1
20
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https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/bc6906f973b58155fcdff1d8fbf5c13e.pdf
cdee1d9f8cd9703c694e69ab3507018e
PDF Text
Text
IS
The
UNIVERSE
THE
argument
design
HRTERHUTP
existence of a designer, a planner, a God,
the
for
RN
(LIKE)
regularly deploys the model of the universe as an artefact, A noteworthy part of
plants
from
universe,
the
planets on through naturally evolved systems,
If the whole arrangement Is an artefact,
contrasts with artefacts.
'artefact'
has
been
and
Its
contexts,
etc.,
and
to lose both Its normal contrasts, place,
much stretched,
e.g.
of
then, firstly
tools applied by external living
external
creatures, and secondly, the relevant features are extremely well hidden.
In the
face of elaboration of these points the artefact claim Is eroded or weakened to-,
the
universe
like an artefact.
Is
like In having a maker.
Is usually meant,
'like'
some
are
There
It s as If It were an artefact, etc. And by
features
curious
about Wilkinson s argument In his
universe Is artefact'. The usual moves to the artefact model
the
Intelligibility
universe
the
of
e.g.
(thus
premissed
are
Heynell).
But
concentrates on the limits to human knowledge and the apparent extent
the
universe
product
on
Wilkinson
which
to
not Intelligible to us and may never be. Wilkinson however Is
Is
Idealism:
not arguing for design In the universe, but for a kind of
the
The
nature
as
of the human mind! The traditional case for design In the universe
Is strangely subverted Into an argument for Idealism.
God's. Everything Intended by
It Is
our
not
artefact,
tells against this: but redefinition Is
artefact
one order of the day In philosophical argument.
Consider first Mrs. four arguments, none decvscve, but all with
to
limits to knowledge, human limits
severe practical limits to
etc.
equipment,
ascertaining
larger
And
that
limits
1. Levels of detail. There are
Is.
very
the
also,
appeal,
such
Size
small.
as
and
spaceship
cost
earth,
of
men s
lifetimes, etc. (One experiment-careers).
2.
forces?
Variety
The
(and
number) of forces. How many
(1)
Ignorance
lead us Into
l>
super-weak ,
««
super-strong
”
Issue of completeness Is serious here (as with Kant s philosophy).
As with forces, so with objects,
NB.
It
major
laws, etc.
of an (undiscovered) moderating or compensating force could
about
error
features
world,
of
e.g.
Into
postulating
granularity of space and time.
(2)
Classlf Icatlon
of
forces
In
sort of periodic table, and then deeper
explanation.
3.
Limits to human conception? Macro-objects of our dimensions can have no
conceptions of very small (micro seconds)
Involves
a
slide
from
or
very
no real personal experience
large.
to
No??
The
argument
no Imagination of
to
no conception of . Argues for limits to conception In both tIme and space. Goes
on to suggest limits to
description
using
everyday
-1-
household
language,
but
�the
argument
Is bad:
It depends on standard (Copenhagen) quantum theory.
Ideas
that limits of' conception tied to limits of language.
4-. Human nature and Its essential prejudice-,
limits to what we are prepared
to accept or understand. Set of prejudices, etc., e.g. prejudices In
of
favour
numbers (In a fuaay world). Our constitution prevents understanding of world.
Wilkinson's further argument Is that In view of limits we humans cannot but
value
to
resort
'in reaching his judgements as to how the natural world Is
-
constructed, man cannot ultimately do more than say
this Is how It has to be
(p.96). Value ImposItIon,
has to be',
lie know that whether or
[whether
'should be',
quarks
No,
(p.98):
Is
here
like Leslie?
not
we
This Is how It
get
can
good'
feel
at
quarks
we shall continue to talk about them and discuss their
exist]
(p.97). Nature Is going to be what the mind
anatomy and domestic economy
It
me
this makes
the
same
makes
of [our] theory with the thing
confusion
theorised that pervades Idealistic approaches.
Wilkinson
also
to
wants
(as above and especially from orthodox
proceed
quantum theory) to reject any theme
of
the
closure
of
nature
to
mind.
He
contends (p.80) that objectivity - looking at nature from outside - dissolves to
be replaced by something Involving man essentially. The natural world depends on
man for Its definition: hence the universe as an artefact. But this Is In no way
established. The argument depends on the fallacy of
of
theory
nature
again,
find
nature
equating
with
the
It makes the erroneous assumption that the only
criteria for theory selection are at bottom those of value or feeling.
