Hinduism, of upward path of "renunciation", to
third (service to human communities) and fourth life-objectives.
�69
chauvinistically learnt early in civilised life. Perhaps because individual selves are so
deeply entrenched, especially in Westerners' impressions of themselves, a clever practical
and ideological course is no doubt the encouragement of expanded egoism, self stretching
exercises and empathy.
But a deeper philosophical approach would investigate the notions of ego and selftheir history, development, entrenchment, arbitrariness, and dispensibility - rather than take
them substantially for granted. In dissolving egoism, it is wise not to concede it at the
outset. It, and the intertwined notions of self-interest, and self-ish-ness, should be taken
apart to begin with, both analytically and historically. There are of course two parts to the
unmasking and dethroning of self-interest: dealing with interest and dealing with self A
historical investigation of the rise of the modern theory of self, done in the style of
Foucault, might serve to show how arbitrary in crucial respects the notion now rigorously
adhered to in social theory happens to be, and how developments could have been different.
But even if such an investigation should run aground (e.g. because the notion, although not
present in all tribal peoples, reaches back to prehistory), a systematic investigation need not
get stuck. The notion of self-interest, and also expanded self interest in the form of group
or class interest, has already been taken apart, from the angle of interest, and found wanting
as an ethical starting point (see esp. our 79). A complementary investigation of self,
standard theories of which should certainly not be conceded, is now required. 36 Some
realisation of the problematic character of the notion of self is in fact disclosed in Naess's
much earlier investigations, but he does not apply it to the familiar Enlightenment ideal of
self-realisation which he takes over as foundation of his own ecosophy, and so of deep
ecology as he conceives it.
Instead of requisite critical and de( con)structive investigation of the notion of self,
resulting in its demotion, what we are witnessing in too much deeper environmental
philosophy, is an elevation of the notion and an attempt to focus and found much theory
upon it (as esp. in Fox). It is reminiscent of, and related to, the earlier failed attempt to
found much theory, including ethics (or a replacement for it), on the notion of person.3 7
36
My impression is that several such investigations are now under way. For discussion
and elaboration of earlier investigations, which glimpse some of the requisite points,
see Perrett. Our own previous investigations, particularly of the interests and needs of
oneself and their interrelations and overlap with those of others (and accordingly the
falseness of the egoism-altruism contrast) in 79 and EP, go some small way along the
requisite path.
37
Thus, for instance, Strawson in metaphysics, and Benn in moral sciences, both
elaborating on Kantian illusions.
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Indeed those routes are significantly interlinked and offer similar beginnings; for instance, a
personality comprises certain roles into which a self, oneself, is cast. In important respects,
self amounts to person somewhat deanthropocized. It also suffers similar defects. Neither
is sufficiently explained (e.g. what are the existence conditions, the identity conditions, the
distinctive properties); neither is up to carrying the heavy theoretical load aficionados have
attempted to impose upon them. In particular, neither enables an independent
characterisation of central axiologic or deontic notions or other notions bound up with the
regulation of conduct which they would somehow displace and to some extent provide new
foundations for. Furthermore it appears that the notion of self is not, and cannot be,
sufficiently deanthropicized, short of distributing selves around in woods, springs and
mountains in the way pagan religions did with spirits (and then letting them be good and
evil, and so forth). Undue concentration upon selves has the unfortunate and retrograde
effect of swinging environmental philosophy away from deepened ecology and back to
agents and actors, the live active subcomponents within ecologies.
unacknowledged return to shallower waters.
It signals an
Because self, however dispensible in environmental philosophy, is integral to
Wes tern deep ecology, it behoves us to say something about it, something more than deep
ecology has said. Self is a folk-theoretic object of philosophical cast, though no doubt an
item with experiential linkage, for instance as a permanent substratum of a certain range of
successive (internal) states and experiences, or, without a substance, as a bundle or
stringing together of a succession of 'personal' experiences. 38 It is an item, almost an
objectification, whose features (which may vary with underlying theory) are primarily
supplied through a culturally-dependent theory or the like (e.g. a religious or cult theory).
In this regard it is like other typically psychological items of philosophical importance, such
as soul (with which it is sometimes identified), spirit, mental substance, mind, psyche,
person, personal essence, ego, life force, conatus, etc. In due course a now standard range
of philosophical theories gets invoked to account for, or discount, such items: realisms,
constructivisms, nominalisms, etc., with dominant scientific ideology committed to a
dismissive nominalism. A fashionable humanist opposition has, by contrast, become
enamoured of a flamboyant constructivism: selves are made, fabricated, and the like. By
contrast again Western deep ecology appears committed to realism, and therewith an
38
While the experiences, such as surges of desire or apprehension, are subjectively
empirical enough, the substratum or self-substance may not be. To put it in Humean
terms, when I look within I don't find a self just like that (how a sceptical Hume
managed to still eludes me). Self itself, like cause, though empirically grounded, is
not an "empirical" concept.
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incredible ontology of selves (already castigated). None of these standard mass-produced
positions impresses as at all satisfactory (for reasons elaborated in JB ). For example,
scientific nominalism inexcusably leaves out lots of experience, life-forms, and much
richness (whereas for its own "legitimate" theoretical purposes it is prepared to introduce all
sorts of strange objects). For constructivism there are so far unsurmounted difficulties in
getting beyond the analogy: exhibiting the materials and explaining just how they are
assembled. While not averse to phrases like 'the fabrication of self', it needs to be
remembered that the fabrications are more like those of fiction. Insensitive realism is
different; there is sound reason to remain entirely sceptical about an intuitive ontology of
selves, especially when a good empathesizer may have numerous different existent selves.
I can see little excuse for (being taken in by) such ontological blow outs.
Item-theory offers an appealing alternative to these standard positions generally, and
therewith very different prospects for self. An item-theoretic account of self will resemble
that already offered for mind (in MX); analogous item-theoretic accounts can no doubt be
given for spirit, psyche and ego (and also spook, shade, spectre, ghost, etc.). Minds are
fairly satisfactory folk-theoretic items which do not exist; ghosts, whether in machines or
not, are decidedly less satisfactory inexistential items. Selves are different inexistential
items again, with different features; many subjects which do not have minds may have
selves. The difficult part of the business consists in explaining whic~ items selves are, a
business that is complicated because there are several somewhat different but interconnected
notions of self in circulation. Fortunately these can all be accounted for as restrictions in
one way or another- temporal, cultural, subject-discipline - of a total self. The total self of
a subject abstracts from the total set of features which contribute to the self or personality of
that subject, from everything that makes it selfwise what it is (whether supplied by local
cultures or not, both supplied internally and not), over the life-span of the subject. For
some subjects with richer psychic lives, these features will include states of consciousness
(and then the total self will properly include ego, the conscious self). Thus a total self is, if
you like, what distinguishes a subject, makes it what it is and so gives its abiding essence
(and id-entity), and so resolves issues of personal identity over times. 39
What the relevant features are will become clearer as we come to the usual restrictions.
A first set of restrictions are temporal restrictions, a second set aspect restrictions. These
are combined in the OED sense
39
This account sharpens and much elaborates the senses which the dictionaries list as
philosophical, e.g. OED sense 3. The inexistential account offered shares common
ground with the Buddhist "no self' theory when presented as denying the real existence
of a self.
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'4.a. What one is at a particular time or in a particular aspect or relation;
one's nature, character, or (sometimes) physical constitution or
appearance, considered as different at different times. Chiefly with
qualifying adj.'
So, for example, Dobbin's total self restricted to time period t1 differs from his total self
restricted to t2 at which period he is old and mentally decrepit. A main aspect restriction,
very commonly imposed, is to psychically-relevant features, excluding merely bodily
features. Differently, a total self, especially a total psychic self, of a subject may be
partitioned into such selves, whence sense 4 b of OED.
'4. b. An assemblage of characteristics and dispositions which may be
conceived as constituting one of various conflicting personalities within
a human being. Better self: the better part of one's nature.'
Among the topic, or subject-discipline, restricted selves those of economics and social
sciences are nowadays particularly prominent. A broad economic self, for instance, is a
psychic self confined to an individual and restricted to its locus of wants, preferences,
desires, interests, needs, aspirations, goals, etc. (Of course some of the volitional features
can be explained in terms of others; in older faculty discourse, it coincides with the
individual will.) With a narrow economic self, that of mainstream economics, the broad
economic self is narrowed considerably to remove all volitional features stretching beyond
those of a present human. Thus interests, for instance, are restricted to selfish interests,
those of the human concerned, to exclude both altruistic interests (those of relevance to
other items and typically against a creature's own selfish interests) and, more important,
other-directed and higher-order interests (such as a's interest is that Ws interest be fulfilled,
a's concern for~' etc.) 40 This narrow self tightens up a further dictionary sense, namely
OED
'5. One's personal welfare and interests as an object of concern; chiefly
in a bad sense, selfish or self-interested motives ... '.
The tightened-up restrictive notion lies at the base of most modern social science. It is
characteristically coupled with the Hobbesian theme, according to which all motivation
reduces to that of narrow economic selves, effectively self-interest. Such psychological
egoism, that nothing can move a creature to action or decision except interests and like
experiences of its own self, was assumed by Spinoza, who proposed absorbing this
40
These points are much further explained in 79 and EP. Other selves, such as altruistic
selves and self-effacing selves, deploy quite different obverse restrictions, eliminating
local selfish interests.
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excessively narrow self in a generous Nature (p.57). Deep ecology has attempted to expand
this sorry route (p.54), which starts out from a dominant paradigm mistake. 41
11.
More troubles with Self as foundation.
The big trouble is that an expanded Hobbesian picture, with expanded-self interest as
the only fundamental motive, presupposes the essential correctness of Hobbes' crude theme
- all that Hobbes really got wrong was the 'size' of one's self - but that is a fundamental
mistake. It is a mistake as fundamental as the conflicting crude motivational theme that the
only basic motive of business enterpreneurs is [self-]profit. It is a mistake of the same cast
as the pervasive idea that conventional ethics can be rendered environmentally adequate just
by expansion of those it applies to (expansion of the "community", or of a suitable base
class of parties with interests, sentience, etc.) - what is often now called 'moral
extensionism' 42 .
As empirical evidence tells, prima facie decisively, against intertwined Hobbesian and
entrepreneurial economic motivational theory - an extraordinarily convenient, and not
"rationally" abandoned, theory for contemporary power elites - two substantially successful
theory-saving strategies swing into action:
• a sustained propaganda campaign to align people's motives with the theory, conducted
through advertising, education and other mass channels of persuasion;
• a sustained reduction campaign by subservient intellectuals to show that all apparently
exceptional motives actually conform to the motivational theory. At the same time,
minorities (such as pre-industrial peoples) whose motives do not conform to the
established/ment theory are of course discounted. This seriously flawed anti-environmental
theory should be resisted and replaced, not just extended. For the only basic and legitimate
motives and interests are not merely those of self (whether expanded in a futile attempt to
encapture other or not). One distinct motive is, to put it in old-fashioned Kantian terms
though the example is not Kantian, that of duty, duty for instance to this Earth, duty which
is neither self-regarding or necessarily Self-regarding or, in any ordinary sense, otherregarding.
41
The chauvinistic expansion of self and person is sometimes carried to remarkable
lengths, as revealed by Shepard: 'we must affirm that the world is being a part of our
own body'.
42
For further explanation and criticism of this expansion, see EP. At least Fox does
Sylvan the "favour" of distancing him from the most famous exponent of such
extensionism, Leopold, whom he tries to push into the wider identification and wider
Self fold (p.64).
�74
A third complementary strategy renders the theory normative: while agents may act, or
appear to act, on non-self-interested motives, it is only rational to act according to one's ongoing self-interest. (While we shall focus upon a strong version of the normative egoistic
theme, that it is only rational to act in one's own self-interest, including one's future self,
much of what is said counts against weaker forms of the theme according to which it is in
some way preeminently reasonable to act in one's own on-going self-interest.) This
normative assumption depends crucially however upon a specially-tailored theory of self- a
substantial underlying self that suitably integrates all one's interests and concerns, past,
present and future. Without such an account the peculiar self-evidence normative egoism is
presented as enjoying, and upon which it depends as an unargued rest position, begins to
fall away. Suppose instead a self or person is represented as a sequence of causally
connected experiential moments (e.g. momentary selves, of a person). Unfortunately then,
for normative egoism, it ceases to be evident to many presently placed selves that there are
special specially-valid reasons for only being concerned with future elements of one
particular sequence rather than another, to which one's present self may not belong; for
promoting the interests of this future momentary self rather than some other more congenial
one, perhaps in another sequence. 43 Indeed it is evident that reasons for action are not
confined to those intermalised to the interests of one future self rather than another, one my
or thou or it (say) rather than another; that reasons can and do operate beyond interests, as
when directed at the futures of forests or fens, and beyond selves and their extensions and
variants such as I's and Thou's and You's, as when arguing for deep environmental action.
Nor is there cogent reason for trying to curtail reasons to what answers to a bad, if deeply
incalcated, theory, a pernicious and damaging, if widely promoted, theory and sense of self
joined to chauvinistic bodily consumption and advancement. A more generous itemtheoretic theory of total self can expose this theoretical fraud, allowing for a full flowering
of reasons for action; it thus diffuses the narrow greedy self of Hobbesian theory.
Expanded Hobbesian is assumed in deep ecological Ego-tripping (pp. 65-66) and in
'the theme of ecological resistance as Self-defence', that resisting ecological depredation is
defending oneSelf, because the whales or forests are me; it is me that is being injured
(p.61). Such expanded Hobbesian is even less plausible than Hobbesianism itself - among
other things because you can go on, to become other You's even after You as the forest has
been destroyed. Be sure I do not deplore, but welcome worthwhile ecological resistance
43
On all these points see further Perrett, esp. p.72. Perrett explains how the regularly
assumed opposition between egoism and altruism depends on particular assumptions
about the nature of self, and breaks down when, as in buddhist ethics with its doctrine
of no-self, these assumptions get removed.
�75
whether conducted as Self-defence, or not; good works, even if undertaken for self-ish or
distorted or ridiculous motives, are not to be disparaged. Nor similarly should the help of
campaigners whose motives have been distorted by propaganda systems be disparaged
because those campaigners are engaged on dubious or bizarre bases, such as that they are
defending themselves rather than something else that deserves their care, concern and
respect. What should be resisted are the twin ideas that these are the wholesome motives or
the only [rational] motives, and that quality of motivation does not affect goodness of act.
The main trouble then with the wild Western approach so advanced under Self-interest is
that, like Hobbesianism but on an expanded scale, it would reduce or suppress all other
motivation. In many ways, it has not really got beyond bad "old paradigm" thinking, but
merely bizarrely extended it.
12. Liquidating Fox's "deep ecological territory".
The success Fox imagines expanded-Self is going to have in the environmental
struggle arena, a success far surpassing that environmental ethics is likely to have (p.84), is
premissed on this faulty expanded Hobbesianism theory. It is not based on monitored field
experience. In the action field, where some Western deep ecologists are seldom seen,
identification techniques, far from admirably shifting the onus of proof (a dubious claim
also advanced on p.84 ), are likely to be greeted with amazement and disbelief: what is this
crap? It is not very long ago that people who thought they were tigers or trees were locked
away, or else regarded, like the man who identified his wife as a hat, as figures of fun not
to be taken seriously. Such motivation is likely to be taken, and presented, by a hostile and
backwards opposition as crazy. Furthermore, such defences can back-fire. Identification
with a rainforest, for instance, because symmetrical, does not guarantee defence of its needs
as one's own, as against one's own needs as its. A powerful bunch of developers and
bureaucrats who identify with the forest may take their needs, for timber profits and tourist
revenues, as its, and interfere with it accordingly. Identification, on its own, admits
disastrous reversal. Expanded Selves can be dubious allies in environmental struggles. It
is fortunate then that for almost all environmental purposes, including those of deep
environmental philosophy, the notion of self can drop out; selves are inessential. While
�76
decent theories of self and self-Self can presumably be worked out44 , and Self tried out as
sole primitive, the theory so far, and with it (Western) deep ecological theory in present
form remains both a shambles and an embarrassment.
It is bad news then, given the abysmal shape of the deep ecological theory of self, that
deep ecology should contract, at least on Fox's continuing vision, to a theory of self (see
also 89). On this presentation much of authentic deep ecology is thrown away. The deep
ecological framework comes down to 'two basic hypotheses and on ultimate norm', all of
which revolve around Self (pp.86-7): it is Self, Self and Self, nothing but Self. And it has
nothing essentially to do with the environment. For Self does not provide the great new (or
shabby old) starting point to environmental philosophy that Fox imagines. To elaborate:One "hypothesis", already criticised, is that 'Our Self is that with which we identify' (p.86,
the pluralisation is interesting, e.g. a vintage car club has a group Self which includes their
cars and perhaps others they covet); the other, not previously encountered, is that 'the self
can and does grow/develop/mature ... over time' (p.17). That hypothesis is presumably
false; for selves, like plants, may decline, wither or die. Or don't ecological selves wither
and die? 'The norm is that the ideal state of being is one that sustains the evident (and
deepest) possible identification and, hence, sense of Self'. It seems to be assumed that the
ideal state, identified in the "norm", ought to be striven for (though it is hard to see why: it
involves much unpleasant, embarrassing or boring identification work, etc.). There are
accordingly covert principles of conduct, such as striving towards the norm and undertaking
the "real spiritual work" of deep ecology, and covert values, such as that of the (so-called)
ideal state, lurking at the bottom of Wes tern deep ecology; it too hides, even in its reduced
form, a condemned "axiology" and ethics. But not environmental ones; the norm could
have issued from a deviant Hinduism, without environmental commitments, concerned
above all with introverted cultivation of self.
Although Fox says the 'ideal state of being is referred to ... as "ecological
consciousness" by Devall and Sessions' (p.87), such reference does not make it so;
ecological consciousness involves rather awareness of and commitment to certain things and
matters ecological, not widest identification, which involves much that is unecological, such
44
Perhaps following through suggestions sketched earlier, perhaps elaborating, in less
anthropocentric style, T.H. Green, whose theory appears to anticipate much of wild
Western deep ecology. Green took self-awareness as a guide to the nature of things and
self-realisation as each person's goal. He held that the developed self is the end which
defines the good, and that all ethical terms may be formed, so far as required, to that
end. Of course he also spoke against atomism and individualism, and in favour of
holism and organicism.
�77
as traffic with occult and transfinite, or antiecological, such as identification with developers
ripping down rainforest and heritage works. While Fox does claim that consequences for
the natural (not the built) environment do follow from his framework, the claim is mistaken.
According to him, 'it follows ... that when we harm or limit the flow of nature then we are
harming or limiting that with which we ... identify and so diminishing our ... Self' (p.87).
No such consequence follows as regards widest possible identification; all that destruction
of an ecosystem does is to put the ecosystem in a possible world, with which identification
is sustained, and bring up a different and perhaps humanly improved world (e.g. a wild
river is dammed to save villages). The remote Self is unperturbed by such commerce of
actuality. Even if Fox should try to save the show by again restricting awkward or
uncomfortable identification feats, his intended consequences do not follow. For we may
well increase that with which we identify by "limiting the flow of nature", for instance by
varying or enriching parts of extensive monotonous natural systems. 45 Fox's deep
ecological-framew ork, Self-indulgence of a deep spiritual cast, is no framework for an
environmental anything. Luckily it is not needed, but can be despatched with other deep
ecological rubbish.
13. Justifying "extreme interpretations" of and "extreme reactions" to wild
West deep ecology.
Fox exhibits full dominant paradigm outrage at what he refers to as my 'extreme
interpretations' and 'extreme reactions' (boldface headings for sections 3 and 4, p.13 and
p.19). While I am quite accustomed to being called or accounted an extremist, it is
generally done by those far on the shallow side of the environmental divide. I trust such
terms as 'extreme' carry no more weight with readers than they do with me. It is a
fashionable, but methodologically quite unsound, ploy to try to dismiss those who depart
far from some lately received position as extremists. Nowadays even 'Thomas Aquinas,
for example, is depicted as an 'extremist' (by Hart) and dismissed because the views he
expressed do not accord with what "all lawyers think" (Dworkin)' ;46 one is in good
company. The Earth will in the longer term be helped by deep environmental extremists
45
That Fox's theory (already epicycling, into dimensions) admits such cases is evident
from "the extinction example" (pp. 82-3). Because they are sufficiently evident, I have
not recorded difficulties regarding this example, which attempts to discriminate
different sorts of environmental losses by their differential effects on Selves (if there
are any ecological ones left that is: Last Self arguments retain their bite and smile).
46
According to H. Miles in a curious letter to the ANU Reporter 1989.
�78
who serve to shift various balances in environmental directions - the balances to be
achieved, for example, in discussions, in time allowed in decision making, and so on.
But what Fox also says he means, under the emotive overlay, is that 'Sylvan's
arguments show a tendency to push the claims of those he criticises to extremes' through
application of the following reduction-of-relations principles:
S 1. 'if two concepts/ideas are linked, then they must be completely similar (equivalent
[identical])';
S2. 'if they are contrasted then they must be completely different (i.e. non-intersecting) as
well as completely exhaustive (i.e. covering all cases/examples of the set in question)' (p.13
and earlier).
All these principles (S2 breaks down into a pair straightaway) are evidently fallacious, and
only hold in very special cases. Now I claim to be well aware of this, and to have
illustrated this awareness sufficiently in my work (esp. investigation of the history of the
attempt to remove or suppress relations, investigation of very special cases, such as
"classical relevant logics", where a connections of the form, "where Rab then a = b" does
hold; see JB and RLR respectively). Indeed I discuss an example of this 'crude fallacy' in
one of the sectors that particularly excites Fox (Cp.27). But in any case, the principles are
substantially irrelevant to Fox's discussion of 'extreme interpretations' and 'extreme
reactions' (in his sections 3 and 4)! For, as we shall see, what really bothers Fox, and also
N aess, has little that is not superficial (merely terminological) to do with extremes; what
troubles them rather is that I take their claims seriously, and not as forever 'preliminary', or
at 'a superficial level', or 'metaphorical' or the like (see e.g. p.13, p.49). 47
Firstly, I introduced the quasi-technical term 'extreme holism' ('extreme' was
italicised to indicate its introduction and quasi-technical character, not to emphasize my
extremism) as contrasted with 'moderate holism' .48 That is obviously not an extreme
claim, it is not pressing a claim to extremes; it is simply using a piece of terminology, and
does nothing for Fox's cause.
I take seriously Naess's holistic claim, repeated by
incautious deep ecologists, that his conception 'dissolves ... the very notion of the world as
composed of discrete, compact, separate "things"', which I describe as 'extreme holism'.
47
One day I should really like some non-preliminary formulations from Naess. Quite
separately from that standing request, I do regard it as pretty ridiculous to insist that
ordinary discourse about chairs and desks, fems and wombats is 'talking at a superficial
or preliminary level of communication'. Perhaps we have to expect this sort of
twaddle from hard-wired physicalists, not from deep thinkers.
48
It is a contrast previously discussed, in more detail but in different terms, in EP,
p.222ff.
�79
Fox's response to my reporting of Naess's claim, in the style of Dr. Johnson (no separate
things, so no wildernesses!, no forests!), his only response it seems, is '(Does Sylvan)
sincerely think that anybody could be that silly?' (p.14). The answer is of course: Yes,
damned right he does; for example, too many influenced by Hegelianism. It 1s
unremarkable that Fox and Naess are trying to backtrack without appearing to do so. 49
Where, then, is the (non-quotational) extreme interpretation? Fox makes two
connected moves, neither of which duly involve principles Sl and S2. Firstly, he
introduces a distinction, not previously in the ballpark, between relative and absolute
autonomy of "things in the world" (p.14). As commonplace in Fox's practice, the apparent
distinction is introduced and put to work without proper explanation. Then Fox announces
that 'it is clear from his interpretation that he [Sylvan] takes Naess and myself to be denying
even relative autonomy ... whereas it should be clear ... that what is being denied is
absolute autonomy'; and he has the audacity to go on, ' ... there is really no excuse for
Sylvan's extreme interpretation' (p.14). Well, you can take my word for it that Sylvan did
not take N aess and Fox that way; the distinction in question had not been introduced in the
literature under discussion. For similar reasons, that there is no basis for it, there is no
extreme interpretation, and nothing to underwrite Fox's captious moralising.
Secondly, Fox proceeds quite scurrilously to make it look as if I am attributing certain
themes I nowhere allude to him and Naess (but in fact attacked in Wilber's book). ' ...
Sylvan's extreme interpretation ... would have Naess and myself reduce all diversity and
multiplicity to something like "uniform, homogeneous, and unchanging mush" or to
"uniform, all-prevading, featureless but divine goo"'. The quotations, which may well look
as if they were drawn from my criticism, bear no resemblance to anything I attributed to
Naess or Fox; they are in fact drawn from Wilber's fashionable Eye to Eye. Similarly that
'extreme interpretation' is not to be found in Sylvan; it is a fabrication on the part of Fox.
Nothing I made critical use of tells against Naess's total-field exhibiting various features,
such as some internal differentiation. The Flux of late nineteenth century philosophy was
both non-uniform and non-homogeneous, with 'eddies, ripples and whirlpools in a stream
("unity in process")' (p.15), without being composed of separate individuals.
The other example Fox includes in his section in extreme interpretations, the matter of
internal relations, will also require, to begin with, some grimy textual exegesis, including
further inspection of Fox's practice of tactical misquotation (or quotation out of context),
49
Their behaviour is reminiscent of Parmenides and Zeno at the races, as delightfully
related by Bouwsma.
�80
rather than real philosophical work. 50 But here no attempt is made to exhibit an 'extreme
interpretation' (nor again do principles Sl and S2 enter). Fox's first (and final) point is that
subscription to a doctrine of internal relations 'does not necessarily render one an idealist'
(p.17). Whereupon, by way of counterexample, Fox trots out his own admirable
philosophical pedigree, and reveals a doctrine of internal relations inherited from the neutral
monism of Spinoza and the process philosophy of Whitehead, both well known for their
doctrines of internal relations. N aess does at least make it evident that he is adopting or
adapting the received theory of internal relations. As it happens, I did not commit myself to
the proposition that a doctrine of internal relations (however characteristic of idealism)
entails idealism; naturally there appears to be more to idealism than that (such as a total-field
doctrine). Only by a misreading or misquotation does Fox obtain his necessarily linkage to
idealism. Firstly he represents me as ascribing to him 'this "idealist theory of internal
relations"' (p.15), when what I actually wrote was that a certain 'form of argument ...
commandeers elements of the idealist theory of internal relations' (p.27 emphasis added).
Later he congratulates himself upon 'discrediting Sylvan's claims that deep ecology
subscribes ... to his characterisation of the theory of internal relations, which he describes
(p.28) as "a terminal form of idealism newly warmed up"' (p.18). To credit to me 'a
characterisation of the theory of internal relations' is certainly a gross overstatement, though
it may be convenient in trying to exonerate the doctrine of deep ecology from evident
criticism. But the immediate salient point is that what I say 'looks like a terminal form of
idealism ... ' (C p.28 emphasis added) is not the theory of internal relations but 'what Fox
describes as "the central intuition of deep ecology"'.
The second, of Fox's three points as to my comments on the deep ecological doctrine
of internal relations, is a bit more philosophically substantive, and concerns the character of
the necessity ascribed to connections. But textual exegesis is again unavoidable. Fox
contends that 'Naess's definition of internal relations ... flatly contradicts Sylvan's claim
that this view point renders "all connections necessary" in the ... sense Sy Ivan intends'
(p.16; Fox has the term 'strong' where dots are inserted; we'll look at what Fox is trying to
hang on me shortly). 51 On Naess's explanation, an internal 'relation between two things A
and B is such that the relation belongs to the definitions or basic constituents of A and B, so
that without the relation, A and Bare no longer the same things' (see p.15). Consider any
50
By and large, deep ecology involves disturbingly little real philosophical work. So
much of it is name dropping, rank pulling, unacknowledged borrowing - all the old
stuff some of us hoped to be rid of with a "new environmental paradigm".
51
In fact I had been arguing from Fox's theme that "all entities are constituted by their
relations" (see C pp.27-8), but Fox diverts the issue to Naess.
�81
internal connection R between A and B (indeed on the standard theory where all relations of
objects are internal, any connection). Then ARB holds by virtue of definitional or
constitutional features of A and B. But what so holds, holds as a matter of necessity (is
'necessarily constitutive' in Fox's lingo, Fox trying again for a resolving distinction);
whence the connection holds of necessity. A flat contradiction? Now to the 'strong sense'
Fox has located and is spreading abroad that I intend (once again he did not consult me as to
what I intended). 'Sylvan is claiming', according to him (though I have never advanced
such a claim, and am still not clear what it means, 'exact nature of' being Fox's
terminology), 'that the exact nature of all those relationships is also necessary' (p.16).
Now in trying to show that Naess's story conflicts with this claim he has hung on me, Fox
proceeds to run Naess into deep trouble (though Naess is blithely oblivious; see note (22)).
For, so Fox says,5 2 'Naess explicitly acknowledges that A and B can exist "without" the
relation"', meaning "'in a different relationship" or "in the absence of that specific relation"'
(p.16). Suppose such a different relation is S (at worst S is the absence of R). So
apparently ASB and not-ARB; whence A, for instance, has inconsistent properties, namely
both ... RB which is constitutive and not- ... RB by acknowledgement . To be sure, the
difficulty can be avoided, by insisting (as N aess did and as Fox also has him say) that
'without the relationship, A and B are no longer the same things', so what we have is
A'SB' and not- A'RB' for some counterparts A' and B' of A and B. Some such line is
taken by the standard theory. But Fox seeks a connection between A and B for Naess
which is in some respects contingent. Certainly that is possible, but it goes beyond the
bounds of the standard theory by admitting external relations, for which it is not required
that A and B are no longer the same without the relation. And, in a straightforward sense, it
fails the constituting claim: entities have relations, external ones, which are not constituting
(to deal with Fox-past), or alternatively (to refute Fox-present, p.17) it is false that 'all
relationships are necessarily constitutive' because some, external ones, are not.
My wombat example, to come to Fox's third point, was designed to indicate just that,
that a wombat stands in various relationships which are not (necessarily) constitutive and
which are merely contingent. Suppose wombat A passed by hollow stringbark B on its
foraging route (say once only, and accidentally, because it had wandered out of its
territory). Then "A passed by B" is a relation between A and B, a true relation, which
furthermore is merely contingent, because it might not have transpired. Moreover, the
relation is not constitutive, for instance of A, because it makes no difference to the nature or
52
The claim attributed to Naess does not appear in his original 1973 paper where the
relational total field image was presented, and from which the other Naess' quotes were
drawn.
�82
constitution of wombat A. What I mean by term 'constitute' (and likewise 'constitutive') Fox professes unclarity about this (p.17) - is what is ordinarily meant by the term in such
contexts, namely what makes a thing what it is, what determines it (see OED), what gives a
definite nature or character to (see Concise English). 53 Wombat A, one and the same A, a
creature with exactly the same make-up as A, not some counterpart or surrogate A', might
not have passed by B. So "passed by B" is not constitutive of A; and again not all relations
are constitutive.
Despite the general paucity and poorness of argument in much revealed deep ecology
literature, the general downgrading of rational and analytic methods 54 , and the emphasis on
experiential and empathetic approaches, the status of argument turns out to be a sensitive
issue too. Fox beats up an issue on this topic, on route to the grander issue of intellectual
rubbish, by his standard practice of misattribution. He proceeds stealthily to amend my
aside, '(argument often not being considered in the proper style of such a nonanalytical
enterprise as deep ecology)', which I believe I can sustain, to the assertion 'that argument is
not in the "proper style" of deep ecology' (p.20), which I did not make (for all Fox's kind
attribution) and would not want to defend. I wish decent argument and careful reasoning
were more often considered in the proper sty le of deep ecology, and more often practised.
Then I should be more enthusiastic about it, writing much less critical of it, and castigating
less as rubbish. Fox, I am afraid, has done little to convince me that 'closely measured
intellectual argument is thoroughly in keeping with the style of deep ecology' (p.20) or that
it is much of a priority. He offers but two examples: he stands on his own record as
attested in his Response (how can I say anything unfavourable about that), and he appeals,
forgetting I said 'often ... considered', to an exceedingly loose talk by Devall on the
Stone/Sky path, which mentions 'logical analyses of ideas, premises, systems of thought'
and 'formal statements of definitions of key terms, explication of relationships', but
deliberately avoids any such work, preferring instead, in characteristic deep ecological style,
'a steeper ... path that requires ... the "real work"', consciousness elevation, jnana yoga or
psychedelic drugs maybe (pp.21-2).
14. Transpersonal logic and methodology.
53
It is proponents of the dubious doctrine of internal relations - a doctrine quite
inessential to and external to deep environmentalism - who are forced into assigning an
extraordinary meaning to constitute.
54
The Counter-Enlightenment antipathy to analytic and rational methods resurfaces in
Western deep ecology. For an example in Fox's Response, consider his remarks on
the 'blunt tools of logical analysis' when applied to the 'real world of communication'
(p.11), which could almost have come from the late eighteenth century.
�83
The quaint relation-reduc tion principles, S 1 and S2, do show up with the first
premisses of what Fox dignifies with the misleading titles of "false equivalence argument"
and "false contrast argument". The second title is particularly misleading, because there is a
recognised traditional fallacy of "false contrast" or "false dichotomy" (arising as regards
classifications), which differs from Fox's defective "false contrast argument". Fox has
proceeded to latch onto my legitimate use of traditional logic, as when I say (rightly or
wrongly) that Devall and Sessions are operating with a false contrast (p.11), in order to
saddle me with a defective argument of his own concoction which I do not apply. But to
show that these defective arguments, which Fox accuses me of heavily and repeatedly
applying (p.6, p.11 ), are not deployed by me in the way Fox alleges, we shall need to look
at the arguments.
To avoid further confusion with tradition, let us relabel the arguments, replacing
'false' by 'foxy'. Let A and B be terms (Fox has 'concept/idea'); let a be a person or group
whose views are under criticism. Then the foxy equivalence argument, set down pretty
much in Fox's way, runs as follows
Key Premiss. When a links A with B (i.e. maintains that ARB for some relation R),
claim a holds that A=B.
Subargument. Show there are cases where A without B or B without A, whence A;;:: B.
Conclusion according to Fox: ' the "argument" (i.e. the claim that A = B) is "false" or
that it "fails"' (p.6).
An immediate observation is that Fox has not succeeded in setting down what he is after
with much success. The conclusion, which does not make use of the key premiss, is a
mess. As he hasn't located an argument, in 'the claim that A = B', he has perhaps felt
obliged to put critical terms in italics, or perhaps he imagines he is quoting me - what is
going on is unclear. He might have concluded, though a level up, that the "false
equivalence argument" itself fails, a conclusion he doesn't explicitly draw, but then he
would be left without a conclusion at all for the foxy equivalence argument.
There is a valid traditional argument, filling out the subargument that is buried in the
foxy argument as intended. In a standard logical format, with A( c) symbolising that c is or
has A or that A applies to c, it runs as follows:!. A= B
hypothesized claim (imposed on a)
2. A( c) iff B(c) for every case c
3. A(c) & ~B(c) for some case c
standard case expansion of 1
further data
4. ~2
from 3
5. ~(A= B)
from 4
6. ~(A= B)
reductio, discharging the hypothetical argument
�84
Thus the claim, that A= B, is indeed false, as its negation is categorically established, given
the data. But again the argument, now valid, makes no use of the key premiss. A proper
fuller version of the argument would replace 3 by the disjunction, A(ci) & -B(ci) V.
-A(c2) & B(c2) for some cases ci and c2, and consider each disjunct. But the result would
be the same, namely 6 categorically.
The preceding represents the valid core of the foxy equivalence argument. What of
the key premiss however? That part also can be rendered correct, but upon assumption of
the quite defective S 1. To convert this part of the argument into available logical form, let
us replace holding or maintaining functors by a correspondin g asserting or (more
satisfactorily) commitment to asserting functor. (Should you imagine a fast one is being
pulled just read 't-a' as 'a holds that'). Then the key dubious premiss becomes, at first
approximation.
KP. from a is committed to asserting A is related to B, i.e. ARB, infer that a is committed
to asserting that A= B (or A= B).
Expressed in symbols in implicational form it looks as follows:
KP➔ .
.,_a ARB ➔ . t-a A= B.
This form makes it easy to see how the key premiss derives from relation-reduction S 1, i.e.
ARB ➔ A = B, namely by a standard distribution of the committed-to -asserting functor,
.,_a, or specifically by the rule x
➔
y / t-a x
➔
t-a y. S1 is the way to arrive at KP.
Moreover without S 1, there is little basis for KP.
Now the arguments can be put together. We argue to KP➔, e.g. from Sl. We run
out the subargument to ~(A= B), from which we conclude a is wrong or mistaken in
asserting A = B. Then we proceed back across KP➔ (using what results from it by
distribution of the mistake functor W, namely W t-a A= B ➔. W t-a ARB), to conclude
that our friends a were wrong in maintaining, as they did, that A is linked to B.
Exposure of that part of the argument involving KP➔ is enough to at least suggest that
I am unlikely to rely on it heavily, since it is manifestly defective when so exposed, relying
upon the already jettisoned S 1. Fox, for all his assertions, does nothing to show that I do
rely on it heavily; indeed he does not show that I rely upon it at all. For all his effort in
eliciting these arguments (shoddy though his work may be), he fails entirely to follow
through and show how they apply.
Consider his "example" of the foxy argument at work, and supposedly scrutinized,
where the terms involved are life and value (p.7). Fox's conclusion does not appear, no
conclusion is reached. Moreover the key premiss is not instantiated, nor is any evidence of
its use advanced; it is knocked down to the claim, deriving from certain deeper positions,
that life= value. Whence the sort of argument that I am alleged to be employing 'in a totally
�85
fallacious manner' comes down to the valid traditional subargument. Fox's complaint is not
about an argument at all, it is about the premiss. As Fox concedes 'this argument is fine,
it's just that the original claim is false' (p.7)!
Let's take time out from the argument to consider the original claim. What Fox
reports that 'Sylvan ... claims, [namely] that (U.S.) "West Coast deep ecology" equates life
(A) and value (B)', differs significantly from what Sylvan did write, namely 'the
impression comes through from much West Coast deep ecology (from certain insufficiently
penetrating intermediate positions) that what is important is ... life and nothing but life'
(Cp.16). No universal claim, no equation, no falsehood. Naturally there are some
commitments, but Fox hasn't taken much care with those, or got them right either. For
example, Sylvan does not offer a definition (of his own or of any sort) of 'biospherical'
(which does not mean 'earth-centered') or of 'biocentric', but relies on standard meanings
(accordingly, too, he cannot 'refute his own ... definition').
The position with the foxy contrast argument is very similar to that already dealt with,
a similar shambles. The argument is exactly the same except that equality or (strong)
equivalence,= , is replaced throughout by a dual notion, exclusive disjunction, symbolised
V. But Fox does not dualise properly; instead of the dual conclusion, "the argument (i.e.
the claim that A V B) is "false" or that it fails", he misleadingly introduces the traditional
fallacy terms, as if they were new terms without a predetermined sense. He has it that we
'conclude that the contrast in question is a "false contrast" or a "false dichotomy'" (p.8).
Once again, a properly developed illustration of the argument is not offered, and in the very
sketchy "example" given the argument drops out. It turns into a question - an interesting
question - of the use, point, and merit of the shallow/deep distinction.
Let's take time out to consider the issues raised, as some are important. But first
some trivia. Fox, in effect, charges me with presenting a straw-person, as no one (but me)
takes the shallow/deep distinction as exhaustive of environmental positions. Well, he has
led a sheltered life; I've met too many activists who do. Fox implies that I 'want to assign
the shallow/deep terminology to the "historical scrap-heap"' (p.9). Here, and elsewhere,
Fox apparently joins the activists who conflate the shallow/deep distinction with the shallow
ecology/deep ecology distinction. It is only deep ecology that I have contemplated for the
scrap heap, not the shallow/deep distinction. More important is the status of such illdefined items as deep ecology. Fox now assumes that shallow and deep ecology, however
imperfect, are "ideal types", the merit of which is to be assessed pragmatically, through
their usefulness, heuristic roles, etc. Some scepticism is warranted. Ideal types such as
protestant and middle class might be defensible in sociological investigations where there
are plenty of protestants or middle class people to survey, but what is supposed to
correspond with deep ecology? The comparison has serious problems. Western deep
�86
ecologists have yet to get their theoretical slum in order, to rectify their classifications, clean
up the objects of these, and so forth.
15. More rubbish removal, especially that borrowed from pop science.
Along with a substantial upgrading of the calibre of argumentation in deep ecology
should go extensive removal of rubbish, such as the unnecessary doctrine of internal
relations. The image of philosophers removing the rubbish, which comes from Locke, is
much favoured in Australia, and has been deployed by both Armstrong and Passmore. 55 It
tends to accompany the picture of real philosophy 'as tough, practical, rational and secular',
which Sessions deplores, in the case of environmental ethics, as 'neither desirable nor
necessary, and perhaps not possible'. 56 While such an approach is hardly necessary it is
certainly possible: it is a divisive issue whether it is desirable.
As is increasingly appreciated these days, there are various sorts of rubbish, which
can be separated; so too in philosophy there is more than one sort of rubbish. Not all of it is
nonsense or quite unintelligible (pace p.23). Considerable parts of prevailing religions have
been dismissed as rubbish (see OED examples); but while some parts, such as the doctrine
of Trinity, may be accounted unintelligible, most parts would not. They are regarded rather
as substantially false as well as seriously flawed in important respects, and perhaps also as
pernicious or largely worthless (and likely as unnecessary). Evidently, then, there are
several distinguishable components to rubbish; and, as dictionary senses reveal (e.g. OED:
'worthless, ridiculous, nonsensical ideas, discourse, or writing'), there may be quite a
variety of ideological and intellectual rubbish.
Rubbish, of all sorts, is hard to escape these days; unfortunately it is easily
encountered in both deep ecology and popular science. Many environmental philosophers,
Fox is one, do seem to be highly attracted by a very fashionable cutting edge, along with a
semi-respectable crank end, of recent diverting popular science. It is almost enough to look
at the cast of witnesses Fox pulls in for defence of his unstated theme that there is no
55
According to Locke, 'it is ambition enough to be employed as an under-labourer in
clearing the ground a little and removing some of the rubbish that lies in the way of
knowledge'. Contrary to the impression Fox tries to convey, here and elsewhere, it
wasn't so much a matter of 'following Passmore' (except in a dilute temporal sense, in
which I always follow Aquinas when I agree with him), as of following a larger
tradition.
56
This part of Session's essay is quoted approvingly in Fox's Response, p.44. Sessions
should be rapped over the knuckles for his sexist citations (which Fox too does little
to rectify).
�87
rubbish in deep or transpersonal ecology (the theme is enthymematically Self-refuting, so to
say). The cast includes Capra, Davies, Bohm, Wilber, Gribbin, Pegals, Zukav, Prigogine,
d'Espagnat, Sheldrake, Pribram, Comfort and Walsh.
There is ample rubbish littering the works of some of these authors, some of which
finds its way into Western deep ecology (e.g. Fox's Section 4, and also e.g. pp. 58-9). It
is instructive to look at a couple of examples of prime rubbish early in the work of Gribbin
cited:- First 'Isaac Newton invented physics, and all of science depends on physics' (p.7).
Observe that this conjoint claim, which luckily does not drift into deep ecology, is
intelligible, but it is ridiculous 57 ; and observe, furthermore, that there is no straightforward
way of recycling such intellectual rubbish. Second, 'what quantum mechanics says is that
nothing is real and that we cannot say anything about what things are doing when we are
not looking at them' (p.2). As Gribbin presents quantum mechanics as true, we can detach
to achieve his shocking headlines and like assertions; so for instance, 'Nothing is real
unless it is observed' (p.3), naive phenomenalism. Remarkably, Gribbin is hardly obliged
to generate the amount of striking rubbish he does (but then he is a scientific journalist),
because of his later proclivity towards a "many worlds" interpretation of quantum
mechanics, which affords one neat way of halting production of this type of idealist
rubbish. Fox, eager to retain an idealistic Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics
for his nefarious metaphysical purposes, fails to take account of Gribbin's later turnabout
which effectively repeals the earlier headlines, and actually appeals to Gribbin's "authority"
(in note 41) in trying to dispose of the many worlds interpretation!
Fortunately we do not have to put up philosophically with the rubbish produced by
popular elaborations of the Copenhagen interpretation, which Fox and other avant-garde
thinkers would foist upon us. One reason is that micro-features of quantum behaviour very
rarely impinge upon macro-phenomena. They thus make little or no real difference to issues
of environmental philosophy (only problems tangential to it, such as determinism). Another
and major reason is that there are significant alternatives to the Copenhagen interpretation,
which at least shed most of the rubbish. And the 'range of choice' is far more extensive
than Fox would allow 'if Sylvan did follow his appeal through' (p.27) - yet another
example of "false choice". It happens that Sylvan had followed through on some of the
further options Fox does not consider, namely
57
If physics and science are the sorts of things that can significantly be invented, then
there are plenty of candidates for the claims both before and after Newton, e.g. Einstein
if we wish to be really extravagant. As for the extravagant reduction claim, well it is
refuted along with physicalism and associated Australian primitivism; see e.g. J.W.
Smith and JB .
�88
• alternative logic approaches. There are many interesting possibilities here, but few of
which physicists have had time or inclination to investigate. My own, rather preliminary,
investigations have concerned a uniform relevant logic approach (see uu § 13, on ultramodal
quantum logic) and, differently, paraconsistent approaches (see OP p.157ff.)
• a neutral worlds interpretation (see my 85). What this amounts to is an ontic
neutralisation of many-worlds interpretation. Because of the neutralisation, the
'metaphysical baggage' and unparsimoniousness that Fox complains about are removed.
Of course too, since the interpretation corresponds, through the mathematical formalism
deployed, to other standard interpretations, it as just as falsifiable (pace note 41 ), and
accordingly hardly 'desperate', a mere "just-so" story. These observations, duly elaborated
(as attempted, in part, in work alluded to), indicate 'how Sylvan would describe the
ontological implications of the "new (ie. post-1920s) physics?"' (p.23 reordered). Briefly,
there are many hitherto unknown physical objects at the sub-atomic level whose behaviour
is classically anomalous, being partly wavelike and partly particlelike, for which a new and
interpretationally difficult theory has been devised. But the positivism and related idealism
of early interpretations can be removed by a warranted change of interpretation. And then
the ontic implications for ecology and most of environmental philosophy are much less
remarkable than Wes tern deep ecology has imagined.
Given apparently viable options as to interpretation, all the rubbish Walsh and Fox
add to the already problematic Copenhagen interpretation can be packed off (if you can find
a way to recycle it, good luck to you). For those who like picking through rubbish (I
occasionally collect stuff from the local dump myself), Fox's page 26 is particularly
rewarding. But two examples only :- 'What can be known is ... never the independent
properties of the observed alone'. So it cannot be known that the wounded wombat
(somehow) observed is female, pregnant, and so on. Such astonishing epistemological
results are not delivered by the Copenhagen interpretation, which only tells us that
knowledge as to quantum happenings is limited by exclusion principles. Similarly for 'the
known universe is inextricably linked with consciousness rather than being separable into
consciousness and objects of consciousness'. The standard formalism of quantum theory
discloses nothing about observers; and while observers do feature in the Copenhagen
interpretation these can be simply more measuring or witnessing devices: consciousness
does not figure. Even if it did, that would only apply to quantum objects, and would
scarcely warrant the grand extrapolations Fox and Walsh wish to make. Furthermore, the
Copenhagen interpretation as elaborated is obliged to set quantum domains within wider
classical settings always (by contrast with multiple-world interpretations there is no wave
function for the universe, etc.); so in the larger setting classical assumptions concerning
independence, separability, and so on, are not overthrown, but confirmed.
�89
In fact my passing reference to rubbish in Fox's presentations was directed not at
Walsh, who was not pretending to tell us what deep ecology is about, but at Fox's
reproduction of this material 'in advancing the "unity of process" metaphysics of deep
ecology' (p.19). Fox's presentation of the issues (in section 4), with himself as some sort
of interested third party in a dispute between Sylvan and Walsh, is substantially misleading;
I was not attempting (what is overdue) a critique of transpersonal psychology.
What is taken to be known, furthermore, affords little comfort or support for the list
of 'ontological implications' that Fox and Walsh wish to draw from the "new physics".
Consider some representative exhibits, mostly compressed one-worders, from 'the
fundamental ontology now being revealed', with which Fox tells us deep ecology is not
merely 'in accord with' but 'throws its full weight behind' (see p.18):- Impermanen t?
Some of the newly discovered sub-atomic objects are extraordinarily durable and have
experimentally assessed lifetimes of millions of years. Fluid? This attribute of macrosystems does not extend significantly even down to the molecular level; it makes no sense to
say that wavicles (or even atoms) flow, they are the wrong sorts of things. Whereas the
attribution of impermanence makes straightforward sense (but is substantially false), that of
fluidity does not. Empty? Some of the newly located astrophysical objects are
extraordinarily dense, packed with matter. Infinitely over-determined? How does this sit
with quantum indeterminacy and under-determination? Or with another speculative exhibit
from the list: Self-consistent? At least questions of the consistency of the "new physics"
and its parts are proper and reasonable. But we are far from being in a position to assert
that the theory is consistent. On the contrary, inconsistencies keep emerging in the
developing theory, to which often ad hoc repairs are proposed (e.g. with the Dirac o
function, renormalization etc.; cf OP). Given the inadequate ramshackle character of the
present quantum theory, it is a fair bet that it remains inconsistent. It is a widespread
opinion among researchers that the present theory is something of a mess and in much need
of improvement. Even so practicing scientists are not hoping for foundations, which tend
to be frowned upon these days. However, foundations, such as an extension of von
Neumann's axiomatisatio n of part of quantum theory, would help in effecting
improvements, and something of the sort is a prerequisite for establishing consistency, if it
can be done. Foundationless? What is meant is, apparently, not foundations for the theory,
such as axiomatic foundations, nor really basic (atomic) components for what the theory is
about. In this sense, Newtonian physics had as foundational elements corpuscles, or
particles of certain sorts. It is sometimes said that quantum physics afford no such ultimate
building blocks, each apparent stopping point fragmenting into new substructures, most
recently quarks. But this idea, which so far appears to lack a satisfactory physical
modelling, diverges from the still entrenched paradigm of particle physics which, for all the
talk about "new paradigms" in physics, still consists in analytical reduction to ultimates.
�90
Such objectual foundations leave open, of course, the question as to whether, and to what
extent, new phenomena may emerge, at "higher levels", as the building blocks are variously
put together and structured. As with elements, so with microphysical particles, while the
zoo of known items has expanded apace, the hope remains that there is a simple underlying
explanation in terms of very small ultimates, such as contemporary quarks. Those who
looked forward to a quite new outlook emerging from particle physics are bound - if they
look at what really goes on nowadays (esp. all the hightech dominant social paradigm
aspects) as distinct from what some popular science entrepreneurs say - to be very
disappointed.
Walsh's "explanation" of what 'foundationle ss' means is something else: 'the
universe appears to be ... foundationless and self-consistent in that, since all components
and mechanisms are interconnected and interdependent, none are ultimately more
fundamental than any other- hence the universe is inexplicable in terms of a limited number
of fundamental mechanisms' (p.23, quoting Walsh p.180). This is Fox's example of how
'Walsh provides clear and intelligible meanings to each and every one of the items on the
list'! The truth is that Walsh offers nothing of substance on some terms in his list (e.g.
'self-consistent'), and much of what he does offer is like that quoted, garbage. Granted we
can make something of some of it, something extravagantly false. Even on Newtonian
physics everything is connected, through forces such as gravitation 58 , but some objects are
fundamental building blocks. So it is too on the 'new physics', protons for instance are
more fundamental than molecules, quarks (if recent theory succeeds and proves consistent)
than protons. Some objects are certainly more fundamental than others. And in the "new
physics" it is widely assumed that the universe is explicable in terms of a very few
principles of mechanist character (e.g. the rashly promised single equation T-shirt). But
Walsh's hence clause would not follow, as simple models indicate, even if his premiss had
requisite physical cogency.
It does deep ecology no credit to include conspicuous rubbish. Nor is there any good
reason why it should; the rubbish is not essential to deep ecology. It is not part of the
platform for instance, and it is relatively easily removed from (authentic) deep ecology. So
much should be evident from my original Critique (as published), and the accompanying
58
Such forces as gravitation offer, of course, nonlocal connections, and delineate fields what are said to be at 'the nub of what these emerging ideas ... of cross-disciplinary
parallels ... have in common' (p.23, insert from p.23 and p.21). This confirms the
impression that Fox lacks a solid grasp on what is new in the "new physics" and other
"new sciences" such as they are, and thereby contributes towards answers to further of
Fox's questions (p.23), by undermining their presuppositions.
�I
91
sketch of deep green theory, intended to function as a relatively rubbish-free relative of deep
ecology. It is some measure of the intellectual sloppiness of some of these engaged in
presenting and promoting deep ecology that in a recent major text from Naess (Naess 89),
the editor and translator, Rothenberg, asserts that my 'critique of deep ecological
philosophy ... labels all of deep ecology literature "inconsistent rubbish"' (p.19), somehow
achieving a fallacious transition from some to all. But apparently Rothenberg's
acquaintance with my Critique was extraordinarily casual, since I didn't use the label
'inconsistent rubbish' (and wouldn't as anyone who had read much of my work, esp. OP,
would realise), and since I certainly did not make a universal claim (and wouldn't for
reasons already given, which should have been evident). 'The interpretation of the whole
thing as rubbish', Rothenberg continues (p.19), 'comes only if you concentrate too much
on rereading some of the sketchy formulations of deep ecology philosophies ... '. While
endorsing the point about sketchy formulations, no rereading of many deep ecological
productions is required to produce rubbish, no projection; several offerings - such as items
lifted from trans personal psychology, idealist physics and other esoteric deep ecological
sources, and such as Fox's 'sketch map of deep ecological territory' (p.89) - contain
notable rubbish of themselves.
Unfortunately Rothenberg proceeds, without even a pause, to repeat Fox's regressive
conclusion, which would return deep ecology to human psychology, the very fate of earlier
establishment-cha llenging ethics, such as (group) egoism and utilitarianism. 'One should
steer clear of "environmental axiology" - that is, looking for values in nature', indeed one
almost feels, from looking directly at nature at all.
Instead, one should seek to change one's whole way of sensing oneself
and the world in the direction of identification and Self-realisation ....
Fox summarises [this debacle]: The appropriate framework of discourse
for describing and presenting deep ecology is not one that is
fundamentally to do with the value of the non-human world, but rather
one that is fundamentally to do with the nature and possibilities of the
Self, or, we might say, the question of who we are, can become, and
should become in the larger scheme of things (Rothenberg p.19,
quoting Fox p.85).
It is a sad fate for a promising philosophy of nature; degeneration into human psychology.
While that can no doubt be edifying enough, in the style of uplifting anthropocentric
religions, it is hardly the sought new ecological paradigm (p. 71) and only a warped
fragment of the sort of philosophy the whole Earth needs.
REFERENCES
Bennett, D and Sylvan, R., Damn Greenies: Australian perspectives on environmental
ethics, a UNESCO project, typescript, Canberra 1989; revised text 1990.
�f
I
92
Bouwsma, O.K., 'Philosophical essays', University Nebraska, Lincoln, 1965, 24-25.
Bradford, G. 1987 'How deep is deep ecology?', Fifth Estate 22(3)(1987) 3-30.
Broad, C.D., Five Types of Ethical Theory, Kegan Paul & Others, London, 1944.
Devall, B. and Sessions G, Deep Ecology, Peregrine Smith Books, Salt Lake City, 1985.
Devall, B., Simple in Means, Rich in Ends. Practicing Deep Ecology, Peregrine Smith
Books, Salt Lake City, 1988.
Drengson, A. "Review of Devall and Sessions, Deep Ecology", Environmental Ethics vol
10, nl, 1988.
Edwards, J.C., Ethics without Philosophy, University Presses of Florida, Tampa, 1982.
Fox, W., Approaching Deep Ecology: A Response to Richard Sylvan's Critique of Deep
Ecology, Environmental Studies Occasional Paper 20, University of Tasmania, 1986:
unless otherwise indicated all references to Fox are to this study.
Fox, W., 'The meanings of "deep ecology"', Island Magazine 32(1989) 32-5; reprinted in
The Trumpeter 7(1990) 48-50.
Hinckfuss, I., The Moral Society: its structure and effects, Discussion Papers in
Environmental Philosophy #16, RSSS, Australian National University, 1987.
Johnson,L.E., A Morally Deep World, Discussion Papers in Environmental Philosophy
#17, RSSS, Australian National University, 1987.
Mannison, D. and others (eds.), Environmental Philosophy, RSSS Australian National
University, 1979; referred to as EP.
Naess, A., 'The shallow and the deep, long-range ecology movement. A summary',
Inquiry, 16(1973) 95-100.
Naess, A., 'Deep ecology disentangled?', typescript, Canberra, 1984.
Naess, A., 'Notes on Professor's Sylvan's Critique of the Deep Ecology Movement',
typescript, Canberra, 1985.
Naess, A. and Rothenberg, D., Ecology, community and lifestyle, Cambridge University
Press, 1989.
Nettleship, R.L. (ed.) Work of Thomas Hill Green, three volumes, Longman, Green & Co,
London, 1889.
Oxford English Dictionary, Oxford University Press, 1971; referred to as OED.
Perrett, R.W., 'Egoism, altruism and intentionalism in Buddhist Ethics', Journal of Indian
Philosophy 15(1987) 71-85.
Priest, G. and Routley, R., On Paraconsistency, Research Series in logic and Metaphysics
#1, RSSS, Australian National University, 1984; referred to as OP.
Rolston, H. R. IV, Philosophy Gone Wild: Essays in Environmental Ethics, Prometheus
Books, Buffalo, 1986.
�93
Routley, R., 'The semantical metamorphosis of metaphysics', Australasian Journal of
Philosophy, 1974.
Routley, Rand V., The Fight for the Forests, Third edition, RSSS, Australian National
University, 1975.
Routley, R. and V., 'Against the inevitability of human chauvinism', Ethics and Problems
of the 21 st Century , (ed. K.E. Goodpaster and K.M. Sayre), University of Notre
Dame Press, 1979, 36-59.
Routley, Rand V., 'Human chauvinism and environmental ethics' in EP; referred to EE.
Routley, R., 'Ultralogic as universal?', represented in JB; referred to as uu.
Routley, R, Exploring Meinong's Jungle and Beyond, RSSS, Australian National
University, 1980; referred to as JB.
Routley, R. and Others, Relevant Logics and Their Rivals, Ridgeview, California, 1982.
Session, G., 'Ecocentrism, wilderness, and global ecosystem protection', in The
Wilderness Condition (ed. M. Oelschlaeger), 1989; to appear.
Shepard, P., 'Introduction - ecology and man - a viewpoint' in The Subversive Science
(ed. P. Shepard & D McKinley), Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1969, 1-10.
Smith, H., The Religions of Man, Harper, New York, 1958.
Smith, J.W., Reductionism and Cultural Being, Nijhoff, The Hague, 1984.
Stone, C.D., Should Trees Have Standing? - Towards Legal Rights for Natural Objects,
revised edition, Avon Books, New York, 1975.
Sylvan, R., 'Windows on Science III, Towards a cosmo-logical synthesis', Research
Series in Unfashionable Philosophy, #2, RSSS Australian National University, 1985.
Sylvan, R., A Critique of Deep Ecology, Discussion Papers in Environmental Philosophy
#12, RSSS 1985; referred to as c.
Sylvan, R., 'Mind and its misplacement in nature', typescript, Canberra, 1988; referred to
asMX.
Sylvan, R., Deep Plurallism, completed typescript 1990.
Walsh, R.N., 'Emerging cross-disciplinary parallels: suggestions from the neurosciences',
Journal of Transpersonal Psychology, 11(1979) 175-184.
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1988.
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City N.Y., 1983.
�ECOLOGICAL ETHICS and ECOLOGICAL POLITICS:
turning John MCCioskey's challenge
This essay comes first because it offers an advanced introduction to parts of
environmental ethics, and to certain significant issues in environmental politics. It is
hung, not altogether incidentally, on MCCloskey's little text on the topics, because that is
a convenient vehicle for organising the material (it is also a text, written in haste, that
deserves more criticism than it has received). Fortunately no one need attempt the
onerous business of reading MCCioskey in order to follow the essay, should it succeed.
Rather, for the purposes of this essay, MCCioskey and likewise his little work can both
be regarded as characters in this piece of intellectual fiction; neither need ever have
existed.
1. Conservative, reformative, and radical responses to the impacts of
ecology on ethics.
There are three broad kinds of responses to the impact of ecology on ethics
according to MCCloskey's account, which adapts a standard political classification:
radical or revolutionary, reformist, and conservative. Of course there are responses
which lie outside this classification, not by disputing the impacts of escalating
environmental problems (or the new awareness of nature and its fragility), but by
questioning the relevance of the other end of the relation: ethics. Those responses target
ethics, its role in evaluating and regulating conduct, or differently, its place in
environmental philosophy (see other essays herein). As we too aspire to MCCloskey's
elevated view of the importance, potential power, and effective ineliminability of ethics
in rational evaluation and conduct, we set aside these gutter responses (which we have
argued against elsewhere). Otherwise, the responses are these:
Radical. A fundamentally new ethic is required, a non-human-centred nature-centred
(or nonanthropocentric ecocentric) ethic and morality, a deeper environmental ethic, what
MCCioskey and others call an ecological ethic. According to MCCioskey - who adopts
the usual double standard, requiring conspicuously higher standards for new challenging
theories than entrenched ones - no one 'has yet succeeded in stating or defending [an
ecological ethic] in a systematic way' (p.29). Nonetheless it will turn out, quite
remarkably, that MCCioskey himself, if he is at all successful, does, given but a small
twist to what he does.
�2
There are two standard components to any such ethic: meta-ethical and normative.
According to Mccloskey, both components are 'more commonly alluded to than set out
and defended in a developed, worked-out form' (p.29). There are, accordingly, two
broad problems for an ecological ethics: devising a new meta-ethic, and furnishing a new
normative ethic (p.30). Meta-ethics, as well as comprising the study of ethics or ethical
systems, includes the logic and analysis of key ethical terms. For the new ethics a
critical meta-ethical task is to 'explain valuation, and hence values, without reference to
human beings, their preferences, pro-attitudes, and the like' (p.30). Normative ethics
involves the organisation, design and structure of systems themselves, their values,
principles, constraints and the like. For the new ethics critical normative tasks include
explaining and justifying the assignments of value made, especially to natural items
independently of species Homo sapiens, and the principles adopted, especially
concerning treatment of more natural environments, wilderness, and endangered species
of plants and animals.
Since all these requirements have been met, to some considerable extent (e.g. in
works such as EE), the issue becomes one of adequacy. How adequately have these
things been done, in particular in what is now called deep-green theory, and what of
significance has been left undone? These are central questions in the on-going dialogue
with MCCioskey; they will direct the questions discussed when shortly we get down to
the real business of MCCloskey's more substantive objections.
Reformist. Instead of a "new" ethic, standard ethical theories are reformed, modifying
them or adjusting them at the periphery, 'so as to acknowledge new, specifically
ecological values and duties' (p.30). Characteristically the adjustment is to the margins
of normative theory, with standard meta-ethics left substantially intact. Animal rights
theories which simply adjust utilitarianism to take account of the suffering of other
sentient creatures than humanoids, afford a stock example of significant reformism. By
contrast, differently designed and defended theories of animal rights may be radical in
character.
The classification is thus pretty rough and ready; given the comparative vagueness
of "newness" and "standardness" as regards ethical theories, the divisions between
responses is likewise blunt. Evidently too, the classification only overlaps other
classifications of ethics with some vogue, for instance that into shallow, intermediate,
and deep (used elsewhere e.g. TE). Thus while reformist utilitarianisms are typically
intermediate, a reformist ethic (or even a revolutionary one, such as Nietzsche's has been
taken to be) may be substantially shallow. The converse linkages are tighter: only an
ethic which merely purports to be conservative can really be intermediate, as
MCCloskey's intuitionism is, or deep, as "supplementation" of such intuitionism could
�3
be.
Conservative. No input from ecology warrants even so much as reform, let alone
revolution, in standard ethical theory; all that is required is 'a more informed, more
accurate thinking out of our moral obligations and moral rights' (p.29). MCCioskey
claims to defend the stock conservative view that ecological considerations and 'findings
... do not necessitate a basic revolution in ethics but supply a more informed, more
accurate thinking out, of our moral obligations and moral rights' (p.29, similarly p.31).
Rather than looking hard at the conspicuous difficulties and inadequacies of
prevailing ethics, unresolved after thousands of years of investigation, MCCioskey
proceeds immediately to try to shift the onus of proof: ' ... no moral philosopher has yet
succeeded in either stating or defending it ... a new ecological ethic ... in a systemic
way' (p.29, insertion from same page). He alleges, to elaborate on a previous charge,
that 'the problem of [a radical] ecological ethics is that of devising
a a new meta-ethics, one that explains valuation, and hence values, without
reference to human beings, their preferences, pro-attitudes, and the like, and
a a new normative ethics that explains both
• the value of natural phenomena prior to man's existence and after the
extinction of the species Homo sapiens and
• why it is morally wrong for man to damage wilderness and endanger or
render extinct natural species of plants and animals' (p.30, display inserted).
As it happens, all these things have been attempted, as was said and as will become
evident - though perhaps in too sketchy and too technical a way so far (it is still early
days). For example, why it is wrong to damage pristine wilderness is, at bottom,
because such wilderness possesses high intrinsic value - something MCCioskey does not
really dispute. How then does he sustain his allegations? For the most part, despite the
repeated rhetoric about "arguing" this and that, he doesn't. He simply assumes that
'concern for human well-being' must dominate, that it always has, well almost always
has, priority (e.g. p.52).
2. A confused and confusing response: supplemented intuitionism.
Furthermore, MCCioskey, although he claims to be defending this conservative
'third view', does not state matters as clearly as he should: he only rules out the 'need for
a specifically ecological ethic', not reformism. This constitutes one part of what amounts
�4
to substantial cheating in MCCloskey's "conservatism" . 1 A further part consists in
adopting an extremely unfashionable ethical theory, an intuitionism supplementing a now
little known theory of the kind developed by Ross, as his "standard" ethical theory. Like
the rare "ideal utilitarianism", such intuitionism can be much closer to proposed new
ecological ethics, given appropriate ideals and intuitions, than standard "standard" ethics
(indeed, given a deep tum, they can be tantamount to ecological ethics). But the most
important dodge is incorporated in the "supplementation" MCCioskey makes of his
"standard" ethic, which far exceeds what it is said to be: Ross 'supplemented by an
account of the moral rights of persons' (p.31). For he also concedes himself such
objectives as an open-ended 'promotion of good' and coupled 'prima facie obligations to
... promote good' (p.33 and p.31). Moreover, such promotion of good elsewhere
expands to a promotion of good, beauty and knowledge (p.36), and to include
promotion and preservation of what is intrinsically valuable (p.36); among 'recognised
ethical values' is 'the securing of the intrinsically valuable' (p.8). Moreover, among
what is intrinsically valuable are some (but not all) natural species, some wilderness
(p.36), and other valuable natural items such as 'forests, lakes, rivers, seas' (p.31).
Such critical "supplementations" mean that MCCioskey can proceed to argue for the
preservation of wilderness or natural species in just the ways that most deep
environmentalists do; for example, along the lines that an area of wilderness has not
merely instrumental value, but evident intrinsic value, which can be felt or intuited (e.g.
p.61 bottom). Such supplementations thus lift MCCioskey right out of the normal
conservative camp in which he has misleadingly located himself: for that shallow camp
does not recognise irreducible values in nature. What he is covertly assuming, in his
considerable supplementation of an unusual noncognitive ethic, is at least a significant
reform of standard ethics. MCCloskey's ethic is not 'perfectly familiar' historically;
more, his insistence (ascribable not to modesty but to political purposes) that it is not
1
There is analogous, if less outrageous, covert cheating in another leading Australian
conservative, with whom McCloskey aligns himself: Passmore. For example,
Passmore helps himself to a notion of vandalism (deep vandalism involving
depreciation or destruction of what has intrinsic value) to which his theory does not
entitle him. It has not been much appreciated that Passmore, too, for all his
apparently tough conservatism (early on) on ethics, also (characteristically) hedges his
claims. A much-quoted passage, endorsed by McCloskey (p.37 italics added), begins:
'what it [the West] needs,for the most part, is not so much a "new ethic" as a more
general adherence to a perfectly familiar ethic'. What that familiar ethic is, and how it
is to be reformed, Passmore never really tells us. In any case the main conservative
theme looks less and less plausible. It is increasingly dubious that better adherence to
established ethical and political forms will prove adequate, especially to environmental
problems unforeseen by these chauvinistic theories.
�5
new is nowhere demonstrated, simply asserted. (In fact the claim is somewhat empty in
the absence of sharpened criteria for newness.)
How far removed MCCloskey's supplemented intuitionism is from its 'perfectly
familiar' source is readily shown by a comparison of MCCioskey with Ross on intrinsic
goodness. Ross contends (on the basis of reflection and using an interesting little
argument from a then 'widely accepted classification of elements in the life of the soul')
that four things, and basically only four things, 'seem to be intrinsically good', all of
which are 'ideal states of the mind' (p.140). How far things ethical have moved since
the nineteen thirties is also shown by the little argument Ross runs out, as if it was quite
decisive, to refute people like MCCioskey who imagine they find intrinsic value beyond
states of mind - in wilderness, forests and other material items. 'It might of course be
objected that there are or may be intrinsic goods that are not states of mind or relations
between states of mind at all, but in this suggestion I find no plausibility. Contemplate
any imaginary universe from which you suppose mind entirely absent, and you will fail
to find anything in it that you can call good in itself' (p.140). Ross no doubt reflects the
conventional ethical wisdom, a narrow wisdom, of his time and place (essentially British
ethics of the first half of the twentieth century). But many before Ross, and many more
since, have not so failed in finding items of intrinsic worth in the absence of states of
mind, in the Earth itself and its natural features for example. Such comparatively
successful arguments as those concerning the Last Sentient (in EE), and the world before
the rise of mental life, were designed to expose and reinforce such common findings.
So much Mccloskey is sufficiently clear about (thereby shortening subsequent
argument for a new ethics): 'The negative part of the Routley's argument, that traditional
[Western] ethics and contemporary morality are human-centered, is substantially well
based. The ecological moral intuitions they seek to explain and justify find no
justification in terms of such ethics' (p.58). But in MCCloskey's ethics they do find
some confirmation, or rather conformation, in the intrinsic ecological values discerned.
Moreover, with but a turn in the intuitions admitted that intuitionistic ethics itself
becomes properly deep - just allow the (over-malleable) intuitions to coincide with those
of deep ecological consciousness: then deepened MCCioskey is deep ecology.
MCCioskey even puts effort into explaining how conventional theories are 'heavily
human centered', without appreciating how far it removes him from the 'perfectly
familiar' ethic of Ross, and from his own professed conservatism.
As a result too, those making too superficial a survey of MCCloskey's complex
ethical position, especially if they came at it with preconceptions of what it amounted to,
have been seriously misled. Goodin is one reviewer who is undone. By quoting
MCCloskey's effort on conventional ethics right out of context, Goodin manages to
�6
attribute to Mccloskey the very negation of what he advances, namely 'that all talk of
intrinsic value must nevertheless be human-centered' (Goodin p.345). The same applies
to what Goodin takes to be 'the punchline' of MCCloskey's position, 'that the
environment per se has no independent moral claims upon it. All our duties to protect it
must be derived from human-centered concerns' (p.344). Nor does such a punch line
emerge from the admittedly convoluted passage quoted in support; for the passage makes
the promotion of goodness, which includes promotion of intrinsic value independent of
humans, a prima f acie obligation.
But Goodin does have excuses. For not merely is MCCloskey's position hard to
fathom, but it exhibits confusion and is internally inconsistent. For example, Mccloskey
typically presents himself as having, and frequently operates as if he had, an entirely
conservative position, when his position is in important respects at least reformist,
making allowance for intrinsic values of natural items including wilderness, plants and
animals (pp. 52-3); his position is both different, with new elements, and not different,
with no new elements. Part of the problem can be traced back to a confusion about
intrinsic value (likewise intrinsic goodness), which is both intrinsic, valuable in itself,
and not intrinsic, because valuable for something else, typically beauty or human
knowledge in the case of natural items. The confusion is manifest in the many intuitive
judgements of intrinsic value of natural items advanced simply on the strength of
judgements of beauty or ugliness, and appears in such themes as that 'a moral duty to
preserve species and wilderness ... is ... based on ... the securing of the intrinsically
valuable objects of knowledge and the beautiful' (p.110). It is no longer just 'the
securing of the intrinsically valuable' as is earlier said (e.g. p.8); those "intrinsic values"
somehow now reduce or answer instrumentally to supposedly human evaluations, i.e.
are not "intrinsic" after all, whereupon MCCloskey's seriously damaged position reverts
to the shallow conservative position it is often been taken to be.
The main features brought out make MCCloskey's ethic, confusions apart, at least a
reformist one, not a conservative one. Briefly, MCCloskey's "supplementation " of
Ross's theory is so great as to make for a difference of kind. The features also render it
what is called an intermediate position. For it admits values in nature, it assigns intrinsic
value to some natural objects, while not however allowing values of natural things to
sometimes override those of humans. The point is fundamental. 'However, as the
theory developed here implies, ultimately, when there is a clear clash between human
welfare and human rights on the one hand and the preservation of wilderness and of
plant and animal species on the other, human welfare and respect for human rights must
prevail ... ' (p.36). Why so? Why preserve this ancient ethical prejudice? Despite the
assertion the theory sketched out, the supplemented Ross ethic, does not imply human
�7
ethical supremacy. But even if the theory did imply this greater value assumption, the
appeal to it in defence of the assumption would be indecently circular. It is no proper
defence of proposition p that Shifty's theory implies p, unless Shifty's theory is shown
to have independent merit, such as correctness, robustness (i.e. continuing to yield p
under reasonable variations), etc. None of the requisite demonstration is attempted. The
radically reformed Ross ethic is just assumed.
In fact MCCioskey has adduced no decent case for this crucial assumption, which
colours much of his text. For it is his repeated insistence on the supreme importance of
things human, of Man over the rest of nature, that gives his work its undoubted antienvironmental appearance, which is obnoxiously exhibited at many places in the text.
One revolting example concerns venomous snakes: 'today they are a nuisance and a
danger to human life and health, concern for which dictates that individuals be accorded
the freedom to kill such snakes, to rid their properties of these pests even at the risk of
rendering them endangered species. (Sufficient specimens could be retained in zoos
throughout the world, where they survive well ... )', perhaps along with dangerous
subspecies of humans (p.116). MCCioskey is particularly concerned to put down
arguments 'for the preservation of species and wilderness at the cost of human interests,
human concerns .. ', even though these arguments 'appear to be correct about the
intuitive insights of those who live in different countries in affluence. 2 Nonetheless it
will be my concern in this work to reject this approach and the moral intuitions on which
it rests' (p.36, italics added). Unfortunately the strongly proclaimed rejection is not
backed up with requisite argument. MCCioskey, in a familiar intuitionistic predicament,
is stranded without argument. Nor, in this case, could the rejection be so easily
supported. For one thing MCCioskey feels obliged, almost immediately, to qualify his
human supremacy claim: human interest 'must prevail, unless what it is proposed to
preserve has great intrinsic value' (p.36 italics added). For another reason, the human
interests involved often cannot justify preeminence; they are too often trivial, or
unworthy, or just plain ordinary. So the ancient (unethical) prejudice in favour of
humans can, and should be relinquished (as argued in much more detail in other places,
e.g. EE).
But then there is nothing to stop MCCloskey's intuitionism sliding to real depth, the
ethic moving from reformist to radical. Call the resulting theory, MCCloskey's stripped
2
But the impression of McCloskey as a fighter for the under-privileged among humans,
one who of course along with developers and colonizers makes human interests
paramount, is deceptive.
�8
of anthropic prejudice so to say, deepened intuitionism, intuitionism informed, again if
you like, by deep ecological consciousness. The beauty of deepened intuitionism is that
it answers, in MCCloskey's own terms, MCCloskey's challenge to radically new
ecological ethics. A now evident "adjustment" to MCCloskey's own theory will serve.
The trouble, of course, with this answer is the trouble with intuitionism in ethics
generally; that, for instance, it is built on the shifting sands of intuition. That is why a
direct response to Mccloskey will be offered, in terms of deep-green theory.
3. On the supposedly dim prospects for new environmental ethics, esp.
that deep-green upstart.
Part of MCCloskey's complaint is that the new environmental ethics demanded back
in the early seventies, have not been presented sufficiently 'clearly and fully' as to admit
proper examination and assessment (p.60). It is easy to level such charges at new
proposals; and such charges did carry some force, and still do, though less as the new
theories develop, among other things, to meet criticism. But MCCioskey would like to
make a much grander charge, the sort of charge (discussed below) that Thompson
recently did level: that such 'a new ethic ... is logically impossible to set out' (p.59
reordered). But Mccloskey, by contrast with Thompson who can slip into still
fashionable noncognitivism, is poorly placed to press such a charge. For he considers
that noncognitivism, which would logically tie all valuation to aspects of human (or
creature) cognition and so would be bad news for deep environmentalism, is bound to
fail. MCCioskey tries instead to push through an eliminative argument, relying upon the
limited range of cognitivist (meta-)ethics 'developed to date'. He claims to eliminate all
but intuitionism: 'Of the known, plausible, meta-ethical theories, the only one available
to such ecologist ethicists is the ethical realism of intuitionism' (p.59), which regrettably
they decline. But the elimination argument is radically defective, as MCCioskey is very
far from exhausting the initially plausible options open to environmentalism. In addition,
more satisfactory options will aim to discard not merely intuitionism but also both the
ethical realism and objectivism that regularly (and to its intellectual cost) accompany it,
but need not.
While it would hardly be surprising should the quite limited range of ethical
theories that have achieved much development to date prove inadequate to new
environmental objectives, the situation is by no means as desperate as MCCioskey
implies. Firstly, the options MCCioskey does offer, deviously pruned down (not 'ideal
observer ethic' but 'Humean ideal observer ethic', not 'natural law ethic' but 'Thomistic
natural law ethic'), are not all restricted in the way portrayed: 'All make human nature or
personhood or features thereof basic to ethics' (p.59). Not so; the contention certainly
does not hold for all the types of theory listed, e.g. naturalism or relativism, and insofar
�9
as it does, it is sometimes easily avoided, as with natural law (e.g. set within pantheism).
Secondly, there is a range of recognised ethical types, such as those distinguished by
Broad, which affords scope for the elaboration of ecological ethics. Obvious candidates
within naturalism include biological and evolutionary naturalism - typical examples of
which 'are the following: "To be virtuous means to perform the specific activities of the
species to which you belong efficiently" (Spinoza). "Better conduct means conduct that
comes later in the course of evolution and is more complex than earlier conduct of the
same kind" (Herbert Spencer)' (Broad p.259). No doubt such proposals exhibit
deficiencies, but not per se of a human chauvinistic sort; and they admit of improvement,
which they are beginning to obtain within the tradition of American naturalism (thus e.g.
Rolston's work).
More promising, however, are "non-naturalistic" theories, of which objectivistic
realistic intuitionism such as Mccloskey is keen to offer and promote is but one kind.
For there are other less demanding types of intuitionism (see, e.g. Broad p.270),
including various "deep intuitionisms", which may be neither objectivistic nor realistic
(in the sense of labouring under heavy ontological commitments). In particular, as Elliot
explains (p.502), what entirely escapes MCCloskey is the feasibility of a meta-ethic
which is nonjective, that is, not objective, like transcendental intuitionism, but not
implausibly subjective either. Then there are moral sense theories and their more
plausible variations including mixtures with rationalism. Further, there are analogous
mixtures coherently building upon emotional presentation. Such a rational reconstuction,
varying the Austrian theory of values as elaborated empirically and logically by Meinong,
is in fact the ethical way taken by deep-green theory (for detail see TE and DG). And so
on. There is logical scope, then, for quite a variety of ecological meta-ethics, and
definitely scope for significant improvements upon those 'developed to date'.
As much to the point, there have already been significant developments of some
forms of ecological meta-ethics, notably of that theory in effect under criticism, deepgreen theory, which is already better articulated than most conventional ethics. There are
several connected parts to this elaboration because it brings into meta-ethics new logical
technology, especially world-semantics. The parts, furthermore, have not been duly
separated because of a pervasive verificationism living on in Anglo-American ethical
theory, which proceeds to equate semantic with epistemic, meaning with method of
coming to know, and the like. A first step then in meta-ethical analysis is some proper
separation of the parts, such as meaning, epistemic confirmation, and rational
justification. Naturally the parts fit together into a larger whole, into the meta-ethical
edifice, but simplistic positivistic equations do not satisfactorily explain the integration.
�10
As to meaning, deep-green theory can already stand on its record of proferred
semantical analyses. 3 Semantics both for axiological terms such as value and bettemess
and for deontic terms such as obligation and wrongness have been provided through
world semantics (see sv, MD). The deontic theory developed in the process (in MD)
offers a considerable improvement over Ross's theory (which supplies no semantics),
because it enables the theory-saving artifice of prima facie obligations to be removed and
natural language discourse concerning obligations to be recovered. While such
semantical advances do not pretend to offer a full account of meaning, as much more
remains to be done within pragmatics, they do offer straightforward resolutions both of
long-standing ethical puzzles and paradoxes and of several complaints about
environmentally deep ethics. A major early problem for a genuinely nonchauvinistic
ethics was to give a satisfactory account of ethical terms without reference to favoured
biological species, above all to humans. On deep-green theory this was accomplished
by a combination of an "annular theory", offering an ethically relevant typology of doers
and receivers, with the semantical analyses (see EE and AP for details). By these means,
deep-green theory proceeded to remove humans from an essential role in ethics.
Humans enter importantly, of course, but only contingently, as certain sorts of valuers
and agents, which sorts depending upon their relevant capacities. For example, humans
do not inevitably enter, as too many had previously supposed, into every ethical picture,
because there were no value judgements without valuers, and all valuers were humans.
Both parts of this linkage fail. Most important, values are not tied to valuers or actual
valuing. But possible valuers and therewith their valuing can always be dummied in
logically. The reason is at bottom that any coherent distribution of values can be
regarded as the values of certain possible valuers. Furthermore, contrary to
MCCloskey's unsupported charge against such semantical analyses, this does not expose
the theory 'to difficulties parallel to those encountered by phenomenalism ... ' (p.60).
For phenomenalism attempts a reduction; the semantical theory makes no such attempt.
The meta-ethic is non-reductionist; nor is it obliged to rely upon tricks like
supervenience.
Deep-green theory already had more up on the meta-ethical scoreboard in the early
eighties than Ross's theory upon which MCCioskey purportedly proposed to reply.
MCCloskey's criticism of ecological ethics as meta-ethically inadequate lapses. As to
normative theory, the other prong of his attack, his demands are excessive. Few ethical
theories have been stated 'fully and clearly' and 'developed in a systematic, detailed
3
Standing on records is hardly a practice I embrace with much enthusiasm, but
sometimes it is inevitable if excess repetition is to be avoided.
�11
form' such as Mccloskey appears to expect (e.g. p.60). To take some grand
comparisons: Those that are detailed such as Confusianism are not particular systematic,
those that are detailed and systematic such as Spinoza's ethic are hardly clear and are
likely inconsistent, those that are fairly full and moderately clear such as Sidgwick's
utilitarianism are also rather clearly defective; and in the twentieth century, nothing much,
ecological or not, matches these grand examples. But to indicate a few details of what is
accomplished normatively in deep-green theory:- Non-interference and like principles are
defended (cf EE p.174); these afford a basis for integrating standard social justice
principles (including obligations to the future), duly amended, with environmental
principles. In this way, making use of the annular theory, much of prevailing social
ethics, of a radical kind, can be subsumed.
In an attempt to be helpful, Mccloskey quite erroneously suggests that 'the
normative ethic appears to be base[d] on ... intuitive insights into what is intrinsically
valuable and what is intrinsically obligatory, where what is intrinsically obligatory need
not be tied to intrinsic value' (p.60, rearranged). What is obligatory, like what is right,
does answer back to what is intrinsically valuable, though in more complex fashion than
elementary ethical courses care to contemplate (see TE and MD). But what is intrinsically
valuable is often not discerned through intuitive insights. The idea that is is part of what
lies at the back of the expectation that instant answers can and should be given to any
question as to what is intrinsically valuable or the like. Rather what is intrinsically
valuable is arrived at through a process of reasoning and coherence-assessment, based at
bottom on emotional presentation (for more detail see TE). We offered, furthermore,
many examples of items - not only individuals, but species, such as the blue whale,
complexes, and ecosystems - that are intrinsically valuable, valuable in and for
themselves and not on other counts (such as some of MCCloskey's "intrinsic values"
which vanish into economic or aesthetic values). Accordingly, the charge (p.60), 'Nor
are the relevant values or principles explained or discussed', loses its force.
As to the specific difficulties for an ecological ethic of deep-green kind that
MCCioskey alleges, many of these are only encountered upon importing assumptions that
the ethics do not include and should not supply. So it is with the assumption that an
ecological ethic should assign intrinsic value to all species, even equally to each species,
given that it does to some. MCCloskey's own intermediate ethic does not do this, why
should an ecological ethic? Some-to-all arguments do not suddenly become valid in deep
space. Deep-green theory, in particular, unlike deep ecology, makes no assumptions as
to biospecies equality; rather it requires a certain interspecies impartiality. The extent of
intrinsic value of a species is assessed in principle, through a multiple factor procedure
incorporating value-making features of the species (cf. EE p.168). Mccloskey wheels
�12
out the already exhausted examples of disease organisms and parasites, and offers his
intuition, a strong human prejudice, that 'there seems to be no intrinsic value in the
existence of such species and organisms' (p.61). No doubt such species and organisms
do not exhibit intrinsic value in the way or to the extent that conspicuous species near the
tops of food chains do. Their biological role and value is different. Their importance,
consists, in part, in control, in regulation of the character and the numbers of more
valuable species; their biological value is, to stretch a term, primarily facilitative, but
often nonetheless, under present ecological arrangements, apparently essential.
One reason why MCCioskey fails to observe how easy it is to shift the difficulties
he finds so pressing is, of course, that he is trying to make a case against deep positions.
Another reason is that he is operating with far too coarse a mesh, both ecologically and
socially. Intrinsic value does not come in big indiscriminable unsieved lumps: all species
if any, all pleasure if any, all knowledge if any. The need for discrimination becomes
evident if added to MCCloskey's list of intrinsic valuables (e.g. p.108) are such standard
goals as wealth and power (itself often linked to knowledge). Like wealth and power,
human pleasure and knowledge4, for example, are far from invariable goods. Often, like
much entrepreneurial information transmitted through expensive systems, they are trivial;
sometimes they are positively evil, as pleasure in extensive torture, or practical
knowledge of the means of excruciating torture. 5 A finer mesh is needed, and available,
a mesh that can be usefully applied in the ecological domain to remove standard
"difficulties", as it was applied by Mill, though in a failed attempt to repair utilitarianism.
4. Extending ecological ethics, inadequately, to ecological politics.
Ecological politics is a structure grafted onto ecological ethics, in much the way
that political theory more generally is supposedly built upon (or alongside) ethics.
Politics is essentially concerned with groups, societies and certain social institutions;
ethics, so it is said, with individuals. But the distinction is not quite so simple; ethics too
concerns groups and interrelations of individuals, normatively. In fact, the exact
4
For these often shoddy goals McCloskey indecently contemplates destruction of the
Rottnest quokka, a species McCloskey provocatively presents as 'useless' and 'ugly'
(p.61). Judgements of aesthetic and utility are notoriously ideological systemdependent, and here McCloskey flouts his commitment to an old, damaging, and
fortunately disappearing, ideology.
5
In any event, Western ethics and ideology much overrate knowledge and information;
largely defunct Eastern theories, such as Taoism, have a better appreciation of the
importance, and nonimportance, of different kinds of knowledge (cf. Sylvan and
Bennett on Taoism).
�13
interrelation of politics with ethics, though an issue under investigation since Aristotle
sought to settle the matter, remains unclear. Judicious borrowing from logic can help a
bit in clarification, in both the general and the ecologically restricted cases. With ethics
and politics, or ecological ethics and ecological politics (of given sorts, e.g. utilitarian,
deep-green), both considered as theories, the relation is that of extension: the latter
extends the former, in fact extends it substantially. For comparison, logical examples of
extensions are afforded by the relation of quantification logic to sentential logic, or set
theory to quantification logic, or, a little nearer the mark in terms of complexity, classical
mathematics to set theory. Ecological politics is not merely - or as regards the pure
theory at all - an application of ecological ethics. It requires a considerable amount of
further apparatus (typically primitives and defined terms in the extended theory) that does
not enter into ethics proper, such as states, leaders, corporations, unions, organisers,
and moreover (what correspond to axiomatic constraints) the manifold interconnections
of these political items.
What kind of extension politics is, or ought to be, of ethics is a more vexed
question. In particular (depending on the matching of the politics to the presumed ethics
it extends) the extension may not be conservative. For example, theoretical allowance
has to be made for the Machiavellian idea that certain political components may be
exempt from given ethical constraints, an idea that has proved unacceptable to most
philosophers from Aristotle through Mccloskey. The prevailing conservative extension
theme is forcefully presented, if in too shallow and individualistic form, by Nozick:
Moral philosophy sets the background for, and the boundaries of,
political philosophy. What persons may and may not do to one another
limits what they may do [politically] through the apparatus of a state, or
do to establish such an apparatus. The moral prohibitions it is
permissible to enforce are the source of whatever legitimacy the state's
fundamental coercive power has (Nagel p.199, endorsing Nozick).
In short, should conservative extension be abandoned, rational justification
becomes a serious, indeed insuperable, problem.
As it happens, the way in which ecological politics proceeds to extend ecological
politics (when done conservatively) is admirably illustrated by MCCloskey's practice and
development of issues. In virtually every case, the approach adopted as regards the
politics of the issue builds directly upon the results reached in the ethical investigation of
that issue.
However, in the political theory advanced, Mccloskey does not take full and
proper advantage of his supplemented ethics, but lapses back into an old-fashioned
chauvinism. (He thus resembles a logician, actual exemplars shall go unnamed, who
�14
with all the underlying logical technology available to avoid the paradoxes and anomalies
of classical set theory, lapses back into these when he makes the extension to set theory.)
Once again this abysmal outcome is primarily a result of his tenacious adherence to that
ancient greater value prejudice, which vastly overrates humans, their attitudes, freedoms
and products, and undervalues natural things, even to the extent of undercutting
previously granted intrinsic value (cf. p.111). Mccloskey proceeds to play humans off
against environments, assuming of course that humans ought to win hands-down. The
resulting theory is ecological only in addressing - in a decidedly unsympathetical way
ecologically - ecological problems. Ecologically then, the proferred ecological politics
proves exceedingly disappointing; politically, things are little better.
A political theory is bound to add to an ethical theory further organisational
structure, comprising further structural units (corporations, states, etc.), institutional
arrangements (property, markets, etc.), and so on. There are a great many, still illclassified and largely untried, types of options here: options as to what gets added, and
how it is adjoined. Among the enormous range of choice McCloskey opts, without
much argument, for unimaginative arrangements like those prevailing in the West and
North, for a statist and developmental status quo (for which he serves very much as an
apologist). He opts for what he is pleased to call 'liberal democratic states' - though the
veneer of democracy is thin (control typically being vested with a ruling minority) and
liberality is sharply hedged (true-blue liberalism conflicting with statism, in ways
thorough-going libertarianism has exposed). Practically, as we know from experience, it
is a jerry-built structure; theoretically, as is insufficiently realised, it remains a house of
cards.
The status quo choice of "liberal democracy" gets confirmed, so Mccloskey
imagines, by disposing of but two sorts of alternatives: primitivism, which he regards as
substantially self-refuting in presently highly civilized highly warlike times; and
totalitarianism, which he regards as the main and menacing alternative. It is a simplistic
scheme, leaving out significant alternatives; but such a picture is remarkably widespread,
even among academics. While, like most urbanised intellectuals, Mccloskey cannot
resist sounding off about any proposed 'return to primitivism', to 'rural communities of
the political imagination' (p.109), he does in fact confine his consideration of alternative
political arrangements to totalitarian alternatives which would sharply increase the
restrictiveness of present statist arrangements. Against totalitarian alternatives, even
present inadequate arrangements no doubt look good; but against certain other political
alternatives (e.g. decentralised organisation using advanced technology as appropriate),
these arrangements look more like a recipe for on-going ecological trouble. Such other
alternatives, Mccloskey does not really consider. He has sighted the far ecological right,
�15
ecofascism as it is sometimes dubbed, and fires almost all his guns at it. However there
is an ecological left, with a longer tradition than the right, which passes unnoticed; yet it
offers a vision of new ecological communities in which liberal principles, on the face of
it MCCloskey's main concern, are maintained or even enhanced. But, for all its
shortcomings, MCCloskey's attempt to get to grips with ecological politics deserves a
somewhat fuller discussion than indicated by Goodin's cavalier dismissal: 'The politics
discussion just amounts to a bash at the authoritarianism of some of the more rabid
ecological doomsayers, propositions which are quite sufficient reductios in and of
themselves' (p.344).
For one thing, that was how much of the field looked when MCCioskey was
helping to put ecological politics on the philosophical agenda. Ecological politics still
remained an unfashionable, and in some places dangerous, field at the time MCCioskey
was writing. Liberal philosophers with respectable academic positions in North America
tended to keep out of the field, which accordingly got left to practical environmentalists,
over-enthusiastic in their appeals to the state for tough control and regulation, and to
authoritarian academics keen to strengthen totalitarian and isolationist tendencies of
states. As MCCioskey emphasizes,
Much ecological political writing exhibits two disturbing features that
undermine its value. The one feature relates to the readiness of many
political theorists on the basis of the flimsiest evidence to waive lightly
man's claim to recognition of his human rights on the ground that the
ecological crisis is so grave and critical that only the most drastic,
desperate measures will succeed. The other feature is the very great
confidence in the capacity of states to take whatever action is necessary
to avoid the ecological crisis. In fact, the states of the world today
greatly contribute to various of the ecologically based problems that
confront mankind. They are unworthy of the great faith and trust that
many ecological reformers appear to have in them or in the state in the
abstract.(p.108).
Bravo! But rather than considering carefully dismantling states, in favour of alternative
organisational arrangements, MCCioskey leaps immediately in the opposite direction, to
the orthodox position that 'a major part of the ecological political problem is that of
ensuring that states carry out their ecological responsibilities' - whatever those may be
(states do not regard themselves as morally bound, and typically their constitutions are
incredibly weak and unspecific, and sometimes evasive on such matters). Indeed he
goes further: 'The nation-state needs to be not superseded but complimented by a world
political authority' (p .107). Again there is little argument, and no due concern that such
an Authority would be yet a further developmental agency operating with tanks and
bulldozers.
�16
For another, MCCioskey tried to open up or advance several issues in ecological
politics (and would have, if his book had existentially impacted and had not been largely
bypassed or dismissed). These issues include not merely the standard issues of
overpopulation, pollution and unethical technology; more notably, they also include the
issue, which has recently received much airing, as to whether environmental demands
and regulations interfere damagingly with individual freedoms and other aspects of
liberal principles. There are other facets to this that deserve further examination (do it
decently, someone!): the extent to which liberal states do and can deliver on
environmental matters, as well as the extent of interference with liberties (much turns
then on how it is all done).
MCCioskey has overestimated the abilities of states to deliver liberal ideals and
guarantee liberal principles, such as individual freedom (in fact, to note some lesser
infringements, they characteristically coerce citizens in many respects, forcing them into
a money economy, to pay taxes and obtain licences, even to serve on juries, to vote, to
fight, etc.). If the state promises liberties with one hand, it is busy actually taking
liberties away with the other. While we may be stuck with states for the present, as an
unpleasant political reality, it is not too difficult to see that there are better unrealised
alternatives even from a traditional liberal angle, alternatives that pass unconsidered.
And MCCioskey has grossly underestimated the severity of ecological problems states
should be trying to solve.
In some of his findings, MCCioskey is so wildly astray that his judgement on
factual issues and his credibility has to fall under real suspicion. For example: ' ... it is
evident that over the whole period of his existence man has only been one relatively
minor factor bearing on species survival rates' (p.47)! ' ... man is simply adding more
hazards to those created by nature itself for some species' (p.47 continuing). For the
next example, by contrast with the previous, MCCioskey might seek refuge in the fact
that he was writing back in 1982: 'Few suggest that man can or will destroy the
ecosystem of the earth' (p.49). Even so, the news on nuclear winter had broken, and the
Greenhouse effect was already worrying some scientists. "Man" appears able to do little
that is very wrong; MCCioskey can only bring himself to engage in the mildest of
censure: ' ... man could have used DDT to better effect' (p.50). No doubt he could have
refrained from using it to significantly better effect. A due adaptation of that Old
Testament idea that humans are characteristically radically flawed, regularly and perhaps
inevitably sinning in their treatment of the Earth, does not break through in MCCloskey's
approach. In fact anti-ecological themes strongly pushed by MCCioskey will break
through again and again in what follows.
�17
Nor did Mccloskey anticipate the rapid march of ecological history at all well.
With his operational assumption that ecological reforms 'would not be popular' (e.g.
p.156), he appears to have been swiftly refuted by history. There has been much
popular movement in favour of ecological causes. The main resistance to far-reaching
reforms has not been popular, but establishment resistance, together with that from
business, wealth and privilege, and their hired economic men and thugs. Similarly with
his assumptions that reform, or change, would not occur unless the ecological problems
were believed 'to be real problems' (p.157) - which of course MCCloskey himself
believed they were not by and large, something he deluded himself that he had shown.
But popular beliefs have changed rapidly, taking MCCloskey's assumptions under along
with old beliefs.
In any case, MCCloskey's argument to unpopularity lacks cogency. It is that
ecological measures 'may necessitate less convenient, changed lifestyles, many controls
and restrictions, increased costs, additional taxes, basic interference with what now are
seen as being matters of basic rights .... democratic legislators [cannot] hope to bring
about the reforms ... and still retain office' (p.157). Whence, again ecological reformers
may look to totalitarian political solutions. So far as I am aware, there have been no such
proposals by ecological groups in Australasia. In small measure too, Mccloskey begins
to meet his own argument. For measures of the type Mccloskey rightly finds distasteful,
have already been run through in contemporary representative democracies; consider
security and surveillance, foreign control and surveillance, nuclear power and
surveillance, urban restructuring and surveillance opportunities, and so on. Secondly,
there are important trade-offs; if these often minor inconveniences are not experienced
now, much more drastic and dislocating changes will probably have to be undertaken
subsequently. Thirdly, of course, if they are not undertaken now much of immense
value will be lost. More direct democracies than we have today, where peoplegovernance and control of established elites is tenuous, would stand a better chance of
limiting these losses; properly pluralistic systems would presumably manage better still.
But Mccloskey does not address such issues as ecologically improved democracies.
Instead he assumes, quite wrongly, that solutions to ecological difficulties will require
strong and authoritarian central governments (perhaps both of states and of the world),
but that such institutions run directly counter to liberal concerns: 'the enjoyments of
many rights and liberties and opportunities to rectify grave injustices' (p.25). So he
tears off to address the difficulties of ecological totalitarianism (pp.158-9), well-known
difficulties (as Goodin observed) confronting Antipodean non-starters among political
alternatives.
�18
Without examining other alternatives than certain totalitarian ones, Mccloskey
manages to conclude (to his own satisfaction) that 'the only realistic, feasible avenue to
ecological political reform is through the political institutions of an open society that
respects human rights', what he appears to think is offered by contemporary 'liberal
democratic states' (p.159). Naturally deep environmentalists seek open societies that
respect rights, including decently discerned human rights. The big trouble is that on
these matters, as with environmental matters, contemporary liberal democratic states have
performed decidedly sublimenally, i.e. well below adequacy threshold. 6 It is not
unreasonable to contemplate alternative political arrangements that perform more
satisfactorily. But it is perhaps unrealistic to expect such improved organisational
structure to be got into place at all easily or at all. For liberal democratic states retain
regional monopolies on violence and other critical control, which, for all the palavering
about respecting rights, they do not hesitate to deploy when their power and security are
threatened.
Nor is Mccloskey, by contrast with libertarians, at all averse to regulations and
restrictions and limitations on liberty - except when these put environmental things ahead
of humans. For humans, if not animals, things material are supposed to be pretty good
in MCCloskey's liberal democratic mixed capitalistic setting. Environmental constraints
are not to impose upon or reduce human living 'standards or levels of enjoyment'
(p.134) - unless that enjoyment should be profligate, for instance involving conspicuous
consumption and waste. Certainly such constraints are not to interfere with morally
acceptable human freedoms: such is one side of the proferred dilute liberalism. But
unnecessary waste is another thing, and should be curbed, through state guidance and
regulation; liberalism here parts company with libertarianism. 'The switch from a
resource-profligate society to a resource-liberal one would involve an acceptance of much
more state action, more state interference by way of incentives, disincentives,
regulations, restrictive laws, and over all planning than now prevails. However, it
would not require the loss of basic freedom ... ' (p.134)! Such double-talk certainly
makes the heavy liberal case MCCloskey tries to mount against decent environmental
concerns - as against decent human concerns - look thin and flawed. Because such
regulation does make serious inroads upon capitalistic freedoms, much hangs on the term
'basic', which is not however explained in this context. If, being freedom-loving
Europeans, we burn down an empty freeway at speeds in excess of wasteful
consumption limitations and we are accordingly locked away for months, then the effect
6
Sublimenal is a satisizing analogue of the maximization ideology's suboptimal.
�19
on our basic freedom to life at large is serious. The paternalistic states MCCioskey
offers, in significant respects more paternal than those we already have in the West, do
not sit so easily with liberalism; patently they are incompatible with libertarianism, which
does not brook such restrictive regulation. The critical point is however this: what is
permissible in rectifying a resource-profligate society is similarly permissible in
reorganising an environmentally-profligate society. Again there need be no loss of basic
freedom, where basic is now characterised in terms of whats ethically acceptable. Only the ethics is now a deep environmental ethics.
5. Structuring ecological ethics and politics: towards an improved
classification of environmental problems.
Environmental ethics and politics are regularly said to be engendered by
environmental problems, increasingly severe and encroaching problems.
Yet in
MCCloskey's text, as in that of his main model, Passmore's establishment text, there is
no well-organised classification of environmental problems, only a rather ramshackle
list.
We can however reach towards an improved classification by considering
environmental impact in a dynamic setting (cf. the beginning of section 1). An impact of
something is something which comes from somewhere, sources, into something, sinks,
parts of environments. In a process diagram, it looks like this:
impacts
processes
sources
sinks
types of environments
participants
distinguished
agents of
impacts
recipients of
impacts
Expanding upon the elements of this process diagram will deliver the sought after
improved classification. Firstly, given distinguished background experience, especially
with environmental impact equations, a further two-way classification is suggested: in
terms of
• sorts of impacts, and
• types of environments.
The latter framework is wide enough (in obvious respects too wide for a tight
classification) to include both special concentrated sources such as mines, power
stations, factories, and the like, and special sinks such as rubbish dumps, sewerage
outflows, and the like. But the framework is not quite wide enough; it is important to
factor into types of environments, expected inhabitants of those environments, which are
the recipients of impacts (impactees). These will include not only present inhabitants of
�20
environments: animals, plants, native humans, for land-surface environments, but also
expected future inhabitants, whose likelihood or very existence may be impaired. There
are two ways of incorporating these sorts of elements in the general scheme: either
expanding environmental components, by having zones and habitats with kinds of
expected inhabitants; or distinguishing participants in the impacts, givers and receivers.
Here the latter course is preferred; we distinguish also then
• kinds of recipients, and as well of course
• kinds of impactors.
While the kinds of impactors is diverse, including such superagents and nonagents as
Nature, Chance, God (as in "acts of God"), and so forth, as well as animals, the main
impactors of interest are, presently, humans.
Accordingly let us run out the standard environmental impact equation for humans
in a region, though it applies to any class of impactors through any kind of impact:
EI.
Environmental
impact
(of ...
through ... )
=
Population
size
(of ... )
X
Resource
use
per member
(of ... )
x
Impact
(through ... )
per unit of
resource use
e.g. of humans in USA through atmospheric pollution.
Such an impact breakdown leads directly to three major categories of environmental
problems, namely
a Population
a Consumption and use
a Technology and waste.
Those components act in concert, and, despite well-publicized attempts to load problems
onto just one component, evidently all are sometimes important.
A more sophisticated environmental impact equation would reduce the aggregation
of the equation, EI = P x C x T (in brief, and functional, form), by introducing
distributional features, which indicated where and when impact really mattered.
Suppose, for example, there are n sufficiently independent regions, as in the following
regionalized impact equation:
n
EI
=
Pi X Ci X Ti
i=l
Suppose, for instance, we are investigating the environmental impact of present humans
l
through industrialization, i.e. EI (present humans through industrialization). Then, on
an obvious regional breakdown, the impact is overwhelmingly dominated by three
regions: North America, Europe, and North Asia (primarily Japan). If it were not that
the rest of the world were locked into this system (and its humans encouraged to applaud
�21
and emulate it), supplying much of the raw materials, taking too much of the expensive
products and waste, and suffering the pollution effects that spill outside the offending
regions, main problems of industrialisation could be isolated in the high latitude N orthem
hemisphere.
The regionalized environmental impact equation will also serve to better organise
widespread assumptions as to how those impacts that are taken seriously can be eroded.
Not only is there the illusory prospect of reducing impact to "acceptable levels" by
variation of just one parameter - Ci is that invariably favoured by socially-oriented
shallower environmentalists; Ti, in the shape of wizard technology, by economists and
technocrats (but such technology is likely to have its own impact and thereby to add to
environmental problems). There is also the possibility of moving further afield to new
regions, where impacts are lower. There are familiar frontier practices ( and a
corresponding frontier ethics), which can be seen as reapplied to elements such as
industrialisation and its components, pollution and waste. Of course such frontier
practices are impoverishing, and too often destructive of further environments and many
of their inhabitants; but in any case they are now seriously limited by biospheric
limitations of the whole Earth.
Many significant types of environment obtain little or no consideration in
MCCloskey's survey; e.g. deserts (too many the product of past human activity), urban
regions, polar regions, atmospheric zones, and so on. To stay within reasonable
bounds, however, not even all the areas of concern that Mccloskey does look at will be
examined in what follows. For to try to track Mccloskey in all the areas he does delve
into would require an extensive treatise, as he raises many fundamental issues in political
theory: to mention two remarkable examples, a brief discussion of 'the right to private
property' is tucked away under 'Family Rights and Rights to Reproduce', and of the
'right for education' under 'The Right to Respect as a Person' (p.75ff.) Instead a more
detailed treatment of a few of the areas he addresses will be offered (in fact some of the
other areas have been investigated elsewhere, in Green Series discussions, or will be).
6. Population impact: the fact of human overpopulation.
A major and very conspicuous impact of humans upon the Earth comes through
their sheer numbers, which, though already huge, are still growing rapidly, and are
overwhelming environmental and social bases for reasonable support in many parts of
the globe. MCCloskey's first thesis, which sets the agenda for his entire population
discussion, is this (pp 146-7,p.97): that there is no world population crisis, indeed
further,
NP. The world is not threatened by a population crisis in the foreseeable future.
�22
But instead of coming out directly and cleanly with this preposterous thesis, MCCioskey
approaches the business in a typical oblique way, designed to shift the onus of proof,
claiming that he has 'argued that a tenable, plausible case had not been made out for
believing that the world is threatened by a population crisis in the foreseeable future'
(p.146). It is fair to wonder about his experiential basis, whether, for instance, he has
travelled through India or visited the vast urban slums of many third-world countries. It
is fair to wonder what would make a "tenable plausible case" - proper theoretical
business for philosophers, which philosophers have generally steadfastly avoided - or,
of immediate relevance, what would constitute a "population crisis", and what counts as
"overpopulation".
On the last at least we do have a proposal from MCCioskey, 'to use overpopulation
to refer to population sizes that exceed a country's or the world's capacity to feed
adequately and to make it possible for all to enjoy their basic rights' (p.97). While the
proposal is no doubt very convenient for the argumentative route MCCioskey will try to
take, a route it already signposts, it is a decidedly chauvinistic and exceedingly shallow
suggestion, which is ecologically entirely unacceptable. First, it takes no due account of
future humans, or other creatures. But present capacity is achieved, so far as it is, too
often through running down present biological and other systems, thereby jeopardising
future capacity; decent sustainability is required even by shallow ecological positions.
Secondly, the proposal is indecently chauvinistic; it takes account of naught but humans,
their basic rights and their feeding. It thus violates the framework MCCioskey elsewhere
professes to have adopted. For instance, high populations, which are not MCCioskey
overpopulations, may lead, and are leading, to promotion of evil and to gross reductions
in intrinsic value, including types of value MCCioskey earlier (somewhat reluctantly)
acknowledged. But like all the political applications of the potentially generous ethical
basis, that on population takes an ugly anti-ecological tum. It is all humans and humans,
humans first, last and only, though humans at brute food subsistence levels or less as it
turns out, and is turning out in many regions.
Now really the proposal should be relativised, to 'overpopulation of a region', as
the awkward disjunction, between country or world, makes evident. Many regions and
countries are already seriously overpopulated (even by MCCloskey's slack standards), as
he goes on to say. However, so he immediately asserts, 'the world as a whole is not
overpopulated' (p.97). Whatever the case for this claim - a defective and disreputable
case as will soon appear - plainly some large assumptions go into the proposition that a
whole or summation can enjoy certain distribution properties when many of its parts do
not: assumptions about the role of international trade, regionalism and self-sustainability
on the one side and about summative features on the other. If clothes, for example, are
�23
dirty or shabby in many parts, so are they as a whole. Suppose some parts are
overpopulated because of constant infringements of basic human rights, infringements
presumably traceable back to excess population sizes (though the connection is not made
clear enough). Then the whole can hardly but be overpopulated, as it stands, whatever
the future prospects for redistribution, reorganisation, and so forth.
To evade such problems and to scramble to his conclusion Mccloskey firstly
weakens 'basic rights' to 'basic needs' (but rights normally demand more than need
satisfaction), and then drops 'basic needs' out altogether. Thus what he finally gets
down to is the bare food issue, all else set aside: of whether 'if the food actually
produced were distributed and used to the best advantage of all persons in the world'
every human could be fed. But, so he claims, 'it is widely accepted' that all can be
amply fed (pp 97-8). It is evident that, even if what is so "widely accepted" were true,
the outcome would be insufficient to show no Mccloskey overpopulation. Suppose the
world has the capacity (and will) to redistribute food to the most advantage. Still, basic
food is no assurance of basic rights. Further argument, not supplied, is essential;
argument to showing that regional overpopulation, stayed however by bread (but not
circuses), does not lead to basic rights infringement, through such media as
unemployment, poverty, inequity and so on. Furthermore it is very doubtful that this
can be established, for the simple reason that there are connections between these human
conditions (however difficult they may be to push into quantifiable or law-like form).
Humans do not survive or depend upon food alone. To keep many of them even
partly contented, so inflated have their wants and needs become under ideological
pressures, will require a very large and very environmentally destructive pie. Humans
are now an extraordinarily greedy and destructive species. Though one animal species
among thousands, and one biological species among tens of millions, they have taken
over most of the Earth and most of its products, so far as they can, for their own uses
and purposes. More than 80% of the fruits of photosynthesis, for example, now flow to
this one species. Yet perhaps 10% of the world's human population are malnourished,
and many millions at least lack other subsistence needs.
Even the bare food claim, upon which MCCloskey's whole case depends at
bottom, is no longer so widely accepted, since the shock of the North American and
other droughts; it was being questioned as MCCloskey wrote. Now however we have
available the Brown University study of world food supply in relation to human
�24
population. 7 The study is based on the 1986 harvest, which was a world record. The
findings were that, with this supply, assuming perfect and equal redistribution, 6 billion
humans would be fed a vegetarian diet. Thus by the end of the century, present record
supplies will not be able to sustain the world's human population even at vegetarian
levels. If the somewhat better South American style diet, with 15% meat, is considered,
then only 4 billion humans can be fed; that is, less than the present world population.
While if a rather better Australian style diet is contemplated, the number that can be fed
declines to 2.5 billion, that is half the present world population. So much for ample
feeding.
It might reasonably be anticipated that the rest of the argument to NP, no
foreseeable population crisis, is hopeless. And it is. All we are offered are, firstly,
some reasons, of very variable quality, 'to suspect the most confident, brash predictions'
(p.99) - suspicions which seem to include NP within their scope, along with
MCCloskey's next speculative thesis. Secondly we are offered the speculative thesis that
world food production will grow at least sufficiently to match world population growth.
It is a thesis floated largely on technological optimism, a thesis that should be regarded
with heavy suspicion given recent serious declines in biological capital: fisheries, soils,
forests, and so on, and given apparently increasing climatic instability.
To give him his small due, MCCioskey does assert, repeatedly, that there is little
ground 'for complacency and inaction in respect of the world's population growth' (e.g.
p.99 ); and as well as firing moral shots at 'alarmist predictions ... based on the flimsiest
premisses' countering NP (for no problem), he makes heavy moral noises about morally
assessing the situation. In any case, he needs to say something like this in order to pull
off convincingly his big discussion of the ins and outs of, ethics and politics of, human
sexuality and population control.
7. On limiting human populations: some neglected considerations.
Hitherto received opinion, in modem Wes tern civilization, has taken the line that
culling animal species is perfectly alright, but that culling humans is not, because
humans have an unalienable right to life (a right regularly neglected however in times of
war, in regressive criminal justice systems, and now questioned as regards poachers of
significant animals). Received opinion, which MCCioskey tries to shore up, is now
being challenged. Alternative methods of controlling populations of wild animals, to
7
The study is regularly cited by Ehrlich in his talks, lectures and works: see reference.
�25
previous technologically primitive ones, are being seriously considered. Another gulf
between humans and other sizeable intelligent animals is beginning to close.
Unlike some dangerous Christian thinkers, Mccloskey does not cede to humans an
unlimited right to procreation. As he says, 'there is no recognised moral, social or legal
right for consenting parties to reproduce at will', but 'few philosophers today would
seek philosophically to justify prevailing recognised ... restrictions on procreation'
(p.150). Mccloskey wishes to impose a restriction as regards adequate provision for
offspring; there is no right to reproduction where a requirement of reasonable prospects
of adequate provision is not met. This bears heavily, as he realises, and perhaps also
inequitably, on impoverished parents in poor communities; the issue is not really
resolved (see p.101). But otherwise, in richer countries, the duties of those who would
undertake human parenthood are presented as slight. Individuals, acting on their own,
have otherwise no duties to restrict the size of their families (for the unMCCloskeyian
consequentialist reason that it will have limited practical significance and achieve little).
Where overpopulation is an issue, political, not individual, action is what is required.
Where overpopulation threatens, individuals 'adequately fulfil their duty if they have
only that number of children for which they can adequately care and [very differently,
and with major political implications] if they foster and support world action to stabilize
the world population and [confirming a right previously hedged] to ensure that all
persons enjoy the right, equally with themselves, to have offspring if they so choose'
(p.104 ). Otherwise the issue is dumped in the (too hard) political basket, for states and
world organisations to try to handle. All this is decidedly unsatisfactory.
Most important, there is no right to production of children without limit, even
given that they can be "provided for". One reason is that new children produce impacts,
and children in quantity seriously interfere with others; so result in significant violations
of liberal principles regarding noninterference with others. In rough analogical terms, as
the Macs' new building interferes with their neighbours' views, so their new children
interfere with the neighbours' freedom and lifestyles and environments, beginning with
local noise and crowding and continuing, much further, through taxes for family
allowances, for schools and so on, through crowded and polluted parks and beaches and
so on. Those assuming (conditional) rights, to reproduce for instance, tend to forget that
rights require justifications (they cannot just be pulled out of thin air). But here any
straightforward justificatory pattern is upset, because of a very familiar neglect of
relations: namely, impacts of new people on environments, and interference of new
people with in-place people. A change in attitudes and practices is accordingly
warranted. Parties producing larger numbers of children should be regarded as socially
and ecologically irresponsible; they should no longer gain special financial support, but
�26
perhaps should, on the contrary, be duly penalized. These themes run counter to the
main thrust of MCCloskey's discourse on population control, an extensive discussion
premised on what he takes to be the improbable hypothesis that a world population crisis
eventuates (pp.147-155). It ought to be enough to pull the plug on that discussion,
sending intellectual babies with soiled bath water.
That voluntary methods of limiting human births 'will not succeed' is MCCloskey's
prime thesis (p.147). The support offered for it is characteristic and characteristically
inadequate. First the thesis is weakened, and then some restricted and contestable
empirical evidence is advanced as suggestive. 'That voluntary methods of checking birth
rates are unlikely to be adequate is suggested by the relatively limited success of family
planning projects even where [well] backed ... ' (p.147). On the contrary, voluntary
methods of checking birth rates, mostly independent of family planning projects, have
been substantially successful in many better educated, less impoverished communities.
Some of these might even count as spectacularly successful, and more would be if they
achieved some real, and sensitive, state support. But there are many powerful interests,
especially those emanating from organised religions, operating against delivery of
support designed for success.
There is a conspicuous difference, again connected with ancient prejudices,
between the attitude shown to human populations and the approach MCCloskeyians take
to animal populations. Humans have the right, but socially constrained, to continue on
their expansive and environmentally degrading course; animals have no such right,
because, among other things, they have no rights.
8. On animal rights and supposed political implications thereof.
The argument to the conservative result, that animals cannot enjoy (moral) rights,
attempts to trade off an argument on which great emphasis is put, that 'there is a vast gap
between rights and interests' (p.66). But that attempt depends on a confusion between
what rights are - certainly not interests - and what can hold rights significantly - perhaps
only items with interests. With that confusion out of the way, MCCioskey still has two
main arguments to his shrill conclusion, that 'animals do not, cannot possess moral
rights' (p.66 and several other places): a tight redefinition argument, and an
environmental chaos otherwise argument.
