"Item Id","Item URI","Dublin Core:Title","Dublin Core:Subject","Dublin Core:Description","Dublin Core:Creator","Dublin Core:Source","Dublin Core:Publisher","Dublin Core:Date","Dublin Core:Contributor","Dublin Core:Rights","Dublin Core:Relation","Dublin Core:Format","Dublin Core:Language","Dublin Core:Type","Dublin Core:Identifier","Dublin Core:Coverage","Item Type Metadata:Text","Item Type Metadata:Interviewer","Item Type Metadata:Interviewee","Item Type Metadata:Location","Item Type Metadata:Transcription","Item Type Metadata:Local URL","Item Type Metadata:Original Format","Item Type Metadata:Physical Dimensions","Item Type Metadata:Duration","Item Type Metadata:Compression","Item Type Metadata:Producer","Item Type Metadata:Director","Item Type Metadata:Bit Rate/Frequency","Item Type Metadata:Time Summary","Item Type Metadata:Email Body","Item Type Metadata:Subject Line","Item Type Metadata:From","Item Type Metadata:To","Item Type Metadata:CC","Item Type Metadata:BCC","Item Type Metadata:Number of Attachments","Item Type Metadata:Standards","Item Type Metadata:Objectives","Item Type Metadata:Materials","Item Type Metadata:Lesson Plan Text","Item Type Metadata:URL","Item Type Metadata:Event Type","Item Type Metadata:Participants","Item Type Metadata:Birth Date","Item Type Metadata:Birthplace","Item Type Metadata:Death Date","Item Type Metadata:Occupation","Item Type Metadata:Biographical Text","Item Type Metadata:Bibliography","Item Type Metadata:Player","Item Type Metadata:Episode","Item Type Metadata:Season","Item Type Metadata:Episode Type","Item Type Metadata:Explicit","Item Type Metadata:Block",Zotero:Artist,"Zotero:Attorney Agent",Zotero:Author,"Zotero:Book Author",Zotero:Cartographer,"Zotero:Cast Member",Zotero:Commenter,Zotero:Composer,Zotero:Contributor,Zotero:Cosponsor,Zotero:Counsel,Zotero:Director,Zotero:Editor,Zotero:Guest,Zotero:Interviewee,Zotero:Interviewer,Zotero:Inventor,Zotero:Performer,Zotero:Podcaster,Zotero:Presenter,Zotero:Producer,Zotero:Programmer,Zotero:Recipient,"Zotero:Reviewed Author",Zotero:Scriptwriter,"Zotero:Series Editor",Zotero:Sponsor,Zotero:Translator,"Zotero:Words By","Zotero:Item Type",Zotero:Note,Zotero:DOI,Zotero:ISBN,Zotero:ISSN,"Zotero:Abstract Note","Zotero:Access Date","Zotero:Application Number",Zotero:Archive,"Zotero:Archive Location","Zotero:Artwork Medium","Zotero:Artwork Size",Zotero:Assignee,"Zotero:Audio File Type","Zotero:Audio Recording Format","Zotero:Bill Number","Zotero:Blog Title","Zotero:Book Title","Zotero:Call Number","Zotero:Case Name",Zotero:Code,"Zotero:Code Number","Zotero:Code Pages","Zotero:Code Volume",Zotero:Committee,Zotero:Company,"Zotero:Conference Name",Zotero:Country,Zotero:Court,Zotero:Date,"Zotero:Date Decided","Zotero:Date Enacted","Zotero:Dictionary Title",Zotero:Distributor,"Zotero:Docket Number","Zotero:Document Number",Zotero:Edition,"Zotero:Encyclopedia Title","Zotero:Episode Number",Zotero:Extra,"Zotero:Filing Date","Zotero:First Page","Zotero:Forum Title",Zotero:Genre,Zotero:History,Zotero:Institution,"Zotero:Interview Medium",Zotero:Issue,"Zotero:Issue Date","Zotero:Issuing Authority","Zotero:Journal Abbreviation",Zotero:Label,Zotero:Language,"Zotero:Legal Status","Zotero:Legislative Body","Zotero:Letter Type","Zotero:Library Catalog","Zotero:Manuscript Type","Zotero:Map Type",Zotero:Medium,"Zotero:Meeting Name","Zotero:Name of Act",Zotero:Network,"Zotero:Num Pages",Zotero:Number,"Zotero:Number of Volumes",Zotero:Pages,"Zotero:Patent Number",Zotero:Place,"Zotero:Post Type","Zotero:Presentation Type","Zotero:Priority Numbers","Zotero:Proceedings Title","Zotero:Program Title","Zotero:Programming Language","Zotero:Public Law Number","Zotero:Publication Title",Zotero:Publisher,Zotero:References,"Zotero:Report Number","Zotero:Report Type",Zotero:Reporter,"Zotero:Reporter Volume",Zotero:Rights,"Zotero:Running Time",Zotero:Scale,Zotero:Section,Zotero:Series,"Zotero:Series Number","Zotero:Series Text","Zotero:Series Title",Zotero:Session,"Zotero:Short Title",Zotero:Studio,Zotero:Subject,Zotero:System,"Zotero:Thesis Type",Zotero:Title,Zotero:University,Zotero:URL,Zotero:Version,"Zotero:Video Recording Format",Zotero:Volume,"Zotero:Website Title","Zotero:Website Type","Zotero:Attachment Title","Zotero:Attachment URL","PDF Text:Text",tags,file,itemType,collection,public,featured
179,https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/show/179,"Box 21, Item 705: Booklets notes","Handwritten notes on scrap paper.","Verso of leaves not digitised. One of ten papers digitised from item 705. Title in collection finding aid: RS: Booklets - Ms notes.","Richard Sylvan","The University of Queensland's Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291, Box 21, Item 705","Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy",,"This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, Dr. N.A.J. Taylor.","For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library.",,"[3] leaves. 4.83 MB. ",,Manuscript,"https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:fac1e9d","Como - Shelves - Top - Pile 3",,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,"Box 21: More Green,Como House,Como House > Shelves > Top > Pile 3",https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/6db9a961bde3d0b17db9e298cfd1671c.pdf,Text,"Notes, Correspondences and Marginalia",1,0
178,https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/show/178,"Box 21, Item 705: Green book structure notes","Green book structure notes","Verso of leaves not digitised. One of ten papers digitised from item 705. Title in collection finding aid: RS: Green Book/Structure ms notes.","Richard Sylvan","The University of Queensland's Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291, Box 21, Item 705","Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy",,"This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, Dr. N.A.J. Taylor.","For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library.",,"[3] leaves. 4.25 MB. ",,Manuscript,"https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:64d7a14",,"/^H^'J;^/
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177,https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/show/177,"Box 21, Item 705: Environmental ethics essays notes on tables of contents","Handwritten notes.","One of ten papers digitised from item 705. Title in collection finding aid: RS: Env Essays - tables of contents.","Richard Sylvan","The University of Queensland's Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291, Box 21, Item 705","Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy",,"This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, Dr. N.A.J. Taylor.","For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library.",,"[1] leaf. 1.62 MB. ",,"Manuscript ","https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:7e4ad6c",,"7
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176,https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/show/176,"Box 21, Item 705: Draft abstract of Paradigmatic roots of environmental problems","Printout of draft, dated 24 May 1995. Trimmed paper pasted on leaf with annotations. Handwritten top of printout: Run new copy.","One of ten papers digitised from item 705.","Richard Sylvan","The University of Queensland's Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291, Box 21, Item 705","Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy",1995-05-24,"This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, Dr. N.A.J. Taylor.","For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library.",,"[1] leaf. 2.6 MB. ",,Manuscript,"https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:7a8f99b","Como - Shelves - Top - Pile 3","PARADIGMATIC ROOTS
OF
ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS
Abstract. Virtually all diagnoses of the roots, and sources, of environmental
problems are defective. While defective diagnoses persist, problems will not
be adequately addressed.
Focal questions ask why human communities so frequently degrade,
impoverish or even destroy their own environments, and more generally why
the whole earth is now in jeopardy through human enterprise. More
immediate answers, sometimes correct so far as they go (which is not deep
enough), look to components of environmental impact equations. More
thorough-going answers fall into two classes: first those that do not question
entrenched paradigms, but seek (unsuccessfully) to explain widespread
problems simply through defective practice, and secondly those that, rightly
recognising that defective practice is no adequate answer, look to deeper
paradigmatic sources of problems. A fatal flaw in most of the latter answers
lies in their monistic concentration on a single paradigm, or single narrow
band of paradigms. These flaws are exposed, whence a wider, more
satisfactory answer can be broached.
Background busy work includes firstly, explaining problems and relevant
paradigms and how paradigms operate regarding environmental problems,
and secondly, detailed disentangling of proposed and alleged sources of the
problems. With this done, it is argued that none of these answers,
fashionable or other, to the focal questions is satisfactory. Here lies the
important hard, but very negative and decidedly incomplete, work of the
present investigation.
A different more complex investigation is accordingly instigated. An initial
answer is located through broader classes of paradigms : environmentally
friendly and unfriendly. Further effort is expended, profitably, in trying to
characterize these classes. Among significant corollaries, one is striking:
philosophy as portrayed through its standard history is dismal environmental
news.
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175,https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/show/175,"Box 21, Item 705: Draft of Impact of alternative systems on Enlightenment Project","Printout of draft, dated 9 May 1995.","One of ten papers digitised from item 705.","Richard Sylvan","The University of Queensland's Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291, Box 21, Item 705","Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy",1995-05-09,"This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, Dr. N.A.J. Taylor.","For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library.",,"[7] leaves. 19.4 MB. ",,Manuscript,"https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:103a4b1",,"9/5/95
IMPACT OF ALTERNATIVE SYSTEMS ON THE
ENLIGHTENMENT PROJECT
There is a recent debate, arising out of older debates, concerning logic, rationality, truth,
science and, more sweepingly, the Enlightenment Project. It is a debate where the concentrated
intellectual superpower formed from those substantially committed to the Project is matched
against dispersed anti- or counter-Enlightenment forces, and so confronted with protracted
guerilla activity. Historically furthermore, the scattered and diverse counter-movement has
taken various different forms at different times. In the main respects the recent debate has
crystallised into one between definite realism and an egalitarian relativism (as revealed in a
useful working example, the debate in Z Papery Oct-Dec 1992). Let's call these sides rea/^m
and re/af/VLym for short, though the divisions are more complex than that (for one reason,
because ""realism"" comprehends an idealist ""anti-realism"", and ""relativism"" includes
""constructive"" forms).
The contrast is invariably presented (as in the debate in Z Papery) as between f/te ane
correct theory, that ultimately delivered by Science, on the one side, and many stories, many
points of view perhaps equally good, on the other.i But, presented thus, it is almost obvious
that what is offered affords a/a/.ye contrast. For omitted are alternatives with more than one
correct account (some of these accounts perhaps better than others), but with many other stories
faulted. For instance, neglected is my own preferred /mJiPe way, which recognises many
correct accounts, none absolute, and many defective stories.2 Such further plurallistic
alternatives are not glimpsed for several reasons: one is a false underlying absolute (one) verytAy
relative (many) dichotomy^; another is a false (also absolute) character accredited to received
1
See Albert's Editorial, p.2, and the clearly stated position of 'the three defendents', namely
Albert, Chomsky and Ehrenreich.
It is both curious and revealing that the debate should have taken f/?A polarized course, given the
question addressed to 'the six critics' (of the Enlightenment Project). Namely, 'Do we need to
reject/transcend/escape an old way of thinking variously called Western
Rationality/Science/Logic if we are to attain a better world? (quoted p.17). Put differently, what
is role of received ""enlightenment"" in a/! Amelioration Project?
Because of these <%/erenf issues there is much (loose) arguing at cross-purposes in Z Papers
2
Such a way is elaborated in DP.
2
logic and scientific methodology. Thus a longer subtitle for the present exercise might well run:
the
concerning logic, rationality, science, truth and all that: the Enlightenment Project
and its Enemies, a pluralistic resolution.
Realists take their stand on the basis of received logic and scientific methodology,
typically as if that were an indisputable given, in great intellectual shape. A couple of
statements will confirm this:
... we do not have to transcend science or rationality as a prerequisite to
developing worthy vision and strategy... logic and the roles of evidence
are here to stay. Moreover, they're on our side.4
Even some small criticism of science is justified; for instance 'science is sometimes
narrow, mechanical, colonizing or hypocritical'.$ What lie beyond such critical reach are
rationality, reason and logic; '... to critique reason or logic as being at the root of sciences many
ills is wrong' 'and has no role in making the world better'. Despite extensive left political
activity, 'I have not once criticized rationality or logic, and anti-intellectualism has always been
anathema to me'.6 Others appear fractionally more cautious about reason and logic (not
Science!):
...in a discussion...there are certain familiar ground rules: those of
rational inquiry, ... what seems to be under discussion here is whether
we should abide by these ground rules at all (trying to improve them as
we proceed?). If the answer is that we are to abide by them, then the
discussion is over: we've implicitly accepted the legitimacy of rational
inquiry. If they are to be abandoned, then we cannot proceed until we
learn what replaces the commitment to consistency, responsibility to fact,
and other out-dated notions.^
Before a final quoted sentence rounding off this passage notice the equations made:
procedures in a discussion (ground rules) = methods of rational inquiry
= commitment to consistency, responsibility to fact, etc.
3
Conspicuous in Albert's own efforts. Albert attempts to recast the multi-faceted debate in these
elementary white and black terms: rationality and science 'real science' which is one and unified)
versus anti-rationalism, which is utterly relativist. Anti-rationalism he can then jammer as
abandoning truth as well as science, as giving away rational and intelligent (and effective)
methods, and as accordingly self-defeating in arguing for ameliorating social change (see p.51).
4
Albert, Z Papery, p.51.
5
One sample from half a page of 'balancing criticism' in Albert, p.50.
6
Albert, p.56.
7
Like Neurath in his boat, a favourite image of the American intellectual establishment.
8
Chomsky, Z papery.
3
The last are variants upon (Albert's) methods of standard logic (consistency-based) and rules of
evidence. Discussion or debate has accordingly been
narrowed (in broad form):
1. by a rationality constraint
2. by explication of rationality through a standard system (by consistency, maximum
expected utility, etc.). Pictorially:
rational
inquiry
standard
rational
inquiry
discussion/ inquiry
Short of some instruction on this matter... new procedures or ideas to
replace the old...we are reduced to primal screams.^
That is hardly so. Almost everyone is familiar with inquiries, debates, arguments and generally
procedures that do not proceed rationally, by any means or standards, but which do not reduce
to screams (though some no doubt do). Regrettably few, by contrast, are familiar with
aZ^rnaf/ve systems of rationality and logic by which inquiry and so forth can proceed, quite
rationally. These alternatives confound and upset realism and the Enlightenment Project.^
That impact of alternatives on the Enlightenment Project—an impact not recognised or
acknowledged by realists—is a main topic to be pursued. But first the uniform, definite realist
Project.
The Project itself which persists.
The Enlightenment Project can be drawn out of standard accounts of the Enlightenment
and the world discerned under it.
The Project involved proceeding in accord with
Enlightenment practices and in bringing its vision to fruition. First, then, a revealing picture ot
9
Chomsky continuing Z Papery, p.52.
10
The useful term
Project coalesces in the course of the debate. In the course of
trying to shame and chastise left intellectuals and left counterparts for their neglect of human
concerns, of emancipation, removal of oppresion and similar, Chomsky assigns a central place to
the ""project of the Enlightenment"" in serving emancipation, in displacing oppressors, removing
monopolies of the powerful, and supplying liberating information and technology. That
expression which he has drawn from essays he is commenting upon, quickly contracts to ""the
Enlightenment project (same page, p.57).
My own opinion is that Chomsky has grossly overestimated the positive role of the
Enlightenment Project in achieving emancipation and social amelioration. Patently too, he
similarly underrates environmental negativities and externalities of implementations of the
Project.
4
the world discerned by the Enlightenment and the associated ideology (drawn from Berlin), and
secondly the sort of accompanying Project which that yields.
The world discerned was a rational scientific world conforming to 'materialism,
utilitarianism, ethical naturalism and atheism':
Whatever the differences that divided the French /z/zzZagop/z^g and their
disciples in other countries...there existed nevertheless a wide ca/zg^zzgzzg:
it rested on an acceptance of what was in effect, a secular version of the
old natural law doctrine according to which the nature of things possessed
a permanent unalterable structure, differences and changes in the world
being subject to universal and immutable laws. These laws were
discoverable in principle by the use of r^agozz and controlled observation,
of which the methods of the natural gcz^zzc^g constituted the most
successful application. The most powerful instrument in the acquisition
of knowledge was held to be mathematics... f/ze
/zaf/z fo ^nawZ^g^
wag f/zaf q/V/z^ na/araZ gcz^zzc^g; that is to say, all statements with claims
to truth must be public, communicable, testable—capable of verification
or falsification by methods open to and accepted by any rational
investigator. From this it followed that aZZ ar/z^r %?^g q/aza/zarzZy w^re
R?
and in particular such foundations of faith as sacred texts,
divine revelation and the dogmatic pronouncements of its authorised
interpreters, tradition, prescription, immemorial wisdom, private intuition
and all other forms of non-rational or transcendent sources of putative
knowledge. This principle was held to apply to both the human and the
non-human world: to abstract disciplines, such as logic or mathematics,
to the applied sciences which established the laws of the behaviour of
inanimate bodies, plants, animals and human beings, and to the normative
disciplines which revealed the true nature of ultimate human goals, and
the correct rules of conduct, public and private, social and political, moral
and aesthetic.
According to this doctrine, aZZ g^KZ/z/ig qz/^gaozzg were zzz qrznczqZe
azzgweraZzZe.* rraf/z wag one, error multiple; the true answers must of
necessity be universal and immutable, that is, true everywhere, at all
times, for all men, and discoverable by the appropriate use of reason, by
relevant experience, observation and the methods of experiment, logic,
calculation.
A logically connected structure of rules, laws,
generalisations, susceptible of demonstration or, at least in practice, of a
high degree of confirmation (and, where required, of application
appropriate to differing circumstances) could, at least in principle, be
constructed, and could replace the chaotic amalgam of ignorance,
laziness, guesswork, superstition, prejudice, dogma, fantasy, and, above
all, what Helvetius called 'interested error', which enabled the cunning
and the strong to dominate and exploit the stupid, ignorant and weak, and
had throughout human history been largely responsible for the vices,
follies and miseries of mankind. Only knowledge, that is, the growth of
the sciences, could rescue mankind from these largely self-induced evils.
Some believed that certainty in empirical matters was attainable, others
that no more than high probability could be achieved; some were
pessimistic about progress towards virtue or happiness, others were more
sanguine. But the majority of the q/zzZagaq/z^g were agreed that if
irrational passions could be controlled, and ignorance, prejudice, fear and
greed diminished, an end could be made to the worst confusions in
5
human thought and feelings, which led to blind fanaticism in thought and
savage barbarism in practice. **
Though we should contest very many of those claims, it would be foolish to deny that there
was
that was enlightened, by comparison with what had gone before, in Enlightenment
proposals. 12 In many respects, the proposals were socially and otherwise enlightened, though
definitely not environmentally so.
Proper affords a brief convenient way of alluding to the prime aims
and objectives of the Enlightenment, which largely coincide with those of modern secular
science broadly construed. Central among emphasized objectives were: pursuit of the truth;
exact deployment of rational methods, including logical argumentation; reliance on science and
especially rigorous empirical procedures. A suitable mnemonic would be TRASH, (short for
truth and reason, and science and (atheistic) humanism).
The Project also included these components:
* as regards
of rational and scientific practice and methods, and
of other methods, such as those depending upon closed authority, private or
organisational revelation, magic and so on.
* bringing to^h/mon.*
the intelligent inhabitants of the Earth (humans)
in particular
in their practice; corollaries are extensive, and include
and
programs (e.g. humans have to be in a position to use their intelligence,
and not ill, disabled, enslaved, etc.);
o&raMimg that accessible correct information.
For all its apparent merits, the project had, and has, a large downside. For example, the
Project underwrites monopolies and elites, namely those who held control of the correct
methods, the right procedures. It brings in its train all those strait-jacketing features now so
familiar in scientific and intellectual life: experts, technocracy, the peer group process,
procedural correctness, scientific accountability, and so on. (Plurallistic criticism will pull the
blocks from under all this familiar rigmarole.)
What looks even worse (from outside), main oppositional groups assume a similar set of
assumptions. Present monopolies and elites are simply mistaken about the truth, which they
have no monopoly upon and do not even hold. Nonetheless truth will out (e.g. with enough
publicity or disguised propaganda, when the public wake up or become informed, or
whatever). Then that opposition, in possession of truth and rationality (or its relevant variants,
11
Berlin pp. 162-4.
12
See DP, final chapter. A
critique of both the Enlightenment project and its Anti-Enlightenment
alternatives is offered in this work.
6
facts and consistency, etc.) will triumph. These oppositional groups have premissed their
opposition upon similar monistic illusions (but nor is
pluralistic truth hidden away in the
background). 13
Criticism of the Project: trashing TRASH.
As a sidelight, the Project was
in principle. It implied that there was a set of
methods by which any sought piece of knowledge could be obtained. But given the logical
systematization the Project presumed (with its consistency requirements, etc.), there are no such
methods; there are inevitable limitations to knowledge.^
The problems with the Project are not restricted to knowledge and information. The idea
that all genuine questions are in principle answerable is similarly flawed. As there are
unknowable truths, so there are unanswerable questions.
As a result, the Project has to withdraw, to retract some of its sweeping claims—else it
fragments, admitting different logical theories which skirt the limitations, in different ways.
Much as with naive set theory, where consistencizing repairs yield many competing
alternatives, none intellectually decisive, so it is elsewhere. Paradoxes and puzzles produce a
plurality or ""solutions"". Likewise, and in any case, the Project fragments, or rather plurallizes,
so it can be argued. But, most important for present purposes the Project fragmented, and was
to fragment.
The Project breaks up into a plurality—of projects, frameworks, ideologies, and so
forth— because of
of one sort or another. Fundamental among these are
alternative systems of logic, alternative correct systems, and therewith of alternative
frameworks of reason and rationality. As von Wright has contended, ""there is not one logic
which is
But from such a plurality of logics derives a plurality of reasoning and
rational procedures, and therewith of all theoretical domains deploying logical methods. From
13
Most of my own experience confirms the contention (defended at the beginning of JB) that truth, even
in fairly degenerate forms, win not out. Certainly not on its own; but I grant that we should be
working and agitating to force truth (plural) out. Even then truth may not emerge and be recognised in
time, before people are hanged, or species or cultures lost. The traditional tag
is itself infected with falsity.
The erroneous assumption that truth (similarly reason) will win out on its own, without agitation or
political activity is also a prime reason, or excuse, for much academic and scientific inactivity and
complacency. An associated illusion in that f/7^y have grasped the truth or, if not, have a better grasp
upon it (now singular) than any others. It is an illusion shared with—what enjoys significantly less
respectable evidence—monistic religion.
14
Details are given in NL.
15
Havas, agreeing with von Wright's thesis (presented in his 'Logic unified ), p.149.
7
these flow, directly or by analogous arguments, alternatives elsewhere, indeed everywhere in
sciences and arts.*6
Alternative
is intended to take in a wide sweep of alternatives: alternative logics,
alternative mathematical systems, alternative theories or theoretical systems more generally,
alternative cultural arrangements, and shifting definitely down to a semantical level, alternative
actual worlds, alternative realities, and so on.
An obvious reaction—had all the alternatives now (beginning to be) appreciated been
systematically assembled at once, in an appropriate show of alternative strength—should have
been pluralization of the Enlightenment Project. Each viable system of alternatives would have
its own project or set of projects. There would be enlightenmenty.^
But, for one thing, the alternatives did not appear historically all at once, but in dribs and
drabs; for another, some have not yet been widely appreciated at all (e.g. alternative logics,
alternative rules of evidence, alternative rational methods). So alternatives and diversity could
be fought off or assimilated.is For yet another, some unwarranted reactions occurred, which
both neglected and further information did little to justify These included for instance, outright
rejection of the Project, and debilitating relativisation.^
Most philosophers, indeed most intellectuals of scientific disposition, are still caught up in
the Enlightenment Project, in what should be a defunct Project.
References
M. Albert (ed.),
I. Berlin,
A. Gare, AWZAw?i
1(4), Oct-Dec 1992.
, Hogarth Press, London, 1979.
, Eco-Logical Press, Bungendore, 1994.
K. Havas, ""Differences in the unity"",
AnaZy^ 14(1986) 149-150.
R. Routley, ""Necessary limits to knowledge: unknowable truths""; referred to as NL.
R. Routley, ExpZormg
Jt/ngZ^ #7izZ RryonJ, Australian National University 1980;
referred to as JB.
R. Sylvan,
PZ^raZZ/^w, Bungendore, 1994; referred to as DP.
16
Detailed arguments are assembled in DP.
17
It seems a similar plural development should have occurred with oriental religions, such as
Buddhism, advocating enlightenment. But religions tend to fossilize.
18
Consider? for instance the search for uniformity and commonality which is often implausible, as at
more than a superficial level, in ethics or aesthetics.
19
Rival forms have evolved and developed. Thus what was Anti-Enlightenment became Post
modernism, including both Nihilism and Egalitarian Relativism (see Gare). [Also ""middle way"" needs
further explanations ]
",,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,"Box 21: More Green,Como House,Como House > Shelves > Top > Pile 3",https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/c6afa206de867f56284fb042bf1e4d96.pdf,Text,"Draft Papers",1,0
173,https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/show/173,"Box 21, Item 705: Draft of Grand philosophies and environmental crises: many problems and a few solutions","Printout (photocopy) of draft, with emendations and annotations, dated 23 May 1995.","One of ten papers digitised from item 705.","Richard Sylvan","The University of Queensland's Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291, Box 21, Item 705","Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy",1995-05-23,"This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, Dr. N.A.J. Taylor.","For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library.",,"[18] leaves. 50.54 MB. ",,Manuscript,"https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:9a8cf49",,"23.5.95
GRAND PHILOSOPHIES AND ENVIRONMENTAL CRISES:
many problems and a few solutions, i
Much of what follows is organised around the following
thesis, which it
aims to further, to sharpen and support:
mainstream Western philosophy is dismal environmental news,
or still more colloquially and generally, mainstream philosophy continues to be bad socioenvironmental news. Presumably that expands, in turn, to something like: grander mainstream
Western philosophy continues to be a significant factor in the ideologies (or paradigms) that
inform destructive social and environmental practices. There are some striking corollaries,
among them that, like dialectical material in Eastern Europe, such Western philosophy should
be substantially abandoned, its furthering and frequent celebration in the schools and
universities discontinued, its place taken by more benign humble alternatives.
Sharpening the anti-mainstream thesis.
All the qualifications prove to be important.
recessive traditions that are comparatively benign.
because there are lesser or
because small-scale analytic
philosophy for example, while likely operating within a damaging paradigm, may have little or
no impact on its own (consider the impact of a philosopher who spends all research time on the
unexpected examination problem). Weyarn, because classical Taoism affords a counter
example to the anti-mainstream thesis, virtually however it is sharpened.^ However the
qualification
is decidedly narrower than need be, and moreover gives a misleading
impression. For conspicuous non-Westem philosophy, such as Confucianism and Islam, is
also dismal news. Other major philosophies can, and do, drive environmental destruction as
well. Accordingly too what uniqueness there is to the Western role has to be differently made
out, in terms of its special (though perhaps inessential) linkage to industrialization.
Although it is expositionally advantageous to highlight present serious predicaments in
terms of crz'y
environmental destruction
' symbolising leads to, or yields (granted
fo faces a validity
issue).
supply its components. But what can be gleamed indicates that it is a submodel of the dominant
social paradigm. For instance, we are informed that natural resources are treated as 'expendable raw
materials or even worse as free goods' (p.24), in effect as without initial value.
8
For details see DP, and in condensed form Sylvan 95.
9
Notably at the end of EE, pp. 188-9.
10
Deep positions divide significantly on this issue. For it is now widely argued that shallow environmentalism
coMp/gJ
heavy technofix— a common position among scientists—is not going to succeed.
11
See Hargrove and Gare, and the ensuing discussion below in the text.
It is a little tempting to suggest that Hargrove presents his thesis as it were by accident, given how
little he actually does to defend it. In the main, Hargrove looks as if he is repeating Roszak and
Drengson rather than proceeding to a larger sounder claim.
5
If something like this enjoyed plausibility, it would support a
philosophy
end.
an evident premiss.
That argument is by contraposition, and
thesis: Western
transmission from
(Thatherites and Wittgensteinians and others of a decidedly mixed
company, reached a similar conclusion, that philosophy should end, by entirely different, very
dubious by-roads.) There are several problems with the Heidegger schema. For one thing, the
argument leaves out other critical components of an important environmental impact equation:
notably excess human population and excess human consumption.
In any event, Heidegger certainly thought that philosophy—as distinct from a quasi-
mstical ""thought""—should end. But he exaggerated the importance of such an outcome by
exaggerating, in characteristic German style, the importance of philosophy, the importance of
German philosophy above all. For example he supposes that modem German philosophy
influenced the rise of industrialism and all it brought in train. It can be plausibly contended,
however in characteristic disparaging British style, that philosophy had comparatively little
influence in such ultimately damaging development as European agricultural and industrial
revolutions (for example, technology, but not philosophy, played a role in the invention of
artifical dyes, a development which can be seen as setting European industrialization in train:)
But such examples do not penetrate deep enough to the conditions of an^preparation for change.
There are myriad ways in which philosophy has shaped historical developments: through
its major input into (other) ideologies such as religions, through its place in politics and law.
With Protestan philosophy in ^particular, basic ground for industrialism was prepared, the
further development of highly exploitative Christen attitudes to nature (and to programs) and of
appropriate attitudes to technology, disciplined education and inculcation of a work ethic, and so
on. Or consider, for instance, the fairly direct role of philosophy in the formulation of modem
theories of property (notably by Locke) which enabled dispossession and displacement of native
peoples in coroized lands. Consider its less direct role in the- preparing ground for
(^^(industrialization, the presumption that the earth, its habitats and other inhabitants and its matter
were of no value, but of value only as transformed by industrial activity, that entrepreneurs
were free to do whatever they liked with them. No doubt many untoward things would have
happened without much philosophy, where philosophy had little influence (as with habitat
destruction by excessive populations of animals). But wherever theory operated to influence
12
The form of the argument is extracted from Passmore's end-of-philosophy address (thanks to
Passmore too for further comments). The argument is much harder to find in Heidegger's later
work. But rudiments are present. The first linkage of philosophy and technology is managed by an
extraordinary redefinition of technology (see p.17?)^/For the second linkage Heidegger was
presumably reflecting upon high destructiv&-teehnology of war, nuclear weapons and so on. Note
however that the middle term has changed; so the argument fails, courtesy the ancient fallacy of
equivocation.
""7
?
.
6
practice, philosophy would have served negatively, as a prime element of
That
could be a significant rubber philosophy today.
Whatever the extend (arguably, substantial) to which they actually impinge, main
philosophical traditions and ideologies do have very negative implications for environmental
theory and practice. So much has been argued or alleged, in one fashion or another, in several
contemporary sources.^ For example, Hargrove has recently investigated, in greater detail,
negative implications of mainstream philosophy for three environmental reaches: environmental
attitudes concerned with nature and creature preservation, with nature appreciation, and with
development of a proper ecological perspective. However Hargrove has ventured some of his
particularly challenging themes in insufficiently careful form, thereby leaving himself
unnecessarily vulnerable to criticism and counter-claims.
These include the criticisms
assembled by Attfield, who, though not unsympathetic to Hargrove's case, has excessively
weakened the themes.
For example, what Attfield presents as 'substantially correct' is
Hargrove's 'verdict that the history of philosophy has discouraged preservationist attitudes',
vastly less than Hargrove's actual negative verdict which comprehended considerably more than
just ""preservationist attitudes"", and recorded a situation conspicuously worse than mere
""discouragement"" of nature and creature preservation, as well as much else. Indeed it is worse
than Hargrove has charged; Hargrove's indictment of mainstream philosophy is itself weaker
than that here ventured, which takes mainstream philosophy as thoroughly implicated in the
present escalating environmental mess, through its roles as a major source and supplier of
operative ideas and paradigms.
There is a single qualification, invoked incidentally by Attfield himself, that would
remove much of Attfield's criticism: a restriction to
philosophy (or differently, to
dominant philosophy). Consider Attfield's exceptions to 'the adverse impacts of Western
philosophy', those alleged 'philosophical traditions that have encouraged taking nature
seriously':-
Firsf/y, insofar as the Church Fathers, medieval Christians and others that Attfield alludes to are
philosophers at all, they are entirely minor figures, unlikely to be known to many philosophers,
and but rarely or never referred to in regular philosophy courses; they do not form part of
mainstream philosophy. Consider the sorts of exceptions:
* minor philosophers, many of whom we know very little about, outside gossip and
speculation, such as Theophrastus, early Stoics, and lesser Epicureans.
13
On the rule in philosophy, and in environmental thought in particular, of resistance, see the
discussion of Rodman's preferred fourth ideal type, Ecological Resistance, REE, p.l46ff.
14
For example, see Hargrove, p.21.
7
* figures who are only secondarily or marginally philosophers, such as Hooke, Boyle, Ray and
Evelyn.
* medieval and early modem Christians, who typically are not significant philosophers, and in
fact were usually not committed to nature preservation and the like, but to nature management
or perfection.
these minor figures do not afford the clear support for his claims that Attfield has
regularly assumed.15 Many of the statements supposed to offer support are ambivalent, or
environmentally dubious, supporting some form of managerialism (e.g. perfectionism or
stewardship). And in any case they have to be set against the remainder of what a figure says
and does (so far as that can be ascertained), often telling against substantial environmental
sensitivity and concern.
As regards the latter matter, there are, inversely, isolated claims in major philosophers
(Plato is regularly cited in this regard) which may make them appear environmentally aware and
even sympathetic.
Although Plato's philosophy generally suggests that he neither knew or
cared about environmental problems, one passage in the
shows that
he was very much aware of at least one problem: the effect of deforestation
on soil quality in Greece during his own lifetime.^
Unfortunately Hargrove does but a comparatively poor job in accounting for what he alleges,
Plato's indifference and lack of ecological concern. 1?
The reasons for Plato's indifference to serious ecological degradation of forests and soils
in Greece can be ascribed to a combination of several elements of Plato's philosophy (a natural
world-dismissive ideology) including: elevation of transcendental forms as what was truly real
and really of value; denigration and dismissal of the everyday natural world as utterly inferior,
of entirely lower existence or even illusory and certainly not of rational concern. This dualistic
ontology and axiology—a wonderfully valuable world of forms standing in complete contrast
with the illusory material world of perception—was supplemented and reinforced by a
corresponding epistemology. Under a tripartite theory of mind, the higher rational part, which
gave epistemic access to the forms, a part exhibited only by humans and more elevated beings,
was sharply separated from the two lower animal parts. Thus under Plato's conception of the
15
In work referred to on p. 127. The main historical claims, many of them based on secondary sources,
are stated in his
of Fnvironwgnro/ Concern. A more detailed criticism of these claims
will be attempted elsewhere.
16
Hargrove, p.29.
17
This sort of problem arises not merely in regard to Plato, as Attfield observes, with decided relish.
There is little doubt but that Hargrove's historical ""excess"" needs to be sharpened and much
elaborated, and, in some critical areas, rectified.
8
human, humans and especially the important rational component of the human, stood in
opposition to nature; the distinctively human task is completely separate from nature and
concerned with control of it and its unruly elements. It is because what really has value—
rational selves cavorting among the forms—is separate from nature, transcending it, with nature
at best comprising very inferior copies, of lower existence, that it does not matter what happens
to the earth and earthly things, to mere matter. That is a matter of indifference.^
A significantly better critical exercise, as regards not merely Plato, but the extensive and
important neo-Platonic tradition, is effected by Gare, who also advances however an
insufficiently specified version of the anti-mainstream thesis. In fact Gare tends to slide back
and forth from Western civilization and metaphysics, both of which are too wide, to
mechanistic materialism (and social Darwinism), which is much too narrow, particularly if
social Darwinism is included (about which Gare vacillates). The latter leaves out such
damaging sources as Cartesianism and contemporary idealism; the former would include the
recessive Western metaphysical tradition Gare wants to refurbish, what has grown into
""process"" philosophy. So while there is a great deal of worthwhile historical documentation to
be found in Gare, the target thesis has so far eluded his critical exercise.