R question Wilkinson suggests, but sets aside (In the too-hard basket) Is:
How It Is that we manage to understand the universe, or
It s
e.g.
the
much
of
It?
mostly good luck. Historically rather different answers were favoured,
universe
Intelligible,
Is
natural,
the
world
Is
Intelligible.
It's
Since
sufficiently Intelligent creatures can come to understand It. The
Intelligibility theme Is not lacking for exponents. Here,
In
summary.
Is
Heynell argues for and applies It:
R.
If
the
It would not be that we can In
world were not Intelligible,
principle come to know. But the
world
Is
that
which
we
can
In
principle come to know.
Therefore the world Is Intelligible.
B.
If
Very
like: We don't; or, So far as we
different repsonses quickly suggest themselves,
do
so
there
were not something analogous to human Intelligence In the
constitution of the world? the world would not be Intelligible.
Therefore there Is something analogous to human Intelligence In
constitution of the world (68).
-2-
the
how
�The
preMiss
first
of
B is flat out false, but present concern is with fl. The
Minor preMiss of fl is false, by virtue of llMltatlon arguments such as those
Wilkinson
and
elsewhere
take an analytical shape is
suffIclently
(e.g.
a
of
Routley). find the Major preMiss, though it can
distortion.
For
Instance,
the
world
May
be
intelligible for us to come to understand what we do of It without
being completely intelligible.
-3-
�f~. i— i— i— r—i f— k i
r^. ez. r- ez. r*--. ez. i -i
H. fl e g n e 11,
London,
The
Intelligible
Universe
r— «~-
ez.
-
-=•
A cosMologlcal arguwent , flacwll I an,
1982.
D.H. Ullklnson,
The universe as an artefact
Models and Han, Clarendon, Oxford,
In
H.
1976, 88-98.
-4-
Harris
(ed. )
Sc tent itto
�Lj
/
1
-\
L/
A
C'T'Zf^ £
X J -/■■».*>
-K f.
/
(/
W7
e (/
7^77
sy
J
e 4^-?'')'? ]
'^7' 4~r>l*'< >
& ''
(
////
O '
a
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Draft Papers
Description
An account of the resource
Sylvan's literary executor encountered an archive in which “all his projects were current", since manuscripts were undated and unattributed.
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Text
Any textual data included in the document
IS
The
UNIVERSE
THE
argument
design
HRTERHUTP
existence of a designer, a planner, a God,
the
for
RN
(LIKE)
regularly deploys the model of the universe as an artefact, A noteworthy part of
plants
from
universe,
the
planets on through naturally evolved systems,
If the whole arrangement Is an artefact,
contrasts with artefacts.
'artefact'
has
been
and
Its
contexts,
etc.,
and
to lose both Its normal contrasts, place,
much stretched,
e.g.
of
then, firstly
tools applied by external living
external
creatures, and secondly, the relevant features are extremely well hidden.
In the
face of elaboration of these points the artefact claim Is eroded or weakened to-,
the
universe
like an artefact.
Is
like In having a maker.
Is usually meant,
'like'
some
are
There
It s as If It were an artefact, etc. And by
features
curious
about Wilkinson s argument In his
universe Is artefact'. The usual moves to the artefact model
the
Intelligibility
universe
the
of
e.g.
(thus
premissed
are
Heynell).
But
concentrates on the limits to human knowledge and the apparent extent
the
universe
product
on
Wilkinson
which
to
not Intelligible to us and may never be. Wilkinson however Is
Is
Idealism:
not arguing for design In the universe, but for a kind of
the
The
nature
as
of the human mind! The traditional case for design In the universe
Is strangely subverted Into an argument for Idealism.
God's. Everything Intended by
It Is
our
not
artefact,
tells against this: but redefinition Is
artefact
one order of the day In philosophical argument.
Consider first Mrs. four arguments, none decvscve, but all with
to
limits to knowledge, human limits
severe practical limits to
etc.
equipment,
ascertaining
larger
And
that
limits
1. Levels of detail. There are
Is.
very
the
also,
appeal,
such
Size
small.
as
and
spaceship
cost
earth,
of
men s
lifetimes, etc. (One experiment-careers).
2.
forces?
Variety
The
(and
number) of forces. How many
(1)
Ignorance
lead us Into
l>
super-weak ,
««
super-strong
”
Issue of completeness Is serious here (as with Kant s philosophy).
As with forces, so with objects,
NB.
It
major
laws, etc.
of an (undiscovered) moderating or compensating force could
about
error
features
world,
of
e.g.
Into
postulating
granularity of space and time.
(2)
Classlf Icatlon
of
forces
In
sort of periodic table, and then deeper
explanation.
3.