The tight redefinition argument proceeds, by appealing to special features of rights,
to tighten up the notion of right so that unwanted (if commonly recognised) classes of
right-holders are excluded. Such an argument, widely deployed against animal
liberation, takes two main forms: less plausibly, that rights require interests, which
�27
animals are alleged to lack, and, more plausibly, that rights have to be suitably
exercisable and claimable, feats beyond animals abilities and capacities to perform.
Though formerly among the ageing afficiandos of the less plausible Cartesian nointerests approach, MCCioskey now pursues the more plausible form. He appeals first to
typical features of rights (though really some combination of these must form an
invariant cluster for a decisive argument), such as their being 'foregone, insisted upon,
exercised in or contrary to one's interests. For possession of a moral right to be
meaningful, the possessor or his/her representative must be able to claim it, exercise it,
or the like' (p.66, italics added). Unfortunately for his argument, MCCioskey proceeds,
at crucial points, to leave out the representative alternative. Thus while an animal may
not be able to claim its rights, a representative can; whereupon talk of claiming a right is
not empty (pace p.66). Thus the argument so far is broken-backed.
Having recanted on his earlier contention that animals cannot have interests (see
p.65), MCCioskey is no longer in a position to preclude the attribution of rights on that
ground, that interests are a necessary condition. 8 'We can plausibly claim to have some
idea of what is in the interests of an animal. We can have no knowledge concerning how
it would exercise its moral rights, if it had any' (p.66). Surely we can. A wombat can
exercise its right to proceed along a way in the same way that a human can, namely by
proceeding along it, setting aside obstructions, and so on. But MCCioskey proceeds, in
a way characteristic of high redefinition strategies, to heighten the requirements. He
appeals to features of what he takes to be 'paradigm cases of the possessors of rights,
persons, rational, morally autonomous beings' which he couples with the characteristic
exercise of rights (p.66). There are, however, other paradigm examples of right
holders, such as small children, senile humans, imbeciles, etc. Despite the suggestions,
rationality and a high level of autonomy are not required for the possession or exercise of
rights. MCCioskey asserts that 'it is capacity for moral autonomy, for moral selfdirection and self-determination, that is basic to the possibility of possessing a right'
(p.66). That is a high redefinition, substantially exceeding the requirements normally
expected, especially where guardians or representatives are appointed or envisaged.
MCCioskey-rights are a quite proper subclass of rights as ordinarily conceived. Even so
it may well be that animals can hold them; it all depends upon how much gets pumped
into the elusive term 'moral'. Wombats, for example, are not human, do not read and
write, are not much given to calculus, do not enter into contracts, and so on; nor do
8
Elliot is quite mistaken in saying that McCloskey's views have not changed since
those espoused in 1979 (p.503). Admitting animal interests represents a major
change. That animals do, of course, have interests is argued in detail in my 81.
�28
many primitive peoples, though humans, engage in any of these activities (though some
of them perhaps could with education). But wombats are, by and large, decidedly
autonomous, self-determining and self-directed; they exhibit much more independence
than most modern humans. Similarly with whales. Despite such familiar findings,
MCCioskey takes the following proposition as decisive: 'Consider how we should
respond if it were to be determined that a whale or dolphin possessed moral autonomy'
(p.66). He does not address the issues raised in this queer pronouncement, but
immediately leaps to his sought conclusion against animal rights. Given that moral
autonomy is not to the point, except for MCCioskey-rights, the proposition is irrelevant
to and not supportive of the conclusion. Without the elusive term 'moral', the
proposition is, furthermore, decidedly not a discussion stopper. Most dolphins exhibit a
high degree of autonomy, the exceptions being primarily those (improperly) held in
captivity, injured in fishing activities, sickened by pollution, and so on. The trouble
with the infiltration of morality is that it normally (if wrongly) suggests human activities
and human communities - whence what small force MCCloskey's proposition enjoys, as
whales as agents fall outside that setting.
The argument to environmental chaos, to entirely untoward environmental
implications, if rights were ceded to animals, comprises several facets. They are facets
that have been seen before, with every legitimate struggle for extensions of rights, such
as, most memorably, allocation of rights to enslaved humans. That latter certainly
brought some desirable dislocation to social arrangements; so will legitimating animal
rights. But it need bring nothing like the complication and aggravations of social and
environmental problems that MCCioskey fearfully envisages (p.69, p.122).
A first facet concerns conflict of rights. There are of course conflicts of rights
between humans and groups of humans, but MCCioskey fears the situation with animals
would not merely be more complicated (as it would with much greater numbers) but that
'the difficulty and complexity of this rights calculus' would make it unworkable (p.67).
But again he fails to show anything like this. Indeed he immediately weakens his
position of apparent strength by looking to an 'easier calculus' where 'man simply
protects animals from human violations of animal rights' (p.67). That would be a fine
start, though politically virtually all nations and peoples would have to advance a long
way to achieve it (Sweden less than most others).
While the "easier calculus" does not mean that animals have lesser rights than
humans, as MCCioskey implies, what is suggested is important in escaping from
difficulties MCCioskey tries to amass. For not all right-holders are on a par, much as not
all types of creatures are equal in abilities or capacities. In particular, to get to critical and
divisive issues straightaway: it does not follow then from the fact that animals have
�29
rights that some of them, domestic ones, cannot be kept, or used - any more than it
follows from the fact that humans have rights that some cannot be kept, or employed, for
instance as servants. Nor does it follow that dead animals (or humans) cannot be eaten.
Nor, most controversially, is it incompatible with animals having rights, that some are
killed. For not all rights stand or fall together; a right for continued existence is very
different from a right to a decent life or treatment while alive. Furthermore,
MCCloskey's invalid arguments to ecological chaos succeed in turning animal liberation
into animal libertinism. They do this by familiar slide strategies from some to more to
all, from some rights, to many other rights, to the same rights as fully-competent
persons. The strategy is coupled with that of assigning to humans more rights than they
have, or should hold. Examples include the right to be absolutely where they like or to
breed at will. But one human does not have the right to be in any other human's house
or bed or space.9 No more do animals, like feral animals or 'disease-carrying pests such
as rats and mice'. So, for example, the major conflict MCCioskey alleges with human
rights to health dissolves; it depends upon granting excessive rights to rats and mice.
With a sensible calculus of rights humans need not be overwhelmed by either animals or
other humans; given due constraints on human populations (more than any other animal
populations), interference by others could be stabilized at a low level.
A further large facet of MCCloskey's argument to chaos doggedly pursues practical
and ecological costs of vegetarianism, costs which he considerably exaggerates. But
whether he is right about these costs, or not, is a separate issue - irrelevant to the main
issue of animal rights. For admitting or stressing animal rights most emphatically does
not 'dictate acceptance of vegetarianism as a moral position or practice' (p.68). There is
no valid route from rights for animals to vegetarianism, for reasons that have already
been very briefly indicated above. 10 MCCioskey has linked the question of animal rights
much too closely with positions like that of Singer (an evident target on pp.68-9 of the
text). But many more ordinary people and even some philosophers, 11 both before and
after Singer, have assigned rights to animals, without commitment thereby to
vegetarianism, and without evident (or any) fallacy. As a result or this flawed linkage,
9
While writing this I heard a local airforce contingent claiming its right-to the freedom
of Canberra. Plainly it only has a right-to the freedom of only certain cities, and to
quite limited things within those cities.
10
A much more detailed case, along with counter-models, can be extracted from my
previous work, esp. the Green Series, number 13, i.e.TE (essay 3), and number 2.
11
A neglected early philosopher is Maclver; see esp. his remarks on p.69.
�30
MCCioskey makes another interesting mistake: namely 'that the two movements, animal
rights on the one hand (the view that some animals possess moral rights) and
conservation and preservation on the other', so far from being 'complementary, mutually
supportive positions', 'in fact are fundamentally opposed and are such as to be calculated
to lead to many major clashes' (p.69, rearranged). While there are major clashes, for
example, between moral extensionisms, such as the expanded utilitarianisms of
Bentham, Sidgwick and Singer on the one side, and deep environmentalism on the
other, there are no clashes of an animal rights position with deep environmentalism .
For, very simply, such deep positions accord animals rights.
As elsewhere, so with animal rights, errors in the ethical treatment intrude into the
supposed political implications. Unremarkably then MCCioskey sees 'the ecological
state' as committed to ecological chaos, all of which 'would very seriously curtail human
liberty in many ways' and 'create massive theoretical and practical political problems'
(p.122). No doubt decent treatment for animals, codified in rights, would restrict human
liberty somewhat, as abolition of public spectacles such as hangings, floggings or
throwing Christians to hungry lions, curtailed spectator opportunities and freedoms. But
the desirable elimination of factory-farmed fast foods and animal-tested cosmetics, or the
curtailment of circuses and reformation of zoos, are hardly very serious restrictions on
human liberty, or what MCCioskey is thinking of really. He is again thinking of his
house full of rats and his garden full of copulating animals, of vegetarianism and
protection of rabbits made legally obligatory, and so on (for many such fantasies see
p.122). But no such consequences, ensue, without repetition of the errors already
exposed in the ethical treatment: inferences from some rights to excessive rights, and so
on.
Because side-tracked by his own production, by this pantomime of absolutely
unconstrained, rampaging, warring and rapidly-multiplyin g animals (i.e. like some
humans when ideological controls are lifted, not like most animals), MCCioskey does not
address at all the very serious abuses in prevailing present treatment of animals, abuses
on farms and in laboratories, at home and in the wild, abuses that should be politically
addressed from ethical bases, issues well addressed through rights.
An
institutionalisation of animal rights would not produce the big problems MCCioskey
envisages; after all most people are now represented by professionals in many of their
dealings concerning legal rights, a professional paternalism increasingly operates, which
�31
subsumes many professionals themselves. On the contrary, such institutionalisation of
animal rights, properly done could make for very desirable changes. 12
9. Two other critical features of dominant political ways: the shibboleths
of extensive private property and high technology.
The orthodox assumption, which McCloskey makes, is that a liberal democratic
state will have a mixed (or marginally socially constrained) market capitalist economy.
Under the simplistic equations that tend to distort much modem political discussion, even
the inadequate qualifications occasionally inserted are forgotten: a liberal democratic state
is often equated with institution of market capitalism, indeed too often market
arrangements get equated with capitalism. Evidently, however, these equations fall apart
under but slight disturbance. Logically they come apart entirely.
There are severe logical problems with the very idea of a liberal democracy, which
is a dialectical union of individual liberal with social welfare and democratic ideals. For a
democratic state, especially should it take popular majoritarian form, can seriously curtail
the freedom of minorities (the well-known "tyranny of the majority"). Liberal ends may
be better served by a benign dictatorship than by democratic arrangements. Liberality
and democracy part company. Similarly individual liberty and statist social welfare.
And so on. Certainly liberality, which is the most free ranging of the five big political
league players being disentangled, 13 does imply some significant limitations on
arrangements, but they may not favour democracy, or capitalism. Fully liberal
arrangements should enable a community to opt for democratic organisation, should it
wish; but similarly these arrangements should allow the community to choose otherwise,
should it want. Also liberal arrangements of a social cast (with decent freedom of the
servants) would mean winding back of capitalism. Despite the immense damage illregulated capitalism and market structures can, and do, separately inflict upon ecological
and social systems, there is practically no discussion of such matters in MCCloskey, and
again little investigation of improved structures or regulation. 14
12
For one thing, it challenges factory farming, as infringing animal rights, in an
obvious way. McCloskey avoids the issue when it arises (p.140).
13
In fact four of the five substantially independent players we are reflecting upon market, social welfare, capitalistic, democratic, and liberal arrangements - do not
receive an index listing in Mccloskey, while the fifth, liberal, collects many citations
and much discussion.
14
A major contemporary myth is that markets and capitalism can flourish without
regulation, indeed that they flourish best in a fully deregulated setting. Both
�32
As with liberal democracy, so with market capitalism, the components separate.
Markets can flourish without capitalism, where for instance agents have sharply limited
and bounded budgets and capitalistic accumulation cannot operate. Markets require no
liberty in other parts of social life than those involving exchange of certain material
goods; they certainly do not require a democratic framework. Capitalism can function
without a vibrant free market system; indeed in advanced capitalist states it increasingly
does so, with oligopolistic arrangements in place of competitive output markets, vertical
integration and contract delivery replacing former input markets, and so on. Capitalism
too requires neither democracy nor liberty, indeed too much of either could seriously
undermine it. It does however depend upon property, for control and as a store for
capital accumulated. In principle, of course, a very limited capitalism could work
without private ownership of land and resources, so long as some exchangeable stable
form of wealth, such as a sound currency or gold, was available for accumulation and
payment of labour. But smart capitalists would rightly feel excessively vulnerable under
such arrangements; for they could be wiped out by an outside devaluation of the currency
or outside increases in rents on resources and land. In any case, many capitalists
(virtually all people of substantial wealth in Australia), and a large array of parasitic
middle parties, agents and hangers-on, would be duly despatched along with free-for-all
property markets.
Having glimpsed MCCloskey's unquestioned commitment to mixed capitalism, it is
piquant to behold him begining upon undermining an institution fundamental to historic
capitalism, namely private property. Most of MCCloskey's brief discussion of rights to
private property (pp. 78-80) focusses upon the labour theory of property, descended
from Locke and others, upon which he effects a full demolition job. In fact he severely
weakens the case for a substantially unfettered ("free") institution of private property,
upon which however the type of liberalism he advances depends. For strong property
rights and guarantees are basic to present liberal democratic arrangements, as they are to
proposed libertarian alternatives. MCCioskey even tries to close off discussion of the
'political desirability of allowing property rights by way of patent rights to discoveries'
in plant and animal breeding, particularly through genetic engineering, on the pretext that
these 'cannot reasonably be objected to without the whole private-property system of
institutions depend for their operation and for their very survival on regulation, on an
appropriate enforceable legal setting. Otherwise, in communities where a certain
egalitarianism counted for something for instance, a capitalist would be rash to bank
upon holding onto substantial surplus wealth for long.
�33
liberal democratic states being questioned' (p.139). Now peripheral cases do not
generally threaten the centre, unless, perchance, it is already in some doubt.
The extent and character of property is a quite critical, indeed a watershed, issue
for environmental politics. For excessive propertarian rights and powers constitute a
very serious impediment to sound environmental practice. The reason is simple: the
proprietor may be less than well disposed to the environment, and may well permit or
enact unsound practices. Yet propertarians often now appeal to a purported need to
strengthen and expand the institution of private property - rather that to let it naturally
contract - in order to combat environmental problems. Thus such dubious proposals as
saleable rights to pollute environments, dump wastes, etc. - licences which look even to
the uninitiated like ways of extending, not contracting, pollution and like environmental
problems, and which look to the more cynical as ways of circumventing costs and limits
environmental constraints impose upon economic activity. 15
The liberal democratic structure to which MCCioskey commits himself to, with its
uncritical approach to population and consumption - like market capitalism, with its
commitments to expanding populations to ensure growth and profit, expanding markets,
enhanced consumption, and cheap labour resources - forces an unduly heavy
dependence on technological wizardry. In particular, it requires a technology that will
facilitate greatly increased cheap food supplies, without however too rapidly depleting
"biological capital". Given recent experience it demands a faith in technology, and the
smart science that underwrites it, that is increasingly difficult to justify. Like all too
many academics, MCCioskey has that faith. Science should be given entirely free reign,
and technology pushed to the hilt.
There is a naive optimism in MCCloskey's attitude to science. 'It is not improbable
that ultimately, through the investigations of the sciences, we will come ... to have a full
understanding of the earth's weather and climatic patterns. Man will be able to use this
15
Such saleable rights also appear to get another foot-in-the-door for bargaining
utilitarians, who claim to want no absolute prohibitions, but want to put the whole
environment up for negotiation - and ultimately for sale. What are not up for
negotiation are the underlying propertarian and utility maximization principles, the
insufficiently examined sources of many of the problems.
In any case, the evidence now coming in shows that market approaches to pollution,
such as saleable rights and pricing controls (like company fines), do not work at all
well. Making directors of polluting firms directly responsible, and putting offenders in
jail, apparently does.
�34
knowledge for his and the earth's best advantage' (p.137). We, the total managers, will
know what is "best" for the earth! Despite the 'dangers of misuse', major disasters,
global warfare, climatic destablisation, and so on, 'this fact constitutes no reason for
holding back the pursuit of knowledge ... ' (p.137). Maximum speed ahead in the
glorious pursuit of science, with full anarchistic enthusiasm there. There is, as well, 'no
reason ... for entrusting rulers with the control of science' (p.137); science at least is
utterly free in MCCloskey's liberal democracy.
While Mccloskey wants the state kept out of science (except as a money pump
presumably), he wants it actively intervening in technology, not to limit it, but 'acting to
ensure that new technologies be developed and used and their benefits widely enjoyed'
(p.138). The liberal state is to be actively and heavily involved in technology promotion
and delivery - which puts into serious question its presumed neutral regulatory function.
Also espoused is a quite insufficiently discriminating attitude to technology. Like most
apologists, Mccloskey emphasizes the possible - but generally unrealised - benefits of
technology, that technology 'can release persons from much mindless, degrading work.
Hence some, even many persons may never need to work' (p.138). For all the talk
about the possible benefits of technology, many alleged benefits seldom or never accrue,
for instance to shorten substantially people's working hours and give them more
worthwhile leisure; and benefits that do accrue are often not well used. Rather
technology is primarily funded to maintain or increase market share and profits (which
too often end up in conspicuous consumption and waste), thereby inducing cycles of
production and waste, more technology to help control the waste, and so on and up.
Technology itself is merely of instrumental worth, with many of its instruments
and techniques defective, destructive or dangerous, either directly or through eventual
side-effects. While some technology is no doubt instrumentally good, much is not. And
the balance of good over bad has been systematically exaggerated in Wes tern culture,
where more technology is now looked to or required to rectify gross economic and social
mismanagement in liberal democratic states. Technology is however no universal
panancea. Both on its record, and in terms of its theoretical prospects, the faith being put
in it, to "deliver us from evil", is misplaced But, as remarked, MCCloskey has the faith
(such episodes as the Green Revolution are seen as unmitigated successes), and
enthusiastically expects great things from technology ('genetic engineering ... constitutes
a dramatic, exciting breakthrough of major proportions, one that opens up vastly wider
possibilities for developing new plant and animal organisms', p.139). Naturally he
concentrates on the sunny side of technology, scarcely touching upon the darker aspects.
We merely glimpse one darker side of genetic engineering (for which perhaps no further
engineering is needed), the edifying spectacle of mass-production of human drones for
�35
industrial slavery (p. 139). As to the big problems with this engineering, we are fobbed
off with an evasive throw-away, of the kind more typical of politicians, as to 'the need
for relevant controls and checks', and no doubt balances, presumably determined by
state masters behind closed doors. Instead Mccloskey tries to divert attention by yet
another attack on the hypothetical totalitarian ecological state, and the threat of its
coercive methods, not those of your normal corrupt intimidatory democratic state, to
human liberties. But the smokescreen quickly subsides, our factional text degenerates
into notes: 'Relevant point here include ... ' (p.139).
Mccloskey would have us locked into state systems that are delivering increasingly
negative results for increasing numbers of humans and disastrous outputs for nonhumans and natural environments. By changing political directions significantly,
environmental and human affairs could again have an opportunity to flourish. But for
much of the environment at least, there is not a lot of time left.
REFERENCES
D. Bennett and R. Sylvan, Damn Greenies: Australian Perspectives on Environmental
Ethics, typescript, Canberra, 1989; referred to as AP.
C.D. Broad, Five Types of Ethical Theory, Kegan Paul and Others, London, 1944.
R. Elliott, Critical Notice of MCCloskey's Ecological Ethics and Politics, Australasian
Journal of Philosophy 63(1985) 499-504.
P.R. and A.H. Ehrlich, The Population Explosion, Simon & Schuster, New York,
1990.
R. E. Goodin, Review of MCCloskey's Ecological Ethics and Politics, Ethics 94(1984)
344-5.
A.M. Maciver, 'Ethics and the beetle', Analysis 8(1948) 65-70.
H.J. MCCioskey, Ecological Ethics and Politics, Rowman and Littlefield, Totowa N.J.,
1983; all page references not otherwise indicated are to this work.
T. Nagel, 'Libertarianism without foundations', in Reading Nozick (ed. J.Paul),
Blackwell, Oxford, 1981.
W.D. Ross, The Right and the Good, Clarendon, Oxford, 1930.
H. Rolston III, Environmental Ethics: Duties to and Values in the Natural World, Temple
University Press, Philadelphia, 1988.
R. Routley, 'Alleged problems in attributing beliefs and intentionality to animals',
Inquiry 24(1981) 387-417.
R. Routley and V. Plumwood, 'Moral dilemmas, and the logic of deontic notions', now
in Paraconsistent Logic (ed. G. Priest and others), Philosophia Verlag, Munich,
1989; referred to as MD.
�36
R. and V. Routley, 'Semantical foundations for value theory', Nous 17(1973) 441-456;
referred to as sv.
R. and V. Routley, 'Human chauvinism and environmental ethics', in Environmental
Philosophy (ed. D. Mannison and others), RSSS, Australian National University,
1979; referred to as EE.
R. Sylvan and D. Bennett, 'Tao and deep ecology', The Ecologist 18(4/5) (1988) 148159.
R. Sylvan, Three essayes upon deeper environmental ethics, Discussion Papers in
Environmental Philosophy, (Green Series) #13, Australian National University
1987; referred to as TE.
R. Sylvan, 'On the value core of deep-green theory', typescript, Canberra, 1988;
referred to as DG.
�DEEP ECOLOGY AND DEEP-GREEN THEORY.
Deep-green theory is a deep pluralistic environmental position, underwritten by a deep
metaphysical theory. It is intended as an alternative, less fraught with problems, to deep ecology.
Deep-green theory has developed, in significant part, through fruitful interreaction with deep
ecology. Many of its leading ideas can thus be more rapidly introduced by contructing and
comparing them with ideas of deep ecology which are already widely diffused (if often in a
muddy or muddled way). As a spin-off then, this outline will offer a simple exposition of central
ideas of deep ecology, and further criticism of many of them. In any practical showdown,
however, deep ecology and deep-green theory are not antagenistic positions but close allies, both
deep positions within a wider environmental alliance.
Though the rudiments of deep-green theory go back about as far as deep ecology (to around
1973), it remained unnamed until the early 80's (and only achieved initial investigation in Bennett
86). Moreover, it has not hitherto attained in any fuller platform and slogan formulation, such as
deep ecology has benefitted (and suffered) from almost since its inception.
The term 'deep ecology' was coined by the Norwegian intellectual, Ame Naess, to label an
emerging environmental movement. But, despite Naess's commitment to pluralism, it was from
the outset constrained to a certain style of environmental position. The notion has since been
elaborated and further delimited not only by Naess but, in the first place, by several Northamericans, particularly Bill Devall and George Sessions, who have on occasion collaborated with
Naess (their main work on deep ecology is cited in the reference list at the end). The notion has
caught on outside narrow academic circles, especially in North America and Australia, where, in
contrast to Wes tern Europe, significant areas of natural environment remain and are becoming of
increasing public concern.
Deep ecology is a radical environmenta l position, which goes far beyond resource
conservation positions (which are typically concerned with the management and stewardship of
resources in long-term human interests); and it offers a much deeper challenge to prevailing
attitudes and practices (of the dominent social paradigm), especially those which concern more or
less natural environments. (Leading features of Resource Conservation are explained in several
sources; e.g. Rodman.)
�2
Deep ecology takes off from value theory themes which stand in diametrical opposition to
mainstream Western ethical and social theory.1 The first of these themes, the wide values theme,
is that what is valuable in or for itself is not confined to human beings or their features (such as
their interests, concerns, pleasures, consciousness, etc.), but extends much more widely to other
beings. The value of these other systems or creatures of their features is not merely instrumental,
aluable as a means to human objectives, but is independent of human concerns; it is in brief
nonanthropic.
Indeed deep ecology goes further, rejecting the greater value assumption, according to
which anthropic values always take precedence over such natural values. How then is value
distributed, in particular across the things of the world? It is here that deep ecology and deepgreen theory part company. Deep ecology takes value to be restricted to things that are alive (in
some attentuated sense, so it turns out); this is the theme of biocentrism, life-centredness. And it
assumes that these things with life are all of equal value; this is the controversial theme of
biospheric egalitarianism. A unique assignment of value results. Deep-green theory rejects both
these themes. For reason to be given, Deep-green theory is much less specific as to how value is
distributed. But it is spread on to things - wholes, collectives, systems as well as individuals which are not alive, and it does not cover all things that are living. Nor is it distributed onto those
things that have the quality in an equal fashion, except in the trivial sense that all have or partake
of value. Some things that have value are much more valuable than others; there is some weak
(and partial) ordering of things with value. It is these things that are worth conserving,
preserving, and so on, the more the more valuable they are. Thus Deep-green theory is
axiocentric, value-centered.
Value in nature is regular coupled with some mix of value-making characteristics,
including such defeasible ecological universals as richness, rarity stability, resilience, diversity,
and so forth. But there are considerable constraints on how values are derived from any such
"objective function". One over or thing constraint, that of impartiality, substitutes for that of
egalitarianism. According to the requirement of biospecies impartiality, which excludes certain
types of class chauvinism, a thing cannot be ranked as valuable or ahead or another simply in
virtue of belonging to some species (e.g. being human); such features are not in themselves
value-making characteristics.
1 There are some who account
themselves deep ecologists who would repudiate such an approach through
value theory, most notably Warrick Fox.
�3
Figure 1. A compariso n of Deep Ecology and Deep-gree n theory, in capsule
form. 2
Deep ecology
biospheric egalitarianism
Shared themes or goals I
I
I
I
I
Deep-gree n. theory
wider value theme rejection
of greater value assumption,
+through
➔
biocentrism
ecological universals as
defeasible value-making
biospecies impartiality , and
rejection of class chauvinism
axiocentrism
characteristics
extreme holism
natural systems as
integral, irreducible
cosmic identity
moderate holism
ultraperson al identificati on
maximal
satisizing on value
self-realisation
determinates
limited interference only
with natural systems;
restricted rights thereto
commitment to implement
principles applications to
economics, politics and
policy, especially in
bioregional ism
➔
environmen tal areas; e.g.
regionalism and federalism +-
ecoregionalism
human population reduction
A major difference between the theories lies in the distribution of value (from which much
else of ethical consequenc e arises: rights, obligations , and so forth). Deep ecology, like simpler
utilitarianism, proposes a unique initial distribution (over a given atomistic base class): each living
individual is assigned equal intrinsic value, and nothing else has intrinsic value. Values of other
things, complexes, systems and so on, are then in principle open to determinate s by a calculation.
It is a type of recipe to which intellectual s bent on numeration and calculation are regularly
attracted; pseudo-obj ective variations are to be found not only in utilitarianis m but in economics
and in democtrati c political theory, and also in probability theory, where elements of suitable
2 Most of the capsule theses of
deep ecology are explained in detail in the critique, CD; many of those of
Deep-green theory are explained in FE.
�4
initial esembles are assigned equal probability, through a principle of indifference. The practice is
also as problematic as indifference principles (cf. CD on deep ecological egalitarianism).
Deep-green theory rejects the assumptions upon which the deep ecological distribution
depends. It rejects the latent atomism, the idea of ultimates upon which value devolves. More
dangerously these days, it rejects the equality assumption. Much as some humans are more
valuable than others (on most moral and other counts), so some creatures, some systems, are
more valuable than others. DG theory is, quite deliberately, much less specific as to how value is
distributed. Often enough, especially in difficult cases, assessment of value is a complex matter
which may call for much reflection (for some details see TE, first essay). But certainly value is an
unevenly distributed feature of a variety of things, not just at bottom altimates. It is a quality of
many items - wholes, collectives, systems as well as individuals - which are not alive; and it does
not extend to all things that are living, e.g. malignant virases engineered in biochemical
laboratories. Nor is it distributed onto those things that have the quality in an equal fashion,
except in the trivial sense that all have or partake of value. Some things that have value are much
more valuable than others; there is some weak (and partial) ordering of things with value. It is
these things that are worth conserving, preserving, and so on, the more the more valuable they
are. Thus the theory is at least weakly axiocentric, value-centered. In fact it is more strongly
axiocentric, in two important respects. Firstly, deontic notions such as those of obligation, rights
and duties, answer back to axiologic ones (see TE, essay 3). Secondly, more difficult to explain,
value penetrates the metaphysics, including what is accounted fact; most strikingly, the choice of
actual world itself depends upon value (see DP).
�AUTHENTIC DEEP ECOLOGY:
expositio n, critique, alternati ves
PREFAC E
No longer is there so much need to chronicle and document the major and serious environmental
problems confonting the Earth and its ecosystems. Much of the relevant information - details of the
damage, difficulties, devastation, disasters, and dire threats of more - now appears in later chapters of
biology and geography textbooks, often in striking pictorial or diagramatic form; and the information
is regularly updated by articles, too often environmental horror stories, in popular perodicals or
newspapers. While many of the problems are abundantly and glaringly evident, others are more
subtle, sometimes more insidious, hidden from view, but bound to emerge in not so long term. So
we can take the problems, and further problems, "for granted", though with little comfort or ease.
Many were, and are, foreseeable; many were, or could be, avoided or mitigated.
Serious though these problems are they are still not being taken with full or due seriousness by
those who exercise some control over how relevant things happen. 1 Most states are busy attempting
more of what has landed us in some of the worst of these problems: more growth, of economic
products, of people, of consumption2 , of energy; more or "better" militarisation; more productivity,
of agriculture, with environmental cost-cutting and short-cutting, more development and more
consumption thereby of biological capital. Growth remains at the top of most national agendas; it is
seen as a panacea for all other problems, economic and security problems of course. Serious
environmental problems are still mostly treated as economic "externalities", peripheral but growing
nuisances, that we shall have to learn to live with3, but not the "real" problems.
We have lived under this dominant destructive ideology for much too long already. It has
already led to the devastation of much of the planet Earth, to the loss of much of value, many species,
While there is a power structure, and a power elite, in all states (virtually as a corollary of features of the
state, such as its monopolies on coercion, currency, etc), it cannot be pretended that there are any impressive
control systems. So some of the problems are unintended. Given the propensity for human-developed
control systems to function in undesirable ways, e.g. to tend towards militarism and totilitarianism, the lack
of satisfactory system is no doubt to the good.
2
So, for example, the USA is pressuring Japan to consume more, internally, to ease American balance-ofpayments problems, and soak up excessive production; there is no pressure to produce less.
3
So, for example, prestigious scientific organisations are preparing to teach us how to live with and love the
Greenhouse effect. Many communities have learned to live with damaging and noxious pollution; no doubt
they would miss it if it were gone.
�2
much irreplaceable wilderness, and has left us with an immense, and sometimes hopeless, clean-up
and restoration task. Moreover things will rapidly get worse environmentally if we are not rid of it
and its variants. Plainly we need several strategies: a strategy for fundamental change, a strategy
(needed first) for what comes after the change, and so on.
Deep ecology offers a strategy and an initial structure for addressing these environmental
problems, along with proposals for addressing the menacing array of other problems confronting
modern industrial societies. It is a strategy which goes much deeper than the pathetic patch-up the
damage after it's largely done (pollute, then cleanup or pay a bit) approaches that prevail. For this
reason alone, deep ecology deserves to be much more widely known. But there is still no satisfactory
text on the topic. This book, while hardly an easy introduction to the subject4 , aims to fill a part of
the gap. Perhaps too, it can help serve as a basis for that introductory text that still needs to be
written.
This text tries to do what the title promises. It begins with a sympathetic exposition of deep
ecology. That is necessary. It remains hard to find out what deep ecology (DE) is, as it means so
many different things to different expositors and exponents. The matter of different visions and
elaborations of DE is taken up in the second part, which provides a detailed critique of DE in its main
versions. In the final part, other criticisms of DE, from its rival social ecology in particular, are
(negatively) assessed; an alternative to DE, deep-green theory is outlined; and some of the political
connections of deeper environmentalism are investigated, including strategies for appropriate
revolutionary change.
Deep ecology is the most exciting deep environmentalism on the present intellectual market; for
all its sortcomings, it is still the most thoroughly worked out widely accessible position. That is one
reason why its worth a fair bit of time, my time, in struggling with it and trying to improve it, and
your time, in getting to know it.
This text grew from a critique of DE along with an unpublished expansion of that critique
(called 'Continuin g the critique of deep ecology') and sundry associated articles on deep
environmentalism. As an expanded version of critique5 remains the centre of the text, some of what I
wrote in prefacing the critique should be repeated. I think, I hope, it merits repetition, as amended.
4
There is a need also, as will be explained in subsequent chapters, for a text that measures up to recognised
academic standards, sufficiently complex and full of (bad) argument, in order to put deep ecology firmly on
academic agenda, to try to ensure that it is not merely a crude popular movement that can be intellectually
ignored.
5
'A critique of deep ecology' Radical Philosophy.
�3
It was with considerable ambivalence and some serious misgiving that I first undertook a
critique of DE, as it risked offending many friends in the deep ecology movement. It succeeded. The
trouble was that when I got down to trying to explain what deep ecology was all about (for a seminar,
at which N aess and Devell were present, some years ago), I found myself confronted by the
following predicament :- While I applauded much about the deep ecology movement, and what it
stood for, I could not find my way to accept deep ecology as formulated by any of its main
proponents. The reason was not merely that deep ecology is less than a fully coherent body of
doctrine, with, furthermore, many problematic sub-themes, but worse, that much of it departed from
the ideals I felt it should be expressing, and that some of it was rubbish. Yet I had no doubt that deep
ecology was a worthwhile enterprise (carried on by dedicated and good people), and that something
along the lines of a replacement for deep ecology - revamped deep ecology if it is simply a matter of
repairs, deep-green theory for more - was very much on the right track. Or to put it slightly
differently, while rejecting every formulation of deep ecology, I agreed with the general drift of much
of deeper ecology, and with virtually all the careful applications of deep ecology.
My attempted resolution went along the lines of critical rationalism (for which I have been
criticised). The method was to subject deep ecology to severe criticism, with a view to obtaining
thereby an improved, more acceptable formulation, which at the same time met other desirable criteria.
However to resort to such critical methods was already to type oneself, as old consciousness and old
paradigm still, and to risk alienating part of the deep movement. The risks have been taken: but there
are some concessions. In the end, when it comes to applications, to lifestyles and policies, the
rational ladder has to be enlarged and also supplemented; for it offers only one distinctive way among
many.
Though the applications of deep ecology to real-world problems are very important, as already
indicated, we shall only reach them and not attempt to develop them very far. However a detailed
listing of various important applications that have been made will be given.6
Naess and others have complained, with some justification, that I have not gone out my way to
find generous interpretation s of deep ecology, which remove apparent rubbish from it (see Naess RS
p.3). It is true that, following the prevailing philosophical mode (by no means always to be
applauded), I have not been very charatable (here or in other philosophical critiques). I have treated
DE as a find it, hopefully in an expositionally straightforwar d and honest way. I do, however, try to
6
The final part of the background paper on population (Routley 84) provides one application in detail, an
application expanding on some remarks of Naess (in 83). And several other examples which Naess has
outlined (also in 83) can be similarly elaborated. Gare has attempted a major elaboration applying to science.
�4
offer alternatives to DE and improvements upon it when I discover them. Deep-greep theory can be
seen as a fairly comprehensive alternative.
�/
ON SOCIAL ECOLOGY
A heavy attack on DE, a tirade really, was launched recently by Bookchin. It caught
leading deep ecologists - who had rather foolistly seen Bookchim as one of them, though it
was obvious enough that he wasn't - off-guard, entirely stunning some of them 1 .
Bookchin furthermore went about his frontal attack in a most ungentlemanly and less than
American way, using practices and methods that Americans do not use as regards decent
fellow countrymen, but reserve for communism and its representatives and others engaged
in un-American activities. 2 Intellectual exchanges are supposed, otherwise, to proceed in a
nice, collegial way (the knives come out in the back rooms, not on the front pages).
Bookchin broke American cultural conventions (which is a main reason why several people,
e.g. Sale, failed to comprehend what was going on). There is heaps of straight
mudslinging in Bookchin, name-calling, attributions of guilt by very thin associations, ad
hominen moves. We shall bypass this unworthy material, much of what there is in the
attack, because anyone with decent basic training in logic can document it for themselves, if
they can obtain copies of the work (not at all easy in the peripheral world). We shall try to
isolate the much slimmer intellectual content of Bookchin's criticism.
Should we dig under all the dirt, we find there are some core criticisms of DE, which
are for the most part defective, but as well some interesting suggestions, which are worth
fossicking out and displaying. There are two key issues. In both Bookchin's criticism
repacts, but focusses upon DE, the old-fashioned erroneous socialist condemnation of
environmentalism of all types - as not only getting priorities wrong in not putting human
societies absolutely first, but worse failing to appreciate that environmental problems are the
product of social problems and removed with them.
• Ecological problems are at bottom nothing but social problems. This rival reduction
theme, which is what justfies the social ecology terminology and approach, also gets stated
in various, often weaker or slacker forms: For instance, ecological problems have their
1
The phrase 'off-guard' is from Naess. As to the extent of Bookchin's depth see the
Critique.
2
This nasty face of American intellectual activity is well exposed in Chomsky's
political writings. For the most part American philosophical periodicals permit only
the nice face to be exhibited. For my part I enjoyed some of this outrageous stuff of
Bookchin's, which was livily and refreshing after the flatness and dullness of much in
Naess's notes, and also by contrast with Bookchin's earlier papers, which are mostly
repetitive and often rather vacuous diatribes.
�2
roots in social problems, ecological problems have their ultimate roots in society and social
problems, etc. But DE, 'despite all its social rhetoric, has virtually no real sense of' this;
that is a major (disgusting) trouble with it.
The correctness and tellingness of social reduction themes vary more or less
inversely, depending in particular upon how far the operative term 'social' is stretched. If
all problems concerning "groups" (including single member groups) of "individuals" of any
sort (including volcanoes, hurricanes, seiges, etc.) are "social" problems, then evidently all
ecological problems become social problems, as these are all concerned in some way with
individuals and their relations with their surroundings. But such a misleading adjustment to
the theme, rendered near-tautologous by a low redefinition of 'social', is not what Bookchin
and other socialists have intended. They characteristically intend by 'social' 'human social',
and what they intend to convey by 'the social roots of the ecological crisis' is that it is 'the
gross inequities in [human] society' - which should be attended to first- 'that underpin the
disequilibrium between [human] society and nature'. 3
Now this strong social bias thesis is interestingly false. Consider counterexamples of
the following sort:Imagine mixed capitalistic and welfare socio-economic arrangements had worked and
succeeded in eliminating the gross inequities in society, at least in some relatively
independent regions of the world, and perhaps even globally. There were, it still seems,
real prospects that this could have happened in the 60s, had energy and funds been
redirected from military-industrial enterprise to social-industrial activity. A welfare safety
net is stretched right across the regions concerned so that no longer is any human homeless
or without sufficient nourishment or basic eductional opportunities and so on, so that
poverty and all other grosser inequities are eliminated. 4 It is sufficiently evident that even if
all this is achieved, many ecological problems will not be addressed, but may be aggravated
by the increased industrialisation and economic development involved. The lot of factory
farmed animals or of threatened wild species would not be removed, but, if touched at all,
3
Bookchin 87 p.10 where the thesis is inaccurately associated with Kropotkin.
4
Naturally, finer inequities, such as unsatisfactory job relativities, race relativities, etc.,
will not thereby be eliminated and are perhaps part of "the human condition", some of
which many societies will be prepared to live with or ignore.
The relatively easy opportunities of the 60s for societies free of grosser inequities (for
good or even great societies) may have passed, as certain new social problems have
much complicated matters.
�3
likely worsened. There is no guarantee that the position of wild and natural regions would
thereby be improved, that these regions would be freed from constant inroads by human
developmental activity, that the Antartcic would not be citified, and so on. In general, no
environmental damage and degradation that did not rebound upon the relevant human social
situation would be halted or resolved. Furthermore, not only is the strong social bias thesis
false, as well human social concerns do not always come first where ecological depth is
attained.
Bookchin suggests an historical basis for the strong social bias thesis, that the notion
of the domination of nature arose in the first place out of social domination of people by
people, women by men, and so on. But that is pseudo-history; for the domination of nature
and some appreciation of its operation, reaches as far back, so far as we can see, so far as
our records go, as other forms of domination. What is more, even if a real history were like
Bookchin's it would offer little support for strong social bias thesis. All it would reveal is
that some ecological problems were glimpsed by anology with social problems, not that
ecological problems are at bottom social problems and so resolved with them.
• • "Second nature", constituted by human society, is uniquely different from first nature,
and so naturally and justifiably interferes substantially with the processes of first nature.
The unexploited play on "second nature" does nothing to support such intervention; or the
contrary, second nature follows nature rather effortlessly without specific reflection.
However, the two "natures" distinction, inadequately introduced and incapable of bearing
much weight, is applied, in social ecology, to support much human interferenc e and
substantial separateness. 'Natural evolution has not only provided humans with ability but
also the necessity to be purposive interveners into "first nature", to conscously change "first
nature" by means of highly institutionalized forms of community we call "society".' 5 Given
the highly artificial and rather accidental social forms now in place, that many humans now
suffer or swear under, this is very far from obvious.
This second nature vs. first nature division would re-erect the old division and
separation , Man vs. Nature, in old-fashio ned football-m ilitary terms, that deeper
environmentalism has been concerned to remove. It is human chauvinistic; it ignores the
continuity between humans and other creatures, the overlap in incapacities and skills
(remembering all the capable animals able to live skilfully off the land and all the incapable
humans). As regards relevant skills and capabilities, there is no uniqueness, or singularity,
of humans as a whole. It would chauvinistically try to convert being human into a
5
Bockchin 87 p.21.
�4
significant moral category, when it is not. 6 It would induce an inverse, obnoxious ranking
among biological kinds; first class, matching second nature, and second class, matching
first or primitive nature. The division would accordingly offer a springboard to a range of
further interference of the sorts of which we have already witnessed much too much.
The main thrust of Bookchin's attack is thus an old-fashioned socialist criticism,
which fails any longer to impress because of its excess anthropocentrism. Social problems,
which are of course often but not always intertangled with environmental problems, are no
longer top of action, political, or other agendas; nor are their standard modern rivals,
similarly entangled with environmental problems, namely economic problems. There is a
third set of problems, neither exactly left nor right, neither exactly social nor economic nor
reducing in approved fashion to those would-be universal categories, nor yet forming an
entirely independent dimension: namely, environmental problems.
Bookchin faithfully rolls out other elements of routine socialist criticism, against deep
ecology. Some of these are telling enough, but mostly not new. They include:• a seriously flawed pantheon of heroic figures. Bookchin gets stuck into DEs favourable
mention of Heidegger, of course, but he also tries to convey quite by association with
Woody Guthrie (p.6), Malthus (p.15) Ehrlich (p.17) and others. Problems with the heroic
figures and historical pedigree of DE had already been observed by others, e.g.
Sholomowski.
• a thin and inadequate historical genesis and setting. In this regard Naess's work is, of
course, primarily in the perfectly admissible tradition and company of systematic
philosophy and of most science. Deep environmental has, no more than science, to supply
at the outset a full historical context in which its ideas are placed (pace. p.5 bottom).
6
So it is argued at length in EP.
�INTRODUCTION
Deep ecology is a major environmental position and movement, one of the most important of
contemporary times. In name and in assemblage of themes it is a recently elaborated position,
dating back only to about 1973; but most of the themes are older, some of them much older. It is
the assemblage, package and the way that has been put to environmental work that is newer and
different. The initial assemblage and the name are due to Naess, a principal character (in all senses)
in what follows 1.
1. On the deep ecology movement and ideology: their intellectual standing.
The expression 'deep long-range ecological movement', of which 'deep ecology' 1s a
subsequent abbreviation, was minted by N aess to label an emerging environmental movement .
Naess was then (sociological) finder ather than founder of this emerging movement, a movement
concerned primarily with the natural environment. In explaining ideological features of the
movement Naess set down a number of what he took to be characteristic themes. It is from these
themes, with much elaboration and considerable variation, that deep ecology, as a doctrine, has
grown. It is with the evolving body of doctrine, the position, that we shall primarily be concerned.
Control such as it was, of the doctrine did not long remain with Naess. Like many good promising
ideas it was quickly imported into California, where it was modified, and to some extent converted
into a further individual consciousness-elevating exercise. Thus the doctrine has been elaborated
and further delimited not only by Naess but, in the first place, by several North-Americans,
particularly Devall and Sessions, who have on occasion collaborated with N aess, and more recently
by various Australians, most notably Fox and Seed.NI Deep ecology has caught on largely outside
No attempt will be made to give an account of Naess's philosophy, except insofar as it bears directly on
deep ecology, though such an attempt would be worth making. We commend the work (which could
simply be entitled Naess ) to others; a smell beginning is made in Naess and Rothenberg.
Naess was already a significant, influential, but maverick, figure on the European intellectual scene well
before deep ecology was discerned. Naess had been professor of philosophy at Oslo since 1939, a chair he
obtained when 27. In early days he was a Norwegian Ayer, likwise basking in reflected glory of a
disinfecting logical positivism; but how much Naess subsequently diverged from empiricism can be
gauged from his 1971 debate with Ayer (recorded in Reflexive Water). In fact Naess had already began to
move out of an empiricist set as a result of his early interesting attempt to carry it towards its logical
conclusion, and to do philosophy itself empirically, recorded in Truth as Conceived by those who are not
Professional Philosophers. Subsequently Naess traversed a wide and unusual range of philosophical
enterprise: scepticism naturally; many of the then fashionable areas, such as communication, semantics
and interpretation; and several others that were much less philosophically fashionable, but politically
significant, such as Gandhi and pacifism, ideology and failure of objectivity, and of course pluralism.
These investigations form the complex backdrop to deep ecology. Unfortunately, despite Naess's longstanding commitment to pluralism, deep ecology was from the outset constrained to a certain unduly
narrow style of environmentalismm as will appear.
�5
narrower academic circles, especially in North America and Australia, where, in contrast to Western
Europe, significant areas of natural environment still remain; these are rapidly becoming of
increasing public concern.
Deep ecology is a radical environmental pos1t10n, which goes far beyond resource
conservation positions (which are typically concerned at best with the management, husbandry and
stewardship of resources in long-term human interests); and it offers a much deeper challenge to
prevailing attitudes and practices (of the dominant social paradigm), especially those which concern
more or less natural environments.N 2 Deep ecology (hereafter is an ideology in the respectible
older sense, a system of belief and ideas. It is not an ideology in the post Marxion sense, of such a
system characterised by an inflexibility and an unwillingness to listen to other points of view. Quite
the contrary.
Radical DE may still be, though its radicalness is in decline as it ages and as informed opinion
on environmental issues advances; respectable, it is not. In particularly DE is not a respectable
academic subject. Though it is arguably the most important movement in environmental philosophy
in recent times, it is fl:Ot even mentioned in several recent texts on the topic. There are several
reasons for this, ranging from the conservation and close-mindedness, snobbery and bigotry
almost, of much contemporary philosophy, to evident presentational deficiencies in DE, its
mouldeness, its lack of discriptive and argument, its popular appeal. DE is particularly weak weaker than environmental ethics, which do poorly on these academic indicators - on a run of
things that are taken to matter in contemporary ethics; analyses of meanings of key ethical terms,
reductions of ethical terms to few primitives, smart arguments, utilitarian-style justifications, etc.
That is one reason why it is not part of Anglo-American analytic philosophy; another is that it
challenges so much of what analytic philosophy represents and (politically) presupposes.
DE scarcely represents, then, many of you will be relieved to learn analytic philosophers'
philosophy. N aess believes has been through and seen through that sort of philosophy early in life;
and seen that it does not contribute very much to the real features of life and living that philosophy
should make significant contributions towards, but mostly does not. As a result you will find very
little analysis in DE. Also there is remarkedly little argument, though argument is often taken to be
what is distinctive in philosophy. (But that is an Anglo American idea of what philosophy is all
about; you find comparatively little argument in much Continental European philosophy - what you
do find, even in authors like Kant and Hegel who look superficially as if they are arguing, is mostly
patently bad argument, poor at best. DE is much more like European philosophy in tone and style,
which helps explain why it is neglected and denigrated in American schools; by contrast, in British
philosophy curricula the environment is only just beginning to win any satisfactory attention at all.)
�6
These are some of the reasons why, despite its importance, DE goes largely unmentioned in
most texts on environmental philosophy and ethics. This says a good deal about the texts, which
are mostly not offering satisfactory coverage of their fields (see further chapter 2). But it indicates
something too about DE, which is not as intellectually accessible as it could or should be.
Moreover, presentation of DE often go out of their way to violate (questionable) academic
standards, expecially those for clarity of statement, extent of analysis, and level of argumentation.
Deep ecology is an amophous doctrine, as anyone who tries to set down from its sources in a
clear and crisp way what its themes are, will readily enough discover. Of course compared with
much French philosophy, it is clarity itself; but French philosophy does not provide an acceptable
benchmark. A good deal of the obscurity concerning DE results from its varying and different
presentations by different expositors. To avoid this problem, we shall, for the most part, follow
Naess's elaboration of DE, taking that as fairly authoritative. But the problem is not thereby
resolved. Naess's views on deep ecology, its place and importance, and its themes, have changed
over the years. Nor are the themes always, sufficiently clear though many of them are succinctly
stated. Some of them are said, by disciples or by N aess himself, to be metaphorical. Furthermore,
as some important matters go largely unelaborated, for instance the issues of satisfactory methods
for achieving ecopolitical change.
To surmount these kinds of difficulties, we shall (somewhat presumptuously no doubt) offer
our own exposition and elaboration of DE, what we call authentic deep ecology. At least under
Naess's conception of DE we are entitled to do this. In part II however, which offers a critique of
DE as it has been variously presented, we shall look at the genuine article in its various
formulations.
Rather than becoming easier with the passage of time, DE has become more and more
difficult, and less intellectually tractable as it picks up or toys with environmental fashions, often
zanier environmental fads. It is complicated by New themes, often muddy themes, and its solidity
is removed by modification or erosion of old themes. Among the new themes picked up, several to
be examined critically (in part II), are the Gaia hypothesis, according to which the Earth itself some
sort of organic living system.
DE is thus an irremedially vague object. Its vagueness has increased with its popularity with
its becoming on the green fringe a fashionable, not to say vogue, item (a Foucaultian object).
Vague and vogue, a common concotenation.
2. Types of environmental positions: deep environmentalism.
�7
What distinguishes an environmental position is a certain level of constraint with respect to
the environment, the natural environment especially: not anything goes with respect to nature. In
this regard environmental positions contrast with a dominant theme of Western cultural heritage;
namely, provided it does not interfere with acknowledged people such as property holders, that
people can do more or less what they like with the land, and with what grows and lives there. It is
even therefor humans to exploit or manage.
This unrestrained position imposes few or no constraints upon treatment of the environment
itself. Under it there would, for example, be little compunction about using up material resources,
forests, fisheries and so on, immediately or even destroying them. But, because it grants such
entitlements to exploitation, the unrestrained position can be excluded from properly moral
positions. 2 For it fails to meet the basic universality requirement on moral principles, of
independence of person, place or time, a requirement which implies that persons of different races,
colours, sexes or ages, or at different places or times are not treated unfairly or seriously
disadvantaged. Insofar as the unrestrained position would permit the exploitation, degradation and
even destruction, of all present resources and environments, it places future humans at a very
serious disadvantage. The position is thus one of expediency, not morality, typically yielding, like
economics, evaluative assessments based on short-term narrow local (or national) interests, rather
than assessments appropriately based on long-range transnational values.
Opposed to the unrestrained position are various environmental positions (what Leopold saw
as the land ethic is just one of these). Such positions can be classified - conveniently for
subsequent development but in a way that already refines and extends Naess's classification - into
three groups: shallow, intermediate and deep. Unlike the unrestrained position, all these positions
would conserve and maintain things - materials, creatures, forests, etc. The shallow
(conservation) position differs from the unrestrained position primarily in taking a longer-term view
and taking account of future humans, their welfare and so forth. It is more enlightened than the
unrestrained position in taking a longer-term perspective: hence its alternative description in the
literture as resource conservation (thus, e.g., soil conservation organisations). Though this
conservation position is only a step away from the unrestrained position, it does pass the test of
morality in that future people are not treated unfairly; so it is a very significant step.
2
This is a substantial and controversial claim, especially since it accounts much economic activity
unethical in the narrow or semse, as involving practices of expediency, not morality. For the fuller case
for obligations and commitment to future humans, see e.g. Routley 81, and other essays collected with it
in Partridge 81. This section is drawn from my People vs the Land (84).
�8
The shallow and unrestricted positions are closely related by an important feature they share and which justifies lumping them together as shallower positions. They are both highly
anthropocentric; they do not move outside a human-centred framework, which construes nature and
the environment instrumentally, that is, simply as a means to human ends and values. Thus they
take account ultimately only of human interests and concerns; all environmental values reduce to
these. It is in this respect especially that these shallower positions differ from deeper, less resource
and management and exploitation oriented, positions.
According to deeper positions, humans are not the sole items of value or bestowing value in
the world, and not all things of value are valuable because they answer back in some way to human
concerns. But deeper positions differ in the weight or relative importance they assign to human
concerns. According to an intermediate position serious human concerns always come first; and
while other things, such as higher animals, have value or utility in their own right, their value is
outranked by that of humans. The deep position rejects this assumption, and maintains that even
serious human concerns should sometimes lose out to environmental values.
Figure 1. The positions separated, and separating principles
SHALLOWER
UNRESTRAINED
DEEPER
SHALLOW
IMMEDIAIB
DEEP
MORALITY
SOLE VALUE
GREATER VALUE
REQUIREMENT
ASSUMPTION
ASSUMPTION
(of human apartheid)
(of human supremacy)
The watershed principle which divides the shallow from the deeper positions is the sole value
assumption . According to this major assumption, which underlies prevailing Western social
theory, humans are the only things of irreducible (or intrinsic) value in the universe, the value of all
other things reducing to or answering back to that of humans in one way or another. This
assumption is build into most present political and economic arrangements; for example, only
aggregated preferences or interests of certain (present) humans are considered in democratic
political choice, and likewise in economic decision making; other creatures and natural items are
presented at best through the preference or votes of interested humans. 3
3
The points are explained in more detail in EP, where too, account is taken of the shift from humans to
persons (which would be important were it taken seriously and adhered to) and also of the inclusion of
�9
Similar assumptions are made in mainstream ethical theories. Typical are reductive theories
which endeavour to derive ethical judgements from features of closed systems of humans.
Examples are provided by presently fashionable ethical theories, such as standard utilitarianism. 4
According to utilitarianism what ought to be done, as well as what is best, is determined through
what affords maximum satisfaction (preference-fulfilment, pleasure, absence of pain, and so on,
for other satisfaction determinates) to the greatest number of individual humans. In theories like
utilitarianism, the outside world of nature does not enter through direct inputs or outputs, but only
insofar as it is reflected in the psychological states of individuals. Such ethical theories are
appropriately described as those of apartness or human apartheid. Man is, or is treated as, apart
from Nature; there is virtually total segregation. Nature or the land enters only as a remote
experiential backdrop, and onstage is the drama of human affairs and interests.
However, humans cannot be entirely insulated from their environment; for example,
volcanoes affect temperatures thus affecting climate thus affecting crop yield and food supplies. At
least limited intercourse with the environment has to be admitted as a result. So, in economics,
ethics, and political theory, secondary theories, dealing with linkages to the environment, have been
appended (thus, for example, externality theory in economics, some allowances for "side"
constraints in more sophisticated utilitarianism, and so on). But the environment remains treated as
an awkward or tiresome afterthought or backdrop, a (re-)source and sink, when it is considered at
all.
There is, however, another approach also with historical standing, vying with (and indeed
often confused with) human apartheid, which can accommodate secondary theories a little more
satisfactorily. That is the position of superiority or human supremacy, according to which Man,
though included in Nature, is above the rest of Nature, meaning ethically superior to it.N While
human supremacist positions can incorporate the sole value assumption and thus remain in the
shallow ethical area, they have the option of rejecting it in favour of the less objectionable greater
value assumption; other things being equal, the value of humans is greater than other things; the
value of humans surpasses that of all other things in the universe. This assumption allows that
other objects, such as some higher animals, may have irreducible value; what it insists upon is that,
at least for "normal" members of respective species, this value never exceeds that of humans. What
super-humans. With value for natural items goes, of course, concern, respect, and sensitivity, towards
them; but the reverie connection may exhibit occasional failures.
4
But the same holds for other fashionable theories on the American-dominated ethical scene, namely
contractualism and libertarianism. More broadly based historical utilitarianisms, which allow for some
input from other sentient creatures, are considered below.
�10
is generally presupposed is that other objects - animals, plants and their communities - are never of
very much importance compared with humans. Though human supremacy has appeared in variants
upon utilitarianism (from Hutcheson and Bentham on) where animal pain is taken into consideration
along with human, Wes tern ethics and associated social sciences such as demography, economics
and political theory, remain predominantly apartheid in form. So in practice does most
utilitarianism. 5
It is the repudiation of the greater value assumption that separates deep from intermediate
positions. Perhaps the most familiar example of an intermediate position 6 is that of Animal
Liberation, in the form in which individual animals (but not plants, forests, ecosystems, etc.) are
taken to have value in their own right, though in any play-off with humans, humans win. Under
the deep position such an outcome is by no means inevitable and not alway assured; in cases of
conflict of animals with humans or natural systems with humans, humans sometimes lose.
There are various arguments designed to show that the deep assessment is right, that humans
do not always matter7 and, more pertinently, that humans should sometimes lose out. A typical one
takes the following form:- Some humans voluntarily lead worthless or negative lives, lives without
net value. The point, though not uncontroversial, 8 can be argued even from a shallow
utilitarianism. Take for instance a life of pain and suffering and little or no happiness: it has a
substantial net negative utility. However, some small natural systems do have net value; one
example would be an uninhabited undisturbed island (a live example might be a tropical island
before Club Mediterranee depradation). Now consider the situation where the considerable value of
a small natural system is to be sacrificed (in a way that shallowly affords no ethical impropriety) on
behalf of a set of humans whose lives each have no positive net value. For instance, the system is
to be exploited, just for the continued maintenance of these humans, or for their addition (as new
settlers) to an established population. Then in such circumstances, these humans lose out; the
natural system takes precedence. Similarly, trivial satisfactions of humans do not dominate over the
5
There practice contrasts with what the theory allows or requires. Utilitarianism is like much pollution
control, where regulations are on the books or are part of the law, but are or never only very occasionally
applied. Utilitarian double standards are further discussed and referenced in DEP #7.
6
Other examples are considered below. Two of the four form of ecological consciousness considered by
Rodman fit here (as Rodman has remarked). For instance, falling into the intermediate range are the types
of environmental positions adopted by Birch and Cobb, and by Attfield and by many other
consequentialists.
7
See the argument of EP, beginning the Last Man argument, p .... ff. See also the initial example of
Routley 2 79 ..
8
The point is argued in detail in DEP #3.
�11
integrity of rich natural environments. This simple result cuts deeply into (standard shallow)
consumer theory, to take just one example of the impact of deep environmentalism.
Authentic deep ecology is a type of deep environmentalism. A genuinely ecospheric
egalitarianism, such as deep ecology offers, is bound to reject the Greater Value assumption. For
under egalitarianism, larger collarations of significant eco-objects outweight smaller groupings of
undistinguished humans.
Notes
1. All their main work on deep ecology is cited in the reference list at the end.
2. Leading features of Resource Conservation are explained in several sources; e.g. Rodman.
3. Here authenticity is important. As will become evident in part II, certain proclaimed deep
ecologists are not prepared to scuttle the Greater Value assumption. As will also become evident,
the egalitarian arguments upsetting the Greater Value assumption are build on defective
foundations.
�CONTINUING THE CRITIQUE OF DEEP ECOLOGY
As a broad label for something rather environmentally different, and no doubt better, than
most ideologies that preceded it, 'deep ecology' is no doubt rather fine. That is how the label
often functions, honorifically, for instance in the collection under that label edited by Tobias, which
gives deep ecology none but a nebulous content, and which indeed contains many articles (such as
the interview with Soleri) in diametrical opposition to the more detailed platform promulgated by
the intellectual "leaders" of the deep ecology movements. In fact, a good deal of the more popular
appeal of deep ecology has been obtained by vacillation between the more discerning authentic
forms and the slack or nebulous forms. The nebulous use of the label has also given cover to some
of those who calls themselves 'deep ecologists', enabling them to shed awkward but crucial themes
from the more detailed platform (thus e.g. Fox).
Many are those who are now pleased to march under the rather fashionable nebulous
banner. 1 Many are not deep, in theory or practice, deeply committed, or deeply changed by the
march. Purchasing or growing organic vegetables, having spiritual experiences in a special natural
place, or practising some oriental art or exercise routine, does not ensure a deepened environmental
position, though it can be a step on the way.
While nebulous deep ecology is compatible with much that is neither deep nor even
significantly ecologically oriented, such as minor lifestyle adjustments within the industrial
paradigm, authentic deep ecology, which is not so slack, remains a defective doctrine, itself
oscillating between an overpermissive environmental assembly point, fast growing its radical
potential, on the one side, and an impermissive, unduly narrow doctrine, dubious or defective in
several of its leading themes, on the other side. Some of the worst of these themes, such as
biological egalitarianism, have already been criticised in sufficient detail in the original critique.
But other features of authentic deep ecology (hereafter mainly DE) were left largely untouched in
the original critique, and new features have emerged. The critique thus needs continuing.
Since the critique was produced, it has been become more difficult, if anything, to grasp
what DE is all about. Even Naess, the founder of the movement, who now tends to adhere much
more closely to the platform than other self-proclaimed deep ecologists, is inclined to make
I too am happy to march under the nebulous banner, though since my first critique I am no longer
particularly welcome. Initially I was cut by about half those individuals and institutions loosely
associated with deep ecology, since my critique began circulating. While I am become accustomed to this
sort of phenomenon in intellectual areas (criticism induces cool and long at least, even in logic), I didn't
expect so much of this given the Christian character of DE.; and such isolation does seriously reduce
information sources.
�2
apparently large concessions to opposition changes, which however he subsequently more
surreptitiously withdraws (of course this is familiar philosophical practice). At other times, he
withdraws with one hand what he is offering, some sort of olive branch, with the other.
The oscillation can be partly ascribed to conflicting motivation. On the one side, there is the
desire, stronger in the founder of DE, Naess, than in his American and Australian prophels, to
create a wide constituency, to tum no one away if it can in any way be avoided. But, on the other
there is an evident desire to make deep ecology a very select position, for a chosen few, a place to
be achieved only after a journey crossing some arduous terrain and involving some difficult life
adjustments. Deep ecology lacks the other-worldly and after-life resources which, in some of its
religious sources, appear to make for an easy resolution of this type of conflict.
I.Further problems with the platform and core platform of deep ecology.
It is the platform (at level 2 of the organising "double pyramid" of DE depicted below) that
constrains, delimits and defines deep ecology, so far as it is well-characterised. For even this level
is not very precisely characterised to put it mildly. Some exponents or practitioners of deep
ecology (some of them self-nominated or self-proclaimed) appear to repudiate even the core themes
at level 2 (e.g. Fox on axiocentrism). In the face of criticism, Naess himself backtracks as far as
he plausibly can, and sometime further. Not only does he considerably muddy the clear waters of
doctrine of occasional prosentations, but the doctrine itself begins to disappear, to be qualified
away (see e.g. Naess's performance in Resurgance , discussed below). The response to
intellectual criticism, which DE has been increasingly encountering as it spreads, has not been an
appropriate one of clarifying, and where requisite expounding, the core theory; it has rather been
one of retreat and digging in, of trying to hold the temple under seige, through diversionary activity
(or by broken-record techniques: simply reiterating parts of the messge not under heavy criticism
over and over again). When the critical raid has passed, the priests (and very occassional priestess)
of deep ecology reemerge, bearing the original doctrine essentially unchanged. The practice
resembles christianity (and too much of the practice of dominant science, the rival Western church).
Dealing with deep ecologists is very like dealing with devout christians; some of them one feels
sure have only recently changed positional hats, from evangelism to deep ecology
(correspondingly, my own position has become that of a black sheep).
A good deal of the argumentative practice of deep ecology appears to be explained by its
evangelical, and even messianic, character. There is genuine effort to tum no-one, except the most
incorrigible moneylenders, away from the temple. Everyone else (except perhaps philosophic
critics) is welcome, and encouraged to join in worship. Much like the churches, the founder of the
�3
De movement seeks as large a flock as possible. In these democratic days, numbers count (at least
under the "right" polling conditions); earlier numbers overted for taxing or tithing purposes. Other
high priests are not so sure: there are some critics of the movement, who may be beyond the poles;
and surely it should be a little more exclusive. But, in any event, DE is a much more liberal
doctrine than one of its sources, christianity, has ever been; it admits coupling not just (so it is
said) with all the great religions, but with all the more benign positions and practices that achieve
fashionability in California. All not ill-disposed to the natural world and duly acknowledging its
value can march under the banner of deep ecology, whose main citadel is Nature.
N aess casts the net of deep ecology wide, catching therewith not only many remote
supporters, but a number of hostile critics as well, such as latterly Bockshim (p.6). Naess now
considers the 8 point platform, formulated by himself and Susians and published in several slightly
different forms, as tentatively setting down the 'basic principles of Deep Ecology'. Naess 'look[s]
upon the formulations as tentatively expressing the most general and basic views which almost all
supporters of the movement have in common' (23.6.88). Thus the 8 point platform (condensed in
box 1) provides, in a still vague and tentative sort of way, the core, the core platform, of DE. To
get around a small obstacle, let us call those who would adhere to the principles of the core (in
some approved formulation) adherents of DE. They are adherents in (simply and literally)
holding to the core, the common (intersection of the) platform. They may not be members of the
movement in any ordinary sense, in any but the set-theoretical sense, because appropriate
intentionality is lacking, for instance they may never have heard of the movement, let alone made
any effort to join. Nor need adherents be supporters in the usual sense; support is neither
necessary nor sufficient for adherence. A critic such as Bockshim, or myself, can be an adherent
without being a supporter, without being supportive. Conversely, a supporter may not be an
adherent. The Salvation Army has many supporters, including atheists, who are not adherents.
The De movement has many supporters, some of whom call themselves 'deep ecologists', who do
not adhere to the core, even more or less. Many of these supporters are shallow environmentalists,
who do not accept the key first point, of intrinsic value outside humans, or try to evade it (e.g. by
redefinition, or by wrapping up value inextrically in relations to valuers). Since there are, in my
experience, many supporters and indeed enthusiasts who turn out to be of this shallow sort,
Naess's view is a little puzzling: what does he mean here 'almost all supporters'? Which isolated
exceptions does he have in view?
Box 1. The core
8 point plat/orm, in capsule form.
l. Non-human and human life have intrinsic value:
The well-being and flourishing of
human and non-human life on
earth have intinsic value, inherent
�4
value, etc. These values are
independent of the usefulness of
the non-human world for human
purposes.
2. Richness and diversity intrinsic virtues :
Richness and diversity of lifeforms contribute to a realisation
of these values and are also
values in themselves.
3.Humans unjustified in reducing such natural virtues:
Humans have no right to reduce
this richness and diversity except
to satisfy vital needs.
4.Human (values compatible with) population decrease:
The flourishing of human life and
culture is compatible with a
substantial decrease of the human
population. Flourishing of nonhuman life requires such a
decrease.
5. Human inte,ference with natural world excessive:
Present human interference with
the non-human world is
excessive and the situation is
rapidly worsening.
6. Policies and basic structures must be changed:
Policies must therefore be
changed. These policies will
affect our basic economic,
technological and ideological
structures.
7.Quality of life should supplant economic standard of living:
The change in our attitudes will
bring an appreciation of the
quality of life rather than
adhering to an increasingly
higher standard of living. There
will be a profound awareness of
the difference between big and
great. We will have a great
society with no bigness.
8. Obligation to attempted implementation:
Those who subscribe to the
foregoing points have an
obligation directly or indirectly to
try to implement necessary
changes.
Most of the core platform is no longer demanding; none of it, except for the last point,
specifying an obligation to attempted implementation, requires any commitment in the past of
adherents. Mainly adherence to DE, and support of DE, would be very considerably increased
were this requirement evaded. A strategy common to econonical practice and sociological research
�5
readily presents itself. Let us speak of silent adherents as those who adhere to the core platform,
more or less, except that they make no requisite effort to implement it (they may of course have
some vague failing of obligation, should they ever reflect on the matter). Even without the benefit
of scholarly survey work, it is evident that De would now have a large number of silent adherents,
many of whom are not however adherents, being either oblimovish, situated in repressive regions
or social situations, or simply uninformed (like indigenous peoples who think here are excessively
many excessively interferring humans of Caucasian stock).
The core platform represents a surprisingly incomplete and rather ill-organised collocation
of principles. The incompleteness is most conspicuous in point 6, which advances no details as to
envisaged structural changes. In extenuation N aess pleads that he has 'not has courage to go into
detail and define what these different structures will be, because we are going to have a lot of
different Green varieties. We shouldn't have one set of structures imposed' (R p.7). The
reasoning does not hold up; a range of structures, rather than a unique structure, can easily be
defined by constraints well-known ones as it happened. Naess should be encouraged to go on and
delimit the structural and policy changes. It is easy to give him a start, drawing upon DE and
neighbouring environmental positions. For instance,
6a. The policy objective of maximizing state economic growth should be abandoned in favour of a
highly selective approach to such growth. Evidently, there are many different ways such a change
in policy can be implemented. Some such change may be suggested by, but is not implied by point
7.
6b. Technology selection should be reoriented to appropriate technology, and away from risky
and polluting technology.
6c. Population policies should be directed at decreasing human populations in overpopulated
regions.
Principle 6c complements point 4, which does not actually enjoin any decrease in human
population. And so on, through a well-known list of constraints, with several of them regularly
included in principle of alternative social paradigms. Point 5 requires similar elaboration.
Another surprising feature is how mild most of these elaborations are, like the core platform
itself, which is pretty wishy-wasy when contrasted with what is happening out there
environmentally. Many environmentalists now wish to proceed much further, and to witness
some real curtailment of heavy broad-acre assaults upon environments, such as extensive clearcutting of forests, over-fishing of shelves, and over-grazing of range-lands, extensive strip and
beach mining, broad-acre pollution, and so on.
�6
Deindustrialization is not explicitly part of the DE program, and the issue is (perhaps
wisely) avoided by some leading proponents of DE. But deindustrialization - a considerable
reduction in the levels of industrial activity, particularly the undesirable dangerous destructive
prolluting types of industry that conspiciuosly contributed to the first industrial revolution - would
emerge from the alternative futures deep ecologists prefer to imagine, with a much smaller, less
consumption-oriented,terrestial human population. In any case, deindustrialization is an important
environmental objective, for both shallower and deeper ecology. It would assist, most materially,
in obtaining some better control on major environmental risks and problems, notably such matters
as the greenhouse affect, atmospheric ozone destruction, and acid rain and its fall-out.
The idea of progress is, like industry, also under a cloud. It is now naive to assume that
progress per se is automatically to be applauded, and that a telling criticism of something is that it
would block progress. People are these days a little more discriminating (in some respects); there
is progress and progress, growth and growth, coke and coke. Much that was progress, and still is
in many quarters, is no longer universally regarded as such, as, for instance, elimination of
wetlands, pollution growth, assimilation of indigenous peoples. The 'previously ... dominant
[assumption], that non-industrial society would and should progress towards the industrial state
and the scientific world view' was challenged, and is increasingly rejected (cf. Naess, on the
"status of mythology").
So wishy-washy is the core characterisation of deep ecology that it lets in as deep ecologists
all sorts of environmental philosophers who would not previously have made that select hand,
philosophers whom main disciples of deep ecology previously did or would have excluded,
philosophers whose positions are not deep. If DE is to be more exclusive, it will require more
careful, tighter formulation. Only clearly ruled out among environmental philosophers, i.e. those
who philosophize about environments and environmental problems, are hard-line human
chauvinists, led by Australians, Passmore (in his main conservative persona) and McCloskey.
Many of these excluded philosophers would, moreover, subscribe to most of the points in the core
platform, as weakly interpreted. It is nowadays a rare thinking person who does not consider that
there are severe environmental problems, local and global, about which something, fairly farreaching by conservative political standards, should be done. It is a rare philosopher, who
becomes inmersed in a spread of these problems, and who does not develop some environmental
commitments, even if a liberalish social agenda continues to dominate an environmental one (and it
is fast becoming hard to avoid observing the interpretation of social with broadly environmental
problems). While environmental philosophy has, by contrast with economics (now ......... of
reaction crises), tended to become progressively more accomodating to what was only a short time
ago radical environmental drought, as the magnitude of environmental problems is revealed, deep
�7
ecology has moved in the opposite direction, has tried be excessively conciliatory, confusing
pluralism with broad consensualism, and lost much of its radical flare. A wide environmental
pluralism is just fine; but it does not have to be achieved through consensus, or at the cost of a deep
or an ecological platform. A pluralism can be achieved by the joining of different positions.
Among the diverse and motley groups of philosophers who now gain entry as adherents of
deep ecology, too generously construed, are apparently included those examples:-
Example 1. Among extensionists, both utilitarians and ratonalists. Among utilitarians are Singer,
and perhaps even Smart on some days. Most turns on how point 1 is construed. Utilitarians in the
Benthamite tradition assign intrinsic value to all creatures with preferences, sometimes a or the like,
and are concerned with the well-being and flourishing of such creatures. Accordingly they satisfy
point 1 if it is read, as it may well be, 'much human and much non-human life'. It all depends
upon how the terms 'human' and 'non-human' are quantified. If both are quantified with 'all', the
theses becomes implausible (admitting e.g. lab-manufactured abominations as intrinsically
valuable), and would exclude some acknowledged deep ecologists. If the terms are more weakly
quantified, then environmentally aware and active Benthamites are admitted. An evident dividing
line, provided by particular quantification, with 'some', is enough to exclude shallow
philosophers. But no quantification will serve to exclude either intermediate positions, which do
not adopt a deep value theory, or individualism, such as moral extension positions, almost
invariably a spouse. Extensionists more patently included are those of rationalistic persuasion,
grouped loosely around Regan in the American South, who have gradually move away from a
utilitarian prescriptions, to the view that ethical principles, including those of vegetarianism, can be
reached by rational means, by clear, consistent and coherent thinking (thus, it is really a coherence
theory of morality).
Example 2. More far-reaching informediate positions, which do assign intrinic value less stingily
throughout nature, to some non-preference-havers, such as trees, and to some non-individuals,
such as forests, but which still adopt a greater value assumption, according to which human values
always take precedence over non-human assignments. Examples of this sort the postions
deliminated (so far in insufficient theoretical details) by Rolston and Attfield. In fact the positions
so far elaborated of this type typically, but hardly inevitably, draw on an enlightened Christian
backdrop heavily laced with science (a religious American naturalism, so to say, in Rolston's
case). They amount to nonsecular moral extensionisms, by contrast with the secular moral
extenionisms of example 1 (to try to squeeze these positions into Rodman's nonexhaustive
classificaton of positions).
Example 3. Deep-green theorists reject the biocentric restriction sometimes built into point 1,
though not in this formulation. This formulation certainly admits Sylvan as an adherent of DE,
�8
despite what some deep ecologists have said. According to strict biocentrism however, only what
has life (in some sense) can have value. Deep-green theorist see this restriction as very like that
imposed by ulitarians, to sentience, or unwarranted, unnecessary and arbitrary. Deep-green
theorists, like enviromental resisters, ecodefenders and Earth-Facters, now see the DE platform as
much too moderate and quite insufficiently radical. The earlier radicalism of DE has been
excessively pruned back, on a mix of dubious grounds: the drive for an environmental consensus
(in place of a genuine pluralism), the religo-political quest for a large support Base (which could
however be environmentalism broadly, with DE in the vanguard), and the input of conservatizing
academic thought and aim of intellectual respectability. In fact DE which does not make much
ground academically, as compared with its success outside academia, especially with book-reading
environmentalists, would better forget academic success, where it has made progress only among
outsiders, not power-players and return to its more radical mission (academics form only a small
minority, though one dangerously and influentially supportive, one the whole, of most past
environmental excesses and assaults).
2. Variability, antiquity or dubiquity of main themes of deep ecology omitted
from the core platform.
Some themes have been retained by letting them undergo extensive change. Nowhere is this
more conspicuous than with the difficult principle of "biospherical egalitarianism in principle",
central to earle DE, which has taken on some remarkable new guises. In Naess, it becomes a
curiously qualified principle of rights: that every being has a right to live - unless the basic needs
of other beings overrides its rights. In Devall, who prefers to avoid the term 'rights' (the use of
which he asserts is metaphorical in Naess, not at all what Naess, who appeals to childrens" usage,
asserts), the principle is emptied of main egalitarian content: 'Properly understood, the principle of
biocentric equality means that humans are members of the biotic community, not its masters'
(p.58). So understood, the principle can be accepted by many shallow thinkers; it is not
incompatible with chauvinism, nor with conciderable inequality, nor with greater value invariably
assigned to humans, only with a certain domination. It is a sell-out.
Few of the supporters of deep ecology (DE) appear to realise how old-fashionedly defective
and sometimes inappropriate some of the elements, and most of the methodology, of deep ecology
really is. 2 The organic and organistic image, for instance - heavily deployed by one of the heroes
of deep ecology, Whitehead - is as old as Aristotle (for some of the history see Berlin). Despite
much valiant effort, no one has so far got the image (now redeployed in the extravagent Gaia
2
Recently, Sholomowski has re-emphasized some of these features.
�9
hypothesis) - valuable as it may be, chauvinistic as it characteristically is -to work in a very fruitful
way. Likewise the drive for self-realisation, is both old-fashioned - it was fostered by the
Enlightenment and had its heyday in the 19thC, was decidedly human chauvinistic in its emphases.
But perhaps the heaviest residue of old-fashioned inappropriate material is to be found in the
methodology of deep ecology, which is mainly transferred from positivism with little alteration.
The hypothetico-deductive methodology, for example, appears essentially intact in the double
pyramidal diagram (now called 'the apron' by Naess), which one is supposed to shuffle around
and descend by deduction. Having descended so, the way back to the top is by intuition of
hypotheses, by the hypothetical part of the method. First principles at the top admit of no proof or
derivation - because of the character of the one inferential relation admitted, deduction.
In other respects, the double pyramid strait-jacket, which is Naess's way of trying to infuse a
certain pluralism (a pluralism of fundamental positions at first principles) into deep ecology, is
insufficiently specific. It does not explain, for example, how at a practical lower level, either an
environmental directive or environmental action is forthcoming. Indeed given restriction to
deduction, it cannot explain how these things come about. DE lacks any requisite theory of
environmental action. 3
The double pyramid gets stylized in the way on the left; an alternative representation is that on
the right (and Naess now has a representation awkwardly superimposed on a mandala):Needless to say, there are problems lacking within DE's easy pluralism. Noone has ever
explained how to get the unretracted DE platform derivationally out of - what looks incompatible Christianity. For that matter no-one has shown how to deduce the platform from any of the other,
sometimes more congenial, great religions or philosophies. The nearest we seem to get is Naess's
sketch of how we derive parts of the platform from his own specially concocted ecosophy.
3. Further flowing of the DE gospel: its heroes, its arguments, ....
Deep ecology is a seriously flawed gospel, not only as regards its doctrines and their
coherence, but in other surrounding evangelic respects as well. Virtually all the patron saints of
DE, the past philosophical heroes (all male) are deeply flawed. Spinoza's views on the place and
treatment of animals, for instance, should be entirely disowned by any deeper environmentalist.
Even the later "reformed" Heidegger is conspicuously human chauvinistic, too complacent in a
human-dominated and tamed landscape, and, (apart from some new-fangled technology and
3
Various old-fashioned, and again defective, models are available to DE, and could be tacked onto the
theory, e.g. the belief (or information) and desire (or value) account of intention and action conventionally
attributed to Hume.
�10
industrialisation) with the established rural way of things in Germany, including significantly racist
and sexist ways. The pervasive background four-fold, fitting the cosmological scheme of things
in, includes only divinities and humans; wilderness and its creatures are not part of the
fundamentals. Whitehead, despite the apparent bounteousness of his philosophical scheme, was a
practising christian, committed to a great chain of being with humans at the top of the chain (and
thus to a greater value assumption antithetical to DE); he took no significant interest in nature or
nonhuman creatures at all, and was very comfortable in the ways of a socio-political order which
directly produced present environmental impasses. 4
No doubt the heroes should be differently viewed. Not as patrons, not even as forerunners;
but as deep thinkers, from whom certain elements can be drawn in elaborating an environmental
philosophy (e.g. parts of a theory of nature, features of process theory, elements of a critique of
technology), while much else is discarded. Most of this theoretical work remains to be done.
Regrettably the calibre of the arguments for proceeding to a DE position has not improved.
N aess has now resorted to making his case in a very conventionalistic populist fashion. People are
inclined to respond in such and such a way (favourable to environmental concerns) to so and so
questions. Thus, for instance 'there is reasonably widespread agreement that animals, and even
plants, have rights' (EIJ p.3). But surely it is largely as a result of environmentalism, which must
(and should) be based on something else that people have began to respond thus and so. Naess
also argues from the the concern of many people about nature and natural phenomena for their own
sakes (the data is however not all that clearcut) to several other conclusions, for instance that
political and stilist approaches to the environmental crisis (etc) should be less anthropocentric (EIJ
p.5). The arguments are thus close in character to those widely used in arguments in economics
and democratic theory; they are none the better for that. The fact that people used to respond
favourably to damming up every nearby river and draining all the swamps is not a solid
recommendation for such practices. Moreover, such populist considerations hardly win out, as
Naess himself explains (p.4). Pressure groups pedalling narrow and sometimes destructive
economic ambitions often succeed against democratic opinion.
4. But much criticism of DE is even more seriously flawed.
Despite the growing constituency for core princles. De, which Naess will correctly have
alluded to here, DE has been portrayed as extremism - especially from the US political right (which
tends towards extreme right). What is extreme depends, of course, on where a carping critic is
4
He appears to have owed his appointment to a philosophy chair at Harvard in significient part to the fact
that he was in no way a radical, but suited to the conservative scene established there.
�11
situated. Gung-ho growth economists are extremists from a deeper environmental situation. No
doubt such GG economists would claim that they have reason, not emotion, on their side; but it is a
narrow flawed reason, tailored and biassed to their cause, reflecting a different class of emotions,
primarily preferences of business communities of humans.
In present deteriorating environmental circumstances, clever "extremism" is sometimes
exactly what is required - ideas and action that upset, disturb, interfere with, subvert, and
eventually overturn, the dominant military-industrial social ethos. Extremism presumably amounts
to being isolated on the outer margins of some politically or socially sensitive (more useless)
normal distribution, without respectable companions. On many environmentally important issues,
DE is no longer in such a position (often instead the power elite would be if it were not so
entrenched). Where it is in such a position, then generally it needs to be, and needs to try to swing
the norm in its direction or else to gather respectability for that position.
What, if anything, supports the charge of extremism, levelled against DE? Such emotionallycharged criticisms from the right tend to be particularly vague. Sometimes DE itself, portrayed as
radical environmentalism, and compared with radical feminism, is dismissed as extremist, without
indicating where it is considered extreme. In fact, while better developed, less accommodating DE
is radical, at least literally in going, as one aspect of its depth, to root issues and assumptions, it is
not very politically radical; it does not seriously challenge present political arrangements in the way
that ecoanovehism, or even ecosocialism, does.
What has infuriated some critics is undoubtedly the DE removal of humans from absolute
centre stage, and above all the cavalier or callous way in which some environmentalists have
portrayed the demise of unfortunate humans, from the God-given position to having to share the
world-stage. There are many different issues tangled up here, and the charges of extremism
depends on retaining the confusion, as well as ascribing to DE claims it does not make. DE asserts
that irreducible value is not confined to humans, that life other than humans has intrinsic value.
Although such a claim is indeed incompatible with the dominant social paradigm, it represents an
old challenge, going back in utilitarianism at least to Bentham. As some of those who held or now
hold such a position were not, by any means extremists or even radicals (e.g. Sidgwick) the charge
against this part of the DE platform, lapses. Similar points apply against any charge of extremism
based on the DE assertion (carefully avoided in the core platform) that a substantial decrease in
human population is desirable, especially for conservation of the biosphere. Such a theme is
increasingly widely maintained, by many respectable figures, far from any fringes. Nor need any
extreme, threatening or dangerous, action result from such DE themes. Human population
reduction can occur (and is envisaged by Naess to occur) by such unthreatening means as a
�12
reduction in birth rates, a demographic transition brought about for instance through improved
education and contraception. Yet some coupling to "extreme" action, and adoption or preparedness
to adopt such, has to be established if a proper charge of extremism is to sustained (cf. also the
OED definition of 'extremism').
Deep ecologists propose no extreme action to reduce human population, no wars, no
genecide, nothing macho. Indeed the idea is ludicrous. Deep ecologists tend to be gentle people,
who are opposed to violence; they care about humans, who are part of nature (even if too many of
them are trying to set themselves above and apart from it).
There are individuals and groups, more evident in America than elsewhere, who do adopt an
uncaring, and sometimes brutal attitude to other humans, especially those outside America. Ecofascists, like Hardin, to the right of environmental thought, who think that the time for triage has
already arrived, and that starving humans in third world countries should be left to fend for
themselfes, offer a striking example. But eco-fascism is far from deep ecology, and has been
severely criticised by those close to DE (e.g. Bennett and Griffin). It is no doubt troublesome for
deep ecology, and convenient for opportunistic critics, if environmentalists with eco-fascist
prodivities present themselves as deep ecologists (as has happened, a prominent example being the
present editor of Earth First). It is no doubt troublesome for a charitable organisation if members
of a mafia present themselves as agents of it and collect on its behalf; it has long been a problem for
democracy that fascists can present themselves as democrats, and even put an end to democracy
through seemingly democratic methods. Political movements admits of much infiltration, by both
well- and evil-intentioned.
ANNEX
1.
Interesting proposals continue to emerge from the deep literature.
One is for an
environmental organisation, which might could be called Environment International, parallelling
Amesty International , and adopting a similar role with regard to the environment that Amesty does
with respect to human rights and political processes (Naess p.4).
2. There are many false "virtues " in contemporary political life that green politics, such as
DE is coupled with, will eventually help remove. These include:-
•
Unity, united front.
All that has
merit is a certain limited unity
in diversity.
•
Balance.
Balance is achieved by
resolution of many forces. To shift
�13
the balance, then, environmentalists
should be as far out as they can
(while still being counted in the
resolution, not written off).
For
end
political
purposes,
citing
especially credibility doesn't matter,
by contrast with countability.
Advice to offer more balanced
statements and work should be
courteously ignored: it is
oppositional, political advice.
•
Two party ideal
REFERENCES
A. Naess, 'Environmental ethics and international justice', Ecospirit Quarterly IV (1) (198.) 1-7;
referred to as EIJ.
�
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page
PREFACE
Part 1
ill
ECOLOGICA L ETHICS & ECOLOGICA L POLITICS:
TURNING JOHN MCCLOSKE Y'S CHALLENGE
i
Conservative, reformative and radical responses to the impacts
of ecology on ethics
1
ii
A confused and confusing response: supplemented intuitionism
3
iii
On the supposedly dim prospects for new environmental ethics
especially that deep-green upstart
8
iv
Extending ecological ethics, inadequately, to ecological politics
12
V
Structuring ecological ethics and politics: towards an improved
classification of environmental problems
19
vi
Population impact: the fact of human consumption
21
vii
On limiting human populations: some neglected considerations
24
viii On animal rights and supposed political implications thereof
ix
Part 2
Two other critical features of dominant political ways:
the shibboleths of extensive private property and high technology
26
31
A CRITIQUE OF (WILD) WEST DEEP ECOLOGY: A RESPONSE TO
w ARWICK
Fox's RESPONSE TO AN EARLIER CRITIQUE.
i
Approaching deep ecology and understanding plurallism
39
ii
Value in deep ecology
42
iii
The extent of values-in-nature
46
iv
A biocentric ethic?
49
V
Biospheric egalitarianism revisted
51
vi
The uneasy position of value theory, or axiology within deep ecology
and the condemned environmental axiological route
53
vii
The 'case' against environmental axiology: 'the inadequacies or
repugnant conclusions that attend the environmental axiological
approach
viii Fox's 'Deep Ecological Territory': transpersonal identification
ix
Problems of Self and Self-realisation: the intrusion of value and the
issue of evil
57
62
65
11
X
Deconstruction and reselection of self
68
xi
More troubles with Self as foundation
73
xii
Liquidating Fox's 'deep ecological territory
75
xiii
Justifying 'extreme interpretations' of and 'extreme reactions' to
wild West deep ecology
77
xiv
Transpersonal logic and methodology
82
xv
More rubbish removal, especially that borrowed from pop science
86
Part 3
ANOTHER 'REFUTATION' OF ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS:
JANNA THOMPSON'S CRITICISMS
i
The newer destructive phase: overtaxing requirements for
(environmental) ethics
94
ii
Satisfying duly modified requirements, environmentally
98
iii
The former constructive phase: a new anthropocentric
environmental ethic?
105
PART 1.
CRITICAL EXPOSITION
Chapter 1. AT THE PYRAMIDS' JUNCTION.
THE BASICS AND CREED OF DEEP ECOLOGY
Deep ecology in both a movement and an ideological position. Thus in significant respects it
resembles a new religion, which has a creed as well as an organisational structure, practices and so
on; a political party, which has a platform as well as organisation, objective and so forth; and an
intellectual school, which aim to propagate a philosophy, gain converts and adherents, etc. Like a
religion in a literate society, there is a set of texts, DE texts as we shall call them, which present
elements of the faith: doctrine, themes, parables, heroic figures, warnings, and so on. The DE texts
have not so far been arranged into any authoritative form.
Although the movement may have come first, and the theory been but gradually extracted (the
historical and pseudo-sociological impression given by the DE texts), it makes for neater
characterisation and easier exposition to consider the theoretical structure J first. The very looselyknit movement, subsequently considered, essentially the genuine environment movement (excluding
those just in it for human ends), is in any case clustered around this structure - as older cities are
around their centre. The theoretical structure is itself conveniently organised in the following
(double) pyramidal diagram (now called by Naess, who devised it, "the Apron"):-
Diagram 1.
Basic Double Pyramid
LEVELS
UPPER (INVERTED) PYRAMID
C
B
p
1. Sources, or
ultimate bases
2.Core
Principles
DE PLATFORM
R
E
E
D
REGULAR PRACTICE
PARTICULAR PRACTICES
POLICIES
LIFESTYLES
3. General
themes & norms
4. Particular
norms and
concrete
decisions
LOWER (COMPLEX) PYRAMID
The theoretical centre of DE is to be found at level 2, where the upper and lower pyramid join.
The various sources of the central part, such doctrines as those of Buddhism (B) and Christianity (C)
and of philosophic cast (P) at level 1, are not usually a part of DE at all. But there is a preferred
philosophical source, ecosophy - another theory elaborated by N aess, who again coined the term which does enjoy a closer connection with DE, and is sometimes considered almost part of it. Levels
3 and 4, which are supposed to derive from the central creed, and in turn inductively inform it, are
parts of DE, but less central parts, parts of the varying practice. It is level 2 then that is crucial for
understanding DE. While the upper pyramid givgs the theoretical or intellectual content and sources
of DE, the lower pyramid supplies working DE, and core principles and the practice.
1. The Central level, level 2, and the standard DE platforms
Deep Ecology is structured around level 2, the central operational level. The main distinctive
principles of DE are set on level 2, the platform level. These principles may be grouped as shown in
the following diagram:CREED
LEVEL2
BASIC CREED
wider
platform
8 point
platform
further
and
more
peripheral
principles
The reason for distinguishing the 8-point platform from the wider platform is simple this:- The 8point platform, as variously presented in DE texts, omits some of the standard articles of the core DE
position, and fails to develop others. 1 There is accordingly a real point in distinguishing "the"
platform from the more comprehensive and better rounded core or creed.
DE is a decidedly vague object, with vague parts. Perhaps the most definite things about it are
its 8-point platform and its diametric opposition to features of the mainstream Western ideology, and
dominant social paradigm as it otherwise known.
The core position is something discerned from the DE texts, in much the way the platform is. But
whereas the 8 point platform is explicitly presented, though in different and incompatible terms, the
core has to be winnowed and from an array of more peripheral material (as is shown in part II).
Box 1 The 8-point platform, in capsule form. 2
I. Both non-human and human life have intrinsic value:
The well-being and flourishing of
human and non-human life on earth
have intrinsic value, inherent value,
etc. These value are independent of
the usefulness of the non-human
world for human purposes.
2. Richness and diversity intrinsic virtues:
Richness and diversity of lifeforms contribute to a realisation
themselves
these values and are also values in
of
3. Humans unjustified in reducing such natural virtues:
Humans have no right to reduce this
richness and diversity except to
satisfy vital needs.
4. Human interference with natural world excessive:
Present human interference with
the
and the situation is rapidly worsening.
non-human world is excessive
5. Policies and basic structures must be changed:
Policies must therefore be changed.
These policies will affect our basic
economic, technological and
ideological structures.
6. Human (values compatible with) population decrease:
The flourishing of human life and
culture is compatible with a substantial
population. Flourishing of nonhuman life requires such a decrease.
decrease of the human
7. Quality of life should supplant economic standard of living:
The change in our attitudes will
bring an appreciation of the quality of
life rather than adhering to an
increasingly higher standard of living.
There will be a profound awareness
of the difference between big and
great. We will have a great society
with no bigness.
8. Obligation to attempt implementation:
Those who subscribe to the
foregoing points have an obligation
directly or indirectly to try to
implement necessary changes.
2
The 8-point platform is perhaps the most repeated exhibit in the DE texts. The present formulation
adopts the presentation of Naess in Resorg ; the brief formulation on the left does not occur in Naess.
A slightly different formulation of the platform under heading 'Basic Principles' is given in DS p.70.
The principles have been rendered, and grJuped, to make their structure and interconnections a
little clearer. Principles / and 2 concern intrinsic values; principles 3-7 concern human practices and
policies. Principle 5 elaborates in principle 3; principle 6 draws the policy consequence of this. The
most important of the general policy changes is listed in principle 4; but another crucial policy change
is indicated in principle 7: decreased production and consumption. The prime terrestrial policy
objectives (that should have obtained separate listing) can in fact be derived from the impact formula:
roughly,
human environmental impact = human population x personal consumption x available technology.
Reducing excessive interference thus requires at least some of, and no doubt all of, human
population reduction, consumption reduction, and appropriate technology improvements. Finally,
principle 8 supplies a commitment principle. Observe that some of the principles of this 8-point
platform, 8-point principles as we may conveniently call them, provide linkages with other levels of
the DE pyramid. For example most of the principles, principles 3-7 especially, have implication for
policy at level 3, and thence for day-to-day practice at level 4. 8-point principle 8 has direct
application to level 4, individual lifestyles.
Before the incomplete 8-point platform was devised (as part of a political conciliation and
unification attempt), DE was rather differently characterised: primarily through listing of principles
countering assumptions of the conventional socioeconomic wisdom, resistance principles. Indeed,
in many respects DE is marked out through reaction and resistance: by its opposition the prevailing
ideology of industrial society, especially by those elements of it that have lead to the assault on the
natural environment, but also by elements that have led to breakdown of connected features of the
social fabric. It gives a clearer picture of what DE is about if we tabulate are principles in opposition
to those of the dominant Western ideology (or social paradigm), and as compared with those of
shallow or reform environmentalism:
TABLE 2 DE PRINCIPLES AS CONTRASTED, ON THE ONE SIDE, WITH THOSE OF THE
DOMINANT PARADIGM AND SHALLOW ECOLOGY, ON OTHER, WITH ONE OF ITS
SOURCES, TAOISM.
DOMINANT
SHALLOW
(WESTERN)
ECOLOGY
DEEP ECOLOGY
TAOISM
(DE)
PARADIGM (DE)
Domination over
nature
Stewardship of
Nature
Nature an exploitable
resource: intrinsic
value confined to
As for, but
with nature a
manager resource
Natural environment
valued for itself
Human
supremacy
Human
ascendency
Biocentric
egalitarianism
Harmony with
Nature
Elaboration of
DE
Much as for DE;
''humanism''
rejected
Differs from
DE; wide
impartiality
Ample resources
substitutes
Some resource
limitations
Earth supplies
limited
Supplies
Material economic
growth a predominant
goal
Sustainable
development
Non-material goods
especially
self-realization
Following
Tao-te
Consumerism
Optimised
consumerism
Doing with enough/
recycling
Doing with
enough
(recycling
inappropriate)
Competitive
lifestyle
As for DP
Cooperative
lifeway
Much as for DE:
voluntary
simplicity
Centralised/urbancentred/national focus
As for DP
Decentralized/
bioregional/
neighborhood focus
As for DE
Largely as for
DP
Non-hierarchical/
Grassroots democracy
Hierarchy
without
structure
More careful
high technology
Appropriate
technology
Limited
technology
Power structure
hierarchical
High technology
ample
Power
7
Shallow ecology, or reform environmentalism as it can to be called3 , differs from the
dominant paradigm primarily in its emphasis on stewardship, on long-term management, on
sustainable development. DE, while it reacts against the dominant paradigm primarily on
environmental grounds, stands opposed to shallow ecology, which it correctly sees as not going
nearly far enough, in particular to satisfy genuine environmental values. Of course the dominant
paradigm resisted is not itself a uniform or static position; some of the in determining of DE
flows from this very feature. For example, until very recently DP used to support dominance as
a throughgoing feature: not just over Nature, but of the male, white, Western, Protestant, rich,
powerful, free, adult, etc., over their opposites. Domination of the latter sorts, within the
human species, is, for the most part, no longer a part of the progressive ideology, having been
gradually shed over the last century; but such domination still remains part of much practice (as
well as of cultural ideologies).
Some of the most distinctive, and most controversial, principles of DE, are omitted from
the 8-point platform, as is evident from the opposition/resistance principles. These include the
principles regularly, and pontifically, claimed to distinguish deep ecology. Moreover without
these further principles, DE amount to nothing more than a slightly less shallow environmental
position (indeed apart from principle 1 and perhaps 2, all the principles of the 8-point platform
can be adopted by reform environmentalism and in fact often are enough espoused therefor).
These additional principles, part of the wider platform (and the creed) include these:9. Biospheric egalitarianism [in principle]: 'all things in the biosphere have an equal right to live
and blossom'. The principle is presented in this unqualified form (in DS) as one of the two
ultimate norms, the other being self-realisation. Fir fact Devall and Sessions proceed to tack on
a self-realisation component to this principle, of biocentric equality as they call it: namely 'and
to reach their own individual forms of unfolding and self-realisation with the larger Selfrealisation' (DS p.67). But, they immediately add, the 'basic intuition is that all organisms and
entities in the ecosphere, as parts of the interrelated whole, are equal in intrinsic worth' (p.67,
continuing, italics added). This italicised value-formulation is straightforward, and has the
advantage of moving rights out of the formulation (No doubt, if equal intrinsic value
guarantees an equal right to live and blossom, it yields the "equal rights to" formulation.) But it
encounters immediate difficulties, because in the process of continuing to live and blossom some
organisms interfere with others, for instance through basic demands for food and shelter, most
conspicuously in predation. To try to escape these difficulties, Naess at least regularly adds the
rider: in principle . 'Naess suggests that biocentric equality as an intuition is true in principle,
3
For example in D & S. The alternative, shallow ecology, was set aside because of the negative
conditions of the word 'shallow'.
8
although in the process of living, all species use each other as food, shelter, etc.' (DS p.67).
10. Self-realisation . This involves the realisation - growth, development and maturity - of the
self, becoming a whole and full person, but not merely in isolation or in a social setting as in
older models of self-realisation, but within a biospheric setting, taking due account of other
forms of life. It 'can be summarised symbolically as the realisation of "self-in-Self' where
"Self' stands for organic wholeness' (DS p.67).
Intimately linked with self-realisation in this wider ecological sense is the next principle.
11 Biospheric identification . The procedure, again a personal one, consists in suitably
identifying with parts or wholes of the larger surrounding biosphere. The underlying notion
here is one of partial identity, sharing certain salient features with, which permits a qualified
substitutivity of an imaginative person into the position of another creature, ecoobject or
ecosystem. Such "identification" is a significant method of heightening
12. Ecological consciousness . Less grandiosely this covers environmental awareness,
appreciation, and concern, and thus responsiveness to environmental depredation. Engendering
ecological consciousness is regarded as a crucial part of spreading the deep ecological message.
13. Holism. On DE precepts, this amounts to more than the modem holism according to which
there are nonadditive wholes, wholes or objects which amount to more than the sums of their
parts. But as to what else holism demands, there is some disagreement within deep ecological
circles.
2. Further principles of the DE creed and important optional extras
Beyond the standard platform there are further principles, not enunciated at all, or until
very recently, or else more peripheral. Some of the further themes help in deciding what clarity
DE had; that is one reason why they presumably do not feature in the 8-point platform.
Among the principles not enunciated are these:•
Non violence.
The new themes, several of them periphical to the main concerns of DE include the
following:• Deep ecology offers a green synthesis. It 'combines the "Social Greens" with the "Natural
Greens" avoiding the extremes of both' (Naess R p.6). This is a surprising theme for a position
that has itself been regularly castigated as extreme. What N aess means, above all, is that DE
does not neglect humans, and their legalerate social concerns and aspirations, in the way that the
9
Natural-greens have been (generally erroneously) accused of doing; nor does it neglect or
devalue nature and its features in the way that many social-greens are inclined to do.
Among the important optional extras that may be coupled with DE are principles of a more
through-going animal liberation, such as:• a severe reduction oforend to the enclavement, confinement and slaughter of animals.
• vegetarianism (of some form).
Some deep ecologists are vegetarians (e.g. Bennett), some are not (e.g. Drengson), and some
are in between (e.g. Naess). Unless they undergo a conversion, Northerness brought up in the
hunting-fishing-shooting tradition eschew these optimal principles. But evidently there is a
tension here; there is pressure coming from other principles, especially nonviolence, to limit
sharply slaughter of other creatures.
3. The creed, the basic creed, and the movement.
Like many a religious creed, the DE creed is an elaborate concoction (as well as a dubious
and rather arbitrary one). Adoption of it, knowledge of it even, cannot be expected of all
adherents, especially given its features: its vagueness, its inaccessibility, and so on. It is not
surprising that, again like many another creed or ideology, many of the faithful do not know too
well what it comprises, still less do many of the fellow-travellers (and DE has many). The most
that can perhaps be expected of adherents is adoption of some simpler creed, a basic creed more
or less in the vicinity of the 8-point platform. But it is apparent from DE texts that not even all
of that platform is demanded: enough will do, especially if other DE principles are adopted. The
platform represents 'what most supporters have in common at a deep level' 4 No doubt
supporters who eschew part of the platform compensate by adherence instead of other DE
principles or practice. Hence the depiction of the basic creed in diagram 2. A basic creed
comprises enough of the 8-point platform plus enough other principles at least to compensate for
omissions.
But not even a basic creed is always demanded. At its most generous and laxest, the DE
movement includes everyone who professes a concern for some part of the natural environment
and does not demolish a manifestation of concern or interest by blatantly anti-environmental
activity or involvement therewith. Inclusion in the movement does not even require strict
adoption of, or adherence to the DE platform, though it involves some vague recognition of
parts of it. Talk of membership of the movement would be somewhat inapposite; there is no
paid-up or recorded membership (or even rewarding as would be done in a voting system).
4
Naess R p.3, italics added.
10
It is sometimes said that the DE movement was born in Europe and adopted elsewhere,
US and Australia especially. But such a claim confuses the movement with quasi-sociological
extraction of the principles involved and the platform assembling them. The movement itself
emerged as a late 1960's affair, substantially under way before it was reported upon and labelled
(as usual, academics, like politicians, reacted to, rather than led, more popular movements).
Such a movement involves some "mass" of people; it must therefore be anticipated by some
smaller groups and likely some initiating individuals. So it was with the DE movement. There
were prominent individuals in several countries where environmental groups with deep leanings
formed or operated, in the 60s and before; and before that there were many isolated individuals.
In USA, where the DE movement no doubt grew to substance first, before that in Europe or
Australia, there is a significant chain of deep ecologists, or rather deep ecological thinkers,
reaching back to the beginning of the century and perhaps into the previous century; for
instance, in reverse temporal order, Carson, Leopold, Muir, perhaps Thoreau. 5 Muir is
regularly alluded to as an early deep ecologist by Americans. 6
There are deeper-seated motives for vagueness about the basic creed and uncertainty about
the basic requirements to be deep ecologist and who makes the hororific status. One is a dislike
of criticism, and resulting vacillation among the high bishops of DE as to what extent critics, and
those who declare themselves not to be deep ecologists, should be included in the fold, and
consequently as to who exactly is a deep ecologist. (From outside the issue can look rather
trivial, but gangs are gangs whether ecological or more generally not..) A main reason for the
omission of central doctrines of DE from the 8-point platform is of course related: the desire to
increase the flock, to turn away no-one who might be decently admitted. 7 Another motive,
linked also with trying to enlist support, in order to mobilize democratic forces and like people
power, concerns the pluralistic drive that is an important aspect of authentric DE. It concerns the
insertion of pluralistic elements within level 2 itself (rather than confining these elements to other
levels, where there are conspicuous, as later exposition will show). As Naess explains the idea
5
6
7
In Australia there were, in reverse order, Dunply, Griffin, Stead; there were of course many others
with very considerable environmental concerns (e.g. Ratcliffe), who apparently lacked however the
requisite feature of depth, and world count only as reform environmentalistser conservationists. But,
quite evidently, there are serious problems in discerning whether some environmentalist or other is
deep (there is generally only indirect evidence, as the category was not clearly recognised). The issue
as to whether some deep environmentalist is a (prota)-deep ecologist is even more vexed because of
the muddiness of DE. It is important to observe that little reliance can be placed, in such issues, on
standard and applauded histories, such as Nash's Wilderness and the America Mind, because these are
written from a shallow perspective and fail to realise the significance of depth; See further Devall's
report on Nash's third edition, Ecorotes, pp23-9.
See, for instance, Devall Ecorates. Devall also suggests that St. Francis is a deep ecologist, but
given what is now known about St. Francis there is room for considerable doubt.
Or othersie admitted. But may be excluded by ignored or incompetance, or deterred by qualms about
significent propositions (human populations restraint esp.).
11
is avoid the 'devastating' 'tendency to dogmatism': 'there is not one, definite, deep ecology
philosophy, not one definite one kind of green society'. Likewise there is no definite or
definitive basic creed. For many purposes this does not matter; we can still normally assert such
and such, so and so, definitely deep ecological, such and such, so and so, is definitely not.
In an attempt to evade criticism, DE is nowadays sometimes represented as a grass-roots
movement, one but loosely associated with philosophical views 8 But such movements have
intellectually-shaped objectives, offer at least a set of slogans and elementary principles. And
DE is this and more; it verges on the dishonest to try to portray DE as such a movement, when
in large measure it is the work of intellectuals, initiated by reporting, rather inaccurately it seems,
on the supposed attitudes of field ecologists and like workers - hardly typical grass-roots people.
8
In a different respect, in term of moral of ideas and change of themes, DE is no doubt a movement. It
has moved (and with Fox shedding critical principles, it continues moving). Such movement is not
good for the types of virtues that stable positions may acquire, such a replenity, reliability,
assessibility etc; but it does make life difficult for critics.
PART II
CRITIQUE OF DEEP ECOLOGY
Chapter 5.
THE INITIAL PROBLEM: WHAT ON EARTH IS DEEP ECOLOGY?
WHO IS AND ISN'T A DEEP ECOLOGIST?
Deep ecology appears , on a preliminary reading, to be some elaboration of the position
that natural things other than humans have value in themselves, value sometimes exceeding that of
or had by humans. So much appears to follow from the first part of the 8-point platform. But
even this much is denied by some of the never philosophers (e.g. Fox). Moreover which
elaboration is quite another matter, and decidedly controversial. Indeed DE has not just been
rapidly converted (in part through overuse) into a conceptual bog, but is well on the way to
becoming all things to all interested parties. This is undoubtedly a drawback; it makes
communication, and theoretical and persuasive use of the notion, that much more difficult though it does not condemn an afflicted notion, such as deep ecology undoubtedly is, out of
hand. For several important and fruitful notions, which have survived, have encountered very
much of this sort of problem - force, mind, energy, differential, infinitesimal, to take some older
examples, paradigm and culture to take relevant recent examples.O On the other hand, many
notions no more afflicted than deep ecology, such as societism, timocracy and ungrund, have
been assigned to the historical scrap-heap. These include the sort of neo-Hegelian panpsychism
which deep ecology of the American texts will tum out to resemble.
What is evidence of conceptual murkiness and degeneration? The trouble begins with the
very introduction of the terminology. Naess, - when first setting down in one preliminary
codification what was already in the air,* wrote only of the 'Deep Ecology movement' and set
down what he has subsequently described as a 'Deep Ecology platform'. The suggested notion
of deep ecology, the underlying notion that informed the loosely-knit and open-ended movement
and platform, was not extracted; that subtraction task fell primarily to West Coast American
intellectuals, and it was done differently by different proponents of deep ecology. The trouble
was accentuated through rapid evolution of the notion. Thus Naess's account of the movement in
0
*
In case it is supposed this sort of conceptual muddiness is limited to less exact science, consider such
recent notions as anthropic principle, from physics, and nonmonotonic logic, from computer science.
See Naess 73, p.98ff. While slogans and preliminary formulations are fine, particularly in campaigns,
philosophy cannot rest at the level of slogans or platforms, as too much of DE continues to do.
2
1983 is significantly different from the account he outlined in 1973; seven principles are replaced
by six different themes, only two or so of which have much in common with the original
principles. t
Although DE is introduced in the 8-point platform as a value theory, basically concerned
with environmental values 1 , it has been presented as a metaphysics, as a consciousness
movement (and as primarily psychological), and even as a sort of (pantheistic) religion. Popular
Australian sources will begin to indicate some of the spread. The Deep Ecologist , a network
newsletter, sees deep ecology as metaphysical at base, as part of a natural philosophy of humans'
place in nature (though many of its correspondents see it as a matter of deep experiences , often
of a religious cast, too often decidedly anthropocentric, obtained in or through Nature).
According to its manifesto, carried in each issue on its title page,
Deep ecology is the search for a sustaining metaphysics of the environment; it
represents "a deep understanding of our unity with other beings and livings
processes" (Drengson); it is biocentric, not anthropocentric.
Though we shall come to modify or reject this manifesto phrase by phrase (deep ecology is not a
search, but on one level a position or theory, on another a movement; sustaining should concern
the environment, not the metaphysics; depth lies elsewhere than understanding; unity too is a
metaphor for integration; biocentric is misleadingly restrictive), the present enterprise, illustrating
the degenerative spread of deep ecology, is different. Let us hasten on to the strikingly different
explanation John Seed prefers in introducing and advertising his anthology Deep Ecology 2 , a
person - and consciousness-oriented souffle (drawn from Devall):
"What I call deep ecology ... is premised on a gestalt of person-in-nature [an image
Naess had rejected at the very outset of the enterprise 3]. The person is not above or
outside of nature. The person is part of creation on-going. The person cares for and
about nature, shows reverence towards and respect for nonhuman nature, loves, and
lives with nonhuman nature, is a person in the "earth household" and "lets beings
be", lets nonhuman nature follow separate evolutionary destinies. Deep ecology,
unlike reform environmentalism, is not just a pragmatic, short-term social movement
with a goal like stopping nuclear power or cleaning up the waterways. Deep ecology
first attempts to question and present alternatives to conventional ways of thinking in
the modern West. Deep ecology understands that some of the "solutions" of reform
environmentalism are counter-productive. Deep ecology seeks transformation of
values and social organisation.
t
2
3
The claim is documented in the Appendix to this chapter.
Thus according to Naess (73, p.99), ' ... the significant tenets of the Deep Ecology movement are
clearly and forcefully normative . They express a value priority system ... '. But even this core claim
is now challenged, by Fox, who sees the primary focus of deep ecology as ontological and not
evaluative.
This is one of three different collections with this title which have been circulated or announced
recently: see references.
See Naess 73, p.95; but Naess's rejection is rejected below.
•
3
Deep ecology is liberating ecological consciousness ... Consciousness is knowing.
From the perspective of deep ecology, ecological resistance will naturally flow from
and with a developing ecological consciousness (Devall, 'The Deep Ecology
Movement').
Again, while informative, much of this will have to be rejected or rectified (for example, the
gesalt theme is problematic, and the deep person need do part only of what is specified; shallow
or reform ecology need not be short-term, insofar as it may take account of many future
generations of humans; it may well not be pragmatic; shallow ecology is better pluralistically
combined with deep ecology, as in Naess's original platform, than denigrated; etc.) It is to Bill
Devall, more than anyone, that we are indebted for a confusing myriad of formulations of the
driving notion, several of them however extending Naess; for instance, deep ecology is first of all
deep questioning, deep ecology is ultimately self-realisation and biocentrism, in deep ecology the
most important ideas are 'the wholeness and integrity of person/planet together with biological
egalitarianism'; it is also however much else - that again we shall come to modify or reject including a new psychology and new philosophical anthropology. 4 But Devall has been much
encouraged by George Sessions, and it is Sessions especially who has tried to convert deep
ecology into a new religion, with main texts drawn from pantheism, Spinoza and Buddhism.
Thus according to Sessions,
If the promise of American pantheism and nature mysticism is to be fulfilled, it will
occur in the deep ecology social paradigm which is based upon pantheism and the
idea of ecological egalitarianism in principle (Ecophilosophy ill).
But although Sessions refers immediately to Naess, there is nothing in Naess about American
pantheism and nature mysticism. At most Naess would allow that pantheism, along with other
comprehensive positions, like Christianity or ecosophy, can be an underlying base for the deep
ecology platform.
Small wonder that John Passmore (hardly one to be philosophically baffled given his
immense experience in comprehending Continental philosophy) goes astray in yet another
account, in which he conveniently pushes the shallow-deep contrast into the unsatisfactory
conservation/preservation boxes (of his 74):
Deep ecophilosophers ... are mainly interested in the preservation of species and
wilderness even when preserving them is not immediately and advantageous to
human interest. In order to provide intellectual support for such preservation they
are prepared to break with traditional Western ethical principles and metaphysical
beliefs (Passmore 83).
4
Devall 79, 83; for a synopsis, see Appendix 1, figure 7B.
4
Again, most of this will have to be rectified, since the presentation is decidedly misleading, not to
say biassed. As initial explanations of the deep ecological movement straightaway show, and
applications reveal, deep ecology has always concerned, and deep ecophilosophers have always
been interested in, much else as well, especially in human population levels and human
interference, and in quality of life and technological and organisational structures. While this of
course requires breaking with some Western traditions - which are in no way sacrosanct Wes tern tradition is far from uniform, and there are other tradition: deep ecology can remain, and
is, rooted in tradition, though much about it is as new and fresh as anything of this sort can be.
As a broad label for something rather environmentally different, and no doubt better, than
most vague ideologies that preceded it, 'deep ecology' is no doubt rather fine. That is broad
vague way is how the label often functions, honorific ally. That is, for instance how it functions
in the collection under that label edited by Tobias, which gives deep ecology none but a nebulous
content, and which indeed contains many articles (such as the interview with Soleri) in diametrical
opposition to the more detailed platform promulgated by the intellectual "leaders" of the deep
ecology movements. In fact, a good deal of the more popular appeal of deep ecology has been
obtained by vacillation between the more discerning authentic forms and the slack or nebulous
forms. The nebulous use of the label has also given cover to some of those who calls themselves
'deep ecologists', enabling them to shed awkward but crucial themes from the more detailed
platform (thus e.g. Fox, as explained below).
Many are those who are now pleased to march under the rather fashionable nebulous
banner. 5 Many are not deep, in theory or practice, deeply committed, or deeply changed by the
march. Attending a consciousness - raising weekend, purchasing or growing organic vegetables,
having spiritual experiences in a special natural place, or practising some oriental art or exercise
routine, does not ensure a deepened environmental position, though it can be a step on the way.
While nebulous deep ecology is compatible with much that is neither deep nor even
significantly ecologically oriented, such as minor lifestyle adjustments within the industrial
paradigm, authentic deep ecology, which is not so slack, remains a defective doctrine, itself
oscillating between an overpermissive environmental assembly point, fast growing its radical
potential, on the one side, and an impermissive, unduly narrow doctrine, dubious or defective in
5
I too am happy to march under the nebulous banner, though since my first critique I am no longer
particularly welcome. Initially I was cut by about half those individuals and institutions loosely
associated with deep ecology, since my critique began circulating. While I am become accustomed to
this sort of phenomenon in intellectual areas (criticism induces cool and long at least, even in logic), I
didn't expect so much of this given the Christian character of DE.; and such isolation does seriously
reduce information sources.
5
several of its leading themes, on the other side. Some of the worst of these themes, such as
biological egalitarianism, have already been subject to much criticism, deserved criticism as will
soon appear. But other features of authentic deep ecology have hitherto been left largely
untouched, and new features have emerged. So an ongoing critique is needed.
Recently 6 , it has been become more difficult, if anything, to grasp what DE is all about.
New themes are introduced, older ones withdrawn or whittled away. Even Naess, the finder of
the movement, who now tends to adhere much more closely to the (nonetheless adjustible)
platform than other self-proclaimed deep ecologists, is inclined to make apparently large
concessions to opposition charges, which however he subsequently more surreptitiously
withdraws (of course this is familiar philosophical practice). At other times, he withdraws with
one hand what he is offering, some sort of olive branch, with the other. The oscillation can be
partly ascribed to conflicting motivation. On the one side, there is the desire, stronger in the
finder-founder, Naess, than in his American and Australian prophets, to create a wide
constituency, to tum no one away if doing so can in any way be avoided. But, on the other, there
is an evident desire, among the prophers, to make deep ecology a very select position, a place for
a chosen few, a place to be achieved only after a journey crossing some arduous terrain and
involving some difficult life adjustments i.e. after an appropriate testing pilgrimage. Deep
ecology, however, lacks the other-worldly and after-life resources which, in some of its religious
sources, appear to make for an easy resolution of this type of conflict.