While the restriction of the anti-mainstream thesis to Western doctrine is both somewhat
misleading and more confining than need be, that to mainstream is different. Something of the
sort is essential.
But it itself raises other difficulties, beginning with: what counts as
7K<2m.yfr<27?i? How is the image cashed out? A contextual explication is conveniently
straightforward, an abstract definition of 'mainstream' in terms of the principal course or flow
less helpful.
By mainstream Western Philosophy —Western philosophy providing the
context—is meant the principal movements in that philosophy, the chief philosophers and
schools and their relevant philosophical interrelations. And who and what these are gets
shown, nearly ostensively in some cases (with portraits and diagrams), in histories of Western
philosophy. 19 Shorter and less encyclopaedia histories in fact tend to portray just the sought '
mainstream (that they differ somewhat in coverage does not matter, but emphasizes, in a superb
valuational fashion the blurred edges of this typically vague mainstream). Long histories
18
On this classical polarisation of nature and higher humanity, see Plumwood.
elaboration, see Gare.
19
One admirable example in this regard is B. Russell's Wiy^fow of the Wejr, a popular work with a
title that should be viewed henceforth, given that Russell was serious, with some incredulity.
For requisite
It is a little surprising, too, that the usual ameritical apriorism about the natural world and its
other inhabitants, should pervade Russell's work. But consider, to take just one example, the
inaccurate and demeaning comparison of animals with humans that fires up his neglected analysis
Power.
9
usually indicate the mainstream both by the way they apportion their space, and also in their
judgements as to what is important, which were principal movements, and so on.
The essential qualification, to mainstream or similar, is ^Independently grasped by Singer
in his account of the dominant western paradigm and his brief but pointed criticism of
Aristotlianism and mainstream Hebrew and Christian philosophy.
The biblical story of creations, in Genesis, makes clear the Hebrew view of the special
place of human beings in the divine plan:
And God said, Let us make man in our image, after our likeness: and
let them have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of
the air, and over the earth, and over every creeping thing that creepeth
upon the earth.
And God blessed them, and God said upon them, Be fruitful, and
multiply, and replenish the earth, and subdue it; and have dominion
over the fish of the sea and over the fowl of the air, and over every
living thing that moveth upon the earth.
Today Christians debate the meaning of this grant of 'dominion'; and those ,
concerned about the environment claim that it should be regarded not as a license
to do as we will with other living things, but rather as a directive to look after
them on God's behalf, and be answerable to God for the way in which we treat
them. There is, however, little justification in the text itself for such an
interpretation; and given the example God set when he drowned almost every
animal on earth in order to punish human beings for their wickedness, it is no
wonder that people should think the flooding of a single river valley is nothing
worth worrying about. After the flood there is a repetition of the grant ofj^\^v
dominion in more onimous language:
And the fear of you and the dread of you shall be upon every beast of
the earth, and upon every fowl of the air, upon all the^ moveth upon
the earth, and upon all the fishes of the sea; into your hand are they
delivered.
The implication is clear: to act in a way that causes fear and dread to everything
that moves on the earth is not improper it is, in fact, in accordance with a God
given decree.
The most influential early Christian thinkers had no doubts about how man's
dominion was to be understood. 'Doth God care for oxen?' asked Paul, in the
course of a discussion of an Old Testament command to rest one's ox on the
sabbath, but it was only a rhetorical question—he took it for granted that the
answer must be negative, and the command was to be explained in terms of
some benefit to humans. Augustine shared this line of thought; referring to
stories in the New Testament in which Jesus destroyed a fig tree and caused a
herd of pigs to drown, Augustine explained these puzzling incidents as intended
to teach us that 'to refrain from the killing of animals and the destroying of
plants is the height of superstition'.
When Christianity prevailed in the Roman Empire, it also absorbed elements of
the ancient Greek attitude to the natural world. The Greek influence was
entrenched in Christian philosophy by the greatest of the medieval scholastics,
Thomas Aquinas, whose life work was the melding of Christian theology with
the thought of Aristotle. Aristotle regarded nature as a hierarchy in which those
with less reasoning ability exist for the sake of those with more:
Plants exist for the sake of animals, and brute beasts for the sake of
man—domestic animals for his use and food, wild on^ (or at any
rate most of them) for food and other accessories of life, such as
clothing and various tools.
10
Since nature makes nothing purposeless or in vain, it is undeniably
true that she has made all animals for sake of man.
In his own major work, the Si/wima
Aquinas followed this passage
from Aristotle almost word for word, adding that the position accords with
God's command, as given in Genesis. In his classification of sins, Aquinas has
room only for sins against God, ourselves, or our neighbours. There is no
possibility of sinning against non-human animals, or against the natural world.
This was the thinking of
C/irfyham/y for at least its first eighteen j
centuries. There were gentler spirits, certainly, like Basil, John Chrysostom^
And Francis of Assisi, but for most of Christian history they have had no
significant impact on the dominant tradition. It is therefore worth emphasising
... major features of this
Weyarn
because these features can
serve as a point of comparison when we discuss different views of the natural
environment.
According to the dominant Western tradition, the natural world exists for the
benefit of human beings. God J^fave human beings dominion over the natural
world, and God does not care how we treat it. Human beings are the only
morally important members of this world. Nature itself is of no intrinsic value,
and the destruction of plants and animals cannot be sinful, unless by this
destruction we harm humans beings.20
/
Singer goes on to labour the familiar point that anthropocentrism of this harsh tradition
need not exclude some concern for the preservation of nature. But for most of recorded history
is has not include^much concern. However, lesser Christian, notably stewardship and
perfectionism, while they lessen some of the brutal impact of domination upon the natural
workd, offer little improvement upon longer term insidious environmental erosion, or as
regards retention of emphasized and enhancement of biodiversity.
As distinctively, the rival humanist paradigm of modem times, running from the French
enlightenment through 20th century Anglo-American empiricism, as exemplified in Russell,
Ayer and Quine among many other luminaries, differs from mainstream Christianity only in
leaving God out of the account (as He does not exist, He is utterly impotent, so to illicitly say).
Exceptional human features themselves, naturalistically achieved, justify dominion and
domination.
Outline of a main argument
Detailed argument for the anti-mainstream thesis, as refined, is, so to say, case by case,
through cases in the mainstream history, considering main philosophers and main schools.
Some of this hard detailed work, some already illustrated, has been carried out, in more or less
detail^ by others: Drengson, Gare, Hargrove, Heidegger and Passmore, among many others.
But, within that uneven treatment, there remain conspicuous gaps. For example, among the
principal 17th century rationalists, while there is much material upon Descartes (along now with
20
Singer pp.265-8, itals added. Singer prefers fracton discourse to the substantially equivalent
(historical linkage diminished) paroJfgm discourse.
11
a conservative back-lash defending Descartes), and some increasingly divisive material upon
Spinoza, there is little at all on Leibnitz.
As there is no prospect here of reworking the dismal history of Western philosophy, case
by case, let us consider a few illustrative examples, which help plug some obvious gaps. Take
again the distinguished early modem rationalists—Descartes, Leibnitz and Spinoza— as
examples. Descartes' significant negative contribution is now well-known, so much so that
Descartes is sometimes represented as the main villain of the environmental pieced Owing to
the premature enthusiasm of various deep ecologists for Spinoza's contribution, the blacker
environmental feature of Spinoza's theory have been enthusiastically exposed to view by a
jubilant opposition. As a result, some deep ecologists have back-tracked, but only a little:
Some Spinoza scholars have recently claimed that an ecological interpretation
of Spinozism is not justified. There are notes in the
where Spinoza
says that we can treat other animals in any way which best suits us. [These
authors] have argued and although the metaphysics is nonanthropocentric,
the ethics is rightfully anthropocentric. Schopenhauer, who was steeped in
Eastern philosophy, was quick to pick up on the anomolous attitude of
Spinoza toward other animals: ""Spinoza's contempt for animals, as mere
things for our use, and declared by him to be without right, is thoroughly
Jewish, and in conjunction with pantheism is at the same time absurd and
abominable."" Ame Naess and I agree that Schopenhauer was correct in his
criticism of Spinoza. Naess admits that although Spinoza himself was what
we would now call a ""speciesist"", his system is not speciesist.^
If Spinoza's system includes his anthropocentric ethics (and is not illegitimately restricted to an
ecologically convenient selection from his holistic metaphysics), then it seems Waess is astray.
The negative character of Spinoza's contribution was rediscovered by Bookchin (unversed in
basic deep ecological texts), who applies this finding to lambast deep ecology regarding 'double
standards' in its
one-sided treatment of philosophers and philosophical traditions. Spinoza,
for example is cast frequently as a nouveau Taoist and is interpreted more in
the romantic tradition than in the scholastic one to which he has more
affinities, despite his many differences with medieval thinkers. That this
great thinker was militantly antliopocentric is consistently ignored by deep
ecologists, as far as I have been^able to ascertain. I have yet to encounter
any attempt to explain Spinoza's extraordinary statement: ""Besides man, we
know of no particular thing in nature in whose mind we may rejoice, and
whom we can associate with ourselves in friendship or any sort of
fellowship; therefore, whatsoever there be in nature besides man, a regard
for our advantage does not call on us to preserve, but to preserve or destroy
according to its various capabilities, and to adapt to our use as best we
21
Thus for example by Dregson.
22
Session, in Appendix D to Devall and Sessions, p.240.
23
Bookchin, p.261. The quotation from Spinoza's Ethics is fully cited in Bookchin.
<'
12
So much for sensitive treatment of natural environments and their other inhabitants! Spinoza
appears to have irreparably damaged any claim to exceptional positive standing.
So far the third of the great rationalist trio, Leibnitz, appears to have escaped critical re-
....... (in a
history of philosophy). Yet, as it happens, Leibnitz's position can be applied
to illustrate features of considerable green generality. In brief, any philosophy is liable to be
environmentally unfriendly that guarantees satisfaction of all or enough elements of the
consumption impact equation, and so would generate excessive impacts. Leibnitz s overall
position does just that, consider what might be called
in honour of Leibnitz
(though Leibnitz's fragmentary work did not initiate any genuine historic school). Leibnitz was
heavily committed to all of human population growth, unfettered technological advance, and
human lifestyles of consumption, in short, to precisely those factors that combine in the familiar
impact recipe to produce excessive human impacts upon environments. There is fair evidence
for these contentions. First, Leibnitz was an early exponent of utilitarianism, indeed he was all
round an enthusiastic maximizer. From his formulation of utilitarianism, he drew an immediate
obvious corollary: the directive to increase human population (maximizing on aggregate human
pleasure is most obviously achieved by production of more happy humans, other aspects of
which technology and affluence can assure).^ Secondly, Leibnitz was a technology enthusiast;
he was heavily committed to the development and use of scientific technology, for which he had
all sorts of schemes (e.g. not only the
intended to encapsulate all of
knowledge in an accessible useable form, a complete calculus duly mechanised, but as well
numerous technological projects.2$). Thirdly, he was committed to an affluent lifestyle for
himself and (through symmetry and basic assumptions of utilitarianism) for others. For his
own part, he abandoned an academic career at an obscure German university ""in favour of the
more active and lucrative pursuits of the courtier and diplomat' and, so it turned out, the bright
lights of major European cities and grand tours of Europe.26
No doubt Leibnitz's lifestyle
commitments need not (and may not) be reflected in his philosophy, which may have
independent environmental merit, for example as stimulation or input for later developments.
There is unfortunately little evidence that that is so. Nonetheless, substantial fragments of
24
For Leibnitz's anticipation of utilitarianism, see Hruschka. For Leibnitz's immediate application
of the principle, to support human population increase, see p.172.
25
'Leibnitz's interest in machinery is illustrated by his complicated plan to drain the Harz mines,
which involved the construction of a new type of windmill, and a virtually friction-free pump',
Cottingham p.193. For a detailed account of Leibnitz's extensive entrepreneurial and technological
activities, see Aiton.
26
Cottingham p.24, p.26.
13
Leibnitz's philosophy—of a different unauthentic subphilosophy—do admit environmental
bending and adaptation, in a way that Descartes' philosophy does not at all easily.
Leibnitz has sometimes been accounted environmentally friendly. Some of that apparent
friendliness appear due rather to scholastic conservativism.
Thus he was opposed to
mechanism; he was sympathetic to the organic and teleological, which did not contract to
isolated human and superhuman loci. His metaphysical theory of monads, which are centres of
living energy, effectively distributed life everywhere, though not equally. Harmony and order
too prevailed throughout the universe, though under God's maximizing management, the
presence of which they duly established! But even this life-expanding harmonious order,
variants of which are now familiar from Whiteheadian and deep ecological quarters, was not as
benign as it has superficially appeared.
Leibnitz supposed that, by virtue of pre-established harmony and final causes governing
inevitable progress, humans would not go wrong in the longer term in their environmental
activities, that they could not 'cMwu/Zafive/y make undesirable changes in nature' .27 Leibnitz
joyfully foresaw more and more of the Earth coming under cultivation, and its long-term
advancement to a complete intensive garden, even if there were occasional relapses where parts
deteriorated back temporarily towards wild state. Leibnitz even criticised Cartesianism, now
widely regarded as prime villain of the environmental piece, as /hi/mg To provide the modal
stimulus ... to the control of nature' ... To scientific advance'. The idea of control, advancing
to total control, total management, is prophesized in Leibnitz (in a sort of chauvinistic Gaia
hypothesis). He saw 'order as progressively increasing, with the help of man [as] a finisher of
nature. He boldly applauded the idea of progress to the earth as a unit, assuming both an
orderliness on earth and an orderliness in the changes it had undergone by man' .28
An important corollary does emerge: that a promising new partial metaphysics is no
panacea for improved environmental performance or paradigms.
Not merely neutral
metaphysics, but even positive metaphysics, such as certain organic and process theories, are
compatible with, and can be coupled with, damaging philosophies, social theories and life-
27
Glacken p.478. As he remarks, these bold assumptions made by Leibnitz have proved wrong. The
preposterous infaHibihty-in-practice assumption has resurfaced recently in a less attractive aspect of
the Gaia hypothesis as peddled by Lovelock.
28
Glacken p.506.
styles. It is almost enough to consider the theories and practices, commitments and lifestyles of
Aristotle, Leibnitz and Whitehead.^
A different example is furnished by mainstream British philosophy, a philosophy which
has influenced much of the English speaking world for the worse, environmentally and
otherwise. This philosophy is highly empiricist in orientation, with this empiricism expanding
through ethics and social theory in the form of utilitarianism, typically a possessive
individualistic human chauvinistic utilitarianism. 30
Despite appearances and propaganda, there has been compentively little improvement in
recent times. Shallow utilitarianism persists as the main
cal informant of and input
into social sciences, including fashionable new areas such as ecological economics, public
choice theory,... . Incidentally, not much is to be expected in the way of deeper change from
contemporary universities and research institutions from where these new fashions emanate.
For these are, by and large, part of the advanced industrial problematic; they are, almost without
exception, urbanocentric conjectural-knowledge factories. The other main movements in
Anglo-American philosophy are even more conservative, for example analytic philosophy and
its variants, such as cor^epttial analysis, and Wittgensteinianism. For they leave almost
everything as it is, asunvisionmentally unsatisfactory as it is.31
Nor is recent Continental philosophy, a main contrast class, any better, but in many
which are the predominant form. But existentialism and phenomenalism, as well as passe-isms
such as Marxism, are mixed in human chauvinism. Social criticism which has at least seriously A /
addressed wider environmental problems, remains shallow. For example, the communcational'
theory of Habernus favours articulate humans, and includes other animals and the rest of
creation from any but very secondary roles.
Modest out-fall.
No doubt the anti-mainstream thesis is not the sort of proposition that most philosophers
care to encounter. For one reason, it may seem like offering free ammunition to those who
29
Leibnitz's standing in the history of philosophy is somewhat curious. His main achievement,
setting aside his reputation as an intellectual wizard with /oty of ideas, appears to be spasmodic
work upon a beautiful ruin, an incomplete (and incompletable) metaphysics, of which only
tantalizing fragmentary structures were ever available.
It is not even as if there is a surviving supply of challenging bad arguments that can be put before
baffled students, as with Descartes and Berkeley for instance.
30
For elaboration and defence of these stark claims, see ""Dominant British ideology'.
31
This theme is developed, in a social setting, by Gelher. His case applies, with over more force, to
environmental matters.
15
would like to put an end to philosophy, for political or ideological purposes. But it does not:
not without a serious confusion of change, or end m present dominant form, with end, end
period. For another, it may appear to give reinforcement to those who, with scant justification,
have prematurely pronounced the end of philosophy.32 But this makes a similar confusion.
Spectacular conclusions such as those that have sometimes been drawn from
considerations like those assembled—such as, again, the end of philosophy, the demise of
grand philosophy, the deconstruction of metaphysics— do not then emerge. For one reason, it
is not philosophy, but only certain sorts of grand philosophy, that leads to disaster, and
accordingly is liable to rejection. No end is implied to less grand regional philosophies,
recessive metaphysics, or the like.
Development of some recessive alternative or other—different ones—is now a favoured
alternative idea (thus Gare and others advocating elaboration of process philosophy,
environmentalists favouring ecological paradigms, etc.). But a more effective course, duly
pluralistic, looks to locally and regionally based philosophies, with worthwhile linkages with
local aspirations and regional cultures.33
Once again, there are philosophies and
philosophies—and appalling regional philosophies (e.g. business philosophies, as promoted by
local chambers of commerce; fundamentalist philosophies stroked by organised religions).
Ways out, if they can be found, lie not through reproduction of dominant destructive ideologies
at local levels, but through less damaging alternatives, fitted to ecoregional circumstances.
Some broad corollaries of the anti-mainstream thesis are accordingly evident. Philosophy
teaching and practice should be drastically reorganised, almost everywhere. Many features of
historical approaches would be transformed. ""Great thinker"" and like series would vanish.
Celebratory aspect of philosophy approached through its history would be abandoned: both the
mainstream historic emphasis and the celebration. Grand but invariably flawed figures from
history would no longer be revered, or celebrated in the same way, even if some of their
argument are retained for exhibition or criticism. There would be new histories of philosophy,
A
different in different regions, with their own pantheons of prominent philosophers, pantheons
not set in stone. Nor would systematic philosophy remain unscathed. For its usual operational
framework is that of the dominant social paradigm. It would be relocated and reoriented.
32
Later authors tend to appeal back to earlier false prophets, notably Heidegger, who really had no
viable arguments. There are other, quite different, equally poor, arguments to an end to philosophy,
for instance those to an end of ideology, from the fall of one awful alternative, soviet
""communism"". And so on; see also above.
33
No doubt this is an intended idea in Caldera, for all that it is scarcely articulated or developed.
Similarly in other productions in Latin-American philosophy.
16
There
be an end to the transfer of inappropriate models, technology (including
logical) and practices (as of temperate agriculture to tropical regions). There would be a
reduction in borrowing and unseemly imitations. Borrowed philosophy is inappropriate for
Latin America, or elsewhere in South. Consider French philosophy, which along with
A
Catholicism and Marxism, still tends to swamp what little happens in Latin America. The
mileau in which French philosophy occurs is n^ established, the infrastucture is not in place,
namely a variety of literary criticism and like mags, an active cafe society, and so on. French
philosophy does not export that well and, by and large, should not be imported, for all its
flashy fashionability.34
Regions should try to do their own appropriate intellectual things, importing only what
they really need. Regional philosophies do not, after all, have to start from nothing or
nowhere; they can draw upon and adapt what already has some local basis, perhaps a strong
base. What is more, they can be directly applied to prevent or delay outside destructive
incursions. For illustration, consider the place
recognised values of forests in
delaying grand pulpwood and integrated forestry [abstruction] projects. Through a regional
network a mesh of constraints can be introduced, controlling intrusions of unregulated or
prejudically regulated international capitalism. Compare a promising strategy for trying to
achieve a nuclear free world, building up by free or freed regions.
Nor does a case for ideological regionalism have to start from nothing. Some of the
arguments for regionalism in organisation also support or suggest regionalization in reaches of
ideas, including philosophy. For example, many of the advantages of subsidizarization
transfer.
None of this will be easy, or achieved without effort. Change is generally hard to achieve
against inertia. And most intellectuals, for all their craving to be first in little approved ideas,
are resistant to extensive change. Moreover the changes modestly proposed will not be simple;
there is not, and cannot be, a simple uniform alternative. What is needed is fragmentation,
pluralisation, regionalisation—unpopular, unfashionable ideas.
References
Aiton, E.J., Leibnitz A Biography, Adam Hilger, Bristol, 1985.
Attfield, R.,
/t&rory o/p/tf/ojop/ty
Environmental
Ethics 13(1991) 127-137.
34
We do not quite have world philosophy, any more than the world car (despite American efforts,
including Solomin & Higgins), but the numbermnainstream Odels is now rather small, and almost
all so fai/ are noisy and polluting.
A
17
Attfield, R., The Ethics of Environmental Concern, Second edition, University of
Georgia Press, Athens, 1991.
Bookchin, M., 'R^ZZ-ycoverZng ^voZMfZoK"", Environmental Ethics 12(1990) c.261.
Caldera, A.J., Fiiosofia e Crise, Peia filosofia latino-americana, Editora Vozes,
Petropolis, Brasil, 1984.
Devall, B., and Sessions G., Deep Ecology, Salt Lake City, Utah 198 5.
Drengson, A, Beyond Environmental Crisis: from Techocrat to Planetary Person,
Peter Lang, New York, 1989.
Gare, A., Nihilism Incorporated, Eco-logical Press, Bungendore N.S.W., 1993.
Glacken, C.J., Traces on the Rhodian Shore, University of California Press, Berkeley,
1967.
Hargrove, E., Foundations of Environmental Ethics, Prentice Halls, New Jersey, 1989.
Heidegger, M., The End of Philosophy, Harper & Row, New York, 1973.
Hruschka, J., '7%^ gr^a^-yf AappZ/z^jj prZncZpZe anJ
^arZy German anrZcZparfan^ p/
ariZ/rarZan r/z^ozy"", Utilitas 3(2)(1991) 165-177.
Passmore, J., '77z^ gzzz7 p/* p/zZZo.yop/zy', address on the occasion of his 80th birthday,
Australian National University, 1994.
Paleocrassas, Y., Environmental crime and punishment.
Towards a new
development model, Austemb, Brussells, 1994.
Plumwood, V., Feminism and the Mastery of Nature, Routledge, London, 1993.
Roszak, T., Where the Wasteland^ Ends, Doubleday, Garden City New York, 1972.
Russell, B., Wisdom of the West.
Solomon, R., and Higgins, K., (eds ), From Africa to Zen, An Invitation to World
Philosophy, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Maryland, 1993.
Sylvan, R., 'DozzzZnanf I3rZfZ.y/z ZzZ^oZogy', typescript, Canberra, 1995.
Sylvan, R., 7wp<2cf p/gZ^rnafZve Shelves > Top > Pile 3",https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/d95c8ba51440c590d49d8f2a4673afe9.pdf,Text,"Draft Papers",1,0
172,https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/show/172,"Box 21, Item 705: Draft of Paradigmatic roots of environmental problems","Printout of draft, dated 3 July 1995.","One of ten papers digitised from item 705.","Richard Sylvan","The University of Queensland's Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291, Box 21, Item 705","Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy",1995-07-03,"This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, Dr. N.A.J. Taylor.","For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library.",,"[31] leaves. 92.75 MB. ",,Manuscript,"https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:906b49d",,"3.7.95
PARADIGMATIC ROOTS
OF
ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS
Abstract. Virtually all diagnoses of the roots, and sources, of environmental
problems are defective. While defective diagnoses persist, problems will not
be adequately addressed.
Focal questions ask why human communities so frequently degrade,
impoverish or even destroy their own environments, and more generally why
the whole earth is now in jeopardy through human enterprise. More
immediate answers, sometimes correct so far as they go (which is not deep
enough), look to components of environmental impact equations. More
thorough-going answers fall into two classes: first those that do not question
entrenched paradigms, but seek (unsuccessfully) to explain widespread
problems simply through defective practice, and secondly those that, rightly
recognising that defective practice is no adequate answer, look to deeper
paradigmatic sources of problems. A fatal flaw in most of the latter answers
lies in their monistic concentration on a single paradigm, or single narrow
band of paradigms. These flaws are exposed, whence a wider, more
satisfactory answer can be broached.
Background busywork includes firstly, explaining problems and relevant
paradigms and how paradigms operate regarding environmental problems,
and secondly, detailed disentangling of proposed and alleged sources of the
problems. With this done, it is argued that none of these answers,
fashionable or other, to the focal questions is satisfactory. Here lies the
important hard, but very negative and decidedly incomplete, work of the
present investigation.
A different more complex investigation is accordingly instigated. An initial
answer is located through broader classes of paradigms : environmentally
friendly and unfriendly. Further effort is expended, profitably, in trying to
characterize these classes. Among significant corollaries, one is striking:
philosophy as portrayed through its standard history is dismal environmental
news.
2
PARADIGMATIC ROOTS
of
ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS
Broaching focai questions, and searching for deeper answers.
Human activity is now degrading terrestrial eco-systems at an extraordinarily rapid rate
(liquidation of natural forest systems affords just one striking example). In modern times
humans have devised sophisticated and sophistical idea-systems which justify such system
degradation.
Often in the past they would not have seen such transformation as mattering;
many remain so programmed, regarding transformation as increasing wealth (a presumption
encouraged under mainstream economics). More recently dominant human cultures have
developed social systems which induct most humans into degradation procedures (through
need, tax impositions, pressure to engage in cash economies, and so on) and which weave
entrapping justificatory webs (through agencies, councils, courts, educations, missions, and so
on).
Whence arises an increasingly broached question 1; Why is this happening? More
explicitly, w/zy
/zzzzzz^zzz cozzzzzzzzzzzyz^^
<27Z6^ zzzzpov^rz^/z
^zzvzwzzzzz^zzr^, their own habitats? Indeed why do they sometimes, persistently, perhaps over a
long period, destroy their owzz habitats? More sweepingly, w/zy fy r/zf w/zo/e
now perhaps
in y^o/7or^y r/zrozzg/z /znnzon ^ni^rprfs^? For those eager to anticipate the main outcome, the
unremarkable answer to be eventually found to these focal questions is in essence this, because
too many humans, especially those in control of environmentally impacting enterprises, remain
committed to or caught within environmentally unfriendly paradigms, diverse paradigms but all
displaying quite insufficient regard for the health and well-being of relevant habitats and of the
earth.
Parts of any answers to such focal questions come immediately through environmental
impact equations, conservation laws, and such like. For example, degradation is occurring
through the impact of overpopulation, excessive pollution, damaging or faulty technologies,
and so on.
While such answers are important, and often correct as far as they go in
combination, and while they may correctly indicate what has to be changed somehow, they are
nonetheless somewhat superficial, and they leave much to be explained. For example, they do
not explain why a community persisted upon a course that deliberately led to such problems, or
why it is so resistant to changes that might reduce impacts and pull it out of its problem-holes.
Less superficial answers look to ideologically entrenched attitudes and commitments, to
1
In sources as diverse as Shepard (first page) and Jacobs (p.23). Contrary to other sources, such
as Marshall, humans are by no means the only biological species that proceed to degrade or
impoverish their own environments. Introduced ""pest"" species, such as rabbits and mynahs in
the Antipodes, also do so; perhaps some botanical species contrive to as well.
3
pervasive paradigms that underwrite anti-environmental practices, as for instance the wood
production ideology does forestry practice, even so-called ""new forestry"", and market ideology
does economic practice, even so-called ""environmental economics""^
An illustrative example which reveals the power of paradigms in blocking or facilitating
action will shortcut a more elaborate argument, through action theory, to the efficacy of idea
systems. Consider an unwanted pregnancy, resulting despite due precautions or whatever.
Observe that, more and more there are comparatively safe technologies available to effect
termination and seemingly solve the immediate problem. Ask: why so many people are
opposed to choice of abortion? A very common answer is: because they are operating under an
elaborate paradigm, typically organised religion (bureaucratic Christianity in the West), themes
of which, the creeds of which, prohibit such choicest Of course pro-choice considerations are
also paradigmatically embedded, for instance in forms of liberalism. Picturesquely, a social
paradigm imposes controls on action, a system of red and green lights on a captured agent s
routing procedures.
Or with a different picture, paradigms project a steeply impeding
topography on action space.
Paradigms not only guide, control and limit, they also
correlatively give permission—as, for instance, space to play god, freedom to release a new
species or variety which may or has proved a pest or noxious or has been biologically
engineered, liberty to neglect or degrade or vandalize. But paradigms do even more; they
facilitate explanation, above all they make understanding possible. In these regards, they may
work for better as well as for worse. Thus it is not a matter of getting rid of them, were this
even feasible, but of getting right paradigms.
The settings in terms of which agents such as humans act and operate, even down-toearth everyday agents, invariably include, not far in the background, paradigms, cultures,
creeds, ideologies, pervasive myths or the like, all idea-systems, all involving models (in a
technical sense) of one sort or another. Even the most practical (and vociferously practical) of
humans are governed by background ideosystems.
It is in terms of these background
ideosystems that a great deal concerning human practices with respect to natural environments
can be explained, what would otherwise lack satisfactory explanation.^
That explanation comes not however through a single paradigm, as has too often been
supposed in trying to answer focal questions, but through a bundle of somehow aligned
paradigms. Compare how a person may be represented, in social science, not through a single
2
3
4
For more on this style of explanation, see further RP.
It is not, going to be contended that religion—or a certain Abramic religion, such as
Christianity—is the main villain of the environmental piece. It is now well enough appreciated
that religions in general borrowed much in their damaging articles from ancient philosophies.
What will however, be suggested is that dominant philosophies Jo have much to answer for in
this regard.
Further, as logical positivists observed, explanation and justification patterns tend to overlap.
How people justify their practices offers an explanation, though perhaps a misleading or
superficial explanation, of them.
As well, positivistic theories show, though in an oversimplified way, how models, which
paradigms are, serve in explanation, justification and understanding. See e.g. Hanson.
4
role or program, but by way of a set of interconnected roles. What has been regularly
overlooked in seeking deeper paradigmatic sources of environmental problems is systematic
plurality. In part this neglect of plurality can be explained through countervailing propensity to
seek single answers, and to try to locate uniqueness, where however causes and sources are
plural. So it is with paradigmatic sources and roots of environmental problems. They are
plural.
As to what is going on theoretically, there is a fairly complex story to be told, an easier
working image for which is appropriately ecological. That image focusses upon the structure of
a perhaps impenetrable thicket or tangle, such as a dense rainforest patch, or, itself simplified, a
fig or bamboo thicket. Below an emergent top layer representing the problems concerned,
those raised by the focal questions, there is the canopy layer, of interlinked proximate causes.
Below that again stands a plurality of stems, plural supports, which can be construed as
supporting sources, and below them again, ultimately sustaining the whole structure, a
multiplicity of intertwined roots, representing paradigmatic basics.
What is sought are ultimate sources, and roots, not immediate causes. The cause of local
pollution may be a factory that an agent installed, to produce more flim-flam. That too may be
the physical source of the immediate problem. But deeper questioning seeks the reasons for
such production and such factories. While there may be problems with ideas and idea
structures as causes, as causally efficacious, these problems do not transfer to reasons and
sources. Nonetheless there are buried metaphors, and linkages, to be unscrambled: how are ""A
is source of B"" and ""A is a root of B"" to be explicated?
While there is much written on roots and sources of environmental problems or
developments virtually none of it addresses the question of what is meant by the partially
buried metaphors of rooA? and
introductory text, 7%^
. One striking example is supplied by Pepper's useful
Although this text presents itself
specifically as concerning roots, there is in fact no explication offered of the crucial
metaphor on which it turns. For that matter there is no direct account of what the roots of
environmentalism—still less, though quite different, of environmental problems to which
environmentalism answers—are supposed to be (granted there is much oblique material). It is
apparent also that Pepper has become rather carried away with the roofs metaphor, throwing it
into several chapter headings and applying it pretty indiscriminately to mean simply
(from some earlier occurrence); thus for instance, 'the roots of the theme of reconciliation of
freedom and authority' (p.193). Such usage is unsound. Because rudiments of some idea make
an earlier appearance in some authority or work, later workers may not have arrived at such an
idea by expanding on these rudiments; they may have arrived where they did quite
independently or by a different route. The mistake is that of reading a source or (genetic)
causal linkage into a mere temporal conjunction:
Neither roots nor sources are mere beginnings or simply early occurrences; there have to
be continuing connections, with directional relationships such as supply or sustenance. But for
5
roots and sources different connections and elaborations are to be expected. After all, the
metaphors, and likewise what they give rise to, are evidently different; more literally, plants
have roots, normally below them, springs and streams rise from sources, not roots, often above
them, and so on. Both differ from another popular
buried metaphor, that of
foundations. Foundations bring in other features such as solidity, stability and comparative
permanency, while severing critical transmission features (for foundations may merely
passively support, not sustain supported superstructure).
So foundations, for all their
importance in epistemology and elsewhere f/Toundationalism is correct, can be set aside.$
So far dictionaries do better than popular and philosophical texts. For instance, a short
listing for the/ig^ra/Mre use of 'root' runs: 'the basis, bottom, the fundamental part, or that
which supplies origin, sustenance, means of development, etc.' (Concise English Dictionary).
Such a two component account will serve nicely, for a start. However conjunctions should
substantially displace disjunctions, else roots could collapse to foundations or could collapse to
mere trace element supplements. Roots both give a basis and bottom binding into a substratum
and supply sustenance and means of development. Roots connections are richer as well as
more specific than sources, which may merely show from where an item comes or is obtained.
Further that place of derivation that may not be a basis or bottom, but for instance a source
book. With roots, like normal foundations, a basis or bottom is reached, whereas sources may
have further sources (hence the search for ""deeper"", even ultimate, sources). Finally, root and
source connections carry explanations, at least genetic explanations—concerning how items got
to be what and the way they are—because roots and sources are characteristically that from
which items develop. Sometimes even more information, including a whole control system,
gets transmitted. As much happens where roots are paradigmatic, to return to that strange mix
of buried metaphors.
Reaching deeper roots is important. Without locating them, perhaps all the roots (should
they resemble blackberry), problems may not get properly addressed. Should we wrongly
locate roots, then proposed resolutions directed at these, cutting them off or replacing them, will
also go astray, wrongly directed or whatever. Such is the fate of many proposals concerning
environmental problems.
There are several parts to the approach sketched, if it is to be properly elaborated—
including a working classification of environmental problems and their proximate solutions,
and an account of paradigms and their roles—before getting to paradigmatic answers to focal
questions. But we can be brief on these necessary preliminaries, because main details are
already in circulation and because they have been addressed elsewhere.
5
Despite a referee's suggestion that discussion of ""roots"" 'could be improved by a contrast of the
""roots"" metaphor with the ""foundations"" metaphor, the fact is that we are decidedly not
concerned with foundations of environmental problems; to the contrary, we do not wish to see
them supported (if shoddily), established and so on. On the growing complexity and varying
interpretations ofan emergent bog, see for instance Chisholm.
6
Although these will be duly connected, with paradigms implicated in problems, they are
different components, and admit and deserve separate explanation.
la. ^nv/ronw^nZoZ pro/?Z^wis omZso/o^ows.
Definitions of 'environmental problem', and classifications of such problems, have already
been ventured? What problems emerge as environmental depends upon background value
framework. What counts as a major problem on deeper environmental perceptions may be but
a minor problem, or written off as not a problem at all, on shallower perspectives. Among such
indicator problems, ones here taken as seri'oMS problems, are those of
* sustaining biodiversity and
* maintaining significant wilderness?
Even if the broad impact of human enterprise were sufficiently reduced to guarantee
comfortable survival of future humans, these desiderata may well not be guaranteed. There
would be outstanding problems.