Limits to human conception? Macro-objects of our dimensions can have no
conceptions of very small (micro seconds)
Involves
a
slide
from
or
very
no real personal experience
large.
to
No??
The
argument
no Imagination of
to
no conception of . Argues for limits to conception In both tIme and space. Goes
on to suggest limits to
description
using
everyday
-1-
household
language,
but
the
argument
Is bad:
It depends on standard (Copenhagen) quantum theory.
Ideas
that limits of' conception tied to limits of language.
4-. Human nature and Its essential prejudice-,
limits to what we are prepared
to accept or understand. Set of prejudices, etc., e.g. prejudices In
of
favour
numbers (In a fuaay world). Our constitution prevents understanding of world.
Wilkinson's further argument Is that In view of limits we humans cannot but
value
to
resort
'in reaching his judgements as to how the natural world Is
-
constructed, man cannot ultimately do more than say
this Is how It has to be
(p.96). Value ImposItIon,
has to be',
lie know that whether or
[whether
'should be',
quarks
No,
(p.98):
Is
here
like Leslie?
not
we
This Is how It
get
can
good'
feel
at
quarks
we shall continue to talk about them and discuss their
exist]
(p.97). Nature Is going to be what the mind
anatomy and domestic economy
It
me
this makes
the
same
makes
of [our] theory with the thing
confusion
theorised that pervades Idealistic approaches.
Wilkinson
also
to
wants
(as above and especially from orthodox
proceed
quantum theory) to reject any theme
of
the
closure
of
nature
to
mind.
He
contends (p.80) that objectivity - looking at nature from outside - dissolves to
be replaced by something Involving man essentially. The natural world depends on
man for Its definition: hence the universe as an artefact. But this Is In no way
established. The argument depends on the fallacy of
of
theory
nature
again,
find
nature
equating
with
the
It makes the erroneous assumption that the only
criteria for theory selection are at bottom those of value or feeling.
R question Wilkinson suggests, but sets aside (In the too-hard basket) Is:
How It Is that we manage to understand the universe, or
It s
e.g.
the
much
of
It?
mostly good luck. Historically rather different answers were favoured,
universe
Intelligible,
Is
natural,
the
world
Is
Intelligible.
It's
Since
sufficiently Intelligent creatures can come to understand It. The
Intelligibility theme Is not lacking for exponents. Here,
In
summary.
Is
Heynell argues for and applies It:
R.
If
the
It would not be that we can In
world were not Intelligible,
principle come to know. But the
world
Is
that
which
we
can
In
principle come to know.
Therefore the world Is Intelligible.
B.
If
Very
like: We don't; or, So far as we
different repsonses quickly suggest themselves,
do
so
there
were not something analogous to human Intelligence In the
constitution of the world? the world would not be Intelligible.
Therefore there Is something analogous to human Intelligence In
constitution of the world (68).
-2-
the
how
The
preMiss
first
of
B is flat out false, but present concern is with fl. The
Minor preMiss of fl is false, by virtue of llMltatlon arguments such as those
Wilkinson
and
elsewhere
take an analytical shape is
suffIclently
(e.g.
a
of
Routley). find the Major preMiss, though it can
distortion.
For
Instance,
the
world
May
be
intelligible for us to come to understand what we do of It without
being completely intelligible.
-3-
f~. i— i— i— r—i f— k i
r^. ez. r- ez. r*--. ez. i -i
H. fl e g n e 11,
London,
The
Intelligible
Universe
r— «~-
ez.
-
-=•
A cosMologlcal arguwent , flacwll I an,
1982.
D.H. Ullklnson,
The universe as an artefact
Models and Han, Clarendon, Oxford,
In
H.
1976, 88-98.
-4-
Harris
(ed. )
Sc tent itto
Lj
/
1
-\
L/
A
C'T'Zf^ £
X J -/■■».*>
-K f.
/
(/
W7
e (/
7^77
sy
J
e 4^-?'')'? ]
'^7' 4~r>l*'< >
& ''
(
////
O '
a
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Box 7, Item 792: Is the universe (like) an artefact?
Subject
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Computer printout with handwritten amendments, and handwritten notes on scrap paper.
Description
An account of the resource
Note, one item digitised from item 792.
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<a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Routley&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&range=&collection=&type=&user=&tags=&public=&featured=&exhibit=&geolocation-mapped=&geolocation-address=&geolocation-latitude=&geolocation-longitude=&geolocation-radius=10&submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Routley</a>
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<span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&pageSize=20&sortBy=score&sortDirection=Desc&searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span>, Box 7, Item 792
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<a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a>
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This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>.
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For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library.
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Manuscript
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<a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:acc747a">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:acc747a</a>
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