There is a considerable lack of discrimination among the pace-setters of the movement over,
and marked differences between them as to, who and what is accounted within deep ecology, and
some unwarranted discrimination from this exclusive club (e.g. of Rodman). Many of the people
classed as within or associated with deep ecology are shallow. And some who are excluded are
not. For example, Naess (in 75) presents a long list of people he associates with the movement,
many of whom are rather or even entirely shallow in their environmental orientation. Elsewhere
(in 83) Naess proceeds to identify with deep ecology several other positions or movements which
only overlap it, and which may be substantially shallow (such as green politics and new natural
philosophies). Some of the predominantly American lists Devall and Sessions assemble are not
so artless. To some extent, this combined discrimination and lack of discrimination again reflects
the conceptual murkiness of deep ecology; to some extent it is symptomatic of other oldconsciousness malignancies, both within the notion and as regards its use.
6
Since the first critique was produced
6
Still more damaging to the movement is that several of the advertised prophets of deep
ecology verge on the shallow, and some of these have denied DE.7 A striking example is
Bookchin who has recently denounced DE, and written ranging declamations much of
Bookchin's main, windy, bringin-it-together book, The Ecology of Freedom, said to be a "book
of deep ecology" is very far from that; it is yet another, is a celebration of humans in very much
the old (enlightenment) style. Insofar as it gets to grips with deeper environmental issues,
Bookchin's material amounts to an extension of shallow ecology. 8 Ecologically Bookchin, like
other of the prophets, buys into vitalism by way of extended consciousness. Ecological ethics is
said to render nature self-conscious; the mechanistic alternative is presented as deadness, thus
making an entirely false contrast. Indeed, part of the problem with the selection of prophets, is
that mechanism is seen as the main bogy - when it is only one of the forms metaphysically
underpinning shallower positions, Cartesian dualism being another - with the result that work that
simply attacks mechanism and its variants and also advocates some sort of environmental way,
gets accounted deep.
N aess has cast the net of deep ecology too wide, catching therewith not only many remote
"supporters", but a number of hostile critics as well, such as latterly the antagonistic Bockchin
(RS p.6). Naess now considers the 8-point platform, formulated by himself and Sessions and
published in several slightly different forms, as tentatively setting down the 'basic principles of
Deep Ecology' - though it leaves out what Devall and Sessions assert are the two essential
features of DE, biospheric egalitorionism and self-realisation, and though it does not require
depth (immediate positions conforming to the platform). Even so Naess 'look[s] upon the
formulations as tentatively expressing the most general and basic views which almost all
supporters of the movement have in common ' (letter 23.6.88). Thus the 8-point platform
provides, in a still vague and tentative sort of way, the distinguishing platform, of DE. To get
around a small obstacle, let us call those who would adhere to an approved minimum of the
principles of the distinguished platform (in some approved formulation) adherents of DE. They
are adherents in (simply and literally) holding to that much of the platform. They may not be
members of the movement in any ordinary sense, in any but the set-theoretical sense, because
appropriate intentionality is lacking, for instance they may never have heard of the movement, let
alone made any effort to join. Nor need adherents be supporters in the usual sense; support is
neither necessary nor sufficient for adherence. A critic such as Bockchin, or Routley, can be an
7
8
See, e.g., B. Devall and G. Sessions, 'The books of deep ecology', Earth First! 4(8) (1984). Several
of these books do not penetrate very deep ecologically or otherwise.
See especially p.344, with remarks like 'and wherever possible the wildlife they may support on their
fringes'. The paragraph portrays a very human-centered (and conquered-land) picture. See also p.342,
middle.
7
adherent without being a supporter, without being supportive. Conversely, a supporter may not
be an adherent. The Salvation Army has many supporters, including atheists, who are not
adherents. The DE movement has many supporters, some of whom call themselves 'deep
ecologists', who do not adhere to the platform, even "more or less". Many of these supporters
are shallow environmentalists, who do not accept the key first point, of intrinsic value outside
humans, or else try to evade it (e.g. by redefinition, or by wrapping up value inextricably in
relations to valuers). Since there are, in my experience, many supporters and indeed enthusiasts
who tum out to be of this shallow sort, Naess's view is a little puzzling: what does he mean here
'almost all supporters'? Also which isolated exceptions does he have in view?
With the rise of environmentism, most of the distinguishing platform is no longer
demanding; indeed it is deliberately lax with a view to increasing the following. Moreover, none
of it, except for the last point, specifying an obligation to attempted implementation, requires any
commitment in the past of adherents. Plainly adherence to DE, as well as support for DE, could
be very considerably increased were this requirement evaded. A neat strategy, common to
ecomonical practice and sociological research, readily presents itself. Let us speak of silent
adherents as those who adhere to the platform, more or less, except that they make no requisite
effort to implement it (they may of course have some vague feeling of obligation, should they
ever reflect on the matter). Even without the benefit of scholarly survey work, it is evident that
DE would now have a large number of silent adherents, many of whom are not however
adherents, being either oblimovish, situated in repressive regions or social situations, or simply
uninformed (like indigenous peoples who think here are excessively many excessively
interferring humans of Caucasian stock).
The core platform represents a surprisingly incomplete and rather ill-organised collocation
of principles. The incompleteness is most conspicuous in point 6, which advances no details as
to envisaged structural changes. In extenuation N aess pleads that he has 'not has courage to go
into detail and define what these different structures will be, because we are going to have a lot of
different Green varieties. We shouldn't have one set of structures imposed' 9 • The reasoning
does not hold up. A range of structures, rather than a unique structure, can easily be defined by
constraints well-known ones as it happens. Naess should certainly be encouraged to go on and
delimit the structural and policy changes. It is easy to give him a start, drawing upon DE and
neighbouring environmental positions. For instance,
6a. The policy objective of maximizing state economic growth should be abandoned in favour of
9
RS p.7. But elsewhere. Naess did go into some detail (e.g. Book). Furthermore, if Naess - old,
famous, unorthodox, courageous enough on difficult mountains - doesn't get down to requisite details
of structural change, who will? Well, even some rather shallow theorists do.
8
a highly selective approach to such growth. Evidently, there are many different ways such a
change in policy can be implemented. Some such change may be suggested by, but is not
implied by, point 7.
6b. Technology selection should be reoriented to appropriate technology, and away from risky
and polluting technology.
6c. Population policies should be directed at decreasing human populations in overpopulated
regions.
Principle 6c complements point 4, which does not actually enjoin any decrease in human
population. And so on, through a well-known list of constraints, with several of them regularly
included in principles of alternative social paradigms. Point 5 requires similar elaboration.
Another surprising feature is how mild most of these elaborations are, like the lax
distinguishing platform itself, which is pretty wishy-washy when contrasted with what is
happening out there environmentally. Many environmentalists now wish to proceed much
further, and to witness some real curtailment of heavy broad-acre assaults upon environments,
such as extensive clear-cutting of forests, over-fishing of shelves, and over-grazing of rangelands, extensive strip and beach mining, broad-acre pollution, and so on. Even
deindustrialization is not explicitly part of the DE creed, though some of the text enjoin it (e.g.
DS); but the issue is (no doubt wisely) avoided by leading prophets of DE familiar with the
demands of socialism. Yet deindustrialization - a considerable reduction in the levels of industrial
activity, particularly the undesirable dangerous destructive polluting types of industry that
conspicuously contributed to the first industrial revolution - would emerge from all the alternative
futures deep ecologists prefer to imagine, along with a much smaller, less consumption-oriented,
terrestrial human population. In any case, deindustrialization is an important environmental
objective, for both shallower and deeper ecology. It would assist, most materially, in obtaining
some better control on major environmental risks and problems, notably such matters as
greenhouse effects, atmospheric ozone destruction, and acid rain and its fall-out.
The idea of progress is, like that of more industrialisation, also under a cloud. It is now
naive to assume that progress per se is automatically to be applauded, and that a telling criticism
of something is that it would block progress. People are these days a little more discriminating
(in some respects); there is progress and progress, growth and growth, coke and coke. Much
that was progress, and still is in many quarters, is no longer universally regarded as such, as, for
instance, elimination of wetlands, pollution growth, assimilation of indigenous peoples. The
'previously ... dominant [assumption], that non-industrial society would and should progress
towards the industrial state and the scientific world view' was challenged, and is increasingly
rejected (cf. Naess, on the "status of mythology").
9
So wishy-washy is the core characterisation of deep ecology that it lets in as deep ecologists
all sorts of environmental philosophers who would not previously have made that select band,
philosophers whom main disciples of deep ecology previously did or would have excluded,
philosophers whose positions are not deep. If DE is to be more exclusive, it will require more
careful, tighter formulation. Only clearly ruled out among environmental philosophers, i.e. those
who philosophize about environments and environmental problems, are hard-line human
chauvinists, led in the textbook stakes by Australians, Passmore (in his main conservative
persona) and McCloskey, but recently joined by some Americans Many of these excluded
philosophers would, moreover, subscribe to most of the points in the core platform, as weakly
interpreted. It is nowadays a rare thinking person who does not consider that there are severe
environmental problems, local and global, about which something, fairly far-reaching by
conservative political standards, should be done. It is a rare philosopher, who becomes
immersed in some spread of these problems (though it is still a rather rare professional
philosopher that does), and who does not develop some environmental commitments - even if a
liberalish social agenda still continues to dominate an environmental one (even so it is fast
becoming hard to avoid observing the interprenetration of social with broadly environmental
problems). While environmental philosophy has, by contrast with economics 10 , tended to
become progressively more accommodating to what was only a short time ago radical
environmental throught, as the magnitude of environmental problems is revealed, deep ecology
has moved in the opposite direction, has tried be excessively conciliatory, confusing pluralism
with broad consensualism, and has lost much of its radical flare. A wide environmental pluralism
is just fine; but it does not have to be achieved through consensus, or at the cost of a deep or an
ecological platform. A pluralism can be achieved by the linking of different positions, not their
mergence.
Among the diverse and motley groups of philosophers who now gain entry as adherents of
deep ecology, too generously construed, are apparently included those examples:Example 1. Moral extensionists, both utilitarians and rationalists 11 . Among utilitarians are
Singer, and perhaps even Smart on some days. Most turns on how point 1 is construed.
Utilitarians in the Benthamite tradition assign intrinsic value to all creatures with preferences,
sentience or the like, and are concerned with the well-being and flourishing of such creatures.
Accordingly they satisfy point 1 if it is read, as it may well be, 'much human and much nonhuman life'. It all depends upon how the terms 'human' and 'non-human' are quantified. If both
are quantified with 'all', the theses becomes implausible (admitting e.g. lab-manufactured
10
11
Now benchmark of reaction rareness, but itself beginning to exhibit some restlessness and unpass and
signs of change.
The useful category of moral extensionism derives from Rodman. It is critically examined also in EE.
10
abominations as intrinsically valuable), and would exclude some acknowledged deep ecologists.
If the terms are more weakly quantified, then environmentally aware and active Benthamites are
admitted. An evident dividing line, provided by particular quantification, with 'some', is enough
to exclude shallow philosophers. But no quantification will serve to exclude either intermediate
positions which do not adopt a deep value theory, or individualism, such as moral extension
positions, almost invariably a spouse. Extensionists more patently included are those of
rationalistic persuasion, grouped loosely around Regan in the American South, who have
gradually move away from utilitarian prescriptions, to the view that ethical principles, including
those of vegetarianism, can be reached by rational means, by clear, consistent and coherent
thinking (thus, the broad position is really a coherence theory of morality).
Example 2. More far-reaching intermediate positions, which do assign intrinsic value less
stingily throughout nature, to some non-preference-havers, such as trees, and to some nonindividuals, such as forests, but which still adopt a greater value assumption, according to which
human values always take precedence over non-human assignments. Positions of this sort are
delineated (so far in insufficient theoretical detail) by Rolston and Attfield. In fact the positions so
far elaborated of this type typically, but hardly inevitably, draw on an enlightened Christian
backdrop heavily laced with science (a religious American naturalism, so to say, in Ralston's
case). They amount to nonsecular moral extensionisms, by contrast with the secular moral
extensionisms of example 1 (to try to squeeze these positions into Rodman's nonexhaustive
classification of positions).
Example 3. Deep-green theorists reject the biocentric restriction sometimes built into point 1,
though not in big formulation given above. This formulation certainly admits Sylvan as an
adherent of DE, despite what some deep ecologists have said. According to strict biocentrism
however, only what has life (in some sense) can have value. Deep-green theorist see this
restriction as very like that imposed by utilitarians, to sentience as unwarranted, unnecessary,
unenforceable and arbitrary.
Deep-green theorists, like environmental resisters, ecodefenders and Earth-Firsters, now
see the DE platform as much too moderate and quite insufficiently radical. The earlier radicalism
of DE has been excessively pruned back, on a mix of dubious grounds: the drive for an
environmental consensus (in place of a genuine pluralism), the religio-political quest for a large
support base (which could however be environmentalism broadly, with DE in the vanguard), and
the input of conservatizing academic thought and the aim of intellectual respectability. In fact DE
which has not gained much ground or good grades academically, as compared with its success
outside academia, especially with book-reading environmentalists, would better forget academic
success, where it has made progress only among outsiders, not power-players, and return to its
11
more radical mission. Academics, after all, form only a tiny minority, though one dangerously
and influentially supportive, on the whole, of most past environmental excesses and assaults.
We have proceeded to cut through the problem of what DE is or may be by formulating a
specific version, authentic deep ecology, and by taking explicit account of main alternatives
proposed. Authentic deep ecology follows, for the most part, Naess's account of deep ecology.
But insistence on authentic deep ecology leaves several casualties, nebulous deep ecologists who
prove not to be authentically deep. An important test is offorded through the greater value
assumption, and the associated special place reserved for humans in the scheme of things, assent
to which serves to expose the inadequate depth of more nebulous 'followers of deep ecology'.
For (after proper preparation) they make the wrong responses on the crucial tests of depth. A
conspicuous casualty who fails to negotiate 'these tricky slopes' is Drengson, behind whose
genuine ecological sensibility lies a human supremacist position with humans occupying 'a
unique position ... in the scheme of things', at the summit of that old-consciousness hierarchy,
"the great chain of being" .12 According to Drengson, circumstances
Might force us, sometimes, to choose between the life of a fish or a cow and that of
a human child. We do not hesitate to choose the child. Our priorities are a result of
our position in the scheme of things, with a spectrum of species (p.7).
Not even followers of medium-depth ecology need respond in this reflex fashion, for instance
where the child is seriously defective. Certainly, faced with a range of duly-elaborated imagined
circumstances of difficult or forced choice, deeper thinkers would hesitate - since such situations
tend to pose moral dilemmas. And sometimes at least their priorities would be different from
Drengson's; for example, the fish is rare and the child ordinary, the cow occupies a unique place
in an important ecosystem.13
Even Naess himself, who vacillates considerably in what he has to say and occasionally
lapses badly from the authentic way. 14 It is worth examining some of Naess's logics, not for
nonphilosophical reasons (or even to reveal N aess as a further flaws doyen, typical of the heroes
12
13
14
See The Trumpeter 1(4) (1984), 6-7. Drengson is not the only casualty; Berry, whose criticism
Drengson is trying to meet, is another.
Differently, the child is Hitler or the President who chooses to press the nuclear button. Such cases,
which in some settings permit of a traditional treatment, were considered from a deeper perspective in
Routley 2 79.
A most striking example is Naess's Rescequence article, 'The basis of deep ecology', which departs
considerably from the spirit and themes of DE. Even Naess, who is not significantly hang-up in
doctrinal purity and doctrinal divergence, felt obliged to circulate a note correcting, "reformulating",
what he had said and written (the article was originally a Sub ...... lecture). 'Some ... may find some of
its sentences not quite in forming with what I usually tend to say. Therefore I offer some
reformulations ... I still stick to my views recently expressed in various articles and books' (Nute,
italics added).
12
of DE), but because these show committing about DE, they are indicative of its doctrical
instability, lack of clarity, and scope for improvement.
• Any society worthy of the name Green is a deep ecological one. 15 Given that there are a range
of ........... societies that are green but not deep green, such a claim must fail. Even if 'deep
green' were substituted for 'green' it could not be contained, because DE policies exclude some
deep green alternatives. Accordingly, it is false that explication of DE is 'articulation of the
fundamental positions that are presupposed in Green societies' (p.4); DE societies are but part of
that rich and variety plurality.
What does Naess say by way of rectification? Frankly, not nearly enough. He proceeds to assert
that in his opinion, a 'society that does not operate in harmony with [the 8-point platform of DE
... is not] worthy of being called Green! But a genuinely Green society may well reject or violate
several of the points emanciated, e.g. the wide intrinsic value assumption (of point 1), the
obligation to action (of point 8).
•
'We should never engage in any discussion on technicalities without asking, "What do we
basically need in life?" Always ask the basic question. This is what I mean by the term Deep
Ecology Movement' (p.5). Naess does nothing whatever to complenish for presentation of the
basic technical question in this (biospherically) chauvinistic way. Do we need a DE which tells us
that the bottom line is "What's in it for us?"! Doesn't part of deep environmentalism consist in
seeing through and explaining what is wrong with this pernicious bottom line. As regard the
'This is what I mean by ... ' blunder, Naess tries to exonerate himself by use of the well-worn
criterion/definition distinction.1 6 But on its own it hardly helps; such bottom line inquiry is not a
criterion for DE either. Nor is following inquiry through to ultimate ends a distinctive feature of
DE; the shallowest sorts of hedonism, for example, may adopt similar procedures. In fact N aess
lands himself in further trouble in trying to extricate himself. To try to make the criterion offer
look tempting (a comprehensive test for depth), he claims that 'when supporters of the shallow
ecology movement are seriously asked about ultimate ends they tend to affirm the same ones as
supporters of the deep movement'. Not only would this be a most unlikely outcome of a
satisfactory questionaire; but worse, if it were the outcome, it would render shallow ecology
supporters deep; so the criterion would eliminate a fundamental contrast for, and for making out,
DE. In any event, too many humans, especially powerholders, remain outside the orbit of
15
16
This follows from what Naess asserts given on that a society that adapts 'policies characteristic of
Deep Ecology' is a deep ecological one.
There is at least a touch of arrogance (or is it part Naess's disdain for conceptual nicety?) in Naess's
introduction of this shabby exoneration attempt: The damaging sentences, - those quoted - 'might be
reformulated (in honor of my conceptually interested friends) in the follow way:'. Maybe Naess was
serious in his (otherwise ab sure) opening remarks in the R ......... article about looking forward to
hobnobbing with the aristocracy.
13
shallow ecology, often attached to the pernicious bottom line (it is doubtful that 'most people
dwell in shallow ecology', p.5 heading).
•
Articulation of DE principles gives a total view. (An amazing contrast with the ....... .
juxtaposed doctrine of ignorance which suggest we can never obtain a total view.) By contrast
with 'shallow ecology which (avoids) the basic questions ... the Deep Ecology Movement
concerns itself with basic beliefs and assumptions about the universe. If you articulate the
principles of the Deep Ecology Movement you get a total view . The term "total view" is
essential. The Deep Ecology Movement is a total view. It covers our basic assumptions, our life
philosophy and our decisions in everyday life' (Res ,p.6.italics added). In first place, the alleged
contrast with shallow ecology do not stand up to much examination. A dedicated shallow
Christian or capitalist may practice the same depth of questioning and reflection or a deep
ecologist, or rather more; such a person may have a well-integrated lifestyle, with a fairly
comprehensive philosophy (as these thing go) covering it. Secondly, N aess takes what seems to
be asserted back in commentary. 'If we articulate the principles of the deep ecology movement, -- you do not get a total view' (p.3); but that apparently directly contradicts the above italicized
passage. There is an escape from contradiction offered - distinguish the principles, by filling in
the dashes by "in the sense of principles of the DE platform" - but it leads a severe problem - what
are the principles of DE? What is DE? Naess's commentary implies that the principles of DE
required for a total view are those of all levels of the double pyramid. Such an idea lands the
articulation of DE in hopeless difficulties. Firstly, we do not, and cannot, know what the
principles are, because they now include principles applied and decisions taken at the bottom level
which refers to particular situations, including 'particular direct actions at a particular date'; but
these will vary, in ......... ways, over-future times. Secondly, since there are various different,
and compating, principles at the top level, DE will either be damagingly inconsistently
characterised, or else it will be far from uniquely characterised. For DE will include Christianity
of this and that sect, Buddinism of this and that form, and so on. In fact Naess accepts such an
outcome (but in his misdirect attempt to avoid dogmatism): 'There is not one, definite, deep
ecology philosophy, not one definite "ecosophy", no definite set of green policies' (p.3) and, he
should have added on this line of thinking no definite deep ecology or set of DE principles.
But there is a set of central principles, those at level 2. They do not present a total view.
But nor in general do those of all four levels of deep ecology. There is much, a mass of opinion
(for instance, concerning scientific speculation) which would form part of a more comprehensive
(world) view that is not reflected at any of the four levels. It is indeed entirely unclear what
would present a total view? Spiniza's philosophy perhaps? But it is easy to ...... of topics it
does not cover, such as city architecture and factory farming, on which a total view could have an
angle. It is certainly doubtful that lesser mentals than Spinaza, such as typical supporters of DE,
14
operate in a total view. N aess claims that they do, but adduces no evidence; testing is much more
likely to reveal how pragmentory the ecological view of most deep ecologists are. Not only is the
noton of a "total view", drawn from Naess's earlier philosophizing muddy; the desirability of the
notion is open to (damaging) questioning. "Total view" comprehends too much, fixes too much
that perhaps should be left open; it sails too close to "totaliterian view" for real pluralistic comfort.
There is, then, quite evidently, a serious problem with deep ecology, and in finding out
exactly what it is, that even the clearer accounts offered differ in significant subjects face similar
difficulties, philosophy for one. With movements, which is what deep ecology is often presented
as, the situation is normally much worse. Consider the difficulties in saying, with much
precision, what some political movement (such as green politics) represents, what some party
stands for and against. And despite the accelerating diversity of accounts there appears to be
substance to the deep ecology notion. Several important interconnected distinctions, which look
to be worth disentangling, are marked out, and an important group of ideas is assembled. Rather
than being simply junked (something my conservative inclinations rise against with notions, as
with the premature discarding of material "goods"), the notions involved should at least be
disentangled and, if feasible, renovated or recycled.
More generally, it is not merely valuabe, but quite essential in senous intellectul
assignments, to indicate what deep ecology is and isn't - for lots of purposes, including
explaining it, arguing from it, and applying it. What can be done? One resolution can be
obtained along the lines of critical rationalism. The fuller formulations of deep ecology, after
reorganisation into more tractable form, are subject to severe criticism, with a view to obtaining
thereby an improved, more satisfactory, thinner and fitter formulation, which at the same time
meets other desirable criteria. Among these is a desideratum often lost sight of in the ferment of
environmental action, the need for environmental pluralism.
A start on this rather analytic approach involves separating out the different components of
the deep ecology messages, and isolating core themes of deep and shallow ecology from wider
positions and paradigms which they inform. The core is (as Naess indicated) essentially
normative. Fortunately the core themes have already been isolated, in a previous application of
deep ecology to population theory 17 , and this work can be taken over largely intact. For the
extensive remainder, the following pretty complicated sort of picture starts to emerge (upon
organising themes and claims of several supporters of deep ecology, in a way explained in the
Appendix to this chapter):-
17
In Routley 84.
Figure 5.1.
SHALLOWER AND DEEPER POSITIONS, AND THEIR ACCLAIMED ASSUMPTIONS, PARTLY
SCHEMATIZED.
SHALLOW
VALUE
CORE
ENVIRONMENT AL
SUBJECT
SOLE
(INTRINSIC)
K,' ALUE ASSUMPTION
VALUES-IN-NATURE
GREATER VALUE ASSUMPTION BIOSPECIES IMPARTIALITY
FURTHER PHILOSOPHICAL BASES
GROUNDOF
VALUE
DEEP
(separable theoretical underpinning)
FEATURES OF
HUMANS
DIVERSITY, RICHNESS OF
NATURAL(LIFE)FORMS
ii. METAPHYSICAL
INDIVIDUAL
REDUCTION. NATURE
AS BACKDROP
IRREDUCIBLE SYSTEMS.
NATUREAS
IN1EGRAL
m EPISTEMIC
REDUCTIONIST/ANALYTIC
SUBJECT-OBJECT ACCOUNT
HOLISTIC/GESTALT /FIELD
ACCOUNT
LARGER
ENCOMPASSING
AND INFORMING
THEORY
EMPIRICISM,IDEALISM,
ECOSOPHY, PANTHEISM,
POSITIVISM
AMERICAN NATURALISM
+- DIFFERENT FACETS ➔
OF CHRISTIANITY, BUDDHISM, ...
VALUE (DEONTIC
AND ACTION)
COLLARIES
EXTENSIVE
INTERFERENCE
FOR HUMAN INTERESTS
AND PURPOSES
1.
ACTION
(META-) PRINCIPLE
APPLICATIONS
(AS COROLLARIES)
LIMITED INTERFERENCE
AND RIGHTS THEREfO
ETHICS
ASETHETICS
METAPHYSICS
EPISTEMOLOGY
IDEOLOGY/
RELIGION
LIFESTYLE
+-OBLIGATION TO IMPLEMENT COMMITMENTS➔
To population, (individual) consumption,
(individual) impact, resources, technology, pollution,
economic growth and quality-of-life, culture, organisation,
science, education; and to the variety of natural (and
some artifical) forms, such as land, oceans, atmosphere,
arctic regions, swamps, forests, soils, ...
POLICY
ECONOMICS
POLITICS
Given the picture some major and serious sets of problems with deep ecology begin to
appear at once. First, the value core arrived at already substantially transforms that suggested by
the literature, with, for instance, biospecies impartiality improving on biospheric egalitarianism.
Secondly, both the bases and the encompassing theories usually indicated (those diagrammed) are
not just highly problematic but are detachable from the core and can be avoided. For example, the
various, rather different, epistemic and metaphysical theories that have been proposed as
16
supporting, or even essential to, deeper positions are, to say the least, very dubious. So it is
fortunate that the deeper value core is independent of them all - though that is not to say that it is
independent of every account, since some (plausible) story of value qualities in the natural world,
and our perception and knowledge of them, has to be told, sooner or later.
But one weaker parts of the larger deep ecological story as usually told concerns the
embedding of deep ecology in a broader philosophical theory, such as Naess's system ecosophy
T, or Buddhism, or nature mysticism, or whatever. This much is true: as it is with shallow
positions, which can be supported by most of the mainstream, more comprehensive,
philosophical theories (for what they are worth), so it is with deeper positions, which can be
supported by very different, though unorthodox, philosophical theories, for instance, by (a
modification of) Whitehead's process theory or by (an adaption of) Meinong's object theory.
But, for reasons we shall come to, such theoretical frameworks as ecosophy, pantheism,
Christianity and Buddhism do not include thorough-going deep positions, but sustain only
shallower positions, and a properly deep picture is not derivable from them. This suggests that
the proposed derivation of deep ecology from ecosophy is substantially astray (and that so, more
sweepingly, is the whole derivational pyramid regularly presented by Naess in his four-level
picture). So it will prove to be: the success of these derivations would depend upon importing
analogues of shallowness into deep ecology.
APPENDIX
1. Survey methods as a way of pinning down deep ecology. How does the sort of
picture shown in figure 5.1 - which is worth persevering with, elaborating and applying - fit in
with the burgeoning deep ecological literature? It is surely not just tangential to that, so that we
should look elsewhere to grasp the deeper features of deep ecology?
In fact the core themes, and philosophical basis, and extension themes, were assembled in a
quite impressionistic fashion, namely working through much of the literature, and all the more
basic work, and setting down the themes which on reflection seemed to be presented or emerge.
Something like this is still a main method of research in the humanities, e.g. in history, history of
ideas, and philosophy.
Figure 7a Schematic picture of elementary procedures
Source 1
T
H
Source 2
Source n
i
INTERSECTION
(COMMON
CORE)
E
M
E
s
UNION
t
DISCOUNTED
But here, with deep ecology, there were prospects of doing better than such impressionistic
methods, or so one might have thought. Empirical, or at least quasi-empirical, methods (of the
sort favoured by Naess in his earlier days) could be employed. The main idea is that the set of
relevant sources is assembled, and then some statistical and set-theoretic work is done on the
themes extracted from these sources; so the method is an elaboration of the sort of technique
larger dictionaries such as the Oxford adopt in pinning down the standard senses of a term. The
hope was that analysis of the serious philosophical literature (pretty rough selection criteria these,
to be sure) on deep ecology would lead, not to despair, but in particular in two directions:Firstly, to what is more or less common to the positions presented - the intersection of theories,
giving the substantial core or basic theory. And secondly, to what results when all the theories
are put together - the union of themes, giving an approximation, after some sifting, to a deep
ecological paradigm.
As you might have anticipated by now, this thematic method hardly worked to perfection.
Still it is worth explaining the method in a little more detail since, despite its limited success, it
18
reveals much. First a set of sources is assembled. Here there is scope for sampling and statistical
methods, so beloved of social scientists; but in the case of deep ecology it seemed feasible, back
in 1984, to gather for winnowing all more serious texts accessible in Australia. That latter
limitation (all too familiar in environmental research) imposes a perhaps unfortunate parochial
geographical constraint; but it induces no violation of such adequacy requirements as that sources
introducing the notion be included in the bundle, as are all sources referred back to in several
other sources. With the rise of networking magazines concerned with deep ecology, there are
many references to deep ecological thinking and experience which get discounted, as not
appropriately serious. Increasingly often, any sort of deeper experience or thought gets assigned
under the "deep" heading, no matter how anthropocentric. This is one of the many problems
with the depth notion and deep terminology, rather counteracting the valuable idea of penetrating
below the conventional surface of received environmental assumptions, that it is important to
think deeper than the assumption of Environment Z-land, for instance, that the environment
should be managed for present and future generations of humans - a typical governmental surface
assumption, often announced, but much less often put into practice.
Once the sources are assembled, a beginning can be made on unscrambling themes,
something that calls for a good deal of judgement also, especially in such matters as deciding
whether themes from different sources come to the same or not. Here and elsewhere care is
required not to penetrate too deeply, to expose only so much of surface themes as is necessary (a
well-known principle in logical analysis). When the themes are duly marked out, there is some
smoothing of the thematic data; for instance, evidently remote and irrelevant themes in one source
may be deleted. (It is like the judging of a diving contest or the massaging of statistics, where
isolated wild elements are removed from the sample used for assessment.) Then the elementary
set operations of union and intersection are applied, again subject to some qualification. In
particular, if a very prominent theme in some formulations is omitted from, or only approximated
in, one formulation, then that theme will be put, initially at least, in the intersection. (Logicians
and mathematicians, for example, sometimes omit intended or assumed axioms; e.g. Parry in
analytic implication, Maclean in category theory.) A striking example concerns the very
introduction of the notion of deep ecology into the philosophical literature (Naess 73), which fails
to present the fundamental value thesis, that intrinsic value is not confined solely to humans or
human features. While it can be argued that rejection of the sole and greater value assumptions is
implied by what is said concerning biospheric egalitarianism (the equal right to live and
blossom), the argument is not decisive, since value is only involved indirectly and perhaps only
instrumentally (as Naess's appeal to effects on the 'life quality of humans' and to our ecological
dependence might suggest).
19
The results are tabulated, as follows:
Figure 7b. Actual results, in not form, of a survey of some main sources.
Naess 73
Naess 83
Naess-Sessions 84
Intrinsic value
Intrinsic value of
life (1)
(1)
Biological
egalitarianism (2)
Diversity/richness(3)
Complexity not
complication (6)
Diversity/
richness (2)
Diversity/
richness ( 1)
Total field holism (1)
No negative
interference
rights, excepting
vital needs (3)
No negative
interference,
etc. (3)
Devall 79
ROUGH
CLASSIFICATIONS
VALUE
CORE
Diversity (10
GROUNDSAND
BASES
New person/planet
metaphysics (1)
Objective approach to
nature 2
Earth wisdom,
VALUEAND
limited interference ACTION
COROLLARIES
More leisure (13)
Action obligation
6
Present interference
excessive (4)
Policy adjustments
to economic and
ideological structures
(5)
Anti-pollution/
resource depletion
(5)
Local autonomy/
decentralisation (7)
Anti-class posture
4
Action obligation
8
Present human
interference
excessive (5)
Policy adjustments,
etc. [Also to
technological
structures (6)
Objective life
quality rather than
higher living
standard (7)
World population
reduction (4)
POLICY AND
LIFESTYLE
APPLICATIONS
Interim policy
steady state (15),(18)
Soft Technology ( 11)
Life quality
rather than quantity
of products (6)
Reduction of population
to optimum (7)
Emphasis on pollution
and like topics
counterproductive (8)
Local autonomy/
decentralisation (11),(14)
New psychology (3)
DISCOUNTED AREAS:
with rejection of
NEW
SUBJECTS
dualisms: man/nature,
subject/object, etc
New philosophical
anthropology (9)
New objective
20
Embedding in
ecosophy
NOTES:
science (4)
New education (12)
? Embedding in
updated Spinoza (2)
EMBEDDJNG
PHrr,OSOPHY/RELIGION
1. Bracketed numerals indicate theses numbers in the sources.
2. The disappointing absence of core themes can to some extent be compensated for
by appeal to statements of them or implying them elsewhere in accompanying texts
and commentaries.
3. Naess-Sessions 84, also Naess 84, became the 8-point platform, now widely
reintensted.
Naturally one does not attempt this sort of analysis entirely in the dark, but in the partial
expectation that certain kinds of results will emerge, these three especially:
•
The substantial core represents a significant deviation from mainstream assumptions, a
deviation which has been encountered before.
•
The total theory, or union, is not simply a jumble of theses, but has some reasonable
coherence.
• There are ways of getting from the substantial core toward the total theory.
In the case of deep ecology it would have been pleasant to report triumphantly that these
expectations, and more, are fulfilled; indeed the theory is so well integrated it represents a
(sub)cultural paradigm. Unfortunately it did not work out that way, as is evident. What is more,
the situation has become markedly worse, as presentations of deep ecology have burgeoned since
1984.
Partly the thematic enterprise did not succeed because of the poor calibre of the leading
presentations of "the" deep ecology intuition, and because exponents had and have different
intuitions, messages and objectives. Partly, however it did not work because the idea of
obtaining a substantial core and a coherent union was misconceived. Taking the union, in
particular, assumed that there was much wider common ground - something that could be called
the deeper ecological paradigm which could be approached in this sort of way - rather than as a
plurality of positions. Pluralism is fine and feasible, and worth encouraging much more widely;
but taking the union of themes of some pluralistic system of positions is likely to lead only to
intractable inconsistent sets, and perhaps to trouble. Consider, to illustrate, the United Religion,
about to sweep California, a pluralist grouping made up of representations of the World's great
religions. While the refined common core of these positions is likely to be interesting, the union
is not: it will contain, for example, all of the following inconsistent triad: Many gods exist (from
e.g. Hinduism); Exactly one god exists (e.g. Islam); no gods exist (from e.g. Buddhism). There
is analogous trouble in combining deep ecological sources with such results as that stones and
mountains both do and do not have inherent value; there both are and are not detachable intrinsic
values; and so on. The picture is then as shown:-
21
putative
substantial core
inconsistent
elements of putative union
What all this emphicizes once again is that deep ecology has to be treated differently, not as
a coherent position but as a loose pluralistic grouping of position. To obtain a clearer authentic
starting position, we shall have to discount since of what paradox as deep ecology. It is for this
sort of reason of course that we chose to follow Naess before other prophets. Once an authentic
position has been made out other prositions can be clustered around it. Such a pluralistic outcome
does not show that the notion of a deeper ecological paradigm is illusory. It only reveals some of
the pluralistic features, mostly not duly recognised at the deeper ends of ecological movements.
And it only indicates that a different route should be taken in getting to a deeper paradigm. For
the alternative environmental, and deep ecological, paradigm covers a spread of positions, much
as the contrasting dominant social paradigm does.
A CRITIQUE OF (WILD) WESTERN DEEP ECOLOGY:
a response to Warwick Fox's Response to an earlier Critique.
Western deep ecology differs in important respects from the deep ecology originated
and pursued by Naess, what I now call authentic deep ecology, at which my Critique of
Deep Ecology was mainly, but by no means entirely, directed. Western deep ecology, also
known as transpersonal ecology (though the ecology has largely dropped out), is very
roughly a doctrine of the west of those new world continents where environmental
philosophy functions; it has been advanced primarily by West Coast Americans (Devall,
Drengson, Sessions and others) and associated West Australians (Fox, now of Tasmania,
also Hallem and others). Unlike authentic deep ecology, Western deep ecology is hostile to
environmental ethics, which it tends to dismiss as mere axiology; and it is excessively
enthusiastic about trans personal experience, spiritual "paths" and "ways", and unitarian
metaphysics - in which there are no ontological divides, no dualisms (of subject/object,
subjective/objective), and no separation of things.
Consider what Drengson 'take[s] to be at the heart of deep ecology as Devall and
Sessions present it', and which he enthusiastically endorses:
What deep ecology directs us towards ... is neither an environmental
axiology or a theory of environmental ethics nor a minor reform of
existing practices. It directs us to develop our own sense of self until it
becomes Self, that is, until we realise through deepening ecological
sensibilities that each of us forms a union with the natural world, and
that protection of the natural world is the protection of ourselves ....
reality lies not in the imaginative, subjective dualism of the dominant
outlook, with its self-destructive exploitation of nature and overkill
nuclear weapons. Reality is to be found in a quite different way: by a
path that is nonaggressive, humble, compassionate, and knows itself as
ultimately embedded in the Self of nature. The sacred is immanent in
the profane, the spirit pervades and is the world, the cosmos. It is the
formed and formless as a unity. This ecosophy is at hand for each of us
[ecosophical salvation]. Its realisation is always personal, firsthand
experiential understanding. It is an I-Thou, not an I-it relationship
(Review pp.87-8).
Fox's Response to my Critique develops similar themes, in considerably more detail, so
they become rather more open to assessment. That is why my further critique will
concentrate on his Responses. (On its own, I doubt that his Response would have
sufficient intrinsic interest to warrant an extensive reply.)
In Western deep ecology, the focus is upon, or even (as in Fox 89) contracts to, that
of self and Self (or what it might almost as well be, soul and Soul/Anima sive Natura, or
spirit and World Spirit). For example, Drengson pontificates upon
•
38
the crux of the issues raised by deep ecology [as follows]. We are
challenged to move to genuinely ecological modes of perception,
conception, and practice. If we do this, we will do it to the degree that
we realise that our self is part of a larger Self for which we must care.
This is part of the ecology of self-Self in the cosmology of deep
ecology' (p.89).
Fox goes further, making this type of stuff coextensive with "deep ecology":
Stated rather formally ... the deep ecological framework ... proceed[s]
from two basic hypotheses and one ultimate norm [all concerning self
and Self]. The hypotheses are (i) that "the self is as comprehensive as
the totality of our identifications. Or, more succinctly: Our Self is that
with which we identify" ... ; and (ii) that the self can and does
grow/develop/mature (i.e. widen its sphere and intensity of
identification over time). The norm is that the ideal state of being is one
that sustains the widest (and deepest) possible identification and, hence,
sense of Self.... this ideal state of being is referred to as "Selfrealisation" by N aess and as "ecological consciousness" by Devall and
Sessions" and its cultivation - effective a spiritual discipline - is
considered to be the "real work" of deep ecology (pp. 86-7).
This self-Self cultivation of Western deep ecology, which will be severely criticised, is far
removed from the deep ecology platform upon which authentic deep ecology is centred, a
mundane, secular platform concerned with real environmental issues, which is not a
predominantly human psychological exercise and which does not mention 'self' or 'Self'.
On the strength of the variant presentation of "deep ecology", of this elaboration of
Western deep ecology, Fox feels entitled to assert that 'Sylvan has seriously misunderstood
what deep ecology is about. ... Sylvan's criticisms miss their mark ... Sylvan's critique
leaves deep ecology ... largely untouched' (p.5). Drengson feels entitled to enlarge this
unfounded assertion: 'the critiques of deep ecology that have appeared so far have been
based on misconceptions of what deep ecology is all about, and they have therefore been off
the mark, or at best superficial' (p.89). The critiques that are substantial, not substantially
tirades or shallow, have been substantially directed at authentic deep ecology, not at its
different Western analogue. There has been no misconception or misunderstanding by such
critics; they have aimed at a different target in the same broad field.
On a personal level, I am quite attracted by authentic deep ecology; but I am
substantially repelled by Western deep ecology. I subscribe, more or less, to the 8-point
platform of deep ecology, and accordingly should be accounted a supporter of deep ecology
(for all that critics are not very welcome). Though I do not care for some features of
Naess's system Ecosophy T, which does provide a rickety bridge ·to Western deep ecology,
N aess has always insisted that this was but one of several optional background ideological
frameworks. Western deep ecology is another matter. Too much of it strikes me as like an
evangelic cult, much too incidentally coupled to deep environmentalism; too much is a
39
celebration of self, human self, an expanded egoism; too much is essentially a good oldfashioned celebration of things human, a comparatively shallow celebration disguised in
new environmental and avant-gard attire.
Drengson has the ability to lay on these
obnoxious, chauvinistic features disagreeably thick. Consider a bit of his poetic outpouring
on that jumbled text, Deep Ecology:
Sessions and Devall see humans as beings who are an expression of a
nature deeper, more mysterious, and creative than any of our abstract
theories appreciate .... it is hoped that [our] experiential encounter with
the otherness of Nature transformed as Self will help us to live in such a
harmonious way as to continually discover ever new wonders and value
inherent in wild nature and in the natural human self. ... The book,
thus is dedicated to ... presenting a philosophy of life that resolves
some of our most fundamental questions, the central one of this is: how
can we live truly in authentic, harmonious relationships with all beings
so as to realise a maximum of intrinsic goodness? This is a question,
ultimately, of what it means to become a complete, mature, fully Selfrealised human being (pp.94-5 rearranged).
The statement could almost have come straight out of modem romanticism; all the same
elements are there down to the maximization of human self-realisation. So presented, the
new environmental paradigm of Western deep ecology is the old anti-Enlightenment
movement in contemporary gear.
Though I am substantially turned off by some of Western deep ecology, though I am
disappointed by its apparent shallowness, by its reversion to human chauvinism, though I
try to take cover when its heavy evangelism blows through, I am far from suggesting that
more than critical intellectual action be taken against it. It is, after all, generally for the right
sorts of things environmentally, even if it has invested too heavily in dominant notions,
such as the exalted human self that a radical environmentalism should be escaping; and it is
no worse intellectually than predominant creeds that are far less kind to natural
environments, such as Vatican christianity and American pragmatism. Live and let live.
1. Approaching deep ecology and understanding plurallism.
Well is Fox's response to Sylvan's critique of deep ecology entitled 'Approaching
Deep Ecology'; for it does no more than approach deep ecology, it does not reach the
authentic article. Instead Fox converts deep ecology into a related concoction, largely of his
own (now called transpersonal ecology*). Having thus commandeered deep ecology for
*
Transpersonal ecology is an extreme variant of Western deep ecology, which tries, for
instance, to jettison what Drengson and others retain: intrinsic goodness, intrinsic value, and
the like.
40
his own purposes, it is easy for Fox to feel confident in his charge that 'Sylvan has
seriously understood what deep ecology is about' (p.5).
Fox's main accusation is indeed that I have seriously misunderstood what deep
ecology is about, that my criticism is misdirected, and that deep ecology emerges largely
unscathed. We shall see about that. But first, I want to lodge a counter-charge: Fox
appears to have misunderstood a good deal of what I was about. My critique was not
concerned with his position, except - in so far as it purported to be deep ecology - in
passing; it was addressed to the mainstream of deep ecology. Fox's own transpersonal
ecology does not belong to the mainstream of deep ecology; indeed it is doubtful that it is
deep ecology at all. It tries to throw away central parts of deep ecology, the value theory in
particular, and to revert to what appears, to all intents and purposes, to be a rather shallow
position. But, most remarkable, it has very little to do with the natural environment; much
of it is but expanded self adulation.
Both Fox and N aess, in their responses to my critique, try to make some easy initial
capital by pointing to the different ending of a working draft of the critique from the pluralist
ending of the published version. 1 Naess uses the different endings to ground his allegation
that Sylvan is uncertain what he is about, an ad hominem strategy which he presumably
hopes will help to defuse substantial criticisms of deep ecology which he does not address
(see his 84 and 85). Fox makes much of the different endings (almost 5 pages worth) in
order to reveal an uncharitable interpretation: that already indicated, of misunderstanding,
and that my 'critique leaves deep ecology .... largely untouched' (p.5).
Naess and Fox seem to think that it counts against a critique that it may enjoy more
than one ending, that it can leave room for doubt as to whether something should be
restored or abandoned. Yet these are very much the sort of outcome a more tolerant and
careful assessment may yield. Consider an old building seriously defective in main
structural detail, yet with many worthwhile period features. It may be a hard question,
over which there is room for uncertainty, whether it should be restored or demolished. So
it is often with intellectual systems, such as deep ecology and ecosophy. By and large I am
in favour of rehabilitation (see e.g. Routley 74), though from a favoured nonpluralistic
1
Though I feel a bit used, I'm not going to make anything of incomplete working drafts
I naively handed out not being a fair target for commentary (it is obvious that one can
be even more stupid and so forth in drafts than in more considered final versions).
Much of the interesting work in and around deep ecology appears only in working draft
form or in what academic snobs describe as semi-published form.
41
stance such systems as ecosophy include material destined for the intellectual scrap heap.
But, in any event, I am in favour of recycling of rubbish wherever this is feasible.
For anyone who adheres to a select position within an also conceded pluralistic
setting, there is always more than one presentation, and more than one ending: a monistic,
or singular, ending deriving from the select position, and a pluralistic ending from the
setting. There is nothing particularly remarkable about this, for all that it baffles Fox. On
the singular ending (of the limited edition "penultimate version" of my critique) many major
themes of deep ecology go down, not because they are ' insubstantial or vacuous' (what
Fox finds it convenient to infer p.2ff.), but because they are all defective, all substantially
astray. So much had already been argued in the main body of the work; for instance, one
sustained development aimed to demonstrate the substantial falsity of the principle of
biospheric egalitarianism and its inconsistency with other principles of deep ecology. What
of the last words, drawn from Eliot's Four Quartets, 'there is no one to bury'? By this, I
meant: no correct doctrine, not: nothing substantial. It is true that from the singular position
I did look upon several main 'ideas of deep ecology ... not even as if they were once useful
... but rather that upon closer scrutiny there is ... nothing ... [correct in] them in the first
place' (p.3); from that stance I still look upon them in that way.
On the final pluralistic ending what remains 2 are not the trumpeted major themes,
which still go down, but a good many of the less heralded points and themes, such as
departure principles in the 8-point platform of deep ecology. What can be added,
furthermore, are significant variations upon some of the major themes; for instance
ecospheric impartiality in place of biospheric egalitarianism. Now both Naess and Fox
assume that a pluralistic ending diminishes, or ought to weaken, the force of the criticism.
Not so. Naess ends his response to the critique with a relativistic complaint: 'if you have
your own philosophy from which you generate the [core] position of deep ecology, ... why
object to ecosophy T?' (Naess pp.3-4 reordered, also quoted in Fox). The short answer is
because system T is seriously intellectually flawed. A pluralist may let such material stand,
but, unlike a relativist, doesn't have to let it alone; its weaknesses can be exposed, its
inferiority exhibited. Fox goes on to claim that under pluralism, which he also confuses
with relativism, my 'critique loses much of its original sting and no longer constitutes the
challenge to deep ecology that was formerly intended' (p.5). Again, not so; the challenge
and sting remain as before. But now deep ecology is regarded more benignly; and more
future work will be directed at restoration, etc. As you might now anticipate, Fox finds 'a
2
Fox's surprise about this (p.3) can be attributed to his failure to appreciate the force of
'acclaimed major themes' in the theories to be put to rest.
42
strong tension between such a pluralistic position' and the singular position which he
regards as 'essentially argumentative' (p.5). But there is no tension; the singular position
slots neatly into the pluralistic array. Further, both are argumentative, though neither
essentially so. 3
2. Value in deep ecology
Fox's 'most fundamental objection to [my] critique' is that it offers, is based upon, an
'environmental axiological interpretation of deep ecology' (p.29, p.53). Given what Fox
intends by 'environmental axiological interpretation' (his never properly explained
terminology, not mine), which involves axiological reductionism and a certain axiological
priority and hegemony throughout environmental philosophy (p.52) 4 , I deny this. My
critique neither offers nor is based upon such an interpretation; and, as inspection will
confirm, my other work will not bear such an interpretation 5 , I do not 'pursue
environmental philosophical discussion almost entirely at the level of environmental
axiology'. What I do ascribe to deep ecology is "a value core", features of which I explain
in some detail (and to which we shall have to return). But a large transformer (or similar
item) does not reduce to its cores, there is much to such an item besides the core; nor do the
cores pervade, dominate or guide all the rest. The core, which was introduced primarily as
part of an organising structure, does not support what Fox tries to read out of it, namely an
axiological reduction (back in 84, Naess thought 'core' was a 'good expression' for a quite
proper part of deep ecology). In fact, I am not hooked on the term 'core'; substitution of
'value part' for 'value core' would make very little difference to the substance of my critique
of deep ecology, but it would quite adversely effect Fox's response.
An early example of the feebleness of Fox's reconstruction is his attempt to make my
treatment of deep ecological theory outside the value core look as if it too was part of an
axiological interpretation. He proceeds to argue from a title of a later section, 'Beyond the
value core: metaphysical and epistemological "intuitions" of deep ecology', thus: 'as this
title suggests, it is Sylvan's environmental axiological interpretation of deep ecology that
underpins his criticisms there (as elsewhere)' (p.29). The title was not intended to suggest,
and would not normally suggest, such an interpretation; it indicated a separation of parts and
3
For much more detail on all these pluralistic matters, see my Deep Plurallism.
4
For fuller illustration of such undesirable phenomena at work in philosophy, see
Edwards, Ethics without Philosophy.
5
For one example, see the jointly authored The Fight for the Forests.
43
the upcoming contents. As an argument (to be slack with this term), Fox's move is a nonsequitur. 6
Now to get down to the real adjudicational business (of this section), I claim to have
been verballed by Fox.7 While I am becoming pretty accustomed to serious
misrepresentation, I see Fox as ascending to new heights in this regard. For he proceeds to
attribute to me major derivative theses which I nowhere presented, which do not derive
from what I did present, and to which I should not, in any case, accede. Let's look straight
away at some of what Fox proceeds to foist upon me. 'Sylvan assumes from the outset and
proceeds upon the basis that deep ecology is ... primarily a value-in-nature position' (p.30),
that is the 'primary claim' (p.31). I do not assume that deep ecology is primarily that, but
that it is that among other things; 8 I do not proceed on that basis, and I never did suppose
that deep ecology was primarily or only a values-in-nature position. As I say, in a clause
Fox left out in the selective quotation of his indictment, deep ecology 'has been presented as
a metaphysics, as a consciousness movement (and a primarily psychological), and even as a
sort of (Pantheist) religion' (and in an accompanying note I mention Fox's alternative
ontological focus). I am not committed to such a primacy claim (what Fox refers to as
6
As the text reveals, Fox is rather fond of making passages suggest not what they were
intended to suggest or prima facie do suggest, but what he would have them "suggest"
conveniently for his own unscrupulous purposes (we might even label this the
suggestive fallacy). He is not averse either to considerable distortion. For example
(also on p.29) he makes it look, by a clever use of sectional divisions, as if the bulk
of my critique was concerned with the value part of deep ecology, when in fact I get
beyond that part on p.26 in a critique of 60 pages. Of course it would not show that
much even if I had devoted virtually the whole critique to the value part rather than less
than a third; it could just mean that that was the part of deep ecology that interested me
most, or that I ran out of energy and patience thereabouts, etc.
In the present critique I ran out of these commodities and time before I had finalized a
section on fallacious methodological practices in deep ecology, perhaps to be called
'fallacies of transpersonal ecology'. Next edition, perhaps.
7
Verbal is an Australian verb, alluding to fabricated evidence made up by police or
official prosecutioners. Verballing was a common practice in Queensland, and is
certainly used by police gangs in some other states.
8
I do begin the first "problem" section of the critique 'Deep ecology appears to be some
elaboration of the position that natural things other than humans have value in
themselves .. .' (Cp.1 ). But that says nothing more offensive than what can be inferred
from point 1 of the 8-point platform of deep ecology, and nothing about primacy.
Moreover I go on to say that the elaboration is extensive (e.g. Cp.4), a claim well
illustrated by Figure 1 (Cp.5), where the "value core" comprises but a small part of the
deep position.
44
'Sylvan's primary claim', p.31, p.33, p.34, p.47, p.48, p.57, p.70 and many other pages,
sometimes obliquely as 'Sylvan's claims' and the like, e.g. 'Sylvan says', p.86).
'Moreover', Fox continues (p.30), 'for Sylvan, it is an objective position since its
"core theme" of "values-in-nature suggests ... that natural items have value qualities
independently of perceivers"'. Firstly there is a misquotation; I refer to 'core themes',
which furthermore extend beyond the value part. 9 Secondly, no objectivist claim is made or
follows for Sylvan. 10 On the basis of the primacy claim, in conjunction with the objectivist
claim (in the case of D2 at least), Fox proceeds to foist upon me 'two derivative claims':
Dl. 'deep ecology does not proceed from a general vision of reality or "underlying
perception of the way things are" ' 11 , and
D2. 'deep ecology is not at all concerned with the way in which we experience the world'
(p.31, Fox's italics).
Firstly, I do not present such claims; indeed I present a substantial amount of material
incompatible with such claims, for instance in the discussion of the theme of extreme holism
as regards D 1, and of cosmic identity as regards D2. Secondly, I did not and do not adhere
to such claims; indeed I have put a good deal of effort into exposing the metaphysical and
epistemological parts of deep ecology. Thirdly, as should be thus evident, they do not
derive from what I did present in the critique. Fourthly, in particular, they do not derive
from the primacy and objectivist claims. Indeed readily available counter-models will show
as much. Consider a values-in-nature objectivist position such as that of Holmes Rolston,
which we can conveniently call 'R(olston)'s deep ecology' (there is not even any cheating
here, as Ralston's position has a better claim to be accounted deep ecology than some of the
positions admitted to the club). Now simply substitute 'R's deep ecology' for 'deep
ecology' throughout the "derivation" of the claims. The premiss or grounds hold, as R's
deep ecology satisfies both primacy and objectivist claims; but the claims supposed to be
derived do not hold, both RD 1 and RD2 fail. For example, Ralston's deep ecology is very
9
It seems to be on the basis of efforts like this misquotation that Fox feels himself
justified in writing of 'Sylvan's "core claim" that deep ecology is primarily a valuesin-nature position ' (p.34). That is remote from what I do. For example, I am in
trouble for dismissing a sizeable chunk of core deep ecology as rubbish; but a valuesin-nature position is not rubbish.
10
The point was explained in considerable detail in EE p.154ff, where the ugly term
nonjective was deliberately introduced to remove illusions as to objectivity or
subjectivity.
11
The context makes it look as if the internal quotation is drawn from me, but it is not
as perusal of fn.44 will show. DI gains no support from anything I assert.
45
much concerned with the way we experience the world, as a reading of Rolston quickly
discloses. Or if a clearer deep example than Rolston is demanded, there is N aess himself.
Finally, unsurprisingly now, Fox has made elementary mistakes in his alleged
derivations. Consider D2 first. 'This follows', Fox says, 'since value-in-nature are held to
exist "out there" independently of perceivers' (p.31). But again it just does not follow, as a
topic can be deeply concerned with something that enjoys some independence. You might
almost as well try to say that epistemology is not at all concerned with the way in which we
experience the world since primary properties are "out there" independent of perceivers.
Consider next D1, where there is considerably more distortion to be exposed. Fox's
"derivation" really consists of two separable parts. In the first part, Fox's thoroughly
fallacious strategy is to replace 'concerned with' by 'only concerned with' and 'because' by
'simply because', as textual comparisons, of my text with what Fox draws from it, make
plain. His strategy certainly makes for terrific derivations. For example, from "the Prime
Minister is concerned with his sex life" we obtain the startling result that the Prime Minister
is only concerned with his sex life. From the premiss that a man likes his wife because of
her body we obtain without any further ado the familiar worry that he likes her simply
because of her body. 'Beyond this', in a second part, there is an argument based on
independence (apparently involving some misunderstanding of the notion). The argument
appears to be of the form: A is independent of B, therefore A does not proceed from B. The
defectiveness of such an argument is obvious enough once its form is exposed. And the
defectiveness of the case in hand should have been evident to Fox. For Naess has
explained many times how a person can be a deep ecologist (e.g. can adhere to the platform)
without adopting (or even being aware of) the general metaphysical vision from which it
proceeds.
The felling of Fox's derivations brings down, like trees felled in a rainforest, a good
part of the rest of the structure. For instance, there cease to be the problems Fox supposes
he has found (p.32 ff.), such as difficulties of consistency in accounting for the
metaphysical 'sources that supporters of deep ecology draws upon' (p.33).
With that small exercise in logic, the remainder of Fox's "response" to my critique
(pages 31-89 of text and miles of footnotes) is disposed of in main essentials. For pages
53-84 constitute a largely separate essay on wider identification, an essay which only bears
obliquely on my critique; and most of the rest turns upon lumbering me with the claims just
off loaded, the claims which 'constitute [my] very poor understanding of deep ecology'
(p.31). Thus, for example, Fox expends a good deal of space upon citing authorities from
deep ecology (who too often supply extremely dubious statements) directed at contradicting
D 1 and D2. Obviously that is beside the point. But while my main work on Fox's dismal
response is done, and I could stop here, I don't intend to, as there is a lot more heavily
46
polluting rubbish to be despatched, or recycled. One's rubbish may be another's input
(therein for Moore lay the whole challenge of philosophy).
3 The extent of values-in-nature.
Even a casual reader of Fox's Response will have observed the following: that Fox is
very quick off the mark with (largely unsubstantiated) accusations like 'so and so has failed
to grasp', 'has misunderstood', 'has ignored', 'has missed the point'; that the evidence for
these ad hominem claims is often quite insubstantial; and that that 'so and so' often happens
to be Sylvan. One of the many things Sylvan allegedly 'fails to grasp' is 'that (a position)
deep ecology can be normative (i.e. offer prescriptive proposals) without that necessarily
meaning that it is prescriptive [of this or that,] of a values-in-nature position'. Well, I
thought I had a reasonable grasp upon, and had made use in print of, the distinction
between prescription and evaluation (likewise deontology and axiology), and had in the
critique sufficiently emphasized that shallow positions were normative but decidedly not
prescriptive of values-in-nature. So what evidence does Fox present for his charge? Well,
none really. True he begins his next sentence with a 'Thus', but he then rambles on with
quotations of material (he has previously tried to flog to death) concerning deep ecology and
value theory. But, as nearly everyone appreciates, a position may include a value theory
without that theory being a values-in-nature position; shallow positions are such.
Now 'Sylvan takes Naess's statement that deep ecology is normative as direct
support ... the only support that Sylvan provides ... for his own ... "claim" that deep
ecology is ... a value-in-nature position' (p.36 rearranged, prejudicial terms deleted). Well,
he didn't take that as direct support; what he did take as support is Naess's oft-repeated
assertion (quoted by Fox on the very page) that 'the significant tenets of ... Deep Ecology
... express a value priority system' (many places, e.g. 73 p.99, my italics). So it includes a
value framework. Furthermore further evidence is adduced or alluded to both for the claim
that deep ecology involves a value framework and that it includes a values-in-nature tenet
(e.g. 'deep ecology seeks a transformation of values' Cp.29, quoting Devall; an 'egalitarian
principle of equal value of all life, is "an intuitively clear and obvious value axiom"' Cp.13
quoting N aess; the restriction of this axiom to cases 'when genuine conflicts of value are
absent 'Cp.14 quoting Fox; etc).
Fox issues the challenge: 'where is the (objectivist) values-in-nature "core claim"?'
(p.36). Of course it is right there in the platform, in the very first point which duly
47
distributes intrinsic value much more widely than humans and human features; it is also
implied by the biocentric egalitarian principle; and so on. 12
What is more, although I have at long last (late 1989) read Fox's tactless Response, I
am sticking to my claim that deep ecology has a value core. As it happens, I think as much
is evident from Naess's recent publications (esp. 89 chapters 2 and 3). But the claim can be
argued, for example as follows:- Firstly, Deep ecology has a value part. Secondly, that part
is a core part. As to the first, I should begin by appealing to the value themes of the deep
ecology platform, particularly points 1 and 2 which amounts values-in-nature points.
Curiously, when several of the points in the platform are value themes, Fox proceeds to
assert that 'biocentric ... egalitarianism ... is the deep ecological notion that most lends itself
to interpretation as a value-in-nature position' (pp.31-33). Perhaps this is a diversionary
tactic. It seems that it would be most convenient for Fox's anti-axiology and unauthentic
view of deep ecology if critics forgot about the platform of deep ecology.
The value part of deep ecology is reasonably taken as a core, i.e. as a central or inner
part (to use dictionary accounts of 'core'). A number of arguments can be advanced for
adopting it as a core, of which I'll indicate one 13 . The 8-point platform is a central part of
deep ecology, what more or less distinguishes deep ecologists; value themes comprise a
central part of this platform (the first three points as well as others such as point 7); what is
a central part of a central part is indeed central.
It is no doubt 'somewhat unfortunate that the 8-principles start with ethical terms ... '
(quoting Sessions p.49). Fox tries to wriggle out of that unfortunate predicament, that the
8-point platform of deep ecology - one of the few hitherto stable parts of the whole jerrybuilt structure - begins with value themes and a values-in-nature claim, by an expansion of
the same shabby tactic he has already tried to use to defuse biological egalitarianism and
displace apparently ethical principles of deep ecology (such as the important obligation to
implement environmental commitments): Namely, the formal-axiological waste-disposal is
replaced by an even grander formal-philosophical disposal - down which goes my
criticism. 'Sylvan ... takes the "neutral"' (i.e. variously: literal, nontechnical,
12
It is only anomalous that the intrinsic value theme is missing Naess's early paper
because it features so prominently in the platform and in parts of Naess's later work,
both characterising deep ecology. Fox tries to twist the anomaly into a contradiction
in my evidence (pp.36-7), but it is a shabby effort, entirely neglecting the evidence I
assemble in Appendix 1 (which he quotes from however) for Figure 1 of the Critique
which indicates the value core.
13
Thereby doing in, by example, another of Fox's unpleasant shotgun accusations, p.6.
48
understandable to most persons) 'formulation of basic principles as a formal philosophical
position .... Thus, even such limited support for his "core claim" as Sylvan is able to find
turns out to be due to mistaking an everyday language 8-point list for an ultimate expression
of deep ecology in formal philosophical terms' (p.51) That I find, I confess, a ridiculous
accusation and defence. I wasn't taking the basic principles at other than face value, as
other than principles in a "neutral" formulation; I was, and am, 'using the word "value" in a
metaphorical or everyday sense' (p.49), namely in the literal everyday non-metaphorical
sense where it signifies worth. I frankly don't really know what it would be like to take
deep ecology in the way Fox alleges I do, as a 'formal philosophical position' (p.49, p.51).
It is not just that we are far removed from 'the ultimate expression of deep ecology in formal
philosophical terms'; deep ecology is not, in the hands of Fox and friends, the sort of
position that looks at all likely to obtain such formulation ever.
Until it is properly made out, then, Fox's "defence" lapses. He owes us an account
of what a 'formal philosophical expression' would be, by contrast with what we have, and
to provide requisite evidence that Sylvan (whatever his actual intentions) was "taking" the
platform in that "mistaken" way. I'm not surprised that Fox has not attempted the requisite
philosophical work; I am surprised he got Session to go along with him in the intellectually
disreputable ploy.
I freely confess, then, my astonishment that Sessions states that he and N aess would
not agree philosophically to the principles of the deep ecology platform (p.50,p.51 ). What
on earth does he mean? In his own book (with Devall), these principles are presented as
'basic principles of deep ecology' (in boldface capitals, p.69), they are supplemented by a
detailed commentary of a type appropriate for serious philosophical principles, and they are
introduced as having 'summarized fifteen years of thinking on the principles of deep
ecology' (p.69). If that doesn't make them philosophical, what in the deep ecological
scheme of things would? In any case, Sessions has elsewhere been prepared, in highly
philosophical contexts to ascribe intrinsic values to parts of nonhuman Nature (e.g. p.236).
For Naess too there is no easy escape. Firstly, the platform is said to derive from his
Ecosophy T; secondly Ecosophy T itself assigns 'intrinsic value to every life form' (89
p.164ff).
But I should make an admission; deep ecology is bound to be a values-in-nature
position, at least as I characterised those things. It follows from the way I explained depth
and what is meant by 'values-in-nature'.
That is one reason why I claim Fox's
49
transpersonal ecology is not deep ecology, because it is explicitly not a values-in-nature
position. 14
Fox himself has tried various ways of avoiding values-in-nature; but, needless to say,
value expressions of "in-nature" cast creep into much of his discourse. For example, the
shallow/deep distinction is now "explained" (in 89 p.33), not directly in terms of value, but,
to begin with, through an anthropocentric/ecocentric distinction. The trouble is that, in
explaining the intended senses of contrasting terms, value slips back again (as in 'use value
for humans (e.g. its scientific, recreational, or aesthetic value)'). But Fox's main chance is
the "value constellation" idea, which tries to lock values away in a complex involving a
valuer and a valuing relation. But nothing stops analyses of this complex, examination of
components of the constellation; and for many logical purposes (such as quantification of
the value end of the complex) some separation is required.
4 A biocentric ethic?
It has been widely thought that deep ecology supplies 'a biocentric ethic as opposed to
an anthropocentric one' 15 , that it includes at least rudiments of a value theory and leading
features of an environmental ethics. But now whether deep ecology is, among other things,
an environmental ethic is in increasing doubt. There are now many, not merely on the
margins of deep ecology, who would question the role or significance of ethics or even
dispense with it altogether. On these issues, as on others, deep ecology speaks not just
with many tongues, but forked tongues as well. Fox does something to assemble the
diverse voices from the deep ecology multitude (p.42ff.). Let us classify - in a preliminary
way:
A. Getting rid of ethics altogether. This appears to be a position taken by Livingston and
by Shepard, at least in the quotes Fox supplies. There is nothing new and exciting, still less
of new paradigmatic cast, about this. It is as old as ethical nihilism and scepticism, which is
to say, very old, reaching back to classical Greek thought. 16 Nor are the entirely dubious
supporting considerations adduced in any way new: 'ethics and morals were ... invented by
one species to meet the needs of that species' p.42, or, more cynically, for the advantage of
certain classes or pressure groups within that species; ethics are at best mischievous, more
14
See e.g. p.85. The matter is further discussed below.
15
Thus Bradford 89,p.10. The authentic deep ecology (of. Naess, on reliable days)
certainly does.
16
For preliminary notes on the history of moral nihilism, see Hinckfuss p.17.
50
likely damaging; ethics are unsuccessful and even counterproductive in their effects (p.43);
'ethics and morals are unknown in nature' (p.42); and similar.
A*. Retaining ethics, hardly intellectually revolutionary either, but
B. Downgrading the whole enterprise. Such appears to be one of Naess's newer
tactics, where ethics, now of minor importance, becomes an experiential epiphenomenon.
'I'm not much interested in ethics or morals. I'm interested in how we experience the
world .... Ethic follows from how we experience the world' (p.46, also Naess 89 p.20 and
elsewhere). Naess is doing more in this much quoted passage (which involves clear
commission of the prescriptive fallacy 17 ) than expressing personal idiosyncracies; he is
saying, he is taken as saying, by those who quote him, how things now stand for deep
ecology (of which he is still, though losing ground, the chief guru).
B*. While ethical enterprise is perhaps not downgraded,
C. Ethics as usually conceived is displaced or superseded. According to Fox,
"conventional ethics", which combines a code of conduct with a set of values, is displaced
by an 'experientially grounded state of being' (p.41). 18 That state of being is none other
than ecological consciousness, which 'precedes and preempts the search for an
"environmental ethic"' (Devall quoted p.45, similarly Sessions, who also goes further,
suggesting we should abandon the search for an environmental ethics' p.44). But surely it
is foolish to discard useful tools (if admittedly due for repair) because something that may
look brighter and shinier and does something for some agents, attracts attention; in these
critical times everything that works at all is needed. A bit differently, Rodman suggests
superfessions of conventional ethics (though perhaps not of a more expansive ethics),
because it is an integral part of the former moral/legal stage of consciousness, conventional
ethics - if not actually in the process of being superseded (in the dominant culture it is not)
by a later and higher stage, of appropriate new experience - ought to be superseded, since
the moral/legal stage is 'now more part of the problem than its solution' (p.43). Again all
17
Elsewhere however (e.g. Naess 89 p.24) explains how values go beyond "facts".
18
Later Fox proceeds differently, with 'deep ecology ... described as ... a position within
... "foundational ethics'" (p.86). "Foundational ethics", another exceedingly illexplained notion, is ethics as 'concerned with "understanding ourselves"' (p.86, p.113),
and so part of the egocentric self nexus; it is also said to be ethics as 'concerned with
development of a state of being' (p.113), the being of selves no doubt. Does
"foundational ethics" supply principles and some values? If not, how does it manage
to be an ethic? If so, how does it escape Fox's objections to environmental ethics? In
any case, "foundational ethics" which we are supposed to search for (along with
"understanding ourselves"), is intended to be an environmental ethic!
51
decidedly questionable, both historically and systematically, particularly given the prospect
of a plurality of integrated techniques.
C*. Instead, a radically new ethic is designed. This is of course part of what deepgreen and other radical, not merely reformist, alternatives to prevailing ethics and nature
philosophies are about. It was, once upon a time, an objective of deep ecology also; it
apparently no longer invariably is. But just as there is no definite position offered by deep
ecology on several critical issues (esp. in ecological politics), so there is now no definite
position on the place of ethics (pace p.41), as the tentative classification serves to reveal.
No doubt Fox had a particular message that he wanted to be drawn from the quotations and
needed for his arguments - explicit rejection of an ethical approach in favour of experience
in the shape of ecological consciousness (p.47) - but what he has supplied is an entertaining
pot pourri of positions, countering or jamming the message.
It is ironic that Western deep ecology should have tried to opt out of ethics, at exactly
the time that ethics is making a major come back, when ethics are becoming again a
significant force in business and the world. Or in terms of a different image, at the very
time when the ship of ethics is returning to harbour after a long period on high rough seas,
Fox and friends decide to jump overboard; we hope they are strong swimmers. With ethics
returned, a renewed force, what we need is not no ethics but new ethics, not to concede the
power of renewed ethics over to conservative power-holders or restrictive do-gooders, but
to put ethics to expansive tolerant good environmental and social works.
5. Biospheric egalitarianism revisited.
The notion is terminally ill, but I fear we shall keep revisiting it until it is buried under
heavy concrete. So far, for all its problems, it lives on (with apologists, Fox included,
shifting ground accordingly; similarly N aess, e.g. 85 p.6). It just keeps reappearing in
strong unqualified form, for instance in Sessions (recently): 'one of the first clear
statements' of ecosophy 'that all individuals, species (including humans), and ecosystems
have EQUAL inherent value (the ecocentric position) was made by Arne Naess when he
proposed the principle of BIOSPHERICAL (ECOLOGICAL) EGALITARIANISM ... ' (89, p.11).
So represented it simply succumbs to all the previous criticism (in my Critique and
indirectly in EE p.139 ff.). Interestingly then both Fox and Naess appeal to 'Sessions'
interpretation of biocentric egalitarianism as "a statement of non-anthropocent ricism"'
(p.39), to which Fox adds, in all seriousness, 'rather than as a formal environmental
axiological position'. In a revealing passage, Sessions puts it rather differently, 'Biocentric
egalitarianism is essentially a rejection of human chauvinistic ethical theory and the criteria
52
used to ascribe rights and value; it is a reductio ad absurdum of conventional ethics.
Biocentric egalitarianism is essentially a statement of non-anthropocentricism' 19 . This
statement does not hang together. For instance, non-anthropocentricism is weaker than
rejection of human chauvinism, which on its own is not a reductio ad absurdum of all
conventional ethics (because, first off, not an argument, and because, second, of the
character of some "conventional" ethics such as intuitionism). Without the logically
inadmissible loop through anti-human chauvinism (the deep-green position) the situation is
worse still; for, on the contrary, rather conventional British utilitarianisms such as Smart's
and Singer's are robustly nonanthropocentric. By so excessively eroding its egalitarian
principles, deep ecology loses much depth.
In a passage which Fox says 'greatly clarifies the confusion that has surrounded
Naess's notion', Naess too, again over-influenced by his minders, takes a similar pathetic
course. The principle had previously 'suggest[ed] a positive doctrine, and that is too
much'!
'The importance of the intuition' contracts to 'its capacity to counteract' certain
chauvinistic hubris. What Fox manages to draw out of these counteracting principles are,
however, not principles at all, but an orientation to or general attitude of non-interference,
"Letting be", etc. This is not just considerably removed from what N aess offers; it is pretty
remote from egalitarianisms. For one can let inferiors, and what is of no inherent value, be,
spare and preserve them, perhaps for later exploitation. But what Fox is really concerned to
draw from his authorities is the concession (they do not make, nor did he himself formerly)
that the principle of biospherical egalitarianism is not a principle, not a position at all (a
curious thing to think it was), but something much less definite, less positive, less specific,
less open to criticism, a more general attitude, no doubt underlying ethical practice, but
definitely not part of an environmental axiology. Poor deluded critics like Sylvan who
supposed that a principle is a principle have 'missed' 'the extremely important point' that for
supporters of deep ecology a "principle" is but a general attitude. These supporters indeed
feel that treating a principle as a principle can do more harm than good, 'and so have
deliberately chosen not to take the environmental axiological route' (p.41). There ends
Fox's diversion on biospheric egalitarianism. What it comes to is this:- Had the principle
been a principle, within environmental axiology, the criticism made of the principle would at
19
Quoted by Fox in a quote that never ends (p.39). In this mismash, Session proceeds
to draw upon our material against human chauvinism and conventional ethics, having
first dismissed us, referring to EE p.139, as 'mistak[ing] what Naess is up to. Naess's
position is not ... "an extension of conventional Western ethics"'. As it happens, we
don't mention Naess at all either on p.139 or in our discussion of extensionalism: how
do we mistake what Naess is up there to when we don't consider what he is up to?
Back in the 70s deep ecology was, after all, not a significant position.
53
the very least constitute a powerful challenge (p.38); but fortunately it is not, "positive
doctrines" are too open to criticism! It is only a general attitude concerning reluctance to
harm other living beings (p.40). 20 Egalitarianism, of value as well as principle, has
dropped out in this rather shallow evasion.
6. The uneasy position of value theory, or axiology within deep ecology
and the condemned "environmental axiological route".
Fox wants to distance deep ecology from value theory but is also aware, from time to
time, that this is not really possible. As a result his position on the relation of deep ecology
to value theory is decidedly ambiguous at best, and at worst inconsistent. The tensions
appear within the space of a single page (e.g. p.85). We are told both that 'deep ecology is
not [a] position within environmental axiology' and that 'it could be quite mistaken to think'
that deep ecology 'stands outside ... value theory'. Whence inconsistency results, given
that axiology has its normal technical sense. 21 But there is evidence that Fox intends
significantly more by 'axiology' than normal - as well as adopting the normal sense: so that
behind the initial inconsistency stands another inconsistency. What precisely Fox does
intend remains however obscure, scandalously obscure.
For one of Fox's main accusations against critics of deep ecology 22 , is that critics are
committed to 'environmental axiological reductionism', they 'pursue environmental
philosophical discussion almost entirely at the level of environmental axiology', so they are
blind to what 'deep ecology thinkers are really on about', which (negatively) consists in
'rejection of the "environmental axiological route"' (pp.51-53). Among these critics, mired
in "ethical reductionism", blind to the new paradigmatic character of deep ecology which
20
Or presumably otherwise negatively interfere with other natural things - otherwise the
reformulation, though apparently platitudinous, is too narrow, discriminating against
some parts of nature. The harm reformulation is borrowed from Devall and Session,
who try to make biospherical egalitarian and Self-realisation interpenetrate: 'Biocentric
equality is intimately related to the all inclusive Self-realisation in the sense that if we
harm the rest of Nature then we are harming ourselves' (p.56). Unfortunately in the
ordinary sense of 'harm' the latter claim is entirely false; as I previously remarked, it is
all too easy to harm parts of Nature without harming ourselves, with but negligible
impact on ourselves.
21
The word 'axiology' does not appear in the Oxford English Dictionary. But no doubt
it means the investigation, study and theory of value or worth, and is thus tantamount
to value theory, as contrasted however with deontology. What it means will soon
become an issue: see below.
22
Yes, it remains an unduly adversial intellectual game, part of the long Britishscholastic history of philosophy.
54
has taken as a guiding star precisely avoidance of the "axiological route", is the hapless
Sylvan; the tenacity with which he sticks to his indefensible account of deep ecology is
largely explained through these features (p.52).
For explanation of some of the operative abusive terminology we are referred
elsewhere, to other writings of Fox. But the source is scarcely more informative, and
indeed relevant parts of it have, in any case, been lifted for Fox's Response. 23 The promise
of explanation is not fulfilled. 'Ethical reductionism' is, like its successor 'environmental
axiological reductionism', explained by Fox on the run, which is to say it is not explained.
Nor is the reductionist charge sustained. For what is offered, what 'the vast majority of
environmental philosophers' are alleged to do, the pursuit of 'environmental philosophical
discussion almost entirely at the level of environmental ethics/axiology', may well reflect
undue concentration, but it is not reductionism. Fox is decidedly adept in the fallacious
business of sliding terms around (otherwise known as Humpty Dumptyism).
'Reductionism' and 'axiology' are not the only terms that suffer at his hands; so, relevant to
our purposes, does 'ontology'. At least in the context of his "guiding stars" paper, parts of
which are shunted into his Response, Fox uses 'ontology' to mean, not what it does mean,
roughly 'the general study of what exists', but very differently, the 'underlying perception
of the way things are', which, among other things, epistemologizes what was part of
metaphysics.
In those terms, 'deep ecology's guiding star ... [which] is (and should be) ... this
attempt to shift the primary focus of environmental philosophical concern from ethics to
ontology' becomes an epistemological diversion: a regressive attempt to move
environmental philosophy to anthropic experiential concerns (Fox 84 p.204 rearranged). It
is evident, by the way, who is attempting to do this shifting. If epistemologists focus their
efforts on a tiny number of tiny epistemological problems, if logicians discuss only
quantificational logic, they cannot be significantly accused of reductionism; they would have
23
While many sorts of recycling are of course commendable, reservations should be held
about academic recycling of earlier papers, especially when no improvements are
attempted. Fox does at least attempt some "improvements" to get around the obvious
objection that deep ecology is itself a normative and hence ethical route; but the
adjustments he infiltrates actually make other matters worse. For they consist of the
replacement of 'ethical' by 'axiological' or 'environmental axiological' or similar. So
now, for instance, the journal Environmental Ethics is charged with reflecting
environmental axiological reductionism (p.106); but as examination quickly shows the
journal carries much ethical material which is not axiological (e.g. on rights and
obligations) - evidently it also carries much that is not reductionistic and even some
that concerns philosophy of nature rather than ethics. Fox's charges are without proper
foundation.
55
also to claim that is all there is to their enterprise, and to make some attempt to show how
the apparent remainder comes down to that. These further necessary conditions are not
fulfilled in the case of 'the vast majority of environmental philosophers'; apart from a small
minority of philosophers associated with the "ethics without philosophy" idea here is
nothing approaching a requisite reduction framework. No doubt there is an axiological
reduction program, pursued by consequentalists of various brands, but that is
predominantly a program within ethics. As well the long-running naturalistic reduction
program grinds on unsuccessfully. But there is no recognisable environmental philosophy
reduction program; nor could such a program hope to succeed.
There are suitably many counter-instances to Fox's large accusations; among them,
conveniently, is that main target, Sylvan, who does not take an "environmental axiological
route". In print I have come out against reduction of deontic notions and normative
discourse generally to axiological terms; and have, in any case, made it perfectly plain that
environmental philosophy comprises much more than ethics, certainly including parts of
politics, philosophy of nature, metaphysics and so on. 24 Thus Sylvan, so far from
'criticis[ing] deep ecology on the erroneous basis of it being a position or approach within
environmental axiology' (p.101), does not himself take the alleged "environmental
axiological route", as the record shows. Rather than rely on my record (a political expedient
that should engender but little philosophical enthusiasm), I'm tempted to issue a countercharge: insofar as Sylvan is committed to an "environmental axiological route" so also is
(authentic) deep ecology, as elaborated by Naess. Consider, for instance, Naess's
elaboration of the deep ecological platform. But in sustaining this counter-charge (the
detailed support involves a comparison, made in Bennett and Sylvan, of deep-green theory
with authentic deep ecology), we come up once again against the problem of what is meant
here by 'axiology'.
Unremarkably Fox deploys the fallacious method of redefinition. By 'axiology' and
its compounds, Fox both means what is normally meant and also means significantly more.
Hardly necessary by now to add, he manages to slide from one to the other. In the normal
way, axiology, or value theory, is the philosophical study of virtue and values, 'their
meaning, characteristics, origins, types, criteria and epistemological status (p.100, quoting
Angeles).
24
So far so good.
But now for the first twist and slide.
'In the area of
See EP, e.g . p.188, p.222, and several works in the Green series. In the early 70s
when there was briefly some glimmer of hope that the Australian National University
might interest itself in environmental philosophy, I sketched out a perspective of what
it might comprise, which I reproduce as an Appendix (if I can find it!).
56
environmental ethics, the axiological concept of intrinsic value plays a fundamental role. 25
. . . On this understanding, environmental ethics is more accurately described as
environmental axiology ... ' (p.100). This is a major non-sequitur. It would almost as well
be said that because induction plays a fundamental role in philosophy of science,
philosophy of science is more accurately described as induction-theory, and even amounts
to induction-theory! Plainly it is quite inaccurately described as induction-theory, since
there is much else to philosophy of science; what makes matters still worse is that there are
schools which contend that induction drops out as a method and so as a problem. Rather
similarly environmental ethics is much more inaccurately redescribed as environmental
axiology because, but not only because, there is much more to ethics than axiology, the
whole matter of proper conduct for example. For value only impacts on action and proper
conduct by way of further principles which are not themselves part of value theory. It is
obvious that value theory does not in general exclude what is not (without further ado) a
part of it, such as deontic theory, moral epistemology, and so on; but the obvious gets lost
sight of, as when Fox assumes that environmental axiology rules out experiential and
empathetic procedures.
Fox attempts rather more than adjustment and exclusion in his "redescription" of
normal environmental ethics as environmental axiology; he has to if his charges against
environmental axiology (on the face of it a harmless enough study), and the importance of
avoiding it, are to begin to stand up.
25
Fox backs up this claim with themes drawn from Callicott and Regan, with which it
is said 'most environmental philosophers would agree', (p.100). Maybe others do; but
I doubt that they should, not without significant qualification. Regan states that 'the
development of what can properly be called an environmental ethic requires that we
postulate inherent value in nature'. Firstly, that is only one way to try to develop an
environmental ethic (which may not be deep). There are other feasible starting points
and primitives: rights, justice, respects, fairness, empathy, identification, utility,
vandalism, evil, and so on, in terms of which value may (or may not) be subsequently
be defined (e.g. along lines that tempted former philosophers: what it is fitting/right,
for any rational being to prefer/desire). Secondly, the term 'postulate' at best grates, at
worst gets the picture seriously wrong: value may not be self-evident, assumed
without proof, imposed as a demand, ... . Callicott describes 'the problem of intrinsic
value in nature ... as the most critical and most recalitrant theoretical problem of
environmental ethics'. That already presupposes that an ethics starts out in Regan's
sort of way. Even if a deep ethics does take value as primitive, that is but one
problem among several, a problem blown up to critical exaggerated size, primarily by
opponents of environmental ethics and infiltrators of the ranks. For other major
problems for any ethics, and a more balanced view, see Broad's final chapter.
57
We can glean further information as to what is loaded into the terminology from what
Fox tries to do. An environmental axiology is the same as a (formal) environmental
axiological position, and that as a formal value theory (pp.40-41; the word 'formal' can be
inserted or left out, in Fox it appears to function primarily as a con-term). Such theories,
which are "theoretical" and "definite", contain as well as
• a value theory, and perhaps also a rights theory (e.g. p.35), both
• exact principles, offering specific positional guidance, which are
• positively formulated
• which apply to all situations, and
• a code of conduct, no doubt made up from the principles. 26
Some of Fox's criticisms of environmental axiology turn on these further, and
excessively exacting, features he has tried illegitimately to incorporate into axiology. At this
stage, there are two main confusions:- first, as to the extent of ethics and moral theory that
axiology comprehends, and secondly as to the character of the principles axiology (and, for
that matter, deontology and praxis) is supposed to include. A value theory on it own yields
neither a rights' theory nor a code of conduct. Even a highly and objectionably reductive
theory such as consequentialism requires principles drawn from outside value theory, such
as that one ought to act so as to maximize value or utility, in order to arrive at principles of
conduct and actionable rights. A value theory may include principles but these are
principles concerning value. Like other principles, like those of deontology, they may well
not measure up to the excessive standards Fox tries to impose. In particular, the principles
may be defeasible, may include or presuppose unspecified and unlistable exceptions; they
may include ceteris paribus clauses; and so they may well not apply in all situations. They
may fall far short of supplying necessary and/or sufficient conditions; they may not be
positively formulated (prohibitions in such forms as 'Don't ... ' are commonplace in ethics);
and so on.
26
As well, it seems to be assumed that an axiology, and indeed an Anglo-American
ethics, must be atomistic and individualistic; they are but 'means of structuring the
interactions of atomistic individuals' (p.112). Not so. It is worth remarking that
deep-green theory assumes neither atomism nor individualism (see EP). Nor does it
pursue or assume any of the following reductive practices: deontic to axiological, or
vice versa; environmental philosophy to environmental ethics, or vice versa;
axiological notions to a unique set of primitives, or the single primitive value. As
there are several ways to disable a bulldozer, so there are many ways to enable an
environmental philosophy: value is but one starting point.
58
7. The "case" against environmental axiology: 'the inadequacies or
repugnant conclusions that attend the environmental axiological approach'
(p.82).
Among the 'serious problems' encountered are said to be those, now hoary, issues
concerning intrinsic value, which Fox tosses up in a substantially shallow way.
For most environmental ethicists, it is difficult to see how something
can have value in itself (i.e. intrinsic value) if it isn't valuable to itself,
and to be valuable to itself it must be able to matter to itself or, in other
words, be sentient, by which is meant that it must possess the capacity
to suffer (p.73)27_
This contention is at least dubious clause by clause, and overall profoundly mistaken. The
critical transformation, for deep environmentalism, is centred on that of value in to valuable
to (or of value to). It is difficult to see why any environmental thinker would accede to such
a transformation, in itself and to itself being so very different in meaning (e.g. consider
them coupled respectively with such terms as conspicuous, unusual, etc.) But, in any
event, there are several sorts of evident counter-examples to such transformations. Firstly,
there are examples from outside environmental territory such as works of art, intellectual
theories, and transcendental metaphysical gems. A beautiful theory or a resplendent form
can be intrinsically valuable without being of value to itself, without being able to matter to
itself, etc. Secondly, there are examples like rare seed, embryonic valuables, and the like.
Thirdly, there are sentient or conscious items of intrinsic value that are not valuable to
themselves, and do not matter to themselves, such as great but utterly modest people. There
is much else wrong in the connections Fox delivers up 28 , but we can bypass most of them
(e.g. sentience does not mean a capacity to suffer, as shown by perceptually aware creatures
who do not suffer because they have no pain receptors and the like; nor is sentience
required, as consciousness will serve for mattering; and so on).
27
It is hard to credit that someone fronting up as a deep environmental thinker could
present such stuff, but of course various reasons can be found. While the argument is
very bad, there is no doubt, what is no excuse, that worse can be found. For instance,
what is intrinsically valuable is valuable in itself, so it must have a self, so it must be
sentient, etc.
28
Fox subsequently announces the 'link between something not mattering to itself ...
and the conclusion that we can do as we will with it ... sacred in the Environmental
Axiological Orthodox Church of Intrinsic Value' (p.80). It is a Church of his own
fabrication, at which no respectable deep environmentalist would worship or even be
found.
59
Fox runs straight on to an old paradigm assertion by Frankena, from whom he
borrowed the argument, which he again proceeds to ascribe (without any evidence offered
or, I suspect, any research basis)to most environmental ethicists 29 : 'I do not see, however,
how anything can have intrinsic value except the activities, experiences, and lives of
conscious sentient beings (persons, etc.)' (Frankena, quoted p.73). Frankena's assertion,
as it stands utterly unsupported, 'is a powerful one', according to Fox, again displaying his
shallow proclivities: 'What difference does it make how I treat something if it cannot matter
to itself?' (p.78) Big differences, not merely to those in a region for whom it may matter,
but in the region, if Fox dams the last wild river in the region, cuts down the last lowland
rainforest. Fox tops his astounding move by dignifying this shallow rubbish by the title
'powerful argument'. Its power 'is evidenced by the fact that those who want to say rocks
or trees have intrinsic value often do so by pure assertion rather than providing an argument
for their view (140)' (p.78). That's no evidence, it's irrelevant; and I wouldn't pursue it,
were not such a familiar utterly shallow complaint built into the alleged evidence, and were
Sylvan not roped in again in a footnote as 'another case in point' (p.112 note 140). It may
come as news to Fox (who seems to have read little of what I have written before he rushed
out his Response), but I do provide arguments, including those built on examples like the
Last Person and the Last Sentient Creatures, examples which have obtained a fair bit of
exposure (for some of these, see e.g. EP pp.121-132; and in fact a general argument can be
developed from the semantical analysis of value).
The certainties of Frankena's dogmatic assertion can be whittled away, first by
separating conscious from sentient (after all many people can now see that animals that are
not conscious persons can have intrinsic value), second by assembling marginal cases and
analogies in a now familiar way, then by counter-arguments, and so on. But, in any case,
insofar as environmental ethicists (as distinct from conventional ethicists) continue to side
with Frankena that reveals them as a rather reactionary lot, significantly lagging popular
thinking. 30 As Naess and others report, many non-philosophers have no difficulty in
recognising value-in-itself outside persons, in living creatures and natural objects.
29
There is evidence that these ascriptions are mere desk-chair speculation, in fact of little
value; e.g. at the bottom of p.78 where Fox says, of Frankena's position, 'I think it
represents the dominant position within ... environmental axiology'. I suspect that,
once again, Fox is not duly separating environmental axiology from conventional
axiology.
30
The chauvinism of traditional ethical systems is enough to explain the comparative
lack of intellectual interest in such moribund systems, and the resulting much wider
search for roots, ideas, etc. There is accordingly no serious puzzle as to the sources of
deep environmentalism (pace Fox p.74).
60
In the course of trying to get his attack on the environmental axiological framework
airborne Fox resorts to some extraordinary distortion and falsification. The looseleaf insert
(page 79), where some disenchanted thinkers make an abrupt unexplained entry, affords a
good illustration. First we are told that what those in the business (except no doubt some
enlightened deep ecologists) 'typically fail to realise is that the environmental axiological
framework of discourse so dominates the discussion of our relationship with the natural
world that it is mistakenly taken to be the only possible approach' (p.79). This claim is, it
seems to me, roundly refuted by the history of the discussion and some of the literature it
encompasses. Among other approaches there are, for instance, extended rights (e.g.
Stone), environmental justice (e.g. Wenz), extended interests (e.g. Johnson), and
negatively ethical nihilism (e.g. Hinckfuss).
Fox continues unabashed: 'In other words [!], the hegemony of the environmental
axiological framework is such that it has led almost everybody involved in the
ecophilosophical debate to think that we have an obligation to care for something if and only
if it "has" intrinsic value' (p.79). There's some prime rubbish for you. The charge is
manifestly false, seriously flawed, plucked from thin air, and unnecessary except for Fox's
misguided mission. Even if an axiological approach were the only approach, no such
obligation-to-care principles would follow, and certainly not principles as dubious or
refutable as those given. The if -half of the unabashed claim is at, the very, least dubious
and would be rejected on some popular positions: suppose, for instance that the intrinsic
value of the thing is small, or that it is overridden by the intrinsic value of some competitor
for our attention. The only-if-half (which wins Fox's italics, he is going to make much of
it) would be rejected by almost everyone who thought about the matter, because of course
obligations apply to what has merely instrumental value. If I have borrowed a friend's tools
then I have an obligation to care for them though these tools have no intrinsic value.
Differently, I am under obligations to behave generally in certain sorts of ways whether the
things encountered have intrinsic value or not; accordingly I'm not entitled to treat them any
old way (e.g. to vandalise them) or even as I will or, more ambiguously, as I 'see fit'.
Combining the pernicious principles Fox has unearthed yields the following
ridiculous result: if a thing has no value to itself, for instance has ceased to be of value to
itself, then we have no obligation to care for it, we can do what we like with it. The
applications of this result are remarkable. There is no doubt that Fox has thereby provided a
simple - if appalling - solutions to such major social problems as those of drug and alcohol
abuse; victims who are so far down the track that they have ceased to be of value to
themselves, can simply be vanished, or dealt with in whatever other way we find
convenient. Then too human slavery and sacrifice, never entirely vanquished, could be
widely reinstated: Oh brave new world that Fox has lead us into!
61
Fox tries to make a lot out of these odious obligation-to-care principles he has
attempted to foist upon environmental axiology. He suggests they indicate the need to
abandon rather than broaden the notion of intrinsic value; he suggests they may 'reflect the
inherent limitations of the environmental axiological approach' (p.79); he suggests that we
need to find instead 'another framework of discourse that can articulate' our feelings about
what we ought to care about. This alternative framework - from the many and various that
might have been selected - is none other than the wider self identification framework. The
obvious course, which should be pursued anyway, of seeking an obligation-to-care
principle that does measure up better to our emotional presentations, does not seem to have
occurred to Fox, so preoccupied is he with attacking what he sees as "the environmental
axiological route" and getting to self immersion.
Finally, Fox runs out some examples which are supposed to show the repugnant
conclusions to which the axiological approach leads. Unfortunately for Fox's case, the
arguments involved do not succeed without further assumptions beyond those Fox
enumerates, assumptions smarter adherents of an axiological approach do not make. The
examples involve comparisons of groups of individuals, which, it is alleged, exponents of
intrinsic value cannot discriminate, though the group situations are very different. One
example runs as follows: ' ... the loss, by human interference at least, of the last members of
a species ... is somehow "worse" than the loss by human interference of an equivalent
number from an abundant species ... . Yet, in terms of intrinsic value, those losses are
equivalent since the same "amount" is lost in both cases' (p.80). Fox then argues against
more holistic assignments of value on the basis of another dogmatic pronouncement from
'Frankena that communities (such as species ... ) do not "have intrinsic value over and
above that contained in ... [their] members"' .31 But he goes on to assert that, irrespective
of Frankena's position, 'the point ... applies generally to any atomistic environmental
axiological position i.e. to any position that sees intrinsic value as exclusively adhering in or
attaching to individual entities' (p.81). Fox is dead wrong. The case assumes, without
warrant or mention, equality of the value adhering or assigned to individuals. Plainly the
loss of the last members of the species is worse (where it is, e.g. the species is not a
diabolical laboratory concoction) because the members of the species are individually more
valuable than those of the abundant species. Consider, for comparison, the razing by fire of
31
Fox's second example actually contains the elements of an interesting argument
(perhaps, to be uncharitable, the only example in his whole Response). This example,
of monoculture vs diversity (p.81), does introduce, if not much of holism, at least
relational features of the individuals assembled. There is no reason, of course, why
axiology should not take account of those features. Contrary to Fox, there is no need
to 'separately posit' that the principle of diversity is 'valuable in and of itself' (p.82).
62
two art galleries containing the same numbers of individual art works, one containing rare
art works, the other containing selections from the abundant works of relatively indifferent
crafters. The amount, assessed in monetary value even, lost in the first fire is much greater,
and so the loss much worse, than in the second fire.
Fox not only proceeds to state what his examples would show without due
qualification. But he goes on, quite inadmissibly, to general claims which leave off even
the qualifications he had earlier introduced (thus later on, p.82, he drops the essential
restriction to atomistic positions). Environmental axiology accordingly emerges
substantially unscathed; it does not need to be replaced by something else, such as wider
identification, only rendered smarter, and supplemented or merged into a fuller
environmental philosophy.
8.
Fox's 'Deep Ecological Territory': transpersonal identification.
But Wes tern deep ecology is now bent upon replacement. Devall, for example, now
maintains that 'the unique contribution that deep ecology makes to ecophilosophy is its
emphasis on ecological self and affirmation.
Subscribing to similar ideas Fox has
suggested changing the label "deep ecology" to "transpersonal ecology".' Devall (in 89
again) has deep ecology as, above all, discovering 'an aspect of our self' which has been
culturally neglected.
Such a reorientation is significantly at variance with Naess's
introduction and initial elaboration of deep ecology; for his original summary (in 73) of deep
ecology, which is ecologically focussed, contains no allusion to self, ecological or other. It
is also at variance with Devall and Sessions of but three years earlier, where nature, ecology
and biological systems still appeared fundamental to deep ecology, these entering through
the other ultimate norm (besides Self-realisation) of deep ecology, that of biocentric equality
(see their p.66). As it happens, Devall, by contrast with Fox, vacillates between a more
authentic deep ecology in the style ofNaess (chapter 1 of Devall 89) and the Western variant
of transparent ecology (e.g. pp.39-57), which would displace the original theory.
There is much speaking with many tongues, much inconsistency, in deep ecology.
We have already witnessed such deep ecology doubletalk in the matter of value and the
status of ethics. We see it again with transpersonal or expanded-self identification. We
only enter 'the real territory of deep ecology' according to Fox (p.53ff.) with such
expanded identification. Yet one can be a deep ecologist, much literature explains, without
any identification efforts at all (for example by adopting the platform which does not
mention identification). So one can be a deep ecologist without ever 'entering deep
ecological territory'. Deep ecology without deep ecology - another wonder, or just more
double talk? Like Fox's parting flourish: there are sketch maps for deep ecological territory
(p.89), yet it is 'ultimately mapless' (see Devall 89 p.39).
63
Fox tries to explain "the search" of deep ecology 'for such things as "ecological
consciousness" (Devall and Sessions) and "Self-realisation" (Naess)' through expanded
identification. Most conveniently he can take ready-made from Devall and Sessions
reductive explications:- 'Ecological consciousness is the result of a psychological expansion
of the narrowly encapsulated sense of self as isolated ego, through identification with all
humans (species chauvinism), to finally an awareness of the identification and
interpenetration of self with ecosystem and biosphere' (Sessions, quoted pp.53-4). 'The
essence of ecological consciousness ... [is] to overcome this illusory dichotomy [between
Humans and N ature 32 ]' for which 'the important task is ... the psychological development
from narrow egotistical "self' to identification with the whole' (Devall as quoted p.53).
But, once again, it is one thing to have on authority such explication; it is quite another thing
whether such reductions work. I submit that they do not, for the simple reason that
ecological consciousness may be had or attained without any such self expansion
developments.
Consider, first, Professor Flatpan who is a devoted but unimaginative ecological field
worker. All his practice, behaviour and so on, shows him as utterly committed to
ecological causes, preservation of wilderness and so on, and fully conscious of its
importance. But he makes no identification of himself with what he works with or for. It
may be that he is some sort of empirical separatist; or it may not. Perhaps he even rejects
identification suggestions when they are put to him, e.g. on grounds of hubris, nonsense,
... , or he simply doesn't identify, etc. In Professor Flatpan and his variants we seem to
have a tribe of people with strong ecological consciousness and affiliations but without
identification. Consider next, the interesting Wombat tribe, superb in their tribal treatment
of their environment, who have not developed the notion of self or, for that matter, that of
identification. The tribe exhibits a high ecological consciousness (in our ordinary
understanding of that non-technical notion, in terms of a strong perception or awareness of
environmental matters) but lacks even the conceptual apparatus for self expansion
developments.
Expanded identity or self developments may serve as useful or powerful tactics for
raising ecological consciousness in people raised and hooked on a narrow self-interested
self, but they are neither necessary nor sufficient for explaining or understanding ecological
consc10usness. Analogous points apply against the attempt to drag Self-realisation into the
picture.
32
Naess, in a regressive move, now asserts that humans are unique (e.g. in 89), whence
the dichotomy ceases to be illusory. More inconsistency.
64
There are in fact at least three separable notions which deep ecology has tended to
fuse: ecological consciousness, widened identification and wider Self-realisation. Confusion is made so much the easier because those notions are, for the most part, not decently
introduced. The whole deep ecological theory of expanded identification and Self remains
exceedingly poorly explained (thus e.g. identification in Fox, esp. p.60; dimensions of
Self, p.83). As ecological consciousness has already been distinguished, it remains to
begin on unscrambling identification and self-realisation, and therewith the many senses of
self
In the first place, identification is independent of self, its manifestation or
"realisation", at least to this extent: that discourse concerning identification can be explained
and can proceed satisfactorily without any introduction of or notion of selves. A theory
may well include identification, and even expanded identification with remote items, without
selves or expanded selves. Early Taoism appears to illustrate the point well. Differently, an
ontologically modest account of acting can afford a good example of how identification can
operate without persona or selves. In fact, a case can be argued that such theories proceed
better in this fashion, because they avoid problematic commitments to selves.
It may look as if Fox, following Naess and Wilber, can escape these problems, and
separation, simply by defining 'self' through identification (and perhaps conversely):
'succinctly: Our Self is that with which we identify' (p.54). There are serious obstacles to
such a stratagem.
d
Elsewhere Fox makes quite a fuss about ontological commitments; on the matter of
cluttering up the universe with Selves he is strangely silent. Yet there are rather a lot of
these strange selves. Assuming selves do not reproduce themselves, in a universe where
there are n objects, and so 2n -1 complexes, and m individuals with selves (with m << n),
there are, at first estimate, m x (2n -1) larger selves. Of course some of these larger selves
may be the same, nonetheless the number of selves is huge where n is large. Moreover, if a
person can identify with nonexistent, with Sherlock Holmes or Pegasus or Satan if not with
the form of the Good and the set of all sets, then the numbers shoot right up, into the big
infinities. Yet nothing is more common in this arena than for people to identify with
fictional objects, of books, TV and so on. Indeed the art of acting depends heavily upon it.
A character actor works to identify with the character being portrayed; a good actor enjoys
more success in this identification enterprise.
d
It does not in any case evade ontic issues, because the definition requires that which
abstraction which a modest theory would not have generally available.
d
There are questions as to the adequacy of such an explicative definition of self:
whether, for example, it answers duly to prevailing senses of 'self'. The proposal does not.
Consider, to bring out just one deficiency, two different but closely integrated creatures,
65
Arthur and Martha say, who identify with the same class of items including themselves and
each other. Then on the Naess-Fox definition, it follows, counter-intuitively, that Arthur's
Self = Martha's Self, though Arthur @ Martha. Part of what has gone wrong is evident
from recent philosophical investigations, namely that the first person point of view, crucial
to such items as a self or a spirit or a soul or an ego, has got omitted; a widened self
involves some sort of (concentric) expansion from, or focused upon, a first-person self. 33
Normally in religious settings, it is furthermore expansion outwards from an inner personal
locus by restrictive identification or selective identification (as Wilber has it), not arbitrary
identification.
9. Problems of Self and Self-realisation: the intrusion of value and the
issue of evil.
Restrictive practices can remove a serious problem for identification theory, the
problem of evil identifications, but they raise an equally serious problem, how the
re intrusion of value is to be avoided. Fox is vaguely aware that 'the concept of intrinsic
worth' may intrude in discussions of Self-realisation. But he assumes, much too facilely,
that it can be simply removed (p.56). Devall's later writings should have alerted him to the
problems of those who identify with anti-environmental objects or causes, such as beach
buggies, symbols of power like bulldozers or tanks , or sand mining opportunities.
Identification is not always with the good, with good guys or good causes, as selective deep
ecology examples invariably suggest (e.g. p.60, with sea turtles, tigers and gibbons).
Spinoza, one of the progenitors of the theory, avoided the problem of evil attachments and
causes by envisaging primarily identification with Nature or God, assumed ipso facto to be
good. But Naess and Sessions allow for a much wider range of identifications, with the
whole human race, which may overall be evil (for all that conventional ethics assert), or
with undoubtedly evil human groups or organisations (e.g. the German S.S. or the Mafia).
Such expanded identification is hardly to be recommended or encouraged.
33
The person touch is too narrow, unless animals are persons. For there appear to be no
serious difficulties in ascribing selves to animals. Of course, if consciousness (or
circularly self-consciousness) is written into the notion of self, as with some of the
dictionary senses, then selves will be restricted to those animals that enjoy
consciousness, a quite extensive class overlapping humans. In a different sense, tied to
an original meaning of 'self as same, or one and the same used esp. prepositionally in
referring back, there is no difficulty in ascribing selves much more widely. Thus we
naturally say of a forest, 'It looks after itself', of an automata or even boomerang, 'It
came back itself'. The broad philosophical sense (first part of sense 3 in OED) in
terms of individual essences, what a thing really and intrinsically is, haecceity,
certainly admits selves for forests!
66
There are criticisms, yet to be answered (though initiated in my Critique), that the
"widened identification route" introduces virtually as many problems as it would resolve,
and that it cannot proceed independently of what it is supposed to offer an alternative to
(p.53), the pernicious "environmental axiological route". In a passage quoted from Seed
part of the problem is glimpsed, though Fox who emphasizes the relevant passage fails to
observe it: 'It is only by identification with the whole process that correct values will
emerge' (p.63). Why? Because, as in Spinoza, "the whole process" is assumed Good,
while anything less may not be; a distribution of value is presupposed. How furthermore
does a disciple ensure that a proper totalising identification is made? By confirming that
correct values do emerge. In brief, then, identification theory is no substitute for valuation
theory, but an addition to it. Moreover, it is not an entirely essential addition, however
psychologically useful. With the reintrusion of value or the like, the acclaimed superiority
of the wider identification approach over the environmental axiological approach lapses.
The claim, for which Fox offers initial but unpersuasive defence (p.77 on), is based on
another mistake: the mistake, already observed, of thinking that value theory excludes
identification. But it need not: selective identification can complement intrinsic value.
Very selective identification reveals as well how a theory of heightened Self can be
substantially independent of widened (unrestrictive) identification. In showing
independence Hinduism, as sometimes presented (e.g. by Smith), affords an admirable
example. Hinduism supposes a diminution or deepening of the self to the underlying Self,
a route of self-abnegation; but that is taken to be equivalent, by inversion, to a unique
expansion of self to approximate a God's eye viewpoint (of things sub specie aeternitas ). 34
34
Whereas Western approaches aim to enlarge the self - as with stock aggrandizement, or
Western deep ecology expansion - Indian approaches are concerned primarily with
contracting upon the self, to reduce individual expectations, aspirations, wants (to
nothing on some accounts). For a resolution of life with disappointments, the
(negative) suggestion is: 'if the ego were to have no expectations, there would then be
nothing to disappoint' (Smith p.26). But interestingly, there is supposed to be a
positive inversion of self abnegation which turns it into self expansion. Expand 'the
interests of the self ... to the point of approximating a God's-eye view .. . . Seeing,
thus, all things "under the aspect of eternity", would not one become completely
objective towards oneself, accepting failure as being as natural an occurrence as success
... . How can defeat disappoint if one feels the joy of the victor as if it were one's
own?' (p.26). 'Detachment from the finite self or attachment to reality as a whole ... positive or negative ... ' (p.27).
One path to God, to oneness with the Godhead (Brahman), that through knowledge,
jnana yoga, strikingly resembles Western deep ecology in some of its features and
terminology. The 'Yoga of knowledge is said to be the shortest path to divine
realisation (to God). It is also the steepest' (p.35). For intellectuals, introverts and
the like 'Hinduism proposes a series of meditations and logical demonstrations
67
While Hinduism does also make room for expansions of selves through time, so as to 'rise
above the present and even above present lifespans' (p.28) these expansions are tied to lifelines of single creatures (perhaps as reincarnated). There is no technical provision for
unlimited wider identification, for instance identification with inanimate items, with a
motorcycle or nuclear reactor. Thus Hinduism can serve to show the independence of
unrestrictive expanded identification from self-Self theories. Evidently, too, variations on
self-Self (e.g. with more ascetic theories of big Self) can strengthen this result.
designed to convince the thinker that there is more to him than his finite self; ... [to]
shift his central concern to the deeper reaches of his being ... the larger self that lies
behind ... ' (p.33).
One 'must pierce and dissolve the innumerable layers of manifest personality until all
strata of the mask [all roles of the persona] are at length cut through, [to] arrive finally
at the anonymous and strangely unconcerned actor [Atman] who stands beneath. The
distinction between self and Self can come through another image' (p.34) however than
that of the removal of roles and personae; thus there is the image of the game of life
upon a chess-board and the image of the charioteer. Through exercise with such
images and such practices it is claimed that a practitioner can 'build up a lively sense
of an abiding Self that underlies his phenomenal personality' (p.34). The further 'step
consists in shifting his self-identification from the passing to the eternal part of his
being. The most direct way of doing this ... is simply to [contemplate] one's identity
with the Eternal Spirit ... ' (p.35).
Of course analogous self-improvement, self-abnegation and self-expansive elements
feature in other religions than Indian, where they were especially early and
conspicuous. In Zen, for instance, 'the dualisms of self and object, of self and other,
are transcended' (p.134). In Christianity too, the circle of self can be broken, and
release experienced from the cramping confines of ego (Smith again, p.280).
Analogous elements made their way into Western philosophies, such as that of
Spinoza, early romanticism (e.g. Schegel), German idealism and T.H. Green, and
directly or indirectly into Western deep ecology (Fox, p.57). As Marxism is
sometimes seen, crudely, as obtained by upending Hegelianism and replacing God by
Man, so transpersonal ecology can be regarded as similarly varying elements of
Hinduism, replacing God by Nature (rather than identifying them as in Spinoza).
Ideological tradition does not however point uniformly in one direction, with self
elevation as invariant. According to Buddhism, here too more enlightened than
alternatives, that is a wrong direction. 'Strong emotions, however lofty [including
those of ecological consciousness], tend to emphasize and strengthen the fatal illusion
of the ego, which it is the whole aim and purpose of religion to transcend'. For the
'idea of a Self is at the root of every evil passion (and through its action Salvation
becomes impossible)' (both quoted in Perrett, p.72). Instead Buddhism offers the
tantalizing doctrine of "no self', which at least denies the existence of a substantial
self. Further there is allusion to "'the two kinds of non-self': that means there is no
ego in humans and no Self in Nature'.
68
Features of Hinduism also show up deficiencies in the Western Enlightenmentsponsored objective of Self-realisation. These include the already remarked problem of
evil, which afflicts unrestricted Self-realisation in much the way it plagues closely related
hedonism (often a main goal of Self-realisation, and out of an adjacent intellectual stable).
To avoid promotion of evil and the like, ethical or similar controls need to be inserted. It
should be realisation of an ethical Self, just as elsewhere it should be ethical happiness and
ethical profit, not happiness and profit at the expense of other creatures or the Earth. There
is worse to come. For there is a scurrilous bigger-is-better element to big Self expansion
and realisation, and to often announced, but thoroughly dubious, goals of maximization.
Without ethical constraints, the supreme goal of ecosophy, of maximizing Self-realisation,
can be decidedly anti-environmental, as too many maximizers proceed to aggrandize
themselves, maximize their consumption, or their identification with false chauvinistic
Gods, or their dominance, and so on. Such maximal Self-realisation is evidently antithetical
to deep environmentalism, which like high-path Hinduism and Taoism, is opposed to selfelevation and self-aggrandizement, especially in material consumption, and favours some
self-restraint, self-effacement, self-domination, even selflessness and self-abnegation. But
such unconstrained maximization is also in conflict with other features of ecosophy, such as
simplicity of, and restraint in, material means, implying a certain Self-contraction. In brief,
unrefined ecosophy is liable to be inconsistent.
10.
Deconstruction and reselection of self.
The problems run deeper however. The theory of expanded self and Self-realisation
has ecologically defective starting points: it takes as given what should be investigated and
rejected. For instance, Naess simply assumes that the process of heightened Self-realisation
starts with the 'development of the narrow ego of the small [Western] child into the
comprehensive structure of a Self which comprises all human beings' (quoted p.55; egoism
is also assumed p.64 ). Of course deep ecology aims to induce a further development,
beyond the anthropic limitations of standard trans personal psychology, 'a deep
identification of individuals with all of life' (p.55 again). 35
While it is plain enough that ego is a theoretical notion, elaborated especially by
Freud, it is less plain that self too is a folk-theoretic term of certain folk cultures, and it is
quite insufficiently appreciated that narrow egos and individual selves are not culturally
independent items (artifacts some would now say), but are acquired concepts,
35
Both developments parallel ascents in Hinduism, of upward path of "renunciation", to
third (service to human communities) and fourth life-objectives.
69
chauvinistically learnt early in civilised life. Perhaps because individual selves are so
deeply entrenched, especially in Westerners' impressions of themselves, a clever practical
and ideological course is no doubt the encouragement of expanded egoism, self stretching
exercises and empathy.
But a deeper philosophical approach would investigate the notions of ego and selftheir history, development, entrenchment, arbitrariness, and dispensibility - rather than take
them substantially for granted. In dissolving egoism, it is wise not to concede it at the
outset. It, and the intertwined notions of self-interest, and self-ish-ness, should be taken
apart to begin with, both analytically and historically. There are of course two parts to the
unmasking and dethroning of self-interest: dealing with interest and dealing with self A
historical investigation of the rise of the modern theory of self, done in the style of
Foucault, might serve to show how arbitrary in crucial respects the notion now rigorously
adhered to in social theory happens to be, and how developments could have been different.
But even if such an investigation should run aground (e.g. because the notion, although not
present in all tribal peoples, reaches back to prehistory), a systematic investigation need not
get stuck. The notion of self-interest, and also expanded self interest in the form of group
or class interest, has already been taken apart, from the angle of interest, and found wanting
as an ethical starting point (see esp. our 79). A complementary investigation of self,
standard theories of which should certainly not be conceded, is now required. 36 Some
realisation of the problematic character of the notion of self is in fact disclosed in Naess's
much earlier investigations, but he does not apply it to the familiar Enlightenment ideal of
self-realisation which he takes over as foundation of his own ecosophy, and so of deep
ecology as he conceives it.
Instead of requisite critical and de( con)structive investigation of the notion of self,
resulting in its demotion, what we are witnessing in too much deeper environmental
philosophy, is an elevation of the notion and an attempt to focus and found much theory
upon it (as esp. in Fox). It is reminiscent of, and related to, the earlier failed attempt to
found much theory, including ethics (or a replacement for it), on the notion of person.3 7
36
My impression is that several such investigations are now under way. For discussion
and elaboration of earlier investigations, which glimpse some of the requisite points,
see Perrett. Our own previous investigations, particularly of the interests and needs of
oneself and their interrelations and overlap with those of others (and accordingly the
falseness of the egoism-altruism contrast) in 79 and EP, go some small way along the
requisite path.
37
Thus, for instance, Strawson in metaphysics, and Benn in moral sciences, both
elaborating on Kantian illusions.
70
Indeed those routes are significantly interlinked and offer similar beginnings; for instance, a
personality comprises certain roles into which a self, oneself, is cast. In important respects,
self amounts to person somewhat deanthropocized. It also suffers similar defects. Neither
is sufficiently explained (e.g. what are the existence conditions, the identity conditions, the
distinctive properties); neither is up to carrying the heavy theoretical load aficionados have
attempted to impose upon them. In particular, neither enables an independent
characterisation of central axiologic or deontic notions or other notions bound up with the
regulation of conduct which they would somehow displace and to some extent provide new
foundations for. Furthermore it appears that the notion of self is not, and cannot be,
sufficiently deanthropicized, short of distributing selves around in woods, springs and
mountains in the way pagan religions did with spirits (and then letting them be good and
evil, and so forth). Undue concentration upon selves has the unfortunate and retrograde
effect of swinging environmental philosophy away from deepened ecology and back to
agents and actors, the live active subcomponents within ecologies.
unacknowledged return to shallower waters.
It signals an
Because self, however dispensible in environmental philosophy, is integral to
Wes tern deep ecology, it behoves us to say something about it, something more than deep
ecology has said. Self is a folk-theoretic object of philosophical cast, though no doubt an
item with experiential linkage, for instance as a permanent substratum of a certain range of
successive (internal) states and experiences, or, without a substance, as a bundle or
stringing together of a succession of 'personal' experiences. 38 It is an item, almost an
objectification, whose features (which may vary with underlying theory) are primarily
supplied through a culturally-dependent theory or the like (e.g. a religious or cult theory).
In this regard it is like other typically psychological items of philosophical importance, such
as soul (with which it is sometimes identified), spirit, mental substance, mind, psyche,
person, personal essence, ego, life force, conatus, etc. In due course a now standard range
of philosophical theories gets invoked to account for, or discount, such items: realisms,
constructivisms, nominalisms, etc., with dominant scientific ideology committed to a
dismissive nominalism. A fashionable humanist opposition has, by contrast, become
enamoured of a flamboyant constructivism: selves are made, fabricated, and the like. By
contrast again Western deep ecology appears committed to realism, and therewith an
38
While the experiences, such as surges of desire or apprehension, are subjectively
empirical enough, the substratum or self-substance may not be. To put it in Humean
terms, when I look within I don't find a self just like that (how a sceptical Hume
managed to still eludes me). Self itself, like cause, though empirically grounded, is
not an "empirical" concept.
71
incredible ontology of selves (already castigated). None of these standard mass-produced
positions impresses as at all satisfactory (for reasons elaborated in JB ). For example,
scientific nominalism inexcusably leaves out lots of experience, life-forms, and much
richness (whereas for its own "legitimate" theoretical purposes it is prepared to introduce all
sorts of strange objects). For constructivism there are so far unsurmounted difficulties in
getting beyond the analogy: exhibiting the materials and explaining just how they are
assembled. While not averse to phrases like 'the fabrication of self', it needs to be
remembered that the fabrications are more like those of fiction. Insensitive realism is
different; there is sound reason to remain entirely sceptical about an intuitive ontology of
selves, especially when a good empathesizer may have numerous different existent selves.