In any event, it is not too difficult to say more or less what environmental problems are
(at worst by furnishing familiar lists), and in many cases to indicate at least in principle how
they might be resolved. Environmental impact equations, encountered in a more perceptive
classification of problems, reveal how they can be resolved. Namely, by altering relevant
impact parameters.
Given this why are they proving so intractable? Why is so little done? Why is so very
little
despite all the talk? Proximate solutions, about as far as positive science conveys
us, are not however satisfactory stopping points. How is it, given so much scientific
information and expertise, that humans are continuing to sharply degrade, and risk substantially
destroying, their habitats.
To these, the focal questions of this exercise, there is an array of competing answers on
offer or to be met in an extensive literative. As we will soon discover, most of these answers
are too simple; and taken, as intended, as comprehensive, they are wrong. Correct answers to
the questions are however tm/yorfoHf, because if we fail to get to the bottom of the issues, there
is even less prospect of satisfactory action to turn around a difficult and deteriorating situation.
That these issues do not matter, that casual human relationships, or how many devaluing
dollars uncaring humans can briefly stuff in their pockets, matter more than whole islands of
habitats—these sorts of value judgements (after all
is a value term par excellence)
derive from and are supported by particular ideologies.
lb. Afo%ZeZ-ZZ%e oZyecZs.
*
poro^ZZgozs, Z^ZeoZogZes, CMZZMr^s ,a?MZ so on.
A
can be explicated, technically, as a model in precisely a generous logical sense?
See for example GE, which duly details connections of the problems with impact equations and
proximate solutions.
As to the extent of the problem (even) in North America, and a proposed remedy, see
See e.g. 77^
eHvhwwwgnta/po/icy m OECD
Box 1.7, in Pearce et al, p.24.
See RP, where many environmentally relevant illustrations are given and explained.
7
That is, a paradigm amounts to a structure supplied by an elaborate interpretation function on a
general system, i.e. semantical and other evaluations defined on an integrated relational
structure. Naturally it is required to be/hif/t/h/ to what it models, the social forms and norms,
scientific research programs, or whatever. A jocz#/
in contrast to a scientific
paradigm, is a paradigm where the propositional and action theory, the socio-political themes
and value judgements, is that of a social group. A pure
is but a comprehensive social
paradigm, where by ""comprehensive"" is meant that it covers a sufficiently comprehensive part
of the life-styles and life-forms of the community concerned. There are now many examples of
formulations of the themes delivered under rival social paradigms and under different cultures,
from these, mostly sketchy formulations we can work back towards the underlying models.
The basic vehicle, a situations or worlds model, is a -ytwHmh'ca/ object, an item like a
complex universal 10 similarly open to a range of construals and reduction attempts, e.g.
metaphysical, conceptual, epistemic, linguistic and so on. Once this is realised, it can be seen
that successive cohorts of philosophers and sociologists, historians and geographers have
repeated one another in vaguely discerning essentially the same sorts of underlying structures
under different categorisations: thus, for instance, forms of understanding (Kant), of
consciousness (Marx), of life (Wittgenstein), conceptual schemes (Conant), presuppositions
(Collingwood), discursive formations (Foucault), W^/to/tsc/zoMMtzgs, total views (Naess),
traditions (MacIntyre), traditions of thought, cultures, perspectives, outlooks, ideologies,
programs,.... An ideology, for instance, in the non-derogatory (non-Marxist) sense is an ideas -
system, initially a propositional system or theory with a relevant domain of ideas operative,
from which a paradigm can be discerned and elaborated.
Such models are typically presented in extremely truncated form, for example through a
tabulation of capsule themes. Here is a combination example:
TABLE 1: Elements of Taoism as contrasted with Deep Ecology and with the dominant
paradigm: an initial capsule formulation .n
Taoism
Deep Ecology
Dominant (Western)
Paradigm
Harmony with nature,
through Tao
Harmony with nature
Domination over nature
Nature valuable in itself;
""humanism"" rejected
Natural environment
valued for itself
Nature a resource;
intrinsic value confined
to humans
10
11
It resembles a
universal; compare e.g. Plato's system of forms, Locke's of complex
ideas. Naturally there are differences between, for instance, traditions (of thought) which are
historically bound, cultures, which are geographically and otherewise connected, and conceptual
schemes (where a conceptual reduction is insinuated), but all are, at logical bottom, models of
paradigmatic sort.
This tripartite example is adapted from UTD, where capsule elements of Taoism are duly
expanded.
8
Levelling of differences;
wide impartiality
Biocentric egalitarianism
Human supremacy
Supplies ample
Earth supplies limited
Ample resources with
substitutes
Following Tao-te
Spiritual goals,
especially self-realisation
Material economic growth
a predominant goal
Enlightenment
Self-realisation
Personal (material)
enrichment
Doing with enough
(recycling inappropriate)
Doing with enough;
recycling
Consumerism
Non-competitive lifestyle;
voluntary simplicity
Cooperative lifestyle
Competitive lifestyle
Decentralised/neighbourhood and village focus
Decentralised/bioregional
/neighbourhood focus
Centralised/urban centred/
national focus
Hierarchy without
power structure;
anarchoid
Non-hierarchical/
grassroots democracy
Power structure
hierarchical
Limited technology
Appropriate technology
High technology
Considerable caution
Precautionary practice
Risking taking (verging
upon adventurism)
Paradigms control action space by some equivalent of directives; under an earlier analogy, red
and green lights duly interpreted. They may not supply direct commands, general obligations
and prohibitions, but may operate more indirectly. For instance an enlightened person, a role
model, a person following Tao, would act this way, not that. (Taoism, like certain modern
ideologies, eschews deontic judgements.)
Paradigms are absorbed and they guide practice. They commonly form part of actors'
worlds; they are certainly part of actors' programs for practice and considered action in a world.
In a
then, they are things, programs actors carry round in their heads; so heads (or rather
consciousnesses) have to be changed, nor rolled.
2. Proposed answers to focal questions: a preliminary classification of inadequate answers
and suggested remedies.
Most of the extraordinary range of answers proposed supply but a single source, and are
accordingly defective for this reason, usually among other reasons. Indeed it is not much of an
exaggeration to assert that virtually everything proposed, in a now extensive literature, is
wrong.
TABLE 2. Main tabulation of answers and remedies , in three stages.
D.
answer?
9
DI.
Ignorance
Relevant
information
Information
now available
D2.
Unintended consequences
Relevant
information
Information
now available
D2a
Faulty technique,
or technology
Repairs
Repairs already
made
D3
Deviation (from
theory, etc.)
Education (for failure
to limit deviance)
Adherence
a. Deviation
uneliminable, or
b. Adherence
no remedy
D4.
Systemic lock-in
(through poverty,
ensnarement in
market forces, etc.)
Trap removal
a. Explains
only certain
cases, and
b. Due to
paradigmatic
features
D5.
Insensitivity or
insensibility
Problem
apprised
Remedy tried;
background
ideological
blockage
D3a
When pursued, objections like those noted either force defective practice out as unsatisfactory,
or push it back to paradigmatic features.
proposed (among others)
single paradigm
an.S3V^r.y
Pl.
Christianity (mainstream
Catholicism)
Pla.
Protestantism and its ethic
P2.
P2a
Cartesianism
Dualism
Scientific enlightenment, or
alternative (Eastern) religion
Monism
Anti-dualism
Modified holism
P2b
Mechanism
Organicism
P3.
P3a
P3aa
Substance metaphysics
Possessive individualism
Personalism
Process metaphysics
Non-reductionism
Transpersonalism
P4.
Capitalism
Socialism
P5.
Industrialism
Pre-industrialism (romanticism)
Post-industrialism
P5a Technocratic bureaucracy
P5aa. Transnational business
P6.
Enlightenment
Anti-enlightenment
Anti-materialism
10
P6a
Materialism
Spiritualism
P8.
P9
Patriarchy, andocentrism
Human domination
of humans
Feminism
Anti-domination
(anti-hierarchy)
Observe that what some have proposed as remedies, others have seen as sources; remedies
proposed tend to share defects of sources.
of this paradigmatic sort (but with the paradigms often subject
PS. Furfur
specific or partial) include:
Typical
Platonism
Leibnitzianism
Kantianism
Anglo-American philosophy^
Utilitarianism
Economism (economic imperialism as
suggested
New metaphysics
New metaphysics
Consequentialism
Continental philosophy
Alternative ethics
New social science; ethics
contrasted with straight economic roots)
-TO on.
A very rough
Contractarianism
Consequentialism
Domination transfer
Human nature (esp. aggression)
Domination removal
Adolescencism
Infantilism (from Freudian physchology)
Maturation
Maturation
runs as follows: draw up a potted list of mayor movements and factors in
dominant Western thought. Then many—perhaps it is not excessive to say mo^r—entries in
that list will have been nominated, likely separately, by someone as the source of the problems.
That list accordingly continues (even including, sometimes, entries like Taylorism, i.e.
reorganisation of industry along lines popularized by Taylor), but what is included is
representative of the important and more interesting answers to be encountered. There are other
allegedly nonparadigmatic answers however, varying from interesting to crazy, that should also
be taken into some account, for instance answers like Shepard's challenging answer. Although
Shepard dismisses ideologies, what he offers is a further ideosystem, of similar dubious or false
cast. Strange answers include pushing it all back to human
(thus not only Shepard,
but also Fox, and Ehrlich and other gurus with insistence upon 'mental maladaptation').
12
The mainstream form, analytic philosophy, appears to comprise empiricism-cum-utilitarianism
in Britain, tempered in America by pragmatism.
11
Basically, there is something wrong with a society that does that to its habitat. It is sick
—in a popular sense, yes, it is sick. It is the slides that follow, however, along psychological
routes, that are to be resisted. One slide begins invitingly: As it is not literally sick, well not
physically usually, it must be
sick; that is, sliding further and fast, insane or mad. But
the sources of mental sickness lie in childhood (as Freudianism erroneously insists). The slide
continues to: what we have are immature societies, frozen at an early stage of development. No
doubt there is somef/nng to the theme that dominant societies, USA especially (which now
influences so much in other cultures), are locked into youth culture, a sort of late consumptive
adolescence. 13 No doubt, too, that maturity—but an environmental maturity—is desirable,
even mandatory.
Meanwhile, immaturity is fostered right through human life. Considerable effort is put
into trying to induct older people, who are often marginalised, into active consumptive society,
to spend their money through tourism, on new compact housing, in those most wasteful of
modern institutions such as airliners and hotels, hospitals and old-age homes, and so forth.
3. Documentation as to some of the acclaimed purer sources.
Like the lists of proposals and intricated paradigms, the documentation too is somewhat
perfunctory, tending here and there towards notes. Of course there are excuses. While whole
theses could be spun out on several of these topics, already beginning to elicit such treatment, a
prime objective here is different from usual: neither to convict, nor to clear or excuse, but to
partially implicate most items cited in the main tabulation above. Consider, in brief, some of
the usually accredited sources:
*
region, above all Christianity. The theme that the source of ecological problems,
The historical roots of our ecological crisis', are to be found in Western religion, and
specifically in The Judaeo-Christian belief that mankind was created to have dominion over
nature', was repeated in a particularly pointed and subsequently influential way by White. 14
One helpful summary of White's line of argument runs as follows:
Allied with technological and scientific developments, orthodox Christianity
has produced arrogant exploitation of nature, and a contemporary ecological
crisis. White's thesis is that the West's successful science and technology
developed between the 8th and 12th centuries — it is much older than the
scientific revolution though it was not until about 1850 — following the
democratic revolutions — that the science and technology were combined to
produce truly immense powers to change nature. The early development,
however, was paralleled by the development of exploitative attitudes to
nature which seemed to be Tn harmony with larger intellectual patterns',
namely the victory of Christianity over paganism. This destroyed the
animistic beliefs whereby men thought twice before they plundered and
destroyed natural objects. It substituted instead a faith in perpetual progress,
13
14
It interestingly matches the locking of primary production systems into pioneering stages such as
preclimax formations. Shepard's dialectic is investigated in more detail in the Appendix .
White's article has generated an enormous defensive literature, primarily from Christian
apologists, but also from softer environmentalists and from testy historians of ideas. The whole
area looks in danger of disappearing from intellectual view under a heavy blanketing snowfall,
snowed.
12
a belief that God designed nature for man's benefit and rule, and that action,
not contemplation, was the correct Christian behaviour. Science formed an
extension of theology (for to know God you had to find out how his creation
worked), and technology provided the active means to carry out God's will.
Because today's attitudes are essentially inherited from Christianity, then it
'bears the burden of guilt"" for contemporary ecological disruption.^
What has happened with the divisive charge, advanced by White, that Christianity was
the prime source of environmental problems, is particularly instructive. In an attempt to diffuse
the charge Christian apologists pointed to, what there undoubtedly were, recessive strands or
isolated seeds in Christianity which were much more environmentally benign (though some
such as stewardship, which has evolved toward total managerialism and sustainable
development, have proved increasingly problematic). That does little or nothing to meet a more
sensitive and telling criticism that mainstream (or dominant) Christianity has much to answer
for as regards destruction and degradation of natural environments.^ Similar responses are
apposite for attempts to exonerate their wider sources, such as Western philosophy.
Against the sheeting of responsibility to religion, dominant forms of which should
undoubtedly cop
heavy criticism, it has been contended that
philosophy ... is the primary source of most Western ideas [and] is ...
for the ideas and attitudes that inhibit environmental protection
today.... Religion ... though often criticized ... as the chief culprit, has played
a much less fundamental role. Most of the environmentally offensive ideas in
Western religion originated not in religion but in Western philosophy.^
* CZa-y-sica/
above all the peak philosophies of Plato and Aristotle.
Greek philosophers approached natural phenomena in a way that (1)
prevented the development of an ecological perspective, (2) discouraged the
aesthetic appreciation of the natural world, and (3) promoted a conception of
reality that made the idea of nature preservation conceptually difficult, if not
impossible, is
More sweepingly, they set Western philosophy on a ruinous environmental course, a course
accentuated with the appearance of modem rationalist and empiricist philosophies.
*
/2/nZ(?.y6)/7/ry.
The dominant modern environmental approach is sometimes
Pepper pp.44-5. Pepper then embarks upon the murky story of alternative interpretations of
Biblical data and the Christian tradition, dredged up by a series of White's critiques. The issue
continues to be debated; for an older survey of traditions see Passmore, for a challenging recent
contribution to the debate see Callicott.
Each religion is multistranded. But we should look hardest at dominant operative forms: Ask,
not merely what they say, but what they Jo, and woM/J do. For an outline of just such a telling
criticism of mainstream Christianity, see Singer esp. pp.265-8.
Hargrove p.15. Certainly the sort of message that Pentecostal missionaries even now try to
preach to resistant Australian Aboriginals, that the earth is just filth, mere rubbish, can be traced
back in direct line to Plato's attitude to the land, an attitude Hargrove and Plumwood help
expose.
Hargrove p.21. Hargrove's claims may appear to have been confuted by Attfield, but really,
while they have been subject to minor qualification, they have been highlighted. There is a
much fuller story still to be told about classical Greek philosophy reassessed environmentally, of
the very different roles and impacts of Plato (with his unearthly philosophy), of Aristotle (with
his earthier chauvinism), of Stoics and of Epicureans, and of neo-Platonists. For a modest
beginning, see Plumwood on Plato, Toulmin on Stoics as contrasted with Epicureans, and
Glacken on lesser or lost Greek strands.
13
denominated Cartesianism, or the Cartesian Technocratic paradigm, in honour of Descartes,
upon whom (as a conveniently select individual from a swag of like-minded people) several of
the leading themes and ideas can be pinned. 19
While Descartes was undoubtedly
extraordinarily influential, so were others; Newton for one, Locke for another. The paradigm is
accordingly better denominated the Atomist-Empiricist-Technocratic paradigm, or some such.
Evidently it substantially overlaps other modern ideologies, such as that of the Enlightenment,
widely implicated as major sources of environmental problems.
*
While some conglomeration of the preceding sources and others
(some potted history of Western metaphysics, so to say) may be offered, more often what is
presented is some selection of Western metaphysical elements. Here is one example, plainly
exhibiting a heavy Heideggerean influence:
The roots of our environmental problems lie in Western metaphysics. For
metaphysics, Being is presencing; no allowance is made for any other mode
(sheltering, declining, concealing). Once metaphysics has established the
absolute dominion of the present over the not-present or no-longer-present,
the way is paved for the scientific method, with its emphasis on replicability
of results, predicability, quantification, and control. Nature becomes a
""natural resource"" —and people become ""human resources"". The sources of
anthropocentricism, imperialism, colonialism, sexism and consumerism can
all be traced back to metaphysics.
Western metaphysics has more or less conquered the world, and there is no
going back. Western metaphysics is more than simply a false consciousness
overlaid on top of ""authentic"" experience. Being changes historically, and
metaphysics is the index of that change... Metaphysics has a conquering,
exclusive imperative, ... and different [former] modes now exist only as
vestigial traces. They cannot be resurrected through ancient wisdom, native
healing, goddess worship, or any other supposedly intact, dormant system.
We cannot create a ""new order"". That would simply be another form of the
Will to Power... We can—and must—turn away from the dominant rhythms
of western metaphysics if we are to avoid the nihilism of a perpetually
ensconced technocratic rationalism. 20
An alternative to turning entirely away from Western metaphysics, consists in combining
rejection of standard Western metaphysics (or, less sweepingly, of dominant metaphysics,
characteristically individualistic and atomistic) in favour of development of recessive traditions
or mere Western seeds. Such a more sophisticated approach, also critical of Western
metaphysics, with atomism a main villain, is pursued by those who promote instead process or
plenum metaphysics.21
For encapsulation of the Cartesianism paradigm (a dominant dualistic form), summarising
Drengson's exposition, see RP, table 5. Drengson, for one, has helped portray Descartes as the
environmentally evil genius (or demiurge). That some orthodox philosophers, not merely
maverick philosophers, are now rushing to the defence of Descartes should be seen as entirely in
keeping with the character and roles of Western philosophy.
Undisclosed source. Amusingly, I have seen myself accused of 'rejecting] in its entirety
mainstream western philosophy and science, ... seen as the cause of the [environmental]
problem' and instead basing my 'ecocentric values on Eastern philosophies' (thus Bellett). This
charge was levelled on the strength of a peripheral exercise on classical Taoism and Deep
Ecology (now included in UTD).
For the first process option, see Gare; for the second, where the plenum is that of a holistic
relativity theory (more exactly holistic relativistic geometrodynamics), see Mathews.
14
*
The source of problems lies in The intellectual heritage of the Enlightenment'
(e.g. Dobson). Of course the main doctrines of the Enlightenment substantially overlap those
of modern mainstream philosophy and of Descartes' philosophy (but they shed dualistic and
theistic scholastic hang-overs).
* CapzfaZfym. The assumption that capitalism is responsible for environmental as well as social
evils, widespread until recently in state-socialist countries (when their own records were
revealed), can be traced back to Marx. According to Marx, with capZr^ZZym
for the first time, nature becomes purely an object for humankind, purely a
matter of utility; ceases to be recognised as a power for itself; and the
theoretical discovery of its autonomous laws appears merely as a ruse so as to
subject it under human needs, whether as an object of consumption or as a
means of production.22
But, as observed, a main embedded theme had appeared in earlier philosophy; for instance, the
idea of nature as purely an object for humankind, was advanced in Aristotle: 'Now if nature
makes nothing incomplete and nothing in vain, the inference must be that she has made all
animals for the sake of man'.23 Aristotle adopted a similar stance on nature as on other species.
The theme was to be oft repeated in subsequent Aristotelianism, and reiterated apparently in
shallower Stoicism.
But the subjection of everything to MfZZZ/y, no doubt a relative of
capitalism, appears to be a distinctively modem contribution.
*
Zn6?M.yfrZaZ jocZ^fy or Z/t^My/rZ^ZZym. Modern ZwJMyZrZ^ZZ^m ('the smooth
superhighway of industrial progress') is the source, such is an extraordinarily popular theme:
'... the root causes of the present crisis lie deep with the very foundations of the industrial
paradigm'.24 Similarly 'roots [of] the environment crisis ... go deeper to the foundations of
modern industrial society'.23 Again, 'the structural roots of the environmental crises [are found
in] industrialism, in commoditization, in commercialism, and in competition and greed'26 The
popular theme, that industrialism is the source, tends to confuse mere means— industrial
technology can without any doubt at all vastly facilitate environmental degradation (as well as,
It should not be overlooked that some of those who nominated
meant thereby
jpara^/gm or /yaraJt'gwM or an equivalent. But what they may gain thereby in verisimilitude, they
tend to lose in confusion.
p.409f.
Aristotle, Po/Zf/cs, Book 1, ch.8.
an inference, you might well exclaim. See further
Hargrove p.25.
M. Gabriel, 'How ""attitudes and implements"" have brought us to ""the end of nature""', a paper
presented at UNE Environment/ Poroe/igm^ Conference, April 1993. Gabriel proposes a
managerial resolution: 'for us to learn to manage both our relationship to our environment, and
more broadly the environment itself (quotes from abstract of paper). This amounts to the flip
side of an old problematic record. For the ""solution"" derives from the same defective box as the
evident problem.
Gabriel
Similarly industrialism is assumed as the source throughout McLaughlin (the
theme pervades his book) and as the root of the modern problem in Marshall (p.5ff). While
seriously astray as to roots and sources, those critical of industrialism have a significant case.
For, as well as functioning as a major inflator of intact problems, industrialism has helped
generate side problems of its own, as with new types of chemical and nuclear pollution.
Editorial in 7%^ Eco/ogMt, Jan-Feb 1992, p.2.
15
less satisfactorily, subsequent clean-up and environmental repair)— with sources and causes,
what directs and powers
uses of industrial technique and practice.
* Economic growf/t or economic JeveZopmenf. 'According to a common and currently
influential diagnosis, the environmental crisis has essentially economic roots'.27 One
widespread misconception is that economic growth is the source of environmental problems.
The assumption is astray for several reasons. For one, growth is at best a proximate cause,
itself in need of explanation. More importantly, growth may occur in sectors of an economy,
such as information technology or religious or artistic services, which have little or no
environmental impact. Also conversely, an economy which fails to grow, but is desperately
trying to survive, may exact heavy environmental costs (e.g. the forests are clear-felled to pay
for continuing employment). No doubt though,
economic growth is intimately intricated
with proximate causes of environmental problems (through environmental impact equations).
Similar considerations tell against the familiar proposition that the source of the problems
is economic development itself or, what is different, the entrenched model of economic
development. While it is no doubt correct, and important to emphasize, that 'the Western
model of economic development, far from being the solution to"" environmental and social
problems, is 'actually fuelling' them, it is not the sole or distinguished source of the
problems. 28
*
nafMre. '... the roots of our ecologic crisis reach beyond the variable topsoil of
intellectual history, whether Eastern or Western, into the common substrata of human nature
itself.'29 What such ""nature"" amounts to and how it functions as roots, both commonly left
obscure, turns upon background hypotheses as to the nature of this nature. Different false
27
28
29
Goodin, p.573. While not contesting the theme, Goodin does continue: 'the problem is not just
that there are too many people, or even that they are enjoying too high a standard of living. A//
r/mf fy
too, of course. More fundamentally, however, problems of environmental
despoliation are said to derive from skewed incentives as they pursue their various goals'
(p.573). That too will be seen to be seriously astray, though it contains large grains of truth; it
presumes unchanged the prevailing economically-skewed dominant social paradigm.
Both socialists and other opponents of capitalistic conspicuous consumption tend to select the
living-standard component of the main environmental impact equation as the source of the crisis.
Thus Cuban luminary, Castro, in a recent stunningly succinct speech: 'Less luxury, less wastage.
Otherwise it will be too late'.
Quoting claims of E. Goldsmith, advanced in an interview in For^f arx/ Fir;/ 273 (August 1994)
pp.46-7. The need for emphasis will persist while locally prominent political figures like the
present Prime Minister of Australia travel around the Earth with the hackneyed message that
only economic growth will solve environmental problems.
Seeing growth as the problem affords only a superficial analysis, like that of pointing to
overconsumption with which growth is interconnected. As deeper inquiry reveals, underlying
both issues of economic growth, employment and consumption, and alternatives taken, are
models, paradigmatic models. Growth is but a means to objectives assumed in the dominant
paradigm. A deeper analysis shows too why more growth will not ultimately solve relevant
problems.
Callicott and Ames, 'Epilogue: On the relation of idea and action' p.282 (see also p.281), in a
desperate and apparently unsuccessful attempt to reconcile the claim (repeatedly advanced in
their book) that Asian traditions of thought can make a significant contribution to much
improved treatment for natural and built environments, with 'the deplorable environmental
conditions prevailing in contemporary Asia' (p.280).
16
hypotheses, that humans are invariably driven by aggression, sexual or reproductive
imperatives, economic needs, yield different defective accounts. In Catholic orthodoxy such a
source, human nature, comes burdened with original sin; the source of a sweep of problems,
including now environmental ones, is ""man's fallen nature"". That astonishing source also
comes contaminated, as for instance gender biassed.
* Parriarc/ty. The source is patriarchy, and androgyny; problems derive from mistreatment of
women. 'Our troubles begin with the invention of male deities located off the planet'.30
'patriarchy is the source of the environmental crisis'.31 One sample linkage statement runs as
follows:
... there is a huge denial ... of the violence perpetrated on women both
historically and ... presently] and ... this is the same energy that, turned
against the Earth, is destroying the very life-support systems and rapidly
destroying the conditions that makes complex life possible. The fires that
consume the Amazon are the very same fires that burned 9 million witches
and I believe that there can be no solution of our ecological problems unless
we simultaneously address our gender issues.32
Patriarchy, as source, is evidently a special case of long invoked
themes:
* 77MW6W JommarzoM
q/
It is an extraordinarily widespread
assumption that the impact of humans (or, until recently, of Man!) on the environment, or
creatures or things in it, is a product of that of humans with each other, typically of groups or
classes. In misleadingly brief form, the source is social: Man's inhumanity to Man; and the
solution correspondingly is social. Unremarkably, this unlikely assumption comes in a variety
of different formsrearly, concerning the mistreatment of animals as an (inevitable) spill-over
from mistreatment of humans, recently concerning maltreatment of nature spilling over from, or
being one with, that of women. The fashionable assumption runs, in one form or another, from
Aquinas through Kant to a range of recent trend-setters, including Marcuse, Illich, Passmore,
Bookchin ... and some leading feminists. In particular, it is part of the very meaning of wcz'a/
an ideology shaped and championed by Bookchin: 'ecological problems arise from
deep-seated social problems'.33 On this theme among others, Bookchin simply follows a
prominent trend in social anarchism set by Kropotkin and his contemporary Reclus:
all see that the JornmoTzon anJ
q/
man L?
*
q/
* man Z?y man. Thus, 'Both Kropotkin and
q/
Reclus ... laid the foundations of a radical theory of human ecology.
Ecological despoliation was seen to reflect imbalances in human relationships
Quoted in Eckersley p.64, who develops and begins to assess patriarchical source themes. For a
more critical assessment see the sequel to GE.
See Seed, quoted in the sequel to GE; also Salleh (e.g. in EP3).
Jo/zzr
7992, Rainforest Information Centre, Lismore, 12. 12.91.
Seed's extravagant identity claims are but a dramatic extension of that popular tendency to
transform comparison and similarity statements into identity claims. Indeed reductionism often
reaches further, with attempted conversion of all relational statements into identity ones, along
with unrelational property claims.
Bookchin sometimes qualifies this central claim, with 'nearly all present', e.g. EP3 p.354. But
he is not strictly entitled to any such qualification, given his invariant theme that the domination
of nature always results from humans' domination of other humans (see e.g. Clark EP3, p.346).
The text EP3 contains a sizeable section providing a useful introduction to social ecology.
17
—domination of nature thus following from human domination'. ... It follows
that if domineering and exploitative human relationships can be avoided in
small-scale decentralised societies then such societies are also best for a
harmonious man-nature relationships
Domination and exploitation of one division by another can in tum be seen as a case of
dualism at work, between the one, the dominator or dominating class, and the other, the
dominated.
*A
*
o/
Environmental problems derive from operation of a set of connected
ideologically-entrenched and defective dualismsS
*
of environmental problems lie in educational systems.
Or if roots don't,
do. However, roots of environmental or social problems do not lie in
educational systems. ParAy of their solutions may however. For education is critical, for
instance, in correcting
to established satisfactory arrangements, such as,
so it is claimed, Enlightenment ideals or traditional ethical systems.^ Therewith we are
transported full circle back to defective practice answers.
4. A
on,
to, proposed answers
A main part of this exercise consists in a detailed critical commentary on the entries in the
main tabulation, and on proposals like them. Small beginnings are made on the exercise, in two
stages reflecting a major division in the main tabulation.
a J D. Defective practice answers tend to come from those who presume we are already in
possession of adequate theories, or what approximates them or supplies main elements of them.
(Such answers are also more liable to emanate from conservatives, opposed to new or radical
theories, advanced on the basis of inadequacy of prevailing theories in practice.)
Defective practice answers are especially popular in economic reaches. There was a time,
perhaps not past yet, when all market failures in the shape of negative externalities were passed
off as unintended consequences of economic activity. While ""consequences"" or outputs such
things as pollution certainly are, unintended they mostly are not now, without
'unintended' of its normal sense. For example, industrialists, apprised of conservation laws and
unsurprised by polluted wastes, who dump their waste where and when regulators and waste
watchers are not looking, can hardly pretend that that output is an unintended consequence of
their industry. That should now be a
joke, itself with serious consequences.
Accordingly new ecological economics insists that we dig deeper—without however
exceeding economic settings or a shifting dominant paradigm—to discover why markets may
Pepper p.192, with internal quotation from Breitbart. Unfortunately it is all too evident, given
humans could so socially organise, that they could settle into harmonious small-scale
communities which retained but little of pristine natural environments.
Such a proposition obtains a much fuller elaboration within Plumwood. In an interesting way,
such a proposal can hardly be wrong, given the conclusion reached below that a set of defective
paradigms is at work. For evidently paradigms can be covered by dualisms, represented by a set
of them in each case, somewhat as numbers can be represented in binary terms, generated from a
basic two-oneness duality.
Thus Passmore, Attfield, and others. For a critical assessment of education, see GE
18
foreseeably fail and why environmentally rectifying technology is not delivered.37 where they
usually arrive, travelling within such unduly confined settings, is, like welfare economics
before ecological, at better regulated markets, with business set as before within frameworks of
plans and incentives, controls and penalties. Environmentally, however, such approaches do
not reach very deep, or tap into underlying paradigmatic problem-sources.
But these sorts of defective practice answers do not always derive from standard
economic sources. A deviation-style answer is much favoured by Marxists to explain failure,
environmental and other, of the former Soviet Union and other Eastern block countries; namely
that true, or authentic, Marxism was not practiced. Unfortunately, even if it had been,
environmental consequences would be little better, given the heavy industrial commitments and
environmental shallowness, at best, of true Marxism.38 Differently, enlightenment liberals like
Passmore try to ascribe failures in Western environmental practice, not to any deficiencies in
mainstream theory, but to deviation from well established principles. Unfortunately adherence
to these ""well established principles"" is just one way in which the Earth will lose what remains
of its wilderness and remarkable diversity.
Now there are no doubt cases, past especially but also present, some resulting
(collectively) in extensive environmental degradation, where defective practice answers may be
correct. For example, there is harrowing case after harrowing case (brought together in texts
like
CAz/z'Wzon and AgrzcM/fMra/ Orzgz/M <2n<7 DAp^r^/) of degradation of prime
agricultural lands by imposed farming practices, where at least early on (before damage became
visible) ignorance and unintended consequences could be legitimately claimed. In most
historical cases we do not have enough information to be able to say with much assurance that
agriculture proceeded until effective collapse because of continuing ignorance, or because
practices were locked-in in one way or another, or because of sheer obduracy. But we do know
more about present agricultural practices, for example in more arid parts of Australia,
concerning both irrigated and dry-land agriculture. Many of these practices are undoubtedly
sharply degrading lands, and the consequences of the practices, which cannot plead or pretend
ignorance, are sufficiently appreciated. But the practices persist, and are encouraged by a
sweep of subsidies or concessions. No doubt some of the practitioners can reasonably claim
that they are locked into bad practices through circumstance, circumstances /tow beyond their
control such as financial pressures, unfavourable terms-of-trade, and so on, coupled with the
need to make a living. But some, such as companies controlling large tracts of land, can make
no such claims or excuses, nor can claim such things as family precedence, attachment to place,
and similar. Their obdurate practice has to be attributed to something else, most obviously not
37
38
Thus e.g. Jacobs, p.24.
it is surprising how much of the practice of later Socialist states is prefigured in texts like
Comm/mA?
Thus ""industrial armies"" are to be set up; credit, communications and
transport are to become state monopolies; ""migrants and rebels"" are to have their property
confiscated; and so on. All this runs contrary to much Marxist apologetics (as A. Urquhart, who
made those points, also observed).
19
deviation from theory, but commitment to an environmentally defective paradigm.
(% P and PS. Dealing with defective paradigm answers is an even more complex, and vexed,
business. Let us try to condense main matters to a few broad
1.
Many of the (incomplete) paradigms listed are no?
for environmental
impasses. They may be seriously mistaken, they may have undesirable intellectual and perhaps
social effects, but a society could persist sustainably with those drawbacks. Thus, for example,
substance metaphysics (under modified Spinozism), dualisms, even patriarchy. The same
might even hold for materialism and mechanism, (assuming these practices can be coherently
made out, that depending on how differentiated ideologies and values are accommodated, and
so forth).
To illustrate: a metaphysics, of any sort, cannot be the whole story, because it does not,
on its own, account for action, anti-environmental or other. Without special bridges, link
principles, from metaphysics to value-intricating action theory, a sort of naturalistic fallacy
Thus subverted, in essentially Hume's way, are all the vulgar sources of
environmental problems which take them as derived from metaphysics of one sort or another.
operates.
Such a criticism does not however extend to more comprehensive paradigms which connect
appropriately with practice.
2.
While several—not just
—of the paradigms listed are sufficient—in the rzg/tf
(given long historical development, accumulation, and so on^9)—none are
necessary. Similar impasses could arise, and locally have arisen, given significantly different
paradigms;
for example given, instead of main Western trouble-making paradigms,
Confucianism or advanced Polynesianism.
At this stage in dialectic, green history and the like—bio-history, eco-history, and related
virtual histories (concerning what
Ponting's
have happened)—enter decisively. For instance,
Hilary of f/te WorM begins with a graphic account of the rise and ecological
fall of Easter Island under the impact of Polynesian projects. The work also conveniently
documents many other examples, well-known to biohistorians, of ecological degradation or
collapse,/hr from the influence of Western paradigms.^ An important example (much less
speculative than some of the numerous other examples because of a comparative wealth of
primary documentation) outlines the destruction of accessible Chinese ecosystems under
Confucian dynasties. What several of these examples—Polynesian, Mayan, Sumerian and
others—also reveal is that no very high level of technology is needed to inflict serious
environmental damage; persistence in pursuit of an ideological project (with nothing directly to
39
40
While it is easy to imagine ineffectual or incompetent tribes which live benignly
environmentally, by just muddling along, under even the worst of paradigms, that is not really to
the point. A pertinent tribe needs to have developed the structure which leads to problems, to
have the means, and so on.
Ponting's valuable though rather simple book is but one of several bleak texts. Another is
Hillel's, and there is a succession of earlier classic works by geographers: Lowdermilk, Dale,
Mallory, Thorp and others. In general however, geographers and historians do not dig deep
enough, to paradigmatic roots.
20
do with basic needs) will suffice.
Other cultures did wreak, or would (given the technology and numbers, both of which
some were gaining) have wreaked similar damage. For instance, deforestation, salination,
megafaunal elimination, and so on, were well established, and expanding, before (or effectively
outside) the rise of modern Western paradigms, or in extensive regions outside their influence.
3.
The list of paradigms, as so far assembled, is substantially Western in orientation.
Moreover environmental woes are regularly ascribed to Western sources — wrongly. For non
Western paradigms have led, or would lead given the opportunities (including access to the
technologies), to outcomes as undesirable as under dominant Western paradigm. Witness
again Confucianism, for instance, and its role and influence in Asian regions. Confucianism
incorporates human chauvinism par excellence (as well as, some might say, Chinese
chauvinism).41 Or consider Islam, with its reach across the Middle East and beyond.
The main tabulation (of table 2) should accordingly be extended to take due account of
non-Westem paradigms, including for example:
Other Abrahamic religions
Islam
Judaism
Confucianism
Shintoism
Polynesianism, at least in advanced forms as on Easter Island.
What is ""Western"" is tending to blur also. Is Judaism Western, how western, or Islam? There
is also a tendency to suppose that more Western religions, Abrahamic religions, with their
intense monotheism, are significantly ideologically worse than non-Western. But the contrasts
are different and much more complex than that. A better divide is into monistic and pluralistic.
Even so, many undesirable social and environmental features are incorporated in, or
encouraged by, religious pluralisms from the Indian subcontinent.
4.
All the single paradigm answers are inadequate, all are too simple. Even so some are
less inadequate than others. It is the same, more or less, for the combined answers, often to be
encountered. For generally they represent but one thin cross-section of Western paradigms.
While all the single one-source one-shot paradigmatic answers, occur on their own, often
they are combined. For instance, although Descartes is often cited as a villain, more often
criticism of Cartesianism is combined with criticism of other concurrent ideological elements,
such as Baconian empiricism (less incompatibly, Drengson, for one, regularly combines
criticism of the technocratic paradigm with criticism of Cartesianism—though Descartes, for all
his rich and appalling thought, contributed little to the rise of technocratic organisation.)
Similarly Hargrove combines Greek philosophy, as original source, with modern rationalism
and much else.
41
Its net of effects extends widely. Consider, e.g., the role of Chinese medicine in decline of large
fauna worldwide.
21
5.
A general method of showing the inadequacy of all the paradigmatic answers tabulated,
and others, is familiar from logical theory: namely, the method of counter-models, of which the
counter-examples (under head 2) provide special cases. A presently important illustration
concerns /?<2frz<2rc/zy as a source of environmental woes. Counter-models reveal the substantial
of mistreatment of women and mistreatment of environmental items such as
animals or ecosystems. One the one hand, it is easy to envisage situations, not far from the
actual in some regions, where the lot of women is significantly improved, but the lot of
environmental items is not (e.g. men change their behaviour and attitudes relevantly as regards
women, are forced to change, or whatever); just such an outcome would accord with persisting
human chauvinism. More relevant, on the other, there are situations where the position of
environmental items is much improved, for instance under much more careful husbandry, but
that of women is not, for one reason or another (e.g. they remain other, different, second class,
etc.). It follows from the elaboration of such counter-models that patriarchy is not the source of
environmental problems, as there can be continuing patriarchy without the present range of
environmental problems (problems can dry up while patriarchy continues to operate). There is
no need to deny that patriarchy as (contingently) practised, with its sweeping supremacist
attitudes which make no due distinctions between inferior items, may be a major contributing
factor in present problems. Such slack contingent conjunctions do not convert to roots or
sources. Similarly with other social roots of environmental problems, for instance with human
domination of humans as the supposed source of all problems.
5. Towards a more satisfactory expianation.
Not only are the paradigmatic roots seriously intertangled (because of connections of one
paradigm with another, because for instance of heavy philosophical inputs into religious
paradigms), but further there is not a single defective paradigm. Rather there is a/wm'/y or
sheaf of paradigms, commitment to any of which, or any suitable combination of which, in
requisite circumstances, appears to have yielded environmentally untoward outcomes (requisite
circumstances including availability of technology, extent of social support, and so on). Within
that plurality there are of course gradations—and not only gradations but major differences—in
calibre, in environmental friendliness. For example, Cartesianism which regards animals as
mere automata incapable of feeling genuine pain, is significantly worse as regards other life
forms and their decent treatment than a utilitarianism which positively values animal sentience.
The family is not exclusively Western, nor somewhat more plausibly Northern, even
though as a result of forces like migration, colonialism and cultural imperialism, paradigms of
these sorts now predominate. Paradigms and cultures of less ""advanced"" and of third world
communities have also operated to enhance environmental vandalism and degradation locally
and regionally.
Nor are major infiators of environmental problems essentially Western. Industrialization
and technological advance—neither intrinsically Western, both manifested in varying degrees
in other cultures—are, without much doubt, what have
environmental problems from
22
rather localised ones, damaging for instance islands and river catchments, to grander and even
global ones. They are the engines, powerhouses, of major problems, generating thereby spin
off problems as well. But, once again, they are not deeper sources, but only means. (For again
push questioning deeper, and ask: why bother or persist with industry, the effort and dirt and
mess involved?) Nor, however, did they run on their own, nor do they continue on their own.
Such engines were not designed and built, fuelled and tended, independently.42 They evolved
primarily in the specially favoured culture of capitalism, though parallel developments could
have occurred, and later did, in other prepared and heavily controlled surroundings, such as
state socialism or post-imperial Confucianism. Now however these engines have been rendered
more reliable and less dependent on careful cultural support, and have been transformed to run
in less favourable settings.
Thus inflation can escalate from a multiplicity of prepared sources, thereby intensifying
problems and spreading them to larger regions. The intensification and spread is much
facilitated by the joint transfer of technology, industry and coupled problems from region to
region. As a result of transfer, inflation can occur within settings of quite different paradigms.
Even if the whole ""West"" went into a terminal decline, and its paradigms disappeared into
history, serious environmental exploitation and degradation would continue, driven by other
enthusiastic cultures. For instance, the West could in theory collapse through protracted war,
through pollution and congestion, or climate change and agriculture failure (there are many
unexcludible routes to catastrophic decline, outlined in ""Limits to Growth"" scenarios, that could
differentially impact on the West). Degradation would now continue however; there would be
only temporary respite from environmental crises.
While most of the conspicuous problems, awfully aggregated in contemporary
environmental crises, are accelerated by—what connects them—contemporary industrial
society, not all environmental problems are or have been of this sort. However, too many of the
other problems, such as destruction of rainforests by itinerant peasants, can be seen as by
products or similar of the main generators. Thus, in the illustration, the peasants displaced by
agribusiness or absentee wealth-holders, arrived there on industrially-made roads opening the
forests, and often wrecked this damage using industrial machinery.
An environmental friendly culture has to be much more critical concerning certain types
of industrialization, and much more selective regarding technology than present dominant
cultures, Western or non-Western. A friendly paradigm would not only ensure much more
Lacking favourable ideological settings, earlier technological ""break throughs"" were not duly
developed: thus early wheels, steam engines, dyes, gunpowder, etc. Western cultures did not
enjoy a monopoly upon technology powerful enough, when massed, to induce global crises.
The picture of development of large-scale environmental problems being sketched bears
superficial resemblance to that now tendered for development of the early Universe, where, to
achieve presumed size, a source event, the Big Bang, was followed by huge inflationary
phenomena. Naturally the resemblance has limitations; for instance, universe inflation is not
terrestrially replicable in the way industrialization now is (hired or delivered off the shelf,
pollution problems and all, with a big price tag).
23
selectivity and care, but would sharply limit impacts of damaging technology and
industrialization. While there are such paradigms, on the ideas market, they mostly lack
sophisticated contemporary elaboration and they may be flawed in other respects. Examples of
more friendly paradigms, that do not lead of themselves to massive environmental problems
and crises conditions, include those now tabulated:
TABLE 3: Examples, some flawed, of environmentally friendly paradigms.
Oriental ideologies:
Taoism (classical)
recessive traditions,
now with tiny
followings and little
political influence.
Jainism
Indigenous cultures:
Australian Aboriginals (e.g. Aranda)
Amazonian Indians.
Western philosophies:
under certain
favourable
interpretations
old
Stoicism
new
Deep-green theories, such as deep ecology.
Given the remoteness of most of these examples from predominant contemporary life, and
difficulties with their wide adaptability, it is a short step to a familiar conclusion that new
paradigms need to be worked out soon. Much much more intellectual effort should be devoted
to such enterprise.
One upshot, then, is a rough classification of paradigms into two families, the second
large: environmentally friendly, and unfriendly. No doubt there is a small fuzzy residue class^
lying between major unfriendly and friendly divisions.
Environmental friendliness means more or less what it appears to mean, what a functional
break-down into components would yield: friendliness in approaches, practices and attitudes, to
environments, especially more natural environments, with friendliness including, as usual,
goodwill and kindliness towards (and substantially displaceable by these). As indicated, such
friendliness concerns not merely actual practices, but also attitudes held, as reflected in what
would be done in certain other sorts of situations.
Certainly a culture that manifests
unfriendliness, as a sweep of Northern cultures do, is unfriendly. But, as well, various
""primitive"" cultures, whose practices are not hostile, for example because they lack means or
resources, energy or health, may nonetheless be unfriendly; for instance all members of a
culture hold thoroughly negative attiudes which they are in fact unable to put into practice.
43
In logical terms
perhaps as well as another residue class, hot/!.
24
It is not too difficult to explain in outline which paradigms will, if duly, diligently or
religiously practiced, lead to environmental problems and impasse.
Certain /hmz/y
c/zaracferMfi'c-y, of unfriendly paradigms are worth elaborating:
*
illustrated through Cartesianism and Confucianism.
More
generally, direct impact is illustrated by any idea-system which attributes little or no value to
natural items, and typically much value to nature transforming or interfering human (or elite)
projects, and whose themes are linked to practice. So it is with Confucianism, which is entirely
human focussed. 'Centering his attention on man in his present life, Confucius had as his goal
the achievement of a good society characterized by harmonious social relations.'44 The outside
world, the natural environment, was of no moral significance. It mattered only instrumentally,
to humans. Descartes went further. Human bodies too were automata, complex machinery.
'The exception is [mznJ, or specifically]
and its external manifestation language: this
alone cannot be explained mechanistically—a thesis which leads Descartes to assert a
fundamental divide between human beings and ""the beasts""'.4$ The remaining world, the
natural environment—lacking humanity, thought, mind—was again of no moral significance.
It possessed derivatively only what value and meaning humans, or minds, chose to confer or
project upon it, typically little or none.
Since, either way, any way, a natural environment devoid of humans has no thoughts,
purposes or interests, no value or meaning of its own, it could hardly matter what happens to it.
It could be regarded and treated, justifiably, as nothing but a reservoir of resources for humans.
Cartesians drew just such conclusions; similar conclusions derive, by one route or another from
Platonism and Pentecostalism, and are implicit at least in Confucianism. Descartes again went
further than some others. His practices and methods, like those of Bacon, were 'aimed at
making men the masters and possessors of nature'.46
Untowards effects result through linkage of ideological theory to heavy practice. Link
principles, reminiscent of ""correspondence rules"" used in explaining applications of scientific
theories and normally included in comprehensive paradigms, connect the theoretic level to
practice, they also serve to activate otherwise inoperative or uncoupled paradigms. Such
principles may take the form of directives; familiar examples include maximization directives,
such as maximize personal fun, tribal utility, national interest, or state GNP.
*
com&z'nafzon
illustrated through Leibnitzianism. Any which yield satisfaction
of all or enough elements of the consumption impact equation, and so would generate excessive
impacts. To illustrate, consider what might be called
in honour of Leibnitz's
fragmentary ideology. Leibnitz was substantially committed to all of human population
46
Reese p.102 For much more on the geographic impact of Confucianism, as also compared with
other (Asian) paradigms, see Tuan's investigations.
Cottingham p.15. The utter invalidity of Descartes' argument (reported in Cottingham) to this
divide is now comparatively easy to expose, given almost 400 years of hindsight. There are no
such status divides—just as flamboyant forms of deep ecology maintain.
See Descartes,
V7.
25
growth, unfettered technological advance, and human lifestyles of consumption,^ in short, to
precisely those factors that combine in the impact recipe to produce excessive human impacts
upon environments. However neutral Leibnitz's metaphysics, his monadology, may have
been—by contrast with Plato's or Descartes', both of which explicitly devalued much or all of
the natural world—Leibnitz's wider ideology is linked indirectly, through impact equations, to
damaging effects.
Some imagine that this oblique formalistic detailing, through direct and indirect classes,
can be simply cut through, retaining plurality and so forth. Surely environmental friendliness is
nothing but environmental depth? While the suggestion points in the right sort of direction (for
the relevant sort of depth) it too is astray .48 Depth is neither necessary nor sufficient. Take the
move plausible sufficiency half, plausible because depth helps, no end. Nonetheless depth can
be achieved in macho ways (as ecofeminism has emphasized against deep ecology), ways
which may not be altogether friendly to less favoured species, groups or habitats. For example,
depth can be satisfied through due selection and support of some super species and magnificent
habitats—requisite environmental impartiality (and reflected justice), critical for friendliness as
intended, being neglected.49 Still less in depth necessary. For kindliness can, both in principle
and in practice, extend far beyond humans, still ranked top, to much more of ""creation"". Such
extensive kindliness, observed in some humanistic humans, appears to be exhibited in some
sects and tribes not committed to depth, and it could well be considerably more widespread,
under changed but not deepened ideological conditions. Naturally, however, deepening would
afford an obvious, and excellent, reason for change.
As friendliness is not tantamount to depth, nor similarly is a prime part of what explains
depth, recognition of intrinsic value in nature outside humans. Some animal liberationists who
display high regard for creatures with capacity to suffer, show little goodwill towards forests
largely unpopulated by such creatures. Conversely, though shifting ground, an environmentally
friendly society may hold that value is but an anthropocentric construct, merely projected onto a
basically neutral world.
All the same, aspects of depth are normally reliable indicators of environmental
sensitivity and friendliness, and inversely, aspects of shallowness (as investigated in authentic
deep ecology) marks of unfriendliness.
Shallowness will work out satisfactorily
environmentally only with what is now rare (given ideological dominance), a right mix of
humans; and its any longer working widely is implausible. These reliable marks include such
familiar features as
For requisite details, see Aiton. The case against Leibnitzianism is developed in a sequel.
As to the relevant sort of depth, see GE. Other accounts of depth are also proferred in deep
ecology, some of which relate to the present exercise. In particular deep questioning should lead
to paradigmatic roots, to Naess's ""total views"".
Herein lies another reason why something like biospecies egalitarianism is essential in deep
ecology; such a requirement needs, not dilution away (as has happened in American and
transpersonal deep ecology), but rectification.
26
* short-term framework.
* devaluation of natural items as against human elements or artefacts (typically exhibiting
human chauvinism); and, as a corollary of heavy devaluation,
* entitlement to domination, dominion over nature;
* appropriation of nature, its conversion to property.
* maximization assumptions concerning personal or societal aggrandizement, utility and size,
coupled with grand projects.
* technofix approach to environmental problems.
Friendly paradigms will tend to mverf these features. An environmentally friendly
paradigm can be expected to yield environmentally significant corollaries, such as the following
samples:
* an end to degrading primary production; instead ecological forestry and ecological
agriculture will come to prevail.
* a strong selectivity regarding industrialization, which weeds out damaging forms.
* a calling off of grand ideologically-grounded projects, interfering with or damaging natural
environments, such as major dams, river diversions, demolished islands (e.g. for airports), new
mountains, terraforming, extensive rainmaking, climatic interference, and generally the sweep
of ""playing God"" projects. A little of this sort of unfriendly technology can go a very long way.
As unfriendly paradigms are decidedly plural, so likewise are answers to questions as to
why agents adhere, or continue to adhere, to environmentally unfriendly paradigms. Some of
the diverse answers match answers already encountered in the main tabulation. Reasons are
psychological, social and cultural (with a familiar circularity here encountered), and include
considerations of the following sorts and others: because that is how things are done, or have
always been done; because needs can be met, perhaps only met, in that way, so it is believed;
because there are no alternatives, or none seen, perhaps because none have been sought;
because negative outcomes can be overcome, or do not really matter; and so on.
A short answer can now be ventured to the focal questions: Because, in one way or
another, most agents are bound to—locked into, committed to, captured by, or just passively go
along with—environmentally unfriendly paradigms. As a result the (long-term) health of the
rest of environments does not matter, or matter enough.
6. Glimpsing an entertaining corollary: an unfavourable report upon dominant
philosophy.
It will hardly have escaped notice that virtually all dominant philosophical roads lead to
Rome, to environmentally unfriendly paradigms.
Stripped of metaphor, there are
environmental conditions of adequacy, which most philosophical systems fail to meet. In an
environmentally friendly new world, most philosophy that is remembered, indeed most of the
humanities, is destined for scrapping. Prevailing philosophy is a serious impediment to
satisfactory environmental outcomes. Predominant philosophy, not just Western philosophy,
has by and large been bad environmental news.
27
It may be insisted that philosophy can make no difference, for instance to environmental
practice. It is not an expression of basic needs, or of any such practical matters. Exceptions to
such practical bravado have however to be recognised almost immediately; philosophy soon
enters for organizational, justificatory and explanatory ends. That concession still grossly
under-estimates the extent to which ideas, and more generally paradigms, influence and even
govern action and practice, especially reflective and rational action. The substantial point is not
therefore removed through any alleged practical impotence of philosophy.
Mainstream philosophy has supplied, or mightily assisted in supplying, dominant
unfriendly paradigms under which environments labour. Of course not everything has to be
trashed, as even defective enterprises or evil projects may include decent part or worthwhile
features; much can be salvaged, arguments, subtheories and so on (and with intellectual tipping
there need be little material waste). Nor therefore is it as if an entirely fresh start has to be
made. As well as salvaged bits and pieces (which need to be carefully tested for soundness),
there are brash new alternatives such as authentic deep ecology, and there are recessive
paradigms and neglected traditions to peruse for suggestions, for inspiration, and perhaps to
rehabilitate.
Richard Sylvan
*
APPENDIX. On Shepard's approach to focal questions.
A remarkably sustained investigation of the focal questions is found in Shepard s
intriguing books. In his TVafi/re anJ
he considers and quickly dismisses many of the
stock responses to focal questions suggested by contemporary luminaries (or by himself in
earlier work), such as lack of information, faulty technique, insensibility, greed, political
inertia, change to agriculture and settlement,^... . He would (and should, for his eliminative
argument) have also dismissed industrialization, state and corporate control, and so on.
More disconcertingly, for present purposes, Shepard claims that 'a history of ideas'
similarly no doubt a story of paradigms—will not serve; for it 'is not enough to explain human
behaviour' (p.3), it 'seems too easy and academic' (p.3), itself an easy and superficial criticism.
But if, for instance, the 'dictum that nature should serve man' and 'insistence that animals feel
no pain' should become widely entrenched, then they may well impact heavily on practice, as
accordingly appears to be the case. His slight further argument appears to miss the intended
*
^0
An earlier, even rougher version of this article was presented at the Environmental Paradigms
Conference, University of New England, Armidale, April 1993. It would not have been written
without its solicitation for the Conference; also it might well not been thought through in
fashionable but confining and perhaps misleading paradigmatic terms.
A subsequent working draft has benefitted, slightly, from comments from very unimpressed
reviewers. Thanks certainly to Holmes Rolston for helpful comments.
No doubt a popular picture of human social changes with agriculture and settlement is simplistic:
that before societies lived in harmony, afterwards they did not. But it is also too simple to go on
to claim, as Shepard does, that 'the economic and material demands of growing villages and
towns are ... not causes but results of this change' (p.3). Some demands appear to derive from
factors, such as population pressures, which were among causes of the changes.
28
target: 'The meticulous analysis of these philosophies and the discovery that they articulate an
ethos beg the question' (p.3).
it can reasonably be inquired? What is offered is but the
facile, false, 'ideas are impotent' consideration, fostered by thinking and operating in terms of
(e.g. lower p.3), rather than reasons and (rational) explanation, and encouraged through
an attempted move to (what is explanatorily inadequate) pure behaviour. For a simple example
of the familiar explanatory roles of ideas and paradigms, consider an alternative explanation
through them. The admittedly bizarre (""crazy"") 'turning everything into something man-made
and [or] man-used' (p.5) is readily explained through dominant paradigms:
is the way it
acquires value, otherwise it is worthless. There is no need at all for psychopathology here.
Correspondingly Shepard briefly reviews and rejects several of the very partial, and often
hopeless, solutions suggested under stock responses to focal questions such as making
information, or better information, more widely available, bringing people from all walks of life
together, encouraging conviviality, hitting problems with smart technology, practicing
conservation, and so on.
Shepard's own resolution is more readily reached from a further (meta-focal) question
that he proceeds to ask: why do humans per-yfyf in degrading their habitats once sources and
solutions are made
He effectively argues by elimination: other sources (read as
causes) do not succeed in providing an answer; but 'the idea of a sick society (which he leaps
to, without argument, p.4) does. Wrong on both counts: On the first because a non-causal
explanation in terms of ideological wiring can provide answers (listen to politicians,
representative of the people, again, just a little time). On the second because some industrial
societies are not sick in a normal sense (though .yome may be), rather sickness has to be yo
redefined (such low redefinitions are among underlying subplots^) that having certain
ideological commitments that are carried into practice counts as ""sickness"".
So it is that Shepard arrives at his
of 'general, culturally-ratified distortions of
childhood, of massive disablement of ontogeny as the basis of irrational and self-destructive
attitudes towards the natural environment' (p.ix). Succinctly, 'there are profound psychic
dislocations at the root of modern society' (p.xii). Psychic disorders have evolved: 'over the
centuries major institutions and metaphysics might finally celebrate attitudes and ideas
originating in the normal context of immaturity [or] ... adolescence ...' (p.15).
Having glided easily and invalidly to the idea of sick societies, in a mere three pages,
Shepard proceeds to diagnose in more detail the nature of the alleged sickness.52 It supposedly
arises, like other psychopathy with which it is immediately associated, in infancy, and is
51
52
For trickery through redefinition of sickness and madness, Wisdom has already prepared us.
Observe that Shepard's redefinition of sickness to include sick (i.e. debasing and devaluing)
practices with regard to natural habitats (and conjoined therewith, to, older people) does not
leave no contrast classes. For there remain benign 'relic tribal' societies, such as the Manus,
Crow and Comanche, Aranda and !Kung San (p.xii), 'people who feel themselves to be
rather than
(p.6 empasis added)—an elegant analogy.
'The idea of a sick society', which as Shepard confesses (on p.4) is hardly new, is reached on the
third page of the main text.
29
manifest in life-long immaturity, with whole societies stuck in a kind of destructive
adolescence. No doubt there is something to some of what Shepard describes in child and
person development (not the 'private demons' and so on) or might well have described. There
is evidently, conspicuously in ""new world"" societies, wide commitment to a shallow juvenile
culture, adulation or imitation of immature media and sport models and flawed authority
figures, marginalization of the elderly, and so on, coupled with hyper-activity, violence and
vandalism. But, like political commitment to extensive economic activity, this is hardly
satisfactorily accounted for through psychopathological reduction, concentrating the whole
social problematic in the ontogeny of individuals.^^ A superior explanation to widespread
individual psychic disorder proceeds through ideological commitment, that industrial humans
are raised and educated in, inducted into and committed to, defective ideologies, without
coming to know or properly experience alternatives.
The 'portraits of maturity' alluded to likewise appear individualistic and culture-bound,
resembling those of deep ecology, directed at embroidery of person and self, through personal
growth and identity, wider identification and relatedness, self-realization.$4 They are not
exactly those of older and ecologically wiser societies. They do not reveal ecologically mature
mixed communities.
Furthermore, comparisons with relic tribal societies, which are important, can be
decoupled from psychopathological analysis and reduction. Different lifeways, commitments
and ideologies, are what they are and do not all reduce to matters of mental health.
Undoubtedly we can learn of and from these different societies. We can still witness 'smallgroup, leisured, foraging life-ways with[in] natural surroundings. ... there is the rub—... for us,
now, that world no longer exists' (p.14 rearranged). Nor is it really true that such a world is no
longer accessible to most of us; more leisured small-group ways can be retrieved, some natural
surrounding can even now be restored.
In a curious fashion, Shepard has managed to invert likely causal relations. While a
certain interaction can no doubt be conceded, it is not so much human ill-health that is leading
to environmental degradation, but rather environmental degradation, generally brought about
for other reasons, that is increasingly leading to human ill-health, and in the longer term causing
erosion of life-support systems.
53
54
A psychopathic reduction is in part made plausible by reexpression in medical or psychological
terms of what would better be otherwise expressed. Consider, for instance the language of the
following clever paragraph, which infiltrates much with no argument:
'The person himself is, of course, caught between his inner calendar and the surgeries of
society. His momentum for further growth may be twisted or amputated according to the
hostilities, fears, or fantasies required of him, as his retardation is silently engineered to
domesticate his integrity or to allow him to share in the collective dream of mastery' (p.16).
But the trapping of agents between inner directives and social conditions and demands, or
between rival ideologies, can be retold in different, less medical and metaphorical terms.
Cf pp.12-14. Likewise there is a conservative underlay, more oppressive than that of deep
ecology: insistence on 'one particular mother' (p.7) even suggestion of unsatisfactoriness in
'taking mothers off to work' (p.15)!
30
REFERENCES
J. Alton, L^z'Zzzzz'fz A EzogzYz/z/zy, Adam Hilger, Bristol, 1985.
E.
R. Attfield, 'Has the history of philosophy ruined the environment?' Ezzvz'rozzzzz^zz^Z Ef/zzcs
13(1991)127-137.
R. Attfield, 77z^ ERzzc.y o/'Ezzvzzwzzzz^zztzzZ Cozzc^z
*zz,
Second edition, University of Georgia Press,
Athens, 1991.
A. Bellett, 'The evaluation of values compatible with ecological sustainability', FMzztEzzzz^zzfaZ
QM^rzozz^ Pap^, No.2, CRES, Australian National University, 1990.
J.B. Callicott and R.T. Ames (eds), Mzfz/z^ in A^zzzzz 7zYZ<7zfz Shelves > Top > Pile 3",https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/8e5b1510f955e6e862f9f4addae6dad3.pdf,Text,"Draft Papers",1,0
171,https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/show/171,"Box 21, Item 705: Notes on Environmental essays","Handwritten notes, undated. Title top of page: ENV Essays 89 EE89.","One of ten papers digitised from item 705.","Richard Sylvan","The University of Queensland's Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291, Box 21, Item 705","Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy",,"This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, Dr. N.A.J. Taylor.","For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library.",,"[1] leaf. 1.98 MB. ",,Manuscript,"https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:f83eb35",,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,"Box 21: More Green,Como House,Como House > Shelves > Top > Pile 3",https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/0122aea0d6ab5ff6e503045efd0a8414.pdf,Text,"Notes, Correspondences and Marginalia",1,0
169,https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/show/169,"Box 21, Item 708: Notes and cuttings on investigations in numerology","Handwritten notes, undated, and cuttings from unidentified publications.","One of eight papers digitised from item 708. Title in collection finding aid: RS: Investigations in Numerology I - clipped bundle of notes + some strays on same topic. Published works redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions.","Richard Sylvan","The University of Queensland's Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291, Box 21, Item 708","Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy",,"This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, Dr. N.A.J. Taylor.","For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library.",,"[21] leaves. 26.77 MB. ",,Manuscript,"https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:ced267e","Como - Shelves - Top - Pile 3","z%'
;
Z?acr^/A/a""
^4—/ 7
<7%^
-/^
/Zc
'J
^4^
^7^
4^L
r. /Z?^ 4r?^ 4 Z/1/
/y^*7^*
y&<^,*.<^
^x/4 Z ^T3-'
y^.
Z
^3^4?
7)^ 7* C^
G,4^4 ^/c^r? /^
/€4^y\ZjZcL
/4\
Shelves > Top > Pile 3",https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/1537483602872e63b62a5bd262f2039a.pdf,Text,"Notes, Correspondences and Marginalia",1,0
168,https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/show/168,"Box 21, Item 708: Notes on utopia","Handwritten notes, undated.","One of eight papers digitised from item 708. Title in collection finding aid: RS: Utopia: Outopia or Eutopia Ms.","Richard Sylvan","The University of Queensland's Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291, Box 21, Item 708","Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy",,"This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, Dr. N.A.J. Taylor.","For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library.",,"[4] leaves + 2 cards. 10.67 MB. ",,Manuscript,"https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:c5d535a",,"'r
/
**<
C^K,
/ Z?^t' /*?^ Shelves > Top > Pile 3",https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/6b4b577a786501afaafd82e859e98104.pdf,Text,"Notes, Correspondences and Marginalia",1,0
167,https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/show/167,"Box 21, Item 708: Partial draft of War and peace IV: Tao and deep-green","Printout (photocopy) of draft, undated. Pages also numbered 15, 17, 19, 21, 22. Later title of paper: On extirpating war: Tao and deep-green pacifism.","One of eight papers digitised from item 708. Title in collection finding aid: RS: Partial xc on Taoism.","Richard Sylvan","The University of Queensland's Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291, Box 21, Item 708","Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy",,"This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, Dr. N.A.J. Taylor.","For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library.",,"[5] leaves. 12.89 MB. ",,Manuscript,"https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:f9e5f52",,"15
nght. 'Vital force without restraint', mtentionaily excessive force, is only part of what counts
as
which is more generally/^ w/tm/i
i.e. transgresses, descrecrates,
profanes, injures, outrages, etc. It is thus a negatively connoted force, an evil force in some
specified intentional respect. There is a tendency for Taoist commentators, not Taoists, to
regard Taoism as condemning all uses, or even occurrences, of force, but this is not so. Rather
intentional ill-forcing is what is castigated, what is deviant. Thus Taoism does not exclude a
range of defensive practices, which make satisfactory use of natural forces, like letting the
machines of war industry stop.
Those who would abolish war and its machinery, substituting for it nonwarlike and
ideally nonviolent methods, technology, and strategies, have been confronted not merely with
much sub-rational abuse but with plenty of criticism and even some paradoxes. Here is a recent
paradox concerning war and nonviolence:
War must be abolished. One reason is simply economic. We can no longer afford it, and
the opportunity costs are enormous. Along with other extraordinarily wasteful activities, it is an
anachronism.
- Doing so cannot be accomplished without violence, i.e. in effect, given the types of violence
involved, without what amounts to war. According to a fuller version of this premiss, the
process of abolishing a war would only be achieved through a revolution so profound that it
could not succeed without extensive and extreme violence, amounting to (civil) war.
But then war cannot be abolished without war.
Therefore, war which must be abolished cannot be abolished.^
This ""paradox"" has been compared with the Liar paradox, but the parallel does not persist far.
For this paradox does not involve self-referential features, and is easily broken, as follows. Let
the ""last war"" be not the last standard war but the revolution abolishing war. Then, given that
the revolution is successful, war will be abolished therewith, i.e. with that last war. There need
be no regress, given again a successful outcome. All the premisses stand intact, but the
conclusion, following the 'therefore' is a nonsequitur. However, while the dissolution of the
argument is accordingly logically fine, the route is repugnant. Standard pacifism challenges the
Brian Medhn, who forcefully propounded this puzzle, set other analogous puzzles alongside it
designed to reveal deep difficulties m contemporary political, and especially alternative,
t oug t Another puzzle, concerning liberty and repression in the context of capitalism
revolved around the following inconsistent triad:
* capitalism must be removed, but liberty retained.
* capitalism cannot be removed without repression.
* repression is antithetical to liberty.
The puzzle is resolved as with the analogous puzzle of abolishing. Let the ""last capitalist""
action be/bre the days of liberty be the repressive but liberating revolution overthrowing
17
Plainly the
to warfare, like the sanctions and so on, cannot itself be military
(using soldiers and other devices of war), on pain of some incoherence. But otherwise""
ways of opposition can be many and various: they can certainly be ucrive, as with nonviolent
demonstrations, resistance movements, and so forth, and they may also be devious (e .
ummg th. forces of war upon themselves so they are neutralised). It quickly becomes evident
hen, that some of th. dictionaries offer but loaded definitions which, by restating the negaZ
components, reduce the initial appeal and plausibility of pacifism. Consider th.
of . al on-c-operadon with any form of warfare'. Thereby excluded ar. forms of pacifism
o er active an plausible alternatives to warfare such as social defence. The Concise
often, with depreciatory implication, the advocacy of peace at any price', 'in any
circumstance . Pacifism can easily resist being forced into thes. sorts of circumstances: it has
y resources, as an extensive senes of texts on alternatives to war, such as negotiation non
ent action and social defence, from Taoism to contemporary environmentalism attest.
of rendennZ
semantical strategy of som. dictmnan.s',
Th f h
""""nT Z""
""""
biassed definitions.
y ave stretched the term from its restricted setting of warfare, confined to state and
ve"" Z
of violence, from state and interstate to, what ,s
noL oZZ^""""""' ""t^
^'nce. Caii the resulting considerably stretched
notion of pacifism, according to which it is morally wrong to us. violence, according to which
stretched pacifism certainly includes standard pacifism
'h' inverse is very far from being
(uniMs Znof
hf c e f
T
diff^mml"" f
""""""""""
different reasons for this, which will be picked up seriatim.
n
several, substantially
Stretched pacifism, also misleadingly called ""mra/ pacifism, has looked a very easy
al arg.t to moral philosophers. Many th. effusive philosopher who, upon sighting such a
""fana icaP- H
""inconsistent"", ""insensitive"",
treZ
'
Z""' ""
accommodating and
reat ng moral dilemmas, it is no great feat to resist such attacks, in the fashion of previous
stretched pacifism
""-ent
wZt oT 7
Zen Zs S 7 ""Z Z""
ways. So far from bemg stupid, it is viable. In future gentler times stretched pacifism
In Al this notion was contrasted with standard pacifism
might have been better.
as
pacifism:
19
accordingly do not hold that violence is always wrong. From such a commonsense angle,
pacifism with its condemnation of conventional wars and the violence they involve remains a
radical doctrine.
As regards wars and other violence-incurring social authorities, contemporary pacificism
is, as previous explained (e.g. Al p.3), a form of activism. Pacifism does not imply utter
pacifity, but may actively involve social defence, resistance and so on. However a certain level
of misrepresentation enters into the JWS challenge in the details of what forms of activism
pacifism may include. That misrepresentation begins in the second clause concerning what is
said to be sometimes justified. For the situational procedure where dilemmas arise will not
generally be consequential applying a principle of lesser evil. In dilemmatic situations such
principles are suspended, and such a principle is in any case unacceptable to moral pacifists. A
small amount of violence may be less bad in its consequences than verbal offence, but a
principled pacifist will choose the slightly greater evil where other obligations do not exclude it.
A more serious distortion occurs in JWS's effort to force procedures in dilemma
situations into purely consequentialist form. In fact consequential decision theory wa
*s
deployed as a
only for how to proceed rationally in a situational setting where deontic
procedures were suspended (see MD p.38). What was said, still misleadingly retrospective
vision reveals, was this: 'what is done is a very consequentialist thing' (Al p.13), nor 'one acts
in a consequentialist fashion to do the sufficiently good thing in the circumstances' (JWS
p.152). Situationally or/zgr procedures than those resembling orthodox rational decision
making (modified from maximizing to satisizing objectives) may be adopted (MD p.38).
Further the orthodox consequentialist theory is inadequate because it leaves out, or tries to
reduce to consequences, nonconsequential elements, notably motives. It is not difficult, in
principle (in advance of attempted consequentialization of motives), to design situations where
motives, such as integrity or maintaining faith, enter to yield outcomes upsetting consequential
calculations. More elaborate decision making procedures than those of consequentialism,
sometimes at variance with consequentialism, are thus presupposed.
A further part of JWS's criticism accordingly goes by the board, the alleged appeal 'to
second best' consequentialist considerations,... already explicitly condemned' (p.154). What
was condemned was stock universal consequentialism, 'that <9t/y consequentialist
considerations carry argumentative weight' (quoted on p.152), so undercutting other deontic
principles, such as those of pacifism. It was not claimed, what is utterly different, that
consequentialist considerations can nouVigrg enter into deliberation and decision making. The
conclusion JWS arrives at is therefore substantially astray.