I can see little excuse for (being taken in by) such ontological blow outs.
Item-theory offers an appealing alternative to these standard positions generally, and
therewith very different prospects for self. An item-theoretic account of self will resemble
that already offered for mind (in MX); analogous item-theoretic accounts can no doubt be
given for spirit, psyche and ego (and also spook, shade, spectre, ghost, etc.). Minds are
fairly satisfactory folk-theoretic items which do not exist; ghosts, whether in machines or
not, are decidedly less satisfactory inexistential items. Selves are different inexistential
items again, with different features; many subjects which do not have minds may have
selves. The difficult part of the business consists in explaining whic~ items selves are, a
business that is complicated because there are several somewhat different but interconnected
notions of self in circulation. Fortunately these can all be accounted for as restrictions in
one way or another- temporal, cultural, subject-discipline - of a total self. The total self of
a subject abstracts from the total set of features which contribute to the self or personality of
that subject, from everything that makes it selfwise what it is (whether supplied by local
cultures or not, both supplied internally and not), over the life-span of the subject. For
some subjects with richer psychic lives, these features will include states of consciousness
(and then the total self will properly include ego, the conscious self). Thus a total self is, if
you like, what distinguishes a subject, makes it what it is and so gives its abiding essence
(and id-entity), and so resolves issues of personal identity over times. 39
What the relevant features are will become clearer as we come to the usual restrictions.
A first set of restrictions are temporal restrictions, a second set aspect restrictions. These
are combined in the OED sense
39
This account sharpens and much elaborates the senses which the dictionaries list as
philosophical, e.g. OED sense 3. The inexistential account offered shares common
ground with the Buddhist "no self' theory when presented as denying the real existence
of a self.
72
'4.a. What one is at a particular time or in a particular aspect or relation;
one's nature, character, or (sometimes) physical constitution or
appearance, considered as different at different times. Chiefly with
qualifying adj.'
So, for example, Dobbin's total self restricted to time period t1 differs from his total self
restricted to t2 at which period he is old and mentally decrepit. A main aspect restriction,
very commonly imposed, is to psychically-relevant features, excluding merely bodily
features. Differently, a total self, especially a total psychic self, of a subject may be
partitioned into such selves, whence sense 4 b of OED.
'4. b. An assemblage of characteristics and dispositions which may be
conceived as constituting one of various conflicting personalities within
a human being. Better self: the better part of one's nature.'
Among the topic, or subject-discipline, restricted selves those of economics and social
sciences are nowadays particularly prominent. A broad economic self, for instance, is a
psychic self confined to an individual and restricted to its locus of wants, preferences,
desires, interests, needs, aspirations, goals, etc. (Of course some of the volitional features
can be explained in terms of others; in older faculty discourse, it coincides with the
individual will.) With a narrow economic self, that of mainstream economics, the broad
economic self is narrowed considerably to remove all volitional features stretching beyond
those of a present human. Thus interests, for instance, are restricted to selfish interests,
those of the human concerned, to exclude both altruistic interests (those of relevance to
other items and typically against a creature's own selfish interests) and, more important,
other-directed and higher-order interests (such as a's interest is that Ws interest be fulfilled,
a's concern for~' etc.) 40 This narrow self tightens up a further dictionary sense, namely
OED
'5. One's personal welfare and interests as an object of concern; chiefly
in a bad sense, selfish or self-interested motives ... '.
The tightened-up restrictive notion lies at the base of most modern social science. It is
characteristically coupled with the Hobbesian theme, according to which all motivation
reduces to that of narrow economic selves, effectively self-interest. Such psychological
egoism, that nothing can move a creature to action or decision except interests and like
experiences of its own self, was assumed by Spinoza, who proposed absorbing this
40
These points are much further explained in 79 and EP. Other selves, such as altruistic
selves and self-effacing selves, deploy quite different obverse restrictions, eliminating
local selfish interests.
73
excessively narrow self in a generous Nature (p.57). Deep ecology has attempted to expand
this sorry route (p.54), which starts out from a dominant paradigm mistake. 41
11.
More troubles with Self as foundation.
The big trouble is that an expanded Hobbesian picture, with expanded-self interest as
the only fundamental motive, presupposes the essential correctness of Hobbes' crude theme
- all that Hobbes really got wrong was the 'size' of one's self - but that is a fundamental
mistake. It is a mistake as fundamental as the conflicting crude motivational theme that the
only basic motive of business enterpreneurs is [self-]profit. It is a mistake of the same cast
as the pervasive idea that conventional ethics can be rendered environmentally adequate just
by expansion of those it applies to (expansion of the "community", or of a suitable base
class of parties with interests, sentience, etc.) - what is often now called 'moral
extensionism' 42 .
As empirical evidence tells, prima facie decisively, against intertwined Hobbesian and
entrepreneurial economic motivational theory - an extraordinarily convenient, and not
"rationally" abandoned, theory for contemporary power elites - two substantially successful
theory-saving strategies swing into action:
• a sustained propaganda campaign to align people's motives with the theory, conducted
through advertising, education and other mass channels of persuasion;
• a sustained reduction campaign by subservient intellectuals to show that all apparently
exceptional motives actually conform to the motivational theory. At the same time,
minorities (such as pre-industrial peoples) whose motives do not conform to the
established/ment theory are of course discounted. This seriously flawed anti-environmental
theory should be resisted and replaced, not just extended. For the only basic and legitimate
motives and interests are not merely those of self (whether expanded in a futile attempt to
encapture other or not). One distinct motive is, to put it in old-fashioned Kantian terms
though the example is not Kantian, that of duty, duty for instance to this Earth, duty which
is neither self-regarding or necessarily Self-regarding or, in any ordinary sense, otherregarding.
41
The chauvinistic expansion of self and person is sometimes carried to remarkable
lengths, as revealed by Shepard: 'we must affirm that the world is being a part of our
own body'.
42
For further explanation and criticism of this expansion, see EP. At least Fox does
Sylvan the "favour" of distancing him from the most famous exponent of such
extensionism, Leopold, whom he tries to push into the wider identification and wider
Self fold (p.64).
74
A third complementary strategy renders the theory normative: while agents may act, or
appear to act, on non-self-interested motives, it is only rational to act according to one's ongoing self-interest. (While we shall focus upon a strong version of the normative egoistic
theme, that it is only rational to act in one's own self-interest, including one's future self,
much of what is said counts against weaker forms of the theme according to which it is in
some way preeminently reasonable to act in one's own on-going self-interest.) This
normative assumption depends crucially however upon a specially-tailored theory of self- a
substantial underlying self that suitably integrates all one's interests and concerns, past,
present and future. Without such an account the peculiar self-evidence normative egoism is
presented as enjoying, and upon which it depends as an unargued rest position, begins to
fall away. Suppose instead a self or person is represented as a sequence of causally
connected experiential moments (e.g. momentary selves, of a person). Unfortunately then,
for normative egoism, it ceases to be evident to many presently placed selves that there are
special specially-valid reasons for only being concerned with future elements of one
particular sequence rather than another, to which one's present self may not belong; for
promoting the interests of this future momentary self rather than some other more congenial
one, perhaps in another sequence. 43 Indeed it is evident that reasons for action are not
confined to those intermalised to the interests of one future self rather than another, one my
or thou or it (say) rather than another; that reasons can and do operate beyond interests, as
when directed at the futures of forests or fens, and beyond selves and their extensions and
variants such as I's and Thou's and You's, as when arguing for deep environmental action.
Nor is there cogent reason for trying to curtail reasons to what answers to a bad, if deeply
incalcated, theory, a pernicious and damaging, if widely promoted, theory and sense of self
joined to chauvinistic bodily consumption and advancement. A more generous itemtheoretic theory of total self can expose this theoretical fraud, allowing for a full flowering
of reasons for action; it thus diffuses the narrow greedy self of Hobbesian theory.
Expanded Hobbesian is assumed in deep ecological Ego-tripping (pp. 65-66) and in
'the theme of ecological resistance as Self-defence', that resisting ecological depredation is
defending oneSelf, because the whales or forests are me; it is me that is being injured
(p.61). Such expanded Hobbesian is even less plausible than Hobbesianism itself - among
other things because you can go on, to become other You's even after You as the forest has
been destroyed. Be sure I do not deplore, but welcome worthwhile ecological resistance
43
On all these points see further Perrett, esp. p.72. Perrett explains how the regularly
assumed opposition between egoism and altruism depends on particular assumptions
about the nature of self, and breaks down when, as in buddhist ethics with its doctrine
of no-self, these assumptions get removed.
75
whether conducted as Self-defence, or not; good works, even if undertaken for self-ish or
distorted or ridiculous motives, are not to be disparaged. Nor similarly should the help of
campaigners whose motives have been distorted by propaganda systems be disparaged
because those campaigners are engaged on dubious or bizarre bases, such as that they are
defending themselves rather than something else that deserves their care, concern and
respect. What should be resisted are the twin ideas that these are the wholesome motives or
the only [rational] motives, and that quality of motivation does not affect goodness of act.
The main trouble then with the wild Western approach so advanced under Self-interest is
that, like Hobbesianism but on an expanded scale, it would reduce or suppress all other
motivation. In many ways, it has not really got beyond bad "old paradigm" thinking, but
merely bizarrely extended it.
12. Liquidating Fox's "deep ecological territory".
The success Fox imagines expanded-Self is going to have in the environmental
struggle arena, a success far surpassing that environmental ethics is likely to have (p.84), is
premissed on this faulty expanded Hobbesianism theory. It is not based on monitored field
experience. In the action field, where some Western deep ecologists are seldom seen,
identification techniques, far from admirably shifting the onus of proof (a dubious claim
also advanced on p.84 ), are likely to be greeted with amazement and disbelief: what is this
crap? It is not very long ago that people who thought they were tigers or trees were locked
away, or else regarded, like the man who identified his wife as a hat, as figures of fun not
to be taken seriously. Such motivation is likely to be taken, and presented, by a hostile and
backwards opposition as crazy. Furthermore, such defences can back-fire. Identification
with a rainforest, for instance, because symmetrical, does not guarantee defence of its needs
as one's own, as against one's own needs as its. A powerful bunch of developers and
bureaucrats who identify with the forest may take their needs, for timber profits and tourist
revenues, as its, and interfere with it accordingly. Identification, on its own, admits
disastrous reversal. Expanded Selves can be dubious allies in environmental struggles. It
is fortunate then that for almost all environmental purposes, including those of deep
environmental philosophy, the notion of self can drop out; selves are inessential. While
76
decent theories of self and self-Self can presumably be worked out44 , and Self tried out as
sole primitive, the theory so far, and with it (Western) deep ecological theory in present
form remains both a shambles and an embarrassment.
It is bad news then, given the abysmal shape of the deep ecological theory of self, that
deep ecology should contract, at least on Fox's continuing vision, to a theory of self (see
also 89). On this presentation much of authentic deep ecology is thrown away. The deep
ecological framework comes down to 'two basic hypotheses and on ultimate norm', all of
which revolve around Self (pp.86-7): it is Self, Self and Self, nothing but Self. And it has
nothing essentially to do with the environment. For Self does not provide the great new (or
shabby old) starting point to environmental philosophy that Fox imagines. To elaborate:One "hypothesis", already criticised, is that 'Our Self is that with which we identify' (p.86,
the pluralisation is interesting, e.g. a vintage car club has a group Self which includes their
cars and perhaps others they covet); the other, not previously encountered, is that 'the self
can and does grow/develop/mature ... over time' (p.17). That hypothesis is presumably
false; for selves, like plants, may decline, wither or die. Or don't ecological selves wither
and die? 'The norm is that the ideal state of being is one that sustains the evident (and
deepest) possible identification and, hence, sense of Self'. It seems to be assumed that the
ideal state, identified in the "norm", ought to be striven for (though it is hard to see why: it
involves much unpleasant, embarrassing or boring identification work, etc.). There are
accordingly covert principles of conduct, such as striving towards the norm and undertaking
the "real spiritual work" of deep ecology, and covert values, such as that of the (so-called)
ideal state, lurking at the bottom of Wes tern deep ecology; it too hides, even in its reduced
form, a condemned "axiology" and ethics. But not environmental ones; the norm could
have issued from a deviant Hinduism, without environmental commitments, concerned
above all with introverted cultivation of self.
Although Fox says the 'ideal state of being is referred to ... as "ecological
consciousness" by Devall and Sessions' (p.87), such reference does not make it so;
ecological consciousness involves rather awareness of and commitment to certain things and
matters ecological, not widest identification, which involves much that is unecological, such
44
Perhaps following through suggestions sketched earlier, perhaps elaborating, in less
anthropocentric style, T.H. Green, whose theory appears to anticipate much of wild
Western deep ecology. Green took self-awareness as a guide to the nature of things and
self-realisation as each person's goal. He held that the developed self is the end which
defines the good, and that all ethical terms may be formed, so far as required, to that
end. Of course he also spoke against atomism and individualism, and in favour of
holism and organicism.
77
as traffic with occult and transfinite, or antiecological, such as identification with developers
ripping down rainforest and heritage works. While Fox does claim that consequences for
the natural (not the built) environment do follow from his framework, the claim is mistaken.
According to him, 'it follows ... that when we harm or limit the flow of nature then we are
harming or limiting that with which we ... identify and so diminishing our ... Self' (p.87).
No such consequence follows as regards widest possible identification; all that destruction
of an ecosystem does is to put the ecosystem in a possible world, with which identification
is sustained, and bring up a different and perhaps humanly improved world (e.g. a wild
river is dammed to save villages). The remote Self is unperturbed by such commerce of
actuality. Even if Fox should try to save the show by again restricting awkward or
uncomfortable identification feats, his intended consequences do not follow. For we may
well increase that with which we identify by "limiting the flow of nature", for instance by
varying or enriching parts of extensive monotonous natural systems. 45 Fox's deep
ecological-framew ork, Self-indulgence of a deep spiritual cast, is no framework for an
environmental anything. Luckily it is not needed, but can be despatched with other deep
ecological rubbish.
13. Justifying "extreme interpretations" of and "extreme reactions" to wild
West deep ecology.
Fox exhibits full dominant paradigm outrage at what he refers to as my 'extreme
interpretations' and 'extreme reactions' (boldface headings for sections 3 and 4, p.13 and
p.19). While I am quite accustomed to being called or accounted an extremist, it is
generally done by those far on the shallow side of the environmental divide. I trust such
terms as 'extreme' carry no more weight with readers than they do with me. It is a
fashionable, but methodologically quite unsound, ploy to try to dismiss those who depart
far from some lately received position as extremists. Nowadays even 'Thomas Aquinas,
for example, is depicted as an 'extremist' (by Hart) and dismissed because the views he
expressed do not accord with what "all lawyers think" (Dworkin)' ;46 one is in good
company. The Earth will in the longer term be helped by deep environmental extremists
45
That Fox's theory (already epicycling, into dimensions) admits such cases is evident
from "the extinction example" (pp. 82-3). Because they are sufficiently evident, I have
not recorded difficulties regarding this example, which attempts to discriminate
different sorts of environmental losses by their differential effects on Selves (if there
are any ecological ones left that is: Last Self arguments retain their bite and smile).
46
According to H. Miles in a curious letter to the ANU Reporter 1989.
78
who serve to shift various balances in environmental directions - the balances to be
achieved, for example, in discussions, in time allowed in decision making, and so on.
But what Fox also says he means, under the emotive overlay, is that 'Sylvan's
arguments show a tendency to push the claims of those he criticises to extremes' through
application of the following reduction-of-relations principles:
S 1. 'if two concepts/ideas are linked, then they must be completely similar (equivalent
[identical])';
S2. 'if they are contrasted then they must be completely different (i.e. non-intersecting) as
well as completely exhaustive (i.e. covering all cases/examples of the set in question)' (p.13
and earlier).
All these principles (S2 breaks down into a pair straightaway) are evidently fallacious, and
only hold in very special cases. Now I claim to be well aware of this, and to have
illustrated this awareness sufficiently in my work (esp. investigation of the history of the
attempt to remove or suppress relations, investigation of very special cases, such as
"classical relevant logics", where a connections of the form, "where Rab then a = b" does
hold; see JB and RLR respectively). Indeed I discuss an example of this 'crude fallacy' in
one of the sectors that particularly excites Fox (Cp.27). But in any case, the principles are
substantially irrelevant to Fox's discussion of 'extreme interpretations' and 'extreme
reactions' (in his sections 3 and 4)! For, as we shall see, what really bothers Fox, and also
N aess, has little that is not superficial (merely terminological) to do with extremes; what
troubles them rather is that I take their claims seriously, and not as forever 'preliminary', or
at 'a superficial level', or 'metaphorical' or the like (see e.g. p.13, p.49). 47
Firstly, I introduced the quasi-technical term 'extreme holism' ('extreme' was
italicised to indicate its introduction and quasi-technical character, not to emphasize my
extremism) as contrasted with 'moderate holism' .48 That is obviously not an extreme
claim, it is not pressing a claim to extremes; it is simply using a piece of terminology, and
does nothing for Fox's cause.
I take seriously Naess's holistic claim, repeated by
incautious deep ecologists, that his conception 'dissolves ... the very notion of the world as
composed of discrete, compact, separate "things"', which I describe as 'extreme holism'.
47
One day I should really like some non-preliminary formulations from Naess. Quite
separately from that standing request, I do regard it as pretty ridiculous to insist that
ordinary discourse about chairs and desks, fems and wombats is 'talking at a superficial
or preliminary level of communication'. Perhaps we have to expect this sort of
twaddle from hard-wired physicalists, not from deep thinkers.
48
It is a contrast previously discussed, in more detail but in different terms, in EP,
p.222ff.
79
Fox's response to my reporting of Naess's claim, in the style of Dr. Johnson (no separate
things, so no wildernesses!, no forests!), his only response it seems, is '(Does Sylvan)
sincerely think that anybody could be that silly?' (p.14). The answer is of course: Yes,
damned right he does; for example, too many influenced by Hegelianism. It 1s
unremarkable that Fox and Naess are trying to backtrack without appearing to do so. 49
Where, then, is the (non-quotational) extreme interpretation? Fox makes two
connected moves, neither of which duly involve principles Sl and S2. Firstly, he
introduces a distinction, not previously in the ballpark, between relative and absolute
autonomy of "things in the world" (p.14). As commonplace in Fox's practice, the apparent
distinction is introduced and put to work without proper explanation. Then Fox announces
that 'it is clear from his interpretation that he [Sylvan] takes Naess and myself to be denying
even relative autonomy ... whereas it should be clear ... that what is being denied is
absolute autonomy'; and he has the audacity to go on, ' ... there is really no excuse for
Sylvan's extreme interpretation' (p.14). Well, you can take my word for it that Sylvan did
not take N aess and Fox that way; the distinction in question had not been introduced in the
literature under discussion. For similar reasons, that there is no basis for it, there is no
extreme interpretation, and nothing to underwrite Fox's captious moralising.
Secondly, Fox proceeds quite scurrilously to make it look as if I am attributing certain
themes I nowhere allude to him and Naess (but in fact attacked in Wilber's book). ' ...
Sylvan's extreme interpretation ... would have Naess and myself reduce all diversity and
multiplicity to something like "uniform, homogeneous, and unchanging mush" or to
"uniform, all-prevading, featureless but divine goo"'. The quotations, which may well look
as if they were drawn from my criticism, bear no resemblance to anything I attributed to
Naess or Fox; they are in fact drawn from Wilber's fashionable Eye to Eye. Similarly that
'extreme interpretation' is not to be found in Sylvan; it is a fabrication on the part of Fox.
Nothing I made critical use of tells against Naess's total-field exhibiting various features,
such as some internal differentiation. The Flux of late nineteenth century philosophy was
both non-uniform and non-homogeneous, with 'eddies, ripples and whirlpools in a stream
("unity in process")' (p.15), without being composed of separate individuals.
The other example Fox includes in his section in extreme interpretations, the matter of
internal relations, will also require, to begin with, some grimy textual exegesis, including
further inspection of Fox's practice of tactical misquotation (or quotation out of context),
49
Their behaviour is reminiscent of Parmenides and Zeno at the races, as delightfully
related by Bouwsma.
80
rather than real philosophical work. 50 But here no attempt is made to exhibit an 'extreme
interpretation' (nor again do principles Sl and S2 enter). Fox's first (and final) point is that
subscription to a doctrine of internal relations 'does not necessarily render one an idealist'
(p.17). Whereupon, by way of counterexample, Fox trots out his own admirable
philosophical pedigree, and reveals a doctrine of internal relations inherited from the neutral
monism of Spinoza and the process philosophy of Whitehead, both well known for their
doctrines of internal relations. N aess does at least make it evident that he is adopting or
adapting the received theory of internal relations. As it happens, I did not commit myself to
the proposition that a doctrine of internal relations (however characteristic of idealism)
entails idealism; naturally there appears to be more to idealism than that (such as a total-field
doctrine). Only by a misreading or misquotation does Fox obtain his necessarily linkage to
idealism. Firstly he represents me as ascribing to him 'this "idealist theory of internal
relations"' (p.15), when what I actually wrote was that a certain 'form of argument ...
commandeers elements of the idealist theory of internal relations' (p.27 emphasis added).
Later he congratulates himself upon 'discrediting Sylvan's claims that deep ecology
subscribes ... to his characterisation of the theory of internal relations, which he describes
(p.28) as "a terminal form of idealism newly warmed up"' (p.18). To credit to me 'a
characterisation of the theory of internal relations' is certainly a gross overstatement, though
it may be convenient in trying to exonerate the doctrine of deep ecology from evident
criticism. But the immediate salient point is that what I say 'looks like a terminal form of
idealism ... ' (C p.28 emphasis added) is not the theory of internal relations but 'what Fox
describes as "the central intuition of deep ecology"'.
The second, of Fox's three points as to my comments on the deep ecological doctrine
of internal relations, is a bit more philosophically substantive, and concerns the character of
the necessity ascribed to connections. But textual exegesis is again unavoidable. Fox
contends that 'Naess's definition of internal relations ... flatly contradicts Sylvan's claim
that this view point renders "all connections necessary" in the ... sense Sy Ivan intends'
(p.16; Fox has the term 'strong' where dots are inserted; we'll look at what Fox is trying to
hang on me shortly). 51 On Naess's explanation, an internal 'relation between two things A
and B is such that the relation belongs to the definitions or basic constituents of A and B, so
that without the relation, A and Bare no longer the same things' (see p.15). Consider any
50
By and large, deep ecology involves disturbingly little real philosophical work. So
much of it is name dropping, rank pulling, unacknowledged borrowing - all the old
stuff some of us hoped to be rid of with a "new environmental paradigm".
51
In fact I had been arguing from Fox's theme that "all entities are constituted by their
relations" (see C pp.27-8), but Fox diverts the issue to Naess.
81
internal connection R between A and B (indeed on the standard theory where all relations of
objects are internal, any connection). Then ARB holds by virtue of definitional or
constitutional features of A and B. But what so holds, holds as a matter of necessity (is
'necessarily constitutive' in Fox's lingo, Fox trying again for a resolving distinction);
whence the connection holds of necessity. A flat contradiction? Now to the 'strong sense'
Fox has located and is spreading abroad that I intend (once again he did not consult me as to
what I intended). 'Sylvan is claiming', according to him (though I have never advanced
such a claim, and am still not clear what it means, 'exact nature of' being Fox's
terminology), 'that the exact nature of all those relationships is also necessary' (p.16).
Now in trying to show that Naess's story conflicts with this claim he has hung on me, Fox
proceeds to run Naess into deep trouble (though Naess is blithely oblivious; see note (22)).
For, so Fox says,5 2 'Naess explicitly acknowledges that A and B can exist "without" the
relation"', meaning "'in a different relationship" or "in the absence of that specific relation"'
(p.16). Suppose such a different relation is S (at worst S is the absence of R). So
apparently ASB and not-ARB; whence A, for instance, has inconsistent properties, namely
both ... RB which is constitutive and not- ... RB by acknowledgement . To be sure, the
difficulty can be avoided, by insisting (as N aess did and as Fox also has him say) that
'without the relationship, A and B are no longer the same things', so what we have is
A'SB' and not- A'RB' for some counterparts A' and B' of A and B. Some such line is
taken by the standard theory. But Fox seeks a connection between A and B for Naess
which is in some respects contingent. Certainly that is possible, but it goes beyond the
bounds of the standard theory by admitting external relations, for which it is not required
that A and B are no longer the same without the relation. And, in a straightforward sense, it
fails the constituting claim: entities have relations, external ones, which are not constituting
(to deal with Fox-past), or alternatively (to refute Fox-present, p.17) it is false that 'all
relationships are necessarily constitutive' because some, external ones, are not.
My wombat example, to come to Fox's third point, was designed to indicate just that,
that a wombat stands in various relationships which are not (necessarily) constitutive and
which are merely contingent. Suppose wombat A passed by hollow stringbark B on its
foraging route (say once only, and accidentally, because it had wandered out of its
territory). Then "A passed by B" is a relation between A and B, a true relation, which
furthermore is merely contingent, because it might not have transpired. Moreover, the
relation is not constitutive, for instance of A, because it makes no difference to the nature or
52
The claim attributed to Naess does not appear in his original 1973 paper where the
relational total field image was presented, and from which the other Naess' quotes were
drawn.
82
constitution of wombat A. What I mean by term 'constitute' (and likewise 'constitutive') Fox professes unclarity about this (p.17) - is what is ordinarily meant by the term in such
contexts, namely what makes a thing what it is, what determines it (see OED), what gives a
definite nature or character to (see Concise English). 53 Wombat A, one and the same A, a
creature with exactly the same make-up as A, not some counterpart or surrogate A', might
not have passed by B. So "passed by B" is not constitutive of A; and again not all relations
are constitutive.
Despite the general paucity and poorness of argument in much revealed deep ecology
literature, the general downgrading of rational and analytic methods 54 , and the emphasis on
experiential and empathetic approaches, the status of argument turns out to be a sensitive
issue too. Fox beats up an issue on this topic, on route to the grander issue of intellectual
rubbish, by his standard practice of misattribution. He proceeds stealthily to amend my
aside, '(argument often not being considered in the proper style of such a nonanalytical
enterprise as deep ecology)', which I believe I can sustain, to the assertion 'that argument is
not in the "proper style" of deep ecology' (p.20), which I did not make (for all Fox's kind
attribution) and would not want to defend. I wish decent argument and careful reasoning
were more often considered in the proper sty le of deep ecology, and more often practised.
Then I should be more enthusiastic about it, writing much less critical of it, and castigating
less as rubbish. Fox, I am afraid, has done little to convince me that 'closely measured
intellectual argument is thoroughly in keeping with the style of deep ecology' (p.20) or that
it is much of a priority. He offers but two examples: he stands on his own record as
attested in his Response (how can I say anything unfavourable about that), and he appeals,
forgetting I said 'often ... considered', to an exceedingly loose talk by Devall on the
Stone/Sky path, which mentions 'logical analyses of ideas, premises, systems of thought'
and 'formal statements of definitions of key terms, explication of relationships', but
deliberately avoids any such work, preferring instead, in characteristic deep ecological style,
'a steeper ... path that requires ... the "real work"', consciousness elevation, jnana yoga or
psychedelic drugs maybe (pp.21-2).
14. Transpersonal logic and methodology.
53
It is proponents of the dubious doctrine of internal relations - a doctrine quite
inessential to and external to deep environmentalism - who are forced into assigning an
extraordinary meaning to constitute.
54
The Counter-Enlightenment antipathy to analytic and rational methods resurfaces in
Western deep ecology. For an example in Fox's Response, consider his remarks on
the 'blunt tools of logical analysis' when applied to the 'real world of communication'
(p.11), which could almost have come from the late eighteenth century.
83
The quaint relation-reduc tion principles, S 1 and S2, do show up with the first
premisses of what Fox dignifies with the misleading titles of "false equivalence argument"
and "false contrast argument". The second title is particularly misleading, because there is a
recognised traditional fallacy of "false contrast" or "false dichotomy" (arising as regards
classifications), which differs from Fox's defective "false contrast argument". Fox has
proceeded to latch onto my legitimate use of traditional logic, as when I say (rightly or
wrongly) that Devall and Sessions are operating with a false contrast (p.11), in order to
saddle me with a defective argument of his own concoction which I do not apply. But to
show that these defective arguments, which Fox accuses me of heavily and repeatedly
applying (p.6, p.11 ), are not deployed by me in the way Fox alleges, we shall need to look
at the arguments.
To avoid further confusion with tradition, let us relabel the arguments, replacing
'false' by 'foxy'. Let A and B be terms (Fox has 'concept/idea'); let a be a person or group
whose views are under criticism. Then the foxy equivalence argument, set down pretty
much in Fox's way, runs as follows
Key Premiss. When a links A with B (i.e. maintains that ARB for some relation R),
claim a holds that A=B.
Subargument. Show there are cases where A without B or B without A, whence A;;:: B.
Conclusion according to Fox: ' the "argument" (i.e. the claim that A = B) is "false" or
that it "fails"' (p.6).
An immediate observation is that Fox has not succeeded in setting down what he is after
with much success. The conclusion, which does not make use of the key premiss, is a
mess. As he hasn't located an argument, in 'the claim that A = B', he has perhaps felt
obliged to put critical terms in italics, or perhaps he imagines he is quoting me - what is
going on is unclear. He might have concluded, though a level up, that the "false
equivalence argument" itself fails, a conclusion he doesn't explicitly draw, but then he
would be left without a conclusion at all for the foxy equivalence argument.
There is a valid traditional argument, filling out the subargument that is buried in the
foxy argument as intended. In a standard logical format, with A( c) symbolising that c is or
has A or that A applies to c, it runs as follows:!. A= B
hypothesized claim (imposed on a)
2. A( c) iff B(c) for every case c
3. A(c) & ~B(c) for some case c
standard case expansion of 1
further data
4. ~2
from 3
5. ~(A= B)
from 4
6. ~(A= B)
reductio, discharging the hypothetical argument
84
Thus the claim, that A= B, is indeed false, as its negation is categorically established, given
the data. But again the argument, now valid, makes no use of the key premiss. A proper
fuller version of the argument would replace 3 by the disjunction, A(ci) & -B(ci) V.
-A(c2) & B(c2) for some cases ci and c2, and consider each disjunct. But the result would
be the same, namely 6 categorically.
The preceding represents the valid core of the foxy equivalence argument. What of
the key premiss however? That part also can be rendered correct, but upon assumption of
the quite defective S 1. To convert this part of the argument into available logical form, let
us replace holding or maintaining functors by a correspondin g asserting or (more
satisfactorily) commitment to asserting functor. (Should you imagine a fast one is being
pulled just read 't-a' as 'a holds that'). Then the key dubious premiss becomes, at first
approximation.
KP. from a is committed to asserting A is related to B, i.e. ARB, infer that a is committed
to asserting that A= B (or A= B).
Expressed in symbols in implicational form it looks as follows:
KP➔ .
.,_a ARB ➔ . t-a A= B.
This form makes it easy to see how the key premiss derives from relation-reduction S 1, i.e.
ARB ➔ A = B, namely by a standard distribution of the committed-to -asserting functor,
.,_a, or specifically by the rule x
➔
y / t-a x
➔
t-a y. S1 is the way to arrive at KP.
Moreover without S 1, there is little basis for KP.
Now the arguments can be put together. We argue to KP➔, e.g. from Sl. We run
out the subargument to ~(A= B), from which we conclude a is wrong or mistaken in
asserting A = B. Then we proceed back across KP➔ (using what results from it by
distribution of the mistake functor W, namely W t-a A= B ➔. W t-a ARB), to conclude
that our friends a were wrong in maintaining, as they did, that A is linked to B.
Exposure of that part of the argument involving KP➔ is enough to at least suggest that
I am unlikely to rely on it heavily, since it is manifestly defective when so exposed, relying
upon the already jettisoned S 1. Fox, for all his assertions, does nothing to show that I do
rely on it heavily; indeed he does not show that I rely upon it at all. For all his effort in
eliciting these arguments (shoddy though his work may be), he fails entirely to follow
through and show how they apply.
Consider his "example" of the foxy argument at work, and supposedly scrutinized,
where the terms involved are life and value (p.7). Fox's conclusion does not appear, no
conclusion is reached. Moreover the key premiss is not instantiated, nor is any evidence of
its use advanced; it is knocked down to the claim, deriving from certain deeper positions,
that life= value. Whence the sort of argument that I am alleged to be employing 'in a totally
85
fallacious manner' comes down to the valid traditional subargument. Fox's complaint is not
about an argument at all, it is about the premiss. As Fox concedes 'this argument is fine,
it's just that the original claim is false' (p.7)!
Let's take time out from the argument to consider the original claim. What Fox
reports that 'Sylvan ... claims, [namely] that (U.S.) "West Coast deep ecology" equates life
(A) and value (B)', differs significantly from what Sylvan did write, namely 'the
impression comes through from much West Coast deep ecology (from certain insufficiently
penetrating intermediate positions) that what is important is ... life and nothing but life'
(Cp.16). No universal claim, no equation, no falsehood. Naturally there are some
commitments, but Fox hasn't taken much care with those, or got them right either. For
example, Sylvan does not offer a definition (of his own or of any sort) of 'biospherical'
(which does not mean 'earth-centered') or of 'biocentric', but relies on standard meanings
(accordingly, too, he cannot 'refute his own ... definition').
The position with the foxy contrast argument is very similar to that already dealt with,
a similar shambles. The argument is exactly the same except that equality or (strong)
equivalence,= , is replaced throughout by a dual notion, exclusive disjunction, symbolised
V. But Fox does not dualise properly; instead of the dual conclusion, "the argument (i.e.
the claim that A V B) is "false" or that it fails", he misleadingly introduces the traditional
fallacy terms, as if they were new terms without a predetermined sense. He has it that we
'conclude that the contrast in question is a "false contrast" or a "false dichotomy'" (p.8).
Once again, a properly developed illustration of the argument is not offered, and in the very
sketchy "example" given the argument drops out. It turns into a question - an interesting
question - of the use, point, and merit of the shallow/deep distinction.
Let's take time out to consider the issues raised, as some are important. But first
some trivia. Fox, in effect, charges me with presenting a straw-person, as no one (but me)
takes the shallow/deep distinction as exhaustive of environmental positions. Well, he has
led a sheltered life; I've met too many activists who do. Fox implies that I 'want to assign
the shallow/deep terminology to the "historical scrap-heap"' (p.9). Here, and elsewhere,
Fox apparently joins the activists who conflate the shallow/deep distinction with the shallow
ecology/deep ecology distinction. It is only deep ecology that I have contemplated for the
scrap heap, not the shallow/deep distinction. More important is the status of such illdefined items as deep ecology. Fox now assumes that shallow and deep ecology, however
imperfect, are "ideal types", the merit of which is to be assessed pragmatically, through
their usefulness, heuristic roles, etc. Some scepticism is warranted. Ideal types such as
protestant and middle class might be defensible in sociological investigations where there
are plenty of protestants or middle class people to survey, but what is supposed to
correspond with deep ecology? The comparison has serious problems. Western deep
86
ecologists have yet to get their theoretical slum in order, to rectify their classifications, clean
up the objects of these, and so forth.
15. More rubbish removal, especially that borrowed from pop science.
Along with a substantial upgrading of the calibre of argumentation in deep ecology
should go extensive removal of rubbish, such as the unnecessary doctrine of internal
relations. The image of philosophers removing the rubbish, which comes from Locke, is
much favoured in Australia, and has been deployed by both Armstrong and Passmore. 55 It
tends to accompany the picture of real philosophy 'as tough, practical, rational and secular',
which Sessions deplores, in the case of environmental ethics, as 'neither desirable nor
necessary, and perhaps not possible'. 56 While such an approach is hardly necessary it is
certainly possible: it is a divisive issue whether it is desirable.
As is increasingly appreciated these days, there are various sorts of rubbish, which
can be separated; so too in philosophy there is more than one sort of rubbish. Not all of it is
nonsense or quite unintelligible (pace p.23). Considerable parts of prevailing religions have
been dismissed as rubbish (see OED examples); but while some parts, such as the doctrine
of Trinity, may be accounted unintelligible, most parts would not. They are regarded rather
as substantially false as well as seriously flawed in important respects, and perhaps also as
pernicious or largely worthless (and likely as unnecessary). Evidently, then, there are
several distinguishable components to rubbish; and, as dictionary senses reveal (e.g. OED:
'worthless, ridiculous, nonsensical ideas, discourse, or writing'), there may be quite a
variety of ideological and intellectual rubbish.
Rubbish, of all sorts, is hard to escape these days; unfortunately it is easily
encountered in both deep ecology and popular science. Many environmental philosophers,
Fox is one, do seem to be highly attracted by a very fashionable cutting edge, along with a
semi-respectable crank end, of recent diverting popular science. It is almost enough to look
at the cast of witnesses Fox pulls in for defence of his unstated theme that there is no
55
According to Locke, 'it is ambition enough to be employed as an under-labourer in
clearing the ground a little and removing some of the rubbish that lies in the way of
knowledge'. Contrary to the impression Fox tries to convey, here and elsewhere, it
wasn't so much a matter of 'following Passmore' (except in a dilute temporal sense, in
which I always follow Aquinas when I agree with him), as of following a larger
tradition.
56
This part of Session's essay is quoted approvingly in Fox's Response, p.44. Sessions
should be rapped over the knuckles for his sexist citations (which Fox too does little
to rectify).
87
rubbish in deep or transpersonal ecology (the theme is enthymematically Self-refuting, so to
say). The cast includes Capra, Davies, Bohm, Wilber, Gribbin, Pegals, Zukav, Prigogine,
d'Espagnat, Sheldrake, Pribram, Comfort and Walsh.
There is ample rubbish littering the works of some of these authors, some of which
finds its way into Western deep ecology (e.g. Fox's Section 4, and also e.g. pp. 58-9). It
is instructive to look at a couple of examples of prime rubbish early in the work of Gribbin
cited:- First 'Isaac Newton invented physics, and all of science depends on physics' (p.7).
Observe that this conjoint claim, which luckily does not drift into deep ecology, is
intelligible, but it is ridiculous 57 ; and observe, furthermore, that there is no straightforward
way of recycling such intellectual rubbish. Second, 'what quantum mechanics says is that
nothing is real and that we cannot say anything about what things are doing when we are
not looking at them' (p.2). As Gribbin presents quantum mechanics as true, we can detach
to achieve his shocking headlines and like assertions; so for instance, 'Nothing is real
unless it is observed' (p.3), naive phenomenalism. Remarkably, Gribbin is hardly obliged
to generate the amount of striking rubbish he does (but then he is a scientific journalist),
because of his later proclivity towards a "many worlds" interpretation of quantum
mechanics, which affords one neat way of halting production of this type of idealist
rubbish. Fox, eager to retain an idealistic Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics
for his nefarious metaphysical purposes, fails to take account of Gribbin's later turnabout
which effectively repeals the earlier headlines, and actually appeals to Gribbin's "authority"
(in note 41) in trying to dispose of the many worlds interpretation!
Fortunately we do not have to put up philosophically with the rubbish produced by
popular elaborations of the Copenhagen interpretation, which Fox and other avant-garde
thinkers would foist upon us. One reason is that micro-features of quantum behaviour very
rarely impinge upon macro-phenomena. They thus make little or no real difference to issues
of environmental philosophy (only problems tangential to it, such as determinism). Another
and major reason is that there are significant alternatives to the Copenhagen interpretation,
which at least shed most of the rubbish. And the 'range of choice' is far more extensive
than Fox would allow 'if Sylvan did follow his appeal through' (p.27) - yet another
example of "false choice". It happens that Sylvan had followed through on some of the
further options Fox does not consider, namely
57
If physics and science are the sorts of things that can significantly be invented, then
there are plenty of candidates for the claims both before and after Newton, e.g. Einstein
if we wish to be really extravagant. As for the extravagant reduction claim, well it is
refuted along with physicalism and associated Australian primitivism; see e.g. J.W.
Smith and JB .
88
• alternative logic approaches. There are many interesting possibilities here, but few of
which physicists have had time or inclination to investigate. My own, rather preliminary,
investigations have concerned a uniform relevant logic approach (see uu § 13, on ultramodal
quantum logic) and, differently, paraconsistent approaches (see OP p.157ff.)
• a neutral worlds interpretation (see my 85). What this amounts to is an ontic
neutralisation of many-worlds interpretation. Because of the neutralisation, the
'metaphysical baggage' and unparsimoniousness that Fox complains about are removed.
Of course too, since the interpretation corresponds, through the mathematical formalism
deployed, to other standard interpretations, it as just as falsifiable (pace note 41 ), and
accordingly hardly 'desperate', a mere "just-so" story. These observations, duly elaborated
(as attempted, in part, in work alluded to), indicate 'how Sylvan would describe the
ontological implications of the "new (ie. post-1920s) physics?"' (p.23 reordered). Briefly,
there are many hitherto unknown physical objects at the sub-atomic level whose behaviour
is classically anomalous, being partly wavelike and partly particlelike, for which a new and
interpretationally difficult theory has been devised. But the positivism and related idealism
of early interpretations can be removed by a warranted change of interpretation. And then
the ontic implications for ecology and most of environmental philosophy are much less
remarkable than Wes tern deep ecology has imagined.
Given apparently viable options as to interpretation, all the rubbish Walsh and Fox
add to the already problematic Copenhagen interpretation can be packed off (if you can find
a way to recycle it, good luck to you). For those who like picking through rubbish (I
occasionally collect stuff from the local dump myself), Fox's page 26 is particularly
rewarding. But two examples only :- 'What can be known is ... never the independent
properties of the observed alone'. So it cannot be known that the wounded wombat
(somehow) observed is female, pregnant, and so on. Such astonishing epistemological
results are not delivered by the Copenhagen interpretation, which only tells us that
knowledge as to quantum happenings is limited by exclusion principles. Similarly for 'the
known universe is inextricably linked with consciousness rather than being separable into
consciousness and objects of consciousness'. The standard formalism of quantum theory
discloses nothing about observers; and while observers do feature in the Copenhagen
interpretation these can be simply more measuring or witnessing devices: consciousness
does not figure. Even if it did, that would only apply to quantum objects, and would
scarcely warrant the grand extrapolations Fox and Walsh wish to make. Furthermore, the
Copenhagen interpretation as elaborated is obliged to set quantum domains within wider
classical settings always (by contrast with multiple-world interpretations there is no wave
function for the universe, etc.); so in the larger setting classical assumptions concerning
independence, separability, and so on, are not overthrown, but confirmed.
89
In fact my passing reference to rubbish in Fox's presentations was directed not at
Walsh, who was not pretending to tell us what deep ecology is about, but at Fox's
reproduction of this material 'in advancing the "unity of process" metaphysics of deep
ecology' (p.19). Fox's presentation of the issues (in section 4), with himself as some sort
of interested third party in a dispute between Sylvan and Walsh, is substantially misleading;
I was not attempting (what is overdue) a critique of transpersonal psychology.
What is taken to be known, furthermore, affords little comfort or support for the list
of 'ontological implications' that Fox and Walsh wish to draw from the "new physics".
Consider some representative exhibits, mostly compressed one-worders, from 'the
fundamental ontology now being revealed', with which Fox tells us deep ecology is not
merely 'in accord with' but 'throws its full weight behind' (see p.18):- Impermanen t?
Some of the newly discovered sub-atomic objects are extraordinarily durable and have
experimentally assessed lifetimes of millions of years. Fluid? This attribute of macrosystems does not extend significantly even down to the molecular level; it makes no sense to
say that wavicles (or even atoms) flow, they are the wrong sorts of things. Whereas the
attribution of impermanence makes straightforward sense (but is substantially false), that of
fluidity does not. Empty? Some of the newly located astrophysical objects are
extraordinarily dense, packed with matter. Infinitely over-determined? How does this sit
with quantum indeterminacy and under-determination? Or with another speculative exhibit
from the list: Self-consistent? At least questions of the consistency of the "new physics"
and its parts are proper and reasonable. But we are far from being in a position to assert
that the theory is consistent. On the contrary, inconsistencies keep emerging in the
developing theory, to which often ad hoc repairs are proposed (e.g. with the Dirac o
function, renormalization etc.; cf OP). Given the inadequate ramshackle character of the
present quantum theory, it is a fair bet that it remains inconsistent. It is a widespread
opinion among researchers that the present theory is something of a mess and in much need
of improvement. Even so practicing scientists are not hoping for foundations, which tend
to be frowned upon these days. However, foundations, such as an extension of von
Neumann's axiomatisatio n of part of quantum theory, would help in effecting
improvements, and something of the sort is a prerequisite for establishing consistency, if it
can be done. Foundationless? What is meant is, apparently, not foundations for the theory,
such as axiomatic foundations, nor really basic (atomic) components for what the theory is
about. In this sense, Newtonian physics had as foundational elements corpuscles, or
particles of certain sorts. It is sometimes said that quantum physics afford no such ultimate
building blocks, each apparent stopping point fragmenting into new substructures, most
recently quarks. But this idea, which so far appears to lack a satisfactory physical
modelling, diverges from the still entrenched paradigm of particle physics which, for all the
talk about "new paradigms" in physics, still consists in analytical reduction to ultimates.
90
Such objectual foundations leave open, of course, the question as to whether, and to what
extent, new phenomena may emerge, at "higher levels", as the building blocks are variously
put together and structured. As with elements, so with microphysical particles, while the
zoo of known items has expanded apace, the hope remains that there is a simple underlying
explanation in terms of very small ultimates, such as contemporary quarks. Those who
looked forward to a quite new outlook emerging from particle physics are bound - if they
look at what really goes on nowadays (esp. all the hightech dominant social paradigm
aspects) as distinct from what some popular science entrepreneurs say - to be very
disappointed.
Walsh's "explanation" of what 'foundationle ss' means is something else: 'the
universe appears to be ... foundationless and self-consistent in that, since all components
and mechanisms are interconnected and interdependent, none are ultimately more
fundamental than any other- hence the universe is inexplicable in terms of a limited number
of fundamental mechanisms' (p.23, quoting Walsh p.180). This is Fox's example of how
'Walsh provides clear and intelligible meanings to each and every one of the items on the
list'! The truth is that Walsh offers nothing of substance on some terms in his list (e.g.
'self-consistent'), and much of what he does offer is like that quoted, garbage. Granted we
can make something of some of it, something extravagantly false. Even on Newtonian
physics everything is connected, through forces such as gravitation 58 , but some objects are
fundamental building blocks. So it is too on the 'new physics', protons for instance are
more fundamental than molecules, quarks (if recent theory succeeds and proves consistent)
than protons. Some objects are certainly more fundamental than others. And in the "new
physics" it is widely assumed that the universe is explicable in terms of a very few
principles of mechanist character (e.g. the rashly promised single equation T-shirt). But
Walsh's hence clause would not follow, as simple models indicate, even if his premiss had
requisite physical cogency.
It does deep ecology no credit to include conspicuous rubbish. Nor is there any good
reason why it should; the rubbish is not essential to deep ecology. It is not part of the
platform for instance, and it is relatively easily removed from (authentic) deep ecology. So
much should be evident from my original Critique (as published), and the accompanying
58
Such forces as gravitation offer, of course, nonlocal connections, and delineate fields what are said to be at 'the nub of what these emerging ideas ... of cross-disciplinary
parallels ... have in common' (p.23, insert from p.23 and p.21). This confirms the
impression that Fox lacks a solid grasp on what is new in the "new physics" and other
"new sciences" such as they are, and thereby contributes towards answers to further of
Fox's questions (p.23), by undermining their presuppositions.
I
91
sketch of deep green theory, intended to function as a relatively rubbish-free relative of deep
ecology. It is some measure of the intellectual sloppiness of some of these engaged in
presenting and promoting deep ecology that in a recent major text from Naess (Naess 89),
the editor and translator, Rothenberg, asserts that my 'critique of deep ecological
philosophy ... labels all of deep ecology literature "inconsistent rubbish"' (p.19), somehow
achieving a fallacious transition from some to all. But apparently Rothenberg's
acquaintance with my Critique was extraordinarily casual, since I didn't use the label
'inconsistent rubbish' (and wouldn't as anyone who had read much of my work, esp. OP,
would realise), and since I certainly did not make a universal claim (and wouldn't for
reasons already given, which should have been evident). 'The interpretation of the whole
thing as rubbish', Rothenberg continues (p.19), 'comes only if you concentrate too much
on rereading some of the sketchy formulations of deep ecology philosophies ... '. While
endorsing the point about sketchy formulations, no rereading of many deep ecological
productions is required to produce rubbish, no projection; several offerings - such as items
lifted from trans personal psychology, idealist physics and other esoteric deep ecological
sources, and such as Fox's 'sketch map of deep ecological territory' (p.89) - contain
notable rubbish of themselves.
Unfortunately Rothenberg proceeds, without even a pause, to repeat Fox's regressive
conclusion, which would return deep ecology to human psychology, the very fate of earlier
establishment-cha llenging ethics, such as (group) egoism and utilitarianism. 'One should
steer clear of "environmental axiology" - that is, looking for values in nature', indeed one
almost feels, from looking directly at nature at all.
Instead, one should seek to change one's whole way of sensing oneself
and the world in the direction of identification and Self-realisation ....
Fox summarises [this debacle]: The appropriate framework of discourse
for describing and presenting deep ecology is not one that is
fundamentally to do with the value of the non-human world, but rather
one that is fundamentally to do with the nature and possibilities of the
Self, or, we might say, the question of who we are, can become, and
should become in the larger scheme of things (Rothenberg p.19,
quoting Fox p.85).
It is a sad fate for a promising philosophy of nature; degeneration into human psychology.
While that can no doubt be edifying enough, in the style of uplifting anthropocentric
religions, it is hardly the sought new ecological paradigm (p. 71) and only a warped
fragment of the sort of philosophy the whole Earth needs.
REFERENCES
Bennett, D and Sylvan, R., Damn Greenies: Australian perspectives on environmental
ethics, a UNESCO project, typescript, Canberra 1989; revised text 1990.
f
I
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Bouwsma, O.K., 'Philosophical essays', University Nebraska, Lincoln, 1965, 24-25.
Bradford, G. 1987 'How deep is deep ecology?', Fifth Estate 22(3)(1987) 3-30.
Broad, C.D., Five Types of Ethical Theory, Kegan Paul & Others, London, 1944.
Devall, B. and Sessions G, Deep Ecology, Peregrine Smith Books, Salt Lake City, 1985.
Devall, B., Simple in Means, Rich in Ends. Practicing Deep Ecology, Peregrine Smith
Books, Salt Lake City, 1988.
Drengson, A. "Review of Devall and Sessions, Deep Ecology", Environmental Ethics vol
10, nl, 1988.
Edwards, J.C., Ethics without Philosophy, University Presses of Florida, Tampa, 1982.
Fox, W., Approaching Deep Ecology: A Response to Richard Sylvan's Critique of Deep
Ecology, Environmental Studies Occasional Paper 20, University of Tasmania, 1986:
unless otherwise indicated all references to Fox are to this study.
Fox, W., 'The meanings of "deep ecology"', Island Magazine 32(1989) 32-5; reprinted in
The Trumpeter 7(1990) 48-50.
Hinckfuss, I., The Moral Society: its structure and effects, Discussion Papers in
Environmental Philosophy #16, RSSS, Australian National University, 1987.
Johnson,L.E., A Morally Deep World, Discussion Papers in Environmental Philosophy
#17, RSSS, Australian National University, 1987.
Mannison, D. and others (eds.), Environmental Philosophy, RSSS Australian National
University, 1979; referred to as EP.
Naess, A., 'The shallow and the deep, long-range ecology movement. A summary',
Inquiry, 16(1973) 95-100.
Naess, A., 'Deep ecology disentangled?', typescript, Canberra, 1984.
Naess, A., 'Notes on Professor's Sylvan's Critique of the Deep Ecology Movement',
typescript, Canberra, 1985.
Naess, A. and Rothenberg, D., Ecology, community and lifestyle, Cambridge University
Press, 1989.
Nettleship, R.L. (ed.) Work of Thomas Hill Green, three volumes, Longman, Green & Co,
London, 1889.
Oxford English Dictionary, Oxford University Press, 1971; referred to as OED.
Perrett, R.W., 'Egoism, altruism and intentionalism in Buddhist Ethics', Journal of Indian
Philosophy 15(1987) 71-85.
Priest, G. and Routley, R., On Paraconsistency, Research Series in logic and Metaphysics
#1, RSSS, Australian National University, 1984; referred to as OP.
Rolston, H. R. IV, Philosophy Gone Wild: Essays in Environmental Ethics, Prometheus
Books, Buffalo, 1986.
93
Routley, R., 'The semantical metamorphosis of metaphysics', Australasian Journal of
Philosophy, 1974.
Routley, Rand V., The Fight for the Forests, Third edition, RSSS, Australian National
University, 1975.
Routley, R. and V., 'Against the inevitability of human chauvinism', Ethics and Problems
of the 21 st Century , (ed. K.E. Goodpaster and K.M. Sayre), University of Notre
Dame Press, 1979, 36-59.
Routley, Rand V., 'Human chauvinism and environmental ethics' in EP; referred to EE.
Routley, R., 'Ultralogic as universal?', represented in JB; referred to as uu.
Routley, R, Exploring Meinong's Jungle and Beyond, RSSS, Australian National
University, 1980; referred to as JB.
Routley, R. and Others, Relevant Logics and Their Rivals, Ridgeview, California, 1982.
Session, G., 'Ecocentrism, wilderness, and global ecosystem protection', in The
Wilderness Condition (ed. M. Oelschlaeger), 1989; to appear.
Shepard, P., 'Introduction - ecology and man - a viewpoint' in The Subversive Science
(ed. P. Shepard & D McKinley), Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1969, 1-10.
Smith, H., The Religions of Man, Harper, New York, 1958.
Smith, J.W., Reductionism and Cultural Being, Nijhoff, The Hague, 1984.
Stone, C.D., Should Trees Have Standing? - Towards Legal Rights for Natural Objects,
revised edition, Avon Books, New York, 1975.
Sylvan, R., 'Windows on Science III, Towards a cosmo-logical synthesis', Research
Series in Unfashionable Philosophy, #2, RSSS Australian National University, 1985.
Sylvan, R., A Critique of Deep Ecology, Discussion Papers in Environmental Philosophy
#12, RSSS 1985; referred to as c.
Sylvan, R., 'Mind and its misplacement in nature', typescript, Canberra, 1988; referred to
asMX.
Sylvan, R., Deep Plurallism, completed typescript 1990.
Walsh, R.N., 'Emerging cross-disciplinary parallels: suggestions from the neurosciences',
Journal of Transpersonal Psychology, 11(1979) 175-184.
Wenz, P.W., Environmental Justice, State University of New York Press, Albany N.Y.,
1988.
Wilber, K., Eye to Eye: The quest for the new paradigm, Anchor Press/Doubleday, Garden
City N.Y., 1983.
ECOLOGICAL ETHICS and ECOLOGICAL POLITICS:
turning John MCCioskey's challenge
This essay comes first because it offers an advanced introduction to parts of
environmental ethics, and to certain significant issues in environmental politics. It is
hung, not altogether incidentally, on MCCloskey's little text on the topics, because that is
a convenient vehicle for organising the material (it is also a text, written in haste, that
deserves more criticism than it has received). Fortunately no one need attempt the
onerous business of reading MCCioskey in order to follow the essay, should it succeed.
Rather, for the purposes of this essay, MCCioskey and likewise his little work can both
be regarded as characters in this piece of intellectual fiction; neither need ever have
existed.
1. Conservative, reformative, and radical responses to the impacts of
ecology on ethics.
There are three broad kinds of responses to the impact of ecology on ethics
according to MCCloskey's account, which adapts a standard political classification:
radical or revolutionary, reformist, and conservative. Of course there are responses
which lie outside this classification, not by disputing the impacts of escalating
environmental problems (or the new awareness of nature and its fragility), but by
questioning the relevance of the other end of the relation: ethics. Those responses target
ethics, its role in evaluating and regulating conduct, or differently, its place in
environmental philosophy (see other essays herein). As we too aspire to MCCloskey's
elevated view of the importance, potential power, and effective ineliminability of ethics
in rational evaluation and conduct, we set aside these gutter responses (which we have
argued against elsewhere). Otherwise, the responses are these:
Radical. A fundamentally new ethic is required, a non-human-centred nature-centred
(or nonanthropocentric ecocentric) ethic and morality, a deeper environmental ethic, what
MCCioskey and others call an ecological ethic. According to MCCioskey - who adopts
the usual double standard, requiring conspicuously higher standards for new challenging
theories than entrenched ones - no one 'has yet succeeded in stating or defending [an
ecological ethic] in a systematic way' (p.29). Nonetheless it will turn out, quite
remarkably, that MCCioskey himself, if he is at all successful, does, given but a small
twist to what he does.
2
There are two standard components to any such ethic: meta-ethical and normative.
According to Mccloskey, both components are 'more commonly alluded to than set out
and defended in a developed, worked-out form' (p.29). There are, accordingly, two
broad problems for an ecological ethics: devising a new meta-ethic, and furnishing a new
normative ethic (p.30). Meta-ethics, as well as comprising the study of ethics or ethical
systems, includes the logic and analysis of key ethical terms. For the new ethics a
critical meta-ethical task is to 'explain valuation, and hence values, without reference to
human beings, their preferences, pro-attitudes, and the like' (p.30). Normative ethics
involves the organisation, design and structure of systems themselves, their values,
principles, constraints and the like. For the new ethics critical normative tasks include
explaining and justifying the assignments of value made, especially to natural items
independently of species Homo sapiens, and the principles adopted, especially
concerning treatment of more natural environments, wilderness, and endangered species
of plants and animals.
Since all these requirements have been met, to some considerable extent (e.g. in
works such as EE), the issue becomes one of adequacy. How adequately have these
things been done, in particular in what is now called deep-green theory, and what of
significance has been left undone? These are central questions in the on-going dialogue
with MCCioskey; they will direct the questions discussed when shortly we get down to
the real business of MCCloskey's more substantive objections.
Reformist. Instead of a "new" ethic, standard ethical theories are reformed, modifying
them or adjusting them at the periphery, 'so as to acknowledge new, specifically
ecological values and duties' (p.30). Characteristically the adjustment is to the margins
of normative theory, with standard meta-ethics left substantially intact. Animal rights
theories which simply adjust utilitarianism to take account of the suffering of other
sentient creatures than humanoids, afford a stock example of significant reformism. By
contrast, differently designed and defended theories of animal rights may be radical in
character.
The classification is thus pretty rough and ready; given the comparative vagueness
of "newness" and "standardness" as regards ethical theories, the divisions between
responses is likewise blunt. Evidently too, the classification only overlaps other
classifications of ethics with some vogue, for instance that into shallow, intermediate,
and deep (used elsewhere e.g. TE). Thus while reformist utilitarianisms are typically
intermediate, a reformist ethic (or even a revolutionary one, such as Nietzsche's has been
taken to be) may be substantially shallow. The converse linkages are tighter: only an
ethic which merely purports to be conservative can really be intermediate, as
MCCloskey's intuitionism is, or deep, as "supplementation" of such intuitionism could
3
be.
Conservative. No input from ecology warrants even so much as reform, let alone
revolution, in standard ethical theory; all that is required is 'a more informed, more
accurate thinking out of our moral obligations and moral rights' (p.29). MCCioskey
claims to defend the stock conservative view that ecological considerations and 'findings
... do not necessitate a basic revolution in ethics but supply a more informed, more
accurate thinking out, of our moral obligations and moral rights' (p.29, similarly p.31).
Rather than looking hard at the conspicuous difficulties and inadequacies of
prevailing ethics, unresolved after thousands of years of investigation, MCCioskey
proceeds immediately to try to shift the onus of proof: ' ... no moral philosopher has yet
succeeded in either stating or defending it ... a new ecological ethic ... in a systemic
way' (p.29, insertion from same page). He alleges, to elaborate on a previous charge,
that 'the problem of [a radical] ecological ethics is that of devising
a a new meta-ethics, one that explains valuation, and hence values, without
reference to human beings, their preferences, pro-attitudes, and the like, and
a a new normative ethics that explains both
• the value of natural phenomena prior to man's existence and after the
extinction of the species Homo sapiens and
• why it is morally wrong for man to damage wilderness and endanger or
render extinct natural species of plants and animals' (p.30, display inserted).
As it happens, all these things have been attempted, as was said and as will become
evident - though perhaps in too sketchy and too technical a way so far (it is still early
days). For example, why it is wrong to damage pristine wilderness is, at bottom,
because such wilderness possesses high intrinsic value - something MCCioskey does not
really dispute. How then does he sustain his allegations? For the most part, despite the
repeated rhetoric about "arguing" this and that, he doesn't. He simply assumes that
'concern for human well-being' must dominate, that it always has, well almost always
has, priority (e.g. p.52).
2. A confused and confusing response: supplemented intuitionism.
Furthermore, MCCioskey, although he claims to be defending this conservative
'third view', does not state matters as clearly as he should: he only rules out the 'need for
a specifically ecological ethic', not reformism. This constitutes one part of what amounts
4
to substantial cheating in MCCloskey's "conservatism" . 1 A further part consists in
adopting an extremely unfashionable ethical theory, an intuitionism supplementing a now
little known theory of the kind developed by Ross, as his "standard" ethical theory. Like
the rare "ideal utilitarianism", such intuitionism can be much closer to proposed new
ecological ethics, given appropriate ideals and intuitions, than standard "standard" ethics
(indeed, given a deep tum, they can be tantamount to ecological ethics). But the most
important dodge is incorporated in the "supplementation" MCCioskey makes of his
"standard" ethic, which far exceeds what it is said to be: Ross 'supplemented by an
account of the moral rights of persons' (p.31). For he also concedes himself such
objectives as an open-ended 'promotion of good' and coupled 'prima facie obligations to
... promote good' (p.33 and p.31). Moreover, such promotion of good elsewhere
expands to a promotion of good, beauty and knowledge (p.36), and to include
promotion and preservation of what is intrinsically valuable (p.36); among 'recognised
ethical values' is 'the securing of the intrinsically valuable' (p.8). Moreover, among
what is intrinsically valuable are some (but not all) natural species, some wilderness
(p.36), and other valuable natural items such as 'forests, lakes, rivers, seas' (p.31).
Such critical "supplementations" mean that MCCioskey can proceed to argue for the
preservation of wilderness or natural species in just the ways that most deep
environmentalists do; for example, along the lines that an area of wilderness has not
merely instrumental value, but evident intrinsic value, which can be felt or intuited (e.g.
p.61 bottom). Such supplementations thus lift MCCioskey right out of the normal
conservative camp in which he has misleadingly located himself: for that shallow camp
does not recognise irreducible values in nature. What he is covertly assuming, in his
considerable supplementation of an unusual noncognitive ethic, is at least a significant
reform of standard ethics. MCCloskey's ethic is not 'perfectly familiar' historically;
more, his insistence (ascribable not to modesty but to political purposes) that it is not
1
There is analogous, if less outrageous, covert cheating in another leading Australian
conservative, with whom McCloskey aligns himself: Passmore. For example,
Passmore helps himself to a notion of vandalism (deep vandalism involving
depreciation or destruction of what has intrinsic value) to which his theory does not
entitle him. It has not been much appreciated that Passmore, too, for all his
apparently tough conservatism (early on) on ethics, also (characteristically) hedges his
claims. A much-quoted passage, endorsed by McCloskey (p.37 italics added), begins:
'what it [the West] needs,for the most part, is not so much a "new ethic" as a more
general adherence to a perfectly familiar ethic'. What that familiar ethic is, and how it
is to be reformed, Passmore never really tells us. In any case the main conservative
theme looks less and less plausible. It is increasingly dubious that better adherence to
established ethical and political forms will prove adequate, especially to environmental
problems unforeseen by these chauvinistic theories.
5
new is nowhere demonstrated, simply asserted. (In fact the claim is somewhat empty in
the absence of sharpened criteria for newness.)
How far removed MCCloskey's supplemented intuitionism is from its 'perfectly
familiar' source is readily shown by a comparison of MCCioskey with Ross on intrinsic
goodness. Ross contends (on the basis of reflection and using an interesting little
argument from a then 'widely accepted classification of elements in the life of the soul')
that four things, and basically only four things, 'seem to be intrinsically good', all of
which are 'ideal states of the mind' (p.140). How far things ethical have moved since
the nineteen thirties is also shown by the little argument Ross runs out, as if it was quite
decisive, to refute people like MCCioskey who imagine they find intrinsic value beyond
states of mind - in wilderness, forests and other material items. 'It might of course be
objected that there are or may be intrinsic goods that are not states of mind or relations
between states of mind at all, but in this suggestion I find no plausibility. Contemplate
any imaginary universe from which you suppose mind entirely absent, and you will fail
to find anything in it that you can call good in itself' (p.140). Ross no doubt reflects the
conventional ethical wisdom, a narrow wisdom, of his time and place (essentially British
ethics of the first half of the twentieth century). But many before Ross, and many more
since, have not so failed in finding items of intrinsic worth in the absence of states of
mind, in the Earth itself and its natural features for example. Such comparatively
successful arguments as those concerning the Last Sentient (in EE), and the world before
the rise of mental life, were designed to expose and reinforce such common findings.
So much Mccloskey is sufficiently clear about (thereby shortening subsequent
argument for a new ethics): 'The negative part of the Routley's argument, that traditional
[Western] ethics and contemporary morality are human-centered, is substantially well
based. The ecological moral intuitions they seek to explain and justify find no
justification in terms of such ethics' (p.58). But in MCCloskey's ethics they do find
some confirmation, or rather conformation, in the intrinsic ecological values discerned.
Moreover, with but a turn in the intuitions admitted that intuitionistic ethics itself
becomes properly deep - just allow the (over-malleable) intuitions to coincide with those
of deep ecological consciousness: then deepened MCCioskey is deep ecology.
MCCioskey even puts effort into explaining how conventional theories are 'heavily
human centered', without appreciating how far it removes him from the 'perfectly
familiar' ethic of Ross, and from his own professed conservatism.
As a result too, those making too superficial a survey of MCCloskey's complex
ethical position, especially if they came at it with preconceptions of what it amounted to,
have been seriously misled. Goodin is one reviewer who is undone. By quoting
MCCloskey's effort on conventional ethics right out of context, Goodin manages to
6
attribute to Mccloskey the very negation of what he advances, namely 'that all talk of
intrinsic value must nevertheless be human-centered' (Goodin p.345). The same applies
to what Goodin takes to be 'the punchline' of MCCloskey's position, 'that the
environment per se has no independent moral claims upon it. All our duties to protect it
must be derived from human-centered concerns' (p.344). Nor does such a punch line
emerge from the admittedly convoluted passage quoted in support; for the passage makes
the promotion of goodness, which includes promotion of intrinsic value independent of
humans, a prima f acie obligation.
But Goodin does have excuses. For not merely is MCCloskey's position hard to
fathom, but it exhibits confusion and is internally inconsistent. For example, Mccloskey
typically presents himself as having, and frequently operates as if he had, an entirely
conservative position, when his position is in important respects at least reformist,
making allowance for intrinsic values of natural items including wilderness, plants and
animals (pp. 52-3); his position is both different, with new elements, and not different,
with no new elements. Part of the problem can be traced back to a confusion about
intrinsic value (likewise intrinsic goodness), which is both intrinsic, valuable in itself,
and not intrinsic, because valuable for something else, typically beauty or human
knowledge in the case of natural items. The confusion is manifest in the many intuitive
judgements of intrinsic value of natural items advanced simply on the strength of
judgements of beauty or ugliness, and appears in such themes as that 'a moral duty to
preserve species and wilderness ... is ... based on ... the securing of the intrinsically
valuable objects of knowledge and the beautiful' (p.110). It is no longer just 'the
securing of the intrinsically valuable' as is earlier said (e.g. p.8); those "intrinsic values"
somehow now reduce or answer instrumentally to supposedly human evaluations, i.e.
are not "intrinsic" after all, whereupon MCCloskey's seriously damaged position reverts
to the shallow conservative position it is often been taken to be.
The main features brought out make MCCloskey's ethic, confusions apart, at least a
reformist one, not a conservative one. Briefly, MCCloskey's "supplementation " of
Ross's theory is so great as to make for a difference of kind. The features also render it
what is called an intermediate position. For it admits values in nature, it assigns intrinsic
value to some natural objects, while not however allowing values of natural things to
sometimes override those of humans. The point is fundamental. 'However, as the
theory developed here implies, ultimately, when there is a clear clash between human
welfare and human rights on the one hand and the preservation of wilderness and of
plant and animal species on the other, human welfare and respect for human rights must
prevail ... ' (p.36). Why so? Why preserve this ancient ethical prejudice? Despite the
assertion the theory sketched out, the supplemented Ross ethic, does not imply human
7
ethical supremacy. But even if the theory did imply this greater value assumption, the
appeal to it in defence of the assumption would be indecently circular. It is no proper
defence of proposition p that Shifty's theory implies p, unless Shifty's theory is shown
to have independent merit, such as correctness, robustness (i.e. continuing to yield p
under reasonable variations), etc. None of the requisite demonstration is attempted. The
radically reformed Ross ethic is just assumed.
In fact MCCioskey has adduced no decent case for this crucial assumption, which
colours much of his text. For it is his repeated insistence on the supreme importance of
things human, of Man over the rest of nature, that gives his work its undoubted antienvironmental appearance, which is obnoxiously exhibited at many places in the text.
One revolting example concerns venomous snakes: 'today they are a nuisance and a
danger to human life and health, concern for which dictates that individuals be accorded
the freedom to kill such snakes, to rid their properties of these pests even at the risk of
rendering them endangered species. (Sufficient specimens could be retained in zoos
throughout the world, where they survive well ... )', perhaps along with dangerous
subspecies of humans (p.116). MCCioskey is particularly concerned to put down
arguments 'for the preservation of species and wilderness at the cost of human interests,
human concerns .. ', even though these arguments 'appear to be correct about the
intuitive insights of those who live in different countries in affluence. 2 Nonetheless it
will be my concern in this work to reject this approach and the moral intuitions on which
it rests' (p.36, italics added). Unfortunately the strongly proclaimed rejection is not
backed up with requisite argument. MCCioskey, in a familiar intuitionistic predicament,
is stranded without argument. Nor, in this case, could the rejection be so easily
supported. For one thing MCCioskey feels obliged, almost immediately, to qualify his
human supremacy claim: human interest 'must prevail, unless what it is proposed to
preserve has great intrinsic value' (p.36 italics added). For another reason, the human
interests involved often cannot justify preeminence; they are too often trivial, or
unworthy, or just plain ordinary. So the ancient (unethical) prejudice in favour of
humans can, and should be relinquished (as argued in much more detail in other places,
e.g. EE).
But then there is nothing to stop MCCloskey's intuitionism sliding to real depth, the
ethic moving from reformist to radical. Call the resulting theory, MCCloskey's stripped
2
But the impression of McCloskey as a fighter for the under-privileged among humans,
one who of course along with developers and colonizers makes human interests
paramount, is deceptive.
8
of anthropic prejudice so to say, deepened intuitionism, intuitionism informed, again if
you like, by deep ecological consciousness. The beauty of deepened intuitionism is that
it answers, in MCCloskey's own terms, MCCloskey's challenge to radically new
ecological ethics. A now evident "adjustment" to MCCloskey's own theory will serve.
The trouble, of course, with this answer is the trouble with intuitionism in ethics
generally; that, for instance, it is built on the shifting sands of intuition. That is why a
direct response to Mccloskey will be offered, in terms of deep-green theory.
3. On the supposedly dim prospects for new environmental ethics, esp.
that deep-green upstart.
Part of MCCloskey's complaint is that the new environmental ethics demanded back
in the early seventies, have not been presented sufficiently 'clearly and fully' as to admit
proper examination and assessment (p.60). It is easy to level such charges at new
proposals; and such charges did carry some force, and still do, though less as the new
theories develop, among other things, to meet criticism. But MCCioskey would like to
make a much grander charge, the sort of charge (discussed below) that Thompson
recently did level: that such 'a new ethic ... is logically impossible to set out' (p.59
reordered). But Mccloskey, by contrast with Thompson who can slip into still
fashionable noncognitivism, is poorly placed to press such a charge. For he considers
that noncognitivism, which would logically tie all valuation to aspects of human (or
creature) cognition and so would be bad news for deep environmentalism, is bound to
fail. MCCioskey tries instead to push through an eliminative argument, relying upon the
limited range of cognitivist (meta-)ethics 'developed to date'. He claims to eliminate all
but intuitionism: 'Of the known, plausible, meta-ethical theories, the only one available
to such ecologist ethicists is the ethical realism of intuitionism' (p.59), which regrettably
they decline. But the elimination argument is radically defective, as MCCioskey is very
far from exhausting the initially plausible options open to environmentalism. In addition,
more satisfactory options will aim to discard not merely intuitionism but also both the
ethical realism and objectivism that regularly (and to its intellectual cost) accompany it,
but need not.
While it would hardly be surprising should the quite limited range of ethical
theories that have achieved much development to date prove inadequate to new
environmental objectives, the situation is by no means as desperate as MCCioskey
implies. Firstly, the options MCCioskey does offer, deviously pruned down (not 'ideal
observer ethic' but 'Humean ideal observer ethic', not 'natural law ethic' but 'Thomistic
natural law ethic'), are not all restricted in the way portrayed: 'All make human nature or
personhood or features thereof basic to ethics' (p.59). Not so; the contention certainly
does not hold for all the types of theory listed, e.g. naturalism or relativism, and insofar
9
as it does, it is sometimes easily avoided, as with natural law (e.g. set within pantheism).
Secondly, there is a range of recognised ethical types, such as those distinguished by
Broad, which affords scope for the elaboration of ecological ethics. Obvious candidates
within naturalism include biological and evolutionary naturalism - typical examples of
which 'are the following: "To be virtuous means to perform the specific activities of the
species to which you belong efficiently" (Spinoza). "Better conduct means conduct that
comes later in the course of evolution and is more complex than earlier conduct of the
same kind" (Herbert Spencer)' (Broad p.259). No doubt such proposals exhibit
deficiencies, but not per se of a human chauvinistic sort; and they admit of improvement,
which they are beginning to obtain within the tradition of American naturalism (thus e.g.
Rolston's work).
More promising, however, are "non-naturalistic" theories, of which objectivistic
realistic intuitionism such as Mccloskey is keen to offer and promote is but one kind.
For there are other less demanding types of intuitionism (see, e.g. Broad p.270),
including various "deep intuitionisms", which may be neither objectivistic nor realistic
(in the sense of labouring under heavy ontological commitments). In particular, as Elliot
explains (p.502), what entirely escapes MCCloskey is the feasibility of a meta-ethic
which is nonjective, that is, not objective, like transcendental intuitionism, but not
implausibly subjective either. Then there are moral sense theories and their more
plausible variations including mixtures with rationalism. Further, there are analogous
mixtures coherently building upon emotional presentation. Such a rational reconstuction,
varying the Austrian theory of values as elaborated empirically and logically by Meinong,
is in fact the ethical way taken by deep-green theory (for detail see TE and DG). And so
on. There is logical scope, then, for quite a variety of ecological meta-ethics, and
definitely scope for significant improvements upon those 'developed to date'.
As much to the point, there have already been significant developments of some
forms of ecological meta-ethics, notably of that theory in effect under criticism, deepgreen theory, which is already better articulated than most conventional ethics. There are
several connected parts to this elaboration because it brings into meta-ethics new logical
technology, especially world-semantics. The parts, furthermore, have not been duly
separated because of a pervasive verificationism living on in Anglo-American ethical
theory, which proceeds to equate semantic with epistemic, meaning with method of
coming to know, and the like. A first step then in meta-ethical analysis is some proper
separation of the parts, such as meaning, epistemic confirmation, and rational
justification. Naturally the parts fit together into a larger whole, into the meta-ethical
edifice, but simplistic positivistic equations do not satisfactorily explain the integration.
10
As to meaning, deep-green theory can already stand on its record of proferred
semantical analyses. 3 Semantics both for axiological terms such as value and bettemess
and for deontic terms such as obligation and wrongness have been provided through
world semantics (see sv, MD). The deontic theory developed in the process (in MD)
offers a considerable improvement over Ross's theory (which supplies no semantics),
because it enables the theory-saving artifice of prima facie obligations to be removed and
natural language discourse concerning obligations to be recovered. While such
semantical advances do not pretend to offer a full account of meaning, as much more
remains to be done within pragmatics, they do offer straightforward resolutions both of
long-standing ethical puzzles and paradoxes and of several complaints about
environmentally deep ethics. A major early problem for a genuinely nonchauvinistic
ethics was to give a satisfactory account of ethical terms without reference to favoured
biological species, above all to humans. On deep-green theory this was accomplished
by a combination of an "annular theory", offering an ethically relevant typology of doers
and receivers, with the semantical analyses (see EE and AP for details). By these means,
deep-green theory proceeded to remove humans from an essential role in ethics.
Humans enter importantly, of course, but only contingently, as certain sorts of valuers
and agents, which sorts depending upon their relevant capacities. For example, humans
do not inevitably enter, as too many had previously supposed, into every ethical picture,
because there were no value judgements without valuers, and all valuers were humans.
Both parts of this linkage fail. Most important, values are not tied to valuers or actual
valuing. But possible valuers and therewith their valuing can always be dummied in
logically. The reason is at bottom that any coherent distribution of values can be
regarded as the values of certain possible valuers. Furthermore, contrary to
MCCloskey's unsupported charge against such semantical analyses, this does not expose
the theory 'to difficulties parallel to those encountered by phenomenalism ... ' (p.60).
For phenomenalism attempts a reduction; the semantical theory makes no such attempt.
The meta-ethic is non-reductionist; nor is it obliged to rely upon tricks like
supervenience.
Deep-green theory already had more up on the meta-ethical scoreboard in the early
eighties than Ross's theory upon which MCCioskey purportedly proposed to reply.
MCCloskey's criticism of ecological ethics as meta-ethically inadequate lapses. As to
normative theory, the other prong of his attack, his demands are excessive. Few ethical
theories have been stated 'fully and clearly' and 'developed in a systematic, detailed
3
Standing on records is hardly a practice I embrace with much enthusiasm, but
sometimes it is inevitable if excess repetition is to be avoided.
11
form' such as Mccloskey appears to expect (e.g. p.60). To take some grand
comparisons: Those that are detailed such as Confusianism are not particular systematic,
those that are detailed and systematic such as Spinoza's ethic are hardly clear and are
likely inconsistent, those that are fairly full and moderately clear such as Sidgwick's
utilitarianism are also rather clearly defective; and in the twentieth century, nothing much,
ecological or not, matches these grand examples. But to indicate a few details of what is
accomplished normatively in deep-green theory:- Non-interference and like principles are
defended (cf EE p.174); these afford a basis for integrating standard social justice
principles (including obligations to the future), duly amended, with environmental
principles. In this way, making use of the annular theory, much of prevailing social
ethics, of a radical kind, can be subsumed.
In an attempt to be helpful, Mccloskey quite erroneously suggests that 'the
normative ethic appears to be base[d] on ... intuitive insights into what is intrinsically
valuable and what is intrinsically obligatory, where what is intrinsically obligatory need
not be tied to intrinsic value' (p.60, rearranged). What is obligatory, like what is right,
does answer back to what is intrinsically valuable, though in more complex fashion than
elementary ethical courses care to contemplate (see TE and MD). But what is intrinsically
valuable is often not discerned through intuitive insights. The idea that is is part of what
lies at the back of the expectation that instant answers can and should be given to any
question as to what is intrinsically valuable or the like. Rather what is intrinsically
valuable is arrived at through a process of reasoning and coherence-assessment, based at
bottom on emotional presentation (for more detail see TE). We offered, furthermore,
many examples of items - not only individuals, but species, such as the blue whale,
complexes, and ecosystems - that are intrinsically valuable, valuable in and for
themselves and not on other counts (such as some of MCCloskey's "intrinsic values"
which vanish into economic or aesthetic values). Accordingly, the charge (p.60), 'Nor
are the relevant values or principles explained or discussed', loses its force.
As to the specific difficulties for an ecological ethic of deep-green kind that
MCCioskey alleges, many of these are only encountered upon importing assumptions that
the ethics do not include and should not supply. So it is with the assumption that an
ecological ethic should assign intrinsic value to all species, even equally to each species,
given that it does to some. MCCloskey's own intermediate ethic does not do this, why
should an ecological ethic? Some-to-all arguments do not suddenly become valid in deep
space. Deep-green theory, in particular, unlike deep ecology, makes no assumptions as
to biospecies equality; rather it requires a certain interspecies impartiality. The extent of
intrinsic value of a species is assessed in principle, through a multiple factor procedure
incorporating value-making features of the species (cf. EE p.168). Mccloskey wheels
12
out the already exhausted examples of disease organisms and parasites, and offers his
intuition, a strong human prejudice, that 'there seems to be no intrinsic value in the
existence of such species and organisms' (p.61). No doubt such species and organisms
do not exhibit intrinsic value in the way or to the extent that conspicuous species near the
tops of food chains do. Their biological role and value is different. Their importance,
consists, in part, in control, in regulation of the character and the numbers of more
valuable species; their biological value is, to stretch a term, primarily facilitative, but
often nonetheless, under present ecological arrangements, apparently essential.
One reason why MCCioskey fails to observe how easy it is to shift the difficulties
he finds so pressing is, of course, that he is trying to make a case against deep positions.
Another reason is that he is operating with far too coarse a mesh, both ecologically and
socially. Intrinsic value does not come in big indiscriminable unsieved lumps: all species
if any, all pleasure if any, all knowledge if any. The need for discrimination becomes
evident if added to MCCloskey's list of intrinsic valuables (e.g. p.108) are such standard
goals as wealth and power (itself often linked to knowledge). Like wealth and power,
human pleasure and knowledge4, for example, are far from invariable goods. Often, like
much entrepreneurial information transmitted through expensive systems, they are trivial;
sometimes they are positively evil, as pleasure in extensive torture, or practical
knowledge of the means of excruciating torture. 5 A finer mesh is needed, and available,
a mesh that can be usefully applied in the ecological domain to remove standard
"difficulties", as it was applied by Mill, though in a failed attempt to repair utilitarianism.
4. Extending ecological ethics, inadequately, to ecological politics.
Ecological politics is a structure grafted onto ecological ethics, in much the way
that political theory more generally is supposedly built upon (or alongside) ethics.
Politics is essentially concerned with groups, societies and certain social institutions;
ethics, so it is said, with individuals. But the distinction is not quite so simple; ethics too
concerns groups and interrelations of individuals, normatively. In fact, the exact
4
For these often shoddy goals McCloskey indecently contemplates destruction of the
Rottnest quokka, a species McCloskey provocatively presents as 'useless' and 'ugly'
(p.61). Judgements of aesthetic and utility are notoriously ideological systemdependent, and here McCloskey flouts his commitment to an old, damaging, and
fortunately disappearing, ideology.
5
In any event, Western ethics and ideology much overrate knowledge and information;
largely defunct Eastern theories, such as Taoism, have a better appreciation of the
importance, and nonimportance, of different kinds of knowledge (cf. Sylvan and
Bennett on Taoism).
13
interrelation of politics with ethics, though an issue under investigation since Aristotle
sought to settle the matter, remains unclear. Judicious borrowing from logic can help a
bit in clarification, in both the general and the ecologically restricted cases. With ethics
and politics, or ecological ethics and ecological politics (of given sorts, e.g. utilitarian,
deep-green), both considered as theories, the relation is that of extension: the latter
extends the former, in fact extends it substantially. For comparison, logical examples of
extensions are afforded by the relation of quantification logic to sentential logic, or set
theory to quantification logic, or, a little nearer the mark in terms of complexity, classical
mathematics to set theory. Ecological politics is not merely - or as regards the pure
theory at all - an application of ecological ethics. It requires a considerable amount of
further apparatus (typically primitives and defined terms in the extended theory) that does
not enter into ethics proper, such as states, leaders, corporations, unions, organisers,
and moreover (what correspond to axiomatic constraints) the manifold interconnections
of these political items.
What kind of extension politics is, or ought to be, of ethics is a more vexed
question. In particular (depending on the matching of the politics to the presumed ethics
it extends) the extension may not be conservative. For example, theoretical allowance
has to be made for the Machiavellian idea that certain political components may be
exempt from given ethical constraints, an idea that has proved unacceptable to most
philosophers from Aristotle through Mccloskey. The prevailing conservative extension
theme is forcefully presented, if in too shallow and individualistic form, by Nozick:
Moral philosophy sets the background for, and the boundaries of,
political philosophy. What persons may and may not do to one another
limits what they may do [politically] through the apparatus of a state, or
do to establish such an apparatus. The moral prohibitions it is
permissible to enforce are the source of whatever legitimacy the state's
fundamental coercive power has (Nagel p.199, endorsing Nozick).
In short, should conservative extension be abandoned, rational justification
becomes a serious, indeed insuperable, problem.
As it happens, the way in which ecological politics proceeds to extend ecological
politics (when done conservatively) is admirably illustrated by MCCloskey's practice and
development of issues. In virtually every case, the approach adopted as regards the
politics of the issue builds directly upon the results reached in the ethical investigation of
that issue.
However, in the political theory advanced, Mccloskey does not take full and
proper advantage of his supplemented ethics, but lapses back into an old-fashioned
chauvinism. (He thus resembles a logician, actual exemplars shall go unnamed, who
14
with all the underlying logical technology available to avoid the paradoxes and anomalies
of classical set theory, lapses back into these when he makes the extension to set theory.)
Once again this abysmal outcome is primarily a result of his tenacious adherence to that
ancient greater value prejudice, which vastly overrates humans, their attitudes, freedoms
and products, and undervalues natural things, even to the extent of undercutting
previously granted intrinsic value (cf. p.111). Mccloskey proceeds to play humans off
against environments, assuming of course that humans ought to win hands-down. The
resulting theory is ecological only in addressing - in a decidedly unsympathetical way
ecologically - ecological problems. Ecologically then, the proferred ecological politics
proves exceedingly disappointing; politically, things are little better.
A political theory is bound to add to an ethical theory further organisational
structure, comprising further structural units (corporations, states, etc.), institutional
arrangements (property, markets, etc.), and so on. There are a great many, still illclassified and largely untried, types of options here: options as to what gets added, and
how it is adjoined. Among the enormous range of choice McCloskey opts, without
much argument, for unimaginative arrangements like those prevailing in the West and
North, for a statist and developmental status quo (for which he serves very much as an
apologist). He opts for what he is pleased to call 'liberal democratic states' - though the
veneer of democracy is thin (control typically being vested with a ruling minority) and
liberality is sharply hedged (true-blue liberalism conflicting with statism, in ways
thorough-going libertarianism has exposed). Practically, as we know from experience, it
is a jerry-built structure; theoretically, as is insufficiently realised, it remains a house of
cards.
The status quo choice of "liberal democracy" gets confirmed, so Mccloskey
imagines, by disposing of but two sorts of alternatives: primitivism, which he regards as
substantially self-refuting in presently highly civilized highly warlike times; and
totalitarianism, which he regards as the main and menacing alternative. It is a simplistic
scheme, leaving out significant alternatives; but such a picture is remarkably widespread,
even among academics. While, like most urbanised intellectuals, Mccloskey cannot
resist sounding off about any proposed 'return to primitivism', to 'rural communities of
the political imagination' (p.109), he does in fact confine his consideration of alternative
political arrangements to totalitarian alternatives which would sharply increase the
restrictiveness of present statist arrangements. Against totalitarian alternatives, even
present inadequate arrangements no doubt look good; but against certain other political
alternatives (e.g. decentralised organisation using advanced technology as appropriate),
these arrangements look more like a recipe for on-going ecological trouble. Such other
alternatives, Mccloskey does not really consider. He has sighted the far ecological right,
15
ecofascism as it is sometimes dubbed, and fires almost all his guns at it. However there
is an ecological left, with a longer tradition than the right, which passes unnoticed; yet it
offers a vision of new ecological communities in which liberal principles, on the face of
it MCCloskey's main concern, are maintained or even enhanced. But, for all its
shortcomings, MCCloskey's attempt to get to grips with ecological politics deserves a
somewhat fuller discussion than indicated by Goodin's cavalier dismissal: 'The politics
discussion just amounts to a bash at the authoritarianism of some of the more rabid
ecological doomsayers, propositions which are quite sufficient reductios in and of
themselves' (p.344).
For one thing, that was how much of the field looked when MCCioskey was
helping to put ecological politics on the philosophical agenda. Ecological politics still
remained an unfashionable, and in some places dangerous, field at the time MCCioskey
was writing. Liberal philosophers with respectable academic positions in North America
tended to keep out of the field, which accordingly got left to practical environmentalists,
over-enthusiastic in their appeals to the state for tough control and regulation, and to
authoritarian academics keen to strengthen totalitarian and isolationist tendencies of
states. As MCCioskey emphasizes,
Much ecological political writing exhibits two disturbing features that
undermine its value. The one feature relates to the readiness of many
political theorists on the basis of the flimsiest evidence to waive lightly
man's claim to recognition of his human rights on the ground that the
ecological crisis is so grave and critical that only the most drastic,
desperate measures will succeed. The other feature is the very great
confidence in the capacity of states to take whatever action is necessary
to avoid the ecological crisis. In fact, the states of the world today
greatly contribute to various of the ecologically based problems that
confront mankind. They are unworthy of the great faith and trust that
many ecological reformers appear to have in them or in the state in the
abstract.(p.108).
Bravo! But rather than considering carefully dismantling states, in favour of alternative
organisational arrangements, MCCioskey leaps immediately in the opposite direction, to
the orthodox position that 'a major part of the ecological political problem is that of
ensuring that states carry out their ecological responsibilities' - whatever those may be
(states do not regard themselves as morally bound, and typically their constitutions are
incredibly weak and unspecific, and sometimes evasive on such matters). Indeed he
goes further: 'The nation-state needs to be not superseded but complimented by a world
political authority' (p .107). Again there is little argument, and no due concern that such
an Authority would be yet a further developmental agency operating with tanks and
bulldozers.
16
For another, MCCioskey tried to open up or advance several issues in ecological
politics (and would have, if his book had existentially impacted and had not been largely
bypassed or dismissed). These issues include not merely the standard issues of
overpopulation, pollution and unethical technology; more notably, they also include the
issue, which has recently received much airing, as to whether environmental demands
and regulations interfere damagingly with individual freedoms and other aspects of
liberal principles. There are other facets to this that deserve further examination (do it
decently, someone!): the extent to which liberal states do and can deliver on
environmental matters, as well as the extent of interference with liberties (much turns
then on how it is all done).
MCCioskey has overestimated the abilities of states to deliver liberal ideals and
guarantee liberal principles, such as individual freedom (in fact, to note some lesser
infringements, they characteristically coerce citizens in many respects, forcing them into
a money economy, to pay taxes and obtain licences, even to serve on juries, to vote, to
fight, etc.). If the state promises liberties with one hand, it is busy actually taking
liberties away with the other. While we may be stuck with states for the present, as an
unpleasant political reality, it is not too difficult to see that there are better unrealised
alternatives even from a traditional liberal angle, alternatives that pass unconsidered.
And MCCioskey has grossly underestimated the severity of ecological problems states
should be trying to solve.
In some of his findings, MCCioskey is so wildly astray that his judgement on
factual issues and his credibility has to fall under real suspicion. For example: ' ... it is
evident that over the whole period of his existence man has only been one relatively
minor factor bearing on species survival rates' (p.47)! ' ... man is simply adding more
hazards to those created by nature itself for some species' (p.47 continuing). For the
next example, by contrast with the previous, MCCioskey might seek refuge in the fact
that he was writing back in 1982: 'Few suggest that man can or will destroy the
ecosystem of the earth' (p.49). Even so, the news on nuclear winter had broken, and the
Greenhouse effect was already worrying some scientists. "Man" appears able to do little
that is very wrong; MCCioskey can only bring himself to engage in the mildest of
censure: ' ... man could have used DDT to better effect' (p.50). No doubt he could have
refrained from using it to significantly better effect. A due adaptation of that Old
Testament idea that humans are characteristically radically flawed, regularly and perhaps
inevitably sinning in their treatment of the Earth, does not break through in MCCloskey's
approach. In fact anti-ecological themes strongly pushed by MCCioskey will break
through again and again in what follows.
17
Nor did Mccloskey anticipate the rapid march of ecological history at all well.
With his operational assumption that ecological reforms 'would not be popular' (e.g.
p.156), he appears to have been swiftly refuted by history. There has been much
popular movement in favour of ecological causes. The main resistance to far-reaching
reforms has not been popular, but establishment resistance, together with that from
business, wealth and privilege, and their hired economic men and thugs. Similarly with
his assumptions that reform, or change, would not occur unless the ecological problems
were believed 'to be real problems' (p.157) - which of course MCCloskey himself
believed they were not by and large, something he deluded himself that he had shown.
But popular beliefs have changed rapidly, taking MCCloskey's assumptions under along
with old beliefs.
In any case, MCCloskey's argument to unpopularity lacks cogency. It is that
ecological measures 'may necessitate less convenient, changed lifestyles, many controls
and restrictions, increased costs, additional taxes, basic interference with what now are
seen as being matters of basic rights .... democratic legislators [cannot] hope to bring
about the reforms ... and still retain office' (p.157). Whence, again ecological reformers
may look to totalitarian political solutions. So far as I am aware, there have been no such
proposals by ecological groups in Australasia. In small measure too, Mccloskey begins
to meet his own argument. For measures of the type Mccloskey rightly finds distasteful,
have already been run through in contemporary representative democracies; consider
security and surveillance, foreign control and surveillance, nuclear power and
surveillance, urban restructuring and surveillance opportunities, and so on. Secondly,
there are important trade-offs; if these often minor inconveniences are not experienced
now, much more drastic and dislocating changes will probably have to be undertaken
subsequently. Thirdly, of course, if they are not undertaken now much of immense
value will be lost. More direct democracies than we have today, where peoplegovernance and control of established elites is tenuous, would stand a better chance of
limiting these losses; properly pluralistic systems would presumably manage better still.
But Mccloskey does not address such issues as ecologically improved democracies.
Instead he assumes, quite wrongly, that solutions to ecological difficulties will require
strong and authoritarian central governments (perhaps both of states and of the world),
but that such institutions run directly counter to liberal concerns: 'the enjoyments of
many rights and liberties and opportunities to rectify grave injustices' (p.25). So he
tears off to address the difficulties of ecological totalitarianism (pp.158-9), well-known
difficulties (as Goodin observed) confronting Antipodean non-starters among political
alternatives.
18
Without examining other alternatives than certain totalitarian ones, Mccloskey
manages to conclude (to his own satisfaction) that 'the only realistic, feasible avenue to
ecological political reform is through the political institutions of an open society that
respects human rights', what he appears to think is offered by contemporary 'liberal
democratic states' (p.159). Naturally deep environmentalists seek open societies that
respect rights, including decently discerned human rights. The big trouble is that on
these matters, as with environmental matters, contemporary liberal democratic states have
performed decidedly sublimenally, i.e. well below adequacy threshold. 6 It is not
unreasonable to contemplate alternative political arrangements that perform more
satisfactorily. But it is perhaps unrealistic to expect such improved organisational
structure to be got into place at all easily or at all. For liberal democratic states retain
regional monopolies on violence and other critical control, which, for all the palavering
about respecting rights, they do not hesitate to deploy when their power and security are
threatened.
Nor is Mccloskey, by contrast with libertarians, at all averse to regulations and
restrictions and limitations on liberty - except when these put environmental things ahead
of humans. For humans, if not animals, things material are supposed to be pretty good
in MCCloskey's liberal democratic mixed capitalistic setting. Environmental constraints
are not to impose upon or reduce human living 'standards or levels of enjoyment'
(p.134) - unless that enjoyment should be profligate, for instance involving conspicuous
consumption and waste. Certainly such constraints are not to interfere with morally
acceptable human freedoms: such is one side of the proferred dilute liberalism. But
unnecessary waste is another thing, and should be curbed, through state guidance and
regulation; liberalism here parts company with libertarianism. 'The switch from a
resource-profligate society to a resource-liberal one would involve an acceptance of much
more state action, more state interference by way of incentives, disincentives,
regulations, restrictive laws, and over all planning than now prevails. However, it
would not require the loss of basic freedom ... ' (p.134)! Such double-talk certainly
makes the heavy liberal case MCCloskey tries to mount against decent environmental
concerns - as against decent human concerns - look thin and flawed. Because such
regulation does make serious inroads upon capitalistic freedoms, much hangs on the term
'basic', which is not however explained in this context. If, being freedom-loving
Europeans, we burn down an empty freeway at speeds in excess of wasteful
consumption limitations and we are accordingly locked away for months, then the effect
6
Sublimenal is a satisizing analogue of the maximization ideology's suboptimal.
19
on our basic freedom to life at large is serious. The paternalistic states MCCioskey
offers, in significant respects more paternal than those we already have in the West, do
not sit so easily with liberalism; patently they are incompatible with libertarianism, which
does not brook such restrictive regulation. The critical point is however this: what is
permissible in rectifying a resource-profligate society is similarly permissible in
reorganising an environmentally-profligate society. Again there need be no loss of basic
freedom, where basic is now characterised in terms of whats ethically acceptable. Only the ethics is now a deep environmental ethics.
5. Structuring ecological ethics and politics: towards an improved
classification of environmental problems.
Environmental ethics and politics are regularly said to be engendered by
environmental problems, increasingly severe and encroaching problems.
Yet in
MCCloskey's text, as in that of his main model, Passmore's establishment text, there is
no well-organised classification of environmental problems, only a rather ramshackle
list.
We can however reach towards an improved classification by considering
environmental impact in a dynamic setting (cf. the beginning of section 1). An impact of
something is something which comes from somewhere, sources, into something, sinks,
parts of environments. In a process diagram, it looks like this:
impacts
processes
sources
sinks
types of environments
participants
distinguished
agents of
impacts
recipients of
impacts
Expanding upon the elements of this process diagram will deliver the sought after
improved classification. Firstly, given distinguished background experience, especially
with environmental impact equations, a further two-way classification is suggested: in
terms of
• sorts of impacts, and
• types of environments.
The latter framework is wide enough (in obvious respects too wide for a tight
classification) to include both special concentrated sources such as mines, power
stations, factories, and the like, and special sinks such as rubbish dumps, sewerage
outflows, and the like. But the framework is not quite wide enough; it is important to
factor into types of environments, expected inhabitants of those environments, which are
the recipients of impacts (impactees). These will include not only present inhabitants of
20
environments: animals, plants, native humans, for land-surface environments, but also
expected future inhabitants, whose likelihood or very existence may be impaired. There
are two ways of incorporating these sorts of elements in the general scheme: either
expanding environmental components, by having zones and habitats with kinds of
expected inhabitants; or distinguishing participants in the impacts, givers and receivers.
Here the latter course is preferred; we distinguish also then
• kinds of recipients, and as well of course
• kinds of impactors.
While the kinds of impactors is diverse, including such superagents and nonagents as
Nature, Chance, God (as in "acts of God"), and so forth, as well as animals, the main
impactors of interest are, presently, humans.
Accordingly let us run out the standard environmental impact equation for humans
in a region, though it applies to any class of impactors through any kind of impact:
EI.
Environmental
impact
(of ...
through ... )
=
Population
size
(of ... )
X
Resource
use
per member
(of ... )
x
Impact
(through ... )
per unit of
resource use
e.g. of humans in USA through atmospheric pollution.
Such an impact breakdown leads directly to three major categories of environmental
problems, namely
a Population
a Consumption and use
a Technology and waste.
Those components act in concert, and, despite well-publicized attempts to load problems
onto just one component, evidently all are sometimes important.
A more sophisticated environmental impact equation would reduce the aggregation
of the equation, EI = P x C x T (in brief, and functional, form), by introducing
distributional features, which indicated where and when impact really mattered.
Suppose, for example, there are n sufficiently independent regions, as in the following
regionalized impact equation:
n
EI
=
Pi X Ci X Ti
i=l
Suppose, for instance, we are investigating the environmental impact of present humans
l
through industrialization, i.e. EI (present humans through industrialization). Then, on
an obvious regional breakdown, the impact is overwhelmingly dominated by three
regions: North America, Europe, and North Asia (primarily Japan). If it were not that
the rest of the world were locked into this system (and its humans encouraged to applaud
21
and emulate it), supplying much of the raw materials, taking too much of the expensive
products and waste, and suffering the pollution effects that spill outside the offending
regions, main problems of industrialisation could be isolated in the high latitude N orthem
hemisphere.
The regionalized environmental impact equation will also serve to better organise
widespread assumptions as to how those impacts that are taken seriously can be eroded.
Not only is there the illusory prospect of reducing impact to "acceptable levels" by
variation of just one parameter - Ci is that invariably favoured by socially-oriented
shallower environmentalists; Ti, in the shape of wizard technology, by economists and
technocrats (but such technology is likely to have its own impact and thereby to add to
environmental problems). There is also the possibility of moving further afield to new
regions, where impacts are lower. There are familiar frontier practices ( and a
corresponding frontier ethics), which can be seen as reapplied to elements such as
industrialisation and its components, pollution and waste. Of course such frontier
practices are impoverishing, and too often destructive of further environments and many
of their inhabitants; but in any case they are now seriously limited by biospheric
limitations of the whole Earth.
Many significant types of environment obtain little or no consideration in
MCCloskey's survey; e.g. deserts (too many the product of past human activity), urban
regions, polar regions, atmospheric zones, and so on. To stay within reasonable
bounds, however, not even all the areas of concern that Mccloskey does look at will be
examined in what follows. For to try to track Mccloskey in all the areas he does delve
into would require an extensive treatise, as he raises many fundamental issues in political
theory: to mention two remarkable examples, a brief discussion of 'the right to private
property' is tucked away under 'Family Rights and Rights to Reproduce', and of the
'right for education' under 'The Right to Respect as a Person' (p.75ff.) Instead a more
detailed treatment of a few of the areas he addresses will be offered (in fact some of the
other areas have been investigated elsewhere, in Green Series discussions, or will be).
6. Population impact: the fact of human overpopulation.
A major and very conspicuous impact of humans upon the Earth comes through
their sheer numbers, which, though already huge, are still growing rapidly, and are
overwhelming environmental and social bases for reasonable support in many parts of
the globe. MCCloskey's first thesis, which sets the agenda for his entire population
discussion, is this (pp 146-7,p.97): that there is no world population crisis, indeed
further,
NP. The world is not threatened by a population crisis in the foreseeable future.
22
But instead of coming out directly and cleanly with this preposterous thesis, MCCioskey
approaches the business in a typical oblique way, designed to shift the onus of proof,
claiming that he has 'argued that a tenable, plausible case had not been made out for
believing that the world is threatened by a population crisis in the foreseeable future'
(p.146). It is fair to wonder about his experiential basis, whether, for instance, he has
travelled through India or visited the vast urban slums of many third-world countries. It
is fair to wonder what would make a "tenable plausible case" - proper theoretical
business for philosophers, which philosophers have generally steadfastly avoided - or,
of immediate relevance, what would constitute a "population crisis", and what counts as
"overpopulation".
On the last at least we do have a proposal from MCCioskey, 'to use overpopulation
to refer to population sizes that exceed a country's or the world's capacity to feed
adequately and to make it possible for all to enjoy their basic rights' (p.97). While the
proposal is no doubt very convenient for the argumentative route MCCioskey will try to
take, a route it already signposts, it is a decidedly chauvinistic and exceedingly shallow
suggestion, which is ecologically entirely unacceptable. First, it takes no due account of
future humans, or other creatures. But present capacity is achieved, so far as it is, too
often through running down present biological and other systems, thereby jeopardising
future capacity; decent sustainability is required even by shallow ecological positions.
Secondly, the proposal is indecently chauvinistic; it takes account of naught but humans,
their basic rights and their feeding. It thus violates the framework MCCioskey elsewhere
professes to have adopted. For instance, high populations, which are not MCCioskey
overpopulations, may lead, and are leading, to promotion of evil and to gross reductions
in intrinsic value, including types of value MCCioskey earlier (somewhat reluctantly)
acknowledged. But like all the political applications of the potentially generous ethical
basis, that on population takes an ugly anti-ecological tum. It is all humans and humans,
humans first, last and only, though humans at brute food subsistence levels or less as it
turns out, and is turning out in many regions.
Now really the proposal should be relativised, to 'overpopulation of a region', as
the awkward disjunction, between country or world, makes evident. Many regions and
countries are already seriously overpopulated (even by MCCloskey's slack standards), as
he goes on to say. However, so he immediately asserts, 'the world as a whole is not
overpopulated' (p.97). Whatever the case for this claim - a defective and disreputable
case as will soon appear - plainly some large assumptions go into the proposition that a
whole or summation can enjoy certain distribution properties when many of its parts do
not: assumptions about the role of international trade, regionalism and self-sustainability
on the one side and about summative features on the other. If clothes, for example, are
23
dirty or shabby in many parts, so are they as a whole. Suppose some parts are
overpopulated because of constant infringements of basic human rights, infringements
presumably traceable back to excess population sizes (though the connection is not made
clear enough). Then the whole can hardly but be overpopulated, as it stands, whatever
the future prospects for redistribution, reorganisation, and so forth.
To evade such problems and to scramble to his conclusion Mccloskey firstly
weakens 'basic rights' to 'basic needs' (but rights normally demand more than need
satisfaction), and then drops 'basic needs' out altogether. Thus what he finally gets
down to is the bare food issue, all else set aside: of whether 'if the food actually
produced were distributed and used to the best advantage of all persons in the world'
every human could be fed. But, so he claims, 'it is widely accepted' that all can be
amply fed (pp 97-8). It is evident that, even if what is so "widely accepted" were true,
the outcome would be insufficient to show no Mccloskey overpopulation. Suppose the
world has the capacity (and will) to redistribute food to the most advantage. Still, basic
food is no assurance of basic rights. Further argument, not supplied, is essential;
argument to showing that regional overpopulation, stayed however by bread (but not
circuses), does not lead to basic rights infringement, through such media as
unemployment, poverty, inequity and so on. Furthermore it is very doubtful that this
can be established, for the simple reason that there are connections between these human
conditions (however difficult they may be to push into quantifiable or law-like form).
Humans do not survive or depend upon food alone. To keep many of them even
partly contented, so inflated have their wants and needs become under ideological
pressures, will require a very large and very environmentally destructive pie. Humans
are now an extraordinarily greedy and destructive species. Though one animal species
among thousands, and one biological species among tens of millions, they have taken
over most of the Earth and most of its products, so far as they can, for their own uses
and purposes. More than 80% of the fruits of photosynthesis, for example, now flow to
this one species. Yet perhaps 10% of the world's human population are malnourished,
and many millions at least lack other subsistence needs.
Even the bare food claim, upon which MCCloskey's whole case depends at
bottom, is no longer so widely accepted, since the shock of the North American and
other droughts; it was being questioned as MCCloskey wrote. Now however we have
available the Brown University study of world food supply in relation to human
24
population. 7 The study is based on the 1986 harvest, which was a world record. The
findings were that, with this supply, assuming perfect and equal redistribution, 6 billion
humans would be fed a vegetarian diet. Thus by the end of the century, present record
supplies will not be able to sustain the world's human population even at vegetarian
levels. If the somewhat better South American style diet, with 15% meat, is considered,
then only 4 billion humans can be fed; that is, less than the present world population.
While if a rather better Australian style diet is contemplated, the number that can be fed
declines to 2.5 billion, that is half the present world population. So much for ample
feeding.
It might reasonably be anticipated that the rest of the argument to NP, no
foreseeable population crisis, is hopeless. And it is. All we are offered are, firstly,
some reasons, of very variable quality, 'to suspect the most confident, brash predictions'
(p.99) - suspicions which seem to include NP within their scope, along with
MCCloskey's next speculative thesis. Secondly we are offered the speculative thesis that
world food production will grow at least sufficiently to match world population growth.
It is a thesis floated largely on technological optimism, a thesis that should be regarded
with heavy suspicion given recent serious declines in biological capital: fisheries, soils,
forests, and so on, and given apparently increasing climatic instability.
To give him his small due, MCCioskey does assert, repeatedly, that there is little
ground 'for complacency and inaction in respect of the world's population growth' (e.g.
p.99 ); and as well as firing moral shots at 'alarmist predictions ... based on the flimsiest
premisses' countering NP (for no problem), he makes heavy moral noises about morally
assessing the situation. In any case, he needs to say something like this in order to pull
off convincingly his big discussion of the ins and outs of, ethics and politics of, human
sexuality and population control.
7. On limiting human populations: some neglected considerations.
Hitherto received opinion, in modem Wes tern civilization, has taken the line that
culling animal species is perfectly alright, but that culling humans is not, because
humans have an unalienable right to life (a right regularly neglected however in times of
war, in regressive criminal justice systems, and now questioned as regards poachers of
significant animals). Received opinion, which MCCioskey tries to shore up, is now
being challenged. Alternative methods of controlling populations of wild animals, to
7
The study is regularly cited by Ehrlich in his talks, lectures and works: see reference.
25
previous technologically primitive ones, are being seriously considered. Another gulf
between humans and other sizeable intelligent animals is beginning to close.
Unlike some dangerous Christian thinkers, Mccloskey does not cede to humans an
unlimited right to procreation. As he says, 'there is no recognised moral, social or legal
right for consenting parties to reproduce at will', but 'few philosophers today would
seek philosophically to justify prevailing recognised ... restrictions on procreation'
(p.150). Mccloskey wishes to impose a restriction as regards adequate provision for
offspring; there is no right to reproduction where a requirement of reasonable prospects
of adequate provision is not met. This bears heavily, as he realises, and perhaps also
inequitably, on impoverished parents in poor communities; the issue is not really
resolved (see p.101). But otherwise, in richer countries, the duties of those who would
undertake human parenthood are presented as slight. Individuals, acting on their own,
have otherwise no duties to restrict the size of their families (for the unMCCloskeyian
consequentialist reason that it will have limited practical significance and achieve little).
Where overpopulation is an issue, political, not individual, action is what is required.
Where overpopulation threatens, individuals 'adequately fulfil their duty if they have
only that number of children for which they can adequately care and [very differently,
and with major political implications] if they foster and support world action to stabilize
the world population and [confirming a right previously hedged] to ensure that all
persons enjoy the right, equally with themselves, to have offspring if they so choose'
(p.104 ). Otherwise the issue is dumped in the (too hard) political basket, for states and
world organisations to try to handle. All this is decidedly unsatisfactory.
Most important, there is no right to production of children without limit, even
given that they can be "provided for". One reason is that new children produce impacts,
and children in quantity seriously interfere with others; so result in significant violations
of liberal principles regarding noninterference with others. In rough analogical terms, as
the Macs' new building interferes with their neighbours' views, so their new children
interfere with the neighbours' freedom and lifestyles and environments, beginning with
local noise and crowding and continuing, much further, through taxes for family
allowances, for schools and so on, through crowded and polluted parks and beaches and
so on. Those assuming (conditional) rights, to reproduce for instance, tend to forget that
rights require justifications (they cannot just be pulled out of thin air). But here any
straightforward justificatory pattern is upset, because of a very familiar neglect of
relations: namely, impacts of new people on environments, and interference of new
people with in-place people. A change in attitudes and practices is accordingly
warranted. Parties producing larger numbers of children should be regarded as socially
and ecologically irresponsible; they should no longer gain special financial support, but
26
perhaps should, on the contrary, be duly penalized. These themes run counter to the
main thrust of MCCloskey's discourse on population control, an extensive discussion
premised on what he takes to be the improbable hypothesis that a world population crisis
eventuates (pp.147-155). It ought to be enough to pull the plug on that discussion,
sending intellectual babies with soiled bath water.
That voluntary methods of limiting human births 'will not succeed' is MCCloskey's
prime thesis (p.147). The support offered for it is characteristic and characteristically
inadequate. First the thesis is weakened, and then some restricted and contestable
empirical evidence is advanced as suggestive. 'That voluntary methods of checking birth
rates are unlikely to be adequate is suggested by the relatively limited success of family
planning projects even where [well] backed ... ' (p.147). On the contrary, voluntary
methods of checking birth rates, mostly independent of family planning projects, have
been substantially successful in many better educated, less impoverished communities.
Some of these might even count as spectacularly successful, and more would be if they
achieved some real, and sensitive, state support. But there are many powerful interests,
especially those emanating from organised religions, operating against delivery of
support designed for success.
There is a conspicuous difference, again connected with ancient prejudices,
between the attitude shown to human populations and the approach MCCloskeyians take
to animal populations. Humans have the right, but socially constrained, to continue on
their expansive and environmentally degrading course; animals have no such right,
because, among other things, they have no rights.
8. On animal rights and supposed political implications thereof.
The argument to the conservative result, that animals cannot enjoy (moral) rights,
attempts to trade off an argument on which great emphasis is put, that 'there is a vast gap
between rights and interests' (p.66). But that attempt depends on a confusion between
what rights are - certainly not interests - and what can hold rights significantly - perhaps
only items with interests. With that confusion out of the way, MCCioskey still has two
main arguments to his shrill conclusion, that 'animals do not, cannot possess moral
rights' (p.66 and several other places): a tight redefinition argument, and an
environmental chaos otherwise argument.
The tight redefinition argument proceeds, by appealing to special features of rights,
to tighten up the notion of right so that unwanted (if commonly recognised) classes of
right-holders are excluded. Such an argument, widely deployed against animal
liberation, takes two main forms: less plausibly, that rights require interests, which
27
animals are alleged to lack, and, more plausibly, that rights have to be suitably
exercisable and claimable, feats beyond animals abilities and capacities to perform.
Though formerly among the ageing afficiandos of the less plausible Cartesian nointerests approach, MCCioskey now pursues the more plausible form. He appeals first to
typical features of rights (though really some combination of these must form an
invariant cluster for a decisive argument), such as their being 'foregone, insisted upon,
exercised in or contrary to one's interests. For possession of a moral right to be
meaningful, the possessor or his/her representative must be able to claim it, exercise it,
or the like' (p.66, italics added). Unfortunately for his argument, MCCioskey proceeds,
at crucial points, to leave out the representative alternative. Thus while an animal may
not be able to claim its rights, a representative can; whereupon talk of claiming a right is
not empty (pace p.66). Thus the argument so far is broken-backed.
Having recanted on his earlier contention that animals cannot have interests (see
p.65), MCCioskey is no longer in a position to preclude the attribution of rights on that
ground, that interests are a necessary condition. 8 'We can plausibly claim to have some
idea of what is in the interests of an animal. We can have no knowledge concerning how
it would exercise its moral rights, if it had any' (p.66). Surely we can. A wombat can
exercise its right to proceed along a way in the same way that a human can, namely by
proceeding along it, setting aside obstructions, and so on. But MCCioskey proceeds, in
a way characteristic of high redefinition strategies, to heighten the requirements. He
appeals to features of what he takes to be 'paradigm cases of the possessors of rights,
persons, rational, morally autonomous beings' which he couples with the characteristic
exercise of rights (p.66). There are, however, other paradigm examples of right
holders, such as small children, senile humans, imbeciles, etc. Despite the suggestions,
rationality and a high level of autonomy are not required for the possession or exercise of
rights. MCCioskey asserts that 'it is capacity for moral autonomy, for moral selfdirection and self-determination, that is basic to the possibility of possessing a right'
(p.66). That is a high redefinition, substantially exceeding the requirements normally
expected, especially where guardians or representatives are appointed or envisaged.
MCCioskey-rights are a quite proper subclass of rights as ordinarily conceived. Even so
it may well be that animals can hold them; it all depends upon how much gets pumped
into the elusive term 'moral'. Wombats, for example, are not human, do not read and
write, are not much given to calculus, do not enter into contracts, and so on; nor do
8
Elliot is quite mistaken in saying that McCloskey's views have not changed since
those espoused in 1979 (p.503). Admitting animal interests represents a major
change. That animals do, of course, have interests is argued in detail in my 81.
28
many primitive peoples, though humans, engage in any of these activities (though some
of them perhaps could with education). But wombats are, by and large, decidedly
autonomous, self-determining and self-directed; they exhibit much more independence
than most modern humans. Similarly with whales. Despite such familiar findings,
MCCioskey takes the following proposition as decisive: 'Consider how we should
respond if it were to be determined that a whale or dolphin possessed moral autonomy'
(p.66). He does not address the issues raised in this queer pronouncement, but
immediately leaps to his sought conclusion against animal rights. Given that moral
autonomy is not to the point, except for MCCioskey-rights, the proposition is irrelevant
to and not supportive of the conclusion. Without the elusive term 'moral', the
proposition is, furthermore, decidedly not a discussion stopper. Most dolphins exhibit a
high degree of autonomy, the exceptions being primarily those (improperly) held in
captivity, injured in fishing activities, sickened by pollution, and so on. The trouble
with the infiltration of morality is that it normally (if wrongly) suggests human activities
and human communities - whence what small force MCCloskey's proposition enjoys, as
whales as agents fall outside that setting.
The argument to environmental chaos, to entirely untoward environmental
implications, if rights were ceded to animals, comprises several facets. They are facets
that have been seen before, with every legitimate struggle for extensions of rights, such
as, most memorably, allocation of rights to enslaved humans. That latter certainly
brought some desirable dislocation to social arrangements; so will legitimating animal
rights. But it need bring nothing like the complication and aggravations of social and
environmental problems that MCCioskey fearfully envisages (p.69, p.122).
A first facet concerns conflict of rights. There are of course conflicts of rights
between humans and groups of humans, but MCCioskey fears the situation with animals
would not merely be more complicated (as it would with much greater numbers) but that
'the difficulty and complexity of this rights calculus' would make it unworkable (p.67).
But again he fails to show anything like this. Indeed he immediately weakens his
position of apparent strength by looking to an 'easier calculus' where 'man simply
protects animals from human violations of animal rights' (p.67). That would be a fine
start, though politically virtually all nations and peoples would have to advance a long
way to achieve it (Sweden less than most others).
While the "easier calculus" does not mean that animals have lesser rights than
humans, as MCCioskey implies, what is suggested is important in escaping from
difficulties MCCioskey tries to amass. For not all right-holders are on a par, much as not
all types of creatures are equal in abilities or capacities. In particular, to get to critical and
divisive issues straightaway: it does not follow then from the fact that animals have
29
rights that some of them, domestic ones, cannot be kept, or used - any more than it
follows from the fact that humans have rights that some cannot be kept, or employed, for
instance as servants. Nor does it follow that dead animals (or humans) cannot be eaten.