After criticising modern moral philosophy for its reliance upon
consequentialist modes of thought, it is surprising, and inconsistent, to find
... [reliance] upon such modes of thought to escape logical difficulties raised
by moral dilemmas facing ... pacifis[m] (p.152)
21
routinely in violent activity. While it can no doubt be argued, as some vegetarians may do, that
the natural order is an immoral order, and that remaining carnivores should be converted to
vegetarianism as rapidly as proves possible (in the way domestic dogs are converted to dog
biscuits), the difficulties with such proposals are immense. The task envisaged is gigantic, and
beyond human capacities - even if it were desirable. For there are millions of species to be
somehow converted to proper vegetarianism. Then there are millions of other species to be
converted to proper and well regulated contraceptive practices, else their numbers will get out of
hand (uncontrollably) with predation removed. Given humans lack of success in limiting their
own excessive numbers, such regulation appears entirely remote. Aside however from the
practical difficulties, is such a fully vegetarian order, with evolution further derailed, a desirable
improvement on the natural order? Is it morally obligatory? It is certainly not obligatory, as
alternative systems of morality in harmony with the prevailing natural order are feasible. Nor is
it desirable, for (to appeal to such alternative value systems) the natural order is more or less in
order as it is. Full vegetarianization would only reduce its value, vastly.
More generally, a defensible ethical framework should not, it would be rightly contended,
be right out of step with the natural order of other creatures, decently depicted. Decent
depiction is important, for some features of the natural order, such as competition, combat and
predation, so far from escaping attention, have been grossly exaggerated and exploited. Thus,
for instance, the ludicrous picture of nature red in truth and claw, so beloved of descendents of
orthodox Victorians and of orthodox economists. However, even under decent depiction, the
""natural order"" is often not benign. That appears to be enough to induce a supervenient moral
dilemma for any stretched pacifism which is coupled to a deep ethic (e.g. which does not
separate humans out from the natural order) and which eschews the desperate vegetarian route:
The natural order is not an immoral order
The natural order contains (regular) instances of violence.
Therefore, instances of violence are not immoral -
in apparent defiance of P2 Moreover, there are too many instances of violence, too regularly
occurring, for them all to be plausibly shunted into the moral dilemma category (and predatory
carnivores face no dilemmas). Raptors that practice violence every week are not immoral
(neither are they clearly moral; the category of morality only significantly extends so far).
The main trouble lies however with P2 (which needs some finer adjustment, as was
alrady indicated in Al). While P2 is alright in context, within a particular, perfectly viable,
ethical framework, designed for the usual human round, the conventional setting for ethical
theories, it stands in need of modification outside that setting. It is time to suggest the sort of
modification envisaged. Evidently P2 was addressed to moral agents. Which agents? Not to
carnivores that supply their own livelihood, nor really to morally degenerate humans, but to
22
peace-sensitive agents. With that semi-technical form, yet to be characterised, a suitably
modified
P2
results:
MP2. It is morally wrong, for a peace-sensitive agent, to use violence.^
To recover what amounts, in the previous discussive context, to P2, it suffices to add the
proposition that every human agent ought to be peace-sensitive. Much as that proposition has
to recommend it, it appears too ethically advanced for many modem humans; it sets too high a
moral standard to be taken as a serious guide to practice. It seems wise to settle presently for
something less demanding, such as that every advanced moral agent ought to be peace
sensitive. To put essentially the same proposition alternatively:
^tr^rc/z^ /?<2cz/z.wz (as modified) is
While it is perhaps too late to hope for
much moral progress in humans, it is pleasant to contemplate alternative futures where what is
supererogatory became obligatory, and widely practiced.
Richard Sylvan*
*
I began drafting this essay at the time (January 17, midday Australian time) of the
American attacks upon Iraq. The optly named Prime Minister Hawke of Australia had just
made a statement to the nation-state, announcing (the) war. In this statement there was much
talk of peace. There was even - in what was effectively a declaration of war - reiteration of the
modem quest for 'a new world order of peace'. Peace through war; so it rings out again and
again, through the centuries. 'War must be for the sake of peace' (Aristotle p.220). More than
two thousand years later, we have fought those wars to end all wars. But it is no use, Hawke
solemely pronounced, just taking aZzoMf
and thinking about peace; we must work for
peace,/zg/zt for it-through war. Impeccable logic?
President Bush, supreme commander, convinced us with similar logic, speaking too with
many tongues. Of how he 'preferred to think of peace, not war'. But now 'only force will
prevail', as 'all reasonable efforts to reach a peaceful solution are exhausted'. 'What must be
done' must be done, or will be anyway. With God on side with the US offensive (as well as
on the other side), it will go well. As it was said to have, though it achieved comparatively little
that other efforts may not have yielded more satisfactorily, and thought it may now have to
9
The generalization of P2, suggested in Al, to cover also the parallel situation of
environmental vandalism, can be similarly modified. The anti-vandolence principle becomes
MP2°. It is morally wrong, for a peace- and environmentally-sensitive agent, to use
vandolence.
*
Thank to David Bennett for joint contributions (from UT) and to JWS for opposition (in
JWS)
",,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,"Box 21: More Green,Como House,Como House > Shelves > Top > Pile 3",https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/4806440e025cfc5ea6631620bfddc532.pdf,Text,"Draft Papers",1,0
166,https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/show/166,"Box 21, Item 708: Letter, Arne Næss to Richard Sylvan, 19 Jul 1991 ; Draft of Taoism and deep environmental concerns: let concern spread to all the myriad things","Typed letter, handwritten notes and printout of draft. Letter on University of Oslo Centre for Development and Environment letter head and addressed to Richard Sylvan from Arne Næss, signed by Kit Fai on behalf of Næss. Næss sends feedback on Sylvan and David Bennett's paper, Utopias, Tao, and deep ecology.","Letter and paper original housed together with a paper clip. Letter redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions. One of eight papers digitised from item 708. Title in collection finding aid: RS: Taoism & Deeper Env. Concers - uncorrected ts + Ms notes.","Richard Sylvan","The University of Queensland's Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291, Box 21, Item 708","Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy",1991,"This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, Dr. N.A.J. Taylor.","For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library.",,"Letter, [1] leaf + [21] leaves. 44.08 MB. ",,,,,"The following has been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions.
Letter, Arne Næss to Richard Sylvan, 19 Jul 1991 re feedback on Sylvan and David Bennett’s
paper, Utopias, Tao, and deep ecology. Letter is signed by Kit Fai on behalf of Næss. (1 leaf)
/V
/
7 7
.
TAOISM and DEEPER ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERNS
Let concern spread to aH the myriad things^
Among accredited religions, Taoism appears exceptionally environmentally friendly.
Whereas the main terrestial religions, particularly those that have gained significant
political influence, are heavily anthropocentric (indeed human chauvinistic), Taoism,
certainly as propounded in the classical texts, is not.2 It is genuinely ecocentric; in it
nature has a preeminent and fundamental place. It is throughout decidedly ecologically
oriented; a high level of ecological consciousness is built into it, a main recipe
amounting to FoZZow TVamre as the basis of practice. Thus it can provide sources for,
and inspiration for, genuine environmentalism in a way that no Western religion can
(outside some deviant minority sects), and in a way that few other Eastern religions can.
It can assume just such a source and inspirational role for contemporary deeper
environmental positions, a place it has been assigned for the most prominent of these,
Deep Ecology.
Taoism was, and remains, a radical position. It represents a severe attack on
mainstream materialist civilization, on themes of the dominant social paradigm (as the
following table shows). Like Deep Ecology, it discards or upsets many mainstream
values, and most mainstream ways of organising and doing things. It holds up instead
examples of very different lifestyles as much preferable, and offers an environmental
path, simple and modest, a middle way between insufficiency and excess.
1 The tenth thesis of Hui Shih, cited in CT.
2 Classical Taoism, or philosophical Taoism as it is sometimes distinguished, consists essentially of two
primary texts, LT and CT, and early creative commentaries upon them. The primary texts were probably
both assembled in the intellectually prolific period of the Warring States (from 403 to 221 BC), before the
deadening cover of an empire descended. The classic works were only subsequently brought together as
texts for a loosely associated religion, Daoism, that then proceeded to diverge from them, especially as
regards natural world emphases and concerns. Very many details of the cultural and physical contexts in
which the texts were written, and of those who wrote them, have vanished with passage of time. For an
outline of what is known or reasonably conjectured, see e.g. Graham. Of course in such respects Taoism
resembles other religions with shrouded origins.
Daoism radically transformed philosophical Taoism, for the worse environmentally (and
intellectually). % became the means to happiness, wealth, and long life, human life; and (neo-)Daoism
became mired in human chauvinism. Coupled to it under Daoism were - what were no part of classical
Taoism - belief in spirit survival, use of magical charms for the cure of illness, confession of sin and
absolution on the basis of good work, a priestly caste, and the trappings of ritual, ceremonies, and so on.
For an account of these features of Daoism, see Lagcrwey.
The present essay considers only classical Taoism, and that under a certain straightforward
interpretation.
3
1. Nature, cosmology, and the character of Tao. Taoism sketches a cosmology,
which is interestingly at variance with Western cosmologies. For the universe arises out
of nothing. Being arises in accordance with Tao, which precedes existence. Nonbeing
precedes Being. Nonbeing is ultimate (according to Chang Tzu) and comes first.
All things in the world come from being
And being comes from nonbeing^
The universe had a primeval beginning, coming into existence from nothing?
Diagram 1: Taoist cycie of return^
flourishing
growth
reversion
cycle of generated
entity
NATURE (HEAVEN AND EARTH, or\
ACTUAL UNIVERSE): Existent, Named, Temporal
(FORMING) SOURCE: Nonexistent, Nameless, Eternal
7
Every entity arises out of (material) nothingness and eventually falls back into
nothingness; all that comes to pass, that is. All things flourish, but each one returns to
its root'? The whole, the integrated natural system, is a process of becoming and decay.
But the emphasis upon process, evolution and change, upon Nature as flux and
transformation, is much enhanced in Chang Tzu, over the work of Lao Tzu, where more
stress is put upon stability, constancy and equilibrium? Overall, it is correct to say, if
not so far highly informative, that Taoism is a natural process philosophy, with a keen
sense both of c/ta/ige and of Zz'mi'Ay.
4 LT 40.
5 SB p.202.
6 Cf. Chan, p.173, fn.2.
7 LT 16. For a detailed contemporary presentation of such a cosmological cycle, see Sylvan cs. In Neo
Taoism, e.g. Kao Hsiang, such a cycle is disputed, on standard ontological grounds (see e.g. Chan SB,
p.335).
8 Cf. Chan, p.20, also SB p.177.
4
Tao itself is a complex item, comprising both an initial source, or program, and a
coupled direction; a planned course, with a natural (and ideal) path. (So it is
appropriately symbolised O—*-) The great or overarching Tao is a comprehensive
source of natural activity; it encapsulates, in its program, a framework of forms or
principles, principles of natural order, both metaphysical and moral. It comprises both
dynamic principles (or evolving ""laws"") of nature an<% axiological principles guiding
conduct. In this representation it invites comparison with Plato's structure of Forms,9 or
still better, though again neglecting the dynamism of Tao, comparison with the preSocratic Logos. But to see overarching Tao as an axiological ontology, after the pattern
of Plato's Form theory, would be to import unwarranted Western assumptions. Though
Tao is a ""great form"", and there is no doubt room in the generous object framework for
other (unhypostatised) forms, main Platonic forms such as Beauty, Truth and Goodness,
do not feature large in the
CTi/ng. They are distinguished, and set rather to the
side, in the final chapter. 10 Other less Platonically emphasised (or available)
environmentally friendly forms are more important, such as Simplicity, Frugality and
Non-competition, as well as Tao itself, the supreme form, also the One, which supplants
the static Good of Plato's scheme and is coupled with a dynamic path component.
Tao is intimately linked with, and concerned with, the natural, and indeed linked
with and not above the everyday. It is certainly not supernatural, and it does not
transcend natural things in the fashion of Western supernatural religions; rather Tao
both orders and reflects nature. Tao supplies the physical laws that provide physical
idealisations (i.e. ideal models) of processes. Tao in this is a process and the container
and origin of process and the laws of process. Tao is the natural way of the universe (of
Heaven and Earth), and super-Tao, also signified as Tao, is the way of the universe and
the universe. (Under a computer analogy, Tao is the program of the whole system; it is
also, as super-Tao, the program combined with the system, everything). As Great Tao it
is certainly simple, all-embracing and one. Getting the hang of its components and their
connections is not quite so simple.
The overarching Tao - grand or capital Tao, the program or recipe of Form or
whole genetic code - combines many individual ones - lesser or /ow^r-case taos within it. Such a lesser tao, of an individual, system or whatever, is what makes a thing
what it is properly, a coursed or informed source, a program directed path, a processed
output. A tao is a sourced directed object; it is thus a type of object, a dynamic item,
which can be represented by a pair comprising a recipe, program or form and a direction
or goal-orientation. Accordingly, an individual or local tao (or form) resembles one of
9 Though appropriately neutralised, in the object-theory fashion Reid urged: for details see JB.
10 LT 81.
5
Aristotle's individual forms as coupled with a
which comprises a normative
directive. For both Artistotle and Tao there is, in effect, an ""invisible hand"" at work.
(How did this, such convenient namra/ order come about? That is Tao. But another,
old, compatible, and more satisfactory answer is: It evolved.) When things are running
properly, the lesser, individual, taos (most conveniently) fit together and operate in
accord under the overarching program (cf. diagram 2).
If each individual runs
according to the program, then the overall program succeeds fully. However, it works
even if each individual does not run according to the overarching program, but it has a
Diagram 2: Super-Tao, or Great Tao, with components integrated
SUPER-TAO
O->
D->
unrealised
Nature, with taos in world
objectified
natural
forms
system
/
E->
a->
—Deviation line—
Defective (or fallen)
taos
from Natural Ways
6
less ideal result. If each person acts in a correct way a massive net good and great order
result.
Yet, any attempt to impose order does not bring it about, but is
counterproductive. The invisible (natural) hand guides, but the hand cannot be forced.
As to the status of principles (laws, rules), standard Western categorisations are
again exceeded. These principles are not transcendent, governing things externally, but
are, so to say, self-supplied, with things self-regulated. Undominated things are
naturally self-governing. 'Everything has its own nature and each nature is its own
ultimate ... then by whom are things produced? They produce themselves, that is all'.n
But
they proceed according to the Tao-te, the goal directed way of virtue,
autonomously.
Diagram 3: Tao-te paths, and going with the natura! fiow^
Te(los)
Tao (source)
EH----------- ?-----------
+
*
Ideal Way: Way of Virtue
2. Natural order, and the extent of Tao as agency. Tao supplies a spontaneous
natural order. Though the phrase ""natural order"" may seem strange, even perverse, it is
not. The reason is, in part, that the Taoist perspective is the reverse of the modern
perception of the world. In contrast to European political thought of the mainstream
Hobbes-Locke strain, where the state-of-nature is one of chaos or extreme disorder, the
Taoist state-of-nature is one of order. A main assumption of Western thought, that
political order must be imposed by regulation on an unruly state-of-nature, is
accordingly undercut. A separate imposed political order is not required; the idea that it
is rests on mistaken assumptions.
Politics can, and ideally should, follow nature.
Science and politics can be blended, not sharply separated in the typical Western
fashion, where nature is taken to exclude value.
11 Kao Hsiang, p.328.
12 Cf. LT 53.
7
According to Taoism then, by contrast with dominant Western thought which sees
the world as extensional, mechanistic and value-neutral (except for its human cargo),
nature is both intensional and value-infused. These features extend not merely to the
whole, but to components which go into composing the greater whole. These have their
programs, or ways, which are integrated into the greater way (somewhat as, but
artificially, expert system programs may be organised into grander programs
representing super-experts).
Nature is already in order as it normally is, through a unity in diversity which
involves a normative component - a principle or recipe for how things ""should"" be as
well as how they are integrally. Values are build into the environment, an integral part
of the way of things. By following the values of Tao one enters and comes into contact
with the whole environment and into unity with the environment. Tao is a description
of how things are and a prescription of how to act in accord with the way they are.
Since it is normally regulated by Tao, natural order is decidedly benign, and
definitely worth emulating. As a result, natural order is the way, the recommended
way. Imposed order is counterproductive. There is reciprocal resistance to the
imposition of deviant order. This would hold even if social organisers tried to impose
Tao itself. To attempt to impose it would be to go astray. Such points help to explain
why little satisfactory detail is offered as to social and political organisation. For the
requisite organisation, such as it is, follows natural patterns and natural social structures
(whichever they are). No doubt details would be (in the style of Aristotelian ethics)
largely descriptive of what happens in cases where social affairs were functioning well.
It is deviation from the natural state that represents the problem, quite in contrast
again to European political thought, where the state-of-nature is one of extreme disorder
(lives are nasty, brutish, short, etc.). Such a state-of-nature is not at all a Taoist natural
state, which is one of satisfactory order. A strong sense of natural order, of self
organisation, of anarchy (in a positive sense), flows from classical Taoism. Like
Buddhism, Taoism assents to the maxim, ""Do nothing and from unforced order greater
order results"". If each being is permitted to follow its tao, then the needs of all will be
met without coercion. Following the way of Tao, nature emerges as a self-supplying
organisation. Such convenient natural organisation stands (so far as it occurs!) in need
of some further explanation, whether of an internal, evolutionary sort or of a
supernatural sort, as in Neoplatonism where God or the One accomplishes the
organisational task. Taoism undermines such latter alternatives, and points^ towards
an evolutionary explanation.
13 In CT.
8
Order occurs naturally, spontaneously (as the inertial state), without agency.
Super-agents do not feature, and would be otoise. God does not occur, and is not
needed, in the cosmology, either as an agent, to make things in the universe happen, or
as an authority, to regulate things or set moral or legal standards. If He did occur, He
would, like other directors and rulers, not be needed, though He could serve as an
example. 'But there is no indication of his existence'.^ As in the socio-political sphere,
direction by a overseer or ruler is otoise, and only exemplary. In particular, God is not
required to start or wind the universe up. 'Everything in the world creates itself without
the direction of any creator. Since things create themselves they are unconditioned.
This is the norm of the universe.'15
The Tao is not a supernatural personal agency; it is not supernatural, it is certainly
not personal, and it is only in a stretched sense ""agency"". If the Tao includes all-
encompassing natural order - a unity in diversity — in which the tao of each is ideally in
harmony with the whole, then there is no need to posit a super-Being. Each being
follows its course in the whole. Moreover, the appeal to a superpersonal authority,
exalted example, or the like, on the one side, or to ethics, on the other, is needed only
when people have moved away from the Tao. Everything will work well if a
community lives according to the Tao. Thus deontic features are brought in only at
disequilibrium - an interesting, if awkward, position. Then too, in formulating norms,
appeal is back to framework from which people have diverged.
There is a concealed moral purpose in Lao Tzu; a moral purpose that is central,
alongside, and inseparable from, the evident metaphysical purpose. Since axiology is a
crucial part of it - evaluations and commendations are freely and extensively offered in
the texts - Taoism is not amoral. But the treatment of deontic principles, and of rules of
conduct generally, is very different. Deontics enter only when there is a lapse or
deviation from an ideal natural state (from a proper course). 'When the Great Tao
declined, the doctrine of humanity and righteousness arose'. 16 Much depends then, on
what counts as ""moral"" and ""amoral"".
Certainly there are approved and implicitly
recommended lifestyles, though there are few ""oughts"", and no (Confucian-Kantian)
lists of duties. Moreover, unless preferred Taoist lifestyles
merely recommended,
not required, Taoism would fall down as insufficiently pluralistic.
3. On Taoist styles of life: an environmental lifestyle. As well as a set of regulative
propositions about how things happen, and proceed ideally, Taoism supplies a parallel
14 CT 2.
15 Kao Hsiang, CTwwze/i/ary
16 LT 18.
pp.330-331.
set of suggestions and prescriptions for how to live well. According to Lao Tzu, there
are some basic elements to living well, for instance 'three treasures'.^
1.
Deep love — which can also be taken to involve compassion, pity, commiseration,
care, concern, respect and regard, and which includes something close to empathy,
deep-penetrating empathy.
Sympathy, a main linkage of the European
""Enlightenment"", does not however capture what is involved: sympathy alone
would be too egoistical and too circumscribed for Taoism, as it is for Deep
Ecology. Deep love is part of the notion of genuine relatedness, not a one-sided
""relatedness"" or possessiveness (which Taoism rejects). It is certainly not confined
to fellow humans, but reaches through, around and beyond them to the myriad
things;
2.
Frugality - a renunciation of excess. That implies a renunciation of consumerism.
But frugality is not impoverishment. Needs are met adequately without deprivation
or excess. As in Deep Ecology too, richness in ends is compatible with modesty of
material means;
3.
Modesty or humility - not to dare to be ahead of the world, not to take the lead. In
Taoism there is no competitive requirement, but the opposite; such Western
desiderata lapse. Rather, one gives up trying to be on top of the pile, or even being
in a faster lane. In a Taoist society there are no conspicuous tall poppies.
Much else connects with or follows in a loose way, so it is assumed, from these
three virtues; for instance, courage from deep love, generosity from frugality, a kind of
leadership from humility. The arguments for those surprising derivations go like this:
'deep love helps one to aim in the case of attack / And to be firm in the case of
defence'. 18 Earlier^ it is taken that proper abandonment of humanistic ethics will mean
a return to (what the ethics inadmissibly substitutes for) deep love, a basic valuational
relation. But in place of frugality, goes a discarding of profit, and in place of humility
an abandonment of conscious sageliness and discarding of immodest (or conventional)
wisdom. These changes are, astonishingly, said to be rather superficial and inadequate;
so further desiderata, commonly read out of the ""treasures"" are adduced: 'Manifest
plainness / embrace simplicity / reduce selfishness / have few desires'. 20 Another
element, beyond the three of relatedness, frugality, and not daring to be ahead, is
17 LT 67; but different overlapping lists are presented, e.g. LT 19.
18 LT 67.
19 LT 19.
20 LT 19.
10
adaptability or spontaneity. This ""fourth treasure"" (which can be read off natural order)
complements the further desiderata.
Evidently main ingredients for a simple environmentally sound lifestyle are highly
commended.
Lao Tzu might almost have been writing another introduction for
Callenbach's environmental handbook, LM/ig Poor
or even for Pausacker
and Andrews' Lfwzg Po^r wft/z
In Chang Tzu, the /?Mr^ person is a deep
environmentalist:— She is a companion' of Nature and does not attempt to interfere
with it by imposing the way of man upon it'. Her goal is 'spiritual emancipation and
peace' and derivatively freedom; and her route is 'through knowing the capacity and
limitations of one's own nature and adapting it to the universal process of
transformation' and thus to the environmental
In complementary fashion, opposite ""virtues"", common in anti-environmental
lifestyles are condemned.
The Western drives to power, fame, competition,
possessions, excess commodities, useless (small) knowledge are rejected by Taoism
(along with ""Mans Affairs""). Thus entrepreneurial activity in business, and also in
professional and academic affairs (as well as busyness itself), gets decidedly
discouraged. The good life naturally reduces ambitions and desires and avoids
competition. Competition is connected with self-assertion and aggressive action.
Taoism, while not neglecting limited natural competition, passes aspersions on both. In
place of the mainstream economic virtue of competition, inherited from the
Enlightenment and reinforced by Darwinianism, appears the 'virtue of non
competition'.^ Competition often requires forced or artificial action; thus it violates the
doctrine of wM-wef (non-action). In competition external rival standards are imposed on
Tao. Competition is deviant, evidencing deviation from tao, and from te, virtue. In any
event, according to Taoism, there is no merit in trying to place onself above another. So
there is no value in competition. Fortunately competition can be reduced. If a person
does not compete then the world cannot compete with him.
A broad way of life is depicted, based on love, respect and compassion for all
things, attuned to what is essential, shedding what is unnecessary, where simplicity and
frugality are sought, and excess and competition avoided. This involves, in a nutshell,
voluntary simplicity of a deep sort. Simplicity is not however the impoverished life of
one who seeks escape. Taoism goes much further in disparaging scarce material means.
Do not exact the worth, so that people compete. Do not value rare treasure, so that
people do not steal. Gross wealth and prestige are rejected; they are vanities and
vexations. But not all is vanity: living well is not.
21 Chan SB p.177.
22 LT 68.
11
It is a very natural inference, then, from the account of living well to the suggestion
that Tao offers a deep form of voluntary simplicity. Voluntary simplicity is a fuzzy
notion.23
Voluntary simplicity can initially be explained through its two obvious
components, simplicity and its voluntary adoption. Simplicity connects with, and is
often equated with frugality, as elaborated in Taoism. But whether or not simplicity is
obtained from frugality or other Taoist virtues, it plays a direct and important part in the
theory, and is in fact modelled, like its metaphysical counterpart, the unconceptualised
Whole, by the uncarved block, a central Gestalt of the theory. The block symbolises
unity, simplicity and naturalness not spoiled by artifice, metaphysically the wholeness
and unity of Tao before conceptual carving, and ethically the wholesome
straightforward non-devious life under Te, the 'simple life that is free from cunning and
cleverness, is not devoted to the pursuit of profit or marked by hypocritical humanity
and righteousness, but is characterised by plainness, tranquility, and purity'.24 As to
voluntariness, people have a c/iozce of selecting the way of Tao rather than one of the
deviant ways.
It is a choice of recipes - frugal vs. excess, relatedness vs. non-
relatedness, tall poppies vs. not daring to be ahead. But one does not attempt to force
one's way onto a correct path. To hyperactively seek the path is a deviation in itself.
Within the broad way of life depicted fall a plurality of particular lifestyles,
appropriate to various different social roles. Among more specialised lifeways on
which Taoist attention is lavished are those of the sage and the ideal ruler. A sage is
naturally one who follows Tao, who has acquired great knowledge, and so on (ideality
is built into the notion of
The sage understands the fundamentals of Tao, and
practices accordingly.
Likewise an ideal ruler is a non-interfering exemplar ruler, who observes voluntary
Ideally the people become emulators of this ruler. Effectively Taoism
redefines the notion of ""ruler"", equating ruler with supreme exemplar, such as the sage,
whereupon the meaning attributed to ""ruler"" becomes that of following Tao. The ruler
simplicity.
is one who deviates little from the Tao; this is his ""power"". Someone who deviates little
from the Tao is kingly, that is, to observe another subversion of terminology, he shows
an all-embracing impartiality. The sage and the ""ruler"" are but two important examples
of kinds of ideal lifes. Another kind is also sketched,2$ that of the best type of person
(effectively an ideal Deep Ecologist), a person 'who in his dwelling loves the earth', but
also loves humanity, and order, and competence, and profundity.
23 As its fullest elaboration, Elgin's very profuse account, reveals.
24 Chan, p.14.
25 Notably in LT 8.
12
4. Following Tao: non-action, cultivating Te and seeking Enlightenment. Part of
the Taoist route to an environmental lifestyle and towards enlightenment consists in
acquiring the practice of non-action, exemplified through non-assertion, non
aggression, non-destruction, and the like.
commonly translated as 'non-action',
is thereby rendered a dialectic notion, for it does not exclude action and in a sense is
action. To avoid such dialectical overtones,
is sometimes rendered 'not acting
wilfully' or 'not acting artificially' or 'acting naturally'; it is better transcribed as 'without
forcing' or 'no forced (or coercive) action'. Construed in this fashion,
is not an
extraneous awkward addition to Taoism, but an integral part, which emerges from other
features of the theory, namely those of following natural low-action ways. For non-
action is the ""activity"" of letting one's tao drift or flow into line with the overall Tao (so
arrows in Diagram 2 are aligned). What is commended is, in the correct circumstances,
pacific action, of letting happen (e.g. letting die), as opposed to aggressive, extraverted
action (e.g. killing), forced action upsetting natural ways. Similarly for other No-nos;
the ""no desires"" directive, for instance, is a piquant shorhand for 'no impure desires',26
i.e. for no unsatisfactory or anti-te desires. Non-action accordingly does not require
literally no action, but only actions in accord with ideal nature, so ruling out actions
contrary to undisturbed Tao. It may appear that perennial problems, alleged to haunt
Taoism (and intensified in Stoicism), are induced. For example, if all is Tao, and Tao is
natural, how can there be unnatural activity? Or differently, if nothing can depart from
Tao, how can there be unspontaneous actions, or any violation of
Tao,
however, is a source which only
in an ideal, natural, direction. It does not
all individual paths, which can deviate from ideal or natural paths. Thus
deviant activity is not excluded, unspontaneous and ill-organised activity by individuals
is in no way ruled out; and forced, coercive and nature-destroying activities are all too
common. When 'all activities follow their specific principles, that is nature';27 deviation
from Nature accordingly occurs, namely when some activities do not follow their
principles. As for destruction, 'Do not let man destroy Nature'.28
Non-action as policy generally implies non-interference, when things have not
been damagingly disturbed. It implies letting things take their own natural course;
letting Being be, as Deep Ecology has it, with basically ""hands off practice and
management. Unforced action in practice is well illustrated by examples of going with
the flow. One main example of going with the flow is cutting meat. The Chef does not
encounter bones. He takes the meat apart effortlessly in the same way that an athlete
26 Chan, p.13.
27 SB p.202.
28 SB p.207.
13
does things effortlessly, with little waste action. Going with the flow can however
involve a lot of activity, as with the man swimming easily in a raging torrent below the
waterfall, or as in sailing and trimming to the wind. At a personal level, non-action lies
in such things as not striving to put oneself above others, in foregoing competition, in
simplicity, frugality, and adherence to the mean. Evidently this removes a range of
normally accepted social activities. Flexibility, and suppleness, and even weakness,
belong to the centre (or mean), to the valley way. Though the ancient transcultural
doctrine of the mean, of a middle way, appears explicitly in La<9 TzM,29 that middle path
is arrived at, and taken, differently. The Taoist route is an easy no-action route, a valley
way, a non-maximising path of weakness and little resistance, in line with the broad
account of living and faring well.
Taoism, like other older non-maximising wisdoms enjoining adherence to the
Mean, is incompatible with modem maximising ideologies.
Taoism is thus
incompatible with Deep Ecology, whose supreme directive is self-realisation (again
capitalised for wider ""selves""). Such Self-realisation is a European idea, a maximising
prescription applied to the aggregated interests of a separate self, inflation of a typically
egoistic concept not found in Taoism. But although such directives to Self-realisation
would be rightly queried in Taoism, there are parallel non-maximising goals to be found
in Taoism: namely, attaining enlightenment and tranquility, following Tao, and
cultivation of
and the contrast between self-realisation and Self-realisation parallels
that between
and %, great re. Since a 'main objective of the [Lao Tza] is the
cultivation of virtue or fe',3O can be seen as displacing self-realisation on the Taoist
scheme. As it works out then, Self-realisation is nicely displaced by Enlightenment.
Complementary to Tao is Te, and to tao is te. Whereas tao is the directed source of
a thing, te is the matching goaZ-bZfrc^Z
or unfolding of a thing. It is a
directed and
standard translation of
(in principle favourably) developing, value-adding; hence the
as 'virtue'. Because of its potentiality to reach a (good) goal, a
rival translation as 'power' has some currency; it is a directed force/br good (or evil).
The program of tao supplies the direction of matching te. So a thing can follow its tao
(and thereby follow Tao) by cultivating te, by practising positive virtue, by choosing a
lifestyle of deep simplicity. The directives for a good individual life are accordingly
commonly given in terms of individual te, and it is te (rather than Tao) that generally
appears invididualised.
Each being has its own tao, its own ideal naturally-programmed path of self
development or unfolding. Correspondingly, there is an immanent telos, a te, a goal29 E.g. 77, also 29.
39 Chan, p.ll.
14
directed virtuous developing, for each thing. By each following its own nature, all
follow nature. Our self-development does not then interfere damagingly with your self
development. How does this happen? Through natural (again invisible) inter
organisation, my proper self-development cannot impede your proper self-development.
While Taoism is decidedly short on details of such mututal adjustment and harmonious
integration, it is certain that it happens naturally — as it may, for instance, through the
evolution of co-operation.3i So there is, or need be, no vacillation between following
one's own path and taking care not to interfere with the paths of others, between
individualistic and relational paths. The Taoist result is integration, a harmonious
combination of plans, without domination, by contrast with the dominant pattern of
Western relations, operating through hierarchical ordering and domination.
5. Environmental theory and practice; environmental problems and difficulties,
such as quietism and security. As on deeper environmental theories, traditional
Western models for human relations to the natural world are one and all rejected. The
dominant view, of domination, of human dominion over the earth and its other
inhabitants, is not merely roundly and soundly rejected; the metaphysical creationist
base and the superiority myths upon which it is regularly founded are also removed.
Therewith also the bases for the lesser, and rather more benign, Western models, such
as stewardship and perfectionism, are also undercut. There is no superior or greater
purpose for humans to serve, or lord to supplicate as steward. Besides stewardship, a
kind of servant-master relationship, which is both hierarchical and implicitly
patriarchical in cast, typically involves active interference in producing products. The
idea of perfecting nature also implies active interference, when however nature is more
or less in order as it is, and requires no ""perfecting"". Thus stewardship and perfectionist
alternatives fall along with domination and dominion.
Taoism offers instead a non-interference model for relations to nature, a letting-be
approach, with ""hands off"" environmental management and associated lifestyles. A
most striking feature of Taoism is its environmental depth, its strong opposition to then
prevailing (and still prevailing) humanism and human chauvinism.
31 Ong resolution of this problem can now make a useful start with Axelrod's investigations of evolving
cooperation.
Cooperation can begin with small clusters. It can thrive with rules that are nice, provocable,
and somewhat forgiving. And once established in a population, individuals using such
discriminating strategies can protect themselves from invasion. The overall level of
cooperation tends to go up and not down. In other words, the machinery for the evolution of
cooperation contains a ratchet (Axelrod p.177).
15
Heaven and earth are not humane
They regard all things as straw dogs [i.e. rather worthless strict ritual objects].
The sage is not humane [or human chauvinist].
He regards all people as straw dogs.32
Because of such tough pronouncements, reiterated and reinforced in Chang Tzu,33
Taoism is sometimes said to be predicated on anti-humanism. But it is not 'a
dehumanizing philosophy', it does not deny compassion; what transpires is that concern
and value are not confined to humans or their affairs, but
include the natural and the metaphysical. The human is no longer the criterion
of what is good or true. The traditonal idea that a supreme supernatural being
... is the ruler of the universe is replaced by the doctrine that the universe
exists and operates by itself. When [Lao Tzu] says that ""Heaven and Earth are
not humane"", he means in a narrow sense that they are
but in a
broader sense that Nature is no longer governed according to
... In one stroke he removes Heaven [or God] and man as the standards of
things and replaces them with Nature.34
What is rejected with the rejection of humanism and humanistic ethics is human
chauvinism.
For being ""humane"" means accepting the chauvinistic assumptions of
conventional society and remaining within the narrow sphere of interests of the human
species. There is no unbridgeable gulf between humans and other creatures such as
Western thought has tried to manufacture. 'Put a halter around the horse's head and put
a string through the cow's nose, that is man'.35 In place of humanism, Taoism adopts a
doctrine of impartiality. 'Embrace all things without inclining to this way or that way'. 36
He who is enlightened 'is impartial';37 'he has no partial love for anyone'38 he does not
bestow undue or special favours upon humans; he aims to be one with Nature.
Impartiality does not imply equality. Despite the received heading of chapter 2 of
the
TzM, 'the equality of all things' (the literal 'levelling all things' is nearer the
mark), and the standard inference to some Taoist doctrine of parity, no simplistic and
difficult theme of equal value of all things is ventured — nor any theme of parity for
some favoured subclass thereof such as living things. (Though there is some accent on
prime life, there is not the same stress on
in Taoism that there is in Deep Ecology,
nor the bizarre extension of ""life"" to include waterfalls, mountains and other striking
What is offered, instead of much in the way elucidation of
impartiality, is (again like Deeper Ecological theory) a doctrine of identification. Wide
natural objects.)
identification and wide solidarity does promote impartiality and counter chauvinism.
32 LT 5.
33 E.g. CT 2.
34 Chan, p.10, italics added; also p.107.
35 SB p.207.
36 SB p.206.
37 LT 6.
38 SB p.201.
16
Egoism, for instance, involves discounting all but oneself, humanism all but humans,
and requires a species solidarity with human things. But wider identification puts a stop
to such discounting (e.g. in favour of one's own or species's interests, as exhausting
value) and to such class-restricted solidarity.