Nor, most controversially, is it incompatible with animals having rights, that some are
killed. For not all rights stand or fall together; a right for continued existence is very
different from a right to a decent life or treatment while alive. Furthermore,
MCCloskey's invalid arguments to ecological chaos succeed in turning animal liberation
into animal libertinism. They do this by familiar slide strategies from some to more to
all, from some rights, to many other rights, to the same rights as fully-competent
persons. The strategy is coupled with that of assigning to humans more rights than they
have, or should hold. Examples include the right to be absolutely where they like or to
breed at will. But one human does not have the right to be in any other human's house
or bed or space.9 No more do animals, like feral animals or 'disease-carrying pests such
as rats and mice'. So, for example, the major conflict MCCioskey alleges with human
rights to health dissolves; it depends upon granting excessive rights to rats and mice.
With a sensible calculus of rights humans need not be overwhelmed by either animals or
other humans; given due constraints on human populations (more than any other animal
populations), interference by others could be stabilized at a low level.
A further large facet of MCCloskey's argument to chaos doggedly pursues practical
and ecological costs of vegetarianism, costs which he considerably exaggerates. But
whether he is right about these costs, or not, is a separate issue - irrelevant to the main
issue of animal rights. For admitting or stressing animal rights most emphatically does
not 'dictate acceptance of vegetarianism as a moral position or practice' (p.68). There is
no valid route from rights for animals to vegetarianism, for reasons that have already
been very briefly indicated above. 10 MCCioskey has linked the question of animal rights
much too closely with positions like that of Singer (an evident target on pp.68-9 of the
text). But many more ordinary people and even some philosophers, 11 both before and
after Singer, have assigned rights to animals, without commitment thereby to
vegetarianism, and without evident (or any) fallacy. As a result or this flawed linkage,
9
While writing this I heard a local airforce contingent claiming its right-to the freedom
of Canberra. Plainly it only has a right-to the freedom of only certain cities, and to
quite limited things within those cities.
10
A much more detailed case, along with counter-models, can be extracted from my
previous work, esp. the Green Series, number 13, i.e.TE (essay 3), and number 2.
11
A neglected early philosopher is Maclver; see esp. his remarks on p.69.
30
MCCioskey makes another interesting mistake: namely 'that the two movements, animal
rights on the one hand (the view that some animals possess moral rights) and
conservation and preservation on the other', so far from being 'complementary, mutually
supportive positions', 'in fact are fundamentally opposed and are such as to be calculated
to lead to many major clashes' (p.69, rearranged). While there are major clashes, for
example, between moral extensionisms, such as the expanded utilitarianisms of
Bentham, Sidgwick and Singer on the one side, and deep environmentalism on the
other, there are no clashes of an animal rights position with deep environmentalism .
For, very simply, such deep positions accord animals rights.
As elsewhere, so with animal rights, errors in the ethical treatment intrude into the
supposed political implications. Unremarkably then MCCioskey sees 'the ecological
state' as committed to ecological chaos, all of which 'would very seriously curtail human
liberty in many ways' and 'create massive theoretical and practical political problems'
(p.122). No doubt decent treatment for animals, codified in rights, would restrict human
liberty somewhat, as abolition of public spectacles such as hangings, floggings or
throwing Christians to hungry lions, curtailed spectator opportunities and freedoms. But
the desirable elimination of factory-farmed fast foods and animal-tested cosmetics, or the
curtailment of circuses and reformation of zoos, are hardly very serious restrictions on
human liberty, or what MCCioskey is thinking of really. He is again thinking of his
house full of rats and his garden full of copulating animals, of vegetarianism and
protection of rabbits made legally obligatory, and so on (for many such fantasies see
p.122). But no such consequences, ensue, without repetition of the errors already
exposed in the ethical treatment: inferences from some rights to excessive rights, and so
on.
Because side-tracked by his own production, by this pantomime of absolutely
unconstrained, rampaging, warring and rapidly-multiplyin g animals (i.e. like some
humans when ideological controls are lifted, not like most animals), MCCioskey does not
address at all the very serious abuses in prevailing present treatment of animals, abuses
on farms and in laboratories, at home and in the wild, abuses that should be politically
addressed from ethical bases, issues well addressed through rights.
An
institutionalisation of animal rights would not produce the big problems MCCioskey
envisages; after all most people are now represented by professionals in many of their
dealings concerning legal rights, a professional paternalism increasingly operates, which
31
subsumes many professionals themselves. On the contrary, such institutionalisation of
animal rights, properly done could make for very desirable changes. 12
9. Two other critical features of dominant political ways: the shibboleths
of extensive private property and high technology.
The orthodox assumption, which McCloskey makes, is that a liberal democratic
state will have a mixed (or marginally socially constrained) market capitalist economy.
Under the simplistic equations that tend to distort much modem political discussion, even
the inadequate qualifications occasionally inserted are forgotten: a liberal democratic state
is often equated with institution of market capitalism, indeed too often market
arrangements get equated with capitalism. Evidently, however, these equations fall apart
under but slight disturbance. Logically they come apart entirely.
There are severe logical problems with the very idea of a liberal democracy, which
is a dialectical union of individual liberal with social welfare and democratic ideals. For a
democratic state, especially should it take popular majoritarian form, can seriously curtail
the freedom of minorities (the well-known "tyranny of the majority"). Liberal ends may
be better served by a benign dictatorship than by democratic arrangements. Liberality
and democracy part company. Similarly individual liberty and statist social welfare.
And so on. Certainly liberality, which is the most free ranging of the five big political
league players being disentangled, 13 does imply some significant limitations on
arrangements, but they may not favour democracy, or capitalism. Fully liberal
arrangements should enable a community to opt for democratic organisation, should it
wish; but similarly these arrangements should allow the community to choose otherwise,
should it want. Also liberal arrangements of a social cast (with decent freedom of the
servants) would mean winding back of capitalism. Despite the immense damage illregulated capitalism and market structures can, and do, separately inflict upon ecological
and social systems, there is practically no discussion of such matters in MCCloskey, and
again little investigation of improved structures or regulation. 14
12
For one thing, it challenges factory farming, as infringing animal rights, in an
obvious way. McCloskey avoids the issue when it arises (p.140).
13
In fact four of the five substantially independent players we are reflecting upon market, social welfare, capitalistic, democratic, and liberal arrangements - do not
receive an index listing in Mccloskey, while the fifth, liberal, collects many citations
and much discussion.
14
A major contemporary myth is that markets and capitalism can flourish without
regulation, indeed that they flourish best in a fully deregulated setting. Both
32
As with liberal democracy, so with market capitalism, the components separate.
Markets can flourish without capitalism, where for instance agents have sharply limited
and bounded budgets and capitalistic accumulation cannot operate. Markets require no
liberty in other parts of social life than those involving exchange of certain material
goods; they certainly do not require a democratic framework. Capitalism can function
without a vibrant free market system; indeed in advanced capitalist states it increasingly
does so, with oligopolistic arrangements in place of competitive output markets, vertical
integration and contract delivery replacing former input markets, and so on. Capitalism
too requires neither democracy nor liberty, indeed too much of either could seriously
undermine it. It does however depend upon property, for control and as a store for
capital accumulated. In principle, of course, a very limited capitalism could work
without private ownership of land and resources, so long as some exchangeable stable
form of wealth, such as a sound currency or gold, was available for accumulation and
payment of labour. But smart capitalists would rightly feel excessively vulnerable under
such arrangements; for they could be wiped out by an outside devaluation of the currency
or outside increases in rents on resources and land. In any case, many capitalists
(virtually all people of substantial wealth in Australia), and a large array of parasitic
middle parties, agents and hangers-on, would be duly despatched along with free-for-all
property markets.
Having glimpsed MCCloskey's unquestioned commitment to mixed capitalism, it is
piquant to behold him begining upon undermining an institution fundamental to historic
capitalism, namely private property. Most of MCCloskey's brief discussion of rights to
private property (pp. 78-80) focusses upon the labour theory of property, descended
from Locke and others, upon which he effects a full demolition job. In fact he severely
weakens the case for a substantially unfettered ("free") institution of private property,
upon which however the type of liberalism he advances depends. For strong property
rights and guarantees are basic to present liberal democratic arrangements, as they are to
proposed libertarian alternatives. MCCioskey even tries to close off discussion of the
'political desirability of allowing property rights by way of patent rights to discoveries'
in plant and animal breeding, particularly through genetic engineering, on the pretext that
these 'cannot reasonably be objected to without the whole private-property system of
institutions depend for their operation and for their very survival on regulation, on an
appropriate enforceable legal setting. Otherwise, in communities where a certain
egalitarianism counted for something for instance, a capitalist would be rash to bank
upon holding onto substantial surplus wealth for long.
33
liberal democratic states being questioned' (p.139). Now peripheral cases do not
generally threaten the centre, unless, perchance, it is already in some doubt.
The extent and character of property is a quite critical, indeed a watershed, issue
for environmental politics. For excessive propertarian rights and powers constitute a
very serious impediment to sound environmental practice. The reason is simple: the
proprietor may be less than well disposed to the environment, and may well permit or
enact unsound practices. Yet propertarians often now appeal to a purported need to
strengthen and expand the institution of private property - rather that to let it naturally
contract - in order to combat environmental problems. Thus such dubious proposals as
saleable rights to pollute environments, dump wastes, etc. - licences which look even to
the uninitiated like ways of extending, not contracting, pollution and like environmental
problems, and which look to the more cynical as ways of circumventing costs and limits
environmental constraints impose upon economic activity. 15
The liberal democratic structure to which MCCioskey commits himself to, with its
uncritical approach to population and consumption - like market capitalism, with its
commitments to expanding populations to ensure growth and profit, expanding markets,
enhanced consumption, and cheap labour resources - forces an unduly heavy
dependence on technological wizardry. In particular, it requires a technology that will
facilitate greatly increased cheap food supplies, without however too rapidly depleting
"biological capital". Given recent experience it demands a faith in technology, and the
smart science that underwrites it, that is increasingly difficult to justify. Like all too
many academics, MCCioskey has that faith. Science should be given entirely free reign,
and technology pushed to the hilt.
There is a naive optimism in MCCloskey's attitude to science. 'It is not improbable
that ultimately, through the investigations of the sciences, we will come ... to have a full
understanding of the earth's weather and climatic patterns. Man will be able to use this
15
Such saleable rights also appear to get another foot-in-the-door for bargaining
utilitarians, who claim to want no absolute prohibitions, but want to put the whole
environment up for negotiation - and ultimately for sale. What are not up for
negotiation are the underlying propertarian and utility maximization principles, the
insufficiently examined sources of many of the problems.
In any case, the evidence now coming in shows that market approaches to pollution,
such as saleable rights and pricing controls (like company fines), do not work at all
well. Making directors of polluting firms directly responsible, and putting offenders in
jail, apparently does.
34
knowledge for his and the earth's best advantage' (p.137). We, the total managers, will
know what is "best" for the earth! Despite the 'dangers of misuse', major disasters,
global warfare, climatic destablisation, and so on, 'this fact constitutes no reason for
holding back the pursuit of knowledge ... ' (p.137). Maximum speed ahead in the
glorious pursuit of science, with full anarchistic enthusiasm there. There is, as well, 'no
reason ... for entrusting rulers with the control of science' (p.137); science at least is
utterly free in MCCloskey's liberal democracy.
While Mccloskey wants the state kept out of science (except as a money pump
presumably), he wants it actively intervening in technology, not to limit it, but 'acting to
ensure that new technologies be developed and used and their benefits widely enjoyed'
(p.138). The liberal state is to be actively and heavily involved in technology promotion
and delivery - which puts into serious question its presumed neutral regulatory function.
Also espoused is a quite insufficiently discriminating attitude to technology. Like most
apologists, Mccloskey emphasizes the possible - but generally unrealised - benefits of
technology, that technology 'can release persons from much mindless, degrading work.
Hence some, even many persons may never need to work' (p.138). For all the talk
about the possible benefits of technology, many alleged benefits seldom or never accrue,
for instance to shorten substantially people's working hours and give them more
worthwhile leisure; and benefits that do accrue are often not well used. Rather
technology is primarily funded to maintain or increase market share and profits (which
too often end up in conspicuous consumption and waste), thereby inducing cycles of
production and waste, more technology to help control the waste, and so on and up.
Technology itself is merely of instrumental worth, with many of its instruments
and techniques defective, destructive or dangerous, either directly or through eventual
side-effects. While some technology is no doubt instrumentally good, much is not. And
the balance of good over bad has been systematically exaggerated in Wes tern culture,
where more technology is now looked to or required to rectify gross economic and social
mismanagement in liberal democratic states. Technology is however no universal
panancea. Both on its record, and in terms of its theoretical prospects, the faith being put
in it, to "deliver us from evil", is misplaced But, as remarked, MCCloskey has the faith
(such episodes as the Green Revolution are seen as unmitigated successes), and
enthusiastically expects great things from technology ('genetic engineering ... constitutes
a dramatic, exciting breakthrough of major proportions, one that opens up vastly wider
possibilities for developing new plant and animal organisms', p.139). Naturally he
concentrates on the sunny side of technology, scarcely touching upon the darker aspects.
We merely glimpse one darker side of genetic engineering (for which perhaps no further
engineering is needed), the edifying spectacle of mass-production of human drones for
35
industrial slavery (p. 139). As to the big problems with this engineering, we are fobbed
off with an evasive throw-away, of the kind more typical of politicians, as to 'the need
for relevant controls and checks', and no doubt balances, presumably determined by
state masters behind closed doors. Instead Mccloskey tries to divert attention by yet
another attack on the hypothetical totalitarian ecological state, and the threat of its
coercive methods, not those of your normal corrupt intimidatory democratic state, to
human liberties. But the smokescreen quickly subsides, our factional text degenerates
into notes: 'Relevant point here include ... ' (p.139).
Mccloskey would have us locked into state systems that are delivering increasingly
negative results for increasing numbers of humans and disastrous outputs for nonhumans and natural environments. By changing political directions significantly,
environmental and human affairs could again have an opportunity to flourish. But for
much of the environment at least, there is not a lot of time left.
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Journal of Philosophy 63(1985) 499-504.
P.R. and A.H. Ehrlich, The Population Explosion, Simon & Schuster, New York,
1990.
R. E. Goodin, Review of MCCloskey's Ecological Ethics and Politics, Ethics 94(1984)
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A.M. Maciver, 'Ethics and the beetle', Analysis 8(1948) 65-70.
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H. Rolston III, Environmental Ethics: Duties to and Values in the Natural World, Temple
University Press, Philadelphia, 1988.
R. Routley, 'Alleged problems in attributing beliefs and intentionality to animals',
Inquiry 24(1981) 387-417.
R. Routley and V. Plumwood, 'Moral dilemmas, and the logic of deontic notions', now
in Paraconsistent Logic (ed. G. Priest and others), Philosophia Verlag, Munich,
1989; referred to as MD.
36
R. and V. Routley, 'Semantical foundations for value theory', Nous 17(1973) 441-456;
referred to as sv.
R. and V. Routley, 'Human chauvinism and environmental ethics', in Environmental
Philosophy (ed. D. Mannison and others), RSSS, Australian National University,
1979; referred to as EE.
R. Sylvan and D. Bennett, 'Tao and deep ecology', The Ecologist 18(4/5) (1988) 148159.
R. Sylvan, Three essayes upon deeper environmental ethics, Discussion Papers in
Environmental Philosophy, (Green Series) #13, Australian National University
1987; referred to as TE.
R. Sylvan, 'On the value core of deep-green theory', typescript, Canberra, 1988;
referred to as DG.
DEEP ECOLOGY AND DEEP-GREEN THEORY.
Deep-green theory is a deep pluralistic environmental position, underwritten by a deep
metaphysical theory. It is intended as an alternative, less fraught with problems, to deep ecology.
Deep-green theory has developed, in significant part, through fruitful interreaction with deep
ecology. Many of its leading ideas can thus be more rapidly introduced by contructing and
comparing them with ideas of deep ecology which are already widely diffused (if often in a
muddy or muddled way). As a spin-off then, this outline will offer a simple exposition of central
ideas of deep ecology, and further criticism of many of them. In any practical showdown,
however, deep ecology and deep-green theory are not antagenistic positions but close allies, both
deep positions within a wider environmental alliance.
Though the rudiments of deep-green theory go back about as far as deep ecology (to around
1973), it remained unnamed until the early 80's (and only achieved initial investigation in Bennett
86). Moreover, it has not hitherto attained in any fuller platform and slogan formulation, such as
deep ecology has benefitted (and suffered) from almost since its inception.
The term 'deep ecology' was coined by the Norwegian intellectual, Ame Naess, to label an
emerging environmental movement. But, despite Naess's commitment to pluralism, it was from
the outset constrained to a certain style of environmental position. The notion has since been
elaborated and further delimited not only by Naess but, in the first place, by several Northamericans, particularly Bill Devall and George Sessions, who have on occasion collaborated with
Naess (their main work on deep ecology is cited in the reference list at the end). The notion has
caught on outside narrow academic circles, especially in North America and Australia, where, in
contrast to Wes tern Europe, significant areas of natural environment remain and are becoming of
increasing public concern.
Deep ecology is a radical environmenta l position, which goes far beyond resource
conservation positions (which are typically concerned with the management and stewardship of
resources in long-term human interests); and it offers a much deeper challenge to prevailing
attitudes and practices (of the dominent social paradigm), especially those which concern more or
less natural environments. (Leading features of Resource Conservation are explained in several
sources; e.g. Rodman.)
2
Deep ecology takes off from value theory themes which stand in diametrical opposition to
mainstream Western ethical and social theory.1 The first of these themes, the wide values theme,
is that what is valuable in or for itself is not confined to human beings or their features (such as
their interests, concerns, pleasures, consciousness, etc.), but extends much more widely to other
beings. The value of these other systems or creatures of their features is not merely instrumental,
aluable as a means to human objectives, but is independent of human concerns; it is in brief
nonanthropic.
Indeed deep ecology goes further, rejecting the greater value assumption, according to
which anthropic values always take precedence over such natural values. How then is value
distributed, in particular across the things of the world? It is here that deep ecology and deepgreen theory part company. Deep ecology takes value to be restricted to things that are alive (in
some attentuated sense, so it turns out); this is the theme of biocentrism, life-centredness. And it
assumes that these things with life are all of equal value; this is the controversial theme of
biospheric egalitarianism. A unique assignment of value results. Deep-green theory rejects both
these themes. For reason to be given, Deep-green theory is much less specific as to how value is
distributed. But it is spread on to things - wholes, collectives, systems as well as individuals which are not alive, and it does not cover all things that are living. Nor is it distributed onto those
things that have the quality in an equal fashion, except in the trivial sense that all have or partake
of value. Some things that have value are much more valuable than others; there is some weak
(and partial) ordering of things with value. It is these things that are worth conserving,
preserving, and so on, the more the more valuable they are. Thus Deep-green theory is
axiocentric, value-centered.
Value in nature is regular coupled with some mix of value-making characteristics,
including such defeasible ecological universals as richness, rarity stability, resilience, diversity,
and so forth. But there are considerable constraints on how values are derived from any such
"objective function". One over or thing constraint, that of impartiality, substitutes for that of
egalitarianism. According to the requirement of biospecies impartiality, which excludes certain
types of class chauvinism, a thing cannot be ranked as valuable or ahead or another simply in
virtue of belonging to some species (e.g. being human); such features are not in themselves
value-making characteristics.
1 There are some who account
themselves deep ecologists who would repudiate such an approach through
value theory, most notably Warrick Fox.
3
Figure 1. A compariso n of Deep Ecology and Deep-gree n theory, in capsule
form. 2
Deep ecology
biospheric egalitarianism
Shared themes or goals I
I
I
I
I
Deep-gree n. theory
wider value theme rejection
of greater value assumption,
+through
➔
biocentrism
ecological universals as
defeasible value-making
biospecies impartiality , and
rejection of class chauvinism
axiocentrism
characteristics
extreme holism
natural systems as
integral, irreducible
cosmic identity
moderate holism
ultraperson al identificati on
maximal
satisizing on value
self-realisation
determinates
limited interference only
with natural systems;
restricted rights thereto
commitment to implement
principles applications to
economics, politics and
policy, especially in
bioregional ism
➔
environmen tal areas; e.g.
regionalism and federalism +-
ecoregionalism
human population reduction
A major difference between the theories lies in the distribution of value (from which much
else of ethical consequenc e arises: rights, obligations , and so forth). Deep ecology, like simpler
utilitarianism, proposes a unique initial distribution (over a given atomistic base class): each living
individual is assigned equal intrinsic value, and nothing else has intrinsic value. Values of other
things, complexes, systems and so on, are then in principle open to determinate s by a calculation.
It is a type of recipe to which intellectual s bent on numeration and calculation are regularly
attracted; pseudo-obj ective variations are to be found not only in utilitarianis m but in economics
and in democtrati c political theory, and also in probability theory, where elements of suitable
2 Most of the capsule theses of
deep ecology are explained in detail in the critique, CD; many of those of
Deep-green theory are explained in FE.
4
initial esembles are assigned equal probability, through a principle of indifference. The practice is
also as problematic as indifference principles (cf. CD on deep ecological egalitarianism).
Deep-green theory rejects the assumptions upon which the deep ecological distribution
depends. It rejects the latent atomism, the idea of ultimates upon which value devolves. More
dangerously these days, it rejects the equality assumption. Much as some humans are more
valuable than others (on most moral and other counts), so some creatures, some systems, are
more valuable than others. DG theory is, quite deliberately, much less specific as to how value is
distributed. Often enough, especially in difficult cases, assessment of value is a complex matter
which may call for much reflection (for some details see TE, first essay). But certainly value is an
unevenly distributed feature of a variety of things, not just at bottom altimates. It is a quality of
many items - wholes, collectives, systems as well as individuals - which are not alive; and it does
not extend to all things that are living, e.g. malignant virases engineered in biochemical
laboratories. Nor is it distributed onto those things that have the quality in an equal fashion,
except in the trivial sense that all have or partake of value. Some things that have value are much
more valuable than others; there is some weak (and partial) ordering of things with value. It is
these things that are worth conserving, preserving, and so on, the more the more valuable they
are. Thus the theory is at least weakly axiocentric, value-centered. In fact it is more strongly
axiocentric, in two important respects. Firstly, deontic notions such as those of obligation, rights
and duties, answer back to axiologic ones (see TE, essay 3). Secondly, more difficult to explain,
value penetrates the metaphysics, including what is accounted fact; most strikingly, the choice of
actual world itself depends upon value (see DP).
AUTHENTIC DEEP ECOLOGY:
expositio n, critique, alternati ves
PREFAC E
No longer is there so much need to chronicle and document the major and serious environmental
problems confonting the Earth and its ecosystems. Much of the relevant information - details of the
damage, difficulties, devastation, disasters, and dire threats of more - now appears in later chapters of
biology and geography textbooks, often in striking pictorial or diagramatic form; and the information
is regularly updated by articles, too often environmental horror stories, in popular perodicals or
newspapers. While many of the problems are abundantly and glaringly evident, others are more
subtle, sometimes more insidious, hidden from view, but bound to emerge in not so long term. So
we can take the problems, and further problems, "for granted", though with little comfort or ease.
Many were, and are, foreseeable; many were, or could be, avoided or mitigated.
Serious though these problems are they are still not being taken with full or due seriousness by
those who exercise some control over how relevant things happen. 1 Most states are busy attempting
more of what has landed us in some of the worst of these problems: more growth, of economic
products, of people, of consumption2 , of energy; more or "better" militarisation; more productivity,
of agriculture, with environmental cost-cutting and short-cutting, more development and more
consumption thereby of biological capital. Growth remains at the top of most national agendas; it is
seen as a panacea for all other problems, economic and security problems of course. Serious
environmental problems are still mostly treated as economic "externalities", peripheral but growing
nuisances, that we shall have to learn to live with3, but not the "real" problems.
We have lived under this dominant destructive ideology for much too long already. It has
already led to the devastation of much of the planet Earth, to the loss of much of value, many species,
While there is a power structure, and a power elite, in all states (virtually as a corollary of features of the
state, such as its monopolies on coercion, currency, etc), it cannot be pretended that there are any impressive
control systems. So some of the problems are unintended. Given the propensity for human-developed
control systems to function in undesirable ways, e.g. to tend towards militarism and totilitarianism, the lack
of satisfactory system is no doubt to the good.
2
So, for example, the USA is pressuring Japan to consume more, internally, to ease American balance-ofpayments problems, and soak up excessive production; there is no pressure to produce less.
3
So, for example, prestigious scientific organisations are preparing to teach us how to live with and love the
Greenhouse effect. Many communities have learned to live with damaging and noxious pollution; no doubt
they would miss it if it were gone.
2
much irreplaceable wilderness, and has left us with an immense, and sometimes hopeless, clean-up
and restoration task. Moreover things will rapidly get worse environmentally if we are not rid of it
and its variants. Plainly we need several strategies: a strategy for fundamental change, a strategy
(needed first) for what comes after the change, and so on.
Deep ecology offers a strategy and an initial structure for addressing these environmental
problems, along with proposals for addressing the menacing array of other problems confronting
modern industrial societies. It is a strategy which goes much deeper than the pathetic patch-up the
damage after it's largely done (pollute, then cleanup or pay a bit) approaches that prevail. For this
reason alone, deep ecology deserves to be much more widely known. But there is still no satisfactory
text on the topic. This book, while hardly an easy introduction to the subject4 , aims to fill a part of
the gap. Perhaps too, it can help serve as a basis for that introductory text that still needs to be
written.
This text tries to do what the title promises. It begins with a sympathetic exposition of deep
ecology. That is necessary. It remains hard to find out what deep ecology (DE) is, as it means so
many different things to different expositors and exponents. The matter of different visions and
elaborations of DE is taken up in the second part, which provides a detailed critique of DE in its main
versions. In the final part, other criticisms of DE, from its rival social ecology in particular, are
(negatively) assessed; an alternative to DE, deep-green theory is outlined; and some of the political
connections of deeper environmentalism are investigated, including strategies for appropriate
revolutionary change.
Deep ecology is the most exciting deep environmentalism on the present intellectual market; for
all its sortcomings, it is still the most thoroughly worked out widely accessible position. That is one
reason why its worth a fair bit of time, my time, in struggling with it and trying to improve it, and
your time, in getting to know it.
This text grew from a critique of DE along with an unpublished expansion of that critique
(called 'Continuin g the critique of deep ecology') and sundry associated articles on deep
environmentalism. As an expanded version of critique5 remains the centre of the text, some of what I
wrote in prefacing the critique should be repeated. I think, I hope, it merits repetition, as amended.
4
There is a need also, as will be explained in subsequent chapters, for a text that measures up to recognised
academic standards, sufficiently complex and full of (bad) argument, in order to put deep ecology firmly on
academic agenda, to try to ensure that it is not merely a crude popular movement that can be intellectually
ignored.
5
'A critique of deep ecology' Radical Philosophy.
3
It was with considerable ambivalence and some serious misgiving that I first undertook a
critique of DE, as it risked offending many friends in the deep ecology movement. It succeeded. The
trouble was that when I got down to trying to explain what deep ecology was all about (for a seminar,
at which N aess and Devell were present, some years ago), I found myself confronted by the
following predicament :- While I applauded much about the deep ecology movement, and what it
stood for, I could not find my way to accept deep ecology as formulated by any of its main
proponents. The reason was not merely that deep ecology is less than a fully coherent body of
doctrine, with, furthermore, many problematic sub-themes, but worse, that much of it departed from
the ideals I felt it should be expressing, and that some of it was rubbish. Yet I had no doubt that deep
ecology was a worthwhile enterprise (carried on by dedicated and good people), and that something
along the lines of a replacement for deep ecology - revamped deep ecology if it is simply a matter of
repairs, deep-green theory for more - was very much on the right track. Or to put it slightly
differently, while rejecting every formulation of deep ecology, I agreed with the general drift of much
of deeper ecology, and with virtually all the careful applications of deep ecology.
My attempted resolution went along the lines of critical rationalism (for which I have been
criticised). The method was to subject deep ecology to severe criticism, with a view to obtaining
thereby an improved, more acceptable formulation, which at the same time met other desirable criteria.
However to resort to such critical methods was already to type oneself, as old consciousness and old
paradigm still, and to risk alienating part of the deep movement. The risks have been taken: but there
are some concessions. In the end, when it comes to applications, to lifestyles and policies, the
rational ladder has to be enlarged and also supplemented; for it offers only one distinctive way among
many.
Though the applications of deep ecology to real-world problems are very important, as already
indicated, we shall only reach them and not attempt to develop them very far. However a detailed
listing of various important applications that have been made will be given.6
Naess and others have complained, with some justification, that I have not gone out my way to
find generous interpretation s of deep ecology, which remove apparent rubbish from it (see Naess RS
p.3). It is true that, following the prevailing philosophical mode (by no means always to be
applauded), I have not been very charatable (here or in other philosophical critiques). I have treated
DE as a find it, hopefully in an expositionally straightforwar d and honest way. I do, however, try to
6
The final part of the background paper on population (Routley 84) provides one application in detail, an
application expanding on some remarks of Naess (in 83). And several other examples which Naess has
outlined (also in 83) can be similarly elaborated. Gare has attempted a major elaboration applying to science.
4
offer alternatives to DE and improvements upon it when I discover them. Deep-greep theory can be
seen as a fairly comprehensive alternative.
/
ON SOCIAL ECOLOGY
A heavy attack on DE, a tirade really, was launched recently by Bookchin. It caught
leading deep ecologists - who had rather foolistly seen Bookchim as one of them, though it
was obvious enough that he wasn't - off-guard, entirely stunning some of them 1 .
Bookchin furthermore went about his frontal attack in a most ungentlemanly and less than
American way, using practices and methods that Americans do not use as regards decent
fellow countrymen, but reserve for communism and its representatives and others engaged
in un-American activities. 2 Intellectual exchanges are supposed, otherwise, to proceed in a
nice, collegial way (the knives come out in the back rooms, not on the front pages).
Bookchin broke American cultural conventions (which is a main reason why several people,
e.g. Sale, failed to comprehend what was going on). There is heaps of straight
mudslinging in Bookchin, name-calling, attributions of guilt by very thin associations, ad
hominen moves. We shall bypass this unworthy material, much of what there is in the
attack, because anyone with decent basic training in logic can document it for themselves, if
they can obtain copies of the work (not at all easy in the peripheral world). We shall try to
isolate the much slimmer intellectual content of Bookchin's criticism.
Should we dig under all the dirt, we find there are some core criticisms of DE, which
are for the most part defective, but as well some interesting suggestions, which are worth
fossicking out and displaying. There are two key issues. In both Bookchin's criticism
repacts, but focusses upon DE, the old-fashioned erroneous socialist condemnation of
environmentalism of all types - as not only getting priorities wrong in not putting human
societies absolutely first, but worse failing to appreciate that environmental problems are the
product of social problems and removed with them.
• Ecological problems are at bottom nothing but social problems. This rival reduction
theme, which is what justfies the social ecology terminology and approach, also gets stated
in various, often weaker or slacker forms: For instance, ecological problems have their
1
The phrase 'off-guard' is from Naess. As to the extent of Bookchin's depth see the
Critique.
2
This nasty face of American intellectual activity is well exposed in Chomsky's
political writings. For the most part American philosophical periodicals permit only
the nice face to be exhibited. For my part I enjoyed some of this outrageous stuff of
Bookchin's, which was livily and refreshing after the flatness and dullness of much in
Naess's notes, and also by contrast with Bookchin's earlier papers, which are mostly
repetitive and often rather vacuous diatribes.
2
roots in social problems, ecological problems have their ultimate roots in society and social
problems, etc. But DE, 'despite all its social rhetoric, has virtually no real sense of' this;
that is a major (disgusting) trouble with it.
The correctness and tellingness of social reduction themes vary more or less
inversely, depending in particular upon how far the operative term 'social' is stretched. If
all problems concerning "groups" (including single member groups) of "individuals" of any
sort (including volcanoes, hurricanes, seiges, etc.) are "social" problems, then evidently all
ecological problems become social problems, as these are all concerned in some way with
individuals and their relations with their surroundings. But such a misleading adjustment to
the theme, rendered near-tautologous by a low redefinition of 'social', is not what Bookchin
and other socialists have intended. They characteristically intend by 'social' 'human social',
and what they intend to convey by 'the social roots of the ecological crisis' is that it is 'the
gross inequities in [human] society' - which should be attended to first- 'that underpin the
disequilibrium between [human] society and nature'. 3
Now this strong social bias thesis is interestingly false. Consider counterexamples of
the following sort:Imagine mixed capitalistic and welfare socio-economic arrangements had worked and
succeeded in eliminating the gross inequities in society, at least in some relatively
independent regions of the world, and perhaps even globally. There were, it still seems,
real prospects that this could have happened in the 60s, had energy and funds been
redirected from military-industrial enterprise to social-industrial activity. A welfare safety
net is stretched right across the regions concerned so that no longer is any human homeless
or without sufficient nourishment or basic eductional opportunities and so on, so that
poverty and all other grosser inequities are eliminated. 4 It is sufficiently evident that even if
all this is achieved, many ecological problems will not be addressed, but may be aggravated
by the increased industrialisation and economic development involved. The lot of factory
farmed animals or of threatened wild species would not be removed, but, if touched at all,
3
Bookchin 87 p.10 where the thesis is inaccurately associated with Kropotkin.
4
Naturally, finer inequities, such as unsatisfactory job relativities, race relativities, etc.,
will not thereby be eliminated and are perhaps part of "the human condition", some of
which many societies will be prepared to live with or ignore.
The relatively easy opportunities of the 60s for societies free of grosser inequities (for
good or even great societies) may have passed, as certain new social problems have
much complicated matters.
3
likely worsened. There is no guarantee that the position of wild and natural regions would
thereby be improved, that these regions would be freed from constant inroads by human
developmental activity, that the Antartcic would not be citified, and so on. In general, no
environmental damage and degradation that did not rebound upon the relevant human social
situation would be halted or resolved. Furthermore, not only is the strong social bias thesis
false, as well human social concerns do not always come first where ecological depth is
attained.
Bookchin suggests an historical basis for the strong social bias thesis, that the notion
of the domination of nature arose in the first place out of social domination of people by
people, women by men, and so on. But that is pseudo-history; for the domination of nature
and some appreciation of its operation, reaches as far back, so far as we can see, so far as
our records go, as other forms of domination. What is more, even if a real history were like
Bookchin's it would offer little support for strong social bias thesis. All it would reveal is
that some ecological problems were glimpsed by anology with social problems, not that
ecological problems are at bottom social problems and so resolved with them.
• • "Second nature", constituted by human society, is uniquely different from first nature,
and so naturally and justifiably interferes substantially with the processes of first nature.
The unexploited play on "second nature" does nothing to support such intervention; or the
contrary, second nature follows nature rather effortlessly without specific reflection.
However, the two "natures" distinction, inadequately introduced and incapable of bearing
much weight, is applied, in social ecology, to support much human interferenc e and
substantial separateness. 'Natural evolution has not only provided humans with ability but
also the necessity to be purposive interveners into "first nature", to conscously change "first
nature" by means of highly institutionalized forms of community we call "society".' 5 Given
the highly artificial and rather accidental social forms now in place, that many humans now
suffer or swear under, this is very far from obvious.
This second nature vs. first nature division would re-erect the old division and
separation , Man vs. Nature, in old-fashio ned football-m ilitary terms, that deeper
environmentalism has been concerned to remove. It is human chauvinistic; it ignores the
continuity between humans and other creatures, the overlap in incapacities and skills
(remembering all the capable animals able to live skilfully off the land and all the incapable
humans). As regards relevant skills and capabilities, there is no uniqueness, or singularity,
of humans as a whole. It would chauvinistically try to convert being human into a
5
Bockchin 87 p.21.
4
significant moral category, when it is not. 6 It would induce an inverse, obnoxious ranking
among biological kinds; first class, matching second nature, and second class, matching
first or primitive nature. The division would accordingly offer a springboard to a range of
further interference of the sorts of which we have already witnessed much too much.
The main thrust of Bookchin's attack is thus an old-fashioned socialist criticism,
which fails any longer to impress because of its excess anthropocentrism. Social problems,
which are of course often but not always intertangled with environmental problems, are no
longer top of action, political, or other agendas; nor are their standard modern rivals,
similarly entangled with environmental problems, namely economic problems. There is a
third set of problems, neither exactly left nor right, neither exactly social nor economic nor
reducing in approved fashion to those would-be universal categories, nor yet forming an
entirely independent dimension: namely, environmental problems.
Bookchin faithfully rolls out other elements of routine socialist criticism, against deep
ecology. Some of these are telling enough, but mostly not new. They include:• a seriously flawed pantheon of heroic figures. Bookchin gets stuck into DEs favourable
mention of Heidegger, of course, but he also tries to convey quite by association with
Woody Guthrie (p.6), Malthus (p.15) Ehrlich (p.17) and others. Problems with the heroic
figures and historical pedigree of DE had already been observed by others, e.g.
Sholomowski.
• a thin and inadequate historical genesis and setting. In this regard Naess's work is, of
course, primarily in the perfectly admissible tradition and company of systematic
philosophy and of most science. Deep environmental has, no more than science, to supply
at the outset a full historical context in which its ideas are placed (pace. p.5 bottom).
6
So it is argued at length in EP.
INTRODUCTION
Deep ecology is a major environmental position and movement, one of the most important of
contemporary times. In name and in assemblage of themes it is a recently elaborated position,
dating back only to about 1973; but most of the themes are older, some of them much older. It is
the assemblage, package and the way that has been put to environmental work that is newer and
different. The initial assemblage and the name are due to Naess, a principal character (in all senses)
in what follows 1.
1. On the deep ecology movement and ideology: their intellectual standing.
The expression 'deep long-range ecological movement', of which 'deep ecology' 1s a
subsequent abbreviation, was minted by N aess to label an emerging environmental movement .
Naess was then (sociological) finder ather than founder of this emerging movement, a movement
concerned primarily with the natural environment. In explaining ideological features of the
movement Naess set down a number of what he took to be characteristic themes. It is from these
themes, with much elaboration and considerable variation, that deep ecology, as a doctrine, has
grown. It is with the evolving body of doctrine, the position, that we shall primarily be concerned.
Control such as it was, of the doctrine did not long remain with Naess. Like many good promising
ideas it was quickly imported into California, where it was modified, and to some extent converted
into a further individual consciousness-elevating exercise. Thus the doctrine has been elaborated
and further delimited not only by Naess but, in the first place, by several North-Americans,
particularly Devall and Sessions, who have on occasion collaborated with N aess, and more recently
by various Australians, most notably Fox and Seed.NI Deep ecology has caught on largely outside
No attempt will be made to give an account of Naess's philosophy, except insofar as it bears directly on
deep ecology, though such an attempt would be worth making. We commend the work (which could
simply be entitled Naess ) to others; a smell beginning is made in Naess and Rothenberg.
Naess was already a significant, influential, but maverick, figure on the European intellectual scene well
before deep ecology was discerned. Naess had been professor of philosophy at Oslo since 1939, a chair he
obtained when 27. In early days he was a Norwegian Ayer, likwise basking in reflected glory of a
disinfecting logical positivism; but how much Naess subsequently diverged from empiricism can be
gauged from his 1971 debate with Ayer (recorded in Reflexive Water). In fact Naess had already began to
move out of an empiricist set as a result of his early interesting attempt to carry it towards its logical
conclusion, and to do philosophy itself empirically, recorded in Truth as Conceived by those who are not
Professional Philosophers. Subsequently Naess traversed a wide and unusual range of philosophical
enterprise: scepticism naturally; many of the then fashionable areas, such as communication, semantics
and interpretation; and several others that were much less philosophically fashionable, but politically
significant, such as Gandhi and pacifism, ideology and failure of objectivity, and of course pluralism.
These investigations form the complex backdrop to deep ecology. Unfortunately, despite Naess's longstanding commitment to pluralism, deep ecology was from the outset constrained to a certain unduly
narrow style of environmentalismm as will appear.
5
narrower academic circles, especially in North America and Australia, where, in contrast to Western
Europe, significant areas of natural environment still remain; these are rapidly becoming of
increasing public concern.
Deep ecology is a radical environmental pos1t10n, which goes far beyond resource
conservation positions (which are typically concerned at best with the management, husbandry and
stewardship of resources in long-term human interests); and it offers a much deeper challenge to
prevailing attitudes and practices (of the dominant social paradigm), especially those which concern
more or less natural environments.N 2 Deep ecology (hereafter is an ideology in the respectible
older sense, a system of belief and ideas. It is not an ideology in the post Marxion sense, of such a
system characterised by an inflexibility and an unwillingness to listen to other points of view. Quite
the contrary.
Radical DE may still be, though its radicalness is in decline as it ages and as informed opinion
on environmental issues advances; respectable, it is not. In particularly DE is not a respectable
academic subject. Though it is arguably the most important movement in environmental philosophy
in recent times, it is fl:Ot even mentioned in several recent texts on the topic. There are several
reasons for this, ranging from the conservation and close-mindedness, snobbery and bigotry
almost, of much contemporary philosophy, to evident presentational deficiencies in DE, its
mouldeness, its lack of discriptive and argument, its popular appeal. DE is particularly weak weaker than environmental ethics, which do poorly on these academic indicators - on a run of
things that are taken to matter in contemporary ethics; analyses of meanings of key ethical terms,
reductions of ethical terms to few primitives, smart arguments, utilitarian-style justifications, etc.
That is one reason why it is not part of Anglo-American analytic philosophy; another is that it
challenges so much of what analytic philosophy represents and (politically) presupposes.
DE scarcely represents, then, many of you will be relieved to learn analytic philosophers'
philosophy. N aess believes has been through and seen through that sort of philosophy early in life;
and seen that it does not contribute very much to the real features of life and living that philosophy
should make significant contributions towards, but mostly does not. As a result you will find very
little analysis in DE. Also there is remarkedly little argument, though argument is often taken to be
what is distinctive in philosophy. (But that is an Anglo American idea of what philosophy is all
about; you find comparatively little argument in much Continental European philosophy - what you
do find, even in authors like Kant and Hegel who look superficially as if they are arguing, is mostly
patently bad argument, poor at best. DE is much more like European philosophy in tone and style,
which helps explain why it is neglected and denigrated in American schools; by contrast, in British
philosophy curricula the environment is only just beginning to win any satisfactory attention at all.)
6
These are some of the reasons why, despite its importance, DE goes largely unmentioned in
most texts on environmental philosophy and ethics. This says a good deal about the texts, which
are mostly not offering satisfactory coverage of their fields (see further chapter 2). But it indicates
something too about DE, which is not as intellectually accessible as it could or should be.
Moreover, presentation of DE often go out of their way to violate (questionable) academic
standards, expecially those for clarity of statement, extent of analysis, and level of argumentation.
Deep ecology is an amophous doctrine, as anyone who tries to set down from its sources in a
clear and crisp way what its themes are, will readily enough discover. Of course compared with
much French philosophy, it is clarity itself; but French philosophy does not provide an acceptable
benchmark. A good deal of the obscurity concerning DE results from its varying and different
presentations by different expositors. To avoid this problem, we shall, for the most part, follow
Naess's elaboration of DE, taking that as fairly authoritative. But the problem is not thereby
resolved. Naess's views on deep ecology, its place and importance, and its themes, have changed
over the years. Nor are the themes always, sufficiently clear though many of them are succinctly
stated. Some of them are said, by disciples or by N aess himself, to be metaphorical. Furthermore,
as some important matters go largely unelaborated, for instance the issues of satisfactory methods
for achieving ecopolitical change.
To surmount these kinds of difficulties, we shall (somewhat presumptuously no doubt) offer
our own exposition and elaboration of DE, what we call authentic deep ecology. At least under
Naess's conception of DE we are entitled to do this. In part II however, which offers a critique of
DE as it has been variously presented, we shall look at the genuine article in its various
formulations.
Rather than becoming easier with the passage of time, DE has become more and more
difficult, and less intellectually tractable as it picks up or toys with environmental fashions, often
zanier environmental fads. It is complicated by New themes, often muddy themes, and its solidity
is removed by modification or erosion of old themes. Among the new themes picked up, several to
be examined critically (in part II), are the Gaia hypothesis, according to which the Earth itself some
sort of organic living system.
DE is thus an irremedially vague object. Its vagueness has increased with its popularity with
its becoming on the green fringe a fashionable, not to say vogue, item (a Foucaultian object).
Vague and vogue, a common concotenation.
2. Types of environmental positions: deep environmentalism.
7
What distinguishes an environmental position is a certain level of constraint with respect to
the environment, the natural environment especially: not anything goes with respect to nature. In
this regard environmental positions contrast with a dominant theme of Western cultural heritage;
namely, provided it does not interfere with acknowledged people such as property holders, that
people can do more or less what they like with the land, and with what grows and lives there. It is
even therefor humans to exploit or manage.
This unrestrained position imposes few or no constraints upon treatment of the environment
itself. Under it there would, for example, be little compunction about using up material resources,
forests, fisheries and so on, immediately or even destroying them. But, because it grants such
entitlements to exploitation, the unrestrained position can be excluded from properly moral
positions. 2 For it fails to meet the basic universality requirement on moral principles, of
independence of person, place or time, a requirement which implies that persons of different races,
colours, sexes or ages, or at different places or times are not treated unfairly or seriously
disadvantaged. Insofar as the unrestrained position would permit the exploitation, degradation and
even destruction, of all present resources and environments, it places future humans at a very
serious disadvantage. The position is thus one of expediency, not morality, typically yielding, like
economics, evaluative assessments based on short-term narrow local (or national) interests, rather
than assessments appropriately based on long-range transnational values.
Opposed to the unrestrained position are various environmental positions (what Leopold saw
as the land ethic is just one of these). Such positions can be classified - conveniently for
subsequent development but in a way that already refines and extends Naess's classification - into
three groups: shallow, intermediate and deep. Unlike the unrestrained position, all these positions
would conserve and maintain things - materials, creatures, forests, etc. The shallow
(conservation) position differs from the unrestrained position primarily in taking a longer-term view
and taking account of future humans, their welfare and so forth. It is more enlightened than the
unrestrained position in taking a longer-term perspective: hence its alternative description in the
literture as resource conservation (thus, e.g., soil conservation organisations). Though this
conservation position is only a step away from the unrestrained position, it does pass the test of
morality in that future people are not treated unfairly; so it is a very significant step.
2
This is a substantial and controversial claim, especially since it accounts much economic activity
unethical in the narrow or semse, as involving practices of expediency, not morality. For the fuller case
for obligations and commitment to future humans, see e.g. Routley 81, and other essays collected with it
in Partridge 81. This section is drawn from my People vs the Land (84).
8
The shallow and unrestricted positions are closely related by an important feature they share and which justifies lumping them together as shallower positions. They are both highly
anthropocentric; they do not move outside a human-centred framework, which construes nature and
the environment instrumentally, that is, simply as a means to human ends and values. Thus they
take account ultimately only of human interests and concerns; all environmental values reduce to
these. It is in this respect especially that these shallower positions differ from deeper, less resource
and management and exploitation oriented, positions.
According to deeper positions, humans are not the sole items of value or bestowing value in
the world, and not all things of value are valuable because they answer back in some way to human
concerns. But deeper positions differ in the weight or relative importance they assign to human
concerns. According to an intermediate position serious human concerns always come first; and
while other things, such as higher animals, have value or utility in their own right, their value is
outranked by that of humans. The deep position rejects this assumption, and maintains that even
serious human concerns should sometimes lose out to environmental values.
Figure 1. The positions separated, and separating principles
SHALLOWER
UNRESTRAINED
DEEPER
SHALLOW
IMMEDIAIB
DEEP
MORALITY
SOLE VALUE
GREATER VALUE
REQUIREMENT
ASSUMPTION
ASSUMPTION
(of human apartheid)
(of human supremacy)
The watershed principle which divides the shallow from the deeper positions is the sole value
assumption . According to this major assumption, which underlies prevailing Western social
theory, humans are the only things of irreducible (or intrinsic) value in the universe, the value of all
other things reducing to or answering back to that of humans in one way or another. This
assumption is build into most present political and economic arrangements; for example, only
aggregated preferences or interests of certain (present) humans are considered in democratic
political choice, and likewise in economic decision making; other creatures and natural items are
presented at best through the preference or votes of interested humans. 3
3
The points are explained in more detail in EP, where too, account is taken of the shift from humans to
persons (which would be important were it taken seriously and adhered to) and also of the inclusion of
9
Similar assumptions are made in mainstream ethical theories. Typical are reductive theories
which endeavour to derive ethical judgements from features of closed systems of humans.
Examples are provided by presently fashionable ethical theories, such as standard utilitarianism. 4
According to utilitarianism what ought to be done, as well as what is best, is determined through
what affords maximum satisfaction (preference-fulfilment, pleasure, absence of pain, and so on,
for other satisfaction determinates) to the greatest number of individual humans. In theories like
utilitarianism, the outside world of nature does not enter through direct inputs or outputs, but only
insofar as it is reflected in the psychological states of individuals. Such ethical theories are
appropriately described as those of apartness or human apartheid. Man is, or is treated as, apart
from Nature; there is virtually total segregation. Nature or the land enters only as a remote
experiential backdrop, and onstage is the drama of human affairs and interests.
However, humans cannot be entirely insulated from their environment; for example,
volcanoes affect temperatures thus affecting climate thus affecting crop yield and food supplies. At
least limited intercourse with the environment has to be admitted as a result. So, in economics,
ethics, and political theory, secondary theories, dealing with linkages to the environment, have been
appended (thus, for example, externality theory in economics, some allowances for "side"
constraints in more sophisticated utilitarianism, and so on). But the environment remains treated as
an awkward or tiresome afterthought or backdrop, a (re-)source and sink, when it is considered at
all.
There is, however, another approach also with historical standing, vying with (and indeed
often confused with) human apartheid, which can accommodate secondary theories a little more
satisfactorily. That is the position of superiority or human supremacy, according to which Man,
though included in Nature, is above the rest of Nature, meaning ethically superior to it.N While
human supremacist positions can incorporate the sole value assumption and thus remain in the
shallow ethical area, they have the option of rejecting it in favour of the less objectionable greater
value assumption; other things being equal, the value of humans is greater than other things; the
value of humans surpasses that of all other things in the universe. This assumption allows that
other objects, such as some higher animals, may have irreducible value; what it insists upon is that,
at least for "normal" members of respective species, this value never exceeds that of humans. What
super-humans. With value for natural items goes, of course, concern, respect, and sensitivity, towards
them; but the reverie connection may exhibit occasional failures.
4
But the same holds for other fashionable theories on the American-dominated ethical scene, namely
contractualism and libertarianism. More broadly based historical utilitarianisms, which allow for some
input from other sentient creatures, are considered below.
10
is generally presupposed is that other objects - animals, plants and their communities - are never of
very much importance compared with humans. Though human supremacy has appeared in variants
upon utilitarianism (from Hutcheson and Bentham on) where animal pain is taken into consideration
along with human, Wes tern ethics and associated social sciences such as demography, economics
and political theory, remain predominantly apartheid in form. So in practice does most
utilitarianism. 5
It is the repudiation of the greater value assumption that separates deep from intermediate
positions. Perhaps the most familiar example of an intermediate position 6 is that of Animal
Liberation, in the form in which individual animals (but not plants, forests, ecosystems, etc.) are
taken to have value in their own right, though in any play-off with humans, humans win. Under
the deep position such an outcome is by no means inevitable and not alway assured; in cases of
conflict of animals with humans or natural systems with humans, humans sometimes lose.
There are various arguments designed to show that the deep assessment is right, that humans
do not always matter7 and, more pertinently, that humans should sometimes lose out. A typical one
takes the following form:- Some humans voluntarily lead worthless or negative lives, lives without
net value. The point, though not uncontroversial, 8 can be argued even from a shallow
utilitarianism. Take for instance a life of pain and suffering and little or no happiness: it has a
substantial net negative utility. However, some small natural systems do have net value; one
example would be an uninhabited undisturbed island (a live example might be a tropical island
before Club Mediterranee depradation). Now consider the situation where the considerable value of
a small natural system is to be sacrificed (in a way that shallowly affords no ethical impropriety) on
behalf of a set of humans whose lives each have no positive net value. For instance, the system is
to be exploited, just for the continued maintenance of these humans, or for their addition (as new
settlers) to an established population. Then in such circumstances, these humans lose out; the
natural system takes precedence. Similarly, trivial satisfactions of humans do not dominate over the
5
There practice contrasts with what the theory allows or requires. Utilitarianism is like much pollution
control, where regulations are on the books or are part of the law, but are or never only very occasionally
applied. Utilitarian double standards are further discussed and referenced in DEP #7.
6
Other examples are considered below. Two of the four form of ecological consciousness considered by
Rodman fit here (as Rodman has remarked). For instance, falling into the intermediate range are the types
of environmental positions adopted by Birch and Cobb, and by Attfield and by many other
consequentialists.
7
See the argument of EP, beginning the Last Man argument, p .... ff. See also the initial example of
Routley 2 79 ..
8
The point is argued in detail in DEP #3.
11
integrity of rich natural environments. This simple result cuts deeply into (standard shallow)
consumer theory, to take just one example of the impact of deep environmentalism.
Authentic deep ecology is a type of deep environmentalism. A genuinely ecospheric
egalitarianism, such as deep ecology offers, is bound to reject the Greater Value assumption. For
under egalitarianism, larger collarations of significant eco-objects outweight smaller groupings of
undistinguished humans.
Notes
1. All their main work on deep ecology is cited in the reference list at the end.
2. Leading features of Resource Conservation are explained in several sources; e.g. Rodman.
3. Here authenticity is important. As will become evident in part II, certain proclaimed deep
ecologists are not prepared to scuttle the Greater Value assumption. As will also become evident,
the egalitarian arguments upsetting the Greater Value assumption are build on defective
foundations.
CONTINUING THE CRITIQUE OF DEEP ECOLOGY
As a broad label for something rather environmentally different, and no doubt better, than
most ideologies that preceded it, 'deep ecology' is no doubt rather fine. That is how the label
often functions, honorifically, for instance in the collection under that label edited by Tobias, which
gives deep ecology none but a nebulous content, and which indeed contains many articles (such as
the interview with Soleri) in diametrical opposition to the more detailed platform promulgated by
the intellectual "leaders" of the deep ecology movements. In fact, a good deal of the more popular
appeal of deep ecology has been obtained by vacillation between the more discerning authentic
forms and the slack or nebulous forms. The nebulous use of the label has also given cover to some
of those who calls themselves 'deep ecologists', enabling them to shed awkward but crucial themes
from the more detailed platform (thus e.g. Fox).
Many are those who are now pleased to march under the rather fashionable nebulous
banner. 1 Many are not deep, in theory or practice, deeply committed, or deeply changed by the
march. Purchasing or growing organic vegetables, having spiritual experiences in a special natural
place, or practising some oriental art or exercise routine, does not ensure a deepened environmental
position, though it can be a step on the way.
While nebulous deep ecology is compatible with much that is neither deep nor even
significantly ecologically oriented, such as minor lifestyle adjustments within the industrial
paradigm, authentic deep ecology, which is not so slack, remains a defective doctrine, itself
oscillating between an overpermissive environmental assembly point, fast growing its radical
potential, on the one side, and an impermissive, unduly narrow doctrine, dubious or defective in
several of its leading themes, on the other side. Some of the worst of these themes, such as
biological egalitarianism, have already been criticised in sufficient detail in the original critique.
But other features of authentic deep ecology (hereafter mainly DE) were left largely untouched in
the original critique, and new features have emerged. The critique thus needs continuing.
Since the critique was produced, it has been become more difficult, if anything, to grasp
what DE is all about. Even Naess, the founder of the movement, who now tends to adhere much
more closely to the platform than other self-proclaimed deep ecologists, is inclined to make
I too am happy to march under the nebulous banner, though since my first critique I am no longer
particularly welcome. Initially I was cut by about half those individuals and institutions loosely
associated with deep ecology, since my critique began circulating. While I am become accustomed to this
sort of phenomenon in intellectual areas (criticism induces cool and long at least, even in logic), I didn't
expect so much of this given the Christian character of DE.; and such isolation does seriously reduce
information sources.
2
apparently large concessions to opposition changes, which however he subsequently more
surreptitiously withdraws (of course this is familiar philosophical practice). At other times, he
withdraws with one hand what he is offering, some sort of olive branch, with the other.
The oscillation can be partly ascribed to conflicting motivation. On the one side, there is the
desire, stronger in the founder of DE, Naess, than in his American and Australian prophels, to
create a wide constituency, to tum no one away if it can in any way be avoided. But, on the other
there is an evident desire to make deep ecology a very select position, for a chosen few, a place to
be achieved only after a journey crossing some arduous terrain and involving some difficult life
adjustments. Deep ecology lacks the other-worldly and after-life resources which, in some of its
religious sources, appear to make for an easy resolution of this type of conflict.
I.Further problems with the platform and core platform of deep ecology.
It is the platform (at level 2 of the organising "double pyramid" of DE depicted below) that
constrains, delimits and defines deep ecology, so far as it is well-characterised. For even this level
is not very precisely characterised to put it mildly. Some exponents or practitioners of deep
ecology (some of them self-nominated or self-proclaimed) appear to repudiate even the core themes
at level 2 (e.g. Fox on axiocentrism). In the face of criticism, Naess himself backtracks as far as
he plausibly can, and sometime further. Not only does he considerably muddy the clear waters of
doctrine of occasional prosentations, but the doctrine itself begins to disappear, to be qualified
away (see e.g. Naess's performance in Resurgance , discussed below). The response to
intellectual criticism, which DE has been increasingly encountering as it spreads, has not been an
appropriate one of clarifying, and where requisite expounding, the core theory; it has rather been
one of retreat and digging in, of trying to hold the temple under seige, through diversionary activity
(or by broken-record techniques: simply reiterating parts of the messge not under heavy criticism
over and over again). When the critical raid has passed, the priests (and very occassional priestess)
of deep ecology reemerge, bearing the original doctrine essentially unchanged. The practice
resembles christianity (and too much of the practice of dominant science, the rival Western church).
Dealing with deep ecologists is very like dealing with devout christians; some of them one feels
sure have only recently changed positional hats, from evangelism to deep ecology
(correspondingly, my own position has become that of a black sheep).
A good deal of the argumentative practice of deep ecology appears to be explained by its
evangelical, and even messianic, character. There is genuine effort to tum no-one, except the most
incorrigible moneylenders, away from the temple. Everyone else (except perhaps philosophic
critics) is welcome, and encouraged to join in worship. Much like the churches, the founder of the
3
De movement seeks as large a flock as possible. In these democratic days, numbers count (at least
under the "right" polling conditions); earlier numbers overted for taxing or tithing purposes. Other
high priests are not so sure: there are some critics of the movement, who may be beyond the poles;
and surely it should be a little more exclusive. But, in any event, DE is a much more liberal
doctrine than one of its sources, christianity, has ever been; it admits coupling not just (so it is
said) with all the great religions, but with all the more benign positions and practices that achieve
fashionability in California. All not ill-disposed to the natural world and duly acknowledging its
value can march under the banner of deep ecology, whose main citadel is Nature.
N aess casts the net of deep ecology wide, catching therewith not only many remote
supporters, but a number of hostile critics as well, such as latterly Bockshim (p.6). Naess now
considers the 8 point platform, formulated by himself and Susians and published in several slightly
different forms, as tentatively setting down the 'basic principles of Deep Ecology'. Naess 'look[s]
upon the formulations as tentatively expressing the most general and basic views which almost all
supporters of the movement have in common' (23.6.88). Thus the 8 point platform (condensed in
box 1) provides, in a still vague and tentative sort of way, the core, the core platform, of DE. To
get around a small obstacle, let us call those who would adhere to the principles of the core (in
some approved formulation) adherents of DE. They are adherents in (simply and literally)
holding to the core, the common (intersection of the) platform. They may not be members of the
movement in any ordinary sense, in any but the set-theoretical sense, because appropriate
intentionality is lacking, for instance they may never have heard of the movement, let alone made
any effort to join. Nor need adherents be supporters in the usual sense; support is neither
necessary nor sufficient for adherence. A critic such as Bockshim, or myself, can be an adherent
without being a supporter, without being supportive. Conversely, a supporter may not be an
adherent. The Salvation Army has many supporters, including atheists, who are not adherents.
The De movement has many supporters, some of whom call themselves 'deep ecologists', who do
not adhere to the core, even more or less. Many of these supporters are shallow environmentalists,
who do not accept the key first point, of intrinsic value outside humans, or try to evade it (e.g. by
redefinition, or by wrapping up value inextrically in relations to valuers). Since there are, in my
experience, many supporters and indeed enthusiasts who turn out to be of this shallow sort,
Naess's view is a little puzzling: what does he mean here 'almost all supporters'? Which isolated
exceptions does he have in view?
Box 1. The core
8 point plat/orm, in capsule form.
l. Non-human and human life have intrinsic value:
The well-being and flourishing of
human and non-human life on
earth have intinsic value, inherent
4
value, etc. These values are
independent of the usefulness of
the non-human world for human
purposes.
2. Richness and diversity intrinsic virtues :
Richness and diversity of lifeforms contribute to a realisation
of these values and are also
values in themselves.
3.Humans unjustified in reducing such natural virtues:
Humans have no right to reduce
this richness and diversity except
to satisfy vital needs.
4.Human (values compatible with) population decrease:
The flourishing of human life and
culture is compatible with a
substantial decrease of the human
population. Flourishing of nonhuman life requires such a
decrease.
5. Human inte,ference with natural world excessive:
Present human interference with
the non-human world is
excessive and the situation is
rapidly worsening.
6. Policies and basic structures must be changed:
Policies must therefore be
changed. These policies will
affect our basic economic,
technological and ideological
structures.
7.Quality of life should supplant economic standard of living:
The change in our attitudes will
bring an appreciation of the
quality of life rather than
adhering to an increasingly
higher standard of living. There
will be a profound awareness of
the difference between big and
great. We will have a great
society with no bigness.
8. Obligation to attempted implementation:
Those who subscribe to the
foregoing points have an
obligation directly or indirectly to
try to implement necessary
changes.
Most of the core platform is no longer demanding; none of it, except for the last point,
specifying an obligation to attempted implementation, requires any commitment in the past of
adherents. Mainly adherence to DE, and support of DE, would be very considerably increased
were this requirement evaded. A strategy common to econonical practice and sociological research
5
readily presents itself. Let us speak of silent adherents as those who adhere to the core platform,
more or less, except that they make no requisite effort to implement it (they may of course have
some vague failing of obligation, should they ever reflect on the matter). Even without the benefit
of scholarly survey work, it is evident that De would now have a large number of silent adherents,
many of whom are not however adherents, being either oblimovish, situated in repressive regions
or social situations, or simply uninformed (like indigenous peoples who think here are excessively
many excessively interferring humans of Caucasian stock).
The core platform represents a surprisingly incomplete and rather ill-organised collocation
of principles. The incompleteness is most conspicuous in point 6, which advances no details as to
envisaged structural changes. In extenuation N aess pleads that he has 'not has courage to go into
detail and define what these different structures will be, because we are going to have a lot of
different Green varieties. We shouldn't have one set of structures imposed' (R p.7). The
reasoning does not hold up; a range of structures, rather than a unique structure, can easily be
defined by constraints well-known ones as it happened. Naess should be encouraged to go on and
delimit the structural and policy changes. It is easy to give him a start, drawing upon DE and
neighbouring environmental positions. For instance,
6a. The policy objective of maximizing state economic growth should be abandoned in favour of a
highly selective approach to such growth. Evidently, there are many different ways such a change
in policy can be implemented. Some such change may be suggested by, but is not implied by point
7.
6b. Technology selection should be reoriented to appropriate technology, and away from risky
and polluting technology.
6c. Population policies should be directed at decreasing human populations in overpopulated
regions.
Principle 6c complements point 4, which does not actually enjoin any decrease in human
population. And so on, through a well-known list of constraints, with several of them regularly
included in principle of alternative social paradigms. Point 5 requires similar elaboration.
Another surprising feature is how mild most of these elaborations are, like the core platform
itself, which is pretty wishy-wasy when contrasted with what is happening out there
environmentally. Many environmentalists now wish to proceed much further, and to witness
some real curtailment of heavy broad-acre assaults upon environments, such as extensive clearcutting of forests, over-fishing of shelves, and over-grazing of range-lands, extensive strip and
beach mining, broad-acre pollution, and so on.
6
Deindustrialization is not explicitly part of the DE program, and the issue is (perhaps
wisely) avoided by some leading proponents of DE. But deindustrialization - a considerable
reduction in the levels of industrial activity, particularly the undesirable dangerous destructive
prolluting types of industry that conspiciuosly contributed to the first industrial revolution - would
emerge from the alternative futures deep ecologists prefer to imagine, with a much smaller, less
consumption-oriented,terrestial human population. In any case, deindustrialization is an important
environmental objective, for both shallower and deeper ecology. It would assist, most materially,
in obtaining some better control on major environmental risks and problems, notably such matters
as the greenhouse affect, atmospheric ozone destruction, and acid rain and its fall-out.
The idea of progress is, like industry, also under a cloud. It is now naive to assume that
progress per se is automatically to be applauded, and that a telling criticism of something is that it
would block progress. People are these days a little more discriminating (in some respects); there
is progress and progress, growth and growth, coke and coke. Much that was progress, and still is
in many quarters, is no longer universally regarded as such, as, for instance, elimination of
wetlands, pollution growth, assimilation of indigenous peoples. The 'previously ... dominant
[assumption], that non-industrial society would and should progress towards the industrial state
and the scientific world view' was challenged, and is increasingly rejected (cf. Naess, on the
"status of mythology").
So wishy-washy is the core characterisation of deep ecology that it lets in as deep ecologists
all sorts of environmental philosophers who would not previously have made that select hand,
philosophers whom main disciples of deep ecology previously did or would have excluded,
philosophers whose positions are not deep. If DE is to be more exclusive, it will require more
careful, tighter formulation. Only clearly ruled out among environmental philosophers, i.e. those
who philosophize about environments and environmental problems, are hard-line human
chauvinists, led by Australians, Passmore (in his main conservative persona) and McCloskey.
Many of these excluded philosophers would, moreover, subscribe to most of the points in the core
platform, as weakly interpreted. It is nowadays a rare thinking person who does not consider that
there are severe environmental problems, local and global, about which something, fairly farreaching by conservative political standards, should be done. It is a rare philosopher, who
becomes inmersed in a spread of these problems, and who does not develop some environmental
commitments, even if a liberalish social agenda continues to dominate an environmental one (and it
is fast becoming hard to avoid observing the interpretation of social with broadly environmental
problems). While environmental philosophy has, by contrast with economics (now ......... of
reaction crises), tended to become progressively more accomodating to what was only a short time
ago radical environmental drought, as the magnitude of environmental problems is revealed, deep
7
ecology has moved in the opposite direction, has tried be excessively conciliatory, confusing
pluralism with broad consensualism, and lost much of its radical flare. A wide environmental
pluralism is just fine; but it does not have to be achieved through consensus, or at the cost of a deep
or an ecological platform. A pluralism can be achieved by the joining of different positions.
Among the diverse and motley groups of philosophers who now gain entry as adherents of
deep ecology, too generously construed, are apparently included those examples:-
Example 1. Among extensionists, both utilitarians and ratonalists. Among utilitarians are Singer,
and perhaps even Smart on some days. Most turns on how point 1 is construed. Utilitarians in the
Benthamite tradition assign intrinsic value to all creatures with preferences, sometimes a or the like,
and are concerned with the well-being and flourishing of such creatures. Accordingly they satisfy
point 1 if it is read, as it may well be, 'much human and much non-human life'. It all depends
upon how the terms 'human' and 'non-human' are quantified. If both are quantified with 'all', the
theses becomes implausible (admitting e.g. lab-manufactured abominations as intrinsically
valuable), and would exclude some acknowledged deep ecologists. If the terms are more weakly
quantified, then environmentally aware and active Benthamites are admitted. An evident dividing
line, provided by particular quantification, with 'some', is enough to exclude shallow
philosophers. But no quantification will serve to exclude either intermediate positions, which do
not adopt a deep value theory, or individualism, such as moral extension positions, almost
invariably a spouse. Extensionists more patently included are those of rationalistic persuasion,
grouped loosely around Regan in the American South, who have gradually move away from a
utilitarian prescriptions, to the view that ethical principles, including those of vegetarianism, can be
reached by rational means, by clear, consistent and coherent thinking (thus, it is really a coherence
theory of morality).
Example 2. More far-reaching informediate positions, which do assign intrinic value less stingily
throughout nature, to some non-preference-havers, such as trees, and to some non-individuals,
such as forests, but which still adopt a greater value assumption, according to which human values
always take precedence over non-human assignments. Examples of this sort the postions
deliminated (so far in insufficient theoretical details) by Rolston and Attfield. In fact the positions
so far elaborated of this type typically, but hardly inevitably, draw on an enlightened Christian
backdrop heavily laced with science (a religious American naturalism, so to say, in Rolston's
case). They amount to nonsecular moral extensionisms, by contrast with the secular moral
extenionisms of example 1 (to try to squeeze these positions into Rodman's nonexhaustive
classificaton of positions).
Example 3. Deep-green theorists reject the biocentric restriction sometimes built into point 1,
though not in this formulation. This formulation certainly admits Sylvan as an adherent of DE,
8
despite what some deep ecologists have said. According to strict biocentrism however, only what
has life (in some sense) can have value. Deep-green theorist see this restriction as very like that
imposed by ulitarians, to sentience, or unwarranted, unnecessary and arbitrary. Deep-green
theorists, like enviromental resisters, ecodefenders and Earth-Facters, now see the DE platform as
much too moderate and quite insufficiently radical. The earlier radicalism of DE has been
excessively pruned back, on a mix of dubious grounds: the drive for an environmental consensus
(in place of a genuine pluralism), the religo-political quest for a large support Base (which could
however be environmentalism broadly, with DE in the vanguard), and the input of conservatizing
academic thought and aim of intellectual respectability. In fact DE which does not make much
ground academically, as compared with its success outside academia, especially with book-reading
environmentalists, would better forget academic success, where it has made progress only among
outsiders, not power-players and return to its more radical mission (academics form only a small
minority, though one dangerously and influentially supportive, one the whole, of most past
environmental excesses and assaults).
2. Variability, antiquity or dubiquity of main themes of deep ecology omitted
from the core platform.
Some themes have been retained by letting them undergo extensive change. Nowhere is this
more conspicuous than with the difficult principle of "biospherical egalitarianism in principle",
central to earle DE, which has taken on some remarkable new guises. In Naess, it becomes a
curiously qualified principle of rights: that every being has a right to live - unless the basic needs
of other beings overrides its rights. In Devall, who prefers to avoid the term 'rights' (the use of
which he asserts is metaphorical in Naess, not at all what Naess, who appeals to childrens" usage,
asserts), the principle is emptied of main egalitarian content: 'Properly understood, the principle of
biocentric equality means that humans are members of the biotic community, not its masters'
(p.58). So understood, the principle can be accepted by many shallow thinkers; it is not
incompatible with chauvinism, nor with conciderable inequality, nor with greater value invariably
assigned to humans, only with a certain domination. It is a sell-out.
Few of the supporters of deep ecology (DE) appear to realise how old-fashionedly defective
and sometimes inappropriate some of the elements, and most of the methodology, of deep ecology
really is. 2 The organic and organistic image, for instance - heavily deployed by one of the heroes
of deep ecology, Whitehead - is as old as Aristotle (for some of the history see Berlin). Despite
much valiant effort, no one has so far got the image (now redeployed in the extravagent Gaia
2
Recently, Sholomowski has re-emphasized some of these features.
9
hypothesis) - valuable as it may be, chauvinistic as it characteristically is -to work in a very fruitful
way. Likewise the drive for self-realisation, is both old-fashioned - it was fostered by the
Enlightenment and had its heyday in the 19thC, was decidedly human chauvinistic in its emphases.
But perhaps the heaviest residue of old-fashioned inappropriate material is to be found in the
methodology of deep ecology, which is mainly transferred from positivism with little alteration.
The hypothetico-deductive methodology, for example, appears essentially intact in the double
pyramidal diagram (now called 'the apron' by Naess), which one is supposed to shuffle around
and descend by deduction. Having descended so, the way back to the top is by intuition of
hypotheses, by the hypothetical part of the method. First principles at the top admit of no proof or
derivation - because of the character of the one inferential relation admitted, deduction.
In other respects, the double pyramid strait-jacket, which is Naess's way of trying to infuse a
certain pluralism (a pluralism of fundamental positions at first principles) into deep ecology, is
insufficiently specific. It does not explain, for example, how at a practical lower level, either an
environmental directive or environmental action is forthcoming. Indeed given restriction to
deduction, it cannot explain how these things come about. DE lacks any requisite theory of
environmental action. 3
The double pyramid gets stylized in the way on the left; an alternative representation is that on
the right (and Naess now has a representation awkwardly superimposed on a mandala):Needless to say, there are problems lacking within DE's easy pluralism. Noone has ever
explained how to get the unretracted DE platform derivationally out of - what looks incompatible Christianity. For that matter no-one has shown how to deduce the platform from any of the other,
sometimes more congenial, great religions or philosophies. The nearest we seem to get is Naess's
sketch of how we derive parts of the platform from his own specially concocted ecosophy.
3. Further flowing of the DE gospel: its heroes, its arguments, ....
Deep ecology is a seriously flawed gospel, not only as regards its doctrines and their
coherence, but in other surrounding evangelic respects as well. Virtually all the patron saints of
DE, the past philosophical heroes (all male) are deeply flawed. Spinoza's views on the place and
treatment of animals, for instance, should be entirely disowned by any deeper environmentalist.
Even the later "reformed" Heidegger is conspicuously human chauvinistic, too complacent in a
human-dominated and tamed landscape, and, (apart from some new-fangled technology and
3
Various old-fashioned, and again defective, models are available to DE, and could be tacked onto the
theory, e.g. the belief (or information) and desire (or value) account of intention and action conventionally
attributed to Hume.
10
industrialisation) with the established rural way of things in Germany, including significantly racist
and sexist ways. The pervasive background four-fold, fitting the cosmological scheme of things
in, includes only divinities and humans; wilderness and its creatures are not part of the
fundamentals. Whitehead, despite the apparent bounteousness of his philosophical scheme, was a
practising christian, committed to a great chain of being with humans at the top of the chain (and
thus to a greater value assumption antithetical to DE); he took no significant interest in nature or
nonhuman creatures at all, and was very comfortable in the ways of a socio-political order which
directly produced present environmental impasses. 4
No doubt the heroes should be differently viewed. Not as patrons, not even as forerunners;
but as deep thinkers, from whom certain elements can be drawn in elaborating an environmental
philosophy (e.g. parts of a theory of nature, features of process theory, elements of a critique of
technology), while much else is discarded. Most of this theoretical work remains to be done.
Regrettably the calibre of the arguments for proceeding to a DE position has not improved.
N aess has now resorted to making his case in a very conventionalistic populist fashion. People are
inclined to respond in such and such a way (favourable to environmental concerns) to so and so
questions. Thus, for instance 'there is reasonably widespread agreement that animals, and even
plants, have rights' (EIJ p.3). But surely it is largely as a result of environmentalism, which must
(and should) be based on something else that people have began to respond thus and so. Naess
also argues from the the concern of many people about nature and natural phenomena for their own
sakes (the data is however not all that clearcut) to several other conclusions, for instance that
political and stilist approaches to the environmental crisis (etc) should be less anthropocentric (EIJ
p.5). The arguments are thus close in character to those widely used in arguments in economics
and democratic theory; they are none the better for that. The fact that people used to respond
favourably to damming up every nearby river and draining all the swamps is not a solid
recommendation for such practices. Moreover, such populist considerations hardly win out, as
Naess himself explains (p.4). Pressure groups pedalling narrow and sometimes destructive
economic ambitions often succeed against democratic opinion.
4. But much criticism of DE is even more seriously flawed.
Despite the growing constituency for core princles. De, which Naess will correctly have
alluded to here, DE has been portrayed as extremism - especially from the US political right (which
tends towards extreme right). What is extreme depends, of course, on where a carping critic is
4
He appears to have owed his appointment to a philosophy chair at Harvard in significient part to the fact
that he was in no way a radical, but suited to the conservative scene established there.
11
situated. Gung-ho growth economists are extremists from a deeper environmental situation. No
doubt such GG economists would claim that they have reason, not emotion, on their side; but it is a
narrow flawed reason, tailored and biassed to their cause, reflecting a different class of emotions,
primarily preferences of business communities of humans.
In present deteriorating environmental circumstances, clever "extremism" is sometimes
exactly what is required - ideas and action that upset, disturb, interfere with, subvert, and
eventually overturn, the dominant military-industrial social ethos. Extremism presumably amounts
to being isolated on the outer margins of some politically or socially sensitive (more useless)
normal distribution, without respectable companions. On many environmentally important issues,
DE is no longer in such a position (often instead the power elite would be if it were not so
entrenched). Where it is in such a position, then generally it needs to be, and needs to try to swing
the norm in its direction or else to gather respectability for that position.
What, if anything, supports the charge of extremism, levelled against DE? Such emotionallycharged criticisms from the right tend to be particularly vague. Sometimes DE itself, portrayed as
radical environmentalism, and compared with radical feminism, is dismissed as extremist, without
indicating where it is considered extreme. In fact, while better developed, less accommodating DE
is radical, at least literally in going, as one aspect of its depth, to root issues and assumptions, it is
not very politically radical; it does not seriously challenge present political arrangements in the way
that ecoanovehism, or even ecosocialism, does.
What has infuriated some critics is undoubtedly the DE removal of humans from absolute
centre stage, and above all the cavalier or callous way in which some environmentalists have
portrayed the demise of unfortunate humans, from the God-given position to having to share the
world-stage. There are many different issues tangled up here, and the charges of extremism
depends on retaining the confusion, as well as ascribing to DE claims it does not make. DE asserts
that irreducible value is not confined to humans, that life other than humans has intrinsic value.
Although such a claim is indeed incompatible with the dominant social paradigm, it represents an
old challenge, going back in utilitarianism at least to Bentham. As some of those who held or now
hold such a position were not, by any means extremists or even radicals (e.g. Sidgwick) the charge
against this part of the DE platform, lapses. Similar points apply against any charge of extremism
based on the DE assertion (carefully avoided in the core platform) that a substantial decrease in
human population is desirable, especially for conservation of the biosphere. Such a theme is
increasingly widely maintained, by many respectable figures, far from any fringes. Nor need any
extreme, threatening or dangerous, action result from such DE themes. Human population
reduction can occur (and is envisaged by Naess to occur) by such unthreatening means as a
12
reduction in birth rates, a demographic transition brought about for instance through improved
education and contraception. Yet some coupling to "extreme" action, and adoption or preparedness
to adopt such, has to be established if a proper charge of extremism is to sustained (cf. also the
OED definition of 'extremism').
Deep ecologists propose no extreme action to reduce human population, no wars, no
genecide, nothing macho. Indeed the idea is ludicrous. Deep ecologists tend to be gentle people,
who are opposed to violence; they care about humans, who are part of nature (even if too many of
them are trying to set themselves above and apart from it).
There are individuals and groups, more evident in America than elsewhere, who do adopt an
uncaring, and sometimes brutal attitude to other humans, especially those outside America. Ecofascists, like Hardin, to the right of environmental thought, who think that the time for triage has
already arrived, and that starving humans in third world countries should be left to fend for
themselfes, offer a striking example. But eco-fascism is far from deep ecology, and has been
severely criticised by those close to DE (e.g. Bennett and Griffin). It is no doubt troublesome for
deep ecology, and convenient for opportunistic critics, if environmentalists with eco-fascist
prodivities present themselves as deep ecologists (as has happened, a prominent example being the
present editor of Earth First). It is no doubt troublesome for a charitable organisation if members
of a mafia present themselves as agents of it and collect on its behalf; it has long been a problem for
democracy that fascists can present themselves as democrats, and even put an end to democracy
through seemingly democratic methods. Political movements admits of much infiltration, by both
well- and evil-intentioned.
ANNEX
1.
Interesting proposals continue to emerge from the deep literature.
One is for an
environmental organisation, which might could be called Environment International, parallelling
Amesty International , and adopting a similar role with regard to the environment that Amesty does
with respect to human rights and political processes (Naess p.4).
2. There are many false "virtues " in contemporary political life that green politics, such as
DE is coupled with, will eventually help remove. These include:-
•
Unity, united front.
All that has
merit is a certain limited unity
in diversity.
•
Balance.
Balance is achieved by
resolution of many forces. To shift
13
the balance, then, environmentalists
should be as far out as they can
(while still being counted in the
resolution, not written off).
For
end
political
purposes,
citing
especially credibility doesn't matter,
by contrast with countability.
Advice to offer more balanced
statements and work should be
courteously ignored: it is
oppositional, political advice.
•
Two party ideal
REFERENCES
A. Naess, 'Environmental ethics and international justice', Ecospirit Quarterly IV (1) (198.) 1-7;
referred to as EIJ.
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Typescripts draft of contents (2 pages) ; Part 1 Critical exposition, Chapter 1 At the pyramid’s junction: the basics and creed of deep ecology (11 pages) ; Part II Critique of deep ecology, Chapter 5 The initial problem: what on earth is deep ecology? Who is and isn't a deep ecologist? (21 pages) ; A critique of (wild) western deep ecology: a response to Warwick Fox's response to an earlier critique (56 pages) ; Ecological ethics and ecological politics: turning John McCloskey's challenge (36 pages); Deep ecology and deep-green theory (4 pages) ; Authentic deep ecology: exposition, critique, alternatives: preface (4 pages) ; On social ecology (4 pages) ; Introduction (11 pages) ; Continuing the critique of deep ecology (13 pages).
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DEEP-GREEN ETHICS
Contents
PARTS
CHAPTERS
0
I
II
III
IV
Prologue
DEEP, GREEN, ETHICS, and PHILOSOPHICAL BACKGROUND
1
Deep [and] green fundamentals
2
Ethics without humans; philosophy without humans
3
Philosophical setting: deep-green plurallisms
4
Inhibiting presumptions and myths
AXIOLOGY: value core
5
Value and its varieities: basic theory and its development
6
Alternative primitives and theoretical beginnings
DEONTOLOGY: necessary moral structure
7
Obligation and its deontic circle, and moral dilemmas
8
Rights, and justice
VIRTUE and INACTION
9
Environmental virtues: what they are and
something of their theory
10
V
Environmental ethical practice
NATURE of ETHICS
11
Ethics, its new character and revised foundations
12
Principal questions of reoriented ethics, and proposed answers
13
Epilogue
�17 .5.96
DEEP-GREEN ETHICS
PROLOGUE
Philosophy and its branches, ethics especially, are among the last places where prejudice
would be found, found alive and thriving, so it might be imagined. Wrong. In the first place,
prevailing ethics all exhibit heavy prejudice in favour of humans, human chauvinism. So they
are one and all defective, wrong in a deep way. An adequate ethic will remove the prejudices
involved. That means, in turn, a radical transformation of prevailing ethics, from the bottom
up. Such a transformation constitutes a main objective of this book. Deep-green ethics aims
not simply to reform present arrangements and systematizations, but to replace them. Abolition
of prejudice has early priority.
Prejudice in philosophy, privelege in prevailing ethics.
There are only about two and half millenia of recorded philosophy on Earth. To a
disconcerting extent, those millenia represent two and half thousand years of prejudice-partial
exceptions occurring and prejudice subsiding somewhat only when ideological empires were
fractured (e.g. fruitful periods of "warring states" in ancient China and Greece). Ethics is far
from alone within philosophy in exhibiting serious deficiencies, in incorporating prejudices that
should not figure so prominently in what is ideally an impartial subject. Much the same holds
for other branches: politics obviously (partly through its interdependence with ethics),
metaphysics and logic perhaps less obviously. Yet prevailing metaphysics display a deep
prejudice in favour of the actual, against what does not exist. In logic the prejudical situation
has in fact been accentuated through the rise of modern symbolic logic. Regrettably mainstream
symbolic logic is wrong. All its forms validate incorrect principles (such as implicational
paradoxes), these results flowing primarily from an underlying prejudice in favour of the
consistent, against the impossible. 1
Several of the systematic prejudices embedded elsewhere in philosophy impact upon
ethics. The prejudice in favour of the actual has served to distort, very seriously, the issue of
obligations to future creatures for example, in this fashion:- Remoter future creatures do not
exist, and therefore, according to prevailing prejudice, cannot have any relevant features, any
preferences or desires, self-traits or satisfactions, to be taken into ethical account. Therefore
All the themes are presented and defended in detail elsewhere. As regards metaphysics, see JB; as
regards logic, see e.g. BGB and generally in philosophy , see TM. There are several coupled
prejudices and prejudical drives, as will appear; for instance the drives to power and to maximization,
strongly manifested in logic, see e.g. RLR.
Prejudice in ethics was explicitly recognised by Bentham, almost two centuries ago; unfortunately
however he imported his own very influential prejudical framework.
�2
"they" can be discounted entirely. The same prejudice also enters in a very different way. All
the standard positions concerning universals, all of which reflect the metaphysical
presupposition that discourse concerns existent objects, show up in ethics. They appear in
vexing issues as to the ontological status of values, such as the good, and of deontic notions,
such as obligations and the right. These are not only difficult items to discover in the world, but
they do not seem adequately housed in conceptual or linguistic apparatus: where are they
located? Whence derives immediate pressure for many mostly bizarre reduction exercises; for
instance of values to human constructs, contructs from social preferences or from
sociobiological drives, and of obligations from veiled contracts. The initial question of location
makes, however, the defective metaphysical presupposition, and lapses therewith. Values,
though significant items, do not exist; so they are not located, anywhere.
Prejudice rooted in established logic has impacted differently, upon a variety of issues in
ethics. The absolute requirement of consistency upsets a straightforward treatment of
obligations, general sets of which are typically inconsistent, thereby leading for instance to
awkward theories of hierarchies of obligation or of merely prima facie obligations. Running
parallel with this, the requirement utterly distorted an initially straightforward theory of ethical
dilemmas, treatment of which is a significant part of any comprehensive ethical theory.
Established logic has also impacted heavily on such different issues as fact-value inferences
(e.g. the prescriptive fallacy) and regarding the extent of pluralism in ethics. The assumption
behind the rationalistic critique of relativism is that there is a single correct logic, governed by
requirements of consistency, namely standard logical theory, which (when combined with the
facts) will eliminate various ethical stances as incorrect, indeed which may, given sufficient
critical thought, lead to a single correct ethics. 2 But the assumption fails; for it too depends on
ancient prejudice.
Pluralism is one most important component in removing prejudice generally, certainly in
reducing it generally, by admitting alternatives, and allowing some to flourish. 3 Elaboration of
deep-green theory is another important direction in removing prejudice, in favour of humans,
persons, or like agents from ethics especially but not only. The main development that follows
will take both these directions, though focussed upon ethics: it will track and investigate
pluralistic deep-green ethics.
Human chauvinism is not the only major prejudice damaging ethics. An extraordinarily
privileged position given to egoistical considerations is another. Western ethics in particular has
2
3
The approach involved, that of traditional rationalistic ethics, is regularly deployed by Singer (e.g.
his Encyclopedia conclusion to Companion to Ethics); the strengthened version features in Regan.
Of course how it is supposed to proceed, the details of how reason works this miracle, is never
revealed.
See esp. TM, epilogue.
�3
recently been deformed through a substantially unquestioned axiom of self concern, that agents
are interested in and motivated by their own (self) concerns and only by them. (Of course an
agent's self, or extended self, may be grander than the agent's soul or person or body or
whatever; it may include the agent's family or even the agent's tribe, or differently it may
comprehend the agent's land or environment. But under such extensions the axiom is already
beginning to disintegrate.) Such an ubiquitous, but largely unquestioned, presumption has lain
behind reductionistic exercises that have distorted much of modem ethical (and political) theory.
The leading idea is simple enough: given that action is justified through human self-interest, and
only thus, if ethical theory (and likewise political superstructure) can be justified through some
construction or modelling on that basis (bringing in only indifference and like neutral
assumptions) , then justification will be transmitted, it too will be justified. Thus those
contractual and utilitarian exercises which have loomed so large in recent theory. 4 The same
dubious presumption also features large elsewhere, for instance in the acclaimed derivation of
Deep Ecology from the ultimate norm of Self-realization!
It is not just prejudice and allied presumption that have damaged and distorted ethics.
Narrow ethics, parading as universal or absolute in defiance of pluralism, ethics often
underwritten by religious or papal presumption, have severely disadvantage d ethics.
Furthermore, connected therewith, ethics has been destabilized, and cast in an unfavourable
light, by
•
a quest for absolute foundations, and in tum connected therewith
•
an invidious comparison with science, which is supposed to have such foundations.
The quest is quixote: there are no such foundations. Nor does science have such foundations,
so the comparison is misplaced. Not only is absoluteness for science increasingly disputed, but
it is becoming apparent that science is in the same sort of pluralistic situation-pre dicament
some, still questing for the old false certainties, would say-as ethics. 5
Through the assumption, or pretence, that it can deliver (whether from religious, rational
or other resources) certainties of a type that it cannot deliver, ethics has become discredited. But
that is only part among reasons why on the contemporary scene ethics is not the force that it has
mostly been in bygone times. At least as important as such intellectual reasons are matters like
removal of social and political pressures to conform, redirection of indoctrination practices (into
consumerism, etc.), and so on, some welcome and some definitely not.
4
5
Roughly, ethics, knocked down to what's in it for everyone (some aggregated base class), is justified
through what's in it for each me. Prima facie the grand construction is based on a simpler fallacy of
aggregation: an invalid each to all inference.
The theme is argued in detail in TM chapter 10.
The quixote quest is strikingly engaged in by Williams, for a entertaining criticism of which see
'Bernard Williams and the Absolute Conception of the World' in Putnam 92.
�4
Aspects of the discreditation have in turn been exaggerated. Ethics, it is said, makes no
difference, even can never make a difference; it never effects change. Such claims are seriously
astray, as examination of elementary examples like human slavery and treatment of animals
quickly reveals. Environmental ethics too can make a difference (perhaps, when coupled with
other practices, a major difference), and they are beginning to do so. But naturally they cannot
compel change; nor should they be capable of doing so, as that would exceed proper roles of
ethics (and other proper practices). 6
Rectification of ethics requires, then, not merely removal of now conspicuous prejudice
and presumptions, but deflation of pretensions. What results-hardly unique naturally, but one
selected for good reasons among many, hardly entirely exclusive but overlapping and admitting
others-is an ethics which differs from standard ethics in the following respects at least: Such
an ethics is:
• deep-green, removing prejudice in favour of humans, and in favour of certain (egoistic)
agents, in an affirmative fashion; and
• Pluralistic in a thorough-going way, accordingly not pretending to absolute or objective
status.
The run of prevailing ethics, including so-called "applied ethics" and "environmental ethics" are
chauvinistic; a satisfactory (environmental) ethic is not. The run of prevailing ethics are
absolutist, or otherwise relativist; a satisfactory ethic is neither.
However the conditions so far presented are but necessary conditions; they are not jointly
sufficient for adequacy. Even among theories that are nonchauvinistic and duly pluralistic,
reductionism may persist. Such reductionisms come in striking variety; thus, on just one
dimension, individualisms, sentientisms, vitalisms, (i.e. all that has value is alive, somehow),
and so on. To avoid such reductionisms, another blanket condition of adequacy is:
• non-reductionistic.
The main task consists in elaborating in detail an ethic, with other preferred features, that meets
these conditions of adequacy.
Regrettably, removal of prejudice cannot be accomplished in ethics alone, as a separate
pollution-free zone. Prejudice in ethics flows through from other regions, religion especially,
but also from psychology (which in the past made little gods of humans with sacred souls of
their own, justifying very differential treatment for them in the world), and from elsewhere.
Removal of these latter sorts of prejudices requires a severe erosion of belief, in regions strictly
outside ethics, but heavily exporting into it; of beliefs fostering intellectual prejudice.
Nonetheless ethics has a role in removal of prejudices elsewhere, because, very simply,
these prejudices ought to be removed. The basic principle, which can also be presented as one
6
These points are developed at some decent length in GE part IL
�5
of rationality, runs as follows: belief ought not to exceed warranting evidence, but should be
appropriate to it.
None of this is as clean and clear-cut as it may initially appear, because source waters
have become very muddied. Sources for instance take a range of forms (this is part of the
ancient issue of the criterion reput in more contemporary terms). Sources include not merely
empirical evidence, perception especially, the favoured, or even exclusive, source of
empiricism. They also include such sources as: emotional presentation, or emotion; postulation
or presumption; reason; authority; a range of psychic and extra sensory perception (ESP) forms;
and, differently, a range of intuitions. Some of these sources overlap; consider for instance
divine relevation. Plainly those sources are very different kinds, quality and calibre. Some
such as reason, which includes itself a disputed variety of forms, are more processing of
information kinds than sources (thought reason becomes a source, of sorts, in pure rationalism,
and a degenerate source of necessary truths in classical logical theory where theorems are
proved, by paradoxical means, from nothing so to say).
While some of these kind of sources are not important or at issue in ethics, for instance
controversial kinds of ESP giving information on remote (spatially distant or past or future)
items, several are. It is not going too far to say that ethics is severely vexed as regards sources,
and many distortions such as naturalism can be seen as coming about as ways of trying to
secure reliable sources (if some naturalistic reduction were correct then ethics would be brought
within the orbit of science and even empirical perceptual bases could be adopted, as in science).
But ethics does not resemble science; its sources are not (except incidentally) primarily
perceptual, thus breaking any very close analogy between epistemology and ethics.
A major source in ethics is emotion, by contrast with epistemology where the major
source is perception. From there already derives a major difference between the fields, as
perception tends to be less variable, more intersubjective, less culturally dependent across the
range of subjects usually taken into account. Accordingly, in any quest for a more objective
ethics, more has to be drawn out, out of the processing substructure, whence the emphasis on
coherence, good reasons, ethical on coherence, good reasons, ethical argumentation. Ethical
inputs, sources, and processing are assessed in detail in the text.
Although this work is focussed upon ethics, it does not, and evidently cannot, merely
concern ethics. Since the ethical theory is itself approached primarily (though not exclusively)
by way of value, it bears upon other areas, such as normative-infected social sciences, where
value theory features. For another example, it also impacts upon aesthetics, heavily. For,
according to the theory advanced, there is no sharp boundary, indeed really no division at all,
between what has been dubbed "aesthetic value" and "ethical value". Value is value, without
these artificial divides. Evidently too, as will appear, the work intrudes in normative reaches
�6
merging into ethics, in particular, wherever normative or deontic dilemmas are encountered,
such as reaches of social choice theory and legal theory. Differently, the work includes much,
though indirectly, upon philosophy of nature. For it is especially concerned to supersede an old
defective philosophy of nature, which included a heavy devaluation of nature, and aided and
abetted a manifestly chauvinistic ethics. The ethical theory to be elaborated fits with, and in
significant respects presupposes, a·different theory of nature. 7
Although investigations in this text are primarily theoretical, they have significant practical
implications. Putting the theory to work in various environmental fields is something that
happens elsewhere (see further in the Epilogue). Some of this has already occurred, in essays
in the Green Series, and some is reserved for other texts on field ethics. 8
Notes on terminology In this text several familiar terms, such as 'green' and 'deep', are
converted into quasi-technical terms. That is to say, special uses of the terms already in
currency, such as the use of 'green' to mean environmentally committed, are further refined.
The result could be signalled by deloyment of appropriate new terminology. Something like
that is assumed done, except that the familiar terms will be retained-onl y now they are to be
read in the quasi-technical way. To put the point differently. Let 'grene' (Olde English) or
'gre-een, (Newe English), for example, be the quasi-technical explication of 'green' in the
relevant sense. Then in the subsequent text, 'green' will normally signify gre-een, or
equivalently 'green' operates as (effectively abbreviates) 'gre-een. Why such a strategem? One
reason is that people are now rather conservative regarding terminology. Indeed they are often
turned off by new terminology (despite regular ruination of established terminology). As a
result, established terminology gets revised for all sorts of new purposes (witness the bizarre
high-school reuses in advanced physics), with a resultant overloading of senses. By contrast,
recycling of old terminology (words or spellings), that has fallen into disuse would be rather
more commendable. Here, rather than pressing our luck with explicit recyclings like diep and
chalowe, we resort to the fiction that the terms 'deep' and 'shallow' deployed throughout the
text stand in for the technical recyclings. As a result 'deep', as figuring in deep approaches,
deep green, deep theory and so on, has no connection with profundity, or 'shallow' with
superficiality.
As several have said, in several respects deep/shallow terminology is unsatisfactory,
execrable it is sometimes said. Founder N aess did a disservice introducing it, and subsequently
7
8
Such an appropriate underlying theory of nature is advanced in the companion work on metaphysics,
namely TM.
Green Series is a popular label for discussion papers in environmental philosophy, published from
Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University. One of the other texts is
tentatively entitled Green Ethical Fields ..
�7
in explaining it, so slackly. While it is too late to easily change the terminology, some
undesirable associations may be shaken off by resorting to older or variant spellings, and
simultaneous ly refining senses intended. That we do. But then we concede to the general
intellectual will, by the substitution or "abbreviations" strategem.
Even so, we have risked a few neologisms, and we shall chance, just here, one or two
more. One we risk, is euthics, for universalizab le ethics, that is an ethics meeting
universalizability requirements (in some appropriate fashion). This bit of terminology helps in
resolving a significant ambiguity in philosophical usage of 'ethics', and making an improved
start on the vexed issue of why an agent should adhere to an ethics, or differently to an euthics?
One we chance is viridology (from Latin virides, green, and Greek logos, study of, in modern
palance) for: theory, principles and practices of deep-green; that is, a single classical word for
diep-grene theory. A purer alternative we contemplated, from among many, was prasinology
(or should it be prasinomics) from Greek (and Latin) prasinus, dark green, leek green.
Acknowledg ements and antecendents: personal development and conceit.
The production of this work owes much to other humans, with of whom I have little or no
acquaintance. The debts are both intellectual and practical. On the heavily practical side, I am
most grateful to Frances Redrup for the processing of reems of rough scribble. On the broad
practical front I am pleased to acknowledge the continuing support of my research endeavours
by the Australian National University. That academic support, while generous by often
niggardly world standards, has recently declined, through contraction of research support and
expansion of alleged accountability practices. In this little respect, there has regettably been
interference in my research, dur the earlier stages of work on this book, by no doubt wellintentioned academics occupying supervisary roles who have deemed by performance less than
satisfactory. It is with regret too that I record that, in part owing to biassed appointment
practices within the University, there has been negligible imput to the present work from any of
my academic colleagues there.
But outside imput there has been of course, of two main sorts: from recent activity in
environmental philosophy and from past exercises in value theory. While environmental issues
have operated as a main stimulus in my recent work in ethics, my own interest in and
investigations in ethics reach back to my graduate work in Wellington, New Zealand, where I
produced a characteristic ally initative work on ethics, entitled Moral Scepticism (I do not
suggest that anyone read that work, which it is far too late to suppress).
In New Zealand, I was educated in the 20th century British type and style of ethical
theory, primarily Oxbridge material, with not antipodean influence of any significance what
cover, except in the obscure background Prior' s quocit little book Logic and the Basis of Ethics
(although my professor at Wellington, George Styles, had ethics as a manfield, I learnt only a
�8
certain technigue from him; I do not recall one position, little theorem argument or there I must
attribute to him, for the very simple reason, (suspect, that he never advanced very much).
Among Oxbridge characters, Moore revoided the dominant influence though much of Hume and
his near contemporaries-N eurall-Smith Tomlesia and others-was scround up to a tiny circle
of ethical enthusiants and fellow academic travellers. Moore is still an influence in this book; in
my occasional more conceited moments, I like to envisage the book as an appropriately greenish
update of Principia Ethica. At least it may be as near as I ever come to producing such a work:
Principa Ethica Virida. What on excessively ambitious idea, sheer hubris! Yet, for all the fuss,
Principia Ethica is not really such a good book; rather it enjoys other advantageous features. A
few companions with Principa Ethica will be ventured.
But, by and large, other ethical theories will not be investigated in much detail. For one
reason, that has been done, to a sufficient extent elsewhere (in others' work more than my
own). For another, in the wake of accumulating evidence, notably from environmental
awakenings, revealing their narrowness and prejudice, they scarcely justify further post
mortems.
More than Moore and Priest, the present work is indebted to Meinong, and through him to
the tradition of Austrian value theory. The theory elaborated in fact fits, more or less, into what
has been called critical cognitivism ..
The evil of ingratitude, for example, ...
Here and there, the present text draws, heavily sometimes, on my own past work,
especially concerning environmental ethics. As much of the work, for example in the local
Green Series in Canberra, is rather inaccessible, such borrowing may not matter much. There
remains a small overlap-ideally vanishingly small as revision proceeds-betwee n this text and
better circulated complementary works, notably essays in Environmental Philosophy and parts
of The Greening of Ethics.
�INTRODU CING DEEP-GR EEN THEORY
Deep-green theory aims eventually to supply a comprehensive alternative environmental
philosophy. While it stands on its own, it is alternative because it stands in radical ideological
opposition to dominant ways, nowadays predominantly industrial. It offers a philosophy both
in the contemporary narrower sense, and in the older sense of an intellectually informed and
critical way of life. That philosophy is centred on an ethical theory (upon which this issue
concentrates), which is in form centred upon a value theory. But the ethic issues, in a fashion
broadly associated since Aristotle, in a politics and political economy. But the output of the
value theory in fact reaches much further, into practical decision making in a range of
environmentally impacting areas such as fishing, forestry and agriculture. The value theory is
also intertwined with philosophical issues which are often considered more fundamental, those
of astophyism and epistemology. Indeed there is no part of philosophy that remains untouched.
Therein lies part of the claim to comprehensiveness.
The particular form of deep-green theory elaborated is by no means independent of
(acclaimed) advances recently made elsewhere in philosophy (those in object-theory, and
relevant and paraconsistent logics especially). But though the theory given is influenced and
sometimes in fact shaped through these developments, deep-green theory more generally can
avoid them (The type of theory given could easily enough be recast in a more classical
Platonistic form - undoubtedly a much less plausible form. Nor will these background advances
intrude, it is hoped, in the given elaboration of deep-green theory; the background will remain,
fairly directly in the background, and not come to dominate proceedings or know proceedings
depend upon special new controversial features of it. Where more technical agreements are
required, they will be relegated to appendices.
1. As to deep theory.
Deep-green theory is the environmental branch of a much larger affair, deep theory. There
is a point, in fact a real expository need, to place deep-green theory in the larger setting of deep
theory. For deep theory influences several of the choices made in deciding upon the way deepgreen theory goes, the shape it takes. Although the influence will become evident, particularly
with the intertwining of truth and value that .... , it is worth giving an example. Too much of the
Anglo-American discussion of intrinsic value and of obligations to future generations is taken up
with - hung up upon - ontological questions, about universal items in the first case, and as how
there can be obligations regarding future items which do not (yet) exist in "suitable" determinate
�2
form in the second. Deep object-theo ry slices straight through these issues, removing the
problem generating ontological assumptions.
Deep-theor y is a grander theory lying in the background , which significantl y influences
the philosophic al approach taken in deep-green theory, as well as being influenced by it. There
is no reason why that grand backdrop should remain hidden; there is no hidden agenda. The
backgroun d theory, of which deep-green theory is a part, is called simply deep theory. For it
represents the confluence of several deep positions with deep-green theory: deep pluralism,
depth relevant theory, deep item-theory, and so on. As a theoretical endeavor, deep theory aims
to pull together, into a unified coherent theory these various deep positions. It thus draws
together and integrates as well, several other interrelated efforts (on dialethism, process theory,
anakyrie, etc. With deep theory I aim to supply eventually a fairly comprehen sive philosophical
package. I used to imagine that with moderate comprehen siveness as regards present
philosophic al problems would come a certain completene ss; but I've come to think that a total
philosophy is an illusion, like pots of gold at the ends of rainbows, and rainboweri a themselves.
Deep theory is no doubt a presumptu ous title (there are worse about, e.g. 'total
philosophy ', 'ecosophy' ), not it is altogether satisfactory given the problems and obscurities, to
be encountere d, lacking in the notion of depth. My main excuse is that I did no exactly choose
the title myself, but had it thrust upon me: problemati c, presumptuo us, it looks to good to
refuse. It emerged from a terminolog ical confluence of several areas in which I'd been
struggling to assemble ac. capirred theory - deep-green theory (itself a union of green thought,
or environmen tal philosophy with a revised deep ecology), deep relevant theory, deep pluralism
(which deepened radical pluralism), and deep item-theory (which deepens object-theory).
To give a picture of deep theory, it suffices for present purposes to indicate some main
features of deep positions, some of their integrating interrelatio ns, and some of their
revolutiona ry potential. Deep theory overturns or subverts very much of what has been
assumed or presuppos ed in Western philosophy , and particularl y in Enlightenm ented
contempora ry philosophy.
For example, it overturns the following widespread assumptions:• the Ontologica l Assumptio n, that truth, and also, meaning, are functions of reference, and
thereby presuppose existence. On the contrary according to (deep) item theory, we can perfectly
well talk and think truly about items that do not exist, and also about items that are not individual
but are complex but perhaps indetermin ate wholes, and finally what items are impossible .
Therewith repudiated also then is an occasionall y favoured full-back from onticalism, namely
possibilism , which assumes
�3
• the Possibilist Reduction, of everything that counts in discourse to possible individuals; there
are no other genuine subjects, all else can be analysed (or thrown) away.
Bound up with possibilism are
• the assumptions of modalism, of the correctness of classical logic, and of the absolute
requirement of consistency. Under more throughgoing transconsistency (or paraconsistency)
these connected assumptions are one and all repudiated. The transconsistent connection
assumes an important role in the straightforward treatment of moral and other dilemmas, in
showing for example how an agent may coherently operate under inconsistent obligations or
with incompatible needs.
Important special cases of modalism are such theories as that
• entailment is strict implication (or its metalinguistic analogical) and that conditionality amounts
to a modal function of material implication 1. The rejection of such themes and their courses is
part of what motivates deep relevant logic.
While the parts of deep theory are integrated and are intended to be materially reinforcing,
nothing prevents their fairly independent elaborations. The holism conceded does not exclude
separation or analysis. In particular, deep-green theory is amenable to independent development
and analysis.
Material implication is the implication defined in terms of truth-functions thus: A materially implies
B iff not last A and not B, or equivalently, iff either not A or B. Strict implication is the
necessitation of material obligatory i.e. A strictly implies B iff necessarily A materially implies B, or
equivalently, iff it is not possible that not A and not B.
�ON THE VALUE CORE OF DEEP-GR EEN THEORY
This essay aims to uncover the value theory of deep-green theory, exposing thereby a
central area of that theory. Though the value theory is (inevitably) abstract, it issues in what is
more concrete, such as an applicable system and practical ecological directives, potentially
destabilizing for prevailing policies and institutions.
Deep-green theory which stands in significant ideological opposition to dominant
industrial ways, is intended to supply a comprehensive alternative environmental philosophy.
At the core of deep-green theory lies a value theory. A fundamental theme thereof, part of what
makes the structure deep, is that a range of environmental items are valuable in themselves,
directly and irreducibly so, so that their value does not somehow reduce to or emerge from
something else, such as features of certain valuers or what matters for them. Thus value does
not answer back in some way to humans, or sentient creatures (or other value-responsive
classes), their interests, uses, preferences, or such like. Many natural items, such as forests
and rivers, mountains and seashores, are intrinsically valuable. They are valuable in their own
right - irrespective of whether they are interesting or useful (to any intentional operators,
themselves interesting or useful or not), indeed whether or not there exist any valuers. Value
spreads through and reaches across the natural domain; it is not bounded by mind, or linkages
with subjective states; nor does it stop with sentience, or associated pyschological features like
satisfaction; nor does it end at life; it observes no such compromising bounds. Although value
is distributed richly if irregularly throughout nature, it is not then encapsulated in some isolable
natural feature, such as life or sentience, or even in defeasible ecological values such as
richness, diversity and variety (and so open to a different, naturalistic, reduction). But of
course such ecologically important features afford criteria for value, and should be represented
in recipes (such as "objective functions") for assessing overall value.
From the presence of natural things of value, and accordingly of natural values, it is a
short, though controversial, step to the important conclusion that there can be values without
valuers. For valuers are sentient creatures with appropriate capacities, but things of value may
precede and succeed all such valuers; that is, these things can persist, their values intact,
without any valuers. As there can be shapes without any shape-perceivers, so there can be
values without valuers. (The theme, like others advanced, can be backed up by more detailed
argument and by formal proof, neither attempted here.) In valuational relations then, which
relate valuers as subjects with values as objects, both ends of relations have independent
standing; though interrelated, as the descriptions are deliberately chosen to suggest, either can
stand without the other. It is a fashionable mistake to try to collapse this relation - usually to
endeavour to soak up values into a modification of valuing subjects (e.g. as a predicate
�'relation-to-values', in which inconvenielt values are locked away). The mistaken procedure
is in fact just one important example of an archetypal modern reduction of relations to
functions; other examples, locking undesired objects away within functions, are those
rendering wholes (such as ecosystems and organised structures) functions of their parts, and,
under functionalism, minds and types of intentionality, including value-direction, as functions
of bodies or their parts such as brains. Values are not, and do not disappear into, functions of
valuers.
A connected corollary is that values are not apart from the actual world, something
"projected" or imposed on it by a favoured class of valuers, something colouring (and even
emotionall y clouding) the otherwise valueless physical world, in rather the way that
reductionistic materialism tries (erroneously) to construe colour itself as projected onto a
colourless physical world. Of course this projection effort, never adequately explicated, does
not succeed, on its own, in removing values. For they remain, left as some function of the
valuers. To try to bulldoze through this difficulty, a second reduction is invoked, of evaluative
features of valuers to "natural" features, commonly preferences, consumer desires or such like.
The second reduction runs into obstacles that halt even the naturalistic bulldozers (e.g.
naturalistic and related fallacies), but the first reduction is the critical one in removing key
environmental values, such as those of wilderness and wild things, which become valuable
only in the focus of certain sentient beholders, and not in and for themselves. This reduction
too is blocked by insuperable difficulties. On the one side, like the parallel proposed
phenomenalist reduction of material objects to sensations, the reduction never achieves
satisfactory support or even a satisfactory statement. On the other, it is counterexampled by
various modellings or thought-experiments revealing intuitively-assessed value in situations
devoid of valuers (as e.g. in the well-known Last Person argument). Values remain then part
of the still rich actual world; they are objects in the domain of actual and other worlds. But
they are not of course material objects; creatures will not fall over them any more than they will
trip over shadows or mere shapes.
Value, like shape, is an attribute, which things have or may lack, and which furthermore
creatures can recognise or may fail to discern. Thus value is, like shape and colour and their
determinate forms (round, red, etc), a universal , distributed across things, individuals and
wholes. The comparison of value with shape is decidedly more helpful than the regular, but
exhausted, comparison of value with colour, or of goodness with colour determinates such as
yellow. For example, shape is not bound by a set of determinates as colour is in the specific
colours, but comes in a spectacular variety of forms, not totally or linearly ordered (as in a
rainbow), or contracted to some primary set (as in colour triangles); shape which pertains to
wholes as well as particulars, links with gestalts better than colour; shape discrimination is
more culture dependent and sensitive; yet shape is, or was, a primary property, and thereby
�3
more immune to reductionist strategies than secondary properties such as colour. Again shapes
like values, can be vague, indeterminate; that does not prevent things, perhaps unique things,
exemplifying them. But naturally the analogy can only be extended so far. Shapes can be
approxima ted by polygons, values cannot; shapes are regularly perceived through sense
perception, by vision or touch especially, values are not, but are differently apprised. Value is
its own thing, not something else; it is what it is and does what is does; it is not something
else, like some quantitative mathematical or economic function. Nor does it contract into some
mark of value, or to what it comes down to in highly restricted settings; most important, it does
not disappear in the style of modern economics into (expected) utility, or into just two
economic forms, value-in-use monetarily and value-in-exchange (price), neither of which may
reflect worth. Value means what it means, and has meant: worth ; and it ties with general
assessments of merit and demerit, goodness or badness, not an economic or other truncation
thereof.
The powerful drive to reduce or deny values has several sources. Part of the motivation
for reduction of value springs from epistemological worries, concerning how values can be
ascertained and known, so far as they are (subjective translation proposals are then a direct
evaluative counterpart of phenomenalism). Part derives from supposedly problematic cultural
relativity (whence the attempt to impose values by identification of value with some favoured
assessible feature, and with it cultural or economic imperialism). Part of the motivation comes
from more sweeping ideological commitments, such as varieties of materialism or scientism,
which leave no space for immaterial values.
As already apparent, attempted reductions of value come in a dazzling variety of forms • subjective, which make use of psychological features, such as desires, interests, emotions,
and the like; or more objective aggregations of these, such as community preferences or utility;
or objectively naturalistic, which enrol single track value-making characteristics such as
richness or evolutionary development as value;
• consequential, which consider only outcomes; or purely motivational, which consider only
attitudes and ignore leads and outcomes;
• straightforward, as in translation proposals for translating value judgement s into reducing
statements; or oblique, as in supervenience propositions (no variations in value without
underwriting variations in reducing features); or obscure, as in unarticulated projection claims.
Values are not well accommodated within these reductionistic schemes, or accommodated at all.
Deep-green value theory, which is thoroughly nonreductive, repudiates all these reductionistic
options. They are not so difficult to avoid, as the options are neither exhaustive nor exclusive.
In particular, value reduces neither in subjective nor objective fashion; it does not reduce.
Evaluative judgements are nonjective, that is, neither subjective nor objective (in any absolutist
�4
fashion). Obversely, evaluation of an act does not reduce to assessing consequences; nor does
it come down to an assessment of motives; both may matter.
The virulent idea is abroad however that science can offer a reduction, can sweep up
value along with all other information, where philosophy has conspicuou sly failed.
Unfortunately for such optimistic ideas, fortunately perhaps for deeper thought, current basic
science does not have much to say at all, or of merit, about values, and if it did reductions
through it would be circular. But, to the contrary, there is a long-standing pretence that science
gets along "well" without values, in appropriate value-free fashion. Nowadays it is
increasingly realised that the positivistic assumption of such value-freedom is a myth, that
much of what passes as science is heavily value-penetrated. While the residual ideal of pure
engagement in pure science may offer the illusion of an escape from value, there is no escape.
For, in any case, reductions do not succeed, as a copious literature, littered with failed
attempts, meanderingly establishes. Nor are they generally desirable, since mostly shallow,
aiming at a reduction to features of some privileged class presented as ideal (i.e. core value is
covertly assumed, so there is no real reduction). Nor are they needed; explanation and
assessment do not require reduction. Evaluations may be arrived at, and value frameworks
expanded, by enhancement methods, which organise and expand emotional presentation by
coherence methods.
The enhancement methodology in fact resembles that sometimes proposed for further
acquisition of scientific information. As accumulated empirical information can be further
extended through presentational input and assessment for overall coherence, so further
evaluations may be arrived at and assessed through a combination of presentational and
coherence procedures. At the (marginal) stage where the next round of evaluations is
undertaken, the following active ingredients figure, in an idealised breakdown:- Firstly, a
background stock of judgements and value experience will have been accumulated or inherited;
in principle all of this is revisable, and some may be up for reassessment. Apart from the
background, which enters in assessing overall coherence of system, what is involved is,
secondly, emotional presentation, which corresponds to further perceptional and sense data
input, and, thirdly and not independe nt, coherence processing , which supplies the
interpretational and rationalisational components. At bottom, parallelling perception in the case
of empirical information, is emotional presentation, gut or visceral reaction in starker forms of
acceptance or rejection, but more generally comprehending a variety of sentiments, including
overall well-being, and also relational impressions, such as empathy, identification, and so on.
As a perceiver perceives shapes, so a valuer feels raw value and disvalue. The basis of
perception is sensation, the basis of valuation is emotion. Apprehension of value is seated in
emotional, and especially visceral, presentation; but what is apprehended is not to be confused
with its apprehension any more than what is perceived. All the warnings about sensation as an
�information source have to be repeat~d, with heavy emphasis, as regards emotional
presentation; for example, reliability cannot be guaranteed, interference with presentation
through drugs, alcohol, temporary excitement or other inputs may render it dubious or
unacceptable, conditioning may have occurred, including substantial cultural conditioning (so
that a person is terrified by harmless spiders but not sickened by bloody massacres of dolphins
or seals). As with perception, there are checks on emotional presentation, such as constancy
over time and after reflection.
Emotional presentation, supplying primarily inclusions and exclusions or prohibitions, is
but the basis of reflective evaluation and value apprehension. The further critical part,
coherence processing, builds on the basis taking account of other inputs or controls including
background (which supplies relevant components of already adopted judgements, assimilated
subculture and so forth) and constraints (such as moral substitutional requirements like
impartiality, e.g. whether considered judgements hold for substitute valuers, and uniformity,
e.g. whether similar acts are judged in similar ways). Essentially, the coherence procedure
consists in asking whether the next or a relevant judgement fits together with what has been
accepted, while meeting constraints, without leading to what has been rejected or excluded. If
it does fit it is added to the included side, otherwise it is sent to the excluded side. Because an
aim of this rationalisation procedure is achievement of some sort of equilibrium such coherence
procedures have gained currency under the rubric "reflective equilibrium". Observe, however,
that equilibrium reached at some stage may be lost as new types of problems arise and further
information enters. No doubt the whole methodology (like the parallel methodology of an
empirically-based coherence theory of truth) is highly idealised, and only practicably applicable
in rudimentary parts. It does however surmount a major theoretical obstacle for environmental
value theory; it reveals how in principle a nonreductionistic value theory can function, and
deliver a tenable value system. Whether what results is however an appropriate deep
environmental system will depend above all on the presentational input, the extent to which
environmental sensitivity enters and is not suppressed.
Enhancement methods reveal too that value systems are not uniquely determined, any
more than other comprehensive theoretical frameworks. There evidently are rival value
systems measuring up to rigorous rationality requirements, much as there are rival logics and
rival physical and biological systems. In particular chauvinistic systems, narrow or shallow
value systems, which are unresponsive to and take no account of environmental items and
values, cannot be excluded on rational or straight logical grounds. Unfortunately such systems
remain in ascendancy, and tend to dominate social and political practice; in recent times
economism, a narrow type of utilitarianism, has all too obviously dominated much terrestial
practice.