For wider identification reveals that
interests and desires, concerns and values and so forth, are not so individual or class
restricted. Many exquisite examples of identification, and the processes by which it
may be achieved, are developed, for example with a butterfly, by dream access,39 with
rivers and seas, and wider again, by the proper meditative process, with the dusty world
- 'Become one with the dusty world / This is called profound identification'40 - and
perhaps wider yet, and ultimate, with ideal Nature, and thus in complete accord with
Tao .41
No less striking than the criticism of humanism, Taoism makes similar sort of
attack on traditional education and on the accumulation of knowledge. The case against
traditional education, especially rote ""learning"", is straightforward; it reinforces
entrenched practices and prejudices, e.g. those of humanism. The criticism does not of
course imply that there would be no regular learning or habituation processes, in place
of those excessively encouraged traditional indoctrination methods. More perplexing is
the attack on knowledge acquisition, though in part it is of the same sort, against an
entrenched knowledge in the hands of power and professional groups. But, in an
organic society, knowledge is integrated into the community and not ratified into a
commodity held or controlled by a priesthood or a class of intellectuals or literati.
Insofar as knowledge is power, such power is removed from the control of a few by
making it a community good. In these respects Taoism goes beyond Deep Ecology, for
instance in questioning and rejecting experts.
Indeed in its criticism of schooling,
narrow expertise, and the like, Taoism resembles and anticipates the stance adopted by
Illich rather than features of Deep Ecology. The superficially anti-intellectual trend of
Taoism is really directed against other targets than pure knowledge: against power
through knowledge and control of knowledge, against slickness and cleverness, against
devious and crafty uses of knowledge ,42 against counter-productive acquiring of
knowledge or cunning, and its teaching. The puzzling situation is tidied up somewhat
in the C%<2Kg TzM, where an apposite distinction is made between
knowledge, the
castigated sorts, which is inquisitive, partial, discriminative or merely analytic, and
greaf knowledge, which is 'leisurely and at ease', comprehensive, extensive, and
39 SB p.190.
40 LT 56, also 4.
41 E.g. LT 16.
4^ LT 3.
17
synthetic .43 Even so, classical Taoism hardly seems to cater for adequate access of
information, and the removal of (perhaps debilitating) ignorance, concerning health and
welfare, careful and damaging practices, choices and alternatives.
What is environmentally significant is that the critique of small knowledge and
narrow expertise extends to encompass a critique of technology. In Taoism, technology
was assigned a very limited role at best. Certain forms of technology were, if not
rejected outright, at least strongly discouraged. 'Even if there are ships and carriages,
none will ride in them. Even if there are arrows and weapons, none will display
them'.44 More generally, while high and dangerous technology is set aside, even more
appropriate technology cannot be accepted uncritically. Lao Tzu recognised clearly that
even low impact technology may destroy conventions and practices constitutive of a
community. Nor was the connection of technology with population neglected. Given a
small country and few inhabitants, if provided with a labour-saving device he would not
use it. There are dominating and non-dominating forms of technology. What is
enjoined is avoidance of artificial wants and desires, and therewith of unnecessary
consumption, and correspondingly on the production side, shunning of a work void, of
efficiently replacing labour with nothing at all.
In these sorts of respects Taoism
exhibits a firmer grasp of some of the problems of technology, even more appropriate
labour-saving technology, than a spread of recent positions. Likewise a Taoist approach
demolishes the so-called iron law of technology, that there is no stopping technology or
its progress. Whatever the merits of the ""law"" (they are not so conspicuous), Taoism
reveals that such social laws are culture and community dependent, and do not
withstand transfer from the dominant social paradigm everywhere else.
Many other elements of a sensitive and sophisticated ecological position feature in
classical Taoism. There is an elaborate and sensitive account of Nature, from which it
emerges plainly that Nature is not a mere instrument or means for other ends, and not
merely a resource, but something of great value in itself. Nature is something to be
cherished in its own right, allowed to take its own course, not to be interfered with or
destroyed by humans. Indeed the dominant instrumental perspective is interestingly
reversed; value for humans is achieved above all by identification with Nature, and by
following natural ways. (Paradoxical reversal is a feature of Taoism; even castigated
Western aims, such as leadership, fame and so on, are in fact achieved, when they are,
not by direct aim, but by letting the reverse happen. So it is with what control of Nature
is required; non-intervention and non-action is the approach. Sufficient control is
gained, it is said, when assertive attempts to impose it are abandoned.) While such
43 CfChan, p.20.
44 LT 80.
18
recently fashionable ideas as bioregionalism are not encountered in explicit form in
Taoism, their bases are, as are other associated environmental ideas: living in place is
certainly present;^ doing things locally and remaining local, while being attuned to the
universe, is certainly advocated, giving some sustenance to the maxim Deep Ecology
happily borrowed, ""think globally, act locally"".
While there is then very much in Taoism that fits easily and revealingly with
deeper environmental theories, Taoism also induces puzzles or generates residual
problems. While some of the problems are genuine enough, that of material scarcity for
example, not all the supposed problems are genuine; and not all the puzzles are
bequeathed to contemporary theory. Illustrating both is the problem of quietism, which
is at bottom the issue of reconciling ""non-action"" with environmental and social
improvement and action. How, for instance, would a Taoist resistance against
depredation, a Taoist defence of environment proceed, and fare, given its apparent
emphasis on not bothering, ""don't bother""? In-built harmony and quietism do not allow
sufficiently for conflict. In part there is only a problem because of misrepresentation of
Taoism, which is not committed to a ""don't bother"" attitude to environmental
destruction: quite to the contrary, humans should not be allowed to destroy nature.^
Furthermore, there are many Taoist tactics and techniques, using weakness to overcome
strength, letting the flow of nature demolish the forces of environmental destruction,
and the like, which can be applied in environmental resistance.^ Quietism is
accordingly a misrepresentation of the practice, and something of a misnomer (an
oppositional, not a Taoist tag).
How can Tao work in a world where there is scarcity almost everywhere? Very
simply, Taoism optimistically holds that there is no genuine problem concerning
plentitude; things are not scarce, there is an abundant outpouring from nature. There is
scarcity only because of violations of the requirements of Tao (with excessive desires,
excessive consumer demand, excessive hoarding, political mismanagement, and so on).
Tao will serve to restore plentitude/s Rather than a collection of scarce resources,
Nature is represented as an virtually infinite storehouse of boundless wealth. Nor was
there a looming problem of limits to growth, because growth (in key parameters, such
as populations) would not proceed exponentially.
Does Tao allow for the prospect and problems of too many people?
Can the
greater Tao keep pace with the requirements of many too many individual taos, even if
45 LT 80.
46 See CT.
47 Use of the power of water affords a prime example; cf LT 15. No-action adaptations of old Chinese
martial arts and strategies presumably offer more direct methods of defence and resistance.
48 LT 77.
19
those individual requirements are in line with the greater Tao? No doubt in those times,
and most historical times when epidemics and plagues were almost as regular as
droughts, when evolution still operated overtly on human species, there was little more
than a hypothetical or remote future problem concerning population. It seems plain
however that Taoism did not face the environmental problems such as those of too
many people and incremental resource and ecosystem degradation. While the texts do
address, forcefully, two of the three main components of the standard environmental
impact equation, namely consumption and technology, the important third, human
population, is not considered at all, still less statisfactorily therefore. It is much the
same for other significant environmental issues. The prime texts say little about soil
degradation and deforestation, long major environmental problems in China, as in other
centres of civilisation. Nor does Taoism have much to offer directly on main
contemporary issues of animal liberation, species loss, urban disgustification, and so
forth, though several of the problems are hardly new (and some are recognised in early
commentaries). Historic Taoism too was a product of its times, adjusted to what were
seen as problems.
There is no reason at all, however, why classical Taoism should not be updated,
more than two millenia, to take account of contemporary environmental problems.
Because of its compatibility with deeper environmentalism, Taoism admits such an
extension in a way that main modem religions do not.49
49 Such an extension of Taoism, entitled Neo-Daoism, is brashly sketched in UTD, from which much of
the present exercise is adapted. Such Neo-Daoism diverges sharply from contemporary Daoism. But it is
very congenial to contemporary deep environmental theory.
20
REFERENCES
Ames, R.T. (1986), 'Taoism and the nature of nature', E/zvzronm^nfaZ P/zz7o^op/zy 8:317350.
Axelrod, R. (1984), T/ze Evo/zmon of Cooperarzo/z, Basic Books, New York.
Chan, W.T. (1963), A .Source BooZr zTz C/zzzz^ E/zzZosop/zy, Princeton University Press,
Princeton [referred to as SB].
Chan, W.T. (1963), 77ze 1Toy of Loo Tza (Too-re c/zzzzg), Bobbs-Merill, New York
[introduction referred to as Chan, translation referred to as LT].
Devall, B. and Sessions, G. (1985), Deep EcoZogy: Lzvzng os y zzomre Moffered, Gibbs
M. Smith, Layton, Utah.
Elgin, D. (1981), VoZa/zfary .SzmpZzczzy, Murrow, New York [for a better briefer account,
see D. Elgin and A. Mitchell, 'Voluntary Simplicity', Co-EvoZafz'on gzzorrerZy 14
(Summer 1977)].
Elgin, D. and Mitchell, A. (1977), 'Voluntary Simplicity', Co-EvoZaaozz QaarferZy 14
(Summer 1977).
Fox, W. (1990), Toward o TroHspersoKo/ EcoZogy, Shambhala, Boston.
Graham, A.C. (1989), Dz'sporers ofr/ze Too, Open Court, La Salle, Illinois.
Illicit, I. (1974), 7oo/sfor CozzvzvzaZzzy, Calder and Boyars, London.
Lagerwey, J. (1987), 7oozsrEz'rooZ z'/z C/zz/zese ^ocze/y, Macmillan, New York.
Naess, A. (with D. Rothenberg) (1989), EcoZogy, Co/w/za/zzZy ozzzZLz/esZy/e, Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge.
Routley, R. (1980), ExpZorzzzg Mez/zozzg's Jzz/zgZe a/z^Z BeyornZ, Research School of
Social Sciences, The Australian National University, Canberra [referred to as JB].
Routley, V. and Routley, R. (1980), 'Social theories, self management and
environmental problems', in D. Mannison cf aZ. (eds), Ezzvz'rozzmc/zro/ E^/zzc^, The
Australian National University, Canberra [referred to as EE].
Sylvan, R. (1985-86), 'Towards an improved cosmological synthesis', Grazer
P/zzZo^op/zz'jc/zg 57a<7z^/z 25/26:135-178 [referred to as CS].
Sylvan, R. and Bennett, D. (1990), Df Ufopza.?, Tao azzefDeep EcoZogy, Green Series
No. 19, Research School of Social Sciences, The Australian National University,
Canberra [referred to as UTD].
Wang Pi (1979), 'Commentary on the Lao Tzu', transl. A. Rump and W.J. Chan,
University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu.
Watson, B. (1964), T/zc Co/zzpZcrc WorE? of C/za/zg Tza, Columbia University Press,
New York [referred to as CT].
",,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,"Box 21: More Green,Como House,Como House > Shelves > Top > Pile 3",https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/5cf3fa7566f03bef6d23380d6f744d0b.pdf,Text,"Draft Papers",1,0
165,https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/show/165,"Box 21, Item 708: Draft of Taoism and deep (ecology) theory: a preliminary object-theoretic investigation","Printout (photocopy) of draft, undated. Pages also numbered 50-80.","One of eight papers digitised from item 708. Title in collection finding aid: RS: Taoism and Deep (Ecological) Theory Ts.","Richard Sylvan","The University of Queensland's Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291, Box 21, Item 708","Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy",,"This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, Dr. N.A.J. Taylor.","For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library.",,"[31] leaves. 67.21 MB. ",,Manuscript,"https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:49545e5",,"TAOISM AND DEEP (ECOLOGICAL) THEORY:
a preliminary object-theoretic investigation.
There is a remarkable, and remarked, convergence of themes of deeper ecological
positions, such-as Deep Ecology, with those ot Taoism, i Given that Deep Theory has not
received adequate elaboration in important directions, particularly metaphysical and political
directions, the older wisdom of Tao can be profitably drawn upon to elaborate and enrich
deeper positions. Where Taoism does diverge from Deep Ecology (our working example
since it is presently the best known deep environmental theory) concerns some of the weakest
and most controversial parts of the Deep Ecology platform, such as the theme of Biospheric
Egalitarianism, the equality of all (living) beings.2 Thus Taoism can also provide a base for
1
The connections are remarked in some of the prime texts for Deep Ecology, for which see
Devall and Sessions (and therein p.100), and also CD. Not all the connections assumed in
Deep Ecology sources are correct however; in parucular Taoism does not deductively deliver
the platform of Deep Ecology. At most it informs the platform, which it would, if taken
seriously, after.
2
A critical exposition of Deep Ecology, which surveys the main themes, is ventured in Sylvan
CD. In several significant respects, Taoism offers a (retrospective) improvement on Deep
Ecology, being free of the excessive junk Deep Ecology has quickly accumulated. Fortunately
for those averse to intellectual junk such as environmental thought tends to collect (though
no doubt for later building or recycling), Deep Ecology is but one deep ecological position.
Another, presently being worked out in some detail, is Deep Green Theory, the ecological
part of a more comprehensive Deep Theory, which is intended to cover a much broader region
of philosophical ideas. Deep Theory includes, for instance, what adds to the depth, depth
relevant logic, intenzional object theory, and deep pluralism. As will begin to become
evident, Taoism proves to be a very congenial position for Deep Theory, and for Deep Green
Theory in particular. Thus it can most usefully be applied to illuminate Deep Theory, as well
as adding to its historical depth. But in this preliminary investigation, we become ^o caught
up in interpreting and explaining authentic Taoism, that we do not get to much explicit
elaboration of Deep Green Theory.
A corollary we want to draw from our investigations (preliminary though they are) bears
upon, and when developed may help to eradicate, a commonplace Western complacency and
smug superiority. A widespread, though usually subterranean, view in philosophy is that the
East really has little or nothing to offer. This view even extends far into environmental
philosophy (cf. Rolston's put-down). It is often part of cultural chauvinism; Western
scientific industrial culture doesn't have much to learn from other, generally more backward or
primitive or scientifically crude, cultures. The West is the cultural pace-setter, with the
information, resources, etc. Observe however that a nothing-new-to-offer position need not
reject old theories as worthless and not worth bothering with; in less brash form it can allow
51
correction and adjustment of Deep Ecology, and an impressionistic guide to a more
satisfactory and richer deep theory. Taoism is throughout decidedly ecologically oriented; a
high level of ecological consciousness is built into it, a main recipe amounting to FoZZow
Mxmrg as the basis of practice. It is also, so it transpires, a very congenial philosophic way
station for ecologically-concerned intellectual travellers weary of mainstream Anglo-American
and Continental philosophies which inform and reinforce the dominant Western social
paradigm.
Both for background, and in order to arrive immediately in the thick of the comparison,
we outline a main part of the Deep Ecology platform in (typical) slogan form and contrast it on
the one side with predominant Western attitudes and platitudes and on the other side with
Taoism.
TABLE 1. DEEP ECOLOGY CONTRASTED WITH THE DOMINANT
PARADIGM AND WITH TAOISM
DOMINANT (WESTERN)
PARADIGM
DEEP ECOLOGY (DE)
TAOISM
Domination over nature
Harmony with nature
Elaboration of DE
Nature a resource;
intrinsic value confined
to humans
Natural environment
valued for itself
Much for DE;
""humanism"" rejected
Humane supremacy
Biocentric egalitarianism
Differs from DE;
wide impartiality
Ample resources/substitutes
Earth supplies limited
Supplies ample
Material economic growth
a predominant goal
Non-material goals,
especially self-realization
Following Tao-te
that there is interest and merit in historical and reconstruction exercises. What it cannot allow
is news, such as News from Tao. Thus it does clash with what we argue, that such deep
theories as Deep Ecology can benefit and learn from Taoism. Taoism offers a striking timetested theory upon which Deep Theory can draw, an ongoing source of inspiration and
wisdom. Taoism texts may lack the detail of prime Western (non-industrial) sources such as
the texts of Aristotle or Plato; but they offer a much more congenial source for Deep Theory.
52
Consumerism
Doing with enough/
recycling
Doing with enough
(recycling inappropriate)
Competitive lifestyle
Cooperative lifeway
Much as for DE:
voluntary simplicity
Centralized/urban centred/
national focus
Decentralized/bioregional
/neighbourhood focus
As for DE
Power structure
hierarchical
Non-hierarchical/
grassroots democracy
Hierarchy without
power structure
High technology
Appropriate technology
Limited technology
The contrasts tabulated are of limited accuracy, because condensed to slogans, and also
limited because much of importance is omitted, especially from Taoism (which as so far
portrayed only reflects themes of Deep Ecology). In what follows several of the contrasts
will be expanded, and main omissions rectified. The richness of Taoism, the philosophical
topics traversed to which nothing corresponds in Deep Ecology, will mean that Deep Ecology
is often left far behind?
Deep Ecology offers however a different perspective on Taoism than has been arrived at
before. Not only can Taoism further Deep Ecology, then, but the compliment can be
returned. A comparison of Taoism with deep ecological theory can hardly be our only
objective; as an essential preliminary, much effort is directed at systematising Taoism. In the
course of this outside endeavour, we succumbed to a rather too familiar taunting challenge: to
draw something philosophically solid, of contemporary relevance, from the ancient Taoist
tests. A key element in our attempt to pull off something mind-expanding has been an object-
theoretic interpretation of perhaps the most vexing part of elusive Taoist theory, the
""metaphysics"". Taoism lends itself to natural systematisation in terms of noneism (the brand
3
We have not attempted anything approaching a fuii coverage of features of Taoism of
contemporary philosophical interest; but a
coverage is an eventual eco-theoretic
objective. The main works repay repeated fossicking.
There is, for instance, a significant doctrine of opposites in Taoism, iikely /tot the same as
that in the main Chinese tradition, which needs fathoming, and linking with common ancient
themes of balance and dynamic equilibrium of healthy systems. Every sort of thing, every
category has an opposite, which furthermore interacts with its dual. In theory, the opposition
appears to be tied to a (questionable) contrast theory of meaning. In practice, the opposites
tend to be reconciled or harmonized, but /tor in a Hegelian fashion by ascent, but through
taking a middle way (natural compromise rather than dialectic confrontation).
53
of object-theory developed in JB). For not only is the theory woven around certain striking
objects - Tao, Te, Tzu-jan, and others - not only does the theory cleverly exploit an objecttheoretic cosmology; but also important, the theory, though remarkedly free of the type of
religious trappings and claptrap that ontologically weigh down most older or traditional
ideologies, is opposed to and is highly resistant to reductionistic practices. That is, like
noneism, Taoism takes a no-rubbish non-reductionist stance. It is in part for such reasons especially that most everything in what it is and neither some other (approved) item nor
reducible to such other item - that Taoism avoids the common-sense implausibility and
scientific naivety of many a position, old and new: that for instance everything reduces to
water or air or fire or matter or energy or superstrings
Evidently, in advancing such noneist claims and other claims about what Taoists say or
imply, an interpretation is adopted, when often enough other rival interpretations of the central
texts are supportable. Indeed such a small body of theoretical work as the basic Taoist tests
comprise is far from categorical and is bound to admit of a plurality of non-isomorphic
interpretations.^ The main arguments we should offer for the selection we make from the
basket of admissible interpretations are these: the interpretation we offer is very
straightforward and is mostly an ""obvious reading""; for the most part such an interpretation
has already been offered, in other connections, by others much better informed than we are
about the Chinese texts; and that it is a relevant and important one for deep ecological
purposes.
Finally we should remark that we are essentially concerned with the
systematisation of only the Erst two Taoist texts (LT and CT) and focus upon LT. In brasher
moments we are inclined to think that the framework supplied (brushstrokes behind the old
master's impressionistic brushstrokes) will enable us to take philosophical account of almost
everything in the compact LT; we are not nearly so confident as regards CT.
1. Nature, cosmology, and the character of Tao.
Taoism sketches a cosmology
while Deep Ecology does not. The cosmology is interestingly at variance with dominant
- Western cosmologies. For the universe arises out of nothing. Being arises in accordance
with Tao, which precedes existence. Nonbeing precedes Being. Nonbeing is ultimate
(according to Chang Tzu) and comes first.
4
There are significant pluralistic lessons for hermeneutics to be drawn from the logical
investigations of categoricalness of postulate systems and the typical /a/Zare of
categoricalness.
54
All things in the world come from being
And being comes from nonbeing (LT 40).
The universe had a primeval beginning, coming into existence from nothing (SB p.202).
DIAGRAM 1. TAOIST CYCLE OF RETURN (cf. Chan p.173 fn 2).
flourishing
growth
cycle of generated
entity
reversion
NATURE (HEAVEN AND EARTH, or
ACTUAL UNIVERSE): Existent, Named, Temporal
(FORMING) SOURCE: Nonexistent, Nameless, Eternal
Every entity arises out of (material) nothingness and eventually falls back into nothingness
all that comes to pass, that is. ""All things flourish, but each one returns to its root' (LT 16).
The whole, the integrated natural system, is a process of becoming and decay. But the
emphasis upon process, evolution and change, upon Nature as flux and transformation, is
5
For a detailed contemporary presentation of such a cosmological cycle, see Sylvan CS. In
Neo-Taoism, e.g. Kao Hsiang, such a cycle is disputed, on standard ontological grounds (see
e.g. Chan SB, p.335)
A serious complication is induced in the Taoist cosmological story by variations on the
traditional interpretation of the later verses of LT 1. (On the variations, see Chan p.99 note
5; the linkage of Nonbeing with ""no desires"" is not however so remote as Chan tries to make
out; see LT 37.) The variations (which replace having desires and having no desires by Being
and Nonbeing) lead to dialethic complications of a Hegelian cast. For they make Being and
Nonbeing ultimately the
no doubt because of the becoming and reversion of each
generated being to nonbeing. (Becoming is seen by the modem translators Hegelian-style, as
the product of Being and Nonbeing.) Of course there is bound to be some dialethic elaboration
of Taoism in any case; e.g. Tao itself is both nameless (LT 1) and named (LT 14), though in
a slack sense. Thus Tao is both nameless because nonexistent and not fully conceptualisable
or describable; and also named, because called ""Tao', ""the Subtle', etc., and theorisable about.
55
much enhanced in Chang Tzu, over the work of Lao Tzu, where more stress is put upon
stability, constancy and equilibrium (cf. Chan p.20, also SB p.177). Overall, it is correct to
say, if not highly informative, that Tao is a natural process philosophy, with a keen sense
both of
and of
The novel cosmology — the emergence of what exists from nothing — is made feasible
through adoption of rudiments of a theory of objects (in the style much later elaborated by
Reid, Meinong and others). Nonbeing, what does not exist, is not formless or empty, an
indescribable nullity, as previous Chinese schools had apparently invariably thought (Chan,
p.8). On the contrary, it is not devoid of characteristics, but has definite features. Perhaps
wisely (if unfortunately from an analytic angle) authentic Taoism is largely silent on such
questions as to exactly which features nonexistent items have. But enough is said to reveal
how what does not exist — above all Tao — may yet have very distinctive features, while yet
lacking other properties (such as existence). Main examples, some repeatedly alluded to, are
those of gaps, lacunae, vacant spaces, as with a hollow bowl (LT 4), or empty utensil or
window space or lightweight wheel (LT 11), or valley. The unoccupied space of a room for
example has definite dimensions, location, and so forth; and its function and utility depends
upon its not being occupied (LT 11).
Rudiments of object-theory are however coupled with a curiously narrow doctrine of
names, perhaps as a concession to rival Chinese schools and with a view to making its
nonstandard position devastatingly clear. (This would parallel then the contemporary
concession of
to mainstream schools, in virtue of which nonexistent objects are not
referents; there are no referring terms, ""referential names"", which signify them.) According
to this doctrine of names, only what is a concrete individual and partly at least describable in
quite particular ostensive terms is nameable (nor at least
nameable). As Wang Pi, an
early commentator, indicated, names have a restricted role, naming requiring circumscription,
'the name that can be named point[s] to a particular affair' (p.l). Thus, for example, the main
-
transcendental notions are not nameable, Tao in particular. Tao, though-a great form ,
though at least apparently ""named"" honorifically in several ways, is not named thereby, but is
nameless, because not suitably circumscribed, because not a particular (affair). Similarly for
the other central notions of Taoism, such as Te; though they can be described, in approximate
fashion, they cannot be named. 'Tao', Te' and the like are not (ptimary) 77#/%?.?, but rather
(like 'God' and 'Vulcan' on contemporary theories) condensed descriptions. They could be
said to be
'Name' has been contracted, perhaps unduly, to 'primary name'.
There is another very important reason for eschewing names, or at least treating them -
56
and descriptions - with due caution. Names come with classification, with conceptualisation,
with carving the whole block, with imposition of a theoretical grid on the seamless Whole.6
Usual metaphysical theories presuppose one or another of standard, narrow and limiting,
conceptualisations and classifications, some perspective already carving up the Whole.
Names, basic to the linguistics of such carving operations, have a major role in the
worldification, in breaking up the One, which is simple and undifferentated, and typically a
major role in imposing a single impoverishing theoretical grid (e.g. recent empiricist
perspectives eliminate intensional and evaluative richness from the presented stuff). Part of
the point of the ""uncarved block"" image - which symbolises the One (among other things, it
is also a symbol for simplicity, and naturalness, for things not spoiled by artifice), the One
simple and undifferentiated, the unity behind all multiplicity - is to get at the purity and unity
of Tao before conceptualisation, before naming, before the differentiating and perhaps
distorting conferring of names.
Though Tao is so nameless, that is, it is not an existent concrete thing (e.g. a
particular), nonetheless a lot can be said a&oM? the Tao, by way of description (see the
excellent summary of Taoist descriptions in Chan pp.6-7). Though Tao is a single item, One,
unity behind multiplicity, under conceptualisations it is ""complex', many things: source of
everything, great form regulating both nature and conduct, Way of satisfactory conduct and
proper lives, and derivatively it is ""invisible', ""inaudible', ""vague and elusive'. Nothing
important conceptualised in Taoism comes in neat single form. All the main features and
notions of Taoism - principles, models, examples, etc. - appear in such multiple form:
metaphysical, ethical, etc. The artificial boundaries between these areas are broken down.
Tao itself exhibits this plural conceptual character: it combines both a complex of natural
principles and methods and of guiding ethical forms, with no imposed separation of fact and
value; but it is also an inexhaustible source, and so on. But the Tao is not beyond the reach of
reason (necessarily), even though it is inexpressible (adequately). Other things, such as
infinity, are also of this sort. (If Tao were Nothing, which in a sense it Ay, many of the
puzzling descriptions would be entirely apt.)
Tao is perhaps best explained by going going back to fundamentals. ""The word fao
6
This appropriate image was popularised by James. Under deep pluralism, different
determinations of the Whole, different grids, yield different worlds, a pZuraf/ry of worlds, with
different domains of objects named or different classes of designated propositions (and so
derivatively perhaps widi different logics).
57
consists of one element meaning a head and another meaning to run. It means that on which
something or someone goes [that by which a thing becomes what it is], a path or road, later
extended to mean ""method"", ""principle""../ (Chan p.6, insert from p.7).
DIAGRAM 2.
FUNDAMENTALS OF TAO
head
running
stvlised
source
course
program
path
§
source
directed
path
To the apt Taoist images of Tao as ""storehouse"", ""mother"" and ""ancestor"", may be added
others, such as that of a programmed or guided projectile. Each image helps peel off
unwanted associations of others; thus Tao is a great mother without male input; an ancestor
without predecessor, a missile without maker, an outputing program without input. Like a
program projectile or delivering storehouse, it integrates a complex source, an initial operating
program, with a planned course, a natural (and ideal) path.
The great or overarching Tao is a comprehensive source of natural activity; it
encapsulates a framework of forms or principles, principles of natural order, both
metaphysical and moral. It comprises both dynamic principles (or evolving """"laws"""") of nature
<37%/ axiological principles guiding conduct. In this representation it invites comparison with
Plato's structure of Forms, appropriately neutralised (in the object-theory fashion Reid urged:
see JB), or still better, though again neglecting the dynamism of Tao, comparison with the
pre-Socratic Logos. But to see overarching Tao as an axiological ontology, after the pattern
of Plato's Form theory, would be to import unwarranted Western assumptions. Though Tao
is a """"great form"""", and there is no doubt room in the generous object framework for other
t (unhypostatized) forms, main Platonic forms such as Beauty, Truth and Goodness, do not
feature large in the
CTn/ig. They are distinguished, and set rather to the side, in the
final chapter (LT 81). Other less Platonically emphasized (or available) forms are more
important, such as Simplicity, Frugality and Non-competition, as well as Tao itself, the
supreme form, also the One, which supplants the static Good of Plato's scheme and is
coupled with a dynamic path component.
Tao as form is part of Tao as in/bT*???//?^ source, which comprehends the class of
characterisations of objects e.g. subjectized and individualized forms, taos (these no doubt
58
relate to forms, ideals or principles, rather as particular essences relate to Platonic forms).
Tao as informing source is summed up in such phrases as ""The original of everything and out
of which all arises."" Tao as combined governing principle and source is summed up in such
phrases as ""the ancestor and mother of all things"". The Mother-image provides both a source,
and for the form of an object without being that object? Under the ancestral-image, Tao
supplies both the material source and the form, the genetic coding, for existence.
It is evident that Tao is intimately linked with, and concerned with, the natural, and
indeed linked with and not above the everyday. But what is the relationship between nature
and Tao? Is Tao supra- or super-natural? Tao is certainly not supernatural, and it does not
transcend natural things in the fashion of Western supernatural religions; rather Tao both
orders and reflects nature. Tao supplies the physical laws that provide physical idealisations
(i.e. ideal models) of processes. Tao in this sense is a process and the container and origin of
process and the laws of process. Tao is the natural way of the universe (of Heaven and
Earth), and super-Tao, also signified as Tao, is the way of the universe and the universe.
(Under a computer analogy, Tao is the program of the whole system; it is also, as super-Tao,
the program combined with the system, everything). As Great Tao it is certainly simple, allembracing and one. Getting the hang of its components and their connections is not quite so
simple.
The persistent Mother image in Lao Tzu has suggested several tancifui interpretations, such
as that of a mother-goddess, which are not textualiy supported. The latest in this fanciful line
is a Gaia story.
59
DIAGRAM 3. SUPER-TAO, OR GREAT TAO, WITH COMPONENTS
INTEGRATED
SUPER-TAO
Overarching forms, principles, Way of Nature
'§
'§
Nature, with taos in world
unrealised
objectified
forms
natural
system
'§
'§
'§
'§
§
'§
'§
Deviation line
Defective (or fallen)
fl'
from Natural
taos
As to the status of principles (laws, rules), standard Western categorisations are again
exceeded. These principles are not transcendent, governing things externally, but are, so to
say, self-supplied, with things self-regulated. Undominated things are naturally self-
governing. Nor is it quite accurate to say that ""the Tao is immanent and expressed through the
60
fe = r^Zoj, ideal direction) of things'.s The transcendent/immanent dichotomy fails (as on
object-theory), because it presupposes that principles and the Tao exist, either externally or
internally; but they do not exist. What is nearer right is that ""Everything has its own nature
and each nature is its own ultimate ... then by whom are things produced? They produce
themselves, that is all' (Kuo Hsiang, p.328). But ZJooZZy they proceed according to the Tao-
te, the goal directed way of virtue, autonomously.
DIAGRAM 4. TAO-TE PATHS, AND GOING WITH THE NATURAL FLOW
(cf. LT 53).
Tao (source)
Te(los)
Flow
Ideal Way: Way of Virtue
§
Deviations
from Flow
Deviant
Ways
tao '§.....................>-Ote
Laws persist, and perhaps evolve, under the guidance of overarching Tao, while the
universe in its rich diversity comes into and goes out of being. Tao thus offers a kind of unity
in, or above, diversity. In this regard too, Taoism can be applied to clarify the value scheme
of Deep Ecology. For Deep Ecology also values diversity and organic unity in diversity, but
lacks the cosmology from which the features derive. The unity lies in a unified tier of
principle (matched in part at an upper level of the Deep Ecology pyramid) above the diversity
of life processes. The Taoist metaphor of a single block, variously composed of many
things, can likewise be applied to fill out Deep Ecology's picture of the ecosphere. However,
8
As Hall claims.
a fundamental notion in Taoism, is often translated as wrfa%, sometimes
power; but often reZo^y gets the intended item and objective better, as the subsequent text tries
to explain. Te is not the same as Tao. And it is a mistake to t?Ze?uZ/y tao, or individualised
Tao, with te (as sometimes suggested; e.g. Chan SB p.178), though they are evidendy closely
connected, and to a restricted extent (as e.g. in a missile example) one can be derived from the
other. While tao gives the source and route ' §, te supplies die virtuous direction and focus or
goal (telos) §-O.
61
the block metaphor has some drawbacks; it tends to suggest a static picture, which is
unwarranted.
For both Tao and Deep Ecology, universes and ecospheres are, when
appropriately stable, in dynamic equilibrium.
Tao is a natural order. Though the phrase ""natural order'* may seem strange, even
contradictory, it is not. The reason is, in part, that the Taoist perception of the world is the
reverse of the modern Hobbes-Locke perception of the world. In contrast to European
political thought of the mainstream Hobbes-Locke strain, where the state-of-nature is one of
chaos or extreme disorder, the Taoist state-of-nature is one of order. A main assumption of
Western thought, that political order must be imposed by regulation on an unruly state-of-
nature, is thus undercut. A separate imposed political order is not required; the idea that it is
rests on mistaken assumptions. Politics can, and should, follow nature. Science and politics
can be blended, not sharply separated in the typical Western fashion, where nature is taken to
exclude value. Nature presumes value.
Nature is already in order as it normally is, through a unity in diversity which involves a
normative component - a principle or recipe for how things ""should"" be as well as how they
are integrally. Values are build into the environment, an integral part of the way of things.
By following the values of Tao one enters and comes into contact with the whole environment
and into unity with the environment. Tao is a description of how things are and a prescription
of how to act in accord with the way they are.
According to Taoism then, by contrast with dominant Western thought which sees the
world as extensional, mechanistic and value-neutral (except for its human cargo), the world is
both intensional and value-infused. These features extend not merely to the whole, but to
components which go into composing the greater whole. These have their programs, or
ways, which are integrated into the greater way (somewhat as, but artificially, expert system
programs may be organised into grander programs representing super-experts, computer
substitutes for the lost ""universal men**).
The overarching Tao - grand or capital Tao, the program or recipe or Form or whole
genetic code - combines many individual ones - lesser or /ow^r-case taos - within it. Such a
lesser tao, of an individual, system or whatever, is what makes a thing what is properly, a
coursed or informed source, a program directed path, a processed output. A tao is a sourced
directed object; it is thus a type of object, a dynamic item, which can be represented by a pair
comprising a recipe, program or form and a direction or goal-orientation. Accordingly, an
individual or local tao (or form) resembles one of Aristotle's individual forms as coupled with
a
which comprises a normative directive. For both Aristotle and Tao there is, in effect,
62
an ""invisible hand"" at work. (How did this, such convenient namraZ order come about? That
is Tao; another, old and compatible answer is: It evolved.) When things are running
properly, the lesser, individual, taos (most conveniently) fit together and operate in accord
under the overarching program (cf. diagram 3). If each individual runs according to the
program, then the overall program succeeds fully. However, it works even if each individual
does not run according to the overarching program, but it has a less ideal result. If each
person acts in a correct way a massive net good and great order result. Yet, any attempt to
impose order does not bring it about, but is counterproductive. The invisible (natural) hand
guides, but the hand cannot be forced.
This picture of order invites comparison with the modem market theory, which claims
that maximum effect or benefit is obtained without regulation (other than extensive framework
legislation!), and that once regulation is imposed the result is inferior. In principle, the market
operates on a set of understood (partly conventional) rules. The rules are known and it is
merely a matter of following them. But the market enables dominance by the rich and
powerful, and thereby discrimination and the like. Tao, however, is opposed to such
dominance; those who follow Tao attempt to refrain from dominating others. But like the
market, the rules of conduct are built into the system and any attempt to impose them is
counterproductive.
As a result, spontaneity and order are not opposites, but result from the same thing. A
strong sense of natural order, of self organisation, of anarchy (in the good sense) enters.
Like Buddhism, Tao assents to the maxim, ""Do nothing and from unforced order greater
order results"". If each being is permitted to follow its tao, then the needs of all will be met
without coercion. Following the way of Tao, nature emerges as a self-supplying
organization. Such convenient natural organisation stands (so far as it occurs!) in need of
some further explanation, whether of an internal, evolutioning sort or of a supernatural sort,
as in Neoplatonism where God or the One accomplishes the organisational task. Taoism
undermines such latter alternates, and points (in CT) towards an evolutionary explanation.
2. The extend of Tao as agency: non-religion and (non-)moraiity. God does not
occur, and is not needed, in the cosmology, either as an agent, to make things in the universe
happen, or as an authority, to regulate things or set moral or legal standards. If He did occur,
He would, like other directors and rulers, not be needed, though He could serve as an
example. ""But there is no indication of his existence"" (CT 2). As in the socio-political sphere,
direction by a overseer or ruler is otoise, and only examplary. In paiticular, God is not
required to start or wind the universe up. ""Everything in the world creates itself without the
63
direction of any creator. Since things create themselves they are unconditioned. This is the
norm of the universe.'9
The Tao is not a supernatural personal agency; it is not supernatural, it is certainly not
personal, and it is only in a stretched sense ""agency"". It the Tao includes all-encompassing
natural order — a unity in diversity — in which the tao of each is ideally in harmony with the
whole, then there is no need to posit a super-Being. Each being follows its course in the
whole. Moreover, the appeal to a superpersonal authority, exalted example, or the like, on
the one side, or to ethics, on the other, is needed only when people have moved away from
the Tao. Everything will work well if a community lives according to the Tao. Thus deontic
features are brought in only at disequilibrium — an interesting, but tricky, position. Then too,
in formulating norms, appeal is back to framework from which people have diverged.
In politics, as in morals, it is deviation from the natural state that represents the
problem, quite in contrast again to European political thought of the Hobbes-Locke strain,
where the state-of-nature is one of extreme disorder (nasty, brutish, short, etc.). Such a state of-nature is not at all a Taoist natural state; by contrast with mainstream thought, nineteenth
century European anarchism adopts a position very similar to Taoism. 10
It is revealing to compare the Taoist picture of deviation from a natural state with
Aristotelian model of deviation from the mean, which provides the norm (cf. diagram 4). On
the Aristotelian model, the end of all things is seeking well-being, to be achieved by following
the Mean. This involves adhering to the Mean in an active rational fashion. Rationality is tied
to seeking, to the means. Tao does not require rationality. Tao is sought passively, by letting
happen, not actively, by forced efficiency, whereas on the Aristotelian account, the search and
aim for the good is active.
9
Kao Hsiang,
on
Tyu, 330-7. When Hall and others try to argue (like
Neo-Taoists) that the Taoist totality is without a beginning - contrary to Hall's other material
about Being coming from Nonbeing - what they actually present, and mean, is. without a
creative beginning. And that is right: there is no Creano
m/h/o as per Genesis. But it is
false that there is no cosmogony. There is; and while there is no creation, a making by
someone, there is a beginning; see e.g. SB, p.202.
10
In this respect, Hall is right off track (in the last sentence of his paragraph 1). The Taoist
point is that naturalness is not such a prominent feature of human affairs, because of the
imposition of excess laws, regulation, etc. Taoist sensibility is only bizarre from an
erroneous dominant paradigm perspective.
64
DIAGRAM 5. TAOIST MIDDLE/CENTRAL/LITTLE-ACTION WAYS
1.
2.
Aristotelian/Confucian/Taoist
Taoist contrasting ways
mean path, in fuzzy sufficiency cone
hard or extreme
mountain ways
a middle
way
valley, ravine or
river way;
easy, natural way
Though the ancient transcultural doctrine of the mean, of a middle way, appears explicitly in
Lao 7h/ (e.g. 77, also 29), that middle path is arrived at, and taken, differently. The Taoist
route is an easy no-action route, a valley way, a path of weakness and little resistance, in line
with the general account of following Tao and living and faring well.
Tao supplies a set of suggestions and prescriptions for how to live well, as well as a
parallel (and controlling) set of propositions about how things happen and proceed ideally.
Of course there is a moral purpose in Lao Tzu; the moral purpose is a central one alongside,
and inseparable from, the metaphysical purpose, the acquiring of an account of ultimate
reality"". To what extent then is Taoism open to the accusation of amorality? Since axiology
is a crucial part of the world view — evaluations and commendations are freely and extensively
offered in the texts — it is not amoral in a generous sense. But the treatment of deontic
principles, and of rules of conduct generally is very different. Deontics get into the picture
only when there is a lapse or deviation from an ideal natural state (from a
t
course),
'When the Great Tao declined, the doctrine of humanity and righteousness arose' (LT 18). It
depends then, on what counts as ""moral"" and ""amoral"". Certainly there are approved and
implicitly recommended life-styles, though there are few ""oughts' and no (ConfucianKantian) lists of duties. Moreover, unless the preferred Taoist lifestyle
merely
recommended, not required, Taoism would tall down as insufficiently pluralistic.
3. On the Taoist styie of iife; an environmental hfestyie. According to Lao Tzu,
there are some basic elements to living well, for instance 'three treasures' (LT 67; but different
overlapping lists are presented, e.g. LT 19).
65
1. Deep love - which can also be taken to involve compassion, pity, commiseration, care,
respect and regard, and which includes something close to empathy, deep-penetrating
empathy. Sympathy, a main linkage of the European ""Enlightenment"", does not however
capture what is involved: sympathy alone would be too egoistical for Taoism, as it is for Deep
Ecology. Deep love is part of the notion of genuine relatedness, not a one-sided ""relatedness""
or possessiveness (which Taoism rejects).
2. Frugality - a renunciation of excess. But frugality is not impoverishment. Needs are met
adequately without deprivation or excess.
3. Modesty or humility - not to dare to be ahead of the world, not to take the lead. In Taoism
there is no competitive requirement, but the opposite; such Western desiderata lapse. Rather,
one gives up trying to be on top of the pile, or even being in a faster lane. In a Taoist society
there are no conspicuous tall poppies.
Much else connects with or follows in a loose way, it is assumed, from these three
virtues; for instance, courage from deep love, generosity from frugality, a kind of leadership
from humility. The arguments for those surprising derivations go like this: 'deep love helps
one to aim in the case of attack/And to be firm in the case of defence"" (LT 67). Earlier (LT
19) it is taken that proper abandonment of humanistic ethics will mean a return to (what the
ethics inadmissibly substitutes for) deep love, a basic valuational relation. But in place of
frugality, goes a discarding of profit, and in place of humility an abandonment of conscious
sageliness and discarding of immodest (or conventional) wisdom. These changes are,
astonishingly, said to be rather superficial and inadequate; so further desiderata, commonly
read out of the ""treasures"""", are adduced: 'Manifest plainness/ embrace simplicity/ reduce
selfishness/have few desires"" (LT 19). Another element, beyond the three of relatedness,
frugality, and not daring to be ahead, is adaptability or sponanteity. This complements the
further desiderata.
Evidently main ingredients for a simple environmentally sound life-style are highly
commended. Lao Tzu might almost have been writing an introduction for Callenbach's
environmental handbook, Living Poor wifL
or even for Pausacker and Andrews'
Living Rener wifL L^^. In Chang Tzu, the pure person is a deep environmentalist:- She is a
'companion' of Nature and 'does not attempt to interfere with it by imposing the way of man
upon it"". Her goal is 'spiritual emancipation and peace"" and derivatively freedom; and her
route is 'through knowing the capacity and limitations of one's own nature and adapting it to
the universal process of transformation"" and thus to the environment (Chan SB p.177).
66
In complementary fashion, opposite ""virtues"", common in anti-environmental life-styles
are condemmed. The Western drives to power, fame, competition, possessions, excess
commodities, useless (small) knowledge are rejected by Taoism (along with ""Mans Affairs"").
Thus entrepreneurial activity in business, and also in professional and academic affairs (as
well as busyness itself), gets decidedly discouraged. The good life naturally reduces
ambitions and desires and avoids competition. Competition is connected with self-assertion
and aggressive action. Taoism, while not neglecting limited natural competition, passes
aspersions on both, thus fitting neatly with Deep Ecology's prescription for environmental
lifestyle and (supposedly derived) policy of non-violence . In place of the Enlightenment and
mainstream economic virtue of competition appears the 'virtue of non-competition' (LT 68).
Arguments against competition can be developed from other doctrines of Taoism. For
example, competition often requires forced or artificial action; thus it violates the doctrine of
(non-action), competition is deviant, evidencing deviation from one's tao. The
penality for such deviation from the path is not spelled out in Deep Ecology, but it is in
Taoism. Another way of putting it (suggested by Clark) is that in competition external rival
standards are imposed on Tao, presumably with electrifying results. In any case, according
to Taoism, there is no merit in trying to place oneself above another. So there is no value in
competition. Fortunately competition can be reduced. If a person does not compete then the
world cannot compete with him.
A way of life is depicted, based on love, respect and compassion for all things, attuned
to what is essential, shedding what is unnecessary, where simplicity and frugality are sought,
and excess avoided. This includes, in a nutshell, voluntary simplicity of a deep sort. In Deep
Ecology the same idea appears, partly sloganised as ""simple in means; rich in ends"".
Simplicity is not the impoverished life of one who seeks escape. Taoism goes much further
in disparaging scarce material means. Do not exact the worth, so that people compete. Do not
value rare treasure, so that people do not steal. Gross wealth and prestige are rejected; they
are vanities and vexations. But not all is vanity: living well is not.
It is a very natural inference, then, from the account of living well to the suggestion that
Tao offers a deep form of voluntary simplicity. Voluntary simplicity is a fuzzy notion.^
11
As Elgin's very profuse account reveals. Strictly much further detail is called for here:
namely, a set of conditions is needed, and also elaboration of the Taoist form of frugality, and
then connection of the conditions with die three basic elements of Tao - frugality, deep
relatedness, and not daring to be ahead in die world.
67
Voluntary simplicity can initially be explained through its two obvious components, simplicity
and its voluntary adoption. Simplicity connects with, and is often equated with frugality, as
elaborated in Taoism. But whether or not simplicity is obtained from frugality or other Taoist
virtues, it plays a direct and important part in the theory, and is in fact modelled, like its
metaphysical counterpart, the unconceptualised Whole, by the uncarved block, a central
Gestalt of the theory. The block symbolises unity, simplicity and naturalness not spoiled by
artifice, metaphysically the wholeness and unity of Tao before conceptual carving, and
ethically the wholesome straightforward non-devious life under Te, the 'simple life that is free
from cunning and cleverness, is not devoted to the pursuit of profit or marked by hypocritical
humanity and righteousness, but is characterised by plainness, tranquility, and purity' (Chan
p.14). As to voluntariness, people have a
of selecting the way of Tao rather than one
of the deviant ways. It is a choice of recipes - frugal vs. excess, relatedness vs. nonrelatedness, tall poppies vs. not daring to be ahead. But one does not attempt to force one's
way onto the correct path. To hyperactively seek the path is a deviation in itself. It is deontic
to speak of a
to find the correct path.
4. Following Tao, non-action, Te and Self-realization. Part of the Taoist route to
an environmental lifestyle and to ""self-realization"" consists in acquiring the practice of non
action, in terms of non-assertion, non-aggression, non-destruction, etc.
commonly
translated as 'non-action', is thereby rendered a dialectic notion, for it does not exclude action
and in a sense is action. To avoid such dialectical overtones, wzz-w^z is sometimes rendered
'not acting wilfully' or 'not acting artificially' or 'acting naturally'; it is better transcribed as
'without forcing' or 'no forced (or coercive) action'.^ Construed in this fashion, wM-wez is
not an extraneous awkward addition to Taoism, but an integral part, which emerges from
other features of the theory, namely those of following natural low-action ways. For non
action is the ""activity"" of letting one's tao drift or flow into line with the overall Tao (so
arrows in diagram 3 are aligned). What is commended is, in the correct circumstances,
pacific action, of letting happen (e.g. letting die), as opposed to aggressive, extraverted action
(e.g. killing), forced action upsetting natural ways. Similarly for other *No-nos; the ""no
12
An illuminating philological comparison of
activity with anarc/zz.wi is developed by
Ames, pp.342-3. The sympathy between [them] lies in their common reference to activity
performed in the absence of coercively determined constraints ...'. As Ames observes, the
comparison operates not only at the political and ethical levels, but bears upon cosmology
also, negating a coercive boss or planner in the beginning of things. For an integrated
treatment of wzz-principles, which generally reject forms of imposition and control, see Hall
pp.59-60.
68
desires"" directive, for instance, is a piquant shorthand for 'no impure desires' (Chan p.13),
i.e. for no unsatisfactory or anti-te desires. Non-action accordingly does not require literally
no action, but only actions in accord with ideal nature, so ruling out actions contrary to
undisturbed Tao. It may appear that perennial problems, alleged to haunt Taoism (and
intensified in Stoicism), are induced. For example, if all is Tao, and Tao is natural, how can
there be unnatural activity? Or differently, if nothing can depart from Tao, how can there be
unspontaneous actions, or any violation of
/yoznAy in an ideal, natural, direction. It does not
Tao, however, is a source which only
all individual paths, which can
deviate from ideal or natural paths. Thus deviant activity is not excluded, unspontaneous and
ill-organised activity by individuals is in no way ruled out; and forced, coercive and nature
destroying activities are all too common.^
Non-action as policy generally implies non-interference, when things have not been
damagingly disturbed. It implies letting things take their own natural course; letting Being be,
as Deep Ecologists would say, with basically ""hands off' practice and management.
Unforced action in practice is well illustrated by examples of going with the flow (cf. diagram
4). One main example of going with the flow is cutting meat. The Chef does not encounter
bones. He takes the meat apart effortlessly in the same way that an athlete does things
effortlessly, with little waste action. Going with the flow can however involve a lot of
activity, as with the man swimming easily in a raging torrent below the waterfall, or as in
sailing and trimming to the wind. At a personal level, non-action lies in such things as not
striving to put oneself above others, in foregoing competition, in simplicity, frugality, and
adherence to the mean. Evidently this removes a range of normally accepted social activities.
Flexibility, and suppleness, and even weakness, belong to the centre (or mean), to the valley
way. In Tao these qualities are associated with life; the inflexible and the rigid are associated
with the dead. This can be visualized as a range of activities associated with the process of
coming into being and passing out of being, in which the pre-life and the post-life are dead.
The central time, like the centre, is flexible and supple; not hard, stiff and inflexible. All this
carries a social message as well as an individual one.
After things reach their prime they grow old, which means they become contrary to
Tao. What is contrary to Tao soon perishes. After prime a thing moves towards rigidity.
13
When 'all activities follow their specific principles, that is nature' (SB p.202); deviation from
Nature accordingly occurs, namely when some activities do not follow their principles. As
for destruction, 'Do not let man destroy Nature' (SB p.207).
69
But Taoism does not accept Western cultural notions of primeness. Primeness is not a matter
of a certain juvenile physical or sporting prowess or peak. It takes a long time to reach a
practice approximating Tao. Socrates died in his prime, although by Western standards he
was an old man. An important, but retrograde, cultural shift has occurred in modern Western
culture. The doyens of Deep Ecology are old(er) men by Western standards.
A supreme goal in Deep Ecology, both for individuals and systems, societies and such
like, is self-realisation (again capitalised in the overall case). Self-realisation is a modem
European idea, not found in Taoism, and indeed incompatible with it and all older non
maximizing wisdoms which incorporate theories of adhering to the Mean. For Self
realisation, as understood and explained (of course the account could ahistorically be amended
to a satisizing one), is a maximizing prescription applied to the aggregated interests of separate
self, inflation of a typically egoistic concept not found in Taoism. But although Deep
Ecology's ideal of Self-realisation would be rightly queried in Taoism, there is a group of
associated goals to be found in Taoism: namely, attaining enlightenment and tranquility,
following Tao, cultivation of
parallels that between
cultivation of virtue or
and the contrast between self-realisation and Self-realisation
and %, great
Since The main objective of the
(Chan p.ll), it is
is the
that displaces self-realisation on the Taoist
scheme.
Complementary to Tao is Te, and to tao is te. Whereas tao is the directed source of a
thing, te is the matching
or unfolding of a thing. It is a directed and
(in principle favourably) developing, perfecting; hence the standard translation of
as 'virtue'. Because of its potentiality to reach a (good) goal, a rival translation as 'power'
has some currency; it is a directed force ybr good (or evil). The program of tao supplies the
direction of matching te. So a thing can follow its tao (and thereby follow Tao) by cultivating
te, by practising positive virtue, by choosing a lifestyle of deep simplicity. The directives for
a good individual life are accordingly commonly given in terms of individual te, and it is te
(rather than Tao) that generally appears individualised.
As self-realisation in Deep Ecology is not restricted to individuals, so te and tao are not.
The society as well as the individual has a tao and a matching te. Taoism is neither
individualistic nor atomistic, but systemic and holistic. Thus groups or societies have their
own taos and the collection is related to the overall Tao. Social insects perhaps provide a
conspicuous example of the social tao. The example transfers to overly rigid social forms,
such as bureaucracies, and also to military societies which are obsessed with security.
(Taoism is fairly lateralist in its thinking, with much inferential movement by association.)
70
But security is not obtained by being secure as in military security, which is characteristically
a fortified security. In peace people are open to danger but secure in another sense. The
materialist world, excessively propped up by possessions, Taoism treats with disdain; it does
not equate security with material security.
Each being has its own tao, its own ideal naturally-programmed path of self
development or unfolding. Correspondingly, there is an immanent telos, a te, a goal-directed
virtuous developing, for each thing. By each following its own nature, all follow nature.
Our self-development does not then interfere damagingly with your self-development. How
does this happen? Through natural (again invisible) inter-organisation, my proper self
development cannot impede your proper self-development. Taoism is decidedly short on
details of such mutual adjustment and harmonious integration, but certain it happens naturally
- as it may, for instance, through the evolution of co-operation.^ So there is, or need be, no
vacillation between following one's own path and taking care not to interfere with the paths of
others, between individualistic and relational paths. Perhaps in Taoism the modem problems
are skirted rather than solved. But the Taoist result is integration, a harmonious combination
of plans, without domination, whereas the pattern of Western relations operates (as in Hegel)
through hierarchical ordering and domination.
5. Anti-patriarchal aspects: feminism, powerlessness, peace.
Taoism advances
other models, than those concerning age, which are strange by entrenched Western standards
- such as demotion of strength and power, and the place and importance ascribed to
characteristically feminine and child-like elements in living well and achieving Taoist self
realisation, te. It was prepared for ecofeminism in a way that Deep Ecology was not. Taoism
is highly critical of patriarchy, accepting in effect main anti-chauvinistic themes of
ecofeminism. By contrast, there has been continuing conflict between Deep Ecology and
ecofeminism. In its formative programmatic days Deep Ecology did not recognise legitimate
feminine aspirations or sexual domination, and it took no due account of the organising theme
14
resolution of this problem can now make a good start with Axelrod's investigations of
evolving cooperation.
Cooperation can begin with small clusters. It can thrive with rules that are nice,
provocable, and somewhat forgiving. And once established in a population,
individuals using such discriminating strategies can protect themselves from
invasion. The overall level of cooperation tends to go up and not down. In other
words, the machinery for the evolution of cooperation contains a ratchet (Axelrod
p.177).
71
of ecofeminism, the striking parallel between the domination of women and the domination of
nature. But Taoism even incorporates an interesting early form of affirmative action. In
Taoism, the traditional Chinese balance between ya/rg and ym swings, when in disequilibrium
it does, towards the y/n. Quite in contrast with the Western paradigm, one properly aims at
yzn (which represents the complex of supposedly feminine features) rather than at yang
(symbolising, among other things, the masculine complex).
There is an emphasis on female and child-like, features, and, as in ym-yang dovetailing,
integration of gender features. There is, nonetheless, some stereotyping of male and female
features in Tao (as there is generally in feminism itself), with males allegedly active and
female weaker and more passive. It is in this way that the emphasis on yin is reached, from
desiderata such as humility and weakness. Still, though historic Taoism hardly admits of
degendering, rigidly defined sex roles are alien to Tao sensibilities. People develop according
to their own tao. They can develop typically male, or female, features or features of both.
One who rigidly accounts these masculine and feminine features, speaks from without the
framework of Tao. Historically, where it began to be put into practice, Taoism worked for
sexual freedom and liberation of women.
The Child also serves as a model (LT 55), and there are certain components of
Childhood liberation in Taoism: in the emphasis on freedom, in the attack on learning and
schooling, and so on. The reason the child is a model is because it has spontaneity, it is direct
and natural, and lacks power or strength. Tao rejects institutions and societies based on
power. Infants are not ruled by a longing for power, instead all actions are spontaneous.
Active force, like power, is in general castigated.
To force growth is deviant,
destroying harmony. To stop growth is deviant. ""For the mind to employ the vital force
without restraint means violence"" (replacing ""mind"" with intentionality would give a better
picture of what is meant). There is a significant difference between force and violence. To
employ intentionally destructive force is to do violence. To so force things is condemned. To
remain in harmony with things one does not so force things or practice violence. There is a
non-interference principle at work, which also indicates types of non-interference that are
excluded.
Not only is the Taoist opposition to violence well-known, but there is a blistering attack
on militarism and warfare in
7zM (e.g. LT 31, 30, 46); ""war is a symptom of the decline
of man' (Chan p.5). Given the hostility to war, it has been regarded as passing strange, not
to say puzzling, that Lao Tzu sketches military tactics and other allegedly devious political
strategies. The strategies are however but application of Taoist principles and techniques to
72
warfare, politics and elsewhere. Nothing excludes application of these techniques to what are
accounted, in general, unnecessary evils (which must sometimes, on other Taoist grounds, be
countered). Nor, to meet the main criticism, need any deceit or deviousness be involved; nor
is it. The legalist tactic, Tn order to grasp, it is necessary first to give"" (LT 36), is said to
involve 'an element of deceit' 'undeniably', and 'worse' is 'morally questionable' (Chan
p.17). But in order for me to grasp your hand in a normal handshake, it is necessary first for
me to give my hand. There is no deceit here, nothing morally questionable. All the tactics
permit of benign construals, of a Taoist kind. Consider, for instance, Tn order to contract, it
is necessary first to expand' (LT 36). In order to bend a copper pipe to the intended angle, it
is better to bend it first further than required. The transformation of water to ice (both
favoured natural items for symbolic purposes) neatly illustrates the Taoist principle (which is
however hardly necessary), and shows softness and weakness turned hardness and strength.
6. Environmental theory and practice, and environmental problems and
difficulties, such as quietism and security.
As on deeper ecological theories,
traditional Western models for human relations to the natural world are one and all rejected.
The dominant view, of domination, of human dominion over the earth and its other
inhabitants, is not merely roundly and soundly rejected; the metaphysical creationist base and
the superiority myths upon which it is regularly founded are also removed. Therewith also
the bases for the lesser, and rather more benign, Western models are also undercut There is
no greater boss or purpose for humans to serve or act as steward to; besides stewardship,
which is both hierarchical and implicitly patriarchical in cast, typically involves active
interference in producing products. The idea of perfecting nature also implies active
interference, when however nature is more or less in order as it is, and requires no
""perfecting"". Thus stewardship and perfectionist views fall along with domination and
dominion.
Taoism offers instead a non-interference model for relations to nature, a letting-be
approach, with ""hands off' management and associated lifestyles, several features of which
we have already glimpsed. A most stoking feature of Taoism is its environmental depth, its
strong opposition to then prevailing (and still prevailing) humanism and human chauvinism.
Heaven and earth are not humane
They regard all things as straw dogs [i.e. rather worthless strict ritual objects].
The sage is not humane [or human chauvinist].
He regards all people as straw dogs (LT.5).
Because of such tough pronouncements, reiterated and reinforced in Chang Tzu (e.g. CT. 2),
Taoism is sometimes said to be predicated on anti-humanism. But it is not 'a dehumanizing
73
philosophy"", it does not deny compassion; what transpires is that concern and value are not
confined to humans or their affairs, but
include the natural and the metaphysical. The human is no longer the criterion
of what is good or true. The traditional idea that a supreme supernatural being
... is the ruler of the universe is replaced by the doctrine that the universe
exists and operates by itself. When [Lao Tzu] says that ""Heaven and Earth are
not humane"", he means in a narrow sense that they are imparm?/, but in a
broader sense that Nature is no longer governed according to
g&m&izTZy
... In one stroke he removes Heaven [or God] and man as the standards ot
things and replaces them with Nature (Chan p.10, italics added; also p.107).
What is rejected with the rejection of humanism and humanistic ethics is human chauvinism.
For being ""humane"" means accepting the chauvinistic assumptions of conventional society
and remaining within the narrow sphere of interests of the human species. There is no
unbridgeable gulf between humans and other creatures such as Western thought has tried to
manufacture. 'Put a halter around the horse's head and put a string through the cow's nose,
that is man"" (SB p.207). In place of humanism, Taoism adopts a doctrine of impartiality.
'Embrace all things without inclining to this way or that way"" (SB p.206). He who is
enlightened 'is impartial"" (LT 6); 'he has no partial love for anyone"" (SB p.201) he does not
bestow undue or special favours upon humans; he aims to be one with Nature.
Impartiality does not imply equality. Despite the received heading of chapter 2 of the
CTxmg
'the equality of all things"" (the literal 'levelling all things"" is nearer the mark), and
the standard inference to some Taoist doctrine of parity, no simplistic and difficult theme of
equal value of all things is ventured - nor any theme of parity for some favoured subclass
thereof such as living things. (Though there is some accent on prime life, there is not the
same stress on /i/i? in Taoism that there is in Deep Ecology, nor the bizarre extension of ""life""
to include waterfalls, mountains and other striking natural objects.) What is offered, instead
of much in the way elucidation of impartiality, is (again like deeper ecological theory) a
doctrine of identification. Wide identification and wide solidarity does promote impartiality
,
and counter chauvinism. Egoism, for instance, involves discounting all but oneself,
humanism all but humans, and requires a species solidarity with human things. But wider
identification puts a stop to such discounting (e.g. in favour of one's own or species's
interests, as exhausting value) and to such class-restricted solidarity. For wider identification
reveals that interests, desires, values and so forth, are not so individual or class restricted.
Many exquisite examples of identification, and the processes by which it may be achieved, are
developed, e.g. with a butterfly, by dream access (SB p.190), with rivers and seas, and wider
again, by the proper meditative process, with the dusty world - 'Become one with the dusty
world/ This is called profound identification"" (LT 56, also 4) - and perhaps wider yet, and
74
ultimate, with ideal Nature, and thus in complete accord with Tao (e.g. LT 16).
No less striking than the criticism of humanism, Taoism makes similar sort of attack on
traditional education and on the accumulation of knowledge. The case against traditional
education, especially rote ""learning"", is straightforward; it reinforces entrenched practices and
prejudices, e.g. those of humanism. The criticism does not of course imply that there would
be no regular learning or habituation processor, such as those encouraged traditional
indoctrination methods. More perplexing is the attack on knowledge acquisition, though in
part it is of the same sort, against an entrenched knowledge in the hands of a power group.
But, in an organic society, knowledge is integrated into the community and not rarified into a
commodity held or controlled by a priesthood or a class of intellectuals or literati. Knowledge
is power; such power is removed from the hands of a few by making it a community good.
This goes beyond Deep Ecology, in that it questions and rejects experts. Indeed in its
criticism of schooling, narrow expertise, and the like, Taoism resembles and anticipates the
position taken by Illich rather than features of Deep Ecology. The move against informational
power also points to the difference between wisdom (not unequivocally approved) and
knowledge, a difference recorded in Taoism as in most older wisdom. However one of the
indicated Taoist arguments against mere knowledge illustrates an a//-to-any fallacy. We can't
reasonably (or possibly) aim for all knowledge - by the unlimited objective or limited beings
argument (see CT 2) - so we can't reasonably aim for any, and shouldn't, so it appears to be
suggested. Another line of argument looks more promising. Life has a limit, but knowledge
is without limit. For the limited to pursue the unlimited is futile. However the argument only
reveals limits to the accumulation of knowledge, not its pointlessness or undesirability. In
any case, in the end the superficially anti-intellectual trend of Taoism shifts ground; it is
directed against other targets than pure knowledge: against slickness and cleverness, against
devious and crafty uses of knowledge (LT 3), against counter-productive acquiring of
knowledge or cunning, and its teaching. The messy situation is tidied up a bit in the CTnxng
where an apposite distinction is made between
knowledge, the castigated sorts,
which is inquisitive, partial, discriminative or merely analytic, and
knowledge, which is
""leisurely and at ease"", comprehensive, extensive, and synthetic (cf. Chan p.20). Even so,
original Taoism hardly seems to cater for adequate access of information, and the removal of
(perhaps debilitating) igornance, concerning health and welfare, careful and damaging
practices, choices and alternatives.
The critique of small knowledge and narrow expertise extends to encompass a critique
of technology. In Taoism, technology was assigned a very limited role at best. (Hence, png
of the complex reasons for the delayed development of technology in China.) Certain forms
75
of technology were, if not rejected outright (as Clark contends), at least strongly discouraged.
Thus, 'Even if there are ships and carriages, none will ride in them. Even if there are arrows
and weapons, none will display them"" (LT 80).15 More generally, while high and dangerous
technology is set aside, even more appropriate technology cannot be accepted uncritically.
Lao Tzu recognized clearly that even low impact technology may destroy human practices and
conventions constructive to a community. Nor was the connection of technology with
population neglected. Given a small country and few inhabitants, if provided with a laboursaving device he would not use it. There are dominating and non-dominating forms of
technology.
There is enjoined an avoidance of artificial wants and desires, and
correspondingly a shunning of replacing labour with nothing at all. Taoism exhibits a firmer
grasp of some of the problems of technology, even more appropriate labour-saving
technology, than recent positions like Deep Ecology.^ The Taoist approach also demolishes
the so-called iron law of technology, that there is no stopping technology or its progress,
whatever the merits of the ""Law"" (they are not so conspicuous), Taoism reveals that such
social laws are highly paradigm-dependent, and do not withstand transfer from the dominant
Western paradigm everywhere else.
Many other elements of a sensitive and sophisticated ecological position feature in
Taoism. There is an elaborate and sensitive account of Nature, from which it emerges plainly
that Nature is not a mere instrument or means for other ends and not a resource, but
something of great value in and for itself. Nature is something to be cherished, allowed to
take its own course, not to be interfered with or destroyed by humans. Indeed the dominant
view is reversed; value for humans is achieved above all by identification with Nature, and by
15
Some verses of LT, of which this one example, support a rival, sinister, interpretation.
According to this sinister interpretation (pointed out to us by David Garrett, a student at the
University of Auckland), the LT represents not what it has been taken to be, but a work
addressed, like Machiavelli's 77%? Prince, to a Prince, on how to pacify and control the people.
Thus weapons, though held and sharpened, will not be displayed; wealth, though inequitably
distributed, will not be shown; the people will be kept ignorant, through lack of information
and education; and so on. Fortunately many other verses tell decisively enough against this
interpretation. In particular, Taoism denies the need for a Ruler. While under satisfactory
arrangements there will be those who are much better attuned to Tao, even sages, they are in
position to rule as to impose upon others. Moreover should they endeavour to do so, thay
would jeopardise or negate their own accord with Tao. Authoritarian rule Machiavelli-style is
decidedly politically counterproductive.
16
The claim promoted recently that Taoism is an evident home for alternative technology, and
prescribes as much, is rather naive in the light of Taoist texts.
76
following natural ways. (Paradoxical reversal is a feature of Taoism; even castigated Western
aims, such as leadership, fame and so on, are in fact achieved, when they are, not by direct
aim, but by letting the reverse happen. So it is with what control of Nature is required; non
intervention and non-action is the approach. Sufficient control is gained, it is said, when
assertive attempts to impose it are abandoned.) While such concepts as bioregionalism is not
to be encountered in explicit forms in Taoism, their bases and many other recently fashionable
environmental ideas are: living in place is certainly present (LT 80); doing things locally and
remaining local, while being attuned to the universe and retaining global connections, is
certainly advocated, underwriting the Deep Ecology maxim of ""think globally, act locally .
While there is then very much in Taoism that fits easily and revealingly with deeper
environmental theories, Taoism also leaves puzzles or points to residual problems. Not all the
supposed problems are however genuine; and not all the puzzles are bequeathed to
contemporary theory. Illustrating both is the problem of quietism, which is at bottom the
issue of reconciling ""non-action"" with environmental and social improvement and action.
How would a Taoist resistance against depredation, a Taoist defence of environment go, and
fare, given its strong (alleged) emphasis on ""don't bother'? In-built harmony and quietism do
not allow sufficiently for conflict.
In part there is only a problem because of
misrepresentation of Taoism, which is not committed to a don t bother attitude to
environmental destruction: quite to the contrary, humans should not be allowed to destroy
nature. Furthermore, there are many Taoist tactics and techniques, using weakness to
overcome strength, letting the flow of nature demolish the forces of environmental
destruction, and the like, which can be applied in environmental resistance.^ Quietism is
accordingly a misrepresentation of the practice, and something of a misnomer.
How can Tao work in a world where there is scarcity almost everywhere? Very simply,
Taoism holds that there is no genuine problem of plentitude; things are not scarce, there is an
abundant outpouring from nature. There is scarcity only because of violations of the
t
requirements of Tao (rather as some claim there is food scarcity even now, with present
gigantic human populations, only because of politico-economic mismanagement). Tao will
serve to restore plentitude (LT 77). Rather than a collection of scarce resources, Nature is
represented as an virtually infinite storehouse of boundless wealth.
17
Use of the power of water affords a prime exampie; cf LT 15. No-action adaptations of old
Chinese martiai arts and strategies presumably offer more direct methods of defence and
resistance.
77
Does Tao allow for the prospect and problems of too many people? Can the greater Tao
keep pace with the requirements of many too many individual taos, even if those individual
requirements are in line with the greater Tao?is No doubt in those times, and most historical
times when epidemics and plagues were almost as regular as droughts, when evolution still
operated on human species, there wasn't more than a hypothetical or remote future problem.
It seems plain however that Taoism did not face the environmental problems such as those of
too many people and incremental resource degradation. The texts say little about soil
degradation and deforestation, long major environmental problems in China. By contrast, in
the West, Plato was properly concerned about deforestation of Greece. Nor does Taoism
have much to offer directly on main contemporary issues of animal liberation, species loss,
urban disgustification, and so forth, though some of the problems are hardly new. Historic
Taoism too was a product of its times, adjusted to what were seen as problems.
7. The extent of political anarchism: hierarchy, domination, and rulers in
Taoism. In looking to Taoism for political illumination, an early query is likely to be: To
what (damaging) extent is Taoism, and the work of Lao Tzu in particular, anarchistic? It
explicitly addresses a ruler, and takes for granted the existence of a state. But the format of
the Lao 7zM may have been obligatory; for Taoism also hopes for ""the absence of princes"".
Nonetheless, overtly, Taoism is not anarchistic. But although literally archist, almost
everything in the work corresponds to anarchist sentiments, and it has struck responsive
chords in anarchists. Not surprisingly then, some have argued that, despite appearances, the
work is anarchistic, and disposes of the state and the ruler ""when taken in a political sense
(thus Clark). What has happened here is that anarchism is confused with an important
Taoism sketches
an early version of monarchically organised anakyrism; Clark (in his book) a late version of
variant,
meaning practice, policy and so on
ecological anakyrism.
If Taoism assumes a ruler then it is open to the charge of not being a suitably natural
-
way - unless there is a no-hands ruler. But a satisfactory ruler does not coerce, and in fact
does no regulation. It seems clear that Lao Tzu assumes a monarchical style of society
without coercion. The basic idea is that it is alright (if maybe costly) to have or inherit a
perhaps superfluous ruler, so long as there is no coercion. The ""ruler"" is merely a planner, a
18
It is tempting to speculate that the greater Tao would serve to limit the number of actual
individual taos, as certainly happened in most historic times. On a market model, supply and
demand would be on a natural parity.