While such value frameworks are open to severe criticism, for instance as
chauvinistic, as violating universality requirements of morality in the case of economism, they
�do not succumb to definitive refutatiog (for the reason that requirements of morality,
universalizability of principle, impartiality and so on, can simply be repudiated; immoral or
amoral frameworks are still value systems). Even so, much can be done to shift or alter
values, though as usual effectiveness cannot be guaranteed. A range of argumentative,
educational and persuasive techniques, of varying quality, can be put to work to move valuers
indoctrinated in old damaging structures, often enough successfully. Important among these
are positive presentations of environments, their habitats and creatures, by way of new
information and experience.
The availability of rival value systems, while it implies a certain desirable (and also
troublesome) pluralism, does not mean relativism. From a deep-green viewpoint, rival
narrower and shallower systems are definitely inferior, and criticised accordingly, while
economism is an anathema which does not even make the moral grade (e.g. too many
principles stop at class or state boundaries). However a critical pluralism does acknowledge
and offer a place in the wider scheme of things for other systems, even if as less favoured or
satisfactory. One political upshot is evident; deep-green theory promotes, what matters in these
irrational times of numbers, alliances - in particular, a green alliance, organising green
positions, against prevailing forces of environmental degradation.
The systematic pluralism of deep-green value theory interpenetrates not only social and
political domains above, but also metaphysics traditionally placed below. In the underlying
metaphysical pluralism of deep-green theory, value runs very deep - so deep that even truth
depends in part upon it. For not merely selection of a correct comprehensive theory or worldview is a value dependent choice, but choice of associated actual world is also. That choice,
insofar as it is consciously made, of world structure and conceptualisation, is a constrained
choice, constrained by informational inputs, such as those of refined perception. But inasmuch
as it is rationally accomplished, that choice, like other choices of structure, proceeds according
to a standard value-information analysis (regularly oversimplified however to a preferenceinformation or even desire-belief modelling); that is, to extract the salient point, it involves
value essentially.
Truth and value are then intertwined; truth, though naturally different from value, is value
dependent. Both are plural, and differently so. So, unremarkably deep-green metaphysics
resembles the value theory in significant respects. For example, as the value theory is
nonreductionistic, so also is the metaphysics; in particular, there is a no-reduction theme that
neither parts nor wholes reduce eliminably to one another, as opposed to atomistic and holistic
views of environmental interrelations. As the value theory is pluralistic, so also is the
metaphysics; in place of established absolutism, a plurality of worlds, with associated truth
definitions is discerned. Indeed a main aim of deep-green theory is to dislodge dominant
�7
destructive ideologies, which (each of them)
assume an absolute truth, from their positions thereby providing intellectual living-space for natural environments.
Much of deep-green theory devolves then from the abstract value theory. As with the
metaphysical way sketched, so it is with the fuller ethical theory, which includes as well as a
specific axiological system, elaborating deep environmental values and virtues, a deontic
framework, supplying obligations, rights, taboos, and similar. For example, given that a
certain wild river is intrinsically valuable, as we can verify by on-site experience and
enhancement methods, and given that we duly respect that value, as deontic principles will tell
us we should, then we are not free to do as we like with that river, to dam it with concrete, to
channel it within concrete, stripping it of its riverine ecosystems. But that does not preclude
respectful use of the river, swimming or sailing quietly in its waters, and the like. Value thus
guides action, practice, and use; it is the ground also upon which principles are formulated,
principles that are assessed and validated by way of enhancement methods. Important among
these are non-interference principles, which exclude unwarranted interference with other
preference-havers and unwarranted damage, ill-treatment, or devaluation of items of value.
Such deontic principles circumscribe environmentally-limited freedom of action. Given noninterference principles, a major shift in onus of proof from homocentricethics takes place.
What is required now is that reasons be givenfor interfering with the environment, rather than
reasons for not doing so. Also direct responsibility for environmental interference or
modification falls upon those who would seriously interfere or significantly modify, who
would tread heavily on the land. Non-interference does not preclude use - only too much use
and use of too much. What it does lead to is the theme that, where use occurs, it should be
careful and respectful use.
An important respect thesis regarding environmental items is founded on such non-interference
principles and the no-reduction theme: namely,
• not to put others (other preference havers) into a dispreferred state for no good reason;
• not to jeopardise the well-being of natural objects or systems without good reason;
• not to damage or destroy items which, while they cannot literally be put into a dispreferred
state, can be damaged or destroyed or have their value eroded or impaired.
These apply to ecosystems, their surrounds, their parts, and so on. The mere making of
further excess profits, or similar economic excuses, are not good reasons. Such a respect
thesis forms part of the ecological outlook of deep-green theory.
Deep-green ethical theory amounts to much more than just another non-reductionist
ethical theory, which highlights ecological values and virtues, and so forth. It changes the
character and shape of ethical enterprise. Perhaps most strikingly, it removes humans as such
�from the centre of the ethical stage (or ~xclusive occupation of the stage). The biological
concept of being human ceases to be a significant ethical category. To elevate it to such is to
fall into human chauvinism, a type of class chauvinism which unwarrantedly discriminates in
favour of the human species. The prevailing chauvinism is not inevitable; it is very logically
avoided by directly connecting ethical characteristics with the categories of items that can have
them. Relevant categories include those marked out by features like: having well-being,
preference-having, rights-holding, contractual-capability, and so on, categories not necessarily
connected with any particular species. Hitherto virtually all Wes tern ethical theories, and the
institutional arrangements they help support, have not merely limited ethical matters to interhuman affairs, but have been blatantly chauvinistic, exhibiting substantial and unjustifiable
discrimination in favour of humans (or certain privileged humans).
Deep-green theory thus implies the inadequacy of prevailing social, political and
economic arrangements and institutions. These structures are the defective products of inferior
value frameworks which take quite insufficient account of environmental desiderata and values.
Richard Sylvan*
RMB 683
Bungendore NSW 2621
*
Thanks to David Bennett for comments on an earlier draft. For more on deep-green theory, see
essays in and work referred to in the Green Series, i.e. Discussion Papers in Environmental
Philosophy, RSSS, Australian National University, Canberra.
This compressed essay was solicited by and written for Island Magazine (Tasmania). Upon receiving
it however, the editors decided that it was too dense, and insufficiently journalistic and popular (not
features they had at any time requested), for their magazine.
�I
\. '1
11.10.95
CHAPTER 1
DEEP AND GREEN
AND PRESUPPOSED FUNDAMENTALS
It soon emerges from preliminary exploration that, under natural characterisations,
relevant notion of both ethics and green presuppose the notion of agency. So with something
on agency, enough to get started, we shall begin. In terms of agency and proclivities to
environments, green can be characterized, and in turn green approaches. Then, within green
approaches, three relevantly different types can be distinguished: shallow, intermediate, and
deep. It is the last, and really only the last, that matters for the ethical theory that follows.
1. Action, agency and agents: a summary . 1
Action theory is grounded in process theory. For actions are types of processes, agentascribed processes. processes are directed functions, ordinarily time-directed functions, 2 ?
framing of certain functional sorts. All the ordinary sorts of processes-ec lipses, transits,
removals, reflections, and so on and on-are processes (and ordinary processes can be
separated out logically, such as by applicability and inapplicability of certain predicates, e.g.
they take place, they are not facts, etc.)
Processes themselves in no way require agents. Actions, however, as distinguished
within goings-ons and taking-places, do require agency, and so agents. There is no reason at
all why these agents should be humans. Many agents are not humans, some humans are not
agents. But it is often quite erroneously assumed agents are humans, or persons. Excess
requirements on agency are partly to blame, the mistaken idea that agents have to be purposeful,
responsible, rational-feat ures that can be added to distinguish subtypes of agents. Rather,
actions can be roughly delineated through answers to questions like What is so and so (the
relevant agent) doing? How is so and so acting? The result reached following through this
route is this: process a is an action iff for some agent x, a is properly ascribed to x, it is x' s
doing. To break residual circularity, it remains to define agency. Agency is defined, such is the
proposal, in terms of exercising a causal role (which may be misdirected or similar), through the
following circuit. First, x is and agent as agents a iff, for some p directly partinent to a, x
causes Pbut x is not caused to cause p. In terms of agency-regarding, other notions can be
defined as follows: x is a sometime-agent, someties an agent, iff for some a, x is an agent as
2
As full an account of processes as so far worked up from notes appears in 'Process and actions',
which does provide detailed background for this section.
�'2
regards a. Agency is a characterizing attribute of sometime-agents. An agent is a sometimesagent that establishes a history of agency (a small reputation therefore).
2.
Explaining Green.
In characterizing green we start with agency. Such relevant features, of greens (or
environmentalists), as being positively concerned about nature of natural things, supporting
environmental causes and similar, are closely tied to practice and action; they are features of
agents. In an original central sense of 'green' so redeployed, an agent was green if that agent
firstly believed that some parts of the natural environment should be protected, and secondly
took some relevant action. 3 In short, a belief-action analysis emerges, which can be recast as a
standard belief-desire-resultant action account. For instance, the agent believes that some
natural environment is worth protection, desires that it should be, and acts (in some way,
perhaps feebly) accordingly. All the parts of this sort of account call, however, for some
elaboration. To remove a certain circularity, resulting from characterising "green" through
terms like "environmen t", 'natural environment' can be replaced by 'parts (surface
configurations) of the Earth substantially uninterfered with by humans'. To specify protection
satisfactorily, protection/ra m what should be indicated. And so on. But there is a little point
in elaborating this already weak characterisation, which can be satisfied by an agent interested in
saving a few square metres of the Earth's surface from exploitation. For the notion has been
further weakened, almost from its inception.
To characterise this laxer, but ubiquitous notion, let us insert the intermediary notion of an
environmental cause. Such causes include not merely protecting natural environments, but
limiting impacts on environments, which may not be pristine, for instance by pouring less
sewage or detergents, CFCS or Greenhouse gases, into them, or conserving items, which could
be exploited or consumed now for future use or for future human generations (to use or
conserve, etc.). The first of these further causes beyond protection, original green, is a largely
consumerist notion of green, the second, an economistic notion (it takes in such beloved
constraints as intergerational equity). There are other related causes of importance also, such as
restoration of something that has been over-exploited or damaged, such as agricultural lands,
waterways, urban air, soils (soil conservation), or even human artefacts such as monuments or
buildings. The shallow green cause of fighting pollution, for human health reasons, can fit in
here. Needless to add the restoration may not be to pristine conditions, but to quite low
3
Although we are explicating terms that are now in widespread usage, in a way substantially
faithful to that usage (but not some of its dilute or corrupt expansions), we shall regard the terms
as quasi-technical. We see these terms, as the discerning reader also may, as spelt not with a
double 'e' but a triple 'e', as 'greeen' and 'greeening' (insert hyphens as need be for appropriate
pronunciation, e.g. 'gre-een' _. The effect is to peel off dilution and corruption of 'green' (e.g. so
to include every politician, at least when any confronts concerned constituents) and to discard all
those unwanted and often undesirable senses the colour term green has accumulated.
�standards. In sum, causes include as well as protection, such matters as nondestruction,
conservation, maintenance, restoration, and so on.
Now substitute supporting an environmental cause for protecting a natural environment.
Then an agent is green in this expanded laxer sense if the agent believes in supporting an
environmental cause and takes some relevant action in that direction. Such an action component
is essential: green does imply some practical, if utterly token, involvement.
The lax account connects in the right ways with testable sociological criteria. For
instance, believing in supporting a cause can be cashed out in terms of joining an organisation
working for that cause, or even, reducing the slight action component still further, considering
joining such an organisation. 4 The appellation green applies not only to individual agents, but
also to groups, coalitions, institutions, even corporations and governments. As a green
government can, meet similar lax conditions, it is evident that there really are very few
requirements, even weak sponsorship may serve.
Many there are now trying to take advantage of green movements-adve rtisers, vendors,
politicians, professors, merchants, even generals (with "defence forces" retooling as
environmental defence forces). Cashing i in on the movement by producing a goods or services
presented as environmentally friendly does not thereby make parties doing so green, especially
if what is supplied adds to overall environmental impacts (as do "environmental markets"
delivering environmental junk, sometimes portrayed as "green goods"). The requirement of
serving environmental causes has been lost.
The excessive generosity of the account arrived at, which allows agents with only passing
or slight active beliefs in some cause to count as green, does not matter. For firstly, it
corresponds moderately well to current lax usage, which allows almost any sort of concern for
environments, coupled with an action component as slight as paying a token subscription, to
serve. Secondly, it still exercises quite enough exclusive power. Many agents are not green.
For instance all those exclusively tuned into possessive individualism, mainstream economics,
or similar creeds are not green (i.e. not even lax green). Thirdly, needed discriminations can be
made within the class of (lax) green. An important subclass of green comprises ecological
green, where the causes include maintenance and protection of natural ecosystems (including
wilderness) and these causes enjoy some primacy. "Ecological green" is by no means a
tautology.
4
In a study entitled 'GREEN PACKAGES IN AUSTRALIA', greens were picked out from the whole
sample of respondents to the Australian Election Study of 1990 in terms of answer to question:
How likely are you to join groups campaigning to protect the environment, or are you alrady a
member? Permitted answers: (1) I am a member, (2) I am not a member but I have considered
joining (3) I am not a member and I haven't considered joining, and (4) I certainly would not
consider joining. Those giving answer (2), perhaps token greens, were accounted green.
�4
To be green in more than a token fashion is to have some commitment to containing or
reducing the environmental impact of humans on the Earth or regions of it. By virtue of the
environmental impact equation (for a given region) that means commitment in the immediate
future term to either
•
human population reduction, or
•
less impacting lifestyles for many humans, or
•
improvements in technology to reduce overall impact.
Most humans in a region can do little to implement the third requirement, except to hope.
Accordingly they cannot satisfactorily demonstrate their commitment in this way. A genuine
green will meet both the other conditions. But since as big coalition as feasible is sought for a
green coalition, marginal greens who meet only one of the requirements, perhaps in weak form,
will not usually be excluded (from almost any green church). Issues of population afford a
simple test (a necessary condition) for a genuine green in Australia; for that agent fails who
suppoes that while efforts (including the agent's contribution) to effect human population
reduction should be invested elsewhere, as in parts of Asia or Africa, Australia can keep on
growmg.
From filling out the conditions delimiting green commitments, a green platform can be
derived. Specifically it will include, along with the action clause, derivative directives as
regards curtailing population, refining and limiting consumption, adjusting technologies, and
consequent thereupon altering administrative, political and economic arrangements and
institutions accordingly. What so results is a proper subplatform of the Deep Ecology platform.
A fair approximation to the full Deep Ecology platform can be derived by adjoining
requirements for depth to those for genine greenness of the action platform; so result themes
concerning intrinsic value in nature, and commitments deriving therefrom. In short, the wellknown Deep Ecology platform accounts (as a fair approximation) to a deep green platformwhich can accordingly supplant it.
As genuine green and green platform can be characterized given the initial notion of green,
that is lax green, so similarly can other green compounds and modified forms be explained (in a
preliminary way). For example, a green ideosystem is an ideosystem (an ideology, in the
unbiassed sense) that coheres with green commitments, and typically organizes and guides
them. As genuinely green, it is a system that includes a green platform, and it could be defined
in that way, as an ideo-system coherently extending a green platform. Similarly for green
ethics, and for green philosophy (and also for other green notions that could be defined but are
not presently needed, e.g. green goods, green consumers, green parties, green ideas and so
forth). A green ethical system is a green ideosystem which is an ethic. Green ethics comprises
�5
such green ethical systems and their theory. 5 Green ethics thus comprise a decidedly restricted
subset of environmental ethics. For an environmental ethic in the broad usage, an ethics that
addresses environmental issues, among others, may well contain themes that could not be
adopted by a green agent, that may even operate against environmental causes. In consequence,
a green ethics is an ethic that could be coherently adopted by a green agent, that does not run
counter to environmental causes.
3. Different approaches to the environment: shallower and deeper.
People can do more or less what they like with the environment, with the land and the sea,
and with what grows and lives there-such was and, in only slightly modified form, remains a
dominant theme of Wes tern cultural heritage. It was not the view of other cultures, such as
some of the American Indians or Australian Aborigines; nor was it the only view included in the
Western cultural package. But it has dominated, especially in colonial and imperial expansion.
It is only recently, for example, that some social or governmental restrictions with teeth have
been imposed upon what Australians can do with the land they occupy or claim, and these lag
far behind advanced green thinking as to what is required. For the most part there has been little
weakening in the Wes tern assumption that people own the land, that it is their possession, to
mould to their purposes and whims. 6
This unrestrained approach proved damaging enough while the land was wide and
humans comparatively few; now that human populations are expanding more rapidly, perhaps
to critical limits, now that much land is damaged and less fragile land is in increasingly short
supply, it is time to re-examine older attitudes and the accompanying practices. Any deeper
reassessment has to look at the presupposed land ethic, and more generally at the underlying
ethical and ideological assumptions.
A land ethic, according to Leopold, who introduced the term, is 'an ethic dealing with
man's relation to land and to the animals and plants which grow upon it' .7 Thus a land ethic
amounts to a nature (or environmental) ethic, with land a symbol for the whole of nature (or the
more comprehensive environment), and man a symbol for all relevant agents. The unrestrained
position, which imposes few or no constraints upon treatment of the environment, affords a
land ethic of only a degenerate sort. The unrestrained position would, for example, have little
5
6
7
Although we are anticipating here-as ethics and ethical systems are explained essentially
reportively however, in the next chapter, there is no circularity. For ethics is separately and
independently characterised.
Indeed, with the renewed libertarian movement emanating from industrial north-eastern America,
this assumption has gained in strength. Foreign "resources" are not to be hoarded but should be
saleable to the highest bidders for "free" economic use. And sometimes it is broadly hinted: or
else!
A. Leopold, A Sand Country Almanac with other essays on Conversation, New York, 1966,
p.238.
�6
compunction about using up materials, forests, pristine environments and so on, immediately or
even destroying them.
In the end the unrestrained position can be excluded from properly ethical positions. 8 For
it fails to meet the basic universality requirement on moral principles, of independence of
person, place or time, a requirement which iplies that persons of different races, colours, sexes
or ages, or at different places or times are not treated unfairly or seriously disadvantaged.
Insofar as the unrestrained position would permit the exploitation, degradation and even
destruction, of all present resources and environments, it places future humans at a very serious
disadvantage. The position is thus one of expediency, not morality, typically yielding, like
economics, evaluative assessments based on short-term narrow local interets, rather than
appropriately based on long-range values.
Opposed to the unrestrained position are various conservation ethics; what Leopold saw
as the land ethic is just one of these. Conservation ethics can be classified, conveniently for
subsequent development, into three groups: shallow, intermediate and deep. 9 Unlike the
unrestrained position, all these politions would conserve and maintain certain things-materials,
creatures, forests, etc. The shallow conservation position differs from the unrestrained position
primarily in taking a longer-term view and taking account of future humans, their welfare and so
forth. It is more enlightened than the unrestrained position in taking a longer-term perspective:
hence its alternative description as resource conservation. Though this conservation position is
only a small step away from the unrestrained position, it does pass one test for morality proper
in that future people are not treated unfairly. Most of the big rush into fashionable
environmentalism does not get beyond shallowness.
The shallow and unrestricted positions are closely related by an important feature they
share-and which justifies lumping them together as shallower positions. They are both highly
anthropocentric; they do not move outside a human-centred framework, which construes nature
and the environment instrumentally, that is, simply as a means to human ends and values. Thus
they take account ultimately only of human interests and concerns; all environmental values
reduce to these or similar human on closed notions. It is in this respect especially that these
shallower positions differ from deeper, less resource and exploitation oriented, positions.
8
9
This is a substantial, and controversial claim, especially since it accounts much economic activity
unethical, as involving practices of expediency, not morality. For the fuller case for obligations
and commitments to future humans, see e.g. R. and V. Routley, 'Nuclear energy and obligations
to the future' in Responsibilities to Future Generations: Environmental ethics, (ed. E. Partridge),
Prometheus Books, Buffalo, 1981, and other essays in this book.
This classification refines Naess's non-exhaustive distinction of shallow and deep ecology, and
extends it to render it exhaustive. For the original distinction, see A. Naess, 'The shallow and the
deep, long-range ecology movement' Inquiry 16 (1973) 95-100. An elaboration on Aess's
position, to which this discussion has some debts, may be found in his 'Philosophical aspects of
the deep ecological momvement', Environmental Ethics, to appear.
�According to deeper positions humans are not the sole items of value or bestowing value
in the world, and not all things of value are valuable because they answer back in some way to
human concerns. But deeper positions differ in the weight or relative importance they assign to
human concerns. According to the intermediate position serious human concerns always come
first; and while other things, such as higher animals, have value or utility in their own right,
their value is outranked by that of humans. The deep position rejects this assumption, and
maintains that even serious human concerns should sometimes lose out to environmental values.
FIGURE 1. THE POSITIONS SEPARATED, AND SEPARATING PRINCIPLES
SHALLOWER
UNRESTRAINED
DEEPER
SHALLOW
INTERMEDIATE
I
I
I
I
J,
J,
J,
DEEP
MORALITY
SOLE VALUE
GREATER VALUE
REQUIREMENT
ASSUMPTION
ASSUMPTION
(of human apartheid)
(of human supremacy)
The watershed principle which divides the shallower from deeper positions is the sole
value assumption. According to this major assumption, which underlies prevailing Western
social theory, humans are the only things of irreducible (or intrinsic) value in the universe, the
value of all other things reducing to or answering back to that of humans in one way or another.
This assumption is built into most present political and economic arrangements; for example,
only aggregated preferences or interests of certain (present) humans are considered in
democratic political choice, and likewise in economic decision making; other creatures and
natural items are represented at best through the preferences or votes of interested humans.
Similar assumptions are made in mainstream ethical theories. Typical are reductive
theories which endeavour to derive ethical judgements from features of closed systems of
humans.
Examples are provided by presently fashionable ethical theories, such as
utilitarianism. 10 According to utilitarianism what ought to be done, as well as what is best, is
determined through what affords maximum satisfaction to the greatest number of individual
humans. In theories like utilitarianism, the outside world of nature does not enter through direct
inputs or outputs, but only insofar as it is reflected in the psychological states of individuals.
Such ethical theories are appropriately described as those of apartness or human apartheid. Man
10
But the same holds for other fashionable theories on the American-dominated ethical scene, namely
contractualism and libertarianism. These theories, along with utilitarianism, are explained in most
modern American introductions to ethical theories or moral problems.
�is, or is treated as, apart from Nature; there is virtually total segregation. Nature or the land
enters only as a remote experiential backdrop, and onstage is the drama of human affairs and
interests.
However, humans cannot be entirely insulated from their environment; for example,
volcanoes affect temperatures thus affecting climate thus affecting crop yield and food supplies.
At least limited intercourse with the environment has to be admitted as a result. So, in
economics, ethics, and political theory, secondary theories, dealing with linkages to the
environment, have been appended (thus, for example, extemality theory in economics, some
allowance for "side" constraints in more sophisticated utilitarianism, and so on). But the land
remains treated as an awkward or tiresome afterthought, when it is considered at all.
There is, however, another approach, also with historical standing, vying with (and
indeed often confused with) human apartheid which can accommodate secondary theories a little
more satisfactorily. That is the position of superiority or human supremacy, according to which
Man, though included in Nature, is above the rest of Nature, meaning ethically superior to it.
While human supremacist positions can incorporate the sole value assumption and thus remain
in the shallow ethical area, they have the option of rejecting it in favour of the less objectionable
greater value assumption:: other things being equal, the value of humans is greater than that of
other things; the value of humans surpasses that of all other things in the universe. This
assumption allows that other objects, such as some higher animals, may have irreducible value;
what it insists upon is that, at least for "normal" members of respective species, this value never
exceeds that of humans. What is generally presupposed is that other objects-animals, plants
and their communities-are never of much importance compared with humans. Though human
supremacy has appeared in versions of utilitarianism where animal pain is taken into
consideration along with human, Western ethics and associated social sciences such as
demography, economics and political theory, remain predominantly apartheid in form.
It is the repudiation of the greater value assumption that separates deep from intermediate
positions. Perhaps the most familiar example of an intermediate position is that of Animal
Liberation, in the form in which animals are taken to have value in their own right, though in
any playoff with humans, humans win. Under the deep position such an outcome is by no
means inevitable; in cases of conflict of animal or natural systems with humans, humans
sometimes lose. I I
There are various arguments designed to show that the deep assessment is right, that
humans should sometimes lose out. A typical one takes the following form:- Some humans
lead worthless or negative lives, lives without net value. The point, though not uncontroversial,
11
So too for some men and some sparrow. So we should reject the intermediate ...... : A man is
worth more than a sparrow! (Drungson/ Ralston etc.)
�9
can be argued even from a shallow utilitarianism.1 2 Take for instance a life of pain and
suffering and little or no happiness: it has a substantial net negative utility. But some small
natural systems do have net value; one example would be an uninhabited undisturbed island (a
live example might be a tropical island before Club Mediterranee depredation). Now consider
the situation where the considerable value of a small natural system is to be sacrificed (in a way
that shallowly affords no ethical impropriety) on behalf of a set of humans whose lives each
have no positive net value. For instance, the system is to be exploited, just for the continued
maintena nce of these humans, or for their addition (as new settlers) to an establish ed
population. Then in such circumstances, these humans lose out; the natural system takes
precedence. Similarly, trivial satisfactions of humans do not dominate over the integrity of rich
natural environments.13
Let us look ahead to glimpse paradimatic expansions of the positions indicated (in figure
1). For the positions soon expand, when applied to real life issues, to more comprehensive
positions; indeed they have expanded all the way to what are now called social paradigms, that
is to full social perspectives. For example, the deep position has expanded from the two core
theses-a s initially reformulated, values in nature, which is a positive counterpart of the sole
value assumption, and biospecies impartiality, which is a positive elaboration of greater value
assumption 14-to fuller deep ecological positions which involve as well many other themes.
12
13
The point is argued in detail in R. Routley and N. Griffin, 'Unravelling the meanings of life?'
Discussion Papers in Environme ntal Philosophy #3, Research School of social Sciences,
Australian National University, 1982.
There are significant cross-classifications of environmental positions. Some further dimensions
are included in the following diagram.
Environment not taken
I
Environments is taken
into account
I
into account
p
14
--------- --------- --------- --------- --------- ---
shallow
intermediate
I dogs
I //////
I
I
E
I
individual
I
I
H
I
holistic
I
I
Another dimension is the static/dynamic. But no one want to be just stauc, really.
According to the values in nature theme natural items other than humans and human artefacts have
intrinsic value; while according to biospecies impartiality members of one species, humans in
particular, are not favoured or valued over members of another simply on the basis of species. The
danger of favouring one species is encouraged by the species fallacy, commonly invoked in
favouring humans. This is the mistake of concluding that because a few members of the species
have accomplish ed something of (immense) value, all members of the species therefore are
(highly) valuable; all members of the species manage to free-load for the ride, obtained by a few
members, so to say. The assumption, once challenged, usually falls back on an argument that
goes by way of capacities: the remaining members of the species have the capacity to achieve these
sorts of things also. But, firstly, that isn't true: intelligence, skills, and the like, vary somewhat
within species, and from our narrow perspective, very considerably among humans, some of whom
have no capacity for advanced mathematics or music. Secondly, it requires more than capacity: it
requires circumstances, a favourable environment to exercise them, (hence, in part, the folly of
�lU
The expansion is not uniquely determined; there can be various different deeper paradigms.
However it characteristically includes a fuller statement of themes recognised as in the spirit of
"deep ecology", in particular ecological themes, but also interconnected economic and political
themes. In a similar way shallower positions are subsumed in shallower perspectives, and
principally in what is called the dominant social paradigm, some relevant themes of which are
indicated in figure 2.1s
FIGURE 2. RELEVANT COMPONENTS OF THE ENCOMPASSING PARADIGMS.
DOMINANT SOCIAL
PARADIGM
DEEP ECOLOGICAL
ALTERNATIVE
Dominance over nature
Natural environment a resource
Harmony with nature
Values in nature/biospecies
impartiality
Less material goals/less growth
orientation
Earth supplies limited
AJ?propriate technology/limits to
science
Doing with enough/recycling
Regional/decentralised/small-scale
Material/economic growth
Ample reserves/perfect substitutes
High technological progress/
scientific solutions
Consumerism
National/centralised/large-scale
SHALLOW
f----------------------------- ➔
DEEP
4.
Criticisms of these beginnings and other beginnings
A main challenge we shall have to meet is that there can be no deep ethics, ethics and
axiology are inevitably shallow, because they must answer back to human valuers. This
challenge we presently set aside (until the next chapter). But it should already be apparent how
we can start to upset the challenge (already taken up by deeper utilitarianism), namely by
displacing humans by relevant agents.
Other challenges grant that something might answer to deeper ethics, but contend that
nothing should-objectio ns of substance-or that making anything much out of it is
unwarranted, for example because preliminaries in making out the distinctions have not been
15
more humans in decidedly suboptimal cities), together with a will and drive actually to follow
through appropriately on capacities.
Much fuller accounts of the dominant social paradigm and environmental alternatives are given in
S. Cotgrove, Catastrophe or Cornucopia, Wiley, New York, 1982, and in R. Routley 'Roles and
limits of paradigms in environmental thought and action' in Environmental Philosophy (ed. R.
Elliot and A. Gare), University of Queensland Press, 1983. The linkage of the dominant paradigm
with maximizing, and the deep alternative with sufficing, is elaborated in R. Routley,
'Maximizing, satisficing, satisizing: the difference in real and rational behaviour under rival
paradigms', Discussion Papers in Environmental Philosophy #10, Research School of Social
Sciences, Australian National University, 1984.
�11
properly accomplished-objections of form and from technicalities (cf. challenges to the
analytic/synthetic distinction). We consider examples of both sorts of challenge.
The misanthropy charge. Deep environmentalism has been criticised for what it does, so it is
alleged, to ethical treatment of other humans; it leads, it has been alleged, to neglectful,
negligent, or downright callous treatment of other humans, to inhumanity. The actual impact of
deep environmentalism affords but little ground for such allegations. Nor does the theory.
Deep environmentalism could leave intrahuman ethics, standard morality virtually entirely intact.
If it did so, deep environmental ethics would provide a conservative extension (in the familiar
technical sense) of standard intrahuman ethics. In this event the allegations would fall; for the
ethical treatment of humans would be in principle just the same as before.
But it is unlikely that any deeper environmentalism will leave standard morality entirely
intact in its own prime sphere of operations, that restricted to humans. For instance the
evolution of humans, and attributions of virtues or vices to them, is bound to be influenced by
how they act or respond towards nonhumans and the environment. A virtuous puritanical oldstyle industrialist who makes his affluent living through environmentally damaging practices
will no longer obtain the virtuous ranking that would have been accorded to him on the older
prevailing morality. (Of course that morality too is changing, but it hardly changes rapidly
enough to keep pace with a deeper ethic). The change in the evaluation of and moral standing
accorded to hard-working but environmentally exploitative business people, technologists and
engineers reflects a more far-reaching adjustment; that of removal of special privilege for
humans (or persons). Even in the more austere of standard ethical positions, such as duty
ethics in the Kantian mould, it is very easy to gain the impression of persons (usually males on
traditional ethics) as kings. There will be a club of kings, that was where more egalitarian
industrialism was proceeding also, to make us all kings - with the rest of nature as subjects.
While the unwarranted privilege accorded to humans under conventional ethical wisdom
will topple then, the treatment of humans by humans need not. To the contrary, if people
develop a more respectful and careful attitude to the environment, then they may well develop a
better, different and more careful, approach to other people as well. Here the awful Kantianstyle theme that decent treatment of animals will trickle down from a decent treatment of other
humans is partially reversed; a better treatment of other humans (a decent treatment is already
ethically required) will percolate up from a more gently and respectful treatment of natural
environments.
Nor finally then need a deeper environmentalism abandon the quest for social justice. 16
Deep-green theory certainly does not; the ethical-change agenda is much wider than social
16
There are two American groups where the quest for terrestial social justice appears to have been
abandoned or comprised: eco-fascists and nature greens, as they are sometimes called from outside.
�12
change alone, but social and human concerns do not thereby fall off the agenda. They remain,
but no longer in such isolations. What they do lose their unchallenged preeminence, and they
may also lose priority.
Problems with the Greater Value assumption (after Attfield).
A prime alternative to a shallow/deep distinction is (what is sometimes considered no
alternative, but a variant on it) the anthropocentric/ecologic distinction.
Notes: 1. Not the same distinction. While shallow positions are normally anthropocentr ic,
converse does not obtain.
2. Distinction never made out properly (really degree issues), and leads to typical 4-fold
outcome.
5.
Domination and chauvininism.
The greater or sole value accorded to humans, as compared with (other) valuations,
justify the domination of nature by humans. The main argument is simply that what has lesser
or no value should give away to what has greater value, the conventional assumption being that
what has greater value is better (analytic) than what has less, and should prevail over it
(substantive assumptions of conventional ethical themes such as utilitarianism).
Domination and associated class chauvinism are justified not only directly through
consideration s of greater or supreme value, but also less directly by pointing to highly valued
features possessed by the favoured class. Similar appeals to prized features are of course
likewise used to justify class chauvinism.
Appendices :
1.
Deep ethics are not automatically acceptable as satisfactory.
Consider e.g.whole chauvinism, where Wholes are intrinsically valuable, each and every
one, and their value much exceeds that of everything else, humans included. So wholes come
first. (This is a doctrical some superwholes may hold).
Two rough comparisions: cows in India, humans on earth.
Other unsatisfactory deep ethics, apart from those that aberate one species, are those that
focus exclusively on certain elements. Those e.g. individualisms, strong holisms, etc.
2.
Arguments to shallowness.
1. Simplistic (from one James O'Connor of Canada).
' ... the word "value" is a human word, with human meanings, in this case transposed to
non-human nature. Hence to say that nature is inherently valuable means that it is inherently
valuable to humans'.
Ecofascists, who follow a route pioneered by Hardin, call for a triage of nations on lifeboat earth
and abandonment of those nations, such as Bangladesh, seen without prospect of recovery. But the
position is not deep, it is certainly not a properly moral position; for due criticism see Griffin and
Bennett.
�u
2. Problem with shallow/deep terminology, e.g. acquired too many associations for comfort.
Intellectual offensiveness shallow, etc.
3. Shallowness involves a reductionist exercise. Making (trying to make) environmental issues
in all that matter environmentally-answer back to shallow concerns.
Series of arguments advanced to try to establish ..... .
Counter argument. These do not succeed and can be counter-evolelled.
3. Cross-classifications reformism/revolation is, like anthropocentrism, a poor
classification. It can be shallow without reformism and unethical economism with reformism.
DE itself is largely reformist in character (and excessively personal).: Anthropo-/ecocentric.
No doubt 'anthropocentricsm' meaning what its etymology implies 'centring in man'
(OED), is a useful term. Theories such as Coperican and Copenhagen quantum theory can be
criticised (or praised) as anthropocentric. What is in doubt is the new contrast of antropocentric
with ecocentric.
While the vague anthropocentric-ecocentric distinction is alright, so far as it goes, as a
starting stage, it is no place to stop. For there is a need for a value specific distinction,
antrhopocentr can be any sort of human centredness.
'Anthropocentric' is a poor choice of contrasting terminology, for several reasons. One,
which may be convenient to some, lies in its vagueness. There is no sharp cut-off in what is
human centred. Similarly for its supposed contrast term 'ecocentric', which presumably
expandents to 'ecologically centred'. Second, it becomes apparent that no proper contrast is
made in many cases. University textbooks on natural ecology, for instance are both ecocentric
because about ecology and anthropocentric because set and supplied for humans. Human
ecology, a subject increasingly encountered in universities, is directly both (not both under
different aspects). Were the classification satisfactory, it would provide a nice contradiction.
But the classification is far from satisfactory. It is not exclusive: nor is it exhaustive, but the
remainder obscure. But worse, any practical ethics, no matter how deep, is bound to be
anthropocentric, not ecocentric, even though duly concerned with ecology. The reason comes
to this: any adequate ethics is bound to be heavily concerned with agents, their obligations and
responsibilities, and for all practical purposes (on earth) these agents are generally certain
humans. This is, an adequate practical ethics is, as a contingent matter, anthropocentric. Of
course such an ethic, by contrast with main traditional ethics, may also be presented as an
ecocentric ethic, inasmuch as it may be focussed upon ethical agents' relations to ecological
items, human treatment of nature.
�14
Problems with the anthropocentric/ecocentric contrast do not mean that something like the
contrast cannot be made good. But it would involve redefinition of the critical terms, and could
accordingly be better accomplished with adjusted terminology.
Anthropocentrism is implausible, once a modern pict "of universe" becomes available.
(Scuh a sufficiently modern picture was already available to Descartes.)
The sun is a medium sized star of very common sort even within its galaxy. The
probability of planets like the Earth within this university is extraordinarly high. The probability
of other agents is also very high. Even the probability of other ..... ./competent agents is high.
But even if it were not, or even if there were other agents, the discourse to be embarked
upon would be significant. It is also pointful, for instance in disposeing of much philosophy.
If anthropocentrism is so implausible as regards "main place in nature", why is it not
implausible as regards intuitionality, value, etc.
Ironically, the swing away from anthropocentrism in the sciences in modern times (with
the advert of Copenhagen quantum theory and anthropic principles) was overpinged by
increasing anthropocentrism in what are misleadingly distinguished as the humanities. Above
all intentionality and value were emptied out of the wider universe and concentrated in the
exclusive focus of humanities, humans.
To adopt Freud:
Humanity has in the course of time had to endure from the hands of science two great
humiliations to its chauvinism .17 The first was when it was realised that our earth was not the
centre of the universe, but only a speck in the world system of a magnitude hardly
conceivible ... . The second was when his logical science robbed man of his particular privilege
of having been specially created and relegated him to a descent from the animal world' (puoted
in Unozco Ev ..... May 1982 p.3)
There are further shocks in store for humans-poor old humans!
3. Explaining depth [contrasts pale/pallid].
For a good sort of depth, what is needed a deep structure, extraction or format that lies
(partially) hidden from the surface. E.G. plate ponites in geology, strata in archasology, logical
form in grammar. Deep = penetrating to fundamentals in several ways and nonchauvinistic, not
shallow. [Mention also pluralism-so only a framework aimed for, on which grew various
detailled positions.]
Part of depth of Deep Green theory lies in its penetration below the surface of classrestricted or interested humanism to a genuine nonchauvinistic ethical structure: the (ill-named)
annular structure, which ties moral principles to nonhumanistic categorestion. Annular structure
17
Freud says: to great outrages upon it naive serif love.
�15
is a deep structure. A deep structure. Maybe can produce one for deep green theory (see Critiq
p.93, bottom halt) Start as above other measures of depth (pp.44-5) misconceived.
1'. Extent of searching of perception of value; depth of (value) perception.
1. Extent to which humanism (h.ch) abandoned for econvisonmental perspective.
2. Extent to which conventional moral and value judgements put op for reassessment.
(Naess's depth of questioning conventional wisdom) 2 is tied to 1; for abandoning heh
involves much reassessment.
Note differs from usual reflective equilibrium, which takes many generally accepted
judgements for granted.
More on what depth means (pragmetinally): Many environmental outcomes sought in deep
grounds can be supported in shallow ways (of course). But there are differences, as examples
show:
• pesticides (in forestry) should not be used, despite insect damage. For pesticides violate
natural succession and healing processes. Toxicity questions, though important, are secondary.
On shallow view: the main problem becomes not the use of pesticides, but whether they are
safe.
• natural world appears as a resource. Life forms which interfere with uses are pests.
2. Reformist/Transformist Variations upon Shallow/Deep Ecology
Unhappy with the derogatory implications of "shallow", Devall and Sessions tried to
convert shallow ecology in ecological reformism. While there was certainly a basis for this
conversion in Naess's original brief account of shallow ecology (which almost invited such
reconstrual), the result has been that something different has emerged, notably in green politics.
For what such conversions, along with associated imagery accompanying reformism,
achieve is not elucidation, but introduction of new contrasts, and therewith political crossclassification of the shallow-deep ecology contrasts. There are various contrasts with (mere)
reformist adjustment on political theory, for instance revolutionary change and radical change.
A revolutionary direction appears inappropriate as regards deep ecology (as revealed both by the
literature and political stances of leading members of the movement), but a politically radical
direction on environmental issues does emerge from later developments in N aess' s work.
Accordingly a rough contrast, which admits sharpening, can be made out between green
reformism and green radicalism. A machine image, which often operates not far from view in
such contrasts, is initially helpful in indicating the differences. Reformism does not interfere
with the main operation of the machine, its motor, though it may alter the adjustments, retune or
fine tune it, add filters or mufflers or converters, alter its appearance cosmetically, and so on.
By contrast radicalism would alter the machine, would interfere with its motor to some extent,
depending on the level of radicalism.
�16
In political terms reformism is exemplified in such measures as limiting pollution by
emission devices, further treatment of sewerage, small reserves and roadside veneers of trees
amid clear-cutting operations, tidying up of litter, and so on. The main motor of liberal
democratic market capitalism, the economic engine designed to deliver maximum economic
growth, and its main institutions, remain untouched and uncriticised; no change is proposed for
them. For radicals such measures and like reforms do not proceed far enough, towards the
sources of the problems. To tackle the range of environmental problems more radical change in
economic, social and perhaps political machinery is required. But evidently the extent of change
envisaged can vary, very considerably. For example, a frugal conservation program, directed at
limiting economic growth through removing conspicuous and excessive consumption, need
carry no accompanying program for radical social and political change. Again, deep ecology,
which offers no well worked out, or even well signposted, radical program or radical
restructuring, does not appear to be politically radical. Alternatives to liberal democratic
arrangements are not really advanced or investigated. By contrast some anarchist and marxist
influenced ecological positions are politically radical, for instance, social ecology. In short,
there is room for a classification of green radicalism, as shown by a preliminary grouping
according to whether the radicalism affects which of separate (though overlapping) economic,
social, or political matters.
The reformist-radical distinction is a vague one, without a sharp boundary. Reforms can
so accumulate that what was a difference in degree becomes a difference in kind, what was
extensive reformism turns out to be radicalism. In such an incremental fashion, positions which
were reformist can find themselves radical, without having undergone any conspicuus
radicalisation.
The contrast between reformism and radicalism can be sharpened somewhat within a (an
improved) theory of social paradigms. Then reformism is intra-paradigmatic, whereas
radicalism is not (but is extra-paradigmatic). That is a reformist works, like a normal scientist,
within the operational paradigm (the given political motor) and does not seek to change it,
whereas the radical does; success of radicalism resembles abnormal (even revolutionary)
periods in science. As there are many ways of deviating from a paradigm, which typically
involves a complex set of presumptions, so there are many sorts of radicalism.
The extent to which the political conversion of the shallow-deep contrast into green
reformism-radical contrast affords not a restatement, but a different classification, may now be
evident though perhaps not to its full extent. The most notable further feature is that green
radicalism may be utterly shallow, entirely anthropocentric. 18 Green Marxism affords a useful
18
In these terms Naess conflated two contrasts in his original 1973 article; shallow-deep and
reformist-radical. Different followers have latched onto different contrasts.
�l'/
example; it is socially and politically radical while shallow (of course it can be argued that it is
environmentally incoherent, though not in the mentioned features, but in its plan to supercharge
the economic motor and make it run even faster, with evident environmental fall-out). Social
ecology offers another example; for while more radical than deep ecology, it is certainy not
deep. Something of the rich variety we have come upon can be glimpsed from the following
table.
All the positions enumerated, except 9, are occupied, we suspect (though positions are often so
poorly or incompletely presented that is difficult to be sure ). 19 Positions 9 is practically
excluded for committed deep parties who duly care about the demise of what is of intrinsic value
under mere reformism. Position 5 is however occupied, by those who want (or believe they
have achieved) improved arrangements for and treatment of animals (e.g., no circuses, no
ordinary zoos, no cruel contests, etc.) but are not committed to a radical animal liberation
agenda. Green party territory is usually shallow, but some of the proposals presented may
extend to position 4, for instance in demands for participatory democratic restructuring. Of
course, many supporters of green parties may adhere to deeper positions.
19
It is worth noting that such positions will in principle supply their own forms of sustainability,
sustainable societies, and so on.
�24.10.95
Chapter 2
ETHICS WITHOUT HUMANS,
PHILOSOPHY WITHOUT HUMANS,
and COROLLARIES
It is a commonplace that ethics has proceeded not merely as if humans were on centre
stage, but as if humans really were all there is, all that mattered in ethics, as if nothing else
enters into morals and ethics, or does through only through them. That commonplace is
moreover commonly strengthened to a claim of necessity, that this must be so, that nothing
else can enter, except indirectly by way of humans. Ethics has to be thus anthropocentric.
Since environmental ethics began to shift humans, if ever so little, off centre stage, there has
been a heavy philosophical reaction, a sometimes bitter blacklash against greener ethics that
would background humans, or dare sometimes to remove humans, from the scene altogether.
Among many other things, it has been contended that by the very meaning of ethics and
morals, these subjects must be human-centred.
A crucial argument for necessary anthropocentricism of ethics makes human centrality
a matter of definition. This crucial argument will be broken, in the first of several stages,
through a detailed characterisation of morals and ethics in a way that is independent of
humans. The characterizations adopted depart in only minor and justified (though highly
consequential) ways from received dictionary definitions; that is the characterisations are
substantially reportive, as they have to be if they are to serve their iconoclastic purposes. The
matter of characterising ethics is in any case part of our business. Where would deep-green
ethics be left, as a subject of investigation, without an appropriate account of ethics?
1. On inadeqacies of what prevails: a sheaf of defective accounts.
It takes but little effort to discover severe shortcomings in most preceding investigations, and
that most accounts, many of them far too casual, are inappropriate for what they are intended
to cover, still less for environmental ends. There is no end to bad and defective definitions to
dissect and discard.
Even textbooks and guidebooks on ethics often make no attempt at a definition, and
often have little or nothing of due generality to offer on what ethics is about. 1 Unremarkably
then, many of those presenting or teaching ethics, perhaps well enough, have no adequate idea
of what ethics is about. This is revealed by the sorts of definitions they slop down and by
what they say ethics is about. The slop presented indicates they did not even bother to consult
their dictionaries with any care. It is an elementary exercise to show deficiencies in most
proposals.
A striking recent example is Singer (ed.) Companion to Ethics, supposedly an encyclopaedic work
on ethics.
�2
A few sample definitions recently encountered will help confirm our claims. Utterly
defective is the account of ethics as 'the relation between you and other people' .2 Such
connections as the spatial relations between people, for instance where they sit at a seminar,
do not belong to ethics. Narrowing relations to those of treatment, as in 'how you treat other
people' improves the account a bit, but not enough. Decent treatment of relevant kinds no
doubt comprises part of ethics, but a small part. Nor is such treatment confined, especially as
regards receivers, to people; animals, nature and more, all matter.
A more interesting account, presumably designed to encompass applied ethics, takes this
remarkable form: "'ethics" [is] defined as disciplined reflection by persons in all walks of life
on moral ideas and ideals'. 3 As a definition, this too fails entirely, appearing circular, and
converting ethics away from, what is essential, practice into head stuff, into something like
meditation, a kind of widely practiced theorizing, though practised on certain parts of ethics!
There are too some unfortunate side-effects of the insertion, aimed at making ethics applicable
to all walks of (human) life: namely, as there are walks of life which have no room for
disciplined reflection, so there is in fact no ethics. Back again to the drawing board.
Similarly for Russell's fuller attempt:
The study of Ethics is perhaps most commonly conceived as being
concerned with the questions "What sort of actions ought men to perform?"
and "What sort of actions ought men to avoid?" It is conceived, that is to
say[!], as dealing with human conduct, and as dividing what is virtuous and
what is vicious among the kinds of conduct between which, in practice,
people are called upon to choose. 4
Owing to feminist criticism of male chauvinism, many now wince at Russell's; piquant use of
term like 'men' (in fact throughout his numerous works). Environmental criticism of human
chauvinism has not been so (terminologically) successful, sad to report.
Back to the board.
It takes little effort to assemble a sheaf of inadequate definitions and accounts of ethics. Many
include too little, for example the popular account of ethics as "how we should live", which as
well as being too narrow is parochial. 5 Similarly, though fractionally better; a coherent set of
values to live by is enough for an ethic. For that appears to omit a deontic component,
obligations and permissions, and certainly leaves out ethical virtues. A major shortcoming,
even in fuller characterisations, concerns the concentration on humans and their parochial
affairs. For, as will soon appear, ethics does not essentially concern humans. An adequate
ethics says nothing about humans, members of species Homo sapiens, their obligations and
rights, values or virtues. It applies but contingently to humans; it applies similarly to
hominids, humanoids, and to persons generally, and functions in the absence of persons
altogether. As a result, the following familiar sorts of pronouncements on what ethics amount
2
3
4
5
John Langford, on ABC radio, 22 February 1993.
Engels, 6.
Russell p.1, F & S, from Elements of Ethics 1910.
For such an account see e.g. Single [Encyl. Brit.]
�3
to are seriously defective: 'An ethic may be thought of as an ideal of human behaviour, an
environmental ethics as ideal human behaviour with respect to the environment, natural and
built" _6 Not everyone got it quite so wrong. For instance, Brandt gets away to a nice neutral
start, even if he does not cover the spread of ethics. Consider his opening:
Moral philosophy has traditionally been a systematic attempt to answer
some questions of apparently universal interest [!] about: what is worth
wanting or working for (what is worthwhile, of worth); what is the best
thing for an agent to do from his own point of view; what is morally right,
and what is morally just). [Also what is rational in these regards.]7
The nice start does not last. Agents turn out to be humans; utilitarianism soon begins to effect
an ugly intrusion, and so on.
2. On how to define ethics and morals more satisfactorily.
It is not difficult to do noticeably better than ethics teachers and writers have managed,
simply by consulting better dictionaries. But it is also not so difficult to re-organize and
improve upon what dictionaries offer. It is significant that dictionary definitions of moral and
ethic contain no essential allusion to humans, nothing essential concerning humans, man, or
we, us and co. (andwhere 'human' does enter, as in 'principles of human duty', it can simply
be elided, it is inessential). But the dictionary accounts do harbour some problems.
For one thing, like some of the preceding definitions, the dictionaries seem mired in a
common and damaging circularity: ethics is defined in terms of morality (and its adjuncts,
decent treatment, and similar); but then morality is itself defined through ethics. Fortunately
the loop back to ethics can be broken.
A particularly satisfactory way to workable definitions of notions in the ethics orbitethic, ethical, ethics, to take direct cases-is through those in the presupposed moral orbitdirectly, moral, morality, morals. For all these ethical notions are regularly defined, in better
dictionaries, through moral notions. This approach reverses the difficult and so far
unsuccessful strategy, sometimes tried in ethical theory, of attempting to define morality (e.g.
through universalizability conditions) inside a somehow independently characterized ethics. 8
The bases, upon which moral notions are carried, lie in turn in the action orbit, in
features of actions and their agents. 9 As agents are entailed by actions-beca use actions just
6
7
8
9
See 'A universal environmental ethics' Connect, UNESCO-UNE P Environmental Education
Newsletter XVI(2)(June 1991). pl.
Brandt p.l.
Long ago I used to think this was now it had to be done, through some singling out of morals
within ethics by way of a combination features of humans and requirements of morality (such as,
variously, consideration of others, universalizability). Not recognising the virtues of agency, I too
erroneously supposed that morality had to pertain to humanity.
No doubt the main definitional enterprise can be carried out, more or less, the other way around,
beginning with ethics, then cutting down to morals within, through agency. Moreover, such an
alternative route (starting out easily enough from the notion of ethics as the theory and
systematization of the good and the right, valuable and permissible, the virtuous and responsible,
and so on) should arrive at the same place, at a similar end result.
These action basics can in turn be explained, as before, within process theory, see Sylvan 1993. A
classification of agents can be drawn from there. It is not claimed that this is how we have to start
or that action nexus affords unique starting point. But its features have to be included sooner or
�4
are agent-ascribed processe s-actions , more generally processes, form bedrock here. Neither
processes nor actions have any essential connection with humans. Relevant elements of
action nexus, upon which moral actions are carried, are now indicated: Single action
snapshot, capturing agent-acts -in-environment nexus:
AGENT
has
motives
emotions
volitions
objectives and goals
of
prior causes
ACTION
has
subsequent consequences
impacts upon (relevant items within) environment
The breakdown of actions, into types, will straightaway yield much that has long been taken
as central in moral theory, such as agonising (as Socrates did) over choices. Choice-making is
a morally critical type of action. Plural actions expose further relevant features, including
conduct, dispositions and character of agents, and suggest typologies (or moral relevance) of
actions and of impacts. Virtue ethics, but part of moral theory, fit here.
Whereas morality -the new ecologically sensitive morality that is-begin s from certain
features of an agent in its environment, ecology begins from investigation of an organism in
its environment. 'From the outset ecology was clearly understood to be the appreciation of
the organism (any organism, note) in and as part of its environment' . 10 'Something along the
lines of "the study of organisms in relation to their environment" is the basis of most ...
attempts ... [at] working definition of ecology ... over [which] there has been little dispute' . 11
Despite initial appearances, the upshot is not (the perhaps appealing one) that morality is a
branch of ecology. For the features investigated are very different (and a satisfactory
definition of 'ecology ' has to be sharpened to indicate what features of organism-inenvironments are studied). Whereas in morality there is much interest in the virtues and vices
of agents for instance, a parallel interest is outside the scope of ecology (and indeed not a
significant question for most organism or for many agents).
Interestingly, the ethical theory being advanced begins in precisely the way Deep
Ecology, in its pristine formulation, implies that no theory should operate, with an agent-inenvironment image. Under the total-field approach of Deep Ecology all such images dividing
up fields should be rejected, in particula r any man-in-e nvironme nt image, a special
chauvinistic case of what our theory operates with. Similarly no doubt for organism-inenvironment images of ecology. Unremarkably no arguments are offered for these rejections;
10
11
later, and it has virtues as a start, including familarity and naturalness.
R. Kitching [New Education], p.39
Ibid p.40 rearranged.
�5
cogent arguments would be hard to find, or articulate. In any case, Deep Ecology strictures do
not prevent preliminary or limited uses of field analysis. As it will soon turn out, for more
general purposes, what is needed is removal of agents, not dissolving the image.
These action-theoretic preliminaries admit of much elaboration and variation, both
expansion and contraction most of which however we can pick up as we proceed. For
example, an illuminating expansion would expose the setting, of constraints and incentives,
within which an agents acts; no doubt some of these features, incentives for instance, can be
absorbed into what is already depicted, such as motives, and the remainder could be included
in under a prior-influences category. Striking contractions are those afforded by prevailing
ethical theories, consequentialism and Kantianism, which would erase, respectively, all but
consequences or all but motives. The parable of the Blindman and the Elephant is not only a
clever analogy for a implausible perspectivism; it can serve as a telling indictment of much
analytic philosophical practice. Moral philosophical practice, especially that of analytic
philosophy, consists in only sensing part of a whole (constellation) and failing to see the
rest. 12 Moral and action theory afford good examples of such skimping; for instance,
consequentialism fails to see anything but consequences.
The term moral, generously construed, covers the assessment of agent-intricated
elements of the action nexus depicted, in all the following sorts of respects (as applicable):
excellent, good, indifferent, bad, evil; approved, disapproved;
valuable, of value, or not
axiological
right or wrong (or alright), fair or unfair, proper or improper
obligatory, forbidden, permissible
deontic
responsible, irresponsible;
it also covers principles concerning such assessments. Morality concerns both appreciation
and assessment of agents-acting-in-environments as regards those sorts of features and
resulting systematization. Parallels with ecology should be evident. X's conduct or the like is
moral, broadly so, iff it is a matter for moral appraisal. In short, what is moral is marked out
by classes of functors in an action nexus.
Plainly some of the features, which perform the distinguishin g work, are not
significantly applicable to all elements in the nexus; for instance, impacts of frogs are not
significantly responsible. Responsibility applies primarily to certain agents, their conduct and
character. The sorts of respects cited are, furthermore, more general forms. But many more
specific evaluations are thereby encompassed; for instance, honourable, dishonourable;
decent, indecent, again as applicable.
In terms of the sorts of respects, certain important subtypes can be distinguished. The
first group (given by the first two lines) covers axiological. The second group (given by the
next two lines) covers deontic. The third group (not usually distinguished in "the logic of
12
For a detailed treatment of skimping in philosophy, see DP, chapter 11.
�6
ethics") comprises accountability notions.
Such, formerly important, terms as virtuous and vicious-regu larly, but wrongly
included in dictionary listings of respects defining moral (e.g., "of or pertaining to character
or disposition considered as ... virtuous or vicious")-ar e axiological. They can be
characterized in terms of what is already available, thereby avoiding further circularity vexing
dictionary definitions (which define 'moral' using 'virtuous', and 'virtuous' deploying
'moral'). 13 For example, to adjust the dictionaries, virtuous [action] is [that] exhibiting moral
excellence or quality, vicious that distinguished as morally evil. Much the same supervenient
story gets told for duty in the deontic class. For while a duty just amounts to a certain sort, a
rigorous sort, of moral obligation, duty is not among the respects listed in defining the term
moral.
There are several, loosely consequential , attachments often made to what counts as
moral(s), notably: issues of punishments and rewards, with a view to altering proper conduct;
of freedom and determinism, as the latter may appear to place moral enterprise in jeopardy; of
justification of moral principles, which do not stand on its own without moral justification;
and so on, for other theoretical topics that consequently arise. While these further issues do
not form part of dictionary definitions of moral, they are stock textbook fare in moral
philosophy. But that, moral philosophy and moral theory, is where they can comfortably stay.
While the issues that result could be called moral, or distinguished as textbook moral, they
might as well simply be accommodate d more accurately, within philosophy of morality (metamorals).
Morality is, at base, the attribute of being moral. 14 Thus, basically, an item exhibits
morality if and only if that item is moral. In wider compass, morality comprehends a larger
package concerning what is moral; it consists in the theory and appreciation, practice and
principles of what is moral. It follows, from the account of moral given, that morality is all
about certain features of agency, features of theory and practice of agency, namely evaluative
and assessment features and principles concerning these, such as conduct and choice.
Several other significant corollaries also emerge. Firstly morality has nothing
essentially to do with humans. A similar but still more striking result will follow for ethics,
which is characterised, also in a human independent way, by way of morality. Ethics too has
nothing essentially to do with humans (or even with humanoids). Morality turns on features
of agency. Humans, some of them, simply happen to supply, presently, prime terrestrial
examples of full moral agents, those actors who do not merely conduct themselves well or
badly (a kangaroo can be a good or poor mother, a dog can behave badly and know it) but
who make promises, recognise obligations, accept responsibilities, and so forth.
Humans were almost certainly not the only full terrestrial agents; other humanoid
13
14
Thus too much of "virtue ethics" can be absorbed, see further, later chapters.
In logical terms it is defined through attribute abstraction.
�7
species that have become extinct (perhaps with human assistance) very likely were also.
Certain humans are probably not the only full moral agents even now in this universe. It is
unlikely that humans will exemplify the only moral agents, perhaps even terrestrially. 15 The
prominen t role of competen t humans in morality, and so as regards ethics, is utterly
contingent. It follows, now quite generally, that those familiar definitions of morality and
ethics in terms of humans and their features are one and all defective. For all the (green)
ethical theory to be developed, humans can drop out altogether. But competent humans are
useful for illustrative purposes; it helps to have some demonstrably actual examples.
Moreove r, in such practical terms as terrestrial ethical impact, they are now almost
unavoidable.
Before explaining how to escape damaging agent centredness, or actocentricity, in ethics
that would result from equating ethics with morals (i.e. morality in this sense), there are loose
ends to be tied up and certain advantages, worth recording, accruing from having actocentrism
as a staging post. One advantage is that unwanted senses of evaluative notions are peeled off
automatically, because they do not apply regards agency. For example, so removed are not
only merely "aesthetic" uses but all those quasi-descriptive uses of commendatory terms such
as good (e.g. 'good car' 'good sort', 'good sox', 'good ox'). Aesthetic uses of evaluative
terms, as in 'fine painting' or 'good book', do not concern, except in oblique ways, action or
conduct of agents. It may well be objected that even so not enough non-moral uses are peeled
off, as various uses like those of mere expediency or practicality are left standing. A countercase will be developed that these should be left standing. For a smarter strategy than
attempting exclusion, includes moralities of expedience, of practicality, egoism and the like
within the moral orbit-so enabling a straightforward answer to such otherwise vexing
questions as Why be moral?- whilst subsequently differentiating within morals a distinuished
subclass (to be called meurals) which does function exclusively through meeting more
exacting requirements of morality.
There is a subsense that should be picked up immediately. Though a vicious or evil
agent is certainly a matter for morality, and within its compass, such an agent would not
normally be accounted moral (as a naive reading of the dictionaries would suggest), but
immoral. What is moral, morality, concerns the span of moral, immoral and indifferent
procedures. Plainly moral in the narrower sense comprehends the definitely positive part of
the span, as good does of the wide value span. Generally, an item (such as an agent, practice,
conduct, or whatever) is strictly moral, moral in this stricter sense, if it is moral, a matter of
15
There are arguments to other moral agents, other full agents even, from evolusionary theory.
According to an expanded theory, every niche is eventually occupied. (In a way, this interesting
theme carries over from the earlier doctrine of a great chain of being, which similarly onto every
position in the chain as potentially occupied.) By a statistical argument (copying those for
intelligent life elswhere in this vast universe), there are, or will be, niches for agents, with requisite
capabilities, wlsewhere in the universe. Therefore, by the theory, these niches will eventually be
occupied.
�8
moral concern, and its appraisal is decidedly positive. Naturally for a full account, positive
within the moral span, has also to be defined. However here the strict sense is picked up only
to be set aside.
Focussing upon morality would be unduly limiting from the perspective of
environment al ethics. For although anthropocent ricism has been avoided, easily
circumvented through agency, though humans play no essential role, still morality is
undoubtedly agent-centred. Morality foregrounds agents and assessments of them and their
actions, and backgrounds environments of agents, and environments more generally (those
without agents in them do not even enter into consideration). The environment remains, so to
say, mere backdrop to actions of agents.
Escape is through an intermediary, which is substituted in place of morality in the
account proposed of ethics. That intermediary is an expanded morality, in convenient
shorthand ectomorality. 16 ('Ectomoralit y' is close enough for the present to 'ecomorality' ,
which is of course part of the main focus.) Expanded morality takes into account also
evaluative settings, perhaps devoid of agents; whatever of value that agents, or agent-like
subjects, agentoids, might in principle impact upon, interfere with, disturb, effect, change,
dislodge, or similar. That is, to say, it encompasses all items of relevant value, of worth,
significant items, including many wholes, such as habitats, ecosystems, the Earth itself; and so
also whatever applies morally with respect to these, for instance permission to disturb or to
improve, principles of letting be, and so on. Such ecosignificant items are also called, in the
literature, morally considerable items (a nicely ambiguous term, both sides of which have
unfortunate features, one because a considerable item may not have large significance, the
other because what it is supposed to respond to is some restricting class of considerers). In yet
other and more satisfactory terms, they have ethical standing. Naturally items of significance
other than agentoids may have other ethically relevant features (which they perhaps accrue
through their significance). For instance they may hold entitlements of various sorts, such as
to be left alone, to be represented, and so on.
In order to characterize core notions in the ethics orbit, the basic strategy consists in
plugging in "expanded morality" where the dictionaries give "morality"; similarly substitute
"ectomoral" for "moral". For the adjectival forms 'ethical' , and (equivalently) 'ethic', that is
all that is required. For the form concerned means: pertaining to ectomorality, or
(equivalently) treating of or relating to ectomorals. For the noun forms it is not so simple,
because there are problems with the dictionary accounts (for instance in 'the science of
morality' owing to misplaced definiteness, and dated uses of the term 'science'). Always
ethics(s) is an abstract, signifying features of being ethical; more exactly, always concerning
ectomoral theories or systems. More specifically, ethic( s) signifies
firstly, in both singular or plural though usually plural, the whole field of ectomoral theory
16
Greek ektos, outside. We include the inside with the expansion which incorporates the outside.
�9
(the "science" of ectomorals), or derivatively, the department of (philosophical) study
concerned therewith;
secondly, in the singular but pluralising, a system or schematization of ectomorality, that is, at
least rudiments of a system, or of a theory, comprising values, ectomoral principles, and rules
of proper conduct.17
Like stock textbook ethics, most environmental ethics so far are in fact truncated; they
are very rudimentar y schemes, leaving out much that would be expected in a fatter
systematization. Hence in part the vagueness of characterization. So far the vagueness
(which does not exceed that of dictionaries or of ordinary usage), is immaterial, as the
characterisation is workable. But further exactness could be obtained through a technical
upgrade of system and a more detailed specification of what such a proposition system
contains. 18
What are sometimes cited as further restricted senses of 'ethic' are not further senses.
Rather they are restrictions, or designations, of what is already presented. Thus for instance,
the 'moral principles of a particular leader or school of thought' as in Buddhist ethics or
Kantian ethics. Similarly for field indications or application restrictions, as in medical ethics
or bioethics. So much for "senses" of 'ethics'.
In order to reach an adequate definition of ethics, not merely for intended environmental
purposes, but for historical purposes as well (so as to include Stoic ethics, Taoist ethics,
romantic nature ethics and the like as ethics) we have been obliged to adjust (if in an
inconspicuous way) dictionary definitions of ethics. That adjustment was made through
"expanded morality", but could have been accomplished in other equivalent ways (Leopold's
expansion of 'community' is another, though less satisfactory, way of achieving the same sort
of thing). Granted that we have adjusted dictionary definitions, have we changed the very
notion of ethics, or did the dictionaries, not for the first item, get it wrong, getting caught with
chauvinistic definitions? We claim that we have not changed the notion. Rather we captured
what some meant, more or less, by ethics all along-fro m Stoics, Epicureans and others on. It
has never been a very precise notion. In this case (by contrast with terms like right) not too
much hangs on the term, and we could simply divide ethics up, for instance, into wide and
narrow. However, we intend to keep the nice term ethics but to give the dictionaries and
modem opposition the expressions, standard ethics, or conventional ethics.
Our inconspicuous but all important adjustment is both good and bad news. It is bad
news, insofar as it appears to assist the charge that [deeper] environmental philosophy is doing
something different from ethics, that it is guilty of changing the subject (i.e., effectively
committing ignoratio elenchi). However we can freely grant, without incurring damage, that
17
18
Thus ethics include what it has to include, as expanded environment ally: philosophy of
ecomorality, and therewith of morality.
A system is a relational structure of a certain sort. An ethic is a propositional system, since it has
to include principles and the like; thus it involves a theory of strict logical sort. For an illustration
of the use of systems formulations in ethics, see e.g. Routley 1973.
�10
standard ethics was, as a matter of definition, at least actocentric, and that, insofar as agents
were identified with humans, it was, therefore, anthropocentric. Even so ethics, as redefined,
includes standard ethics, so it is more satisfactorily seen not a different but a larger subject,
expanded through an expanded morality. It is good news, not merely because it facilitates
environmental ethics and accords with more satisfactory (greener) accounts of the subject, but
because it helps in getting around a snarl of objections to the effect that ethics has to be
homocentric, or at least actocentric. Removing these objections will recur throughout what
follows.
Among corollaries of note, a first one is that plurality of ethics falls out of the
characterisation. An ethic is not unique. Nor (through such a result does not follow as
environmental ethics form a subclass of ethics) are environmental ethics. Nor are military or
professional ethics. Failure of uniqueness is not a deficiency, but a virtue. For, one thing, it
gives places to go in cases of breakdown of an ethic, namely to other nearby ethics. Plurality
is tied up with nonuniqueness and other features of merit: noncomprehensiveness, openness,
flexibility, and so on.19
Secondly, there is more news on what an ethics is; and what an environmental one is. It
is widely claimed that an ethics requires a communit y, in an environme ntal ethic the
community (of concern etc.) is a wide environmental one. Ethics enlarges the community, a
scope of values. Ethics (partaking of ethos ~ the evaluative frame(or spirit) of a community.
While these ideas are popular they are astray.
Environmental ethics shifts the frame of reference for ethical consideration from purely
human concerns to ecological communities. 1-B Human beings as moral agents are not
ethically privileged.
An environmental ethic must be compatible with ecological principles and with life, i.e.
be livable.
3. Within ethics and morals, as so far generously constured: decent and dud distinctions.
Something like the division between the first and second specifics above has been
quasi-technicalized within ethics, and distorted through merger with a theory-metatheory
distinction borrowed from outside ethics. Engagement with the second (as in systematisation,
constructing and working within systems, etc.) has been dubbed normative ethics, or
sometimes to increase the confusion just ethics, or condescendingly, casuistry. Metaethics has
been taken however to be not what the logical analogy, and borrowing, would suggest metanormative ethics, the (positivistically correct) study of such systems, but instead a brand of
analytic philosophy, analysing the meanings and uses of key ethical terms. Taken as
exhaustive, there is much of importance, that the normative-metaethical distinction leaves out.
Nor is the distinction exhaustive. As well, the labels are misleading. In short, the distinction
is ill-made out and rather unsatisfactory, a handicap, not an asset; it can be abandoned without
19
See EEHC p.57.
�11
loss and to advantage. Let us do so (so forget this paragraph, if you prefer). Many other
distinctions from standard ethics are also defective, in one way or another. It will be advisable
to resurvey and rechart ethical terrain.
Among other standard, but often dud, distinctions from ethical theory that have to
reexamined after environmental impact, to be duly salvaged or scrapped, are all the following:
• objective/subjective. That the objective/subjective distinction provides a false dichotomy is
easily seen from usual explanations of the terms: 'either objective, standing for a real factor in
things, or subjective, simply standing for a human proposal' 20
• Cognitive/non-cognitive. 2 1
To be retained are some distinctions which certain forces have worked hard to eliminate, such
as that of
• Fact/value (and earlier demise).
• Expedient/moral.
There is an elasticity in the notion of ethics, and a neglected distinction, that it is
important to take into account.. In contemporary ethical theory there is a concerted attempt to
build a universalizability requirement or some sort of equivalent into the very notion of ethics.
The evident result is that selfish systems of evaluation and conduct, systematic egoisms for
instance, are refused the title of ethics, and as an important corollary questions like Why be
ethical? become vexed. 22 Given, in particular, that any such "universality" requirement is
problematic in its formulation, and typically limited, chauvinistically to persons, a superior
course proceeds to distinguish: between ethics as already characterised (reportively) and its
subclass, universalizable ethics. As impartial ethics do have much to recommend them, let us
coin a convenient portmanteau term condensing the clumsy "universalizable ethics", namely
euthics. (Conveniently then un-euthical suggests unethical, which is what from a properly
ethical stance it is!)
There is undoubtedly some pressure to have ethics and morality extend beyond a single
or isolated individual 23 ( even so, a Crusoe ethics is intelligible and feasible, as regrettably is
egoistic morality). But that pressure does not extend very far; and such notions as those of a
tribal morality and an upper-class ethics are not defective on significance or semantic grounds,
even if they are wide open to objections on substantive grounds.
Such restricted ethics are not however immediately ruled out, as ethics, by such
requirements as that like cases be assessed alike, and that differences of assessment be based
on relevant differences. 24 For a tribalist or racist can respond that a foreigner is not like a
20
21
22
23
24
Reese p.157.
See also Reese.
On both, narrowing and vexing, see Singer Impractical ethics (Singer equates moral with ethical).
Singer does not really have an answer to the question Why be moral? though he thinks it not a bad
idea; mainly he tries to put down shuffles that have been presented as decisive.
Pettit reworking a rough route hacked out by Wittgenstein, tries to expand this across into a
philosophical forest denominated "holism", no-dwelling place for an isolated individual.
These requirements are presented by Attfield as basic formal requirements of reason (p.6). No
�12
Greek, or that there are relevant differences between whites and blacks (intelligence has been
proposed as such a difference, when skin pigmentation appeared a merely superficial
difference). These sorts of responses, which were long accepted, are no longer acceptable,
because the differences put up are not considered ethically relevant differences (correctly
enough, though ethical relevance itself lacks an adequate explanation). Egoism, for instance,
exhibits rationality failure, as it does not treat likes alike. There are no relevant differences
justifying different treatment.
Singer's main argument for a much wider point of view,for universality, rests upon an
extensive appeal to authority (p.11). What else is offered is but an appeal to usage.
the notion of ethics carries with it the idea of something bigger than the
individual'. [It often does, but it may not.] 'If I am to defend my conduct
on ethical grounds, I cannot point only to the benefits it brings me. I must
address myself to a larger audience'(p.10).
That depends on the conduct concerned. More important, the audience does not need to be so
large, certainly not universal: my family or clan will suffice often enough. Nonetheless there
is this of use 'ethics', especially in such criticisms as 'unethical'.
• due consideration of others, all others;
Parallel to the distinction of euthics within ethics is a distinction of neurals within morals,
neurality within morality. Again the subclass, reflecting widespread philosophical usage of
the term morality, is separated through some requirement of morality, such as
• universalizability, which is a strong way of ensuring the first (do unto others etc.).
Insofar as these principles all allude to others, they often admit easy extension (to other
others). 25
4. Environmental and greener ethics.
As prevailing accounts of ethics are for the most part defective, so are what builds upon
them, recent accounts of environmental ethics. But there are also other grounds for
dissatisfaction with these.
Issues in the characterizat ion of ethics, especially removal of actocentrism and
homocentrism, naturally get transmitted to critical types, such as environmental ethics. But it
might be imagined, rashly, that disagreement ends there. After all, all decent environmental
ethics make the non-human world a proper object of concern, either directly or indirectly.
Differences between explications offered can be ascribed to ordinary philosophica l
incompleteness. "An environmental ethic, broadly, is a set of values to live by which takes
due account of the value of the non-human world". 26 Stated differently, the aim of
environmental ethics 'is to understand and act appropriately in relation of our ecological-i n
25
26
doubt they are, though they appear to figure in no logic of ethics yet formulated.
The distinctions can be filled out (and made to work-verify!) by a strategy like the earlier. Again
the list of moral predicates is deliberately wide. But once again we can later separate off certain
uses e.g. instrumenal, aesthetic uses of good.
Gunn 1987, 3.
�13
the broad sense-circum stances". 27 Differently again, " ... sets of principles, which would
guide our treatment of wild nature, constitute an environmental ethic in the most general
sense". 28 The first of these slack explanations leaves out what is essential for an ethics,
principles; the second is unduly actocentric, leaving out what is not, as well as main
paraphernalia of ethics; the third not only neglects values, but excessively narrows scope so
that such an ethics is inapplicable in places devoid of wild nature or to other issues. A better
explication, which avoids these obvious pitfalls runs: An environmental ethics is an ethics, as
defined, which, among other concerns, takes specific account, through its values and
principles, of (significant) environmental items, of parts of nonhuman nature.
But obviously it too leaves much to be explained. How the non-human world is made
the object of concern, how it is moral concern, to what degree it is made the object of moral
concern, what forms of moral concern are applicable to what elements of the environment,
and how to achieve the aim of acting appropriately - all are matters that make environmental
ethics one of the most controversial areas of philosophy and also one of the most exciting,
although many professional philosophers still regard it as a peripheral area. Yet there now is
broad agreement among most of those active in the area that some change is needed and that
environmental matters need much more attention and action.
An environmental ethics is an ethics concerned, usually among other ethical things, with
parts of the environment. Coal-face or factory-floor environmenta l ethics bears on
environmental issues, problems and causes, and can be expected to say something about
environment s or some of their nonhuman components. Academic or board-room
environmental ethics is frequently, however, a remove from direct ethical work, comprising
discussion of environmental ethics, its features, its methods, its variability, its presumed
merely derived and applied character, and so on. Much of this academic environmental ethics
is directed against coal-face environmental ethics, especially that of a genuinely committed
sort aimed at advancing environmental sources.
It is almost immediate that there is an important elasticity -ambiguity, in a slack sense
-in the notion of environmental ethics, between an ethics which considers environmental
matters, whether positively or negatively, and an ethics which is positive about some
environmental elements, which evinces concern about environmental items (as 18th century
sympathy ethics did about other humans). A superficial environmental ethics need not say
anything particularly positive or sympathetic about environments; indeed productions on the
topic may try to dismiss or defeat environmenta l causes and to defuse or dissolve
environmental problems, for instance as not worth bothering about. 29 It may be argued that
27
28
29
Drengson 1989, 15.
Elliot, in Singer, 284.
That is, fashionable contemporary practice with respect to philosophy is transferred to parts of
enviromental philosophy (e.g. by Eco Wittgenstein and AppliedQuine). Environmental philosophy
may in no way interfere with industry and business. To an astonishing extent American academic
environmental ethics tends to conform to such ridiculous strictures (often encouraged by a fawning
�14
natural environme nts should serve highest economic causes, which means in practice
becoming reserves for city folks, city corporations and consumers. Under such environmental
ethics ("environmental ethics" it is tempting to say, contravening usage) many an environme nt
should be razed, levelled, and paved over, to become a grand parking lot, shopping mall or
urban escarpmen t of a concrete jungle. What rural environment remains will, also serve those
"high" purposes, be tamed and managed, like much of Western Europe. Witness the
enthusiasm in productions on environmental ethics for landscapes like that of Tuscany, where
virtually everything is under tight human control and no bird moves (else it is shot).
Environm ental ethics and environme ntal philosophy may well prove to be
disappointm ents for enthusiastic environmentalists. For there may be little that is materially
green about them, no commitme nt to changes in old attitudes and practices, no offers of
improved standing and ethical treatment for environme ntal items. As an environme ntal
economics may be no green economics , but (very likely) some part or application of
mainstream economics , some sweep of resource or land economics , so an environme ntal
ethics or environme ntal ethic may not be particularly or at all green, but, for instance, simply
part of establishm ent ethics or an "application" of it to environmental items. Fortunately not
all environmental ethics is like this; beyond environmental is genuinely green ethics.
The elasticity in environmental ethics between superficial and material forms, parallels
that of the term concern (and rather similarly of matter), and can be substantially constricted
to that: an environme ntal ethics is one concerned with environmental items or matter. Thus,
on the one construal, such an ethics may be simply about such topics, it may be a standard
ethics "applied" to such topics, in which case environmental ethics does become just so-called
applied ethics. Alternatively, however, such an ethic may be one evincing concern, worry,
about the treatment of some environmental items on other, and directed at obtaining improved
treatment. Such an ethic is not negative or indifferent towards environme ntal matters, but is
advancing environme ntal causes. They matter. With such ethics, environme ntal ethics
cannot possibly be an applied ethics, for the framework of standard ethics and their
application s, is exceeded. (At best such ethics can be approxima ted by standard ethics by
assuming enlightened agents holding appropriate sorts of values. 30)
5. Human chauvinism and its detailed removal.
Deep-green theory is, unambiguously, a green ethical theory, of deep kind: that is, there
is intrinsic value in nature, natural items have intrinsic value, which may predomina te over
human-bas ed value. In short, the theory rejects both the 'Sole Value Assumptio n' and the
'Greater Value Assumptio n'. The theory finds all standard ethics mired in heavy prejudice, in
30
pragmatism).
Compare also Naess (in Engel 1990) on utilitarian approximation to Deep Ecology, made by
assuming availability of enough agents holding deep ecological values or, more or less
equivalently, having deep ecological consciousness.
�15
favour of things human and against things non-human. The distinctive, still pervasive,
prejudice concerned is that encapsulated as human chauvinism, which is itself a special case
of class chauvinism (for the class, human 31 ). Removal of human chauvinism dovetails with
displacement of humans.
Class chauvinism consists in substantia lly differentia l treatment, typically
discriminatory and inferior treatment, of items outside the class, by sufficiently many
members of the class concerned, for which there is no sufficient justification. Human
chauvinism is a feature, a cardinal weakness, of virtually all ethical systems hitherto, so deepgreen theory contends. The main argument takes the following form: there is no
characteristic, such as those tendered in ethical theories as justifying differential treatment in
favour of humans (characteristics such as rationality, language possession, tool making
abilities, needs, preferences, sentience, etc.) which first is held by all and only humans, as
distinct from not all humans and some non-humans, and which second does justify differential
treatment.3 2
Signs and manifestations of chauvinism are many and various, some conspicuous, some
subtle, and so on. For instance, a dead giveaway is any allusion to all outside certain human
concerns that may have a value as resources. For that assigns to the items so referred to mere
instrumental value. A little less obvious is the discriminative mode when individual humans
are counted, but only species of other living things (or a step down, individual sentients but
only species of others).
The thorough-going rejection of human chauvinism itself sets a program: that of
reworking ethics, and indeed much of philosophy, in a way free of chauvinism and humanism,
without any specially privileged place for humans. A first part of such a program has already
been outlined, that of suitably characterising ethics in a way that does not make essential
appeal to humans or their features, or to other favoured groups such as sentients. A further
important part of the program, formulation of ethical theory in a way which avoids entirely
group chauvinism. Such a desirable outcome can be achieved simply through formulation of
ethical theory in terms of ethically relevant categories, assembled in what is called an annular
theory. 33
31
32
33
Insofar as an account of human is required, it can be some improvement on the biological species
definitions, a reworking to remove past biasses (superioristic, rationalistic, masceulinist, etc.) and
to dislodge appeals to aspects of human nature. But, despite the preponderance of human agents
hereabouts, on planet Earth, such an account is not required for ethics, or for philosophy.
Theorizing in these and many other areas can proceed perfectly well without allusion to humans.
The detailed argument for this proposition is presented in Routley and Routley 1980a 97-108,
where chauvinism is spelled out a bit further. A truncated version of this argument appears in Fox
1990, 16-17.
Though the theory is so labelled in several publications, the label, which presumably should stay,
is misleading, because some ethical relevant categories may overlap one another. The concentric
theory (developed in Wenz 1988 and others, perhaps in steps of Leopold), which incorporates a
similar mistake, can be seen as a subversion of the annular model.
�16
The annular picture helps show how to redo ethics and philosophy with ideal types, or
with some equivalent thereof. No simple species or subspecies , such as humans or
superhumans, no single feature, such as sentience or life, serves as a reference benchmark, a
base class, for determinin g moral relevance and other ethical dimensions . 34 No ethical
irrelevant distinctions and classes, such as those of humans or base class, are required. What
is required instead is a major shift in perspective , a new focus upon morally relevant
categorical distinctions:
it is not possible to provide criteria which would justify distinguishing, in the
sharp way standard Western ethics do, between humans and certain
nonhuman creatures, and particularly those creatures which have preferences
or preferred states. For such criteria appear to depend upon the mistaken
assumption that moral respect for other creatures is due only when they can
be shown to measure up to some rather arbitrarily -determine d and loaded
tests for membershi p of a privileged class (essentially an elitist view),
instead of upon, say, respect for the preference s of other creatures.
According ly the sharp moral distinction, commonly accepted in ethics by
philosophe rs and other alike, between all humans and all other animal
species, lacks a satisfactory coherent basis (Routley and Routley 80a, 103).
The categorical distinctions thereby proposed do not reject traditional ethical notions such as
rationality, self-awaren ess, having interests; but they do reject the automatic use of the
characteristics of one species, or some base class as the model upon which the characteristics
of all other species or classes are judged. They also reject as unjustified distinctions that are
not "categorical distinctions which tie analytically with ethical notions". 35 For instance, they
hold that the human/nonhuman distinction is not ethically significant. Humans enter only in a
contingent way into general ethical theory, as holders of these or those features, which
34
35
Another common mistake which annular theory helps dispel and avoid is that of trying to stretch
community (or moral commuity) to include webs, mountains, Earth, land etc.-a trend Leopold
started with his land ethic. An agent can have an obligation to care for earth, and soil without
there being part of community. (The Land ethic is misguided). What ethics covers diverges from
any moral community. (Contra Dobson's suggestion p.47).
Routley and Routley 1980a, 108.
�17
depending upon their respective capabilities and competence.
It is also desirable to have available some more positive principles corresponding to the
negative rejection of class chauvinism, principles so to say, of anti-chauvinism. Principles
like the biospherical egalitarianism of Deep Ecology represent an unsatisfactory attempt in
this direction. The deep-green improvement on this principle is the powerful principle of ecoimpartiality, according to which there should be no substantially differential treatment of
items outside any favoured class or species of discriminatory sort that lacks sufficient
justification. The appropriate impartial treatment is substantially independent of the
comparative value of the item treated. Most important, impartial treatment does not entail
equal treatment, or equal consideration, and does not require equal intrinsic or other value.
Other distinctive principles of deep-green theory will emerge as the ethical theory
accumulates.
One major conclusion is that human is not a significant ethical category. The outcome
is not anti-human; humans enter to the extent that they respectively deserve to enter. It is not
being claimed that humans lack value, that none of them have much or any value. Quite the
contrary, some humans have great value, some have established themselves as having great
propensity for evil, many lead quite indifferent lives. What is being rejected is the elevated,
often exaggerated, frequently exclusive, value assigned to humans, too often uniform value.
What are being contested are received distributions of values, and the heavy concentration of
value in humans and things and features human, the relative importance of which has been
grossly exaggerated. 36
Be in no doubt: many humans have positive value, some remarkable value. That is one
reason why it matters that humans should not vanish off the planet (for all that many of they
have sinned against it), to leave an impoverished earth, for instance a microbe planet. For that
would involve a huge reduction in value. Nor is it enough, adequate compensation, that
something like humans would evolve again at some remote future time. For, even if it
happened (in fact the probability of such replacement looks rather small), there would still be
a huge and extended dip in value. Similar points tell against a range of similar arguments to
the effect that it does not matter what happens to, or is done to, the Earth, because evolution
will eventually restore richness. 37 Even if richness were to return (much evidence indicates
36
37
Moral consideration and intrinsic value are not limited to humans; similarly these are not confined
to any other favoured or "improved" class closely overlapping humans, such as (it is supposed)
persons or rational creatures. Moral principles can be applied to all species and to the natural
environment in general. (A corollary concerns the characterisation of morality. ) Evolutionary
space is thereby afforded for other species, other systems other things.
An associated feature is stereotyping. Stereotyping is characteristic of speciesism/chauvinism as it
is in exploitation. To stereotype an item is to see it purely as a member of a class and as having
conventional feature of the class as a whole.
Recently there have been some attempts to have things ethical both ways: a special role for
humans without privilege or prejudice. There is a latent incoherence in Rachel's text, between his
initial and final proposals regarding ethics and morals-which are essentially human intricatedand regarding morals without hubris (MWH)-where human hubris is supposed to be removed.
Such an argument has been advanced by, among others, William Grey in 'Anthropocentrism and
�18
that extinction and destruction is for ever, permanent), there would still be serious loss of
value. So it does matter.
6. Philosophy without humans.
It is hard to move and operate philosophically without encountering humans and human
chauvinism. Chauvinism is written deep into all prevailing Western (and Eastern) ideological
forms, common to what, at a more superficial level, are rival positions. But while human
chauvinism transcends parochial differences, it is more conspicuous and brazen in some
philosophical locales than others, notably idealism and empiricism, existentialism and
phenomenology. In short, it is particularly prominent where matters answer back to subjects,
those who have the ideas, do the observing, assemble the phenomena, do the living, and so
on-back to subjects that are invariably assumed to be human. Thus it is human existence,
human Being, human ideas and impressions, that count, those and none others. Such
chauvinism, nauseatingly strong, pervades not only Continental philosophy (esp. French and
German varieties)-but also Anglo-American empiricism and pragmatism (esp. anti-realist
varieties). 38
Once the main strategies of ethics-without-humans have been grasped, it is easy to see
how analogous moves can be made the deanthropize other reaches of philosophy, notably
some of the more chauvinistic enterprises. In general there are two stages: Firstly, as with
morality, replacing humans and human subjects by agents and ideal subjects. And secondly,
as with ethics, delineating significant reaches-philosop hical wildernesses-wh ere agents are
removed, not just off-stage but altogether.
While a few examples of each stage only will be given, it will become evident that the
procedures are general. Consider as an example of the first stage, existentialism, a philosophy
celebrating humans, and their exclusive freedom, and shot through with human chauvinism.
Existentialism is (to quote a convenient caricature)
a philosophy which emphasises man's freedom to act independently of any
laws, natural or otherwise, and according to his own choice. It is a free will
philosophy which can be seen as 'a protest against views of the world and
policies ... in which humans are regarded as the helpless playthings of
historical forces, or as wholly determined by the regular operation of natural
38
Deep Ecology', Australasian Journal of Philosophy vol.71, No 4: December 1993.
There is a residual serious problem here, as to why existence is so important. Why do actual
humans and existent tigers matter, not merely virtual ones or possible ones. What is it about
existence? There are many items which it would be better did not exist, such as devils, helicopters
(for the most part), pollution, erosion and so on. Existence, of favoured sorts, makes for richness,
which is a high (if defeasible) virtue.
Sartre's philosophy is rendolent with human chauvinism: e.g. Critique of Dialectical Reason p.8.
as regards destruction and destroy, is an amazing piece of human chauvinism. While humans
may have a greater potentiality for production of value than most other animals, many humans
also have a far greater potentiality for evil than most other animals. Historically, the evil
producing capacity has dominated. Another example of Sartre's anthropocentism is his
"philosophy of the present".
Marx's philosophy is similarly rendolent. Productivity is human productivity... . For almost
random examples from anti-realism, see DP.
�19
processes' (Encyclopaedia Britannica 1978). This anti-determinist
perspective is, again, connected with the question of objectivity.
Existentialists hold that the only objective external fact independent of the
control of human beings is the fact of their being brought into existence, and
that death will one day come to terminate that existence. In all other
respects it is they who are in control. There are no outside independent
laws, of economics, history, nature or whatever, which they cannot deny or
shape for themselves. Thus we are all free to choose how we will behave
and develop and how we will shape society and nature. It follows that the
consequences of our actions are down to us, and therefore if they are
unpleasant that is our fault-not the fault of outside forces or external laws.
There are no excuses for our not thinking and acting for ourselves and we
are 'condemned' to be free because everything is theoretically permitted to
us and we therefore carry a heavy burden of responsibility for what we do.
As Sartre put it, 'Man is responsible for what he is. The first effect of
existentialism is that it puts every man in possession of himself as he is, and
places the entire responsibility for existence squarely on his shoulders' ....
We have a duty to face up to this, and not to base our actions thoughtlessly
on what is said to be prescribed/or us ('laws' of society, of economics, of
nature). That is abdicating responsibility.39
Note the heavy concentration throughout on humans, variously appearing as human beings,
we, us, they, and (in singular musculine form) man and he. But, as before 40 , on the one
boundary, many humans are incapable of what is presumed, the heavy burden of
responsibility and so forth; and, on the other, other agents are, in principle at least, capable of
achieving those relevant sorts of freedom that humans can obtain. It is already apparent that
once the synthetic setting of highly competent humans is exceeded, notions invoked by
existentialism begin to fall apart. For instance, some "wild" animals may enjoy considerable
levels of unreflective unagonised freedom while lacking capacity to bear much responsibility.
Conversely, there are fairly responsible agents, such as some trapped in determined or
deterministic situations, who have no opportunity to exercise freedom.
Accordingly too, though human should be replaced by agent of appropriate sort in
dechauvinized existentialism, it would hardly suffice to substitute for 'human' any of
'responsible agent', 'freedom exercising agent' or similar-though these substitutions effect
some of what was intended, such as exclusion of children, many animals, dementeds and so
on. What sort of agent is appropriate? That existentialism can be seen as trying to explain.
And for the present we can leave it at that, replacing human throughout by the dummy term,
existential agent. This is existentialism partly rectified.
At the same primary stage of dechauvinizing existentialism, connected improvements
could well be sought in existentialism, such as reducing the driven and elitist ethos. In part
this ethos is encouraged by the response of existentialism to what motivates and shapes it,
deterministic arguments; for it sees only such "strong" agents as evading deterministic forces.
The whole business is rather ironic, as the first driven feature is incompatible with full
39
40
Pepper (Roots) pp.118-9; itals in original. Pepper refers to Sartre 1943 and 1946.
As at the beginning of EE, where standard privileged treatment for humans is reviewed and found
wanting.
�20
freedom, while the second elitist feature is incompatible with the stress on things human, as
(like elitist religions) only exceptional agents escape. A promising alternative tries direct
confrontation with deterministic arguments, undercutting their scope and grip, and thereby
making room for free action in a range of situations (not everywhere between birth and
death!) for a wide variety of agents, including lesser, less elite, less stressed and sensitive
agents. For the arguments prove vulnerable to selective undermining by careful logical and
analytic procedures, 41 methods existentialism itself is loath to deploy (for all that its approach
rests upon past entrenched argumentation). Insofar as a main motivation for existentialism in
its prevailing ironic form is undiscriminating antideterminism, that motivation too is thereby
collapsed, and room is made for a less demanding more relaxed dechauvinized existentialism.
As for existentialism, so for a range of other subjects inclined to intrude humans as
central to world functioning or intelligibility, a range as apparently diverse as phenomenology
and quantum theory, empiricism and theology, pragmatism and cosmology. Quantum theory
fits into this range because of its received Copenhagen interpretation, cosmology because of
its return to anthropocentrism through adoption of anthropic principles. Both are however
readily freed of human shackles, first by replacing humans by "observers" (which for the most
part can simply be recording devices), and better, secondly to deagentize completely, by
amending interpretation s to dislodge both Copenhagen phenomenolo gy and anthropic
principles. 42 For a larger illustration, consider a popular mixture of versions of
phenomenology (a fuller elaboration again would disentangle versions, all of which however
require similar detoxification).
Phenomenol ogy to which existentialism is related .. .is summed up by
Nietzsche, who said, 'Objectivity is the main enemy of understanding. It
means the myth that there are hard observable facts ... but all the concepts we
employ in describing the world and predicting its behaviour are imposed on
it by ourselves. We have a choice about what view of the world we adopt.'
... Phenomenology is not just a philosophy which implies that we are not
subject to external laws, imposed by and through forces independent of
ourselves. It holds that there actually is no world external to and separate
from ourselves. There is no 'reality' in the sense of there being an external
'real world' divorced from our own consciousness and capable of existing if
we did not exist. Nature cannot exist without ourselves also existing-if we
ceased to be, so would it cease, and vice-versa. Therefore what 'the
environment' is, and is like, is a function of our own subjective construction
of it. The very use of such terms as 'ourselves' and 'human consciousness'
in opposition to terms like 'nature' and 'the environment' is inappropriate
and shows the extent to which we are immersed in positivist science as our
way of seeing the world. For the phenomenologists these terms are
meaningless because there is no separation between ourselves and a 'nature'
or a 'reality'. We and the world are one-a single united entity.
Phenomenology is thus anti-positivist science, opposing ... Cartesian dualism.
It does not deal in laws, or in cause-effect relationships consequent on the
dualism and neither can it be concerned with analysis-brea king the world
into parts ... If we want to know and understand nature we must, as Hume
41
42
For technical details, see Sylvan FWD.
On satisfactory ways of accomplishing this second stage see Sylvan (Cosm. Syn).
�21
{
said in his Treatise on Human Nature in 1737, come to full comprehension
of man. For if there is no nature except as structured through human
consciousness, knowledge and truth cannot exist independently of man. 43
As with existentialism, there is a similar enormous exorbitant emphases on humans and things
humans; humans carry everything. But insofar as humans can perform those feats, so better
can a class a appropriate agents, phenomenolo gical agents, who include no incompetents
(who might let this world flicker out of existence, or worse).
Phenomenolo gy is a full immersion human chauvinism. Fashionable contemporary
empiricisms, normally taken as rivals to phenomenolo gy, are incomplete immersion
analogues. While a few properties, primary properties of basic physics, are separated out as
human independent, the rest, the phenomenolo gical mass, are categorised as responsedependent, and treated phenomenologically. 44 Take, for example, aesthetic features, which
include certain ecological features. Nowadays humans can grow up with the assumption that
aesthetic qualities, indeed all "response dependent" qualities, are features of humans, not in
any way objective.
So it can be seriously, if ridiculously, hypothesized that what is
(considered) beautiful, for instance of depends on how the human gene-pool is composed. As
before, humans are readily displaced in favour of appropriate agents. But, for the most part,
these agents too are otiose.
While the first stage 1s the main stage with agentocentric philosophies like
extistentialism, there is a second stage, which comprises significantly more than pointing out
how much, how much of importance, such philosophies leave out by their narrow
concentration. What is left out includes, to begin, all those times and places where there are
no agents, rich worlds, devoid of relevant agents, and the like. But that is only the beginning
of the business. For agents have been infiltrated or inserted in all sorts of settings where they
have no business to be or to transact.
Against the ancient and formerly honorable practice of agent invocation, pushed
primarily for explanatory purposes, 45 agent detachment and agent elimination campaigns have
periodically been mounted (e.g. conspicuously , but not only, in classic Greece, when it
became clearly appreciated that there could be causes without agents, during the
Enlightenmen t, and in Frege' s propositional ization program). Deagentizatio n, typically
coupled with deanthropization, can be, and should be, pushed much further. Agents, often
evidence of immature, even primitive, philosophy, still lurk everywhere in philosophy.
Agent-detach ment themes, still struggling against an unenlightened opposition, include:
objects, including worlds, without perceivers or sensors, nonexistent items without
conceivers, propositions without proposers, assumptions without assumers, values without
43
44
45
Pepper p.199 (where references are supplied). We shall not stop off for expository adjustment or
for any critique of this material. For main elements of such a critique, see however DP chapter 11
and JB.
Thus thesis that all properties are response dependent merges empiricism with European
phenomenology.
Deluded explanatory purposes, for agents themselves have in turn to be explained.
�I
22
t
valuers, causation without causers (or intentional agents), organisation without organisers,
wilderness without wilderness managers, land (or property) without owners or stewards,
regulation without regulators, selection without selectors, and purposes without purposers. 46
But without humans who does philosophy? Well, in the old days, God of course, most
gods, the Devil, demiurges, gifted spirits and so on. At any time duly accomplished agents.
While it is easy to see how ethics and philosophy could in principle flourish given only
suitably accomplished agents, and no humans, namely the agents do something like what a
few humans hereabouts do, still it may be less easy for many to see how these subjects can
function without agents. But it is straightforward, is it not? A philosophy stands as a system
of propositions. And propositions do not need agents, proposers, or whatever. Nor do
systems.
It is here that blockage may occur, for two reasons: First, because of the idealistic idea
that there are no statements without staters. Second, because of the mistaken assumption that
a system of propositions standing on its own involves an obnoxious platonism. No such
assumption is made. Third, part of the struggle has been conducted before, in the tussle
between psychologism and its opposite in logic and associated regions (e.g. mathematics,
philosophy of mathematics etc.), in the tussle between Husserl and Frege (to name two
prominent parties). Although the issues have been rejoined more recently, it is still widely
supposed that anti-psychologism triumphed. Its success is, to some extent, mere appearance.
For all that, anti-psychologism is here extended much further, right across philosophy.
Appendix. 1. Examples showing divergence of utilitarianism from consequentialism.
Consider two different actions with some set of consequence s, one (A) done
deliberately, one (B) unintended. Then suppose, for one sort of case, the outcome is
disastrous. Not only is A normally regarded as much worse than B, e.g. arson than a naturally
occurring fire such as lightening strike, but further fuller utility assessments should give
analogous results, e.g. the satisfaction of the arsonist could be given a high negative rating.
Utilitarianism itself is but a well-tempered egoism: egoism extended to substituting
others. That cannot so plausibly be charged of consequentialism.
Utilitarianism has been associated with the "greed is good" ideology of the 1980s. The
association has point (so Singer tries, desperately, to disassociate utilitarianism). Suppose it is
said that the 80s, were a decade of greed (as so depicted in many movies) but the 90s is a
decade of ethics (despite counterevidence). But nothing has changed in underlying ideologies,
in ethics or economics!
Appendix 2. Inadequacy of standard ethics.
The inadequacy of standard ethics for green purposes has been recognised, if obliquely
and perversely, by many critics of the idea of (deep) green ethics (e.g. McCloskey). They
46
The very controversial tlast theme is argued in Sylvan 90 [purpose], where most of these various
detachment themes are assembled. Obviously there are many more such themes.
�23
l
have proceeded to argue that there couldn't be such an ethics because none of the standard
ethics would serve. But the argument fails because standard ethics does not exhaust ethics.
There are some prospects of a general proof of inadequacy from what has been
developed so far. Standard forms are restricted to proper subsets of agents, whereas ethics in
full flower applies to all agents. Standard ethics leaves out much of the subject, all the deep
part.
References
William Grey in 'Anthropocentrism and Deep Ecology', Australasian Journal of Philosophy
vol.71, No 4: December 1993.
�ON THE VALUE CORE OF DEEP-GREEN THEORY
Deep-green theory is a deep environmental theory, with much in common with deep
ecology. Like deep ecology, it stands in significant ideological opposition to the dominant
technocratic-industrial way. But, even more than deep ecology, deep-green theory aims to
supply a comprehensive alternative environmental philosophy (in the full senses of those
atrophied terms, esp philosophy ). It seeks to accomplish this, furthermore, without
accumulating the amount of philosophical rubbish deep ecology regularly attracts. For, to
insert a key difference between these ecocentric theories in a deliberately prejudical way: deepgreen theory resembles a deep ecology with the pseudo-scientific garbage removed,
reorganised into a tight, coherent and more comprehensive theory. Deep-green theory, which
has roots that stretch back about as far as its much publicized neighbour, accordingly merits
elaboration separate from deep ecology, which in any case lacks a well-thought-through
valuational and ethical basis. This essay aims to uncover the value theory of deep-green
theory, exposing thereby one central area of deep-green theory. Though the value theory is
(inevitably) abstract, it issues in what is more concrete, such as practical ecological directives,
potentially destabilizing prevailing policies and institutions.
At the core of deep-green theory, as of authentic deep ecology, lies a value theory. A
fundamental theme thereof, part of what makes these positions deep, is that a range of
environmental items are valuable in themselves, directly and irreducibly so, so that their value
does not somehow reduce to or emerge from something else, such as features of certain valuers
or what counts for them. Value then does not answer back in some way to humans, or sentient
creatures (or other value-responsive classes), their interests, uses, preferences, or such like.
Many natural items such as forests and rivers, mountains and seashores, are, as it is often put
(without however any commitment thereby to dubious essentialist or absolute objectivist
positions), intrinsically valuable. They are valuable in their own right - irrespective of whether
they are interesting or useful (to any intentional operators, themselves interesting or useful or
not), indeed whether or not there exist any valuers. Value spreads through and reaches across
the natural domain; it is not bounded by mind or linkages with subjective states; nor does it
stop with sentience, or associated pyschological features like satisfaction; nor (pace deep
ecology) does it end at life; it observes no such compromising bounds. Although value is
distributed richly if irregularly throughout nature, and accordingly may be found in nature, it is
not encapsulated in some isolable natural feature, such as life or sentience, or even in defeasible
ecological values such as richness, diversity and variety (and so subject to a different,
naturalistic, reduction). But of course such ecological features afford criteria for value, and
should be represented in recipes (such as "objective functions") for assessing total value.
From the presence of natural things of value, and accordingly of natural values, it is a
short, though controversial, step to the important conclusion that there can be values without
valuers. For valuers are sentient creatures with appropriate capacities, but things of value may
�precede and succeed all such valuers; tfiat is, these things can persist, their values intact,
without any valuers. As there can be shapes without any shape-perceivers, and concepts with
conceivers, so there can be values without valuers. (The theme, like others advanced, can be
backed up by more detailed argument and by formal proof, neither attempted here.) In
valuational relations then, relating valuers as subjects with values as objects, both ends of
relations have independent standing; though interrelated, as the descriptions deliberately chosen
suggest, either can stand without the other. It is a fashionable mistake, which cannot however
be got away with, to try to collapse this relation - usually to endeavour to soak up values into a
modification of valuing subjects (e.g. as a predicate 'relation-to-values', in which inconvenient
values are locked away), not to remove valuers, considered unproblematic, from view. The
mistaken procedure is in fact just one important example of an archetypal reduction of
mainstream modern philosophy, of relations to functions; other examples, locking undesired
objects away within functions, are those rendering wholes (such as ecosystems and organised
structures) functions of their parts, and, under functionalism, minds and types of intentionality,
including value direction, as functions of bodies or their parts such as brains. Values are not,
and do not disappear into, functions of valuers.
A connected corollary is that values are not apart from the actual world, something
"projected" or imposed on it by a favoured class of valuers, something colouring (and even
emotionall y clouding) the otherwise valueless physical world, in rather the way that
reductionistic materialism tries (erroneously) to construe colour itself as projected onto a
colourless physical world. Of course this projection effort, never adequately explicated, does
not succeed, on its own, in removing values. For they remain, left as some function of the
valuers. To try to bulldoze through this difficulty, a second reduction is invoked, of evaluative
features of valuers to "natural" features, commonly preferences, desires or such like. The
second reduction runs into obstacles that halt even the naturalistic bulldozers (e.g. naturalistic
and related fallacies), but the first reduction is the critical one in removing key environmental
values, such as those of wilderness and wild things, which become valuable only in the focus
of certain sentient beholders, and not in and for them self. This reduction too is blocked by
insuperable difficulties. On the one side, like the parallel proposed phenomonalist reduction of
material objects to sensations, the reduction never achievers satisfactory support or even a
satisfactory statement. On the other, it is counterexampled by various modellings or thoughtexperiments revealing intuitively-assessed value in situations devoid of valuers (as e.g. in the
well-known Last Person argument). Values are not apart from the actual world, then, merely
projected onto it by valuers, or else locked up in certain valuers (in the fashion of Carterian
intensions ). Values are part of the world; they are objects in the domain of actual and other
worlds. But they are not of course material objects; creatures will not fall over them any more
than they will trip over shadows or shapes.
�Value like the shape and taste, is an3attribute, which things have or may lack, and which
furthermore creatures can recognise or may fail to discern. Thus value is, like colour and taste
and their determinate forms (red, acidic, etc), a universa l , distributed across things,
individuals and wholes. Like shape and colour, value is a high-level universal. The
comparison of value with shape is decidedly more helpful than the standard, but exhausted,
comparison of value with colour, or of goodness with colour determinates such as redness or
yellow. For example, shape is not bound by a set of determinates as colour is in the specific
colours, but comes in a spectacular variety of forms, not totally or linearly ordered (as in a
rainbow), or contracted to some primary set (as in colour traingles); shapes like value pertain to
wholes as well as particulars, and links with gestalts rather better than colour; shape
discrimination is more culture dependent and sensitive; shape is, or was, a primary property,
and thereby more immune to reductionist strategies than secondary properties such as colour,
which is, under physicalism, prized off objects and allegedly relocated in creatures or in their
interrelation with colourless physical things. Shapes like values, can be vague, indeterminate;
that does not prevent things, perhaps unique things, exemplifying them. But naturally the
anology can only be extended so far. Shapes can be approximated by polygons, values cannot;
shapes are regularly perceived through sense perception, by vision or touch especially, values
are not, but are differently apprised. Value is its own thing, not something else; it is what it is
and does what is does, and not something else, like some specialised mathematical or economic
thing. It does not contract to some mark of value or to what it comes down to in highly
restricted settings; most important, it does not disappear in the style of modem economics into
(expected) utility or into just two economic forms, value-in-use monetarily and value-inexchange (price). Value means what it means, and has meant: worth; and it ties with general
assessments of merit and demerit, goodness or badness, not an economic or other cut-down
thereof. Price, for example, may fail entirely to reflect worth, it may have little to do with
goodness of product.
The powerful drive to reduce or deny values has several sources. part of the motivation
for reduction of value springs from epistemological worries, concerning how values can be
ascertained and known, so far as they are (subjective translation proposals are than a direct
evaluative counterpart of phenomenalism). Part derives from supposedly problematic cultural
and subcultural relativity (whence the attempt to impose values by identification of value with
some favoured feature, and cultural or economic imperialism). Part of the motivation comes
from more sweeping ideologic al commitments, such as the varieties of materiali sm
(physicalism esp.) or scientism.
As has become apparent, attempted reductions of value come too in a variety of forms subjective, which made use of psychological features, such as desires, interests, emotions, and
the like or subjective aggregations, such as community preferences or utility; or objectiviely
naturalistic, which enrol value-making characteristics such as richness or evolutionary
�development as value - consequential, w~ch consider only outcomes, or purely motivational,
which consider only attitudes and ignore leads and outcomes - straightforward, as in translation
proposals for translating value judgements into reducing statements; or oblique, as in
supervenience propositions (no variations in value without underwriting variations in reducing
features), or obscure, as in unarticulated projection claims. Values are not well accommodated
within theses schemes, or accommodated at all. The idea is abroad however that science can
offer a reduction, can sweep up value along with all other knowledge, where philosophy has
conspicuously failed. Unfortunately for such optimistic ideas, fortunately perhaps for deeper
thought, current science, physics especially, does not have much to say at all, or of merit,
about values, and if it did reductions through it would be circular. But, to the contrary, there is
a long-standing pretence that science gets along "well" without values, in appropriate value-free
fashion. Nowadays it is increasingly realised that such value-freedom is a myth, that much of
what passes as science is heavily value-penetrated. While those engaged purely in purer
science may have the illusion of an escape from value, there is no escape.
Though deep-green value theory is thoroughly nonreductive, it does not sacrifice
warranted claims to scientific and logical adequacy thereby. The reductionistic dichotomies are
avoided and repudiated. Value reduces neither in subjective nor objective fashion; it does not
reduce. Evaluative judgements are certainly not subjective; but nor are they objection in an
absolutist sense; they are nonjective, that is, neither. Somewhat similarly, evaluation of an act
does not reduce to assessing consequences; nor does it come down to an assessment of
motives; both may matter.
In any case, reductions do not succeed, as a copious literature, littered with failed
attempts, meanderingly establishes. Nor are they generally desirable, since mostly shallow,
aiming at a reduction to features of some privileged class presented as ideal (i.e. core value is
covertly assumed). Nor are they needed; explanation and assessment do not require reduction.
Evaluations may be arrived at, and value systems expanded, by enhancement methods, which
consists in emotional presentation (as under Meinong's phenomenological account) organised
by coherence methods. The methodology in fact resembles that sometimes proposed for
acquisition of scientific information. As with accumulated empirial information, which can be
extended through presentational input and assessment for overall coherence, so further
evaluations may be arrived at and assessed through a combination of presentational and
coherence procedures. At the (marginal) stage where the next round of evaluations is
undertaken, the following active ingredients figure, in an idealised breakdown:- Firstly, a
background stock of judgements and experience will have been accumulated or inherited; in
principle all of this is revisable, and some may be up for reassessment. Apart from the
background, which enters in assessing overall coherence of system, what is involved is,
secondly, emotional presentation, which corresponds to further perceptional and sense data
input, and, thirdly and not independent, coherence processing , which supplies the
�interpretational and rationalisational comp~nents. At bottom, parallelling perception in the case
of empirical information, is emotional presentation, gut or visceral reaction in starker forms of
acceptance or rejection, but more generally comprehending a variety of sentiments, including
overall well-being, and also relational impressions, such as empathy, identification, and so on.
As a perceiver perceives shapes and taster tastes and goodness, so a valuer feels value and
disvalue.
The basis of perceptio n is sensation , the basis of valuation is emotion.
Apprehension of value is seated in emotional, and especially visceral, presentation; but what is
apprehended is not to be confused with its apprehension any more than what is perceived. All
the warnings about sensation as an information source have to be repeated with heavy
emphasis as regards emotional presentation; for example, reliability cannot be guaranteed,
interference with presentation through drugs, alcohol, temporary excitement or other inputs
may render it dubious or unacceptable, conditioning may have occurred, including substantial
cultural conditioning (so that a person is terrified by huntsmen spiders but not sickened by
bloody massacres of dolphins or seals). As with perception, there are checks on emotional
presentation, such as constancy over time and after reflection.
Emotional presentation, supplying in particular inclusions and exclusions or prohibitions,
is but the basis of reflective evaluation and value apprehension. The further critical part,
coherence processing, builds on the basis taking account of other inputs or controls including
background (which supplies relevant components of already adopted judgements, assimilated
subculture and so forth) and constraints (such as substitutional requirements like impartiality,
e.g. whether considered judgements hold for substitute valuers, and uniformity, e.g. whether
similar acts are judged in similar ways). The coherence procedure consists, in essence, of
asking whether the next or a relevant judgemen t fits together with what has been accepted,
while meeting constraints, without leading to what has been rejected or excluded. If it does fit
it is added to the included side, otherwise it is sent to the excluded side. (The familiar ethical
practice of devising cases and comparing them with the cases in hand can be worked in under
this procedure.) Because an aim of this rationalisation procedure is achievement of some sort
of equilibrium - admitting what is included, while excluding what is unsupported, fails to gain
support, is emotionally spoken against - such coherence procedures have gained currency in
North America under the rubric "reflectiv e equilibrium". Observe, however, that any
equilibriu m gained at some stage may be quickly lost, as new types of problems arise and
further information enters. To be sure, the whole methodology (like the parallel methodology
of a coherence theory of truth) is highly idealised, and only practicably usable in rudimentary
parts. It does however surmount a major obstacle for value theory; it reveals how in principle a
nonreduc tionistic value theory can function. Whether that theory is an appropria te
environmental one or not will depend however above all on the presentational input, the extent
to which environmental sensitivity enters and is not dismissed.
�Enhancement methods reveal too tRat value systems are not uniquely determined, any
more than other comprehensive theoretical frameworks, such as those intended to reflect truth.
There can be, there evidently are, rival value systems, measuring up to rigorous rationality
requirements, much as there are rival logics, rival physical and biological theories, and rival
coherent religions. Chauvinistic systems, narrow or shallow value systems, which take no
requisite account of many environmental items, likewise cannot be excluded on rational or
straight logical grounds. Unfortunately such systems remain in ascendancy, and tend to
dominate social practices; in recent times economism, a narrow type of utilitarianism, has all
too obviously dominated much terrestial practice. While such value frameworks are open to
severe criticism, for instance as chauvinistic, as violating universality requirements of morality
in the case of economism, they do not succumb to definitive refutation (for the reason that
requirements of morality, of universalizability of principle, impartiality and so on, can be
repudiated; immoral or amoral frameworks are still value systems). Of course a range of
argumentative, educational and persuasive techniques, of varying equality, can be put to work
to move valuers who adhere to other structures, often enough successfully. Emotional
presentation of environmental items, by way of new experience and information, is important
among these. In short, much can be done to shift or alter values, though as usual effectiveness
cannot be guaranteed.
The availability of rival value systems and prospect of yet others, while it implies a
certain desirable (and also troublesome) pluralism, does not mean relativism. Neither deep
green theory nor authentic deep ecology espouse any superficially easy relativism. From their
viewpoint, rival narrower and shallower systems are definitely inferior , and marked down
accordingly, while economism is an onathema which does not even make the moral grade (e.g.
too many principles stop at state boundaries). However a critical pluralism does acknowledge,
and offer a place, in the wider scheme of things for other positions, even if as less favoured or
satisfactory. Politically then, deep positions can allow for, what makes good sense in these
times of numbers, alliances. Hence the point of a green alliance, combining green positions,
against still prevailing anti-environmentalism and economism.
The value system pluralism of deep-green theory interpenetrates not only social and
political domains above, but also metaphysics traditionally placed below. In the underlying
metaphysical pluralism of deep-green theory, value runs very deep - so deep that even truth
depends in part upon it. For not merely selection of a correct comprehensive theory or worldview, but choice of associated actual world, is a value dependent choice. That choice, insofar
as it is consciously made, of world conceptualisation and structure, is a constrained choice,
constrained by informational inputs, such as those of refined perception. But in as much as it
is rationally accomplished, that choice, like other choices of structure, proceeds according to a
standard value-information analysis (regularly oversimplified however to a preference-
�information or even desire-belief modellin1); that is, to get to the salient point, it involves value
essentially.
Truth and value are then intertwined. Their relation, not one of identity (for contrary to
idealism, there are many relations not identical with identity), can now be stated more
accurately than the poets have managed. Neither is one; both are plural, and differently so. In
certain significant respects the metaphysics resembles the value theory. For example, as the
value theory is nonreductionistic, so also is the metaphysics; in particular, there is a noreduction theme that neither parts nor wholes reduce eliminably to one another, as opposed to
atomistic and holistic views of environmental interrelations. As the value theory is pluralistic
so also is the metaphysics; what needs to be discerned, in place of absolutism, is a plurality of
worlds and of associated truth characterisations. A main aim of a thoroughgoing
environmental theory is to displace very destructive dominant ideasystems, regularly presented
as absolute, which incorporate both value and truth themes concerning the environment and its
organisation.
Much of deep-green theory devolves then from the abstract value theory, beginning (to
take a more accessible route than the metaphysical way) with a more comprehensive ethical
theory, which includes as well as a specific axiological theory, elaborating environmental
values and virtues, a deontic theory, supplying obligations, rights, taboos, and similar. For
example, given that a certain wild river is intrinsically valuable, as we can verify by on-site
experience and enhancement methods, and given that we duly respect that value, as deontic
principles will tell us we should, then we are not free to do as we like with that river, to dam it
with concrete, to channel it within concrete, stripping it of its riverine ecosystems. But that
does not preclude respectful use of the river, swimming or sailing quitely in its waters, and so
on. Value thus guides action, practice, and use; it is the ground also upon which principles are
formulated, principles that are assessed and validated by way of enhancement methods.
Important among these are non-interference principles, which exclude unwarranted interference
with other preference-havers and unwarranted damage, ill-treatment, or devaluation of items of
value. Such deontic principles circumscribe environmentally-limited freedom of action. Given
non-interference principles, a major shift in onus of proof from homocentricthics takes place.
What is required now is that reasons be givenfor interfering with the environment, rather than
reasons for not doing so.
Also direct responsibility for environmental interference or
modification falls upon those who would interfere or significantly modify, who would tread
heavily on the land. Non-interference does not preclude use, only too much use and use of too
much. What it does lead to is the theme that, where use occurs, it should be careful and
respectful use.
An important respect thesis regarding environmental items is founded on such
interference principles and the no-reduction theme: namely
�•
•
8
not to put others (other preference havers) into a dispreferred state for no good reason;
not to jeopardis e the well being of natural objects or systems without good reason;
•
not to damage or destroy items which, while they cannot literally be put into a
dispreferred state, can be damaged or destroyed or have their value eroded or impaired.
These apply to ecosystem s, their surrounds, their parts, and so on. The mere making of
further excess profits, or similar economic excuses, are not good reasons. Such a respect
thesis form part of the ecological outlook of deep-green theory.
As permissib ility, obligatio n and respect principles can be explained through the
valuations reached on the theory, so too can rights and other significant components of morality
be explained and justified through, but again not reduced to, values. For example, a creature
has a right to something if it has a valid title thereto established from correct moral principles.
Candidates for the parameter "something" provide a familiar list: freedom from unnecessary
suffering, respectful treatment, satisfaction of basic needs, and so on. Such rights accordingly
derive from and reinforce corresponding deontic principles.
Deep-gre en ethical theory is much more than just another non-redu ctionist ethical
theory, which highlights ecological values and virtues, and so forth. It changes the character
and shape of ethical enterprise. Perhaps most strikingly, it removes humans as such from the
centre of the ethical stage (or exclusive occupation of the stage). The biological concept of
being human is not, contrary to prevailing humanism, a highly significant ethical category. To
elevate it to such is to fall into human chauvinis m, a type of class chauvini sm which
unwarrantedly discriminates in favour of the human species. The prevailing chauvinis m is
avoided through a natural annular model, which connects ethical characteristics directly with the
categorie s of items that can have them. Relevant categories include those marked out by
features like: having well-being, preference-having, rights-holding, contractual-capability, and
so on, categories not necessarily connected with any particular species. Hitherto virtually all
Western ethical theories have not merely so limited ethical matters predominately to inter-human
affairs, but have been blantantly chauvinistic, exhibiting a substantial, discrimin ately and
unjustifiably bias in favour of humans (of certain privileged humans). These sorts of systems
should be superseded; it is not a matter of simple adjustments or extensions.
Deep-gre en value theory, as developed, implies the inadequacy of prevailing social,
political and economic arrangements and institutions, both those of a mixed capitalistic kind and
those of a more state socialistic cast. They are the (devious) product of inferior value
frameworks which take quite insufficient account of environmental considerations and values.
But explainin g their deficiencies, and indicating more satisfactory green alternatives and
replacements, is another chapter in the elaboration of deep-green theory.
�9
*
Richard Sylvan*
RMB 683
B ungendore NSW 2621
For more on deep-green theory and deep ecology, see for instance essays in and work referred to in the
Green Series, i.e. Discussion Papers in Environme ntal Philosophy, RSSS, Australian National
University, Canberra.
�Annex
1. Most people inherit their value framework along with their culture. Many never do any
substantial overhaul. Many indeed are not active or responsible valuers. But in these respects,
values are not so different from other things. Some people are poor judges of shape; many
never learn to distinguish plants, or to discriminate among wines.
Likewise for other choices, options, major changes, metaphysical and even political.
Mostly that a choice has been made or inherited and is incorporated in the subculture is not
noticed, along with its not been observed how arbitrary many of the choices and resulting
structures are (in Foucault has emphasized). Of course it is often not in the interests of the
power elite, who control media outlets, etc., that this sort of arbitrariness should be widely
known, and alternative structures considered and perhaps experimented with.
Choices occur where distinctive circumstance prevail. For instance, there is serious
scarcity; food supplies in particular are threatened (e.g. with being out of reach is price, with
pollution, etc.). Differently, circumstances lead to conversions, as when a new ideology
sweeps through, enthusiam generated by some charismatic figures.
�/
bits from chapter 2
There is another important elasticity. In contemporary ethical theory there is a concerted
attempt to build on universalizability requirement or the equivalent into the very motion of ethics.
The evident result is that selfish systems of induction and conduct, systematic egoisms for
instance are refused the title of ethics, and as an important corollary questions like Why be
ethical? become vexed. 1 Given, in particular, that any such "universality" requirement is
problematic in this formulation, and typically limited, chauvinistically to persons, a superior
course proceeds to distinguish: between ethics as already characterised (reportively) and its
subclass, universalizable ethics. As impartial ethical do have much to recommend them, let us
coin a convenient portmonteau term condensing the chancy "universalerable ethics", namely
euthics. (Conveniently then an euthical supports unethical, which is what from a properly
ethical stance it is!)
There is undoubtedly some pressure to have ethics and morality extend beyond a single or
isolated individual (even so, a Causal ethics is understood, as is egoisticmorality). But that
pressure does not extend very far; and such notions as those of a tribal morality and an
upperclass ethics are not defective on significance grounds, even if they are objectional on
substantive grounds.
Such restricted ethics are not however immediately ruled out by such requirements as that
like cases be assessed alike, and that differences of assessment be based on relevant
differences. 2 For a tribalist or racist can respond that a foreigner is not like a Greek, or that there
are relevant differences between whites and blacks (intelligence has been proposed as such a
difference, when skin pigmentation appeared a merely superficial difference). These sorts of
responses, which were longer accepted, are no longer acceptable, because the differences put up
are not considered ethically relevant differences (correctly enough, though ethical relevance itself
lacks an adequate explanation).
Singer's main argument for a much wider point of view, universality, commits in a
extensive appel to authority (p.11).
What is offered: an appeal to usage.
'the notion of ethics carries with it the idea of something bigger than the individual'. [It
often does, but it may not.] 'If I am to defend my conduct in ethical grounds, I cannot point
only to the benefits it brings me. I wont address myself to a larger audience' (p.10). That
On both, narrowing and vexing, see Singer lmpractual ethics (Singer aquates moral with
ethical). Singer does not really have an answer to Why be moral? though he thinks it not a bad idea; mainly he
tries to put down shuffles that have been presented or decisive.
2
These requirements are presented byu Attfield as basic formal requirements of reason (p.6). No
doubt they are, though they appear to figure in no logic of ethics yet formulated.
�depends on the conduct concerned. More important the audience does not need to be much
larger, certainly not universal: my family or law will suffice often enough.
�J.
From Chap 4
Evaluations may be arrived at, and value systems expanded, by enhancement methods,
which consists in emotional presentation (as under Meinong's phenomenological account)
organised by coherence methods. The methodology in fact resembles that sometimes proposed
for acquisition of scientific information. As with accumulated empirial information, which can
be extended through presentational input and assessment for overall coherence, so further
evaluations may be arrived at and assessed through a combination of presentational and
coherence procedures. At the (marginal) stage where the next round of evaluations is
undertaken, the following active ingredients figure, in an idealised breakdown:- Firstly, a
background stock of judgements and experience will have been accumulated or inherited; in
principle all of this is revisable, and some may be up for reassessment. Apart from the
background, which enters in assessing overall coherence of system, what is involved is,
secondly, emotional presentation, which corresponds to further perceptional and sense data
input, and, thirdly and not independent, coherence processing, which supplies the
interpretational and rationalisational components. At bottom, parallelling perception in the case
of empirical information, is emotional presentation, gut or visceral reaction in starker forms of
acceptance or rejection, but more generally comprehending a variety of sentiments, including
overall well-being, and also relational impressions, such as empathy, identification, and so on.
As a perceiver perceives shapes and taster tastes and goodness, so a valuer feels value and
disvalue. The basis of perception is sensation, the basis of valuation is emotion. Apprehension
of value is seated in emotional, and especially visceral, presentation; but what is apprehended is
not to be confused with its apprehension any more than what is perceived. All the warnings
about sensation as an information source have to be repeated with heavy emphasis as regards
emotional presentation; for example, reliability cannot be guaranteed, interference with
presentation through drugs, alcohol, temporary excitement or other inputs may render it
dubious or unacceptable, conditioning may have occurred, including substantial cultural
conditioning (so that a person is terrified by huntsmen spiders but not sickened by bloody
massacres of dolphins or seals). As with perception, there are checks on emotional
presentation, such as constancy over time and after reflection.
Emotional presentation, supplying in particular inclusions and exclusions or prohibitions,
is but the basis of reflective evaluation and value apprehension. The further critical part,
coherence processing, builds on the basis taking account of other inputs or controls including
background (which supplies relevant components of already adopted judgements, assimilated
subculture and so forth) and constraints (such as substitutional requirements like impartiality,
e.g. whether considered judgements hold for substitute valuers, and uniformity, e.g. whether
similar acts are judged in similar ways). The coherence procedure consists, in essence, of
asking whether the next or a relevant judgement fits together with what has been accepted, while
�meeting constraints, without leading to what has been rejected or excluded. If it does
fit it is
added to the included side, otherwise it is sent to the excluded side. (The familiar ethical
practice
of devising cases and compari ng them with the cases in hand can be worked in under
this
procedure.) Because an aim of this rationalisation procedure is achievement of some
sort of
equilibr ium - admitting what is included, while excluding what is unsupported, fails
to gain
support, is emotionally spoken against - such coherence procedures have gained currency
in
North Americ a under the rubric "reflect ive equilibr ium". Observe , howeve r, that
any
equilibr ium gained at some stage may be quickly lost, as new types of problem s arise
and
further information enters. To be sure, the whole methodology (like the parallel methodo
logy of
a coherence theory of truth) is highly idealised, and only practicably usable in rudimentary
parts.
It does howeve r surmou nt a major obstacle for value theory; it reveals how in principl
e a
nonredu ctionist ic value theory can function . Whethe r that theory is an appropr
iate
environmental one or not will depend however above all on the presentational input, the extent
to
which environmental sensitivity enters and is not dismissed.
end
The availability of rival value systems and prospect of yet others, while it implies a certain
desirabl e (and also troublesome) pluralism, does not mean relativism. Neither deep
green
theory nor authenti c deep ecology espouse any superficially easy relativism. From
their
viewpoint, rival narrowe r and shallow er systems are definitely inferior , and marked
down
accordingly, while econom ism is an onathema which does not even make the moral grade
(e.g.
too many principles stop at state bo':lndaries). However a critical pluralism does acknow
ledge,
and offer a place, in the wider scheme of things for other positions, even if as less favoured
or
satisfactory. Politically then, deep positions can allow for, what makes good sense in
these
times of numbers, alliances. Hence the point of a green alliance, combining green position
s,
against still prevailing anti-environmentalism and economism.
The value system pluralis m of deep-green theory interpenetrates not only social and
political domains above, but also metaphysics traditionally placed below. In the underly
ing
metaphysical pluralis m of deep-green theory, value runs very deep - so deep that even
truth
depends in part upon it. For not merely selection of a correct comprehensive theory or
worldview, but choice of associated actual world, is a value dependent choice. That choice,
insofar
as it is conscio usly made, of world conceptualisation and structure, is a constrai ned
choice,
constrained by informational inputs, such as those of refined perception. But in as much
as it is
rationally accomplished, that choice, like other choices of structure, proceeds accordin
g to a
standard value-in formati on analysis (regular ly oversim plified howeve r to a preferen
ceinformation or even desire-belief modelling); that is, to get to the salient point, it involves
value
essentially.
�Truth and value are then intertwined. Their relation, not one of identity (for contrary to
idealism, there are many relations not identical with identity), can now be stated more accurately
than the poets have managed. Neither is one; both are plural, and differently so. In certain
significant respects the metaphysics resembles the value theory. For example, as the value
theory is nonreductionistic, so also is the metaphysics; in particular, there is a no-reduction
theme that neither parts nor wholes reduce eliminably to one another, as opposed to atomistic
and holistic views of environmental interrelations. As the value theory is pluralistic so also is
the metaphysics; what needs to be discerned, in place of absolutism, is a plurality of worlds and
of associated truth characterisations. A main aim of a thoroughgoing environmental theory is to
displace very destructive dominant ideasystems, regularly presented as absolute, which
incorporate both value and truth themes concerning the environment and its organisation.
Much of deep-green theory devolves then from the abstract value theory, beginning (to
take a more accessible route than the metaphysical way) with a more comprehensive ethical
theory, which includes as well as a specific axiological theory, elaborating environmental values
and virtues, a deontic theory, supplying· obligations, rights, taboos, and similar. For example,
given that a certain wild river is intrinsically valuable, as we can verify by on-site experience and
enhancement methods, and given that we duly respect that value, as deontic principles will tell
us we should, then we are not free to do as we like with that river, to dam it with concrete, to
channel it within concrete, stripping it of its riverine ecosystems. But that does not preclude
respectful use of the river, swimming or sailing quitely in its waters, and so on. Value thus
guides action, practice, and use; it is the ground also upon which principles are formulated,
principles that are assessed and validated by way of enhancement methods. Important among
these are non-interference principles, which exclude unwarranted interference with other
preference-havers and unwarranted damage, ill-treatment, or devaluation of items of value.
Such deontic principles circumscribe environmentally-limited freedom of action. Given noninterference principles, a major shift in onus of proof from homocentricthics takes place. What
is required now is that reasons be given for interfering with the environment, rather than
reasons for not doing so. Also direct responsibility for environme ntal interferenc e or
modification falls upon those who would interfere or significantly modify, who would tread
heavily on the land. Non-interference does not preclude use, only too much use and use of too
much. What it does lead to is the theme that, where use occurs, it should be careful and
respectful use.
An important respect thesis regarding environme ntal items is founded on such
interference principles and the no-reduction theme: namely
•
not to put others (other preference havers) into a dis preferred state for no good reason;
•
not to jeopardise the well being of natural objects or systems without good reason;
�•
not to damage or destroy items which, while they cannot literally be put into a
dispreferred state, can be damaged or destroyed or have their value eroded or impaired.
These apply to ecosystems, their surrounds, their parts, and so on. The mere making of further
excess profits, or similar economic excuses, are not good reasons. Such a respect thesis form
part of the ecological outlook of deep-green theory.
As permissibility, obligation and respect principles can be explained through the
valuations reached on the theory, so too can rights and other significant components of morality
be explained and justified through, but again not reduced to, values. For example, a creature
has a right to something if it has a valid title thereto established from correct moral principles.
Candidates for the parameter "something" provide a familiar list: freedom from unnecessary
suffering, respectful treatment, satisfaction of basic needs, and so on. Such rights accordingly
derive from and reinforce corresponding deontic principles.
Deep-green ethical theory is much more than just another non-reductionist ethical theory,
which highlights ecological values and virtues, and so forth. It changes the character and shape
of ethical enterprise. Perhaps most strikingly, it removes humans as such from the centre of the
ethical stage (or exclusive occupation of the stage). The biological concept of being human is
not, contrary to prevailing humanism, a highly significant ethical category. To elevate it to such
is to fall into human chauvinism, a type of class chauvinism which unwarrantedly discriminates
in favour of the human species. The prevailing chauvinism is avoided through a natural annular
model, which connects ethical characteristics directly with the categories of items that can have
them. Relevant categories include those marked out by features like: having well-being,
preference-having, rights-holding, contractual-capability, and so on, categories not necessarily
connected with any particular species. Hitherto virtually all Wes tern ethical theories have not
merely so limited ethical matters predominately to inter-human affairs, but have been blantantly
chauvinistic, exhibiting a substantial, discriminately and unjustifiably bias in favour of humans
(of certain privileged humans). These sorts of systems should be superseded; it is not a matter
of simple adjustments or extensions.
Deep-green value theory, as developed, implies the inadequacy of prevailing social,
political and economic arrangements and institutions, both those of a mixed capitalistic kind and
those of a more state socialistic cast. They are the (devious) product of inferior value
frameworks which take quite insufficient account of environmental considerations and values.
But explaining their deficiencies, and indicating more satisfactory green alternatives and
replacements, is another chapter in the elaboration of deep-green theory.
Deep-green theory is a deep environmental theory, with much in common with deep
ecology. Like deep ecology, it stands in significant ideological opposition to the dominant
technocratic-industrial way. But, even more than deep ecology, deep-green theory aims to
supply a comprehensive alternative environmental philosophy (in the full senses of those
�atrophied terms, esp philosophy ). It seeks to accomplish this, furthermore, without
accumulating the amount of philosophical rubbish deep ecology regularly attracts. For, to insert
a key difference between these ecocentric theories in a deliberately prejudical way: deep-green
theory resembles a deep ecology with the pseudo-scientific garbage removed, reorganised into a
tight, coherent and more comprehensive theory. Deep-green theory, which has roots that stretch
back about as far as its much publicized neighbour, accordingly merits elaboration separate from
deep ecology, which in any case lacks a well-thought-through valuational and ethical basis.
This essay aims to uncover the value theory of deep-green theory, exposing thereby one central
area of deep-green theory. Though the value theory is (inevitably) abstract, it issues in what is
more concrete, such as practical ecological directives, potentially destabilizing prevailing policies
and institutions.
�ETHICS AND METAPHYSICS:
their relevance to one another
There is rich range of incompatible claims about the mutual interelations of the two
ancient subjects. Most of these claims appear mistaken. Sorting out something of what looks
right is a daunting task, a small beginning on which is attempted here.
Initial severe difficulties derive from the vagueness, in determinacy and problematicality
of the relata, both of which are ill-understood by philosophers metaphysics especially. Many
there are who think that metaphyscis coincides with ontology, the study (description,
explanation and understanding) of what exists. 1 The general study of what there is, sistology,
which includes ontology as a very proper part, is only one facet of metaphysics (unless it is
presumed that items somehow supply also all propositions concerning them). For sistology is
the totality of things side of metaphysics, there is also the totality of true propositions side
(propositionology, for a nice term). Metaphysics also comprises the study of the very general
attributes of this and other universe and of what accounts for these attributes (or propositional
functions). In technical terms, then, a metaphysics amount to a very general and
comprehensi ve constrained model; and metaphysics to the plural assembly of these
metaphysics. 2 Each metaphysics will be constrained (as will become clear through examples
given below) through modelling conditions or postulates (which delimit how "altimate reality"
is according to that system).
Metaphysics is sometimes construed more comprehencisvely to include some or all of
epistemology (knowledge of "ultimate reality" for instance), some of or all of other branches of
philosophy, perhaps all of philosophy. Plainly, if metaphysics, so expansively construed,
includes ethics, then their relation is straightforward, metaphysics includes ethics. But we shall
not adopt such construals.
Whereas metaphysics concerns features of universes, ethics is a study of moral values and
principles, and of rules and practices of conduct. A case can be made out that an ethic is
outlined through its distributions of values, in terms of which both deontic features (rights,
obligations, etc) and axiological features (goodness, etc) can be discerned. (Utilitarian can
afford a crude exemplar). So, without loss of generality, I can concentrate on the relation of
value theory to metaphysics.
Now a value theory does not derive from a purely naturalistic metaphysic, by virtue of a
rectified naturalistic fallacy. But, firstly even is a value theory may be influenced or even
construed by such a metaphysics. For example if the theory rules out all but primary qualities
2
What there is according to most Western philosophers, still labouring under the probleminducing Ontological Assumption. For such a confusion of ontology with metaphysics see
Forrest p.3.
For the bsis of this large (and estrageous) technical leap, see DP.
�2
as some sort of constructs, the value qualities will have to be explained as constructs,
projections or similar. Secondly, a metaphysics is unlikely to be purely naturalistic.
Metaphysics is not a value-free enterprise; a metaphysics typically presumes a range of
presumptions, including archivative ones (deeper examples include assumptions of primary,
e.g. of certain sorts of objects, of importance, e.g. of what exists, of implicit world selection,
e.g. the world is Newtonian, Copenhagen quantum, or obitives).
An ethics does not determine a meta-ethics or therefore a metaphysics. Nor does the
converse hold. A metaphysics does not in general determine an ethics, but is compatible with
many.
Against the stock determination and priority claims, I want to oppose interaction and no
priority themes. Determination claims are commonplace in philosophers who wish to wield the
big stock of dominant science to settle ethics (or mataethics). For instance Collicott asserts that
"intrinsic value in nature ... remains ... painfully inconsistent with the ... modern scientific
world-view' (Celbration of Robton p.14, similarly p.22, whence
CD 1. Modern scientific metaphysics entails there are no intrinsic values in nature.
This is not a lapse (though soon Collicott will weaken his determination claims) because almost
immediately Collicott goes on to assert
CD2. 'A value neutral nature is ... an immediate inference from the institutionalised
metaphysical foundations of modern science' (p.15).
Given some large assumptions, most conspiciously that the metaphysics involved is that of
British empiricism, the claim CD2 become incontestable. For under that empiricism, as
elaborated by Locke and Hurve, non primary qualities like value and colour are not part of or in
nature, but substantially subjective in character. However insitutionalized those foundations an important issue -
it has since become apparent that there are at least several parts of
operative sciences, such a classical and quantum; namely a core calculus or formalism;
operational rules for connecting the formalism with testable data and making in ..... applications;
and layers of interpretation. It is in these separable, and variable, larger of interpretation that
metaphysical and elaborative princi;es begin to enter conspicuously.
The "institutionalized" interpretation is but one among the interpretations that can be
fitted to classical formalism. It is an interpretation incorperating some major and controverisial
philosophical theories, such as the reference theory and verificationism. Rival interpretations
are feasible and were developed, for instance by the Scottish comon-sense school. Such rival
foundations do not yield a value-free value neutral nature. Collicott calls upon Rolston 'to
provide a persuasive alternative to the integral set of Carterian-Gohblein-Humean assumptions
that render the subjective provenance of value so fundamental to the modern scientific outlook'
(p.16). But Rolston hardly needs to do any such thing 3 : it has already been done, in various
3
Rolston makes giving an appropriate interpretation for more difficult than he need by conceeding
"seconddoary" qualities to the reductionistic opposition.
Thus, regressively: 'the greenness of the tree is in my hand, but it looks as though the tree is
�3
ways, and, in any case, as Collicott soon observes, 'the modern scientific worldview is
obsolete' (p.19). The property for a full value-in-nature theory are little better under postmodern quantum theory, Collicott however insinuates, then they were before. Under a
Copenhagen interpretations, which he adopts, prospects look worse.
Abruptly too Collicott switches from a determination thesis, such as CD, to a slacker and
more plausible if vaguer linkage. The linkage appears in different nonequivalent forms:
CL 1. A science, such as 'the new physics might play an architectonic role in our eventual
thinking about nature (and human society)' (p.23 itals added).
Subsequently, 'architectonic role' is replaced through the as vague 'inspired by' and more
specific 'mapped out'.
CL2. 'A value thoery [may be] inspired by, and mapped on, ... quantum physics (p.25, where
reduction and derviation are now explicitly repudiated!).
Such a value theory is, it is claimed, 'particularly congenial to an ecologically informed
environmental ethics' (p.25). Whether it is, or not, depends on other-things, such as the sort of
interpretation of quantum theory, the congeniality of that with ecology. No doubt values in
nature without values is excluded under the Copenhagen interpretation, so is much else that
makes good sense. Fortunately there are congenial alternatives.
REFERENCES
P.R.H. Forrest, Speculation and Experience the New Metaphysics, Inaugural Public Lecture,
University of New England, N.S.W., 1987.
J.B. Callicott, 'Ralston's Environmental Ethics: A critical celbration', critical response at APA,
Oakland, March 1989.
R. Sylvan, Deep Plurallism, Australian National University, Research School of Social Science,
1993.
green. OUt there are only ....... waves... . The greenness is projected, more factural in my head
and apparently hung on the tree'. What a ridiculous idea.
�'
,,.
ON THE VALUE CORE OF DEEP-GREEN THEORY
This essay aims to uncover the value theory of deep-green theory, exposing thereby a
central area of that theory. Though the value theory is (inevitably) abstract, it issues in what is
more concrete, such as an applicable system and practical ecological directives, potentially
destabilizing for prevailing policies and institutions.
Deep-green theory which stands in significant ideological opposition to dominant
industrial ways, is intended to supply a comprehensive alternative environmental philosophy.
At the core of deep-green theory lies a value theory. A fundamental theme thereof, part of what
makes the structure deep, is that a range of environmental items are valuable in themselves,
directly and irreducibly so, so that their value does not somehow reduce to or emerge from
something else, such as features of certain valuers or what matters for them. Thus value does
not answer back in some way to humans, or sentient creatures (or other value-responsive
classes), their interests, uses, preferences, or such like. Many natural items, such as forests
and rivers, mountains and seashores, are intrinsically valuable. They are valuable in their own
right - irrespective of whether they are interesting or useful (to any intentional operators,
themselves interesting or useful or not), indeed whether or not there exist any valuers. Value
spreads through and reaches across the natural domain; it is not bounded by mind, or linkages
with subjective states; nor does it stop with sentience, or associated pyschological features like
satisfaction; nor does it end at life; it observes no such compromising bounds. Although value
is distributed richly if irregularly throughout nature, it is not then encapsulated in some isolable
natural feature, such as life or sentience, or even in defeasible ecological values such as
richness, diversity and variety (and so open to a different, naturalistic, reduction). But of
course such ecologically important features afford criteria for value, and should be represented
in recipes (such as "objective functions") for assessing overall value.
From the presence of natural things of value, and accordingly of natural values, it is a
short, though controversial, step to the important conclusion that there can be values without
valuers. For valuers are sentient creatures with appropriate capacities, but things of value may
precede and succeed all such valuers; that is, these things can persist, their values intact,
without any valuers. As there can be shapes without any shape.:.perceivers, so there can be
values without valuers. (The theme, like others advanced, can be backed up by more detailed
argument and by formal proof, neither attempted here.) In valuational relations then, which
relate valuers as subjects with values as objects, both ends of relations have independent
standing; though interrelated, as the descriptions are deliberately chosen to suggest, either can
stand without the other. It is a fashionable mistake to try to collapse this relation - usually to
endeavour to soak up values into a modification of valuing subjects (e.g. as a predicate
�'relation-to-values', in which inconvenierZt values are locked away). The mistaken procedure
is in fact just one important example of an archetypal modern reduction of relations to
functions; other examples, locking undesired objects away within functions, are those
rendering wholes (such as ecosystems and organised structures) functions of their parts, and,
under functionalism, minds and types of intentionality, including value-direction, as functions
of bodies or their parts such as brains. Values are not, and do not disappear into, functions of
valuers.
A connected corollary is that values are not apart from the actual world, something
"projected" or imposed on it by a favoured class of valuers, something colouring (and even
emotionally clouding) the otherwise valueless physical world, in rather the way that
reductionistic materialism tries (erroneously) to construe colour itself as projected onto a
colourless physical world. Of course this projection effort, never adequately explicated, does
not succeed, on its own, in removing values. For they remain, left as some function of the
valuers. To try to bulldoze through this difficulty, a second reduction is invoked, of evaluative
features of valuers to "natural" features, commonly preferences, consumer desires or such like.
The second reduction runs into obstacles that halt even the naturalistic bulldozers (e.g.
naturalistic and related fallacies), but the first reduction is the critical one in removing key
environmental values, such as those of wilderness and wild things, which become valuable
only in the focus of certain sentient beholders, and not in and for themselves. This reduction
too is blocked by insuperable difficulties. On the one side, like the parallel proposed
phenomenalist reduction of material objects to sensations, the reduction never achieves
satisfactory support or even a satisfactory statement. On the other, it is counterexampled by
various modellings or thought-experiments revealing intuitively-assessed value in situations
devoid of valuers (as e.g. in the well-known Last Person argument). Values remain then part
of the still rich actual world; they are objects in the domain of actual and other worlds. But
they are not of course material objects; creatures will not fall over them any more than they will
trip over shadows or mere shapes.
Value, like shape, is an attribute, which things have or may lack, and which furthermore
creatures can recognise or may fail to discern. Thus value is, like shape and colour and their
determinate forms (round, red, etc), a universal , distributed across things, individuals and
wholes. The comparison of value with shape is decidedly more helpful than the regular, but
exhausted, comparison of value with colour, or of goodness with colour determinates such as
yellow. For example, shape is not bound by a set of determinates as colour is in the specific
colours, but comes in a spectacular variety of forms, not totally or linearly ordered (as in a
rainbow), or contracted to some primary set (as in colour triangles); shape which pertains to
wholes as well as particulars, links with gestalts better than colour; shape discrimination is
more culture dependent and sensitive; yet shape is, or was, a primary property, and thereby
�more immune to reductionist strategies thJn secondary properties such as colour. Again shapes
like values, can be vague, indeterminate; that does not prevent things, perhaps unique things,
exemplifying them. But naturally the analogy can only be extended so far. Shapes can be
approximated by polygons, values cannot; shapes are regularly perceived through sense
perception, by vision or touch especially, values are not, but are differently apprised. Value is
its own thing, not something else; it is what it is and does what is does; it is not something
else, like some quantitative mathematical or economic function. Nor does it contract into some
mark of value, or to what it comes down to in highly restricted settings; most important, it does
not disappear in the style of modern economics into (expected) utility, or into just two
economic forms, value-in-use monetarily and value-in-exchange (price), neither of which may
reflect worth. Value means what it means, and has meant: worth ; and it ties with general
assessments of merit and demerit, goodness or badness, not an economic or other truncation
thereof.
The powerful drive to reduce or deny values has several sources. Part of the motivation
for reduction of value springs from epistemological worries, concerning how values can be
ascertained and known, so far as they are (subjective translation proposals are then a direct
evaluative counterpart of phenomenalism). Part derives from supposedly problematic cultural
relativity (whence the attempt to impose values by identification of value with some favoured
assessible feature, and with it cultural or economic imperialism). Part of the motivation comes
from more sweeping ideological commitments, such as varieties of materialism or scientism,
which leave no space for immaterial values.
As already apparent, attempted reductions of value come in a dazzling variety of forms • subjective, which make use of psychological features, such as desires, interests, emotions,
and the like; or more objective aggregations of these, such as community preferences or utility;
or objectively naturalistic, which enrol single track value-making characteristics such as
richness or evolutionary development as value;
• consequential, which consider only outcomes; or purely motivational, which consider only
attitudes and ignore leads and outcomes;
• straightforward, as in translation proposals for translating value judgements into reducing
statements; or oblique, as in supervenience propositions (no variations in value without
underwriting variations in reducing features); or obscure, as in unarticulated projection claims.
Values are not well accommodated within these reductionistic schemes, or accommodated at all.
Deep-green value theory, which is thoroughly nonreductive, repudiates all these reductionistic
options. They are not so difficult to avoid, as the options are neither exhaustive nor exclusive.
In particular, value reduces neither in subjective nor objective fashion; it does not reduce.
Evaluative judgements are nonjective, that is, neither subjective nor objective (in any absolutist
�4
fashion). Obversely, evaluation of an act does not reduce to assessing consequences; nor does
it come down to an assessment of motives; both may matter.
The virulent idea is abroad however that science can offer a reduction, can sweep up
value along with all other information, where philosophy has conspicuously failed.
Unfortunately for such optimistic ideas, fortunately perhaps for deeper thought, current basic
science does not have much to say at all, or of merit, about values, and if it did reductions
through it would be circular. But, to the contrary, there is a long-standing pretence that science
gets along "well" without values, in appropriate value-free fashion. Nowadays it is
increasingly realised that the positivistic assumption of such value-freedom is a myth, that
much of what passes as science is heavily value-penetrated. While the residual ideal of pure
engagement in pure science may offer the illusion of an escape from value, there is no escape.
For, in any case, reductions do not succeed, as a copious literature, littered with failed
attempts, meanderingly establishes. Nor are they generally desirable, since mostly shallow,
aiming at a reduction to features of some privileged class presented as ideal (i.e. core value is
covertly assumed, so there is no real reduction). Nor are they needed; explanation and
assessment do not require reduction. Evaluations may be arrived at, and value frameworks
expanded, by enhancement methods, which organise and expand emotional presentation by
coherence methods.
The enhancement methodology in fact resembles that sometimes proposed for further
acquisition of scientific information. As accumulated empirical information can be further
extended through presentational input and assessment for overall coherence, so further
evaluations may be arrived at and assessed through a combination of presentational and
coherence procedures. At the (marginal) stage where the next round of evaluations is
undertaken, the following active ingredients figure, in an idealised breakdown:- Firstly, a
background stock of judgements and value experience will have been accumulated or inherited;
in principle all of this is revisable, and some may be up for reassessment. Apart from the
background, which enters in assessing overall coherence of system, what is involved is,
secondly, emotional presentation, which corresponds to further perceptional and sense data
input, and, thirdly and not independent, coherence processing, which supplies the
interpretational and rationalisational components. At bottom, parallelling perception in the case
of empirical information, is emotional presentation, gut or visceral reaction in starker forms of
acceptance or rejection, but more generally comprehending a variety of sentiments, including
overall well-being, and also relational impressions, such as empathy, identification, and so on.
As a perceiver perceives shapes, so a valuer feels raw value and disvalue. The basis of
perception is sensation, the basis of valuation is emotion. Apprehension of value is seated in
emotional, and especially visceral, presentation; but what is apprehended is not to be confused
with its apprehension any more than what is perceived. All the warnings about sensation as an
�information source have to be repeat~d, with heavy emphasis, as regards emotional
presentation; for example, reliability cannot be guaranteed, interference with presentation
through drugs, alcohol, temporary excitement or other inputs may render it dubious or
unacceptable, conditioning may have occurred, including substantial cultural conditioning (so
that a person is terrified by harmless spiders but not sickened by bloody massacres of dolphins
or seals). As with perception, there are checks on emotional presentation, such as constancy
over time and after reflection.
Emotional presentation, supplying primarily inclusions and exclusions or prohibitions, is
but the basis of reflective evaluation and value apprehension. The further critical part,
coherence processing, builds on the basis taking account of other inputs or controls including
background (which supplies relevant components of already adopted judgements, assimilated
subculture and so forth) and constraints (such as moral substitutional requirements like
impartiality, e.g. whether considered judgements hold for substitute valuers, and uniformity,
e.g. whether similar acts are judged in similar ways). Essentially, the coherence procedure
consists in asking whether the next or a relevant judgement fits together with what has been
accepted, while meeting constraints, without leading to what has been rejected or excluded. If
it does fit it is added to the included side, otherwise it is sent to the excluded side. Because an
aim of this rationalisation procedure is achievement of some sort of equilibrium such coherence
procedures have gained currency under the rubric "reflective equilibrium". Observe, however,
that equilibrium reached at some stage may be lost as new types of problems arise and further
information enters. No doubt the whole methodology (like the parallel methodology of an
empirically-based coherence theory of truth) is highly idealised, and only practicably applicable
in rudimentary parts. It does however surmount a major theoretical obstacle for environmental
value theory; it reveals how in principle a nonreductionistic value theory can function, and
deliver a tenable value system. Whether what results is however an appropriate deep
environmental system will depend above all on the presentational input, the extent to which
environmental sensitivity enters and is not suppressed.
Enhancement methods reveal too that value systems are not uniquely determined, any
more than other comprehensive theoretical frameworks. There evidently are rival value
systems measuring up to rigorous rationality requirements, much as there are rival logics and
rival physical and biological systems. In particular chauvinistic systems, narrow or shallow
value systems, which are unresponsive to and take no account of environmental items and
values, cannot be excluded on rational or straight logical grounds. Unfortunately such systems
remain in ascendancy, and tend to dominate social and political practice; in recent times
economism, a narrow type of utilitarianism, has all too obviously dominated much terrestial
practice. While such value frameworks are open to severe criticism, for instance as
chauvinistic, as violating universality requirements of morality in the case of economism, they
�do not succumb to definitive refutatiog (for the reason that requirements of morality,
universalizability of principle, impartiality and so on, can simply be repudiated; immoral or
amoral frameworks are still value systems). Even so, much can be done to shift or alter
values, though as usual effectiveness cannot be guaranteed. A range of argumentative,
educational and persuasive techniques, of varying quality, can be put to work to move valuers
indoctrinated in old damaging structures, often enough successfully. Important among these
are positive presentations of environments, their habitats and creatures, by way of new
information and experience.
The availability of rival value systems, while it implies a certain desirable (and also
troublesome) pluralism, does not mean relativism. From a deep-green viewpoint, rival
narrower and shallower systems are definitely inferior, and criticised accordingly, while
economism is an anathema which does not even make the moral grade (e.g. too many
principles stop at class or state boundaries). However a critical pluralism does acknowledge
and offer a place in the wider scheme of things for other systems, even if as less favoured or
satisfactory. One political upshot is evident; deep-green theory promotes, what matters in these
irrational times of numbers, alliances - in particular, a green alliance, organising green
positions, against prevailing forces of environmental degradation.
The systematic pluralism of deep-green value theory interpenetrates not only social and
political domains above, but also metaphysics traditionally placed below. In the underlying
metaphysical pluralism of deep-green theory, value runs very deep - so deep that even truth
depends in part upon it. For not merely selection of a correct comprehensive theory or worldview is a value dependent choice, but choice of associated actual world is also. That choice,
insofar as it is consciously made, of world structure and conceptualisation, is a constrained
choice, constrained by informational inputs, such as those of refined perception. But inasmuch
as it is rationally accomplished, that choice, like other choices of structure, proceeds according
to a standard value-information analysis (regularly oversimplified however to a preferenceinformation or even desire-belief modelling); that is, to extract the salient point, it involves
value essentially.
Truth and value are then intertwined; truth, though naturally different from value, is value
dependent. Both are plural, and differently so. So, unremarkably deep-green metaphysics
resembles the value theory in significant respects. For example, as the value theory is
nonreductionistic, so also is the metaphysics; in particular, there is a no-reduction theme that
neither parts nor wholes reduce eliminably to one another, as opposed to atomistic and holistic
views of environmental interrelations. As the value theory is pluralistic, so also is the
metaphysics; in place of established absolutism, a plurality of worlds, with associated truth
definitions is discerned. Indeed a main aim of deep-green theory is to dislodge dominant
�destructive ideologies, which (each of th]m) assume an absolute truth, from their positions thereby providing intellectual living-space for natural environments.
Much of deep-green theory devolves then from the abstract value theory. As with the
metaphysical way sketched, so it is with the fuller ethical theory, which includes as well as a
specific axiological system, elaborating deep environmental values and virtues, a deontic
framework, supplying obligations, rights, taboos, and similar. For example, given that a
certain wild river is intrinsically valuable, as we can verify by on-site experience and
enhancement methods, and given that we duly respect that value, as deontic principles will tell
us we should, then we are not free to do as we like with that river, to dam it with concrete, to
channel it within concrete, stripping it of its riverine ecosystems. But that does not preclude
respectful use of the river, swimming or sailing quietly in its waters, and the like. Value thus
guides action, practice, and use; it is the ground also upon which principles are formulated,
principles that are assessed and validated by way of enhancement methods. Important among
these are non-interference principles, which exclude unwarranted interference with other
preference-havers and unwarranted damage, ill-treatment, or devaluation of items of value.
Such deontic principles circumscribe environmentally-limited freedom of action. Given noninterference principles, a major shift in onus of proof from homocentricethics takes place.
What is required now is that reasons be givenfor interfering with the environment, rather than
reasons for not doing so. Also direct responsibility for environmental interference or
modification falls upon those who would seriously interfere or significantly modify, who
would tread heavily on the land. Non-interference does not preclude use - only too much use
and use of too much. What it does lead to is the theme that, where use occurs, it should be
careful and respectful use.
An important respect thesis regarding environmental items is founded on such non-interference
principles and the no-reduction theme: namely,
• not to put others (other preference havers) into a dispreferred state for no good reason;
• not to jeopardise the well-being of natural objects or systems without good reason;
• not to damage or destroy items which, while they cannot literally be put into a dispreferred
state, can be damaged or destroyed or have their value eroded or impaired.
These apply to ecosystems, their surrounds, their parts, and so on. The mere making of
further excess profits, or similar economic excuses, are not good reasons. Such a respect
thesis forms part of the ecological outlook of deep-green theory.
Deep-green ethical theory amounts to much more than just another non-reductionist
ethical theory, which highlights ecological values and virtues, and so forth. It changes the
character and shape of ethical enterprise. Perhaps most strikingly, it removes humans as such
�from the centre of the ethical stage (or :xclusive occupation of the stage). The biological
concept of being human ceases to be a significant ethical category. To elevate it to such is to
fall into human chauvinism, a type of class chauvinism which unwarrantedly discriminates in
favour of the human species. The prevailing chauvinism is not inevitable; it is very logically
avoided by directly connecting ethical characteristics with the categories of items that can have
them. Relevant categories include those marked out by features like: having well-being,
preference-having, rights-holding, contractual-capability, and so on, categories not necessarily
connected with any particular species. Hitherto virtually all Western ethical theories, and the
institutional arrangements they help support, have not merely limited ethical matters to interhuman affairs, but have been blatantly chauvinistic, exhibiting substantial and unjustifiable
discrimination in favour of humans (or certain privileged humans).
Deep-green theory thus implies the inadequacy of prevailing social, political and
economic arrangements and institutions. These structures are the defective products of inferior
value frameworks which take quite insufficient account of environmental desiderata and values.
Richard Sylvan*
RMB 683
Bungendore NSW 2621
*
Thanks to David Bennett for comments on an earlier draft. For more on deep-green theory, see
essays in and work referred to in the Green Series, i.e. Discussion Papers in Environmental
Philosophy, RSSS, Australian National University, Canberra.
This compressed essay was solicited by and written for Island Magazine (Tasmania). Upon receiving
it however, the editors decided that it was too dense, and insufficiently journalistic and popular (not
features they had at any time requested), for their magazine.
�
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DEEP-GREEN ETHICS
Contents
PARTS
CHAPTERS
0
I
II
III
IV
Prologue
DEEP, GREEN, ETHICS, and PHILOSOPHICAL BACKGROUND
1
Deep [and] green fundamentals
2
Ethics without humans; philosophy without humans
3
Philosophical setting: deep-green plurallisms
4
Inhibiting presumptions and myths
AXIOLOGY: value core
5
Value and its varieities: basic theory and its development
6
Alternative primitives and theoretical beginnings
DEONTOLOGY: necessary moral structure
7
Obligation and its deontic circle, and moral dilemmas
8
Rights, and justice
VIRTUE and INACTION
9
Environmental virtues: what they are and
something of their theory
10
V
Environmental ethical practice
NATURE of ETHICS
11
Ethics, its new character and revised foundations
12
Principal questions of reoriented ethics, and proposed answers
13
Epilogue
17 .5.96
DEEP-GREEN ETHICS
PROLOGUE
Philosophy and its branches, ethics especially, are among the last places where prejudice
would be found, found alive and thriving, so it might be imagined. Wrong. In the first place,
prevailing ethics all exhibit heavy prejudice in favour of humans, human chauvinism. So they
are one and all defective, wrong in a deep way. An adequate ethic will remove the prejudices
involved. That means, in turn, a radical transformation of prevailing ethics, from the bottom
up. Such a transformation constitutes a main objective of this book. Deep-green ethics aims
not simply to reform present arrangements and systematizations, but to replace them. Abolition
of prejudice has early priority.
Prejudice in philosophy, privelege in prevailing ethics.
There are only about two and half millenia of recorded philosophy on Earth. To a
disconcerting extent, those millenia represent two and half thousand years of prejudice-partial
exceptions occurring and prejudice subsiding somewhat only when ideological empires were
fractured (e.g. fruitful periods of "warring states" in ancient China and Greece). Ethics is far
from alone within philosophy in exhibiting serious deficiencies, in incorporating prejudices that
should not figure so prominently in what is ideally an impartial subject. Much the same holds
for other branches: politics obviously (partly through its interdependence with ethics),
metaphysics and logic perhaps less obviously. Yet prevailing metaphysics display a deep
prejudice in favour of the actual, against what does not exist. In logic the prejudical situation
has in fact been accentuated through the rise of modern symbolic logic. Regrettably mainstream
symbolic logic is wrong. All its forms validate incorrect principles (such as implicational
paradoxes), these results flowing primarily from an underlying prejudice in favour of the
consistent, against the impossible. 1
Several of the systematic prejudices embedded elsewhere in philosophy impact upon
ethics. The prejudice in favour of the actual has served to distort, very seriously, the issue of
obligations to future creatures for example, in this fashion:- Remoter future creatures do not
exist, and therefore, according to prevailing prejudice, cannot have any relevant features, any
preferences or desires, self-traits or satisfactions, to be taken into ethical account. Therefore
All the themes are presented and defended in detail elsewhere. As regards metaphysics, see JB; as
regards logic, see e.g. BGB and generally in philosophy , see TM. There are several coupled
prejudices and prejudical drives, as will appear; for instance the drives to power and to maximization,
strongly manifested in logic, see e.g. RLR.
Prejudice in ethics was explicitly recognised by Bentham, almost two centuries ago; unfortunately
however he imported his own very influential prejudical framework.
2
"they" can be discounted entirely. The same prejudice also enters in a very different way. All
the standard positions concerning universals, all of which reflect the metaphysical
presupposition that discourse concerns existent objects, show up in ethics. They appear in
vexing issues as to the ontological status of values, such as the good, and of deontic notions,
such as obligations and the right. These are not only difficult items to discover in the world, but
they do not seem adequately housed in conceptual or linguistic apparatus: where are they
located? Whence derives immediate pressure for many mostly bizarre reduction exercises; for
instance of values to human constructs, contructs from social preferences or from
sociobiological drives, and of obligations from veiled contracts. The initial question of location
makes, however, the defective metaphysical presupposition, and lapses therewith. Values,
though significant items, do not exist; so they are not located, anywhere.
Prejudice rooted in established logic has impacted differently, upon a variety of issues in
ethics. The absolute requirement of consistency upsets a straightforward treatment of
obligations, general sets of which are typically inconsistent, thereby leading for instance to
awkward theories of hierarchies of obligation or of merely prima facie obligations. Running
parallel with this, the requirement utterly distorted an initially straightforward theory of ethical
dilemmas, treatment of which is a significant part of any comprehensive ethical theory.
Established logic has also impacted heavily on such different issues as fact-value inferences
(e.g. the prescriptive fallacy) and regarding the extent of pluralism in ethics. The assumption
behind the rationalistic critique of relativism is that there is a single correct logic, governed by
requirements of consistency, namely standard logical theory, which (when combined with the
facts) will eliminate various ethical stances as incorrect, indeed which may, given sufficient
critical thought, lead to a single correct ethics. 2 But the assumption fails; for it too depends on
ancient prejudice.
Pluralism is one most important component in removing prejudice generally, certainly in
reducing it generally, by admitting alternatives, and allowing some to flourish. 3 Elaboration of
deep-green theory is another important direction in removing prejudice, in favour of humans,
persons, or like agents from ethics especially but not only. The main development that follows
will take both these directions, though focussed upon ethics: it will track and investigate
pluralistic deep-green ethics.
Human chauvinism is not the only major prejudice damaging ethics. An extraordinarily
privileged position given to egoistical considerations is another. Western ethics in particular has
2
3
The approach involved, that of traditional rationalistic ethics, is regularly deployed by Singer (e.g.
his Encyclopedia conclusion to Companion to Ethics); the strengthened version features in Regan.
Of course how it is supposed to proceed, the details of how reason works this miracle, is never
revealed.
See esp. TM, epilogue.
3
recently been deformed through a substantially unquestioned axiom of self concern, that agents
are interested in and motivated by their own (self) concerns and only by them. (Of course an
agent's self, or extended self, may be grander than the agent's soul or person or body or
whatever; it may include the agent's family or even the agent's tribe, or differently it may
comprehend the agent's land or environment. But under such extensions the axiom is already
beginning to disintegrate.) Such an ubiquitous, but largely unquestioned, presumption has lain
behind reductionistic exercises that have distorted much of modem ethical (and political) theory.
The leading idea is simple enough: given that action is justified through human self-interest, and
only thus, if ethical theory (and likewise political superstructure) can be justified through some
construction or modelling on that basis (bringing in only indifference and like neutral
assumptions) , then justification will be transmitted, it too will be justified. Thus those
contractual and utilitarian exercises which have loomed so large in recent theory. 4 The same
dubious presumption also features large elsewhere, for instance in the acclaimed derivation of
Deep Ecology from the ultimate norm of Self-realization!
It is not just prejudice and allied presumption that have damaged and distorted ethics.
Narrow ethics, parading as universal or absolute in defiance of pluralism, ethics often
underwritten by religious or papal presumption, have severely disadvantage d ethics.
Furthermore, connected therewith, ethics has been destabilized, and cast in an unfavourable
light, by
•
a quest for absolute foundations, and in tum connected therewith
•
an invidious comparison with science, which is supposed to have such foundations.
The quest is quixote: there are no such foundations. Nor does science have such foundations,
so the comparison is misplaced. Not only is absoluteness for science increasingly disputed, but
it is becoming apparent that science is in the same sort of pluralistic situation-pre dicament
some, still questing for the old false certainties, would say-as ethics. 5
Through the assumption, or pretence, that it can deliver (whether from religious, rational
or other resources) certainties of a type that it cannot deliver, ethics has become discredited. But
that is only part among reasons why on the contemporary scene ethics is not the force that it has
mostly been in bygone times. At least as important as such intellectual reasons are matters like
removal of social and political pressures to conform, redirection of indoctrination practices (into
consumerism, etc.), and so on, some welcome and some definitely not.
4
5
Roughly, ethics, knocked down to what's in it for everyone (some aggregated base class), is justified
through what's in it for each me. Prima facie the grand construction is based on a simpler fallacy of
aggregation: an invalid each to all inference.
The theme is argued in detail in TM chapter 10.
The quixote quest is strikingly engaged in by Williams, for a entertaining criticism of which see
'Bernard Williams and the Absolute Conception of the World' in Putnam 92.
4
Aspects of the discreditation have in turn been exaggerated. Ethics, it is said, makes no
difference, even can never make a difference; it never effects change. Such claims are seriously
astray, as examination of elementary examples like human slavery and treatment of animals
quickly reveals. Environmental ethics too can make a difference (perhaps, when coupled with
other practices, a major difference), and they are beginning to do so. But naturally they cannot
compel change; nor should they be capable of doing so, as that would exceed proper roles of
ethics (and other proper practices). 6
Rectification of ethics requires, then, not merely removal of now conspicuous prejudice
and presumptions, but deflation of pretensions. What results-hardly unique naturally, but one
selected for good reasons among many, hardly entirely exclusive but overlapping and admitting
others-is an ethics which differs from standard ethics in the following respects at least: Such
an ethics is:
• deep-green, removing prejudice in favour of humans, and in favour of certain (egoistic)
agents, in an affirmative fashion; and
• Pluralistic in a thorough-going way, accordingly not pretending to absolute or objective
status.
The run of prevailing ethics, including so-called "applied ethics" and "environmental ethics" are
chauvinistic; a satisfactory (environmental) ethic is not. The run of prevailing ethics are
absolutist, or otherwise relativist; a satisfactory ethic is neither.
However the conditions so far presented are but necessary conditions; they are not jointly
sufficient for adequacy. Even among theories that are nonchauvinistic and duly pluralistic,
reductionism may persist. Such reductionisms come in striking variety; thus, on just one
dimension, individualisms, sentientisms, vitalisms, (i.e. all that has value is alive, somehow),
and so on. To avoid such reductionisms, another blanket condition of adequacy is:
• non-reductionistic.
The main task consists in elaborating in detail an ethic, with other preferred features, that meets
these conditions of adequacy.
Regrettably, removal of prejudice cannot be accomplished in ethics alone, as a separate
pollution-free zone. Prejudice in ethics flows through from other regions, religion especially,
but also from psychology (which in the past made little gods of humans with sacred souls of
their own, justifying very differential treatment for them in the world), and from elsewhere.
Removal of these latter sorts of prejudices requires a severe erosion of belief, in regions strictly
outside ethics, but heavily exporting into it; of beliefs fostering intellectual prejudice.
Nonetheless ethics has a role in removal of prejudices elsewhere, because, very simply,
these prejudices ought to be removed. The basic principle, which can also be presented as one
6
These points are developed at some decent length in GE part IL
5
of rationality, runs as follows: belief ought not to exceed warranting evidence, but should be
appropriate to it.
None of this is as clean and clear-cut as it may initially appear, because source waters
have become very muddied. Sources for instance take a range of forms (this is part of the
ancient issue of the criterion reput in more contemporary terms). Sources include not merely
empirical evidence, perception especially, the favoured, or even exclusive, source of
empiricism. They also include such sources as: emotional presentation, or emotion; postulation
or presumption; reason; authority; a range of psychic and extra sensory perception (ESP) forms;
and, differently, a range of intuitions. Some of these sources overlap; consider for instance
divine relevation. Plainly those sources are very different kinds, quality and calibre. Some
such as reason, which includes itself a disputed variety of forms, are more processing of
information kinds than sources (thought reason becomes a source, of sorts, in pure rationalism,
and a degenerate source of necessary truths in classical logical theory where theorems are
proved, by paradoxical means, from nothing so to say).
While some of these kind of sources are not important or at issue in ethics, for instance
controversial kinds of ESP giving information on remote (spatially distant or past or future)
items, several are. It is not going too far to say that ethics is severely vexed as regards sources,
and many distortions such as naturalism can be seen as coming about as ways of trying to
secure reliable sources (if some naturalistic reduction were correct then ethics would be brought
within the orbit of science and even empirical perceptual bases could be adopted, as in science).
But ethics does not resemble science; its sources are not (except incidentally) primarily
perceptual, thus breaking any very close analogy between epistemology and ethics.
A major source in ethics is emotion, by contrast with epistemology where the major
source is perception. From there already derives a major difference between the fields, as
perception tends to be less variable, more intersubjective, less culturally dependent across the
range of subjects usually taken into account. Accordingly, in any quest for a more objective
ethics, more has to be drawn out, out of the processing substructure, whence the emphasis on
coherence, good reasons, ethical on coherence, good reasons, ethical argumentation. Ethical
inputs, sources, and processing are assessed in detail in the text.
Although this work is focussed upon ethics, it does not, and evidently cannot, merely
concern ethics. Since the ethical theory is itself approached primarily (though not exclusively)
by way of value, it bears upon other areas, such as normative-infected social sciences, where
value theory features. For another example, it also impacts upon aesthetics, heavily. For,
according to the theory advanced, there is no sharp boundary, indeed really no division at all,
between what has been dubbed "aesthetic value" and "ethical value". Value is value, without
these artificial divides. Evidently too, as will appear, the work intrudes in normative reaches
6
merging into ethics, in particular, wherever normative or deontic dilemmas are encountered,
such as reaches of social choice theory and legal theory. Differently, the work includes much,
though indirectly, upon philosophy of nature. For it is especially concerned to supersede an old
defective philosophy of nature, which included a heavy devaluation of nature, and aided and
abetted a manifestly chauvinistic ethics. The ethical theory to be elaborated fits with, and in
significant respects presupposes, a·different theory of nature. 7
Although investigations in this text are primarily theoretical, they have significant practical
implications. Putting the theory to work in various environmental fields is something that
happens elsewhere (see further in the Epilogue). Some of this has already occurred, in essays
in the Green Series, and some is reserved for other texts on field ethics. 8
Notes on terminology In this text several familiar terms, such as 'green' and 'deep', are
converted into quasi-technical terms. That is to say, special uses of the terms already in
currency, such as the use of 'green' to mean environmentally committed, are further refined.
The result could be signalled by deloyment of appropriate new terminology. Something like
that is assumed done, except that the familiar terms will be retained-onl y now they are to be
read in the quasi-technical way. To put the point differently. Let 'grene' (Olde English) or
'gre-een, (Newe English), for example, be the quasi-technical explication of 'green' in the
relevant sense. Then in the subsequent text, 'green' will normally signify gre-een, or
equivalently 'green' operates as (effectively abbreviates) 'gre-een. Why such a strategem? One
reason is that people are now rather conservative regarding terminology. Indeed they are often
turned off by new terminology (despite regular ruination of established terminology). As a
result, established terminology gets revised for all sorts of new purposes (witness the bizarre
high-school reuses in advanced physics), with a resultant overloading of senses. By contrast,
recycling of old terminology (words or spellings), that has fallen into disuse would be rather
more commendable. Here, rather than pressing our luck with explicit recyclings like diep and
chalowe, we resort to the fiction that the terms 'deep' and 'shallow' deployed throughout the
text stand in for the technical recyclings. As a result 'deep', as figuring in deep approaches,
deep green, deep theory and so on, has no connection with profundity, or 'shallow' with
superficiality.
As several have said, in several respects deep/shallow terminology is unsatisfactory,
execrable it is sometimes said. Founder N aess did a disservice introducing it, and subsequently
7
8
Such an appropriate underlying theory of nature is advanced in the companion work on metaphysics,
namely TM.
Green Series is a popular label for discussion papers in environmental philosophy, published from
Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University. One of the other texts is
tentatively entitled Green Ethical Fields ..
7
in explaining it, so slackly. While it is too late to easily change the terminology, some
undesirable associations may be shaken off by resorting to older or variant spellings, and
simultaneous ly refining senses intended. That we do. But then we concede to the general
intellectual will, by the substitution or "abbreviations" strategem.
Even so, we have risked a few neologisms, and we shall chance, just here, one or two
more. One we risk, is euthics, for universalizab le ethics, that is an ethics meeting
universalizability requirements (in some appropriate fashion). This bit of terminology helps in
resolving a significant ambiguity in philosophical usage of 'ethics', and making an improved
start on the vexed issue of why an agent should adhere to an ethics, or differently to an euthics?
One we chance is viridology (from Latin virides, green, and Greek logos, study of, in modern
palance) for: theory, principles and practices of deep-green; that is, a single classical word for
diep-grene theory. A purer alternative we contemplated, from among many, was prasinology
(or should it be prasinomics) from Greek (and Latin) prasinus, dark green, leek green.
Acknowledg ements and antecendents: personal development and conceit.
The production of this work owes much to other humans, with of whom I have little or no
acquaintance. The debts are both intellectual and practical. On the heavily practical side, I am
most grateful to Frances Redrup for the processing of reems of rough scribble. On the broad
practical front I am pleased to acknowledge the continuing support of my research endeavours
by the Australian National University. That academic support, while generous by often
niggardly world standards, has recently declined, through contraction of research support and
expansion of alleged accountability practices. In this little respect, there has regettably been
interference in my research, dur the earlier stages of work on this book, by no doubt wellintentioned academics occupying supervisary roles who have deemed by performance less than
satisfactory. It is with regret too that I record that, in part owing to biassed appointment
practices within the University, there has been negligible imput to the present work from any of
my academic colleagues there.
But outside imput there has been of course, of two main sorts: from recent activity in
environmental philosophy and from past exercises in value theory. While environmental issues
have operated as a main stimulus in my recent work in ethics, my own interest in and
investigations in ethics reach back to my graduate work in Wellington, New Zealand, where I
produced a characteristic ally initative work on ethics, entitled Moral Scepticism (I do not
suggest that anyone read that work, which it is far too late to suppress).
In New Zealand, I was educated in the 20th century British type and style of ethical
theory, primarily Oxbridge material, with not antipodean influence of any significance what
cover, except in the obscure background Prior' s quocit little book Logic and the Basis of Ethics
(although my professor at Wellington, George Styles, had ethics as a manfield, I learnt only a
8
certain technigue from him; I do not recall one position, little theorem argument or there I must
attribute to him, for the very simple reason, (suspect, that he never advanced very much).
Among Oxbridge characters, Moore revoided the dominant influence though much of Hume and
his near contemporaries-N eurall-Smith Tomlesia and others-was scround up to a tiny circle
of ethical enthusiants and fellow academic travellers. Moore is still an influence in this book; in
my occasional more conceited moments, I like to envisage the book as an appropriately greenish
update of Principia Ethica. At least it may be as near as I ever come to producing such a work:
Principa Ethica Virida. What on excessively ambitious idea, sheer hubris! Yet, for all the fuss,
Principia Ethica is not really such a good book; rather it enjoys other advantageous features. A
few companions with Principa Ethica will be ventured.
But, by and large, other ethical theories will not be investigated in much detail. For one
reason, that has been done, to a sufficient extent elsewhere (in others' work more than my
own). For another, in the wake of accumulating evidence, notably from environmental
awakenings, revealing their narrowness and prejudice, they scarcely justify further post
mortems.
More than Moore and Priest, the present work is indebted to Meinong, and through him to
the tradition of Austrian value theory. The theory elaborated in fact fits, more or less, into what
has been called critical cognitivism ..
The evil of ingratitude, for example, ...
Here and there, the present text draws, heavily sometimes, on my own past work,
especially concerning environmental ethics. As much of the work, for example in the local
Green Series in Canberra, is rather inaccessible, such borrowing may not matter much. There
remains a small overlap-ideally vanishingly small as revision proceeds-betwee n this text and
better circulated complementary works, notably essays in Environmental Philosophy and parts
of The Greening of Ethics.
INTRODU CING DEEP-GR EEN THEORY
Deep-green theory aims eventually to supply a comprehensive alternative environmental
philosophy. While it stands on its own, it is alternative because it stands in radical ideological
opposition to dominant ways, nowadays predominantly industrial. It offers a philosophy both
in the contemporary narrower sense, and in the older sense of an intellectually informed and
critical way of life. That philosophy is centred on an ethical theory (upon which this issue
concentrates), which is in form centred upon a value theory. But the ethic issues, in a fashion
broadly associated since Aristotle, in a politics and political economy. But the output of the
value theory in fact reaches much further, into practical decision making in a range of
environmentally impacting areas such as fishing, forestry and agriculture. The value theory is
also intertwined with philosophical issues which are often considered more fundamental, those
of astophyism and epistemology. Indeed there is no part of philosophy that remains untouched.
Therein lies part of the claim to comprehensiveness.
The particular form of deep-green theory elaborated is by no means independent of
(acclaimed) advances recently made elsewhere in philosophy (those in object-theory, and
relevant and paraconsistent logics especially). But though the theory given is influenced and
sometimes in fact shaped through these developments, deep-green theory more generally can
avoid them (The type of theory given could easily enough be recast in a more classical
Platonistic form - undoubtedly a much less plausible form. Nor will these background advances
intrude, it is hoped, in the given elaboration of deep-green theory; the background will remain,
fairly directly in the background, and not come to dominate proceedings or know proceedings
depend upon special new controversial features of it. Where more technical agreements are
required, they will be relegated to appendices.
1. As to deep theory.
Deep-green theory is the environmental branch of a much larger affair, deep theory. There
is a point, in fact a real expository need, to place deep-green theory in the larger setting of deep
theory. For deep theory influences several of the choices made in deciding upon the way deepgreen theory goes, the shape it takes. Although the influence will become evident, particularly
with the intertwining of truth and value that .... , it is worth giving an example. Too much of the
Anglo-American discussion of intrinsic value and of obligations to future generations is taken up
with - hung up upon - ontological questions, about universal items in the first case, and as how
there can be obligations regarding future items which do not (yet) exist in "suitable" determinate
2
form in the second. Deep object-theo ry slices straight through these issues, removing the
problem generating ontological assumptions.
Deep-theor y is a grander theory lying in the background , which significantl y influences
the philosophic al approach taken in deep-green theory, as well as being influenced by it. There
is no reason why that grand backdrop should remain hidden; there is no hidden agenda. The
backgroun d theory, of which deep-green theory is a part, is called simply deep theory. For it
represents the confluence of several deep positions with deep-green theory: deep pluralism,
depth relevant theory, deep item-theory, and so on. As a theoretical endeavor, deep theory aims
to pull together, into a unified coherent theory these various deep positions. It thus draws
together and integrates as well, several other interrelated efforts (on dialethism, process theory,
anakyrie, etc. With deep theory I aim to supply eventually a fairly comprehen sive philosophical
package. I used to imagine that with moderate comprehen siveness as regards present
philosophic al problems would come a certain completene ss; but I've come to think that a total
philosophy is an illusion, like pots of gold at the ends of rainbows, and rainboweri a themselves.
Deep theory is no doubt a presumptu ous title (there are worse about, e.g. 'total
philosophy ', 'ecosophy' ), not it is altogether satisfactory given the problems and obscurities, to
be encountere d, lacking in the notion of depth. My main excuse is that I did no exactly choose
the title myself, but had it thrust upon me: problemati c, presumptuo us, it looks to good to
refuse. It emerged from a terminolog ical confluence of several areas in which I'd been
struggling to assemble ac. capirred theory - deep-green theory (itself a union of green thought,
or environmen tal philosophy with a revised deep ecology), deep relevant theory, deep pluralism
(which deepened radical pluralism), and deep item-theory (which deepens object-theory).
To give a picture of deep theory, it suffices for present purposes to indicate some main
features of deep positions, some of their integrating interrelatio ns, and some of their
revolutiona ry potential. Deep theory overturns or subverts very much of what has been
assumed or presuppos ed in Western philosophy , and particularl y in Enlightenm ented
contempora ry philosophy.
For example, it overturns the following widespread assumptions:• the Ontologica l Assumptio n, that truth, and also, meaning, are functions of reference, and
thereby presuppose existence. On the contrary according to (deep) item theory, we can perfectly
well talk and think truly about items that do not exist, and also about items that are not individual
but are complex but perhaps indetermin ate wholes, and finally what items are impossible .
Therewith repudiated also then is an occasionall y favoured full-back from onticalism, namely
possibilism , which assumes
3
• the Possibilist Reduction, of everything that counts in discourse to possible individuals; there
are no other genuine subjects, all else can be analysed (or thrown) away.
Bound up with possibilism are
• the assumptions of modalism, of the correctness of classical logic, and of the absolute
requirement of consistency. Under more throughgoing transconsistency (or paraconsistency)
these connected assumptions are one and all repudiated. The transconsistent connection
assumes an important role in the straightforward treatment of moral and other dilemmas, in
showing for example how an agent may coherently operate under inconsistent obligations or
with incompatible needs.
Important special cases of modalism are such theories as that
• entailment is strict implication (or its metalinguistic analogical) and that conditionality amounts
to a modal function of material implication 1. The rejection of such themes and their courses is
part of what motivates deep relevant logic.
While the parts of deep theory are integrated and are intended to be materially reinforcing,
nothing prevents their fairly independent elaborations. The holism conceded does not exclude
separation or analysis. In particular, deep-green theory is amenable to independent development
and analysis.
Material implication is the implication defined in terms of truth-functions thus: A materially implies
B iff not last A and not B, or equivalently, iff either not A or B. Strict implication is the
necessitation of material obligatory i.e. A strictly implies B iff necessarily A materially implies B, or
equivalently, iff it is not possible that not A and not B.
ON THE VALUE CORE OF DEEP-GR EEN THEORY
This essay aims to uncover the value theory of deep-green theory, exposing thereby a
central area of that theory. Though the value theory is (inevitably) abstract, it issues in what is
more concrete, such as an applicable system and practical ecological directives, potentially
destabilizing for prevailing policies and institutions.
Deep-green theory which stands in significant ideological opposition to dominant
industrial ways, is intended to supply a comprehensive alternative environmental philosophy.
At the core of deep-green theory lies a value theory. A fundamental theme thereof, part of what
makes the structure deep, is that a range of environmental items are valuable in themselves,
directly and irreducibly so, so that their value does not somehow reduce to or emerge from
something else, such as features of certain valuers or what matters for them. Thus value does
not answer back in some way to humans, or sentient creatures (or other value-responsive
classes), their interests, uses, preferences, or such like. Many natural items, such as forests
and rivers, mountains and seashores, are intrinsically valuable. They are valuable in their own
right - irrespective of whether they are interesting or useful (to any intentional operators,
themselves interesting or useful or not), indeed whether or not there exist any valuers. Value
spreads through and reaches across the natural domain; it is not bounded by mind, or linkages
with subjective states; nor does it stop with sentience, or associated pyschological features like
satisfaction; nor does it end at life; it observes no such compromising bounds. Although value
is distributed richly if irregularly throughout nature, it is not then encapsulated in some isolable
natural feature, such as life or sentience, or even in defeasible ecological values such as
richness, diversity and variety (and so open to a different, naturalistic, reduction). But of
course such ecologically important features afford criteria for value, and should be represented
in recipes (such as "objective functions") for assessing overall value.
From the presence of natural things of value, and accordingly of natural values, it is a
short, though controversial, step to the important conclusion that there can be values without
valuers. For valuers are sentient creatures with appropriate capacities, but things of value may
precede and succeed all such valuers; that is, these things can persist, their values intact,
without any valuers. As there can be shapes without any shape-perceivers, so there can be
values without valuers. (The theme, like others advanced, can be backed up by more detailed
argument and by formal proof, neither attempted here.) In valuational relations then, which
relate valuers as subjects with values as objects, both ends of relations have independent
standing; though interrelated, as the descriptions are deliberately chosen to suggest, either can
stand without the other. It is a fashionable mistake to try to collapse this relation - usually to
endeavour to soak up values into a modification of valuing subjects (e.g. as a predicate
'relation-to-values', in which inconvenielt values are locked away). The mistaken procedure
is in fact just one important example of an archetypal modern reduction of relations to
functions; other examples, locking undesired objects away within functions, are those
rendering wholes (such as ecosystems and organised structures) functions of their parts, and,
under functionalism, minds and types of intentionality, including value-direction, as functions
of bodies or their parts such as brains. Values are not, and do not disappear into, functions of
valuers.
A connected corollary is that values are not apart from the actual world, something
"projected" or imposed on it by a favoured class of valuers, something colouring (and even
emotionall y clouding) the otherwise valueless physical world, in rather the way that
reductionistic materialism tries (erroneously) to construe colour itself as projected onto a
colourless physical world. Of course this projection effort, never adequately explicated, does
not succeed, on its own, in removing values. For they remain, left as some function of the
valuers. To try to bulldoze through this difficulty, a second reduction is invoked, of evaluative
features of valuers to "natural" features, commonly preferences, consumer desires or such like.
The second reduction runs into obstacles that halt even the naturalistic bulldozers (e.g.
naturalistic and related fallacies), but the first reduction is the critical one in removing key
environmental values, such as those of wilderness and wild things, which become valuable
only in the focus of certain sentient beholders, and not in and for themselves. This reduction
too is blocked by insuperable difficulties. On the one side, like the parallel proposed
phenomenalist reduction of material objects to sensations, the reduction never achieves
satisfactory support or even a satisfactory statement. On the other, it is counterexampled by
various modellings or thought-experiments revealing intuitively-assessed value in situations
devoid of valuers (as e.g. in the well-known Last Person argument). Values remain then part
of the still rich actual world; they are objects in the domain of actual and other worlds. But
they are not of course material objects; creatures will not fall over them any more than they will
trip over shadows or mere shapes.
Value, like shape, is an attribute, which things have or may lack, and which furthermore
creatures can recognise or may fail to discern. Thus value is, like shape and colour and their
determinate forms (round, red, etc), a universal , distributed across things, individuals and
wholes. The comparison of value with shape is decidedly more helpful than the regular, but
exhausted, comparison of value with colour, or of goodness with colour determinates such as
yellow. For example, shape is not bound by a set of determinates as colour is in the specific
colours, but comes in a spectacular variety of forms, not totally or linearly ordered (as in a
rainbow), or contracted to some primary set (as in colour triangles); shape which pertains to
wholes as well as particulars, links with gestalts better than colour; shape discrimination is
more culture dependent and sensitive; yet shape is, or was, a primary property, and thereby
3
more immune to reductionist strategies than secondary properties such as colour. Again shapes
like values, can be vague, indeterminate; that does not prevent things, perhaps unique things,
exemplifying them. But naturally the analogy can only be extended so far. Shapes can be
approxima ted by polygons, values cannot; shapes are regularly perceived through sense
perception, by vision or touch especially, values are not, but are differently apprised. Value is
its own thing, not something else; it is what it is and does what is does; it is not something
else, like some quantitative mathematical or economic function. Nor does it contract into some
mark of value, or to what it comes down to in highly restricted settings; most important, it does
not disappear in the style of modern economics into (expected) utility, or into just two
economic forms, value-in-use monetarily and value-in-exchange (price), neither of which may
reflect worth. Value means what it means, and has meant: worth ; and it ties with general
assessments of merit and demerit, goodness or badness, not an economic or other truncation
thereof.
The powerful drive to reduce or deny values has several sources. Part of the motivation
for reduction of value springs from epistemological worries, concerning how values can be
ascertained and known, so far as they are (subjective translation proposals are then a direct
evaluative counterpart of phenomenalism). Part derives from supposedly problematic cultural
relativity (whence the attempt to impose values by identification of value with some favoured
assessible feature, and with it cultural or economic imperialism). Part of the motivation comes
from more sweeping ideological commitments, such as varieties of materialism or scientism,
which leave no space for immaterial values.
As already apparent, attempted reductions of value come in a dazzling variety of forms • subjective, which make use of psychological features, such as desires, interests, emotions,
and the like; or more objective aggregations of these, such as community preferences or utility;
or objectively naturalistic, which enrol single track value-making characteristics such as
richness or evolutionary development as value;
• consequential, which consider only outcomes; or purely motivational, which consider only
attitudes and ignore leads and outcomes;
• straightforward, as in translation proposals for translating value judgement s into reducing
statements; or oblique, as in supervenience propositions (no variations in value without
underwriting variations in reducing features); or obscure, as in unarticulated projection claims.
Values are not well accommodated within these reductionistic schemes, or accommodated at all.
Deep-green value theory, which is thoroughly nonreductive, repudiates all these reductionistic
options. They are not so difficult to avoid, as the options are neither exhaustive nor exclusive.
In particular, value reduces neither in subjective nor objective fashion; it does not reduce.
Evaluative judgements are nonjective, that is, neither subjective nor objective (in any absolutist
4
fashion). Obversely, evaluation of an act does not reduce to assessing consequences; nor does
it come down to an assessment of motives; both may matter.
The virulent idea is abroad however that science can offer a reduction, can sweep up
value along with all other information, where philosophy has conspicuou sly failed.
Unfortunately for such optimistic ideas, fortunately perhaps for deeper thought, current basic
science does not have much to say at all, or of merit, about values, and if it did reductions
through it would be circular. But, to the contrary, there is a long-standing pretence that science
gets along "well" without values, in appropriate value-free fashion. Nowadays it is
increasingly realised that the positivistic assumption of such value-freedom is a myth, that
much of what passes as science is heavily value-penetrated. While the residual ideal of pure
engagement in pure science may offer the illusion of an escape from value, there is no escape.
For, in any case, reductions do not succeed, as a copious literature, littered with failed
attempts, meanderingly establishes. Nor are they generally desirable, since mostly shallow,
aiming at a reduction to features of some privileged class presented as ideal (i.e. core value is
covertly assumed, so there is no real reduction). Nor are they needed; explanation and
assessment do not require reduction. Evaluations may be arrived at, and value frameworks
expanded, by enhancement methods, which organise and expand emotional presentation by
coherence methods.
The enhancement methodology in fact resembles that sometimes proposed for further
acquisition of scientific information. As accumulated empirical information can be further
extended through presentational input and assessment for overall coherence, so further
evaluations may be arrived at and assessed through a combination of presentational and
coherence procedures. At the (marginal) stage where the next round of evaluations is
undertaken, the following active ingredients figure, in an idealised breakdown:- Firstly, a
background stock of judgements and value experience will have been accumulated or inherited;
in principle all of this is revisable, and some may be up for reassessment. Apart from the
background, which enters in assessing overall coherence of system, what is involved is,
secondly, emotional presentation, which corresponds to further perceptional and sense data
input, and, thirdly and not independe nt, coherence processing , which supplies the
interpretational and rationalisational components. At bottom, parallelling perception in the case
of empirical information, is emotional presentation, gut or visceral reaction in starker forms of
acceptance or rejection, but more generally comprehending a variety of sentiments, including
overall well-being, and also relational impressions, such as empathy, identification, and so on.
As a perceiver perceives shapes, so a valuer feels raw value and disvalue. The basis of
perception is sensation, the basis of valuation is emotion. Apprehension of value is seated in
emotional, and especially visceral, presentation; but what is apprehended is not to be confused
with its apprehension any more than what is perceived. All the warnings about sensation as an
information source have to be repeat~d, with heavy emphasis, as regards emotional
presentation; for example, reliability cannot be guaranteed, interference with presentation
through drugs, alcohol, temporary excitement or other inputs may render it dubious or
unacceptable, conditioning may have occurred, including substantial cultural conditioning (so
that a person is terrified by harmless spiders but not sickened by bloody massacres of dolphins
or seals). As with perception, there are checks on emotional presentation, such as constancy
over time and after reflection.
Emotional presentation, supplying primarily inclusions and exclusions or prohibitions, is
but the basis of reflective evaluation and value apprehension. The further critical part,
coherence processing, builds on the basis taking account of other inputs or controls including
background (which supplies relevant components of already adopted judgements, assimilated
subculture and so forth) and constraints (such as moral substitutional requirements like
impartiality, e.g. whether considered judgements hold for substitute valuers, and uniformity,
e.g. whether similar acts are judged in similar ways). Essentially, the coherence procedure
consists in asking whether the next or a relevant judgement fits together with what has been
accepted, while meeting constraints, without leading to what has been rejected or excluded. If
it does fit it is added to the included side, otherwise it is sent to the excluded side. Because an
aim of this rationalisation procedure is achievement of some sort of equilibrium such coherence
procedures have gained currency under the rubric "reflective equilibrium". Observe, however,
that equilibrium reached at some stage may be lost as new types of problems arise and further
information enters. No doubt the whole methodology (like the parallel methodology of an
empirically-based coherence theory of truth) is highly idealised, and only practicably applicable
in rudimentary parts. It does however surmount a major theoretical obstacle for environmental
value theory; it reveals how in principle a nonreductionistic value theory can function, and
deliver a tenable value system. Whether what results is however an appropriate deep
environmental system will depend above all on the presentational input, the extent to which
environmental sensitivity enters and is not suppressed.
Enhancement methods reveal too that value systems are not uniquely determined, any
more than other comprehensive theoretical frameworks. There evidently are rival value
systems measuring up to rigorous rationality requirements, much as there are rival logics and
rival physical and biological systems. In particular chauvinistic systems, narrow or shallow
value systems, which are unresponsive to and take no account of environmental items and
values, cannot be excluded on rational or straight logical grounds. Unfortunately such systems
remain in ascendancy, and tend to dominate social and political practice; in recent times
economism, a narrow type of utilitarianism, has all too obviously dominated much terrestial
practice.
While such value frameworks are open to severe criticism, for instance as
chauvinistic, as violating universality requirements of morality in the case of economism, they
do not succumb to definitive refutatiog (for the reason that requirements of morality,
universalizability of principle, impartiality and so on, can simply be repudiated; immoral or
amoral frameworks are still value systems). Even so, much can be done to shift or alter
values, though as usual effectiveness cannot be guaranteed. A range of argumentative,
educational and persuasive techniques, of varying quality, can be put to work to move valuers
indoctrinated in old damaging structures, often enough successfully. Important among these
are positive presentations of environments, their habitats and creatures, by way of new
information and experience.
The availability of rival value systems, while it implies a certain desirable (and also
troublesome) pluralism, does not mean relativism. From a deep-green viewpoint, rival
narrower and shallower systems are definitely inferior, and criticised accordingly, while
economism is an anathema which does not even make the moral grade (e.g. too many
principles stop at class or state boundaries). However a critical pluralism does acknowledge
and offer a place in the wider scheme of things for other systems, even if as less favoured or
satisfactory. One political upshot is evident; deep-green theory promotes, what matters in these
irrational times of numbers, alliances - in particular, a green alliance, organising green
positions, against prevailing forces of environmental degradation.
The systematic pluralism of deep-green value theory interpenetrates not only social and
political domains above, but also metaphysics traditionally placed below. In the underlying
metaphysical pluralism of deep-green theory, value runs very deep - so deep that even truth
depends in part upon it. For not merely selection of a correct comprehensive theory or worldview is a value dependent choice, but choice of associated actual world is also. That choice,
insofar as it is consciously made, of world structure and conceptualisation, is a constrained
choice, constrained by informational inputs, such as those of refined perception. But inasmuch
as it is rationally accomplished, that choice, like other choices of structure, proceeds according
to a standard value-information analysis (regularly oversimplified however to a preferenceinformation or even desire-belief modelling); that is, to extract the salient point, it involves
value essentially.
Truth and value are then intertwined; truth, though naturally different from value, is value
dependent. Both are plural, and differently so. So, unremarkably deep-green metaphysics
resembles the value theory in significant respects. For example, as the value theory is
nonreductionistic, so also is the metaphysics; in particular, there is a no-reduction theme that
neither parts nor wholes reduce eliminably to one another, as opposed to atomistic and holistic
views of environmental interrelations. As the value theory is pluralistic, so also is the
metaphysics; in place of established absolutism, a plurality of worlds, with associated truth
definitions is discerned. Indeed a main aim of deep-green theory is to dislodge dominant
7
destructive ideologies, which (each of them)
assume an absolute truth, from their positions thereby providing intellectual living-space for natural environments.
Much of deep-green theory devolves then from the abstract value theory. As with the
metaphysical way sketched, so it is with the fuller ethical theory, which includes as well as a
specific axiological system, elaborating deep environmental values and virtues, a deontic
framework, supplying obligations, rights, taboos, and similar. For example, given that a
certain wild river is intrinsically valuable, as we can verify by on-site experience and
enhancement methods, and given that we duly respect that value, as deontic principles will tell
us we should, then we are not free to do as we like with that river, to dam it with concrete, to
channel it within concrete, stripping it of its riverine ecosystems. But that does not preclude
respectful use of the river, swimming or sailing quietly in its waters, and the like. Value thus
guides action, practice, and use; it is the ground also upon which principles are formulated,
principles that are assessed and validated by way of enhancement methods. Important among
these are non-interference principles, which exclude unwarranted interference with other
preference-havers and unwarranted damage, ill-treatment, or devaluation of items of value.
Such deontic principles circumscribe environmentally-limited freedom of action. Given noninterference principles, a major shift in onus of proof from homocentricethics takes place.
What is required now is that reasons be givenfor interfering with the environment, rather than
reasons for not doing so. Also direct responsibility for environmental interference or
modification falls upon those who would seriously interfere or significantly modify, who
would tread heavily on the land. Non-interference does not preclude use - only too much use
and use of too much. What it does lead to is the theme that, where use occurs, it should be
careful and respectful use.
An important respect thesis regarding environmental items is founded on such non-interference
principles and the no-reduction theme: namely,
• not to put others (other preference havers) into a dispreferred state for no good reason;
• not to jeopardise the well-being of natural objects or systems without good reason;
• not to damage or destroy items which, while they cannot literally be put into a dispreferred
state, can be damaged or destroyed or have their value eroded or impaired.
These apply to ecosystems, their surrounds, their parts, and so on. The mere making of
further excess profits, or similar economic excuses, are not good reasons. Such a respect
thesis forms part of the ecological outlook of deep-green theory.
Deep-green ethical theory amounts to much more than just another non-reductionist
ethical theory, which highlights ecological values and virtues, and so forth. It changes the
character and shape of ethical enterprise. Perhaps most strikingly, it removes humans as such
from the centre of the ethical stage (or ~xclusive occupation of the stage). The biological
concept of being human ceases to be a significant ethical category. To elevate it to such is to
fall into human chauvinism, a type of class chauvinism which unwarrantedly discriminates in
favour of the human species. The prevailing chauvinism is not inevitable; it is very logically
avoided by directly connecting ethical characteristics with the categories of items that can have
them. Relevant categories include those marked out by features like: having well-being,
preference-having, rights-holding, contractual-capability, and so on, categories not necessarily
connected with any particular species. Hitherto virtually all Wes tern ethical theories, and the
institutional arrangements they help support, have not merely limited ethical matters to interhuman affairs, but have been blatantly chauvinistic, exhibiting substantial and unjustifiable
discrimination in favour of humans (or certain privileged humans).
Deep-green theory thus implies the inadequacy of prevailing social, political and
economic arrangements and institutions. These structures are the defective products of inferior
value frameworks which take quite insufficient account of environmental desiderata and values.
Richard Sylvan*
RMB 683
Bungendore NSW 2621
*
Thanks to David Bennett for comments on an earlier draft. For more on deep-green theory, see
essays in and work referred to in the Green Series, i.e. Discussion Papers in Environmental
Philosophy, RSSS, Australian National University, Canberra.
This compressed essay was solicited by and written for Island Magazine (Tasmania). Upon receiving
it however, the editors decided that it was too dense, and insufficiently journalistic and popular (not
features they had at any time requested), for their magazine.
I
\. '1
11.10.95
CHAPTER 1
DEEP AND GREEN
AND PRESUPPOSED FUNDAMENTALS
It soon emerges from preliminary exploration that, under natural characterisations,
relevant notion of both ethics and green presuppose the notion of agency. So with something
on agency, enough to get started, we shall begin. In terms of agency and proclivities to
environments, green can be characterized, and in turn green approaches. Then, within green
approaches, three relevantly different types can be distinguished: shallow, intermediate, and
deep. It is the last, and really only the last, that matters for the ethical theory that follows.
1. Action, agency and agents: a summary . 1
Action theory is grounded in process theory. For actions are types of processes, agentascribed processes. processes are directed functions, ordinarily time-directed functions, 2 ?
framing of certain functional sorts. All the ordinary sorts of processes-ec lipses, transits,
removals, reflections, and so on and on-are processes (and ordinary processes can be
separated out logically, such as by applicability and inapplicability of certain predicates, e.g.
they take place, they are not facts, etc.)
Processes themselves in no way require agents. Actions, however, as distinguished
within goings-ons and taking-places, do require agency, and so agents. There is no reason at
all why these agents should be humans. Many agents are not humans, some humans are not
agents. But it is often quite erroneously assumed agents are humans, or persons. Excess
requirements on agency are partly to blame, the mistaken idea that agents have to be purposeful,
responsible, rational-feat ures that can be added to distinguish subtypes of agents. Rather,
actions can be roughly delineated through answers to questions like What is so and so (the
relevant agent) doing? How is so and so acting? The result reached following through this
route is this: process a is an action iff for some agent x, a is properly ascribed to x, it is x' s
doing. To break residual circularity, it remains to define agency. Agency is defined, such is the
proposal, in terms of exercising a causal role (which may be misdirected or similar), through the
following circuit. First, x is and agent as agents a iff, for some p directly partinent to a, x
causes Pbut x is not caused to cause p. In terms of agency-regarding, other notions can be
defined as follows: x is a sometime-agent, someties an agent, iff for some a, x is an agent as
2
As full an account of processes as so far worked up from notes appears in 'Process and actions',
which does provide detailed background for this section.
'2
regards a. Agency is a characterizing attribute of sometime-agents. An agent is a sometimesagent that establishes a history of agency (a small reputation therefore).
2.
Explaining Green.
In characterizing green we start with agency. Such relevant features, of greens (or
environmentalists), as being positively concerned about nature of natural things, supporting
environmental causes and similar, are closely tied to practice and action; they are features of
agents. In an original central sense of 'green' so redeployed, an agent was green if that agent
firstly believed that some parts of the natural environment should be protected, and secondly
took some relevant action. 3 In short, a belief-action analysis emerges, which can be recast as a
standard belief-desire-resultant action account. For instance, the agent believes that some
natural environment is worth protection, desires that it should be, and acts (in some way,
perhaps feebly) accordingly. All the parts of this sort of account call, however, for some
elaboration. To remove a certain circularity, resulting from characterising "green" through
terms like "environmen t", 'natural environment' can be replaced by 'parts (surface
configurations) of the Earth substantially uninterfered with by humans'. To specify protection
satisfactorily, protection/ra m what should be indicated. And so on. But there is a little point
in elaborating this already weak characterisation, which can be satisfied by an agent interested in
saving a few square metres of the Earth's surface from exploitation. For the notion has been
further weakened, almost from its inception.
To characterise this laxer, but ubiquitous notion, let us insert the intermediary notion of an
environmental cause. Such causes include not merely protecting natural environments, but
limiting impacts on environments, which may not be pristine, for instance by pouring less
sewage or detergents, CFCS or Greenhouse gases, into them, or conserving items, which could
be exploited or consumed now for future use or for future human generations (to use or
conserve, etc.). The first of these further causes beyond protection, original green, is a largely
consumerist notion of green, the second, an economistic notion (it takes in such beloved
constraints as intergerational equity). There are other related causes of importance also, such as
restoration of something that has been over-exploited or damaged, such as agricultural lands,
waterways, urban air, soils (soil conservation), or even human artefacts such as monuments or
buildings. The shallow green cause of fighting pollution, for human health reasons, can fit in
here. Needless to add the restoration may not be to pristine conditions, but to quite low
3
Although we are explicating terms that are now in widespread usage, in a way substantially
faithful to that usage (but not some of its dilute or corrupt expansions), we shall regard the terms
as quasi-technical. We see these terms, as the discerning reader also may, as spelt not with a
double 'e' but a triple 'e', as 'greeen' and 'greeening' (insert hyphens as need be for appropriate
pronunciation, e.g. 'gre-een' _. The effect is to peel off dilution and corruption of 'green' (e.g. so
to include every politician, at least when any confronts concerned constituents) and to discard all
those unwanted and often undesirable senses the colour term green has accumulated.
standards. In sum, causes include as well as protection, such matters as nondestruction,
conservation, maintenance, restoration, and so on.
Now substitute supporting an environmental cause for protecting a natural environment.
Then an agent is green in this expanded laxer sense if the agent believes in supporting an
environmental cause and takes some relevant action in that direction. Such an action component
is essential: green does imply some practical, if utterly token, involvement.
The lax account connects in the right ways with testable sociological criteria. For
instance, believing in supporting a cause can be cashed out in terms of joining an organisation
working for that cause, or even, reducing the slight action component still further, considering
joining such an organisation. 4 The appellation green applies not only to individual agents, but
also to groups, coalitions, institutions, even corporations and governments. As a green
government can, meet similar lax conditions, it is evident that there really are very few
requirements, even weak sponsorship may serve.
Many there are now trying to take advantage of green movements-adve rtisers, vendors,
politicians, professors, merchants, even generals (with "defence forces" retooling as
environmental defence forces). Cashing i in on the movement by producing a goods or services
presented as environmentally friendly does not thereby make parties doing so green, especially
if what is supplied adds to overall environmental impacts (as do "environmental markets"
delivering environmental junk, sometimes portrayed as "green goods"). The requirement of
serving environmental causes has been lost.
The excessive generosity of the account arrived at, which allows agents with only passing
or slight active beliefs in some cause to count as green, does not matter. For firstly, it
corresponds moderately well to current lax usage, which allows almost any sort of concern for
environments, coupled with an action component as slight as paying a token subscription, to
serve. Secondly, it still exercises quite enough exclusive power. Many agents are not green.
For instance all those exclusively tuned into possessive individualism, mainstream economics,
or similar creeds are not green (i.e. not even lax green). Thirdly, needed discriminations can be
made within the class of (lax) green. An important subclass of green comprises ecological
green, where the causes include maintenance and protection of natural ecosystems (including
wilderness) and these causes enjoy some primacy. "Ecological green" is by no means a
tautology.
4
In a study entitled 'GREEN PACKAGES IN AUSTRALIA', greens were picked out from the whole
sample of respondents to the Australian Election Study of 1990 in terms of answer to question:
How likely are you to join groups campaigning to protect the environment, or are you alrady a
member? Permitted answers: (1) I am a member, (2) I am not a member but I have considered
joining (3) I am not a member and I haven't considered joining, and (4) I certainly would not
consider joining. Those giving answer (2), perhaps token greens, were accounted green.
4
To be green in more than a token fashion is to have some commitment to containing or
reducing the environmental impact of humans on the Earth or regions of it. By virtue of the
environmental impact equation (for a given region) that means commitment in the immediate
future term to either
•
human population reduction, or
•
less impacting lifestyles for many humans, or
•
improvements in technology to reduce overall impact.
Most humans in a region can do little to implement the third requirement, except to hope.
Accordingly they cannot satisfactorily demonstrate their commitment in this way. A genuine
green will meet both the other conditions. But since as big coalition as feasible is sought for a
green coalition, marginal greens who meet only one of the requirements, perhaps in weak form,
will not usually be excluded (from almost any green church). Issues of population afford a
simple test (a necessary condition) for a genuine green in Australia; for that agent fails who
suppoes that while efforts (including the agent's contribution) to effect human population
reduction should be invested elsewhere, as in parts of Asia or Africa, Australia can keep on
growmg.
From filling out the conditions delimiting green commitments, a green platform can be
derived. Specifically it will include, along with the action clause, derivative directives as
regards curtailing population, refining and limiting consumption, adjusting technologies, and
consequent thereupon altering administrative, political and economic arrangements and
institutions accordingly. What so results is a proper subplatform of the Deep Ecology platform.
A fair approximation to the full Deep Ecology platform can be derived by adjoining
requirements for depth to those for genine greenness of the action platform; so result themes
concerning intrinsic value in nature, and commitments deriving therefrom. In short, the wellknown Deep Ecology platform accounts (as a fair approximation) to a deep green platformwhich can accordingly supplant it.
As genuine green and green platform can be characterized given the initial notion of green,
that is lax green, so similarly can other green compounds and modified forms be explained (in a
preliminary way). For example, a green ideosystem is an ideosystem (an ideology, in the
unbiassed sense) that coheres with green commitments, and typically organizes and guides
them. As genuinely green, it is a system that includes a green platform, and it could be defined
in that way, as an ideo-system coherently extending a green platform. Similarly for green
ethics, and for green philosophy (and also for other green notions that could be defined but are
not presently needed, e.g. green goods, green consumers, green parties, green ideas and so
forth). A green ethical system is a green ideosystem which is an ethic. Green ethics comprises
5
such green ethical systems and their theory. 5 Green ethics thus comprise a decidedly restricted
subset of environmental ethics. For an environmental ethic in the broad usage, an ethics that
addresses environmental issues, among others, may well contain themes that could not be
adopted by a green agent, that may even operate against environmental causes. In consequence,
a green ethics is an ethic that could be coherently adopted by a green agent, that does not run
counter to environmental causes.
3. Different approaches to the environment: shallower and deeper.
People can do more or less what they like with the environment, with the land and the sea,
and with what grows and lives there-such was and, in only slightly modified form, remains a
dominant theme of Wes tern cultural heritage. It was not the view of other cultures, such as
some of the American Indians or Australian Aborigines; nor was it the only view included in the
Western cultural package. But it has dominated, especially in colonial and imperial expansion.
It is only recently, for example, that some social or governmental restrictions with teeth have
been imposed upon what Australians can do with the land they occupy or claim, and these lag
far behind advanced green thinking as to what is required. For the most part there has been little
weakening in the Wes tern assumption that people own the land, that it is their possession, to
mould to their purposes and whims. 6
This unrestrained approach proved damaging enough while the land was wide and
humans comparatively few; now that human populations are expanding more rapidly, perhaps
to critical limits, now that much land is damaged and less fragile land is in increasingly short
supply, it is time to re-examine older attitudes and the accompanying practices. Any deeper
reassessment has to look at the presupposed land ethic, and more generally at the underlying
ethical and ideological assumptions.
A land ethic, according to Leopold, who introduced the term, is 'an ethic dealing with
man's relation to land and to the animals and plants which grow upon it' .7 Thus a land ethic
amounts to a nature (or environmental) ethic, with land a symbol for the whole of nature (or the
more comprehensive environment), and man a symbol for all relevant agents. The unrestrained
position, which imposes few or no constraints upon treatment of the environment, affords a
land ethic of only a degenerate sort. The unrestrained position would, for example, have little
5
6
7
Although we are anticipating here-as ethics and ethical systems are explained essentially
reportively however, in the next chapter, there is no circularity. For ethics is separately and
independently characterised.
Indeed, with the renewed libertarian movement emanating from industrial north-eastern America,
this assumption has gained in strength. Foreign "resources" are not to be hoarded but should be
saleable to the highest bidders for "free" economic use. And sometimes it is broadly hinted: or
else!
A. Leopold, A Sand Country Almanac with other essays on Conversation, New York, 1966,
p.238.
6
compunction about using up materials, forests, pristine environments and so on, immediately or
even destroying them.
In the end the unrestrained position can be excluded from properly ethical positions. 8 For
it fails to meet the basic universality requirement on moral principles, of independence of
person, place or time, a requirement which iplies that persons of different races, colours, sexes
or ages, or at different places or times are not treated unfairly or seriously disadvantaged.
Insofar as the unrestrained position would permit the exploitation, degradation and even
destruction, of all present resources and environments, it places future humans at a very serious
disadvantage. The position is thus one of expediency, not morality, typically yielding, like
economics, evaluative assessments based on short-term narrow local interets, rather than
appropriately based on long-range values.
Opposed to the unrestrained position are various conservation ethics; what Leopold saw
as the land ethic is just one of these. Conservation ethics can be classified, conveniently for
subsequent development, into three groups: shallow, intermediate and deep. 9 Unlike the
unrestrained position, all these politions would conserve and maintain certain things-materials,
creatures, forests, etc. The shallow conservation position differs from the unrestrained position
primarily in taking a longer-term view and taking account of future humans, their welfare and so
forth. It is more enlightened than the unrestrained position in taking a longer-term perspective:
hence its alternative description as resource conservation. Though this conservation position is
only a small step away from the unrestrained position, it does pass one test for morality proper
in that future people are not treated unfairly. Most of the big rush into fashionable
environmentalism does not get beyond shallowness.
The shallow and unrestricted positions are closely related by an important feature they
share-and which justifies lumping them together as shallower positions. They are both highly
anthropocentric; they do not move outside a human-centred framework, which construes nature
and the environment instrumentally, that is, simply as a means to human ends and values. Thus
they take account ultimately only of human interests and concerns; all environmental values
reduce to these or similar human on closed notions. It is in this respect especially that these
shallower positions differ from deeper, less resource and exploitation oriented, positions.
8
9
This is a substantial, and controversial claim, especially since it accounts much economic activity
unethical, as involving practices of expediency, not morality. For the fuller case for obligations
and commitments to future humans, see e.g. R. and V. Routley, 'Nuclear energy and obligations
to the future' in Responsibilities to Future Generations: Environmental ethics, (ed. E. Partridge),
Prometheus Books, Buffalo, 1981, and other essays in this book.
This classification refines Naess's non-exhaustive distinction of shallow and deep ecology, and
extends it to render it exhaustive. For the original distinction, see A. Naess, 'The shallow and the
deep, long-range ecology movement' Inquiry 16 (1973) 95-100. An elaboration on Aess's
position, to which this discussion has some debts, may be found in his 'Philosophical aspects of
the deep ecological momvement', Environmental Ethics, to appear.
According to deeper positions humans are not the sole items of value or bestowing value
in the world, and not all things of value are valuable because they answer back in some way to
human concerns. But deeper positions differ in the weight or relative importance they assign to
human concerns. According to the intermediate position serious human concerns always come
first; and while other things, such as higher animals, have value or utility in their own right,
their value is outranked by that of humans. The deep position rejects this assumption, and
maintains that even serious human concerns should sometimes lose out to environmental values.
FIGURE 1. THE POSITIONS SEPARATED, AND SEPARATING PRINCIPLES
SHALLOWER
UNRESTRAINED
DEEPER
SHALLOW
INTERMEDIATE
I
I
I
I
J,
J,
J,
DEEP
MORALITY
SOLE VALUE
GREATER VALUE
REQUIREMENT
ASSUMPTION
ASSUMPTION
(of human apartheid)
(of human supremacy)
The watershed principle which divides the shallower from deeper positions is the sole
value assumption. According to this major assumption, which underlies prevailing Western
social theory, humans are the only things of irreducible (or intrinsic) value in the universe, the
value of all other things reducing to or answering back to that of humans in one way or another.
This assumption is built into most present political and economic arrangements; for example,
only aggregated preferences or interests of certain (present) humans are considered in
democratic political choice, and likewise in economic decision making; other creatures and
natural items are represented at best through the preferences or votes of interested humans.
Similar assumptions are made in mainstream ethical theories. Typical are reductive
theories which endeavour to derive ethical judgements from features of closed systems of
humans.
Examples are provided by presently fashionable ethical theories, such as
utilitarianism. 10 According to utilitarianism what ought to be done, as well as what is best, is
determined through what affords maximum satisfaction to the greatest number of individual
humans. In theories like utilitarianism, the outside world of nature does not enter through direct
inputs or outputs, but only insofar as it is reflected in the psychological states of individuals.
Such ethical theories are appropriately described as those of apartness or human apartheid. Man
10
But the same holds for other fashionable theories on the American-dominated ethical scene, namely
contractualism and libertarianism. These theories, along with utilitarianism, are explained in most
modern American introductions to ethical theories or moral problems.
is, or is treated as, apart from Nature; there is virtually total segregation. Nature or the land
enters only as a remote experiential backdrop, and onstage is the drama of human affairs and
interests.
However, humans cannot be entirely insulated from their environment; for example,
volcanoes affect temperatures thus affecting climate thus affecting crop yield and food supplies.
At least limited intercourse with the environment has to be admitted as a result. So, in
economics, ethics, and political theory, secondary theories, dealing with linkages to the
environment, have been appended (thus, for example, extemality theory in economics, some
allowance for "side" constraints in more sophisticated utilitarianism, and so on). But the land
remains treated as an awkward or tiresome afterthought, when it is considered at all.
There is, however, another approach, also with historical standing, vying with (and
indeed often confused with) human apartheid which can accommodate secondary theories a little
more satisfactorily. That is the position of superiority or human supremacy, according to which
Man, though included in Nature, is above the rest of Nature, meaning ethically superior to it.
While human supremacist positions can incorporate the sole value assumption and thus remain
in the shallow ethical area, they have the option of rejecting it in favour of the less objectionable
greater value assumption:: other things being equal, the value of humans is greater than that of
other things; the value of humans surpasses that of all other things in the universe. This
assumption allows that other objects, such as some higher animals, may have irreducible value;
what it insists upon is that, at least for "normal" members of respective species, this value never
exceeds that of humans. What is generally presupposed is that other objects-animals, plants
and their communities-are never of much importance compared with humans. Though human
supremacy has appeared in versions of utilitarianism where animal pain is taken into
consideration along with human, Western ethics and associated social sciences such as
demography, economics and political theory, remain predominantly apartheid in form.
It is the repudiation of the greater value assumption that separates deep from intermediate
positions. Perhaps the most familiar example of an intermediate position is that of Animal
Liberation, in the form in which animals are taken to have value in their own right, though in
any playoff with humans, humans win. Under the deep position such an outcome is by no
means inevitable; in cases of conflict of animal or natural systems with humans, humans
sometimes lose. I I
There are various arguments designed to show that the deep assessment is right, that
humans should sometimes lose out. A typical one takes the following form:- Some humans
lead worthless or negative lives, lives without net value. The point, though not uncontroversial,
11
So too for some men and some sparrow. So we should reject the intermediate ...... : A man is
worth more than a sparrow! (Drungson/ Ralston etc.)
9
can be argued even from a shallow utilitarianism.1 2 Take for instance a life of pain and
suffering and little or no happiness: it has a substantial net negative utility. But some small
natural systems do have net value; one example would be an uninhabited undisturbed island (a
live example might be a tropical island before Club Mediterranee depredation). Now consider
the situation where the considerable value of a small natural system is to be sacrificed (in a way
that shallowly affords no ethical impropriety) on behalf of a set of humans whose lives each
have no positive net value. For instance, the system is to be exploited, just for the continued
maintena nce of these humans, or for their addition (as new settlers) to an establish ed
population. Then in such circumstances, these humans lose out; the natural system takes
precedence. Similarly, trivial satisfactions of humans do not dominate over the integrity of rich
natural environments.13
Let us look ahead to glimpse paradimatic expansions of the positions indicated (in figure
1). For the positions soon expand, when applied to real life issues, to more comprehensive
positions; indeed they have expanded all the way to what are now called social paradigms, that
is to full social perspectives. For example, the deep position has expanded from the two core
theses-a s initially reformulated, values in nature, which is a positive counterpart of the sole
value assumption, and biospecies impartiality, which is a positive elaboration of greater value
assumption 14-to fuller deep ecological positions which involve as well many other themes.
12
13
The point is argued in detail in R. Routley and N. Griffin, 'Unravelling the meanings of life?'
Discussion Papers in Environme ntal Philosophy #3, Research School of social Sciences,
Australian National University, 1982.
There are significant cross-classifications of environmental positions. Some further dimensions
are included in the following diagram.
Environment not taken
I
Environments is taken
into account
I
into account
p
14
--------- --------- --------- --------- --------- ---
shallow
intermediate
I dogs
I //////
I
I
E
I
individual
I
I
H
I
holistic
I
I
Another dimension is the static/dynamic. But no one want to be just stauc, really.
According to the values in nature theme natural items other than humans and human artefacts have
intrinsic value; while according to biospecies impartiality members of one species, humans in
particular, are not favoured or valued over members of another simply on the basis of species. The
danger of favouring one species is encouraged by the species fallacy, commonly invoked in
favouring humans. This is the mistake of concluding that because a few members of the species
have accomplish ed something of (immense) value, all members of the species therefore are
(highly) valuable; all members of the species manage to free-load for the ride, obtained by a few
members, so to say. The assumption, once challenged, usually falls back on an argument that
goes by way of capacities: the remaining members of the species have the capacity to achieve these
sorts of things also. But, firstly, that isn't true: intelligence, skills, and the like, vary somewhat
within species, and from our narrow perspective, very considerably among humans, some of whom
have no capacity for advanced mathematics or music. Secondly, it requires more than capacity: it
requires circumstances, a favourable environment to exercise them, (hence, in part, the folly of
lU
The expansion is not uniquely determined; there can be various different deeper paradigms.
However it characteristically includes a fuller statement of themes recognised as in the spirit of
"deep ecology", in particular ecological themes, but also interconnected economic and political
themes. In a similar way shallower positions are subsumed in shallower perspectives, and
principally in what is called the dominant social paradigm, some relevant themes of which are
indicated in figure 2.1s
FIGURE 2. RELEVANT COMPONENTS OF THE ENCOMPASSING PARADIGMS.
DOMINANT SOCIAL
PARADIGM
DEEP ECOLOGICAL
ALTERNATIVE
Dominance over nature
Natural environment a resource
Harmony with nature
Values in nature/biospecies
impartiality
Less material goals/less growth
orientation
Earth supplies limited
AJ?propriate technology/limits to
science
Doing with enough/recycling
Regional/decentralised/small-scale
Material/economic growth
Ample reserves/perfect substitutes
High technological progress/
scientific solutions
Consumerism
National/centralised/large-scale
SHALLOW
f----------------------------- ➔
DEEP
4.
Criticisms of these beginnings and other beginnings
A main challenge we shall have to meet is that there can be no deep ethics, ethics and
axiology are inevitably shallow, because they must answer back to human valuers. This
challenge we presently set aside (until the next chapter). But it should already be apparent how
we can start to upset the challenge (already taken up by deeper utilitarianism), namely by
displacing humans by relevant agents.
Other challenges grant that something might answer to deeper ethics, but contend that
nothing should-objectio ns of substance-or that making anything much out of it is
unwarranted, for example because preliminaries in making out the distinctions have not been
15
more humans in decidedly suboptimal cities), together with a will and drive actually to follow
through appropriately on capacities.
Much fuller accounts of the dominant social paradigm and environmental alternatives are given in
S. Cotgrove, Catastrophe or Cornucopia, Wiley, New York, 1982, and in R. Routley 'Roles and
limits of paradigms in environmental thought and action' in Environmental Philosophy (ed. R.
Elliot and A. Gare), University of Queensland Press, 1983. The linkage of the dominant paradigm
with maximizing, and the deep alternative with sufficing, is elaborated in R. Routley,
'Maximizing, satisficing, satisizing: the difference in real and rational behaviour under rival
paradigms', Discussion Papers in Environmental Philosophy #10, Research School of Social
Sciences, Australian National University, 1984.
11
properly accomplished-objections of form and from technicalities (cf. challenges to the
analytic/synthetic distinction). We consider examples of both sorts of challenge.
The misanthropy charge. Deep environmentalism has been criticised for what it does, so it is
alleged, to ethical treatment of other humans; it leads, it has been alleged, to neglectful,
negligent, or downright callous treatment of other humans, to inhumanity. The actual impact of
deep environmentalism affords but little ground for such allegations. Nor does the theory.
Deep environmentalism could leave intrahuman ethics, standard morality virtually entirely intact.
If it did so, deep environmental ethics would provide a conservative extension (in the familiar
technical sense) of standard intrahuman ethics. In this event the allegations would fall; for the
ethical treatment of humans would be in principle just the same as before.
But it is unlikely that any deeper environmentalism will leave standard morality entirely
intact in its own prime sphere of operations, that restricted to humans. For instance the
evolution of humans, and attributions of virtues or vices to them, is bound to be influenced by
how they act or respond towards nonhumans and the environment. A virtuous puritanical oldstyle industrialist who makes his affluent living through environmentally damaging practices
will no longer obtain the virtuous ranking that would have been accorded to him on the older
prevailing morality. (Of course that morality too is changing, but it hardly changes rapidly
enough to keep pace with a deeper ethic). The change in the evaluation of and moral standing
accorded to hard-working but environmentally exploitative business people, technologists and
engineers reflects a more far-reaching adjustment; that of removal of special privilege for
humans (or persons). Even in the more austere of standard ethical positions, such as duty
ethics in the Kantian mould, it is very easy to gain the impression of persons (usually males on
traditional ethics) as kings. There will be a club of kings, that was where more egalitarian
industrialism was proceeding also, to make us all kings - with the rest of nature as subjects.
While the unwarranted privilege accorded to humans under conventional ethical wisdom
will topple then, the treatment of humans by humans need not. To the contrary, if people
develop a more respectful and careful attitude to the environment, then they may well develop a
better, different and more careful, approach to other people as well. Here the awful Kantianstyle theme that decent treatment of animals will trickle down from a decent treatment of other
humans is partially reversed; a better treatment of other humans (a decent treatment is already
ethically required) will percolate up from a more gently and respectful treatment of natural
environments.
Nor finally then need a deeper environmentalism abandon the quest for social justice. 16
Deep-green theory certainly does not; the ethical-change agenda is much wider than social
16
There are two American groups where the quest for terrestial social justice appears to have been
abandoned or comprised: eco-fascists and nature greens, as they are sometimes called from outside.
12
change alone, but social and human concerns do not thereby fall off the agenda. They remain,
but no longer in such isolations. What they do lose their unchallenged preeminence, and they
may also lose priority.
Problems with the Greater Value assumption (after Attfield).
A prime alternative to a shallow/deep distinction is (what is sometimes considered no
alternative, but a variant on it) the anthropocentric/ecologic distinction.
Notes: 1. Not the same distinction. While shallow positions are normally anthropocentr ic,
converse does not obtain.
2. Distinction never made out properly (really degree issues), and leads to typical 4-fold
outcome.
5.
Domination and chauvininism.
The greater or sole value accorded to humans, as compared with (other) valuations,
justify the domination of nature by humans. The main argument is simply that what has lesser
or no value should give away to what has greater value, the conventional assumption being that
what has greater value is better (analytic) than what has less, and should prevail over it
(substantive assumptions of conventional ethical themes such as utilitarianism).
Domination and associated class chauvinism are justified not only directly through
consideration s of greater or supreme value, but also less directly by pointing to highly valued
features possessed by the favoured class. Similar appeals to prized features are of course
likewise used to justify class chauvinism.
Appendices :
1.
Deep ethics are not automatically acceptable as satisfactory.
Consider e.g.whole chauvinism, where Wholes are intrinsically valuable, each and every
one, and their value much exceeds that of everything else, humans included. So wholes come
first. (This is a doctrical some superwholes may hold).
Two rough comparisions: cows in India, humans on earth.
Other unsatisfactory deep ethics, apart from those that aberate one species, are those that
focus exclusively on certain elements. Those e.g. individualisms, strong holisms, etc.
2.
Arguments to shallowness.
1. Simplistic (from one James O'Connor of Canada).
' ... the word "value" is a human word, with human meanings, in this case transposed to
non-human nature. Hence to say that nature is inherently valuable means that it is inherently
valuable to humans'.
Ecofascists, who follow a route pioneered by Hardin, call for a triage of nations on lifeboat earth
and abandonment of those nations, such as Bangladesh, seen without prospect of recovery. But the
position is not deep, it is certainly not a properly moral position; for due criticism see Griffin and
Bennett.
u
2. Problem with shallow/deep terminology, e.g. acquired too many associations for comfort.
Intellectual offensiveness shallow, etc.
3. Shallowness involves a reductionist exercise. Making (trying to make) environmental issues
in all that matter environmentally-answer back to shallow concerns.
Series of arguments advanced to try to establish ..... .
Counter argument. These do not succeed and can be counter-evolelled.
3. Cross-classifications reformism/revolation is, like anthropocentrism, a poor
classification. It can be shallow without reformism and unethical economism with reformism.
DE itself is largely reformist in character (and excessively personal).: Anthropo-/ecocentric.
No doubt 'anthropocentricsm' meaning what its etymology implies 'centring in man'
(OED), is a useful term. Theories such as Coperican and Copenhagen quantum theory can be
criticised (or praised) as anthropocentric. What is in doubt is the new contrast of antropocentric
with ecocentric.
While the vague anthropocentric-ecocentric distinction is alright, so far as it goes, as a
starting stage, it is no place to stop. For there is a need for a value specific distinction,
antrhopocentr can be any sort of human centredness.
'Anthropocentric' is a poor choice of contrasting terminology, for several reasons. One,
which may be convenient to some, lies in its vagueness. There is no sharp cut-off in what is
human centred. Similarly for its supposed contrast term 'ecocentric', which presumably
expandents to 'ecologically centred'. Second, it becomes apparent that no proper contrast is
made in many cases. University textbooks on natural ecology, for instance are both ecocentric
because about ecology and anthropocentric because set and supplied for humans. Human
ecology, a subject increasingly encountered in universities, is directly both (not both under
different aspects). Were the classification satisfactory, it would provide a nice contradiction.
But the classification is far from satisfactory. It is not exclusive: nor is it exhaustive, but the
remainder obscure. But worse, any practical ethics, no matter how deep, is bound to be
anthropocentric, not ecocentric, even though duly concerned with ecology. The reason comes
to this: any adequate ethics is bound to be heavily concerned with agents, their obligations and
responsibilities, and for all practical purposes (on earth) these agents are generally certain
humans. This is, an adequate practical ethics is, as a contingent matter, anthropocentric. Of
course such an ethic, by contrast with main traditional ethics, may also be presented as an
ecocentric ethic, inasmuch as it may be focussed upon ethical agents' relations to ecological
items, human treatment of nature.
14
Problems with the anthropocentric/ecocentric contrast do not mean that something like the
contrast cannot be made good. But it would involve redefinition of the critical terms, and could
accordingly be better accomplished with adjusted terminology.
Anthropocentrism is implausible, once a modern pict "of universe" becomes available.
(Scuh a sufficiently modern picture was already available to Descartes.)
The sun is a medium sized star of very common sort even within its galaxy. The
probability of planets like the Earth within this university is extraordinarly high. The probability
of other agents is also very high. Even the probability of other ..... ./competent agents is high.
But even if it were not, or even if there were other agents, the discourse to be embarked
upon would be significant. It is also pointful, for instance in disposeing of much philosophy.
If anthropocentrism is so implausible as regards "main place in nature", why is it not
implausible as regards intuitionality, value, etc.
Ironically, the swing away from anthropocentrism in the sciences in modern times (with
the advert of Copenhagen quantum theory and anthropic principles) was overpinged by
increasing anthropocentrism in what are misleadingly distinguished as the humanities. Above
all intentionality and value were emptied out of the wider universe and concentrated in the
exclusive focus of humanities, humans.
To adopt Freud:
Humanity has in the course of time had to endure from the hands of science two great
humiliations to its chauvinism .17 The first was when it was realised that our earth was not the
centre of the universe, but only a speck in the world system of a magnitude hardly
conceivible ... . The second was when his logical science robbed man of his particular privilege
of having been specially created and relegated him to a descent from the animal world' (puoted
in Unozco Ev ..... May 1982 p.3)
There are further shocks in store for humans-poor old humans!
3. Explaining depth [contrasts pale/pallid].
For a good sort of depth, what is needed a deep structure, extraction or format that lies
(partially) hidden from the surface. E.G. plate ponites in geology, strata in archasology, logical
form in grammar. Deep = penetrating to fundamentals in several ways and nonchauvinistic, not
shallow. [Mention also pluralism-so only a framework aimed for, on which grew various
detailled positions.]
Part of depth of Deep Green theory lies in its penetration below the surface of classrestricted or interested humanism to a genuine nonchauvinistic ethical structure: the (ill-named)
annular structure, which ties moral principles to nonhumanistic categorestion. Annular structure
17
Freud says: to great outrages upon it naive serif love.
15
is a deep structure. A deep structure. Maybe can produce one for deep green theory (see Critiq
p.93, bottom halt) Start as above other measures of depth (pp.44-5) misconceived.
1'. Extent of searching of perception of value; depth of (value) perception.
1. Extent to which humanism (h.ch) abandoned for econvisonmental perspective.
2. Extent to which conventional moral and value judgements put op for reassessment.
(Naess's depth of questioning conventional wisdom) 2 is tied to 1; for abandoning heh
involves much reassessment.
Note differs from usual reflective equilibrium, which takes many generally accepted
judgements for granted.
More on what depth means (pragmetinally): Many environmental outcomes sought in deep
grounds can be supported in shallow ways (of course). But there are differences, as examples
show:
• pesticides (in forestry) should not be used, despite insect damage. For pesticides violate
natural succession and healing processes. Toxicity questions, though important, are secondary.
On shallow view: the main problem becomes not the use of pesticides, but whether they are
safe.
• natural world appears as a resource. Life forms which interfere with uses are pests.
2. Reformist/Transformist Variations upon Shallow/Deep Ecology
Unhappy with the derogatory implications of "shallow", Devall and Sessions tried to
convert shallow ecology in ecological reformism. While there was certainly a basis for this
conversion in Naess's original brief account of shallow ecology (which almost invited such
reconstrual), the result has been that something different has emerged, notably in green politics.
For what such conversions, along with associated imagery accompanying reformism,
achieve is not elucidation, but introduction of new contrasts, and therewith political crossclassification of the shallow-deep ecology contrasts. There are various contrasts with (mere)
reformist adjustment on political theory, for instance revolutionary change and radical change.
A revolutionary direction appears inappropriate as regards deep ecology (as revealed both by the
literature and political stances of leading members of the movement), but a politically radical
direction on environmental issues does emerge from later developments in N aess' s work.
Accordingly a rough contrast, which admits sharpening, can be made out between green
reformism and green radicalism. A machine image, which often operates not far from view in
such contrasts, is initially helpful in indicating the differences. Reformism does not interfere
with the main operation of the machine, its motor, though it may alter the adjustments, retune or
fine tune it, add filters or mufflers or converters, alter its appearance cosmetically, and so on.
By contrast radicalism would alter the machine, would interfere with its motor to some extent,
depending on the level of radicalism.
16
In political terms reformism is exemplified in such measures as limiting pollution by
emission devices, further treatment of sewerage, small reserves and roadside veneers of trees
amid clear-cutting operations, tidying up of litter, and so on. The main motor of liberal
democratic market capitalism, the economic engine designed to deliver maximum economic
growth, and its main institutions, remain untouched and uncriticised; no change is proposed for
them. For radicals such measures and like reforms do not proceed far enough, towards the
sources of the problems. To tackle the range of environmental problems more radical change in
economic, social and perhaps political machinery is required. But evidently the extent of change
envisaged can vary, very considerably. For example, a frugal conservation program, directed at
limiting economic growth through removing conspicuous and excessive consumption, need
carry no accompanying program for radical social and political change. Again, deep ecology,
which offers no well worked out, or even well signposted, radical program or radical
restructuring, does not appear to be politically radical. Alternatives to liberal democratic
arrangements are not really advanced or investigated. By contrast some anarchist and marxist
influenced ecological positions are politically radical, for instance, social ecology. In short,
there is room for a classification of green radicalism, as shown by a preliminary grouping
according to whether the radicalism affects which of separate (though overlapping) economic,
social, or political matters.
The reformist-radical distinction is a vague one, without a sharp boundary. Reforms can
so accumulate that what was a difference in degree becomes a difference in kind, what was
extensive reformism turns out to be radicalism. In such an incremental fashion, positions which
were reformist can find themselves radical, without having undergone any conspicuus
radicalisation.
The contrast between reformism and radicalism can be sharpened somewhat within a (an
improved) theory of social paradigms. Then reformism is intra-paradigmatic, whereas
radicalism is not (but is extra-paradigmatic). That is a reformist works, like a normal scientist,
within the operational paradigm (the given political motor) and does not seek to change it,
whereas the radical does; success of radicalism resembles abnormal (even revolutionary)
periods in science. As there are many ways of deviating from a paradigm, which typically
involves a complex set of presumptions, so there are many sorts of radicalism.
The extent to which the political conversion of the shallow-deep contrast into green
reformism-radical contrast affords not a restatement, but a different classification, may now be
evident though perhaps not to its full extent. The most notable further feature is that green
radicalism may be utterly shallow, entirely anthropocentric. 18 Green Marxism affords a useful
18
In these terms Naess conflated two contrasts in his original 1973 article; shallow-deep and
reformist-radical. Different followers have latched onto different contrasts.
l'/
example; it is socially and politically radical while shallow (of course it can be argued that it is
environmentally incoherent, though not in the mentioned features, but in its plan to supercharge
the economic motor and make it run even faster, with evident environmental fall-out). Social
ecology offers another example; for while more radical than deep ecology, it is certainy not
deep. Something of the rich variety we have come upon can be glimpsed from the following
table.
All the positions enumerated, except 9, are occupied, we suspect (though positions are often so
poorly or incompletely presented that is difficult to be sure ). 19 Positions 9 is practically
excluded for committed deep parties who duly care about the demise of what is of intrinsic value
under mere reformism. Position 5 is however occupied, by those who want (or believe they
have achieved) improved arrangements for and treatment of animals (e.g., no circuses, no
ordinary zoos, no cruel contests, etc.) but are not committed to a radical animal liberation
agenda. Green party territory is usually shallow, but some of the proposals presented may
extend to position 4, for instance in demands for participatory democratic restructuring. Of
course, many supporters of green parties may adhere to deeper positions.
19
It is worth noting that such positions will in principle supply their own forms of sustainability,
sustainable societies, and so on.
24.10.95
Chapter 2
ETHICS WITHOUT HUMANS,
PHILOSOPHY WITHOUT HUMANS,
and COROLLARIES
It is a commonplace that ethics has proceeded not merely as if humans were on centre
stage, but as if humans really were all there is, all that mattered in ethics, as if nothing else
enters into morals and ethics, or does through only through them. That commonplace is
moreover commonly strengthened to a claim of necessity, that this must be so, that nothing
else can enter, except indirectly by way of humans. Ethics has to be thus anthropocentric.
Since environmental ethics began to shift humans, if ever so little, off centre stage, there has
been a heavy philosophical reaction, a sometimes bitter blacklash against greener ethics that
would background humans, or dare sometimes to remove humans, from the scene altogether.
Among many other things, it has been contended that by the very meaning of ethics and
morals, these subjects must be human-centred.
A crucial argument for necessary anthropocentricism of ethics makes human centrality
a matter of definition. This crucial argument will be broken, in the first of several stages,
through a detailed characterisation of morals and ethics in a way that is independent of
humans. The characterizations adopted depart in only minor and justified (though highly
consequential) ways from received dictionary definitions; that is the characterisations are
substantially reportive, as they have to be if they are to serve their iconoclastic purposes. The
matter of characterising ethics is in any case part of our business. Where would deep-green
ethics be left, as a subject of investigation, without an appropriate account of ethics?
1. On inadeqacies of what prevails: a sheaf of defective accounts.
It takes but little effort to discover severe shortcomings in most preceding investigations, and
that most accounts, many of them far too casual, are inappropriate for what they are intended
to cover, still less for environmental ends. There is no end to bad and defective definitions to
dissect and discard.
Even textbooks and guidebooks on ethics often make no attempt at a definition, and
often have little or nothing of due generality to offer on what ethics is about. 1 Unremarkably
then, many of those presenting or teaching ethics, perhaps well enough, have no adequate idea
of what ethics is about. This is revealed by the sorts of definitions they slop down and by
what they say ethics is about. The slop presented indicates they did not even bother to consult
their dictionaries with any care. It is an elementary exercise to show deficiencies in most
proposals.
A striking recent example is Singer (ed.) Companion to Ethics, supposedly an encyclopaedic work
on ethics.
2
A few sample definitions recently encountered will help confirm our claims. Utterly
defective is the account of ethics as 'the relation between you and other people' .2 Such
connections as the spatial relations between people, for instance where they sit at a seminar,
do not belong to ethics. Narrowing relations to those of treatment, as in 'how you treat other
people' improves the account a bit, but not enough. Decent treatment of relevant kinds no
doubt comprises part of ethics, but a small part. Nor is such treatment confined, especially as
regards receivers, to people; animals, nature and more, all matter.
A more interesting account, presumably designed to encompass applied ethics, takes this
remarkable form: "'ethics" [is] defined as disciplined reflection by persons in all walks of life
on moral ideas and ideals'. 3 As a definition, this too fails entirely, appearing circular, and
converting ethics away from, what is essential, practice into head stuff, into something like
meditation, a kind of widely practiced theorizing, though practised on certain parts of ethics!
There are too some unfortunate side-effects of the insertion, aimed at making ethics applicable
to all walks of (human) life: namely, as there are walks of life which have no room for
disciplined reflection, so there is in fact no ethics. Back again to the drawing board.
Similarly for Russell's fuller attempt:
The study of Ethics is perhaps most commonly conceived as being
concerned with the questions "What sort of actions ought men to perform?"
and "What sort of actions ought men to avoid?" It is conceived, that is to
say[!], as dealing with human conduct, and as dividing what is virtuous and
what is vicious among the kinds of conduct between which, in practice,
people are called upon to choose. 4
Owing to feminist criticism of male chauvinism, many now wince at Russell's; piquant use of
term like 'men' (in fact throughout his numerous works). Environmental criticism of human
chauvinism has not been so (terminologically) successful, sad to report.
Back to the board.
It takes little effort to assemble a sheaf of inadequate definitions and accounts of ethics. Many
include too little, for example the popular account of ethics as "how we should live", which as
well as being too narrow is parochial. 5 Similarly, though fractionally better; a coherent set of
values to live by is enough for an ethic. For that appears to omit a deontic component,
obligations and permissions, and certainly leaves out ethical virtues. A major shortcoming,
even in fuller characterisations, concerns the concentration on humans and their parochial
affairs. For, as will soon appear, ethics does not essentially concern humans. An adequate
ethics says nothing about humans, members of species Homo sapiens, their obligations and
rights, values or virtues. It applies but contingently to humans; it applies similarly to
hominids, humanoids, and to persons generally, and functions in the absence of persons
altogether. As a result, the following familiar sorts of pronouncements on what ethics amount
2
3
4
5
John Langford, on ABC radio, 22 February 1993.
Engels, 6.
Russell p.1, F & S, from Elements of Ethics 1910.
For such an account see e.g. Single [Encyl. Brit.]
3
to are seriously defective: 'An ethic may be thought of as an ideal of human behaviour, an
environmental ethics as ideal human behaviour with respect to the environment, natural and
built" _6 Not everyone got it quite so wrong. For instance, Brandt gets away to a nice neutral
start, even if he does not cover the spread of ethics. Consider his opening:
Moral philosophy has traditionally been a systematic attempt to answer
some questions of apparently universal interest [!] about: what is worth
wanting or working for (what is worthwhile, of worth); what is the best
thing for an agent to do from his own point of view; what is morally right,
and what is morally just). [Also what is rational in these regards.]7
The nice start does not last. Agents turn out to be humans; utilitarianism soon begins to effect
an ugly intrusion, and so on.
2. On how to define ethics and morals more satisfactorily.
It is not difficult to do noticeably better than ethics teachers and writers have managed,
simply by consulting better dictionaries. But it is also not so difficult to re-organize and
improve upon what dictionaries offer. It is significant that dictionary definitions of moral and
ethic contain no essential allusion to humans, nothing essential concerning humans, man, or
we, us and co. (andwhere 'human' does enter, as in 'principles of human duty', it can simply
be elided, it is inessential). But the dictionary accounts do harbour some problems.
For one thing, like some of the preceding definitions, the dictionaries seem mired in a
common and damaging circularity: ethics is defined in terms of morality (and its adjuncts,
decent treatment, and similar); but then morality is itself defined through ethics. Fortunately
the loop back to ethics can be broken.
A particularly satisfactory way to workable definitions of notions in the ethics orbitethic, ethical, ethics, to take direct cases-is through those in the presupposed moral orbitdirectly, moral, morality, morals. For all these ethical notions are regularly defined, in better
dictionaries, through moral notions. This approach reverses the difficult and so far
unsuccessful strategy, sometimes tried in ethical theory, of attempting to define morality (e.g.
through universalizability conditions) inside a somehow independently characterized ethics. 8
The bases, upon which moral notions are carried, lie in turn in the action orbit, in
features of actions and their agents. 9 As agents are entailed by actions-beca use actions just
6
7
8
9
See 'A universal environmental ethics' Connect, UNESCO-UNE P Environmental Education
Newsletter XVI(2)(June 1991). pl.
Brandt p.l.
Long ago I used to think this was now it had to be done, through some singling out of morals
within ethics by way of a combination features of humans and requirements of morality (such as,
variously, consideration of others, universalizability). Not recognising the virtues of agency, I too
erroneously supposed that morality had to pertain to humanity.
No doubt the main definitional enterprise can be carried out, more or less, the other way around,
beginning with ethics, then cutting down to morals within, through agency. Moreover, such an
alternative route (starting out easily enough from the notion of ethics as the theory and
systematization of the good and the right, valuable and permissible, the virtuous and responsible,
and so on) should arrive at the same place, at a similar end result.
These action basics can in turn be explained, as before, within process theory, see Sylvan 1993. A
classification of agents can be drawn from there. It is not claimed that this is how we have to start
or that action nexus affords unique starting point. But its features have to be included sooner or
4
are agent-ascribed processe s-actions , more generally processes, form bedrock here. Neither
processes nor actions have any essential connection with humans. Relevant elements of
action nexus, upon which moral actions are carried, are now indicated: Single action
snapshot, capturing agent-acts -in-environment nexus:
AGENT
has
motives
emotions
volitions
objectives and goals
of
prior causes
ACTION
has
subsequent consequences
impacts upon (relevant items within) environment
The breakdown of actions, into types, will straightaway yield much that has long been taken
as central in moral theory, such as agonising (as Socrates did) over choices. Choice-making is
a morally critical type of action. Plural actions expose further relevant features, including
conduct, dispositions and character of agents, and suggest typologies (or moral relevance) of
actions and of impacts. Virtue ethics, but part of moral theory, fit here.
Whereas morality -the new ecologically sensitive morality that is-begin s from certain
features of an agent in its environment, ecology begins from investigation of an organism in
its environment. 'From the outset ecology was clearly understood to be the appreciation of
the organism (any organism, note) in and as part of its environment' . 10 'Something along the
lines of "the study of organisms in relation to their environment" is the basis of most ...
attempts ... [at] working definition of ecology ... over [which] there has been little dispute' . 11
Despite initial appearances, the upshot is not (the perhaps appealing one) that morality is a
branch of ecology. For the features investigated are very different (and a satisfactory
definition of 'ecology ' has to be sharpened to indicate what features of organism-inenvironments are studied). Whereas in morality there is much interest in the virtues and vices
of agents for instance, a parallel interest is outside the scope of ecology (and indeed not a
significant question for most organism or for many agents).
Interestingly, the ethical theory being advanced begins in precisely the way Deep
Ecology, in its pristine formulation, implies that no theory should operate, with an agent-inenvironment image. Under the total-field approach of Deep Ecology all such images dividing
up fields should be rejected, in particula r any man-in-e nvironme nt image, a special
chauvinistic case of what our theory operates with. Similarly no doubt for organism-inenvironment images of ecology. Unremarkably no arguments are offered for these rejections;
10
11
later, and it has virtues as a start, including familarity and naturalness.
R. Kitching [New Education], p.39
Ibid p.40 rearranged.
5
cogent arguments would be hard to find, or articulate. In any case, Deep Ecology strictures do
not prevent preliminary or limited uses of field analysis. As it will soon turn out, for more
general purposes, what is needed is removal of agents, not dissolving the image.
These action-theoretic preliminaries admit of much elaboration and variation, both
expansion and contraction most of which however we can pick up as we proceed. For
example, an illuminating expansion would expose the setting, of constraints and incentives,
within which an agents acts; no doubt some of these features, incentives for instance, can be
absorbed into what is already depicted, such as motives, and the remainder could be included
in under a prior-influences category. Striking contractions are those afforded by prevailing
ethical theories, consequentialism and Kantianism, which would erase, respectively, all but
consequences or all but motives. The parable of the Blindman and the Elephant is not only a
clever analogy for a implausible perspectivism; it can serve as a telling indictment of much
analytic philosophical practice. Moral philosophical practice, especially that of analytic
philosophy, consists in only sensing part of a whole (constellation) and failing to see the
rest. 12 Moral and action theory afford good examples of such skimping; for instance,
consequentialism fails to see anything but consequences.
The term moral, generously construed, covers the assessment of agent-intricated
elements of the action nexus depicted, in all the following sorts of respects (as applicable):
excellent, good, indifferent, bad, evil; approved, disapproved;
valuable, of value, or not
axiological
right or wrong (or alright), fair or unfair, proper or improper
obligatory, forbidden, permissible
deontic
responsible, irresponsible;
it also covers principles concerning such assessments. Morality concerns both appreciation
and assessment of agents-acting-in-environments as regards those sorts of features and
resulting systematization. Parallels with ecology should be evident. X's conduct or the like is
moral, broadly so, iff it is a matter for moral appraisal. In short, what is moral is marked out
by classes of functors in an action nexus.
Plainly some of the features, which perform the distinguishin g work, are not
significantly applicable to all elements in the nexus; for instance, impacts of frogs are not
significantly responsible. Responsibility applies primarily to certain agents, their conduct and
character. The sorts of respects cited are, furthermore, more general forms. But many more
specific evaluations are thereby encompassed; for instance, honourable, dishonourable;
decent, indecent, again as applicable.
In terms of the sorts of respects, certain important subtypes can be distinguished. The
first group (given by the first two lines) covers axiological. The second group (given by the
next two lines) covers deontic. The third group (not usually distinguished in "the logic of
12
For a detailed treatment of skimping in philosophy, see DP, chapter 11.
6
ethics") comprises accountability notions.
Such, formerly important, terms as virtuous and vicious-regu larly, but wrongly
included in dictionary listings of respects defining moral (e.g., "of or pertaining to character
or disposition considered as ... virtuous or vicious")-ar e axiological. They can be
characterized in terms of what is already available, thereby avoiding further circularity vexing
dictionary definitions (which define 'moral' using 'virtuous', and 'virtuous' deploying
'moral'). 13 For example, to adjust the dictionaries, virtuous [action] is [that] exhibiting moral
excellence or quality, vicious that distinguished as morally evil. Much the same supervenient
story gets told for duty in the deontic class. For while a duty just amounts to a certain sort, a
rigorous sort, of moral obligation, duty is not among the respects listed in defining the term
moral.
There are several, loosely consequential , attachments often made to what counts as
moral(s), notably: issues of punishments and rewards, with a view to altering proper conduct;
of freedom and determinism, as the latter may appear to place moral enterprise in jeopardy; of
justification of moral principles, which do not stand on its own without moral justification;
and so on, for other theoretical topics that consequently arise. While these further issues do
not form part of dictionary definitions of moral, they are stock textbook fare in moral
philosophy. But that, moral philosophy and moral theory, is where they can comfortably stay.
While the issues that result could be called moral, or distinguished as textbook moral, they
might as well simply be accommodate d more accurately, within philosophy of morality (metamorals).
Morality is, at base, the attribute of being moral. 14 Thus, basically, an item exhibits
morality if and only if that item is moral. In wider compass, morality comprehends a larger
package concerning what is moral; it consists in the theory and appreciation, practice and
principles of what is moral. It follows, from the account of moral given, that morality is all
about certain features of agency, features of theory and practice of agency, namely evaluative
and assessment features and principles concerning these, such as conduct and choice.
Several other significant corollaries also emerge. Firstly morality has nothing
essentially to do with humans. A similar but still more striking result will follow for ethics,
which is characterised, also in a human independent way, by way of morality. Ethics too has
nothing essentially to do with humans (or even with humanoids). Morality turns on features
of agency. Humans, some of them, simply happen to supply, presently, prime terrestrial
examples of full moral agents, those actors who do not merely conduct themselves well or
badly (a kangaroo can be a good or poor mother, a dog can behave badly and know it) but
who make promises, recognise obligations, accept responsibilities, and so forth.
Humans were almost certainly not the only full terrestrial agents; other humanoid
13
14
Thus too much of "virtue ethics" can be absorbed, see further, later chapters.
In logical terms it is defined through attribute abstraction.
7
species that have become extinct (perhaps with human assistance) very likely were also.
Certain humans are probably not the only full moral agents even now in this universe. It is
unlikely that humans will exemplify the only moral agents, perhaps even terrestrially. 15 The
prominen t role of competen t humans in morality, and so as regards ethics, is utterly
contingent. It follows, now quite generally, that those familiar definitions of morality and
ethics in terms of humans and their features are one and all defective. For all the (green)
ethical theory to be developed, humans can drop out altogether. But competent humans are
useful for illustrative purposes; it helps to have some demonstrably actual examples.
Moreove r, in such practical terms as terrestrial ethical impact, they are now almost
unavoidable.
Before explaining how to escape damaging agent centredness, or actocentricity, in ethics
that would result from equating ethics with morals (i.e. morality in this sense), there are loose
ends to be tied up and certain advantages, worth recording, accruing from having actocentrism
as a staging post. One advantage is that unwanted senses of evaluative notions are peeled off
automatically, because they do not apply regards agency. For example, so removed are not
only merely "aesthetic" uses but all those quasi-descriptive uses of commendatory terms such
as good (e.g. 'good car' 'good sort', 'good sox', 'good ox'). Aesthetic uses of evaluative
terms, as in 'fine painting' or 'good book', do not concern, except in oblique ways, action or
conduct of agents. It may well be objected that even so not enough non-moral uses are peeled
off, as various uses like those of mere expediency or practicality are left standing. A countercase will be developed that these should be left standing. For a smarter strategy than
attempting exclusion, includes moralities of expedience, of practicality, egoism and the like
within the moral orbit-so enabling a straightforward answer to such otherwise vexing
questions as Why be moral?- whilst subsequently differentiating within morals a distinuished
subclass (to be called meurals) which does function exclusively through meeting more
exacting requirements of morality.
There is a subsense that should be picked up immediately. Though a vicious or evil
agent is certainly a matter for morality, and within its compass, such an agent would not
normally be accounted moral (as a naive reading of the dictionaries would suggest), but
immoral. What is moral, morality, concerns the span of moral, immoral and indifferent
procedures. Plainly moral in the narrower sense comprehends the definitely positive part of
the span, as good does of the wide value span. Generally, an item (such as an agent, practice,
conduct, or whatever) is strictly moral, moral in this stricter sense, if it is moral, a matter of
15
There are arguments to other moral agents, other full agents even, from evolusionary theory.
According to an expanded theory, every niche is eventually occupied. (In a way, this interesting
theme carries over from the earlier doctrine of a great chain of being, which similarly onto every
position in the chain as potentially occupied.) By a statistical argument (copying those for
intelligent life elswhere in this vast universe), there are, or will be, niches for agents, with requisite
capabilities, wlsewhere in the universe. Therefore, by the theory, these niches will eventually be
occupied.
8
moral concern, and its appraisal is decidedly positive. Naturally for a full account, positive
within the moral span, has also to be defined. However here the strict sense is picked up only
to be set aside.
Focussing upon morality would be unduly limiting from the perspective of
environment al ethics. For although anthropocent ricism has been avoided, easily
circumvented through agency, though humans play no essential role, still morality is
undoubtedly agent-centred. Morality foregrounds agents and assessments of them and their
actions, and backgrounds environments of agents, and environments more generally (those
without agents in them do not even enter into consideration). The environment remains, so to
say, mere backdrop to actions of agents.
Escape is through an intermediary, which is substituted in place of morality in the
account proposed of ethics. That intermediary is an expanded morality, in convenient
shorthand ectomorality. 16 ('Ectomoralit y' is close enough for the present to 'ecomorality' ,
which is of course part of the main focus.) Expanded morality takes into account also
evaluative settings, perhaps devoid of agents; whatever of value that agents, or agent-like
subjects, agentoids, might in principle impact upon, interfere with, disturb, effect, change,
dislodge, or similar. That is, to say, it encompasses all items of relevant value, of worth,
significant items, including many wholes, such as habitats, ecosystems, the Earth itself; and so
also whatever applies morally with respect to these, for instance permission to disturb or to
improve, principles of letting be, and so on. Such ecosignificant items are also called, in the
literature, morally considerable items (a nicely ambiguous term, both sides of which have
unfortunate features, one because a considerable item may not have large significance, the
other because what it is supposed to respond to is some restricting class of considerers). In yet
other and more satisfactory terms, they have ethical standing. Naturally items of significance
other than agentoids may have other ethically relevant features (which they perhaps accrue
through their significance). For instance they may hold entitlements of various sorts, such as
to be left alone, to be represented, and so on.
In order to characterize core notions in the ethics orbit, the basic strategy consists in
plugging in "expanded morality" where the dictionaries give "morality"; similarly substitute
"ectomoral" for "moral". For the adjectival forms 'ethical' , and (equivalently) 'ethic', that is
all that is required. For the form concerned means: pertaining to ectomorality, or
(equivalently) treating of or relating to ectomorals. For the noun forms it is not so simple,
because there are problems with the dictionary accounts (for instance in 'the science of
morality' owing to misplaced definiteness, and dated uses of the term 'science'). Always
ethics(s) is an abstract, signifying features of being ethical; more exactly, always concerning
ectomoral theories or systems. More specifically, ethic( s) signifies
firstly, in both singular or plural though usually plural, the whole field of ectomoral theory
16
Greek ektos, outside. We include the inside with the expansion which incorporates the outside.
9
(the "science" of ectomorals), or derivatively, the department of (philosophical) study
concerned therewith;
secondly, in the singular but pluralising, a system or schematization of ectomorality, that is, at
least rudiments of a system, or of a theory, comprising values, ectomoral principles, and rules
of proper conduct.17
Like stock textbook ethics, most environmental ethics so far are in fact truncated; they
are very rudimentar y schemes, leaving out much that would be expected in a fatter
systematization. Hence in part the vagueness of characterization. So far the vagueness
(which does not exceed that of dictionaries or of ordinary usage), is immaterial, as the
characterisation is workable. But further exactness could be obtained through a technical
upgrade of system and a more detailed specification of what such a proposition system
contains. 18
What are sometimes cited as further restricted senses of 'ethic' are not further senses.
Rather they are restrictions, or designations, of what is already presented. Thus for instance,
the 'moral principles of a particular leader or school of thought' as in Buddhist ethics or
Kantian ethics. Similarly for field indications or application restrictions, as in medical ethics
or bioethics. So much for "senses" of 'ethics'.
In order to reach an adequate definition of ethics, not merely for intended environmental
purposes, but for historical purposes as well (so as to include Stoic ethics, Taoist ethics,
romantic nature ethics and the like as ethics) we have been obliged to adjust (if in an
inconspicuous way) dictionary definitions of ethics. That adjustment was made through
"expanded morality", but could have been accomplished in other equivalent ways (Leopold's
expansion of 'community' is another, though less satisfactory, way of achieving the same sort
of thing). Granted that we have adjusted dictionary definitions, have we changed the very
notion of ethics, or did the dictionaries, not for the first item, get it wrong, getting caught with
chauvinistic definitions? We claim that we have not changed the notion. Rather we captured
what some meant, more or less, by ethics all along-fro m Stoics, Epicureans and others on. It
has never been a very precise notion. In this case (by contrast with terms like right) not too
much hangs on the term, and we could simply divide ethics up, for instance, into wide and
narrow. However, we intend to keep the nice term ethics but to give the dictionaries and
modem opposition the expressions, standard ethics, or conventional ethics.
Our inconspicuous but all important adjustment is both good and bad news. It is bad
news, insofar as it appears to assist the charge that [deeper] environmental philosophy is doing
something different from ethics, that it is guilty of changing the subject (i.e., effectively
committing ignoratio elenchi). However we can freely grant, without incurring damage, that
17
18
Thus ethics include what it has to include, as expanded environment ally: philosophy of
ecomorality, and therewith of morality.
A system is a relational structure of a certain sort. An ethic is a propositional system, since it has
to include principles and the like; thus it involves a theory of strict logical sort. For an illustration
of the use of systems formulations in ethics, see e.g. Routley 1973.
10
standard ethics was, as a matter of definition, at least actocentric, and that, insofar as agents
were identified with humans, it was, therefore, anthropocentric. Even so ethics, as redefined,
includes standard ethics, so it is more satisfactorily seen not a different but a larger subject,
expanded through an expanded morality. It is good news, not merely because it facilitates
environmental ethics and accords with more satisfactory (greener) accounts of the subject, but
because it helps in getting around a snarl of objections to the effect that ethics has to be
homocentric, or at least actocentric. Removing these objections will recur throughout what
follows.
Among corollaries of note, a first one is that plurality of ethics falls out of the
characterisation. An ethic is not unique. Nor (through such a result does not follow as
environmental ethics form a subclass of ethics) are environmental ethics. Nor are military or
professional ethics. Failure of uniqueness is not a deficiency, but a virtue. For, one thing, it
gives places to go in cases of breakdown of an ethic, namely to other nearby ethics. Plurality
is tied up with nonuniqueness and other features of merit: noncomprehensiveness, openness,
flexibility, and so on.19
Secondly, there is more news on what an ethics is; and what an environmental one is. It
is widely claimed that an ethics requires a communit y, in an environme ntal ethic the
community (of concern etc.) is a wide environmental one. Ethics enlarges the community, a
scope of values. Ethics (partaking of ethos ~ the evaluative frame(or spirit) of a community.
While these ideas are popular they are astray.
Environmental ethics shifts the frame of reference for ethical consideration from purely
human concerns to ecological communities. 1-B Human beings as moral agents are not
ethically privileged.
An environmental ethic must be compatible with ecological principles and with life, i.e.
be livable.
3. Within ethics and morals, as so far generously constured: decent and dud distinctions.
Something like the division between the first and second specifics above has been
quasi-technicalized within ethics, and distorted through merger with a theory-metatheory
distinction borrowed from outside ethics. Engagement with the second (as in systematisation,
constructing and working within systems, etc.) has been dubbed normative ethics, or
sometimes to increase the confusion just ethics, or condescendingly, casuistry. Metaethics has
been taken however to be not what the logical analogy, and borrowing, would suggest metanormative ethics, the (positivistically correct) study of such systems, but instead a brand of
analytic philosophy, analysing the meanings and uses of key ethical terms. Taken as
exhaustive, there is much of importance, that the normative-metaethical distinction leaves out.
Nor is the distinction exhaustive. As well, the labels are misleading. In short, the distinction
is ill-made out and rather unsatisfactory, a handicap, not an asset; it can be abandoned without
19
See EEHC p.57.
11
loss and to advantage. Let us do so (so forget this paragraph, if you prefer). Many other
distinctions from standard ethics are also defective, in one way or another. It will be advisable
to resurvey and rechart ethical terrain.
Among other standard, but often dud, distinctions from ethical theory that have to
reexamined after environmental impact, to be duly salvaged or scrapped, are all the following:
• objective/subjective. That the objective/subjective distinction provides a false dichotomy is
easily seen from usual explanations of the terms: 'either objective, standing for a real factor in
things, or subjective, simply standing for a human proposal' 20
• Cognitive/non-cognitive. 2 1
To be retained are some distinctions which certain forces have worked hard to eliminate, such
as that of
• Fact/value (and earlier demise).
• Expedient/moral.
There is an elasticity in the notion of ethics, and a neglected distinction, that it is
important to take into account.. In contemporary ethical theory there is a concerted attempt to
build a universalizability requirement or some sort of equivalent into the very notion of ethics.
The evident result is that selfish systems of evaluation and conduct, systematic egoisms for
instance, are refused the title of ethics, and as an important corollary questions like Why be
ethical? become vexed. 22 Given, in particular, that any such "universality" requirement is
problematic in its formulation, and typically limited, chauvinistically to persons, a superior
course proceeds to distinguish: between ethics as already characterised (reportively) and its
subclass, universalizable ethics. As impartial ethics do have much to recommend them, let us
coin a convenient portmanteau term condensing the clumsy "universalizable ethics", namely
euthics. (Conveniently then un-euthical suggests unethical, which is what from a properly
ethical stance it is!)
There is undoubtedly some pressure to have ethics and morality extend beyond a single
or isolated individual 23 ( even so, a Crusoe ethics is intelligible and feasible, as regrettably is
egoistic morality). But that pressure does not extend very far; and such notions as those of a
tribal morality and an upper-class ethics are not defective on significance or semantic grounds,
even if they are wide open to objections on substantive grounds.
Such restricted ethics are not however immediately ruled out, as ethics, by such
requirements as that like cases be assessed alike, and that differences of assessment be based
on relevant differences. 24 For a tribalist or racist can respond that a foreigner is not like a
20
21
22
23
24
Reese p.157.
See also Reese.
On both, narrowing and vexing, see Singer Impractical ethics (Singer equates moral with ethical).
Singer does not really have an answer to the question Why be moral? though he thinks it not a bad
idea; mainly he tries to put down shuffles that have been presented as decisive.
Pettit reworking a rough route hacked out by Wittgenstein, tries to expand this across into a
philosophical forest denominated "holism", no-dwelling place for an isolated individual.
These requirements are presented by Attfield as basic formal requirements of reason (p.6). No
12
Greek, or that there are relevant differences between whites and blacks (intelligence has been
proposed as such a difference, when skin pigmentation appeared a merely superficial
difference). These sorts of responses, which were long accepted, are no longer acceptable,
because the differences put up are not considered ethically relevant differences (correctly
enough, though ethical relevance itself lacks an adequate explanation). Egoism, for instance,
exhibits rationality failure, as it does not treat likes alike. There are no relevant differences
justifying different treatment.
Singer's main argument for a much wider point of view,for universality, rests upon an
extensive appeal to authority (p.11). What else is offered is but an appeal to usage.
the notion of ethics carries with it the idea of something bigger than the
individual'. [It often does, but it may not.] 'If I am to defend my conduct
on ethical grounds, I cannot point only to the benefits it brings me. I must
address myself to a larger audience'(p.10).
That depends on the conduct concerned. More important, the audience does not need to be so
large, certainly not universal: my family or clan will suffice often enough. Nonetheless there
is this of use 'ethics', especially in such criticisms as 'unethical'.
• due consideration of others, all others;
Parallel to the distinction of euthics within ethics is a distinction of neurals within morals,
neurality within morality. Again the subclass, reflecting widespread philosophical usage of
the term morality, is separated through some requirement of morality, such as
• universalizability, which is a strong way of ensuring the first (do unto others etc.).
Insofar as these principles all allude to others, they often admit easy extension (to other
others). 25
4. Environmental and greener ethics.
As prevailing accounts of ethics are for the most part defective, so are what builds upon
them, recent accounts of environmental ethics. But there are also other grounds for
dissatisfaction with these.
Issues in the characterizat ion of ethics, especially removal of actocentrism and
homocentrism, naturally get transmitted to critical types, such as environmental ethics. But it
might be imagined, rashly, that disagreement ends there. After all, all decent environmental
ethics make the non-human world a proper object of concern, either directly or indirectly.
Differences between explications offered can be ascribed to ordinary philosophica l
incompleteness. "An environmental ethic, broadly, is a set of values to live by which takes
due account of the value of the non-human world". 26 Stated differently, the aim of
environmental ethics 'is to understand and act appropriately in relation of our ecological-i n
25
26
doubt they are, though they appear to figure in no logic of ethics yet formulated.
The distinctions can be filled out (and made to work-verify!) by a strategy like the earlier. Again
the list of moral predicates is deliberately wide. But once again we can later separate off certain
uses e.g. instrumenal, aesthetic uses of good.
Gunn 1987, 3.
13
the broad sense-circum stances". 27 Differently again, " ... sets of principles, which would
guide our treatment of wild nature, constitute an environmental ethic in the most general
sense". 28 The first of these slack explanations leaves out what is essential for an ethics,
principles; the second is unduly actocentric, leaving out what is not, as well as main
paraphernalia of ethics; the third not only neglects values, but excessively narrows scope so
that such an ethics is inapplicable in places devoid of wild nature or to other issues. A better
explication, which avoids these obvious pitfalls runs: An environmental ethics is an ethics, as
defined, which, among other concerns, takes specific account, through its values and
principles, of (significant) environmental items, of parts of nonhuman nature.
But obviously it too leaves much to be explained. How the non-human world is made
the object of concern, how it is moral concern, to what degree it is made the object of moral
concern, what forms of moral concern are applicable to what elements of the environment,
and how to achieve the aim of acting appropriately - all are matters that make environmental
ethics one of the most controversial areas of philosophy and also one of the most exciting,
although many professional philosophers still regard it as a peripheral area. Yet there now is
broad agreement among most of those active in the area that some change is needed and that
environmental matters need much more attention and action.
An environmental ethics is an ethics concerned, usually among other ethical things, with
parts of the environment. Coal-face or factory-floor environmenta l ethics bears on
environmental issues, problems and causes, and can be expected to say something about
environment s or some of their nonhuman components. Academic or board-room
environmental ethics is frequently, however, a remove from direct ethical work, comprising
discussion of environmental ethics, its features, its methods, its variability, its presumed
merely derived and applied character, and so on. Much of this academic environmental ethics
is directed against coal-face environmental ethics, especially that of a genuinely committed
sort aimed at advancing environmental sources.
It is almost immediate that there is an important elasticity -ambiguity, in a slack sense
-in the notion of environmental ethics, between an ethics which considers environmental
matters, whether positively or negatively, and an ethics which is positive about some
environmental elements, which evinces concern about environmental items (as 18th century
sympathy ethics did about other humans). A superficial environmental ethics need not say
anything particularly positive or sympathetic about environments; indeed productions on the
topic may try to dismiss or defeat environmenta l causes and to defuse or dissolve
environmental problems, for instance as not worth bothering about. 29 It may be argued that
27
28
29
Drengson 1989, 15.
Elliot, in Singer, 284.
That is, fashionable contemporary practice with respect to philosophy is transferred to parts of
enviromental philosophy (e.g. by Eco Wittgenstein and AppliedQuine). Environmental philosophy
may in no way interfere with industry and business. To an astonishing extent American academic
environmental ethics tends to conform to such ridiculous strictures (often encouraged by a fawning
14
natural environme nts should serve highest economic causes, which means in practice
becoming reserves for city folks, city corporations and consumers. Under such environmental
ethics ("environmental ethics" it is tempting to say, contravening usage) many an environme nt
should be razed, levelled, and paved over, to become a grand parking lot, shopping mall or
urban escarpmen t of a concrete jungle. What rural environment remains will, also serve those
"high" purposes, be tamed and managed, like much of Western Europe. Witness the
enthusiasm in productions on environmental ethics for landscapes like that of Tuscany, where
virtually everything is under tight human control and no bird moves (else it is shot).
Environm ental ethics and environme ntal philosophy may well prove to be
disappointm ents for enthusiastic environmentalists. For there may be little that is materially
green about them, no commitme nt to changes in old attitudes and practices, no offers of
improved standing and ethical treatment for environme ntal items. As an environme ntal
economics may be no green economics , but (very likely) some part or application of
mainstream economics , some sweep of resource or land economics , so an environme ntal
ethics or environme ntal ethic may not be particularly or at all green, but, for instance, simply
part of establishm ent ethics or an "application" of it to environmental items. Fortunately not
all environmental ethics is like this; beyond environmental is genuinely green ethics.
The elasticity in environmental ethics between superficial and material forms, parallels
that of the term concern (and rather similarly of matter), and can be substantially constricted
to that: an environme ntal ethics is one concerned with environmental items or matter. Thus,
on the one construal, such an ethics may be simply about such topics, it may be a standard
ethics "applied" to such topics, in which case environmental ethics does become just so-called
applied ethics. Alternatively, however, such an ethic may be one evincing concern, worry,
about the treatment of some environmental items on other, and directed at obtaining improved
treatment. Such an ethic is not negative or indifferent towards environme ntal matters, but is
advancing environme ntal causes. They matter. With such ethics, environme ntal ethics
cannot possibly be an applied ethics, for the framework of standard ethics and their
application s, is exceeded. (At best such ethics can be approxima ted by standard ethics by
assuming enlightened agents holding appropriate sorts of values. 30)
5. Human chauvinism and its detailed removal.
Deep-green theory is, unambiguously, a green ethical theory, of deep kind: that is, there
is intrinsic value in nature, natural items have intrinsic value, which may predomina te over
human-bas ed value. In short, the theory rejects both the 'Sole Value Assumptio n' and the
'Greater Value Assumptio n'. The theory finds all standard ethics mired in heavy prejudice, in
30
pragmatism).
Compare also Naess (in Engel 1990) on utilitarian approximation to Deep Ecology, made by
assuming availability of enough agents holding deep ecological values or, more or less
equivalently, having deep ecological consciousness.
15
favour of things human and against things non-human. The distinctive, still pervasive,
prejudice concerned is that encapsulated as human chauvinism, which is itself a special case
of class chauvinism (for the class, human 31 ). Removal of human chauvinism dovetails with
displacement of humans.
Class chauvinism consists in substantia lly differentia l treatment, typically
discriminatory and inferior treatment, of items outside the class, by sufficiently many
members of the class concerned, for which there is no sufficient justification. Human
chauvinism is a feature, a cardinal weakness, of virtually all ethical systems hitherto, so deepgreen theory contends. The main argument takes the following form: there is no
characteristic, such as those tendered in ethical theories as justifying differential treatment in
favour of humans (characteristics such as rationality, language possession, tool making
abilities, needs, preferences, sentience, etc.) which first is held by all and only humans, as
distinct from not all humans and some non-humans, and which second does justify differential
treatment.3 2
Signs and manifestations of chauvinism are many and various, some conspicuous, some
subtle, and so on. For instance, a dead giveaway is any allusion to all outside certain human
concerns that may have a value as resources. For that assigns to the items so referred to mere
instrumental value. A little less obvious is the discriminative mode when individual humans
are counted, but only species of other living things (or a step down, individual sentients but
only species of others).
The thorough-going rejection of human chauvinism itself sets a program: that of
reworking ethics, and indeed much of philosophy, in a way free of chauvinism and humanism,
without any specially privileged place for humans. A first part of such a program has already
been outlined, that of suitably characterising ethics in a way that does not make essential
appeal to humans or their features, or to other favoured groups such as sentients. A further
important part of the program, formulation of ethical theory in a way which avoids entirely
group chauvinism. Such a desirable outcome can be achieved simply through formulation of
ethical theory in terms of ethically relevant categories, assembled in what is called an annular
theory. 33
31
32
33
Insofar as an account of human is required, it can be some improvement on the biological species
definitions, a reworking to remove past biasses (superioristic, rationalistic, masceulinist, etc.) and
to dislodge appeals to aspects of human nature. But, despite the preponderance of human agents
hereabouts, on planet Earth, such an account is not required for ethics, or for philosophy.
Theorizing in these and many other areas can proceed perfectly well without allusion to humans.
The detailed argument for this proposition is presented in Routley and Routley 1980a 97-108,
where chauvinism is spelled out a bit further. A truncated version of this argument appears in Fox
1990, 16-17.
Though the theory is so labelled in several publications, the label, which presumably should stay,
is misleading, because some ethical relevant categories may overlap one another. The concentric
theory (developed in Wenz 1988 and others, perhaps in steps of Leopold), which incorporates a
similar mistake, can be seen as a subversion of the annular model.
16
The annular picture helps show how to redo ethics and philosophy with ideal types, or
with some equivalent thereof. No simple species or subspecies , such as humans or
superhumans, no single feature, such as sentience or life, serves as a reference benchmark, a
base class, for determinin g moral relevance and other ethical dimensions . 34 No ethical
irrelevant distinctions and classes, such as those of humans or base class, are required. What
is required instead is a major shift in perspective , a new focus upon morally relevant
categorical distinctions:
it is not possible to provide criteria which would justify distinguishing, in the
sharp way standard Western ethics do, between humans and certain
nonhuman creatures, and particularly those creatures which have preferences
or preferred states. For such criteria appear to depend upon the mistaken
assumption that moral respect for other creatures is due only when they can
be shown to measure up to some rather arbitrarily -determine d and loaded
tests for membershi p of a privileged class (essentially an elitist view),
instead of upon, say, respect for the preference s of other creatures.
According ly the sharp moral distinction, commonly accepted in ethics by
philosophe rs and other alike, between all humans and all other animal
species, lacks a satisfactory coherent basis (Routley and Routley 80a, 103).
The categorical distinctions thereby proposed do not reject traditional ethical notions such as
rationality, self-awaren ess, having interests; but they do reject the automatic use of the
characteristics of one species, or some base class as the model upon which the characteristics
of all other species or classes are judged. They also reject as unjustified distinctions that are
not "categorical distinctions which tie analytically with ethical notions". 35 For instance, they
hold that the human/nonhuman distinction is not ethically significant. Humans enter only in a
contingent way into general ethical theory, as holders of these or those features, which
34
35
Another common mistake which annular theory helps dispel and avoid is that of trying to stretch
community (or moral commuity) to include webs, mountains, Earth, land etc.-a trend Leopold
started with his land ethic. An agent can have an obligation to care for earth, and soil without
there being part of community. (The Land ethic is misguided). What ethics covers diverges from
any moral community. (Contra Dobson's suggestion p.47).
Routley and Routley 1980a, 108.
17
depending upon their respective capabilities and competence.
It is also desirable to have available some more positive principles corresponding to the
negative rejection of class chauvinism, principles so to say, of anti-chauvinism. Principles
like the biospherical egalitarianism of Deep Ecology represent an unsatisfactory attempt in
this direction. The deep-green improvement on this principle is the powerful principle of ecoimpartiality, according to which there should be no substantially differential treatment of
items outside any favoured class or species of discriminatory sort that lacks sufficient
justification. The appropriate impartial treatment is substantially independent of the
comparative value of the item treated. Most important, impartial treatment does not entail
equal treatment, or equal consideration, and does not require equal intrinsic or other value.
Other distinctive principles of deep-green theory will emerge as the ethical theory
accumulates.
One major conclusion is that human is not a significant ethical category. The outcome
is not anti-human; humans enter to the extent that they respectively deserve to enter. It is not
being claimed that humans lack value, that none of them have much or any value. Quite the
contrary, some humans have great value, some have established themselves as having great
propensity for evil, many lead quite indifferent lives. What is being rejected is the elevated,
often exaggerated, frequently exclusive, value assigned to humans, too often uniform value.
What are being contested are received distributions of values, and the heavy concentration of
value in humans and things and features human, the relative importance of which has been
grossly exaggerated. 36
Be in no doubt: many humans have positive value, some remarkable value. That is one
reason why it matters that humans should not vanish off the planet (for all that many of they
have sinned against it), to leave an impoverished earth, for instance a microbe planet. For that
would involve a huge reduction in value. Nor is it enough, adequate compensation, that
something like humans would evolve again at some remote future time. For, even if it
happened (in fact the probability of such replacement looks rather small), there would still be
a huge and extended dip in value. Similar points tell against a range of similar arguments to
the effect that it does not matter what happens to, or is done to, the Earth, because evolution
will eventually restore richness. 37 Even if richness were to return (much evidence indicates
36
37
Moral consideration and intrinsic value are not limited to humans; similarly these are not confined
to any other favoured or "improved" class closely overlapping humans, such as (it is supposed)
persons or rational creatures. Moral principles can be applied to all species and to the natural
environment in general. (A corollary concerns the characterisation of morality. ) Evolutionary
space is thereby afforded for other species, other systems other things.
An associated feature is stereotyping. Stereotyping is characteristic of speciesism/chauvinism as it
is in exploitation. To stereotype an item is to see it purely as a member of a class and as having
conventional feature of the class as a whole.
Recently there have been some attempts to have things ethical both ways: a special role for
humans without privilege or prejudice. There is a latent incoherence in Rachel's text, between his
initial and final proposals regarding ethics and morals-which are essentially human intricatedand regarding morals without hubris (MWH)-where human hubris is supposed to be removed.
Such an argument has been advanced by, among others, William Grey in 'Anthropocentrism and
18
that extinction and destruction is for ever, permanent), there would still be serious loss of
value. So it does matter.
6. Philosophy without humans.
It is hard to move and operate philosophically without encountering humans and human
chauvinism. Chauvinism is written deep into all prevailing Western (and Eastern) ideological
forms, common to what, at a more superficial level, are rival positions. But while human
chauvinism transcends parochial differences, it is more conspicuous and brazen in some
philosophical locales than others, notably idealism and empiricism, existentialism and
phenomenology. In short, it is particularly prominent where matters answer back to subjects,
those who have the ideas, do the observing, assemble the phenomena, do the living, and so
on-back to subjects that are invariably assumed to be human. Thus it is human existence,
human Being, human ideas and impressions, that count, those and none others. Such
chauvinism, nauseatingly strong, pervades not only Continental philosophy (esp. French and
German varieties)-but also Anglo-American empiricism and pragmatism (esp. anti-realist
varieties). 38
Once the main strategies of ethics-without-humans have been grasped, it is easy to see
how analogous moves can be made the deanthropize other reaches of philosophy, notably
some of the more chauvinistic enterprises. In general there are two stages: Firstly, as with
morality, replacing humans and human subjects by agents and ideal subjects. And secondly,
as with ethics, delineating significant reaches-philosop hical wildernesses-wh ere agents are
removed, not just off-stage but altogether.
While a few examples of each stage only will be given, it will become evident that the
procedures are general. Consider as an example of the first stage, existentialism, a philosophy
celebrating humans, and their exclusive freedom, and shot through with human chauvinism.
Existentialism is (to quote a convenient caricature)
a philosophy which emphasises man's freedom to act independently of any
laws, natural or otherwise, and according to his own choice. It is a free will
philosophy which can be seen as 'a protest against views of the world and
policies ... in which humans are regarded as the helpless playthings of
historical forces, or as wholly determined by the regular operation of natural
38
Deep Ecology', Australasian Journal of Philosophy vol.71, No 4: December 1993.
There is a residual serious problem here, as to why existence is so important. Why do actual
humans and existent tigers matter, not merely virtual ones or possible ones. What is it about
existence? There are many items which it would be better did not exist, such as devils, helicopters
(for the most part), pollution, erosion and so on. Existence, of favoured sorts, makes for richness,
which is a high (if defeasible) virtue.
Sartre's philosophy is rendolent with human chauvinism: e.g. Critique of Dialectical Reason p.8.
as regards destruction and destroy, is an amazing piece of human chauvinism. While humans
may have a greater potentiality for production of value than most other animals, many humans
also have a far greater potentiality for evil than most other animals. Historically, the evil
producing capacity has dominated. Another example of Sartre's anthropocentism is his
"philosophy of the present".
Marx's philosophy is similarly rendolent. Productivity is human productivity... . For almost
random examples from anti-realism, see DP.
19
processes' (Encyclopaedia Britannica 1978). This anti-determinist
perspective is, again, connected with the question of objectivity.
Existentialists hold that the only objective external fact independent of the
control of human beings is the fact of their being brought into existence, and
that death will one day come to terminate that existence. In all other
respects it is they who are in control. There are no outside independent
laws, of economics, history, nature or whatever, which they cannot deny or
shape for themselves. Thus we are all free to choose how we will behave
and develop and how we will shape society and nature. It follows that the
consequences of our actions are down to us, and therefore if they are
unpleasant that is our fault-not the fault of outside forces or external laws.
There are no excuses for our not thinking and acting for ourselves and we
are 'condemned' to be free because everything is theoretically permitted to
us and we therefore carry a heavy burden of responsibility for what we do.
As Sartre put it, 'Man is responsible for what he is. The first effect of
existentialism is that it puts every man in possession of himself as he is, and
places the entire responsibility for existence squarely on his shoulders' ....
We have a duty to face up to this, and not to base our actions thoughtlessly
on what is said to be prescribed/or us ('laws' of society, of economics, of
nature). That is abdicating responsibility.39
Note the heavy concentration throughout on humans, variously appearing as human beings,
we, us, they, and (in singular musculine form) man and he. But, as before 40 , on the one
boundary, many humans are incapable of what is presumed, the heavy burden of
responsibility and so forth; and, on the other, other agents are, in principle at least, capable of
achieving those relevant sorts of freedom that humans can obtain. It is already apparent that
once the synthetic setting of highly competent humans is exceeded, notions invoked by
existentialism begin to fall apart. For instance, some "wild" animals may enjoy considerable
levels of unreflective unagonised freedom while lacking capacity to bear much responsibility.
Conversely, there are fairly responsible agents, such as some trapped in determined or
deterministic situations, who have no opportunity to exercise freedom.
Accordingly too, though human should be replaced by agent of appropriate sort in
dechauvinized existentialism, it would hardly suffice to substitute for 'human' any of
'responsible agent', 'freedom exercising agent' or similar-though these substitutions effect
some of what was intended, such as exclusion of children, many animals, dementeds and so
on. What sort of agent is appropriate? That existentialism can be seen as trying to explain.
And for the present we can leave it at that, replacing human throughout by the dummy term,
existential agent. This is existentialism partly rectified.
At the same primary stage of dechauvinizing existentialism, connected improvements
could well be sought in existentialism, such as reducing the driven and elitist ethos. In part
this ethos is encouraged by the response of existentialism to what motivates and shapes it,
deterministic arguments; for it sees only such "strong" agents as evading deterministic forces.
The whole business is rather ironic, as the first driven feature is incompatible with full
39
40
Pepper (Roots) pp.118-9; itals in original. Pepper refers to Sartre 1943 and 1946.
As at the beginning of EE, where standard privileged treatment for humans is reviewed and found
wanting.
20
freedom, while the second elitist feature is incompatible with the stress on things human, as
(like elitist religions) only exceptional agents escape. A promising alternative tries direct
confrontation with deterministic arguments, undercutting their scope and grip, and thereby
making room for free action in a range of situations (not everywhere between birth and
death!) for a wide variety of agents, including lesser, less elite, less stressed and sensitive
agents. For the arguments prove vulnerable to selective undermining by careful logical and
analytic procedures, 41 methods existentialism itself is loath to deploy (for all that its approach
rests upon past entrenched argumentation). Insofar as a main motivation for existentialism in
its prevailing ironic form is undiscriminating antideterminism, that motivation too is thereby
collapsed, and room is made for a less demanding more relaxed dechauvinized existentialism.
As for existentialism, so for a range of other subjects inclined to intrude humans as
central to world functioning or intelligibility, a range as apparently diverse as phenomenology
and quantum theory, empiricism and theology, pragmatism and cosmology. Quantum theory
fits into this range because of its received Copenhagen interpretation, cosmology because of
its return to anthropocentrism through adoption of anthropic principles. Both are however
readily freed of human shackles, first by replacing humans by "observers" (which for the most
part can simply be recording devices), and better, secondly to deagentize completely, by
amending interpretation s to dislodge both Copenhagen phenomenolo gy and anthropic
principles. 42 For a larger illustration, consider a popular mixture of versions of
phenomenology (a fuller elaboration again would disentangle versions, all of which however
require similar detoxification).
Phenomenol ogy to which existentialism is related .. .is summed up by
Nietzsche, who said, 'Objectivity is the main enemy of understanding. It
means the myth that there are hard observable facts ... but all the concepts we
employ in describing the world and predicting its behaviour are imposed on
it by ourselves. We have a choice about what view of the world we adopt.'
... Phenomenology is not just a philosophy which implies that we are not
subject to external laws, imposed by and through forces independent of
ourselves. It holds that there actually is no world external to and separate
from ourselves. There is no 'reality' in the sense of there being an external
'real world' divorced from our own consciousness and capable of existing if
we did not exist. Nature cannot exist without ourselves also existing-if we
ceased to be, so would it cease, and vice-versa. Therefore what 'the
environment' is, and is like, is a function of our own subjective construction
of it. The very use of such terms as 'ourselves' and 'human consciousness'
in opposition to terms like 'nature' and 'the environment' is inappropriate
and shows the extent to which we are immersed in positivist science as our
way of seeing the world. For the phenomenologists these terms are
meaningless because there is no separation between ourselves and a 'nature'
or a 'reality'. We and the world are one-a single united entity.
Phenomenology is thus anti-positivist science, opposing ... Cartesian dualism.
It does not deal in laws, or in cause-effect relationships consequent on the
dualism and neither can it be concerned with analysis-brea king the world
into parts ... If we want to know and understand nature we must, as Hume
41
42
For technical details, see Sylvan FWD.
On satisfactory ways of accomplishing this second stage see Sylvan (Cosm. Syn).
21
{
said in his Treatise on Human Nature in 1737, come to full comprehension
of man. For if there is no nature except as structured through human
consciousness, knowledge and truth cannot exist independently of man. 43
As with existentialism, there is a similar enormous exorbitant emphases on humans and things
humans; humans carry everything. But insofar as humans can perform those feats, so better
can a class a appropriate agents, phenomenolo gical agents, who include no incompetents
(who might let this world flicker out of existence, or worse).
Phenomenolo gy is a full immersion human chauvinism. Fashionable contemporary
empiricisms, normally taken as rivals to phenomenolo gy, are incomplete immersion
analogues. While a few properties, primary properties of basic physics, are separated out as
human independent, the rest, the phenomenolo gical mass, are categorised as responsedependent, and treated phenomenologically. 44 Take, for example, aesthetic features, which
include certain ecological features. Nowadays humans can grow up with the assumption that
aesthetic qualities, indeed all "response dependent" qualities, are features of humans, not in
any way objective.
So it can be seriously, if ridiculously, hypothesized that what is
(considered) beautiful, for instance of depends on how the human gene-pool is composed. As
before, humans are readily displaced in favour of appropriate agents. But, for the most part,
these agents too are otiose.
While the first stage 1s the main stage with agentocentric philosophies like
extistentialism, there is a second stage, which comprises significantly more than pointing out
how much, how much of importance, such philosophies leave out by their narrow
concentration. What is left out includes, to begin, all those times and places where there are
no agents, rich worlds, devoid of relevant agents, and the like. But that is only the beginning
of the business. For agents have been infiltrated or inserted in all sorts of settings where they
have no business to be or to transact.
Against the ancient and formerly honorable practice of agent invocation, pushed
primarily for explanatory purposes, 45 agent detachment and agent elimination campaigns have
periodically been mounted (e.g. conspicuously , but not only, in classic Greece, when it
became clearly appreciated that there could be causes without agents, during the
Enlightenmen t, and in Frege' s propositional ization program). Deagentizatio n, typically
coupled with deanthropization, can be, and should be, pushed much further. Agents, often
evidence of immature, even primitive, philosophy, still lurk everywhere in philosophy.
Agent-detach ment themes, still struggling against an unenlightened opposition, include:
objects, including worlds, without perceivers or sensors, nonexistent items without
conceivers, propositions without proposers, assumptions without assumers, values without
43
44
45
Pepper p.199 (where references are supplied). We shall not stop off for expository adjustment or
for any critique of this material. For main elements of such a critique, see however DP chapter 11
and JB.
Thus thesis that all properties are response dependent merges empiricism with European
phenomenology.
Deluded explanatory purposes, for agents themselves have in turn to be explained.
I
22
t
valuers, causation without causers (or intentional agents), organisation without organisers,
wilderness without wilderness managers, land (or property) without owners or stewards,
regulation without regulators, selection without selectors, and purposes without purposers. 46
But without humans who does philosophy? Well, in the old days, God of course, most
gods, the Devil, demiurges, gifted spirits and so on. At any time duly accomplished agents.
While it is easy to see how ethics and philosophy could in principle flourish given only
suitably accomplished agents, and no humans, namely the agents do something like what a
few humans hereabouts do, still it may be less easy for many to see how these subjects can
function without agents. But it is straightforward, is it not? A philosophy stands as a system
of propositions. And propositions do not need agents, proposers, or whatever. Nor do
systems.
It is here that blockage may occur, for two reasons: First, because of the idealistic idea
that there are no statements without staters. Second, because of the mistaken assumption that
a system of propositions standing on its own involves an obnoxious platonism. No such
assumption is made. Third, part of the struggle has been conducted before, in the tussle
between psychologism and its opposite in logic and associated regions (e.g. mathematics,
philosophy of mathematics etc.), in the tussle between Husserl and Frege (to name two
prominent parties). Although the issues have been rejoined more recently, it is still widely
supposed that anti-psychologism triumphed. Its success is, to some extent, mere appearance.
For all that, anti-psychologism is here extended much further, right across philosophy.
Appendix. 1. Examples showing divergence of utilitarianism from consequentialism.
Consider two different actions with some set of consequence s, one (A) done
deliberately, one (B) unintended. Then suppose, for one sort of case, the outcome is
disastrous. Not only is A normally regarded as much worse than B, e.g. arson than a naturally
occurring fire such as lightening strike, but further fuller utility assessments should give
analogous results, e.g. the satisfaction of the arsonist could be given a high negative rating.
Utilitarianism itself is but a well-tempered egoism: egoism extended to substituting
others. That cannot so plausibly be charged of consequentialism.
Utilitarianism has been associated with the "greed is good" ideology of the 1980s. The
association has point (so Singer tries, desperately, to disassociate utilitarianism). Suppose it is
said that the 80s, were a decade of greed (as so depicted in many movies) but the 90s is a
decade of ethics (despite counterevidence). But nothing has changed in underlying ideologies,
in ethics or economics!
Appendix 2. Inadequacy of standard ethics.
The inadequacy of standard ethics for green purposes has been recognised, if obliquely
and perversely, by many critics of the idea of (deep) green ethics (e.g. McCloskey). They
46
The very controversial tlast theme is argued in Sylvan 90 [purpose], where most of these various
detachment themes are assembled. Obviously there are many more such themes.
23
l
have proceeded to argue that there couldn't be such an ethics because none of the standard
ethics would serve. But the argument fails because standard ethics does not exhaust ethics.
There are some prospects of a general proof of inadequacy from what has been
developed so far. Standard forms are restricted to proper subsets of agents, whereas ethics in
full flower applies to all agents. Standard ethics leaves out much of the subject, all the deep
part.
References
William Grey in 'Anthropocentrism and Deep Ecology', Australasian Journal of Philosophy
vol.71, No 4: December 1993.
ON THE VALUE CORE OF DEEP-GREEN THEORY
Deep-green theory is a deep environmental theory, with much in common with deep
ecology. Like deep ecology, it stands in significant ideological opposition to the dominant
technocratic-industrial way. But, even more than deep ecology, deep-green theory aims to
supply a comprehensive alternative environmental philosophy (in the full senses of those
atrophied terms, esp philosophy ). It seeks to accomplish this, furthermore, without
accumulating the amount of philosophical rubbish deep ecology regularly attracts. For, to
insert a key difference between these ecocentric theories in a deliberately prejudical way: deepgreen theory resembles a deep ecology with the pseudo-scientific garbage removed,
reorganised into a tight, coherent and more comprehensive theory. Deep-green theory, which
has roots that stretch back about as far as its much publicized neighbour, accordingly merits
elaboration separate from deep ecology, which in any case lacks a well-thought-through
valuational and ethical basis. This essay aims to uncover the value theory of deep-green
theory, exposing thereby one central area of deep-green theory. Though the value theory is
(inevitably) abstract, it issues in what is more concrete, such as practical ecological directives,
potentially destabilizing prevailing policies and institutions.
At the core of deep-green theory, as of authentic deep ecology, lies a value theory. A
fundamental theme thereof, part of what makes these positions deep, is that a range of
environmental items are valuable in themselves, directly and irreducibly so, so that their value
does not somehow reduce to or emerge from something else, such as features of certain valuers
or what counts for them. Value then does not answer back in some way to humans, or sentient
creatures (or other value-responsive classes), their interests, uses, preferences, or such like.
Many natural items such as forests and rivers, mountains and seashores, are, as it is often put
(without however any commitment thereby to dubious essentialist or absolute objectivist
positions), intrinsically valuable. They are valuable in their own right - irrespective of whether
they are interesting or useful (to any intentional operators, themselves interesting or useful or
not), indeed whether or not there exist any valuers. Value spreads through and reaches across
the natural domain; it is not bounded by mind or linkages with subjective states; nor does it
stop with sentience, or associated pyschological features like satisfaction; nor (pace deep
ecology) does it end at life; it observes no such compromising bounds. Although value is
distributed richly if irregularly throughout nature, and accordingly may be found in nature, it is
not encapsulated in some isolable natural feature, such as life or sentience, or even in defeasible
ecological values such as richness, diversity and variety (and so subject to a different,
naturalistic, reduction). But of course such ecological features afford criteria for value, and
should be represented in recipes (such as "objective functions") for assessing total value.
From the presence of natural things of value, and accordingly of natural values, it is a
short, though controversial, step to the important conclusion that there can be values without
valuers. For valuers are sentient creatures with appropriate capacities, but things of value may
precede and succeed all such valuers; tfiat is, these things can persist, their values intact,
without any valuers. As there can be shapes without any shape-perceivers, and concepts with
conceivers, so there can be values without valuers. (The theme, like others advanced, can be
backed up by more detailed argument and by formal proof, neither attempted here.) In
valuational relations then, relating valuers as subjects with values as objects, both ends of
relations have independent standing; though interrelated, as the descriptions deliberately chosen
suggest, either can stand without the other. It is a fashionable mistake, which cannot however
be got away with, to try to collapse this relation - usually to endeavour to soak up values into a
modification of valuing subjects (e.g. as a predicate 'relation-to-values', in which inconvenient
values are locked away), not to remove valuers, considered unproblematic, from view. The
mistaken procedure is in fact just one important example of an archetypal reduction of
mainstream modern philosophy, of relations to functions; other examples, locking undesired
objects away within functions, are those rendering wholes (such as ecosystems and organised
structures) functions of their parts, and, under functionalism, minds and types of intentionality,
including value direction, as functions of bodies or their parts such as brains. Values are not,
and do not disappear into, functions of valuers.
A connected corollary is that values are not apart from the actual world, something
"projected" or imposed on it by a favoured class of valuers, something colouring (and even
emotionall y clouding) the otherwise valueless physical world, in rather the way that
reductionistic materialism tries (erroneously) to construe colour itself as projected onto a
colourless physical world. Of course this projection effort, never adequately explicated, does
not succeed, on its own, in removing values. For they remain, left as some function of the
valuers. To try to bulldoze through this difficulty, a second reduction is invoked, of evaluative
features of valuers to "natural" features, commonly preferences, desires or such like. The
second reduction runs into obstacles that halt even the naturalistic bulldozers (e.g. naturalistic
and related fallacies), but the first reduction is the critical one in removing key environmental
values, such as those of wilderness and wild things, which become valuable only in the focus
of certain sentient beholders, and not in and for them self. This reduction too is blocked by
insuperable difficulties. On the one side, like the parallel proposed phenomonalist reduction of
material objects to sensations, the reduction never achievers satisfactory support or even a
satisfactory statement. On the other, it is counterexampled by various modellings or thoughtexperiments revealing intuitively-assessed value in situations devoid of valuers (as e.g. in the
well-known Last Person argument). Values are not apart from the actual world, then, merely
projected onto it by valuers, or else locked up in certain valuers (in the fashion of Carterian
intensions ). Values are part of the world; they are objects in the domain of actual and other
worlds. But they are not of course material objects; creatures will not fall over them any more
than they will trip over shadows or shapes.
Value like the shape and taste, is an3attribute, which things have or may lack, and which
furthermore creatures can recognise or may fail to discern. Thus value is, like colour and taste
and their determinate forms (red, acidic, etc), a universa l , distributed across things,
individuals and wholes. Like shape and colour, value is a high-level universal. The
comparison of value with shape is decidedly more helpful than the standard, but exhausted,
comparison of value with colour, or of goodness with colour determinates such as redness or
yellow. For example, shape is not bound by a set of determinates as colour is in the specific
colours, but comes in a spectacular variety of forms, not totally or linearly ordered (as in a
rainbow), or contracted to some primary set (as in colour traingles); shapes like value pertain to
wholes as well as particulars, and links with gestalts rather better than colour; shape
discrimination is more culture dependent and sensitive; shape is, or was, a primary property,
and thereby more immune to reductionist strategies than secondary properties such as colour,
which is, under physicalism, prized off objects and allegedly relocated in creatures or in their
interrelation with colourless physical things. Shapes like values, can be vague, indeterminate;
that does not prevent things, perhaps unique things, exemplifying them. But naturally the
anology can only be extended so far. Shapes can be approximated by polygons, values cannot;
shapes are regularly perceived through sense perception, by vision or touch especially, values
are not, but are differently apprised. Value is its own thing, not something else; it is what it is
and does what is does, and not something else, like some specialised mathematical or economic
thing. It does not contract to some mark of value or to what it comes down to in highly
restricted settings; most important, it does not disappear in the style of modem economics into
(expected) utility or into just two economic forms, value-in-use monetarily and value-inexchange (price). Value means what it means, and has meant: worth; and it ties with general
assessments of merit and demerit, goodness or badness, not an economic or other cut-down
thereof. Price, for example, may fail entirely to reflect worth, it may have little to do with
goodness of product.
The powerful drive to reduce or deny values has several sources. part of the motivation
for reduction of value springs from epistemological worries, concerning how values can be
ascertained and known, so far as they are (subjective translation proposals are than a direct
evaluative counterpart of phenomenalism). Part derives from supposedly problematic cultural
and subcultural relativity (whence the attempt to impose values by identification of value with
some favoured feature, and cultural or economic imperialism). Part of the motivation comes
from more sweeping ideologic al commitments, such as the varieties of materiali sm
(physicalism esp.) or scientism.
As has become apparent, attempted reductions of value come too in a variety of forms subjective, which made use of psychological features, such as desires, interests, emotions, and
the like or subjective aggregations, such as community preferences or utility; or objectiviely
naturalistic, which enrol value-making characteristics such as richness or evolutionary
development as value - consequential, w~ch consider only outcomes, or purely motivational,
which consider only attitudes and ignore leads and outcomes - straightforward, as in translation
proposals for translating value judgements into reducing statements; or oblique, as in
supervenience propositions (no variations in value without underwriting variations in reducing
features), or obscure, as in unarticulated projection claims. Values are not well accommodated
within theses schemes, or accommodated at all. The idea is abroad however that science can
offer a reduction, can sweep up value along with all other knowledge, where philosophy has
conspicuously failed. Unfortunately for such optimistic ideas, fortunately perhaps for deeper
thought, current science, physics especially, does not have much to say at all, or of merit,
about values, and if it did reductions through it would be circular. But, to the contrary, there is
a long-standing pretence that science gets along "well" without values, in appropriate value-free
fashion. Nowadays it is increasingly realised that such value-freedom is a myth, that much of
what passes as science is heavily value-penetrated. While those engaged purely in purer
science may have the illusion of an escape from value, there is no escape.
Though deep-green value theory is thoroughly nonreductive, it does not sacrifice
warranted claims to scientific and logical adequacy thereby. The reductionistic dichotomies are
avoided and repudiated. Value reduces neither in subjective nor objective fashion; it does not
reduce. Evaluative judgements are certainly not subjective; but nor are they objection in an
absolutist sense; they are nonjective, that is, neither. Somewhat similarly, evaluation of an act
does not reduce to assessing consequences; nor does it come down to an assessment of
motives; both may matter.
In any case, reductions do not succeed, as a copious literature, littered with failed
attempts, meanderingly establishes. Nor are they generally desirable, since mostly shallow,
aiming at a reduction to features of some privileged class presented as ideal (i.e. core value is
covertly assumed). Nor are they needed; explanation and assessment do not require reduction.
Evaluations may be arrived at, and value systems expanded, by enhancement methods, which
consists in emotional presentation (as under Meinong's phenomenological account) organised
by coherence methods. The methodology in fact resembles that sometimes proposed for
acquisition of scientific information. As with accumulated empirial information, which can be
extended through presentational input and assessment for overall coherence, so further
evaluations may be arrived at and assessed through a combination of presentational and
coherence procedures. At the (marginal) stage where the next round of evaluations is
undertaken, the following active ingredients figure, in an idealised breakdown:- Firstly, a
background stock of judgements and experience will have been accumulated or inherited; in
principle all of this is revisable, and some may be up for reassessment. Apart from the
background, which enters in assessing overall coherence of system, what is involved is,
secondly, emotional presentation, which corresponds to further perceptional and sense data
input, and, thirdly and not independent, coherence processing , which supplies the
interpretational and rationalisational comp~nents. At bottom, parallelling perception in the case
of empirical information, is emotional presentation, gut or visceral reaction in starker forms of
acceptance or rejection, but more generally comprehending a variety of sentiments, including
overall well-being, and also relational impressions, such as empathy, identification, and so on.
As a perceiver perceives shapes and taster tastes and goodness, so a valuer feels value and
disvalue.
The basis of perceptio n is sensation , the basis of valuation is emotion.
Apprehension of value is seated in emotional, and especially visceral, presentation; but what is
apprehended is not to be confused with its apprehension any more than what is perceived. All
the warnings about sensation as an information source have to be repeated with heavy
emphasis as regards emotional presentation; for example, reliability cannot be guaranteed,
interference with presentation through drugs, alcohol, temporary excitement or other inputs
may render it dubious or unacceptable, conditioning may have occurred, including substantial
cultural conditioning (so that a person is terrified by huntsmen spiders but not sickened by
bloody massacres of dolphins or seals). As with perception, there are checks on emotional
presentation, such as constancy over time and after reflection.
Emotional presentation, supplying in particular inclusions and exclusions or prohibitions,
is but the basis of reflective evaluation and value apprehension. The further critical part,
coherence processing, builds on the basis taking account of other inputs or controls including
background (which supplies relevant components of already adopted judgements, assimilated
subculture and so forth) and constraints (such as substitutional requirements like impartiality,
e.g. whether considered judgements hold for substitute valuers, and uniformity, e.g. whether
similar acts are judged in similar ways). The coherence procedure consists, in essence, of
asking whether the next or a relevant judgemen t fits together with what has been accepted,
while meeting constraints, without leading to what has been rejected or excluded. If it does fit
it is added to the included side, otherwise it is sent to the excluded side. (The familiar ethical
practice of devising cases and comparing them with the cases in hand can be worked in under
this procedure.) Because an aim of this rationalisation procedure is achievement of some sort
of equilibrium - admitting what is included, while excluding what is unsupported, fails to gain
support, is emotionally spoken against - such coherence procedures have gained currency in
North America under the rubric "reflectiv e equilibrium". Observe, however, that any
equilibriu m gained at some stage may be quickly lost, as new types of problems arise and
further information enters. To be sure, the whole methodology (like the parallel methodology
of a coherence theory of truth) is highly idealised, and only practicably usable in rudimentary
parts. It does however surmount a major obstacle for value theory; it reveals how in principle a
nonreduc tionistic value theory can function. Whether that theory is an appropria te
environmental one or not will depend however above all on the presentational input, the extent
to which environmental sensitivity enters and is not dismissed.
Enhancement methods reveal too tRat value systems are not uniquely determined, any
more than other comprehensive theoretical frameworks, such as those intended to reflect truth.
There can be, there evidently are, rival value systems, measuring up to rigorous rationality
requirements, much as there are rival logics, rival physical and biological theories, and rival
coherent religions. Chauvinistic systems, narrow or shallow value systems, which take no
requisite account of many environmental items, likewise cannot be excluded on rational or
straight logical grounds. Unfortunately such systems remain in ascendancy, and tend to
dominate social practices; in recent times economism, a narrow type of utilitarianism, has all
too obviously dominated much terrestial practice. While such value frameworks are open to
severe criticism, for instance as chauvinistic, as violating universality requirements of morality
in the case of economism, they do not succumb to definitive refutation (for the reason that
requirements of morality, of universalizability of principle, impartiality and so on, can be
repudiated; immoral or amoral frameworks are still value systems). Of course a range of
argumentative, educational and persuasive techniques, of varying equality, can be put to work
to move valuers who adhere to other structures, often enough successfully. Emotional
presentation of environmental items, by way of new experience and information, is important
among these. In short, much can be done to shift or alter values, though as usual effectiveness
cannot be guaranteed.
The availability of rival value systems and prospect of yet others, while it implies a
certain desirable (and also troublesome) pluralism, does not mean relativism. Neither deep
green theory nor authentic deep ecology espouse any superficially easy relativism. From their
viewpoint, rival narrower and shallower systems are definitely inferior , and marked down
accordingly, while economism is an onathema which does not even make the moral grade (e.g.
too many principles stop at state boundaries). However a critical pluralism does acknowledge,
and offer a place, in the wider scheme of things for other positions, even if as less favoured or
satisfactory. Politically then, deep positions can allow for, what makes good sense in these
times of numbers, alliances. Hence the point of a green alliance, combining green positions,
against still prevailing anti-environmentalism and economism.
The value system pluralism of deep-green theory interpenetrates not only social and
political domains above, but also metaphysics traditionally placed below. In the underlying
metaphysical pluralism of deep-green theory, value runs very deep - so deep that even truth
depends in part upon it. For not merely selection of a correct comprehensive theory or worldview, but choice of associated actual world, is a value dependent choice. That choice, insofar
as it is consciously made, of world conceptualisation and structure, is a constrained choice,
constrained by informational inputs, such as those of refined perception. But in as much as it
is rationally accomplished, that choice, like other choices of structure, proceeds according to a
standard value-information analysis (regularly oversimplified however to a preference-
information or even desire-belief modellin1); that is, to get to the salient point, it involves value
essentially.
Truth and value are then intertwined. Their relation, not one of identity (for contrary to
idealism, there are many relations not identical with identity), can now be stated more
accurately than the poets have managed. Neither is one; both are plural, and differently so. In
certain significant respects the metaphysics resembles the value theory. For example, as the
value theory is nonreductionistic, so also is the metaphysics; in particular, there is a noreduction theme that neither parts nor wholes reduce eliminably to one another, as opposed to
atomistic and holistic views of environmental interrelations. As the value theory is pluralistic
so also is the metaphysics; what needs to be discerned, in place of absolutism, is a plurality of
worlds and of associated truth characterisations. A main aim of a thoroughgoing
environmental theory is to displace very destructive dominant ideasystems, regularly presented
as absolute, which incorporate both value and truth themes concerning the environment and its
organisation.
Much of deep-green theory devolves then from the abstract value theory, beginning (to
take a more accessible route than the metaphysical way) with a more comprehensive ethical
theory, which includes as well as a specific axiological theory, elaborating environmental
values and virtues, a deontic theory, supplying obligations, rights, taboos, and similar. For
example, given that a certain wild river is intrinsically valuable, as we can verify by on-site
experience and enhancement methods, and given that we duly respect that value, as deontic
principles will tell us we should, then we are not free to do as we like with that river, to dam it
with concrete, to channel it within concrete, stripping it of its riverine ecosystems. But that
does not preclude respectful use of the river, swimming or sailing quitely in its waters, and so
on. Value thus guides action, practice, and use; it is the ground also upon which principles are
formulated, principles that are assessed and validated by way of enhancement methods.
Important among these are non-interference principles, which exclude unwarranted interference
with other preference-havers and unwarranted damage, ill-treatment, or devaluation of items of
value. Such deontic principles circumscribe environmentally-limited freedom of action. Given
non-interference principles, a major shift in onus of proof from homocentricthics takes place.
What is required now is that reasons be givenfor interfering with the environment, rather than
reasons for not doing so.
Also direct responsibility for environmental interference or
modification falls upon those who would interfere or significantly modify, who would tread
heavily on the land. Non-interference does not preclude use, only too much use and use of too
much. What it does lead to is the theme that, where use occurs, it should be careful and
respectful use.
An important respect thesis regarding environmental items is founded on such
interference principles and the no-reduction theme: namely
•
•
8
not to put others (other preference havers) into a dispreferred state for no good reason;
not to jeopardis e the well being of natural objects or systems without good reason;
•
not to damage or destroy items which, while they cannot literally be put into a
dispreferred state, can be damaged or destroyed or have their value eroded or impaired.
These apply to ecosystem s, their surrounds, their parts, and so on. The mere making of
further excess profits, or similar economic excuses, are not good reasons. Such a respect
thesis form part of the ecological outlook of deep-green theory.
As permissib ility, obligatio n and respect principles can be explained through the
valuations reached on the theory, so too can rights and other significant components of morality
be explained and justified through, but again not reduced to, values. For example, a creature
has a right to something if it has a valid title thereto established from correct moral principles.
Candidates for the parameter "something" provide a familiar list: freedom from unnecessary
suffering, respectful treatment, satisfaction of basic needs, and so on. Such rights accordingly
derive from and reinforce corresponding deontic principles.
Deep-gre en ethical theory is much more than just another non-redu ctionist ethical
theory, which highlights ecological values and virtues, and so forth. It changes the character
and shape of ethical enterprise. Perhaps most strikingly, it removes humans as such from the
centre of the ethical stage (or exclusive occupation of the stage). The biological concept of
being human is not, contrary to prevailing humanism, a highly significant ethical category. To
elevate it to such is to fall into human chauvinis m, a type of class chauvini sm which
unwarrantedly discriminates in favour of the human species. The prevailing chauvinis m is
avoided through a natural annular model, which connects ethical characteristics directly with the
categorie s of items that can have them. Relevant categories include those marked out by
features like: having well-being, preference-having, rights-holding, contractual-capability, and
so on, categories not necessarily connected with any particular species. Hitherto virtually all
Western ethical theories have not merely so limited ethical matters predominately to inter-human
affairs, but have been blantantly chauvinistic, exhibiting a substantial, discrimin ately and
unjustifiably bias in favour of humans (of certain privileged humans). These sorts of systems
should be superseded; it is not a matter of simple adjustments or extensions.
Deep-gre en value theory, as developed, implies the inadequacy of prevailing social,
political and economic arrangements and institutions, both those of a mixed capitalistic kind and
those of a more state socialistic cast. They are the (devious) product of inferior value
frameworks which take quite insufficient account of environmental considerations and values.
But explainin g their deficiencies, and indicating more satisfactory green alternatives and
replacements, is another chapter in the elaboration of deep-green theory.
9
*
Richard Sylvan*
RMB 683
B ungendore NSW 2621
For more on deep-green theory and deep ecology, see for instance essays in and work referred to in the
Green Series, i.e. Discussion Papers in Environme ntal Philosophy, RSSS, Australian National
University, Canberra.
Annex
1. Most people inherit their value framework along with their culture. Many never do any
substantial overhaul. Many indeed are not active or responsible valuers. But in these respects,
values are not so different from other things. Some people are poor judges of shape; many
never learn to distinguish plants, or to discriminate among wines.
Likewise for other choices, options, major changes, metaphysical and even political.
Mostly that a choice has been made or inherited and is incorporated in the subculture is not
noticed, along with its not been observed how arbitrary many of the choices and resulting
structures are (in Foucault has emphasized). Of course it is often not in the interests of the
power elite, who control media outlets, etc., that this sort of arbitrariness should be widely
known, and alternative structures considered and perhaps experimented with.
Choices occur where distinctive circumstance prevail. For instance, there is serious
scarcity; food supplies in particular are threatened (e.g. with being out of reach is price, with
pollution, etc.). Differently, circumstances lead to conversions, as when a new ideology
sweeps through, enthusiam generated by some charismatic figures.
/
bits from chapter 2
There is another important elasticity. In contemporary ethical theory there is a concerted
attempt to build on universalizability requirement or the equivalent into the very motion of ethics.
The evident result is that selfish systems of induction and conduct, systematic egoisms for
instance are refused the title of ethics, and as an important corollary questions like Why be
ethical? become vexed. 1 Given, in particular, that any such "universality" requirement is
problematic in this formulation, and typically limited, chauvinistically to persons, a superior
course proceeds to distinguish: between ethics as already characterised (reportively) and its
subclass, universalizable ethics. As impartial ethical do have much to recommend them, let us
coin a convenient portmonteau term condensing the chancy "universalerable ethics", namely
euthics. (Conveniently then an euthical supports unethical, which is what from a properly
ethical stance it is!)
There is undoubtedly some pressure to have ethics and morality extend beyond a single or
isolated individual (even so, a Causal ethics is understood, as is egoisticmorality). But that
pressure does not extend very far; and such notions as those of a tribal morality and an
upperclass ethics are not defective on significance grounds, even if they are objectional on
substantive grounds.
Such restricted ethics are not however immediately ruled out by such requirements as that
like cases be assessed alike, and that differences of assessment be based on relevant
differences. 2 For a tribalist or racist can respond that a foreigner is not like a Greek, or that there
are relevant differences between whites and blacks (intelligence has been proposed as such a
difference, when skin pigmentation appeared a merely superficial difference). These sorts of
responses, which were longer accepted, are no longer acceptable, because the differences put up
are not considered ethically relevant differences (correctly enough, though ethical relevance itself
lacks an adequate explanation).
Singer's main argument for a much wider point of view, universality, commits in a
extensive appel to authority (p.11).
What is offered: an appeal to usage.
'the notion of ethics carries with it the idea of something bigger than the individual'. [It
often does, but it may not.] 'If I am to defend my conduct in ethical grounds, I cannot point
only to the benefits it brings me. I wont address myself to a larger audience' (p.10). That
On both, narrowing and vexing, see Singer lmpractual ethics (Singer aquates moral with
ethical). Singer does not really have an answer to Why be moral? though he thinks it not a bad idea; mainly he
tries to put down shuffles that have been presented or decisive.
2
These requirements are presented byu Attfield as basic formal requirements of reason (p.6). No
doubt they are, though they appear to figure in no logic of ethics yet formulated.
depends on the conduct concerned. More important the audience does not need to be much
larger, certainly not universal: my family or law will suffice often enough.
J.
From Chap 4
Evaluations may be arrived at, and value systems expanded, by enhancement methods,
which consists in emotional presentation (as under Meinong's phenomenological account)
organised by coherence methods. The methodology in fact resembles that sometimes proposed
for acquisition of scientific information. As with accumulated empirial information, which can
be extended through presentational input and assessment for overall coherence, so further
evaluations may be arrived at and assessed through a combination of presentational and
coherence procedures. At the (marginal) stage where the next round of evaluations is
undertaken, the following active ingredients figure, in an idealised breakdown:- Firstly, a
background stock of judgements and experience will have been accumulated or inherited; in
principle all of this is revisable, and some may be up for reassessment. Apart from the
background, which enters in assessing overall coherence of system, what is involved is,
secondly, emotional presentation, which corresponds to further perceptional and sense data
input, and, thirdly and not independent, coherence processing, which supplies the
interpretational and rationalisational components. At bottom, parallelling perception in the case
of empirical information, is emotional presentation, gut or visceral reaction in starker forms of
acceptance or rejection, but more generally comprehending a variety of sentiments, including
overall well-being, and also relational impressions, such as empathy, identification, and so on.
As a perceiver perceives shapes and taster tastes and goodness, so a valuer feels value and
disvalue. The basis of perception is sensation, the basis of valuation is emotion. Apprehension
of value is seated in emotional, and especially visceral, presentation; but what is apprehended is
not to be confused with its apprehension any more than what is perceived. All the warnings
about sensation as an information source have to be repeated with heavy emphasis as regards
emotional presentation; for example, reliability cannot be guaranteed, interference with
presentation through drugs, alcohol, temporary excitement or other inputs may render it
dubious or unacceptable, conditioning may have occurred, including substantial cultural
conditioning (so that a person is terrified by huntsmen spiders but not sickened by bloody
massacres of dolphins or seals). As with perception, there are checks on emotional
presentation, such as constancy over time and after reflection.
Emotional presentation, supplying in particular inclusions and exclusions or prohibitions,
is but the basis of reflective evaluation and value apprehension. The further critical part,
coherence processing, builds on the basis taking account of other inputs or controls including
background (which supplies relevant components of already adopted judgements, assimilated
subculture and so forth) and constraints (such as substitutional requirements like impartiality,
e.g. whether considered judgements hold for substitute valuers, and uniformity, e.g. whether
similar acts are judged in similar ways). The coherence procedure consists, in essence, of
asking whether the next or a relevant judgement fits together with what has been accepted, while
meeting constraints, without leading to what has been rejected or excluded. If it does
fit it is
added to the included side, otherwise it is sent to the excluded side. (The familiar ethical
practice
of devising cases and compari ng them with the cases in hand can be worked in under
this
procedure.) Because an aim of this rationalisation procedure is achievement of some
sort of
equilibr ium - admitting what is included, while excluding what is unsupported, fails
to gain
support, is emotionally spoken against - such coherence procedures have gained currency
in
North Americ a under the rubric "reflect ive equilibr ium". Observe , howeve r, that
any
equilibr ium gained at some stage may be quickly lost, as new types of problem s arise
and
further information enters. To be sure, the whole methodology (like the parallel methodo
logy of
a coherence theory of truth) is highly idealised, and only practicably usable in rudimentary
parts.
It does howeve r surmou nt a major obstacle for value theory; it reveals how in principl
e a
nonredu ctionist ic value theory can function . Whethe r that theory is an appropr
iate
environmental one or not will depend however above all on the presentational input, the extent
to
which environmental sensitivity enters and is not dismissed.
end
The availability of rival value systems and prospect of yet others, while it implies a certain
desirabl e (and also troublesome) pluralism, does not mean relativism. Neither deep
green
theory nor authenti c deep ecology espouse any superficially easy relativism. From
their
viewpoint, rival narrowe r and shallow er systems are definitely inferior , and marked
down
accordingly, while econom ism is an onathema which does not even make the moral grade
(e.g.
too many principles stop at state bo':lndaries). However a critical pluralism does acknow
ledge,
and offer a place, in the wider scheme of things for other positions, even if as less favoured
or
satisfactory. Politically then, deep positions can allow for, what makes good sense in
these
times of numbers, alliances. Hence the point of a green alliance, combining green position
s,
against still prevailing anti-environmentalism and economism.
The value system pluralis m of deep-green theory interpenetrates not only social and
political domains above, but also metaphysics traditionally placed below. In the underly
ing
metaphysical pluralis m of deep-green theory, value runs very deep - so deep that even
truth
depends in part upon it. For not merely selection of a correct comprehensive theory or
worldview, but choice of associated actual world, is a value dependent choice. That choice,
insofar
as it is conscio usly made, of world conceptualisation and structure, is a constrai ned
choice,
constrained by informational inputs, such as those of refined perception. But in as much
as it is
rationally accomplished, that choice, like other choices of structure, proceeds accordin
g to a
standard value-in formati on analysis (regular ly oversim plified howeve r to a preferen
ceinformation or even desire-belief modelling); that is, to get to the salient point, it involves
value
essentially.
Truth and value are then intertwined. Their relation, not one of identity (for contrary to
idealism, there are many relations not identical with identity), can now be stated more accurately
than the poets have managed. Neither is one; both are plural, and differently so. In certain
significant respects the metaphysics resembles the value theory. For example, as the value
theory is nonreductionistic, so also is the metaphysics; in particular, there is a no-reduction
theme that neither parts nor wholes reduce eliminably to one another, as opposed to atomistic
and holistic views of environmental interrelations. As the value theory is pluralistic so also is
the metaphysics; what needs to be discerned, in place of absolutism, is a plurality of worlds and
of associated truth characterisations. A main aim of a thoroughgoing environmental theory is to
displace very destructive dominant ideasystems, regularly presented as absolute, which
incorporate both value and truth themes concerning the environment and its organisation.
Much of deep-green theory devolves then from the abstract value theory, beginning (to
take a more accessible route than the metaphysical way) with a more comprehensive ethical
theory, which includes as well as a specific axiological theory, elaborating environmental values
and virtues, a deontic theory, supplying· obligations, rights, taboos, and similar. For example,
given that a certain wild river is intrinsically valuable, as we can verify by on-site experience and
enhancement methods, and given that we duly respect that value, as deontic principles will tell
us we should, then we are not free to do as we like with that river, to dam it with concrete, to
channel it within concrete, stripping it of its riverine ecosystems. But that does not preclude
respectful use of the river, swimming or sailing quitely in its waters, and so on. Value thus
guides action, practice, and use; it is the ground also upon which principles are formulated,
principles that are assessed and validated by way of enhancement methods. Important among
these are non-interference principles, which exclude unwarranted interference with other
preference-havers and unwarranted damage, ill-treatment, or devaluation of items of value.
Such deontic principles circumscribe environmentally-limited freedom of action. Given noninterference principles, a major shift in onus of proof from homocentricthics takes place. What
is required now is that reasons be given for interfering with the environment, rather than
reasons for not doing so. Also direct responsibility for environme ntal interferenc e or
modification falls upon those who would interfere or significantly modify, who would tread
heavily on the land. Non-interference does not preclude use, only too much use and use of too
much. What it does lead to is the theme that, where use occurs, it should be careful and
respectful use.
An important respect thesis regarding environme ntal items is founded on such
interference principles and the no-reduction theme: namely
•
not to put others (other preference havers) into a dis preferred state for no good reason;
•
not to jeopardise the well being of natural objects or systems without good reason;
•
not to damage or destroy items which, while they cannot literally be put into a
dispreferred state, can be damaged or destroyed or have their value eroded or impaired.
These apply to ecosystems, their surrounds, their parts, and so on. The mere making of further
excess profits, or similar economic excuses, are not good reasons. Such a respect thesis form
part of the ecological outlook of deep-green theory.
As permissibility, obligation and respect principles can be explained through the
valuations reached on the theory, so too can rights and other significant components of morality
be explained and justified through, but again not reduced to, values. For example, a creature
has a right to something if it has a valid title thereto established from correct moral principles.
Candidates for the parameter "something" provide a familiar list: freedom from unnecessary
suffering, respectful treatment, satisfaction of basic needs, and so on. Such rights accordingly
derive from and reinforce corresponding deontic principles.
Deep-green ethical theory is much more than just another non-reductionist ethical theory,
which highlights ecological values and virtues, and so forth. It changes the character and shape
of ethical enterprise. Perhaps most strikingly, it removes humans as such from the centre of the
ethical stage (or exclusive occupation of the stage). The biological concept of being human is
not, contrary to prevailing humanism, a highly significant ethical category. To elevate it to such
is to fall into human chauvinism, a type of class chauvinism which unwarrantedly discriminates
in favour of the human species. The prevailing chauvinism is avoided through a natural annular
model, which connects ethical characteristics directly with the categories of items that can have
them. Relevant categories include those marked out by features like: having well-being,
preference-having, rights-holding, contractual-capability, and so on, categories not necessarily
connected with any particular species. Hitherto virtually all Wes tern ethical theories have not
merely so limited ethical matters predominately to inter-human affairs, but have been blantantly
chauvinistic, exhibiting a substantial, discriminately and unjustifiably bias in favour of humans
(of certain privileged humans). These sorts of systems should be superseded; it is not a matter
of simple adjustments or extensions.
Deep-green value theory, as developed, implies the inadequacy of prevailing social,
political and economic arrangements and institutions, both those of a mixed capitalistic kind and
those of a more state socialistic cast. They are the (devious) product of inferior value
frameworks which take quite insufficient account of environmental considerations and values.
But explaining their deficiencies, and indicating more satisfactory green alternatives and
replacements, is another chapter in the elaboration of deep-green theory.
Deep-green theory is a deep environmental theory, with much in common with deep
ecology. Like deep ecology, it stands in significant ideological opposition to the dominant
technocratic-industrial way. But, even more than deep ecology, deep-green theory aims to
supply a comprehensive alternative environmental philosophy (in the full senses of those
atrophied terms, esp philosophy ). It seeks to accomplish this, furthermore, without
accumulating the amount of philosophical rubbish deep ecology regularly attracts. For, to insert
a key difference between these ecocentric theories in a deliberately prejudical way: deep-green
theory resembles a deep ecology with the pseudo-scientific garbage removed, reorganised into a
tight, coherent and more comprehensive theory. Deep-green theory, which has roots that stretch
back about as far as its much publicized neighbour, accordingly merits elaboration separate from
deep ecology, which in any case lacks a well-thought-through valuational and ethical basis.
This essay aims to uncover the value theory of deep-green theory, exposing thereby one central
area of deep-green theory. Though the value theory is (inevitably) abstract, it issues in what is
more concrete, such as practical ecological directives, potentially destabilizing prevailing policies
and institutions.
ETHICS AND METAPHYSICS:
their relevance to one another
There is rich range of incompatible claims about the mutual interelations of the two
ancient subjects. Most of these claims appear mistaken. Sorting out something of what looks
right is a daunting task, a small beginning on which is attempted here.
Initial severe difficulties derive from the vagueness, in determinacy and problematicality
of the relata, both of which are ill-understood by philosophers metaphysics especially. Many
there are who think that metaphyscis coincides with ontology, the study (description,
explanation and understanding) of what exists. 1 The general study of what there is, sistology,
which includes ontology as a very proper part, is only one facet of metaphysics (unless it is
presumed that items somehow supply also all propositions concerning them). For sistology is
the totality of things side of metaphysics, there is also the totality of true propositions side
(propositionology, for a nice term). Metaphysics also comprises the study of the very general
attributes of this and other universe and of what accounts for these attributes (or propositional
functions). In technical terms, then, a metaphysics amount to a very general and
comprehensi ve constrained model; and metaphysics to the plural assembly of these
metaphysics. 2 Each metaphysics will be constrained (as will become clear through examples
given below) through modelling conditions or postulates (which delimit how "altimate reality"
is according to that system).
Metaphysics is sometimes construed more comprehencisvely to include some or all of
epistemology (knowledge of "ultimate reality" for instance), some of or all of other branches of
philosophy, perhaps all of philosophy. Plainly, if metaphysics, so expansively construed,
includes ethics, then their relation is straightforward, metaphysics includes ethics. But we shall
not adopt such construals.
Whereas metaphysics concerns features of universes, ethics is a study of moral values and
principles, and of rules and practices of conduct. A case can be made out that an ethic is
outlined through its distributions of values, in terms of which both deontic features (rights,
obligations, etc) and axiological features (goodness, etc) can be discerned. (Utilitarian can
afford a crude exemplar). So, without loss of generality, I can concentrate on the relation of
value theory to metaphysics.
Now a value theory does not derive from a purely naturalistic metaphysic, by virtue of a
rectified naturalistic fallacy. But, firstly even is a value theory may be influenced or even
construed by such a metaphysics. For example if the theory rules out all but primary qualities
2
What there is according to most Western philosophers, still labouring under the probleminducing Ontological Assumption. For such a confusion of ontology with metaphysics see
Forrest p.3.
For the bsis of this large (and estrageous) technical leap, see DP.
2
as some sort of constructs, the value qualities will have to be explained as constructs,
projections or similar. Secondly, a metaphysics is unlikely to be purely naturalistic.
Metaphysics is not a value-free enterprise; a metaphysics typically presumes a range of
presumptions, including archivative ones (deeper examples include assumptions of primary,
e.g. of certain sorts of objects, of importance, e.g. of what exists, of implicit world selection,
e.g. the world is Newtonian, Copenhagen quantum, or obitives).
An ethics does not determine a meta-ethics or therefore a metaphysics. Nor does the
converse hold. A metaphysics does not in general determine an ethics, but is compatible with
many.
Against the stock determination and priority claims, I want to oppose interaction and no
priority themes. Determination claims are commonplace in philosophers who wish to wield the
big stock of dominant science to settle ethics (or mataethics). For instance Collicott asserts that
"intrinsic value in nature ... remains ... painfully inconsistent with the ... modern scientific
world-view' (Celbration of Robton p.14, similarly p.22, whence
CD 1. Modern scientific metaphysics entails there are no intrinsic values in nature.
This is not a lapse (though soon Collicott will weaken his determination claims) because almost
immediately Collicott goes on to assert
CD2. 'A value neutral nature is ... an immediate inference from the institutionalised
metaphysical foundations of modern science' (p.15).
Given some large assumptions, most conspiciously that the metaphysics involved is that of
British empiricism, the claim CD2 become incontestable. For under that empiricism, as
elaborated by Locke and Hurve, non primary qualities like value and colour are not part of or in
nature, but substantially subjective in character. However insitutionalized those foundations an important issue -
it has since become apparent that there are at least several parts of
operative sciences, such a classical and quantum; namely a core calculus or formalism;
operational rules for connecting the formalism with testable data and making in ..... applications;
and layers of interpretation. It is in these separable, and variable, larger of interpretation that
metaphysical and elaborative princi;es begin to enter conspicuously.
The "institutionalized" interpretation is but one among the interpretations that can be
fitted to classical formalism. It is an interpretation incorperating some major and controverisial
philosophical theories, such as the reference theory and verificationism. Rival interpretations
are feasible and were developed, for instance by the Scottish comon-sense school. Such rival
foundations do not yield a value-free value neutral nature. Collicott calls upon Rolston 'to
provide a persuasive alternative to the integral set of Carterian-Gohblein-Humean assumptions
that render the subjective provenance of value so fundamental to the modern scientific outlook'
(p.16). But Rolston hardly needs to do any such thing 3 : it has already been done, in various
3
Rolston makes giving an appropriate interpretation for more difficult than he need by conceeding
"seconddoary" qualities to the reductionistic opposition.
Thus, regressively: 'the greenness of the tree is in my hand, but it looks as though the tree is
3
ways, and, in any case, as Collicott soon observes, 'the modern scientific worldview is
obsolete' (p.19). The property for a full value-in-nature theory are little better under postmodern quantum theory, Collicott however insinuates, then they were before. Under a
Copenhagen interpretations, which he adopts, prospects look worse.
Abruptly too Collicott switches from a determination thesis, such as CD, to a slacker and
more plausible if vaguer linkage. The linkage appears in different nonequivalent forms:
CL 1. A science, such as 'the new physics might play an architectonic role in our eventual
thinking about nature (and human society)' (p.23 itals added).
Subsequently, 'architectonic role' is replaced through the as vague 'inspired by' and more
specific 'mapped out'.
CL2. 'A value thoery [may be] inspired by, and mapped on, ... quantum physics (p.25, where
reduction and derviation are now explicitly repudiated!).
Such a value theory is, it is claimed, 'particularly congenial to an ecologically informed
environmental ethics' (p.25). Whether it is, or not, depends on other-things, such as the sort of
interpretation of quantum theory, the congeniality of that with ecology. No doubt values in
nature without values is excluded under the Copenhagen interpretation, so is much else that
makes good sense. Fortunately there are congenial alternatives.
REFERENCES
P.R.H. Forrest, Speculation and Experience the New Metaphysics, Inaugural Public Lecture,
University of New England, N.S.W., 1987.
J.B. Callicott, 'Ralston's Environmental Ethics: A critical celbration', critical response at APA,
Oakland, March 1989.
R. Sylvan, Deep Plurallism, Australian National University, Research School of Social Science,
1993.
green. OUt there are only ....... waves... . The greenness is projected, more factural in my head
and apparently hung on the tree'. What a ridiculous idea.
'
,,.
ON THE VALUE CORE OF DEEP-GREEN THEORY
This essay aims to uncover the value theory of deep-green theory, exposing thereby a
central area of that theory. Though the value theory is (inevitably) abstract, it issues in what is
more concrete, such as an applicable system and practical ecological directives, potentially
destabilizing for prevailing policies and institutions.
Deep-green theory which stands in significant ideological opposition to dominant
industrial ways, is intended to supply a comprehensive alternative environmental philosophy.
At the core of deep-green theory lies a value theory. A fundamental theme thereof, part of what
makes the structure deep, is that a range of environmental items are valuable in themselves,
directly and irreducibly so, so that their value does not somehow reduce to or emerge from
something else, such as features of certain valuers or what matters for them. Thus value does
not answer back in some way to humans, or sentient creatures (or other value-responsive
classes), their interests, uses, preferences, or such like. Many natural items, such as forests
and rivers, mountains and seashores, are intrinsically valuable. They are valuable in their own
right - irrespective of whether they are interesting or useful (to any intentional operators,
themselves interesting or useful or not), indeed whether or not there exist any valuers. Value
spreads through and reaches across the natural domain; it is not bounded by mind, or linkages
with subjective states; nor does it stop with sentience, or associated pyschological features like
satisfaction; nor does it end at life; it observes no such compromising bounds. Although value
is distributed richly if irregularly throughout nature, it is not then encapsulated in some isolable
natural feature, such as life or sentience, or even in defeasible ecological values such as
richness, diversity and variety (and so open to a different, naturalistic, reduction). But of
course such ecologically important features afford criteria for value, and should be represented
in recipes (such as "objective functions") for assessing overall value.
From the presence of natural things of value, and accordingly of natural values, it is a
short, though controversial, step to the important conclusion that there can be values without
valuers. For valuers are sentient creatures with appropriate capacities, but things of value may
precede and succeed all such valuers; that is, these things can persist, their values intact,
without any valuers. As there can be shapes without any shape.:.perceivers, so there can be
values without valuers. (The theme, like others advanced, can be backed up by more detailed
argument and by formal proof, neither attempted here.) In valuational relations then, which
relate valuers as subjects with values as objects, both ends of relations have independent
standing; though interrelated, as the descriptions are deliberately chosen to suggest, either can
stand without the other. It is a fashionable mistake to try to collapse this relation - usually to
endeavour to soak up values into a modification of valuing subjects (e.g. as a predicate
'relation-to-values', in which inconvenierZt values are locked away). The mistaken procedure
is in fact just one important example of an archetypal modern reduction of relations to
functions; other examples, locking undesired objects away within functions, are those
rendering wholes (such as ecosystems and organised structures) functions of their parts, and,
under functionalism, minds and types of intentionality, including value-direction, as functions
of bodies or their parts such as brains. Values are not, and do not disappear into, functions of
valuers.
A connected corollary is that values are not apart from the actual world, something
"projected" or imposed on it by a favoured class of valuers, something colouring (and even
emotionally clouding) the otherwise valueless physical world, in rather the way that
reductionistic materialism tries (erroneously) to construe colour itself as projected onto a
colourless physical world. Of course this projection effort, never adequately explicated, does
not succeed, on its own, in removing values. For they remain, left as some function of the
valuers. To try to bulldoze through this difficulty, a second reduction is invoked, of evaluative
features of valuers to "natural" features, commonly preferences, consumer desires or such like.
The second reduction runs into obstacles that halt even the naturalistic bulldozers (e.g.
naturalistic and related fallacies), but the first reduction is the critical one in removing key
environmental values, such as those of wilderness and wild things, which become valuable
only in the focus of certain sentient beholders, and not in and for themselves. This reduction
too is blocked by insuperable difficulties. On the one side, like the parallel proposed
phenomenalist reduction of material objects to sensations, the reduction never achieves
satisfactory support or even a satisfactory statement. On the other, it is counterexampled by
various modellings or thought-experiments revealing intuitively-assessed value in situations
devoid of valuers (as e.g. in the well-known Last Person argument). Values remain then part
of the still rich actual world; they are objects in the domain of actual and other worlds. But
they are not of course material objects; creatures will not fall over them any more than they will
trip over shadows or mere shapes.
Value, like shape, is an attribute, which things have or may lack, and which furthermore
creatures can recognise or may fail to discern. Thus value is, like shape and colour and their
determinate forms (round, red, etc), a universal , distributed across things, individuals and
wholes. The comparison of value with shape is decidedly more helpful than the regular, but
exhausted, comparison of value with colour, or of goodness with colour determinates such as
yellow. For example, shape is not bound by a set of determinates as colour is in the specific
colours, but comes in a spectacular variety of forms, not totally or linearly ordered (as in a
rainbow), or contracted to some primary set (as in colour triangles); shape which pertains to
wholes as well as particulars, links with gestalts better than colour; shape discrimination is
more culture dependent and sensitive; yet shape is, or was, a primary property, and thereby
more immune to reductionist strategies thJn secondary properties such as colour. Again shapes
like values, can be vague, indeterminate; that does not prevent things, perhaps unique things,
exemplifying them. But naturally the analogy can only be extended so far. Shapes can be
approximated by polygons, values cannot; shapes are regularly perceived through sense
perception, by vision or touch especially, values are not, but are differently apprised. Value is
its own thing, not something else; it is what it is and does what is does; it is not something
else, like some quantitative mathematical or economic function. Nor does it contract into some
mark of value, or to what it comes down to in highly restricted settings; most important, it does
not disappear in the style of modern economics into (expected) utility, or into just two
economic forms, value-in-use monetarily and value-in-exchange (price), neither of which may
reflect worth. Value means what it means, and has meant: worth ; and it ties with general
assessments of merit and demerit, goodness or badness, not an economic or other truncation
thereof.
The powerful drive to reduce or deny values has several sources. Part of the motivation
for reduction of value springs from epistemological worries, concerning how values can be
ascertained and known, so far as they are (subjective translation proposals are then a direct
evaluative counterpart of phenomenalism). Part derives from supposedly problematic cultural
relativity (whence the attempt to impose values by identification of value with some favoured
assessible feature, and with it cultural or economic imperialism). Part of the motivation comes
from more sweeping ideological commitments, such as varieties of materialism or scientism,
which leave no space for immaterial values.
As already apparent, attempted reductions of value come in a dazzling variety of forms • subjective, which make use of psychological features, such as desires, interests, emotions,
and the like; or more objective aggregations of these, such as community preferences or utility;
or objectively naturalistic, which enrol single track value-making characteristics such as
richness or evolutionary development as value;
• consequential, which consider only outcomes; or purely motivational, which consider only
attitudes and ignore leads and outcomes;
• straightforward, as in translation proposals for translating value judgements into reducing
statements; or oblique, as in supervenience propositions (no variations in value without
underwriting variations in reducing features); or obscure, as in unarticulated projection claims.
Values are not well accommodated within these reductionistic schemes, or accommodated at all.
Deep-green value theory, which is thoroughly nonreductive, repudiates all these reductionistic
options. They are not so difficult to avoid, as the options are neither exhaustive nor exclusive.
In particular, value reduces neither in subjective nor objective fashion; it does not reduce.
Evaluative judgements are nonjective, that is, neither subjective nor objective (in any absolutist
4
fashion). Obversely, evaluation of an act does not reduce to assessing consequences; nor does
it come down to an assessment of motives; both may matter.
The virulent idea is abroad however that science can offer a reduction, can sweep up
value along with all other information, where philosophy has conspicuously failed.
Unfortunately for such optimistic ideas, fortunately perhaps for deeper thought, current basic
science does not have much to say at all, or of merit, about values, and if it did reductions
through it would be circular. But, to the contrary, there is a long-standing pretence that science
gets along "well" without values, in appropriate value-free fashion. Nowadays it is
increasingly realised that the positivistic assumption of such value-freedom is a myth, that
much of what passes as science is heavily value-penetrated. While the residual ideal of pure
engagement in pure science may offer the illusion of an escape from value, there is no escape.
For, in any case, reductions do not succeed, as a copious literature, littered with failed
attempts, meanderingly establishes. Nor are they generally desirable, since mostly shallow,
aiming at a reduction to features of some privileged class presented as ideal (i.e. core value is
covertly assumed, so there is no real reduction). Nor are they needed; explanation and
assessment do not require reduction. Evaluations may be arrived at, and value frameworks
expanded, by enhancement methods, which organise and expand emotional presentation by
coherence methods.
The enhancement methodology in fact resembles that sometimes proposed for further
acquisition of scientific information. As accumulated empirical information can be further
extended through presentational input and assessment for overall coherence, so further
evaluations may be arrived at and assessed through a combination of presentational and
coherence procedures. At the (marginal) stage where the next round of evaluations is
undertaken, the following active ingredients figure, in an idealised breakdown:- Firstly, a
background stock of judgements and value experience will have been accumulated or inherited;
in principle all of this is revisable, and some may be up for reassessment. Apart from the
background, which enters in assessing overall coherence of system, what is involved is,
secondly, emotional presentation, which corresponds to further perceptional and sense data
input, and, thirdly and not independent, coherence processing, which supplies the
interpretational and rationalisational components. At bottom, parallelling perception in the case
of empirical information, is emotional presentation, gut or visceral reaction in starker forms of
acceptance or rejection, but more generally comprehending a variety of sentiments, including
overall well-being, and also relational impressions, such as empathy, identification, and so on.
As a perceiver perceives shapes, so a valuer feels raw value and disvalue. The basis of
perception is sensation, the basis of valuation is emotion. Apprehension of value is seated in
emotional, and especially visceral, presentation; but what is apprehended is not to be confused
with its apprehension any more than what is perceived. All the warnings about sensation as an
information source have to be repeat~d, with heavy emphasis, as regards emotional
presentation; for example, reliability cannot be guaranteed, interference with presentation
through drugs, alcohol, temporary excitement or other inputs may render it dubious or
unacceptable, conditioning may have occurred, including substantial cultural conditioning (so
that a person is terrified by harmless spiders but not sickened by bloody massacres of dolphins
or seals). As with perception, there are checks on emotional presentation, such as constancy
over time and after reflection.
Emotional presentation, supplying primarily inclusions and exclusions or prohibitions, is
but the basis of reflective evaluation and value apprehension. The further critical part,
coherence processing, builds on the basis taking account of other inputs or controls including
background (which supplies relevant components of already adopted judgements, assimilated
subculture and so forth) and constraints (such as moral substitutional requirements like
impartiality, e.g. whether considered judgements hold for substitute valuers, and uniformity,
e.g. whether similar acts are judged in similar ways). Essentially, the coherence procedure
consists in asking whether the next or a relevant judgement fits together with what has been
accepted, while meeting constraints, without leading to what has been rejected or excluded. If
it does fit it is added to the included side, otherwise it is sent to the excluded side. Because an
aim of this rationalisation procedure is achievement of some sort of equilibrium such coherence
procedures have gained currency under the rubric "reflective equilibrium". Observe, however,
that equilibrium reached at some stage may be lost as new types of problems arise and further
information enters. No doubt the whole methodology (like the parallel methodology of an
empirically-based coherence theory of truth) is highly idealised, and only practicably applicable
in rudimentary parts. It does however surmount a major theoretical obstacle for environmental
value theory; it reveals how in principle a nonreductionistic value theory can function, and
deliver a tenable value system. Whether what results is however an appropriate deep
environmental system will depend above all on the presentational input, the extent to which
environmental sensitivity enters and is not suppressed.
Enhancement methods reveal too that value systems are not uniquely determined, any
more than other comprehensive theoretical frameworks. There evidently are rival value
systems measuring up to rigorous rationality requirements, much as there are rival logics and
rival physical and biological systems. In particular chauvinistic systems, narrow or shallow
value systems, which are unresponsive to and take no account of environmental items and
values, cannot be excluded on rational or straight logical grounds. Unfortunately such systems
remain in ascendancy, and tend to dominate social and political practice; in recent times
economism, a narrow type of utilitarianism, has all too obviously dominated much terrestial
practice. While such value frameworks are open to severe criticism, for instance as
chauvinistic, as violating universality requirements of morality in the case of economism, they
do not succumb to definitive refutatiog (for the reason that requirements of morality,
universalizability of principle, impartiality and so on, can simply be repudiated; immoral or
amoral frameworks are still value systems). Even so, much can be done to shift or alter
values, though as usual effectiveness cannot be guaranteed. A range of argumentative,
educational and persuasive techniques, of varying quality, can be put to work to move valuers
indoctrinated in old damaging structures, often enough successfully. Important among these
are positive presentations of environments, their habitats and creatures, by way of new
information and experience.
The availability of rival value systems, while it implies a certain desirable (and also
troublesome) pluralism, does not mean relativism. From a deep-green viewpoint, rival
narrower and shallower systems are definitely inferior, and criticised accordingly, while
economism is an anathema which does not even make the moral grade (e.g. too many
principles stop at class or state boundaries). However a critical pluralism does acknowledge
and offer a place in the wider scheme of things for other systems, even if as less favoured or
satisfactory. One political upshot is evident; deep-green theory promotes, what matters in these
irrational times of numbers, alliances - in particular, a green alliance, organising green
positions, against prevailing forces of environmental degradation.
The systematic pluralism of deep-green value theory interpenetrates not only social and
political domains above, but also metaphysics traditionally placed below. In the underlying
metaphysical pluralism of deep-green theory, value runs very deep - so deep that even truth
depends in part upon it. For not merely selection of a correct comprehensive theory or worldview is a value dependent choice, but choice of associated actual world is also. That choice,
insofar as it is consciously made, of world structure and conceptualisation, is a constrained
choice, constrained by informational inputs, such as those of refined perception. But inasmuch
as it is rationally accomplished, that choice, like other choices of structure, proceeds according
to a standard value-information analysis (regularly oversimplified however to a preferenceinformation or even desire-belief modelling); that is, to extract the salient point, it involves
value essentially.
Truth and value are then intertwined; truth, though naturally different from value, is value
dependent. Both are plural, and differently so. So, unremarkably deep-green metaphysics
resembles the value theory in significant respects. For example, as the value theory is
nonreductionistic, so also is the metaphysics; in particular, there is a no-reduction theme that
neither parts nor wholes reduce eliminably to one another, as opposed to atomistic and holistic
views of environmental interrelations. As the value theory is pluralistic, so also is the
metaphysics; in place of established absolutism, a plurality of worlds, with associated truth
definitions is discerned. Indeed a main aim of deep-green theory is to dislodge dominant
destructive ideologies, which (each of th]m) assume an absolute truth, from their positions thereby providing intellectual living-space for natural environments.
Much of deep-green theory devolves then from the abstract value theory. As with the
metaphysical way sketched, so it is with the fuller ethical theory, which includes as well as a
specific axiological system, elaborating deep environmental values and virtues, a deontic
framework, supplying obligations, rights, taboos, and similar. For example, given that a
certain wild river is intrinsically valuable, as we can verify by on-site experience and
enhancement methods, and given that we duly respect that value, as deontic principles will tell
us we should, then we are not free to do as we like with that river, to dam it with concrete, to
channel it within concrete, stripping it of its riverine ecosystems. But that does not preclude
respectful use of the river, swimming or sailing quietly in its waters, and the like. Value thus
guides action, practice, and use; it is the ground also upon which principles are formulated,
principles that are assessed and validated by way of enhancement methods. Important among
these are non-interference principles, which exclude unwarranted interference with other
preference-havers and unwarranted damage, ill-treatment, or devaluation of items of value.
Such deontic principles circumscribe environmentally-limited freedom of action. Given noninterference principles, a major shift in onus of proof from homocentricethics takes place.
What is required now is that reasons be givenfor interfering with the environment, rather than
reasons for not doing so. Also direct responsibility for environmental interference or
modification falls upon those who would seriously interfere or significantly modify, who
would tread heavily on the land. Non-interference does not preclude use - only too much use
and use of too much. What it does lead to is the theme that, where use occurs, it should be
careful and respectful use.
An important respect thesis regarding environmental items is founded on such non-interference
principles and the no-reduction theme: namely,
• not to put others (other preference havers) into a dispreferred state for no good reason;
• not to jeopardise the well-being of natural objects or systems without good reason;
• not to damage or destroy items which, while they cannot literally be put into a dispreferred
state, can be damaged or destroyed or have their value eroded or impaired.
These apply to ecosystems, their surrounds, their parts, and so on. The mere making of
further excess profits, or similar economic excuses, are not good reasons. Such a respect
thesis forms part of the ecological outlook of deep-green theory.
Deep-green ethical theory amounts to much more than just another non-reductionist
ethical theory, which highlights ecological values and virtues, and so forth. It changes the
character and shape of ethical enterprise. Perhaps most strikingly, it removes humans as such
from the centre of the ethical stage (or :xclusive occupation of the stage). The biological
concept of being human ceases to be a significant ethical category. To elevate it to such is to
fall into human chauvinism, a type of class chauvinism which unwarrantedly discriminates in
favour of the human species. The prevailing chauvinism is not inevitable; it is very logically
avoided by directly connecting ethical characteristics with the categories of items that can have
them. Relevant categories include those marked out by features like: having well-being,
preference-having, rights-holding, contractual-capability, and so on, categories not necessarily
connected with any particular species. Hitherto virtually all Western ethical theories, and the
institutional arrangements they help support, have not merely limited ethical matters to interhuman affairs, but have been blatantly chauvinistic, exhibiting substantial and unjustifiable
discrimination in favour of humans (or certain privileged humans).
Deep-green theory thus implies the inadequacy of prevailing social, political and
economic arrangements and institutions. These structures are the defective products of inferior
value frameworks which take quite insufficient account of environmental desiderata and values.
Richard Sylvan*
RMB 683
Bungendore NSW 2621
*
Thanks to David Bennett for comments on an earlier draft. For more on deep-green theory, see
essays in and work referred to in the Green Series, i.e. Discussion Papers in Environmental
Philosophy, RSSS, Australian National University, Canberra.
This compressed essay was solicited by and written for Island Magazine (Tasmania). Upon receiving
it however, the editors decided that it was too dense, and insufficiently journalistic and popular (not
features they had at any time requested), for their magazine.
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Box 16, Item 1223: Drafts of Deep-green ethics chapters, and short version of On the value core of deep-green theory
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Typescript draft of chapters from Deep-green ethics and two copies of short version of On the value core of deep-green theory
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<a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&range=&collection=&type=&user=&tags=&public=&featured=&exhibit=&geolocation-mapped=&geolocation-address=&geolocation-latitude=&geolocation-longitude=&geolocation-radius=10&submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a>
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<span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&pageSize=20&sortBy=score&sortDirection=Desc&searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span>, Box 16, Item 1223
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<a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a>
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<span>This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, </span><a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a><span>.</span>
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[88] leaves. 90.34 MB.
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<a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:14a9695">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:14a9695</a>
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Australian National University Office - Typing Table at End of Desk
Australian National University Office
Australian National University Office > Typing Table at End of Desk
Box 16: Green Projects in Progress