78
guide, an example. ""Laws"" are not backed up with coercion. Carving the block coercively is
seen as counterproductively breaking up the community.
Control or domination breaks the natural order of society, coercion removes the basic
elements of voluntary simplicity; they are appropriately met with resistance. Government is
said to be a sort of disorder. Government is indeed a main source of disorder, where
government means coercive government. People are difficult to keep in order because those
above interfere. Indeed this is the only reason they are difficult to keep in order (LT 57 and
58). The more laws there are, the more disorder is possible, the more disorder there is. The
more ways order is attempted, and more ways there are to have disorder.
Natural order is the way, the recommended way. Imposed order is counterproductive.
There is reciprocal resistance to the imposition of deviant order. This would hold even if
social organisers tried to impose Tao itself. To attempt to impose it would be to go astray.
Such points help to explain why little satisfactory detail is given on social and political
organisation. For the requisite organisation, such as it is, follows natural patterns and natural
social structures (whichever they are). No doubt details would be (in the style of Aristotelian
ethics) largely descriptive of what happens in cases where social affairs were functioning
well. Even so, rather more needs to be said about how society accommodates ""deviants"" of
various sorts, as to how unsocial and unenvironmental activities are curtailed, what support
structures natural arrangements afford, and so on. Of course these things are attended to
locally by society, not by a remote and mostly indifferent state. As in modem anarchism, an
important distinction is taken for granted between (local) society and the state or empire. (By
contrast, in contemporary texts, especially those of economic orientation, the state is often
conflated with society, social roles are transferred to the state, and it is even claimed that what
society wants is what the state does!) In Taoism, as in nineteenth century social anarchism,
society functions along natural lines; the state is essentially otiose. Society is self-regulating.
No doubt small markets that do not yield excess profits flourish, no doubt craftspeople
-
abound and live well but not extravagantly, no doubt local people make inputs to the
arrangements of their social affairs. Most of these sorts of background details go largely
unstated. But some significant features of social practice are revealed; for example (LT 3), the
worthy are not exalted or rewarded, competition is not promoted, there is no unnecessary
accumulation of possessions, consumerism and the manufacturing ot wants is discouraged.
In short, all the main approved features of modern economic behaviour - the sources of
greed, discrimination and strife according to Taoism (Chan p. 103) - are gently set aside, they
do not represent natural, or satisfactory, ways.
79
Just as nature can operate by itself without a director or boss, so a confederation can run
itself without an emperor or president. True, there may be one or more rulers. However a
Taoist ruler/sage ""exercises"" non-dominating authority. But obviously, since he exercises no
authority, some of the stuffing has been removed from notion of authority. The ruler/sage
has no personal power. He imposes nothing on others. He transmits worthwhile tradition
but does not impose it. He is said to transmit it through eternal edicts, but these are principles
proferred or advice at best. He does not attempt to legislate or require the good. Society is
like the individual, it cannot be coerced into doing right things. And it should not be! At
work is a teleological model of ""transcendent"" good, a bit like a natural law theory, but even
more like recent deep environmental theory. No more than co-operating individuals in a
social matrix are required for the good. A ruler, or organiser, does not attempt to require it
for society. He takes no action and the people are transformed by an exemplar ruler. He is a
ruler on a rather more Gandhian model, but even so not a visible charismatic leader. Unlike
contemporary models, the ruler is not a jet-setter or super-consumer; he is not usually seen on
television, and perhaps not seen at all, but only known about, or his or her existence merely
rumoured.
As with ""authority"", but even more so, other social and political terms thus get
drastically turned around, and even subverted. The ""empire ceases to be coercive power, but
turns into a natural super-regional order under general guidance of the Tao. Possessing the
empire"" even comes to mean something like attunement to Te. The ""power"" of a ruler is not
coercive. It is exemplary. The best rulers are those whose existence is merely known by the
people. Thus they are not rulers or leaders, but models for personal development. (For Deep
Ecology the corresponding roles would be those oi eco-saints.) They are not apart from
society, but central to society's ideals. Society could have a lot of ""rulers"" (kingly people) or
could consist entirely of ""kingly people"". Like Christ, a taoist ruler leads from within or
behind. The people seeing the life of the sage choose to do likewise.
An ideal ruler is a non-interfering exemplar ruler. The people bec&me, if you like,
ruler-groupies. The sage understands the fundamentals of Tao, and practices accordingly.
So Taoism reinterprets the notion of ""ruler"", equating ruler with supreme exemplar, such as
the sage. The meaning attributed to ""ruler"" becomes that of following Tao. The ruler is one
who deviates little from the Tao. This is his ""power"""". Someone who deviates little from the
Tao is kingly, that is, to observe another subversion of terminology, he shows an allembracing impartiality. The sage and the ""ruler"" are but two important examples of an ideal
life. A more general model is also sketched (notably in LT 8) ot the best type of person — a
person 'who in his dwelling loves the earth"", but also loves humanity, and order, and
80
competence, and profundity.
While Taoism is decidedly short on structural details for organising large human
populations, which are no longer self-regulating (by contrast with large dense populations of
modem penguins), it nonetheless transmits significant political messages, which deep theory
needs to assimilate. Taoism has been attacked, like other similar alternative political forms
(e.g. Morris's social anarchism and Illich's convivial society), as being conservative, as
seeking anachronistically to turn the clock back to some ancient village communal life-style,
better left far behind. Such attacks do not cohere. Such considerable changes, as Taoism
envisages, from the status quo, can hardly be represented as conservative. To be sure, there
are conservative elements in Taoism, as in the most radical environmental movements, for
instance the desire to conserve elements of the natural environment that the ""conservatives""
wish to exploit or destroy. ('Conservative', like many a political terms in heavy popular use,
breaks down under conceptual overload.)
While backward-looking glances at an idealised past is a conservative tendency,
anathema to forward-looking progressives who prefer to leave the past obscured in a heavy
cloud of dust, nonetheless, the past, with its actual features, its blocked possibilities, and its
paths not taken, remains important to all main political persuasions. Against anarchistic
positions, progressives like to lodge the charges
that the past never was ideal, that
virtually everything that matters (not, surely, forests inhabited by wild creatures) was far
worse than the enlightened present, #776? that anarchism has never really been achieved in the
past. Again the charges do not cohere. (Proof is left as an exercise; but for hints, see EE).
It should be evident that Taoism was, and remains, a radical position. It represents a
severe attack on mainstream civilization, on themes of the dominant social paradigm. It
discards or upsets many mainstream values, and most mainstream ways of organising and
doing things. It holds up instead examples of very different lifestyles as much preferable, and
offers a very mean path, simple and modest, between insufficiency and excess-
APPENDIX. Doctrines of Four: the four great things and the fourfold way.
Running in a striking way through the history of thought are certain related doctrines of four —
of four great, important or valuable, things, whose basic interrelations are fundamental to the
whole doctrine involved. Consider first three, plainly related, fourfolds, of much interest in
deeper ecological thinking:-
theWay/Tao
I
God(s)
I
Whole/Gaia
",,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,"Box 21: More Green,Como House,Como House > Shelves > Top > Pile 3",https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/390ffa1bb15fead94d0f2ceb672bf51a.pdf,Text,"Draft Papers",1,0
164,https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/show/164,"Box 21, Item 708: Draft of War and peace IV: Tao and deep-green","Printout of draft, undated, with correction notes (1 leaf). Later title: On extirpating war: Tao and deep-green pacifism.","One of eight papers digitised from item 708. Title in collection finding aid: RS: War & Peace IV: Tao and Deep Green corrected ts.","Richard Sylvan","The University of Queensland's Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291, Box 21, Item 708","Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy",,"This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, Dr. N.A.J. Taylor.","For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library.",,"[21] leaves + [1] leaf. 53.46 MB. ",,Manuscript,"https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:f28769f",,"/
/
* WAR AND
TAO AND DEE
Taoism and deep-green environmental theory
nanism, is not a pacific
issues, diverge over war. For Taoism, by contrast foi
doctrine, but is committed to skilful defensive militarism. While it does not espouse a fortress
mentality, Taoism certainly condones limited defensive military operations for specific
purposes, a sort of guerilla warfare. sBy contrast, deep-green theory, while acknowledging the
role of organised social defence, stands opposed to professional militarism, and thereby to
military defence, and is committed to a principled pacifism. Conveniently a route through
Taoism, philosophically fascinating in its own right, will lead us to problems of pacifism and
towards deep-green theory.
7.
o/ a
o/ war
wnZz/arMw.
War did not receive a favourable press in ancient Chinese philosophy. Generally
aggression and war were to be avoided. Even Confucius imposed very demanding conditions:
for example, 'when good men have instructed the people [in morals, agriculture, military
tactics] for seven years, they way be allowed to bear arms/ Tf a ruler ... does not set himself
right, even his commands will not be obeyed' (SB p.41, italics added). Mo Tzu went much
further than Confucius, roundly condemning war - on utilitarian grounds, that war yields no
net benefit at any level (SB p.227). What is more, he backed his heavy condemnation
practically (unlike some conspicuous contemporary theoretical utilitarians); 'he did not hesitate
to walk for ten days and ten nights in an effort to dissuade a ruler from making war' (SB
p.212). But none, it is said, went as far, in a detailed and sophisticated criticism of war,,as Lao
Tzu; 'none has condemned war more strongly than Lao Tzu'. '[T]he opposition of Taoism to
the use of force is well-known, and the most bitter attack on militarism if found in the Zzzo
(Chan, p.154, p.17.)
But, after that splendid build-up, the text is slightly disappointing. Lao Tzu does not
assert outright that war is an abomination, or even roundly condemn it. His critique of war,
militarism, and military technology, is subtle and oblique, and, on the surface, far distanced
from pacifism. For he does not recommend an end to war - in that genuine Taoists, those who
possess Tao, will never participate in them - but expects wars to continue as
^vz'Ay.
Worse, he even goes so far as to outline proper attitudes to war and conduct in war, and indeed
to suggest military techniques and strategies, some of which look decidedly devious. Among
the classical works of Taoism, we focus on the
because, by contrast with other works,
a remarkable component of that book is devoted to war and militarism.
The apparent deviousness of the tactics Lao Tzu allocates serves to highlight what has
been seen as 'the most troublesome element' in his philosophy (Chan p.17) - not so much
however because they concern military operations, but because they are taken to apply much
more widely, 'to life in general' (p.17). But why should military activity obtain some special
/
/
46""""WAR AND PEACE )V:
TAO AND DEEP-GREEN
\
Taoism and deep-green environmental theory, although closely aligned on very many
issues, diverge over war. For Taoism, by contrast for instance with Buddhism, is not a pacific
doctrine, but is committed to skilful defensive militarism. While it does not espouse a fortress
mentality, Taoism certainly condones limited defensive military operations for specific
purposes, a sort of guerilla warfare. sBy contrast, deep-green theory, while acknowledging the
role of organised social defence, stands opposed to professional militarism, and thereby to
military defence, and is committed to a principled pacifism. Conveniently a route through
Taoism, philosophically fascinating in its own right, will lead us to problems of pacifism and
towards deep-green theory.
J.
of a Tao:s;
of war anJ wn/%ar:syn.
War did not receive a favourable press in ancient Chinese philosophy. Generally
aggression and war were to be avoided. Even Confucius imposed very demanding conditions:
for example, 'when good men have instructed the people [in morals, agriculture, military
tactics] for seven years, they way be allowed to bear arms/ 'If a ruler ... does not set himself
right, even his commands will not be obeyed"" (SB p.41, italics added). Mo Tzu went much
further than Confucius, roundly condemning war - on utilitarian grounds, that war yields no
net benefit at any level (SB p.227). What is more, he backed his heavy condemnation
practically (unlike some conspicuous contemporary theoretical utilitarians); 'he did not hesitate
to walk for ten days and ten nights in an effort to dissuade a ruler from making war"" (SB
p.212). But none, it is said, went as far, in a detailed and sophisticated criticism of war,,as Lao
Tzu; 'none has condemned war more strongly than Lao Tzu"". '[T]he opposition of Taoism to
the use of force is well-known, and the most bitter attack on militarism if found in the Lao 7za""
(Chan, p.154, p.17.)
But, after that splendid build-up, the text is slightly disappointing. Lao Tzu does not
assert outright that war is an abomination, or even roundly condemn it. His critique of war,
militarism, and military technology, is subtle and oblique, and, on the surface, far distanced
from pacifism. For he does not recommend an end to war - in that genuine Taoists, those who
possess Tao, will never participate in them - but expects wars to continue as tmavoMfa&Zt? evz'A.
Worse, he even goes so far as to outline proper attitudes to war and conduct in war, and indeed
to suggest military techniques and strategies, some of which look decidedly devious. Among
the classical works of Taoism, we focus on the Lao 7za because, by contrast with other works,
a remarkable component of that book is devoted to war and militarism.
The apparent deviousness of the tactics Lao Tzu allocates serves to highlight what has
been seen as 'the most troublesome element"" in his philosophy (Chan p.17) — not so much
however because they concern military operations, but because they are taken to apply much
more widely, 'to life in general"" (p.17). But why should military activity obtain some special
2
dispensation? Why should what is no/ tolerated more generally be exonerated there? But given
that Taoism has here the virtue of consistency (i.e. uniformity on principles) and of
universalizability, that simply leaves more explaining to be done.
* Pnzz^/br 7hofym, on J wary a.y nnavo^^/e evi/.y
There are /wo puzzles here in Taoism rather than one. There is the miP/ary-prac/fce^
paradox, and, varying and generalising on that, there are /{/e-^racOce^ paradoxes. The special
paradox is generated by the following incompatible elements: on the one side, The most bitter
attack on militarism"", the well-known opposition of Taoism to the use of force (p.17) and to the
possession and use of smart military weapons and technology - implying that war is far from
all right - and on the other, advocacy of certain (devious) military tactics, outlines of (deceitful)
conduct in war, and so on - implying that war is all right after all. A straightforward
generalisation of this paradox would look at other morally-sensitive parts of life, where some
practice was strongly condemned yet engaged in (for many examples, see the dilemmas
assembled in MD). But the variation of concern to Chan and the neo-Confucians concerns the
conjunction of upright with devious practices in life, in particular in the life of the sage. For a
Taoist sage is presumed to lead an upright straightforward life, yet appears to engage in devious
and even deceitful practices incompatible with such a life-style. Call this the
paradox.
Evidently a good deal of explaining is required, as to how Taoism can coZ^r^n/Zy take the
positions it appears to presume, both on war and peace, and on life more generally. A desirable
preliminary would seem to be a little investigation of what position Ay taken, especially on war
and militarism. One key pasage runs:
Fine weapons are instruments of evil
They are hated by creatures
Therefore those who possess the Tao turn away from them....
Weapons are instruments of evil, not the instruments of a good ruler.
When he uses them unavoidably, he regards calm restraint as the best
principle
Even when he is victorious, he does not regard it as praiseworthy,
For to praise victory is to delight in the slaughter of men.
He who delights in the slaughter of men will not succeed in the empire. ...
For a victory, let us observe the occasion with funeral-ceremonies
(LT p.154).
Wars, which involve the use of weapons, instruments of evil, are accordingly themselves evil.
They are also evil because they involve the slaughter of men. But they are also sometimes
unavoidable (also p.152). Therefore such wars are unavoidable evils. Such discourse,
obtained by almost immediate inference from the passage, is within the standard orbit of
dilemma talk. But Taoism lacks, through deliberately eschewing deontic talk, the discourse
which enables direct expression of such dilemmas, or even direct condemnation of wars or of
clever weapons. Instead the points are made by circMw/ocM/Zon, what the possesser of Tao
does, how the good ruler conducts himself, or by ana/ogy, of victory in war with death.
3
Unavoidable evils are the very stuff of deontic dilemmas (though many theories,
underpinned by shonky logic, lack the resources for representing this stuff properly). Where
something is unavoidably evil, it is
because evil,
J also no/
doing it is
excusable, because it is unavoidable. So, given such an argument (which has its weaknesses),
an unavoidable evil is a genuinely dilemmatic object with inconsistent features. Certain wars
have looked, since ancient times, like such dilemmatic objects.
Revealingly, Chan tries to explain that 'most troublesome element' in Taoism, the
military-practice paradox, through the following exercise in lateral thinking:
It can ... be argued that Lao Tzu uses warfare to illustrate his principles of
taking no action and weakness because warfare is among the most dynamic
and critical of human experiences, just as the Indian classic, the
chooses fighting as the theme on which to discuss the terrible dilemma
whether one should fulfil his duty, as in the case of a soldier, and kill, or
should fail in his duty and refrain from killing (p.17).
'Just as'? The Indian classic prevents a classic moral dilemma, a dilemma represented in
contemporary philosophy (following its rediscovery by Sartre), where there are incompatible
duties: the duty to kill, because of one's role as a soldier, and the duty not to kill, because of
one's human condition, and the supervenient dilemma of failing in and fulfilling one's duties.
These dilemmas for an individual (male, as it then was) are replicated in dilemmas regarding
war for group institutions: at bottom, the obligation to engage in war (for one set of compelling
reasons) as contraposed with the obligation not to engage in war (for another, perhaps
overlapping, set of reasons).
A theory of moral dilemmas (as worked out for example in MD) is crucial for an adequate
treatment of major issues in war and peace, especially (as will become evident) for a viable
strong pacifism. But Taoism, eschewing deontic discourse, lacks the apparatus to state or
develop moral dilemmas. Hence it is logically excluded from giving a full or adequate account
of what is going on conceptually. One of the philosophically fascinating feature of Taoism is
the fashion in which it manages to avoid deontic discourse, and to substitute for direct deontic
discourse or improvise circumlocutions when deontic discourse would otherwise appear
inevitable (cf. UT for examples). But there are costs. One is inability to display the mechanism
of deontic dilemmas, or to show what reasons and argument lie behind Taoist prounouncements
and conclusions (the shortage of Taoism on argument is another philosophically conspicious
feature, also observed in UT). As conceptual apparatus for analysizing moral dilemmas is
missing, most of the machinery involved has to be passed over. Only the outcomes, as Taoism
sees them, are presented, as if from a black box. Taoism blacks out the story on deontic
dilemmas that deep-green theory can tell, as the following diagram tries to show:
DMgrawy . C/tar/ing
4
It is evident that Taoism can be
information can be put into the Black Box
rendering it less opaque. That extension can be made so as to conform to deep-green theory,
i.e. so that the extended Taoist chart, a neo-Daoist chart, looks like the deep-green one. That is
indeed essentially how neo-Daoism get characterised, in terms of conformity of the extension to
deep ecological theory (see UT).
We are now placed to explain how to dissolve, or at least neutralize, the paradoxes
deriving from repudiation of militarism, an awkwardly qualified repudiation in the case of
Taoism. In a significant sense there is no resolving of genuine deontic dilemmas. The
principles delineating the fix may .yfonJ, incompatible, signalling the persisting suboptimality
(or better, sublimenality) of the dilemmatic situation. Where there is a dilemma, involved
parties should try to do well enough in the sublimenal circumstances (for a much fuller account,
see MD). Thus where there is a war, itself a non-Taoist process, engaged or caught up Taoists
will not abandon Taoism. Taoist methods will be applied, Taoist strategies pursued.
So much for theoretical representation and (non-)resolution of life-practices and other
dilemmas, details of which are readily elaborated in deep-green extensions of Taoism. A prior
substantive issue is whether dilemmas always
generated: not whether wars are evil
(typically they are, an issue we shall come to), but whether wars are unavoidable. Analysis of
wars does not bear that familiar claim out decisively. Many wars could have been avoided,
through conciliation, negotiation, restraint, etc., and no worse results apparently obtained,
through sanctions, exchange, trade, etc. Through a typology of wars (coming up) that
conjecture can be given some substance. Consider, for instance, what would be walk-overs.
Then there is little point in making a military response. So war can be avoided. Certainly an
occupation, to be met in a different way, may still occur. And so on, perhaps, for various other
types of war. But, more generally, try this:Every war involves an aggressor, who makes an aggressive move. Such an aggressor
could always avoid that move, taking a different (or a do-nothing) course of action. Therefore,
5
every war can be avoided. No war is entirely unavoidable.
Setting aside determinism (which renders %/Z actual wars along with all other events
unavoidable), it could be argued that a war sometimes simply boils up, without an aggressor,
an intensification of a conflagatory situation. There are grounds for scepticism regarding such
examples; for such intensification can only occur if provocative military moves are made, for
instance troops are stationed in provocative or risky positions.
The presumption that certain wars are unavoidable typically derives from a one-sided
perspective on war, a defender's perspective. A defender has no option, so it is routinely
averred, but to respond to a determined aggressor. Even i/that should be so sometimes, when
there is no running away or going underground, it does not establish that such a war is
unavoidable; for it neglects the role of the aggressor. By a smarter formulation, relevant
features of unavoidability can be captured. Although wars may not be unavoidable, defensive
action in wars that have been initiated may be unavoidable. At least such action may be
unavoidable z/ unacceptably high costs (death, enslavement, etc.) are not to be avoided.
Thereupon another highly relevant feature emerges: the linkage of avoidability to costs. For
whether an action is unavoidable then depends upon what costs a party is prepared to incur
before and when insisting on action: but this appears entirely unacceptable. How can what is
""unavoidable"" cease to be so when some further costs are absorbed? However with basics like
survival, a certain liberty, and so on, we do reach such bounds. An important fype of
unavoidability. We also reach scenarios, unavailable to Lao Tzu but kindly brought within
range by modem technology, which may appear to justify aggressive strikes.
State Z, while not an aggressor, is carrying out practices which will impose unacceptably
high costs upon peoples of other states and implacably refuses to desist. It could, for example,
be poisoning air or water flowing to other states. But ,to make the case vivid, let us suppose
that state Z is constructing, for reasons Zeders find convincing (they are committed to a faith
which depicts all humans as incorrigible sinners and unworthy of life), an effective doomsday
machine. Would an (aggressive) preemptory strike designed to disable or destroy the machine
be unavoidable?*
In a sense, No; in another Yes. For different modalities can operate.
Physically outsiders need to do nothing, but watch Zeders go about their zealous work. But
deontically they are under heavy moral pressure, because of the costs of standing by idly: if the
human race is worth anything very substantial, then they are obliged to act, action is deontically
unavoidable.
Here is a situation where a proposed reduction of deontic logic proves
illuminating. Obligation is explicated through not implying, or necessitating, the sanction, i.e.
1
Whether it would be justifiable, or just, are separate issues. But it is evident enought that
such scenarios further damage the obsolescent idea of
war. For, according to received
doctrine, a just war is defensive. (How such a war can be fought at all is another matter;
coherence requires relativization to Just war Jbr party d'.)
6
excessive ethical costs such as extermination.
Let us explain deontic unavoidability
analogously: an action is so unavoidable if not undertaking it would result in excessive ethical
costs. Then /fit can be established that there is no other way than a military strike, an act of
war, to ensure that the Zeders desist (and certainly we can envisage scenarios like that), then
that is deontically unavoidable. It is also
for those committed to, or inclined
towards pacifism; and it is, for them at least, but paradoxically justifiable, as the negation is
also justifiable, on pacific grounds.
Scenarios like that sketched, that appear to render certain wars deontically unavoidable
require but little or no elaboration to render them evil. Evil indeed is such a standard feature of
standard wars that at least its great presence call for little supporting evidence. But it has taken
to vast stretch of human history to reach this general point of recognition.
The manifold evils of war Lao Tzu very early recognised and emphasized:
Wherever armies are stationed, briars and thorns grow.
Great wars are always followed by famines (p.152).
And nowadays followed by great tides of refugees. This passage includes not only recognition
of the widely-observed socio-environmental consequences of war, but, more striking, very
early recognition of the severe environmental impact of military forces. That critique is not
however developed in Taoism.^ Only recently has it been pushed substantially further. And
only recently could a new, most significant twist occur, the merging of resource security, long a
military objective, with environmental security.
The appalling idea has recently been floated that the military, in need of new work and
roles with the apparent warming of West-East relations and cooling of the Cold War, should
exchange usual military idleness for meddling in environmental matters: regulation and policing
of environmental resources, ensurance of environmental security of powerful states, and
similar. This is a bit like reassigning those imprisoned for child abuse to managing
kindergartens; for consider the impressive military record of environmental vandalism. What
the military is alleged to offer is a structure appropriate and available for handling such matters.
But, to the contrary, it is precisely the sort of hierarchical, authoritarian expensive structure that
should be wound down and up as soon as the opportunity appears, as (briefly) now, rather than
being retained and shockingly reoriented (as a state-serving ""Greenwar"").
2.
On
q/
/row
Having arrived, by better or worse arguments, at the conclusion that wars, though
2
But a bridge to deep-green theory can be made through neo-Daoism, an updating of Taoism in
continuity with deep ecology (which however is somewhat thin and threadbare on war; for
what there is so far, see Naess p.160). On neo-Daoism, see UT.
7
generally evil, may be sometimes unavoidable, it is evidently important to say something about
how they - those of the theoretical residue - are to be conducted. By appropriate conduct the
damage they do may be reduced; also the conduct should be appropriate to the funereal nature
of wars (to exceed Taoist resources for stating this sort of point). It is at this stage that deep
green theory begins to diverge from Taoism.
In further explaining the Taoist and deep-green critiques of war, and diverting objections
to them, a roMg/t and preliminary %? Shelves > Top > Pile 3",https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/c2e6632d96cd9731bb185e500740e78e.pdf,Text,"Draft Papers",1,0
163,https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/show/163,"Box 21, Item 708: Draft of War and peace IV: Tao and deep-green","Printout of draft, with emendations and annotation, dated 1992. Handwritten above title: Old. Diagrams. Draft includes multiple versions of page 22 (2 versions ) and 23 (3 versions). Later title: On extirpating war: Tao and deep-green pacifism.","One of eight papers digitised from item 708.","Richard Sylvan","The University of Queensland's Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291, Box 21, Item 708","Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy",1992,"This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, Dr. N.A.J. Taylor.","For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library.",,"[26] leaves. 61.54 MB. ",,Manuscript,"https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:0c7af66",,"WAR AND PEACE IV:
TAO AND DEEP-GREEN
Taoism and deep-green environmental theory, although closely aligned on very many
issues, diverge over war. For Taoism, by contrast for instance with Buddhism, is not a pacific
doctrine, but is committed to skilful defensive militarism. While it does not espouse a fortress
mentality, Taoism certainly condones limited defensive military operations for specific
purposes, a sort of guerilla warfare. By contrast, deep-green theory, while acknowledging the
role of organised social defence, stands opposed to professional militarism, and thereby to
military defence, and is committed to a principled pacifism. Conveniently a route through
Taoism, philosophically fascinating in its own right, will lead us to problems of pacifism and
towards deep-green theory.
7. Fca/ar^y o/ % Tao/s/
q/ war an
War did not receive a favourable press in ancient Chinese philosophy. Generally
aggression and war were to be avoided. Even Confucius imposed very demanding conditions:
for example, 'when good men have instructed the people [in morals, agriculture, military
tactics] for seven years, they way be allowed to bear arms/ Tf a ruler ... does not set himself
right, even his commands will not be obeyed' (SB p.41, italics added). Mo Tzu went much
further than Confucius, roundly condemning war - on utilitarian grounds, that war yields no
net benefit at any level (SB p.227). What is more, he backed his heavy condemnation
practically (unlike some conspicuous contemporary theoretical utilitarians); 'he did not hesitate
to walk for ten days and ten nights in an effort to dissuade a ruler from making war' (SB
p.212). But none, it is said, went as far, in a detailed and sophisticated criticism of war, as Lao
Tzu; 'none has condemned war more strongly than Lao Tzu'. '[T]he opposition of Taoism to
the use of force is well-known, and the most bitter attack on militarism if found in the Lao 7za'
(Chan, p.154, p.17.)
But, after that splendid build-up, the text is slightly disappointing. Lao Tzu does not
assert outright that war is an abomination, or even roundly condemn it. His critique of war,
militarism, and military technology, is subtle and oblique, and, on the surface, far distanced
from pacifism. For he does not recommend an end to war - in that genuine Taoists, those who
possess Tao, will never participate in them - but expects wars to continue as tmavoi<7a&/e gvfAy.
Worse, he even goes so far as to outline proper attitudes to war and conduct in war, and indeed
to suggest military techniques and strategies, some of which look decidedly devious. Among
the classical works of Taoism, we focus on the Lao 7za because, by contrast with other works,
a remarkable component of that book is devoted to war and militarism.
The apparent deviousness of the tactics Lao Tzu allocates serves to highlight what has
been seen as 'the most troublesome element' in his philosophy (Chan p.17) - not so much
however because they concern military operations, but because they are taken to apply much
2
more widely, 'to life in general' (p.17). But why should military activity obtain some special
dispensation? Why should what is no? tolerated more generally be exonerated there? But given
that Taoism has here the virtue of consistency (i.e. uniformity on principles) and of
universalizability, that simply leaves
* PMzz/ay/br
explaining to be done.
and wars as M/tavafda&Ze evf/s
There are fwa puzzles here in Taoism rather than one. There is the zm/ffary-pracac^s
paradox, and, varying and generalising on that, there are /Z/g-prac^c^s paradoxes. The special
paradox is generated by the following incompatible elements: on the one side, 'the most bitter
attack on militarism', the well-known opposition of Taoism to the use of force (p.17) and to the
possession and use of smart military weapons and technology - implying that war is far from
all tight - and on the other, advocacy of certain (devious) military tactics, outlines of (deceitful)
conduct in war, and so on - implying that war is all right after all. A straightforward
generalisation of this paradox would look at other morally-sensitive parts of life, where some
practice was strongly condemned yet engaged in (for many examples, see the dilemmas
assembled in MD). But the variation of concern to Chan and the neo-Confucians concerns the
conjunction of upright with devious practices in life, in particular in the life of the sage. For a
Taoist sage is presumed to lead an upright straightforward life, yet appears to engage in devious
and even deceitful practices incompatible with such a life-style. Call this the 7%oLyf-ZZ/&y?y/e
paradox.
Evidently a good deal of explaining is required, as to how Taoism can coA^nfZy take the
positions it appears to presume, both on war and peace, and on life more generally. A desirable
preliminary would seem to be a little investigation of what position taken, especially on war
and militarism. One key pasage runs:
Fine weapons are instruments of evil
Weapons are instruments of evil, not the instruments of a good ruler.
When he uses them unavoidably, he regards calm restraint as the best
principle
Even when he is victorious, he does not regard it as praiseworthy,
For to praise victory is to delight in the slaughter of men.
He who delights in the slaughter of men will not succeed in the empire. ...
For a victory, let us observe the occasion with funeral-ceremonies
(LT p.154).
Wars, which involve the use of weapons, instruments of evil, are accordingly themselves evil.
They are also evil because they involve the slaughter of men. But they are also sometimes
unavoidable (also p.152). Therefore such wars are unavoidable evils. Such discourse,
obtained by almost immediate inference from the passage, is within the standard orbit of
dilemma talk. But Taoism lacks, through deliberately eschewing deontic talk, the discourse
which enables direct expression of such dilemmas, or even direct condemnation of wars or
cleaver weapons. Instead the points are made by
what the possesser of Tao
3
does, how the good ruler conducts himself, or by awa/ogy, of victory in war with death.
Unavoidable evils are the very stuff of deontic dilemmas (though many theories,
underpinned by shonky logic, lack the resources for representing this stuff properly). Where
something is unavoidably evil, it is bof/i
because evil,
also no?
doing it is
excusable, because it is unavoidable. So, given such an argument (which has its weaknesses),
an unavoidable evil is a genuinely dilemmatic object with inconsistent features. Certain wars
have looked, since ancient times, like such dilemmatic objects.
Revealingly, Chan tries to explain that ""most troublesome element* in Taoism, the
military-practice paradox, through the following exercise in lateral thinking:
It can ... be argued that Lao Tzu uses warfare to illustrate his principles of
taking no action and weakness because warfare is among the most dynamic
and critical of human experiences, just as the Indian classic, the
chooses fighting as the theme on which to discuss the terrible dilemma
whether one should fulfil his duty, as in the case of a soldier, and kill, or
should fail in his duty and refrain irom killing (p. 17).
'Just as*? The Indian classic prevents a classic moral dilemma, a dilemma represented in
contemporary philosophy (following its rediscovery by Sartre), where there are incompatible
duties: the duty to kill, because of one's role as a soldier, and the duty not to kill, because of
one's human condition, and the supervenient dilemma of failing in and fulfilling one's duties.
These dilemmas for an individual (male, as it then was) are replicated in dilemmas regarding
war for group institutions: at bottom, the obligation to engage in war (for one set of compelling
reasons) as contraposed with the obligation not to engage in war (for another, perhaps
overlapping, set of reasons).
A theory of moral dilemmas (as worked out for example in MD) is crucial for an adequate
treatment of major issues in war and peace, especially (as will become evident) for a viable
strong pacifism. But Taoism, eschewing deontic discourse, lacks the apparatus to state or
develop moral dilemmas. Hence it is logically excluded from giving a full or adequate account
of what is going on conceptually. One of the philosophically fascinating feature of Taoism is
the fashion in which it manages to avoid deontic discourse, and to substitute for direct deontic
discourse or improvise circumlocutions when deontic discourse would otherwise appear
inevitable (cf. UT bn examples). But there are costs. One is inability to display the mechanism
of deontic dilemmas, or to show what reasons and argument lie behind Taoist prounouncements
and conclusions (the shortage of Taoism on argument is another philosophically conspicious
feature, observed in UT). As conceptual apparatus for analysizing moral dilemmas is missing,
most of the machinery involved has to be passed over. Only the outcomes, as Taoism sees
them, are presented, as if from a black box. Taoism blacks out the story on deontic dilemmas
that deep-green theory can tell, as the following diagram tries to show:
4
Diagrams . C/%zr%Kg
""r&w/v^"".
procawmg
Dggp-grgg/Y c/Mrr
Arguments to
incompatible
prescriptions
Processing of dilemma,
directive
situational procedures
output
CorrasppMJing 7%<9i\f c/M!rr:
Black
directive
Box
output
input
It is evident that Taoism can be
information can be put into the Black Box
rendering it less opaque. That extension can be made so as to conform to deep-green theory,
i.e. so that the extended Taoist chart, a neo-Daoist chart, looks like the deep-green one. That is
indeed essentially how neo-Daoism get characterised, in terms of conformity of the extension to
deep ecological theory (see UT).
We are now placed to explain how to dissolve, or at least neutralize, the paradoxes
deriving from repudiation of militarism, an awkwardly qualified repudiation in the case of
Taoism. In a significant sense there is no resolving of genuine deontic dilemmas. The
principles delineating the fix may stand, incompatible, signalling the persisting suboptimality
(or better, sublimenality) of the dilemmatic situation. Where there is a dilemma, involved
parties should try to do well enough in the sublimenal circumstances (for a much fuller account,
see MD). Thus where there is a war, itself a non-Taoist process, engaged or caught up Taoists
will not abandon Taoism. Taoist methods will be applied, Taoist strategies pursued.
So much for theoretical representation and (non-)resolution of life-practices and other
dilemmas, details of which are readily elaborated in deep-green extensi^s of Taoism. A prior
substantive issue is whether dilemmas always are generated: not whether wars are evil
(typically they are, an issue we shall come to), but whether wars are unavoidable. Analysis of
wars does not bear that familiar claim out decisively. Many wars could have been avoided,
through conciliation, negotiation, restraint, etc., and no worse results apparently obtained,
through sanctions, exchange, trade, etc. Through a typology of wars (coming up) that
conjecture can be given some substance. Consider, for instance, what would be walk-overs.
Then there is little point in making a military response. So war can be avoided. Certainly an
occupation, to be met in a different way, may still occur. And so on, perhaps, for various other
types of war. But, more generally, try this:-
5
Every war involves an aggressor, who makes an aggressive move. Such an aggressor
could always avoid that move, taking a different (or a do-nothing) course of action. Therefore,
every war can be avoided. No war is entirely unavoidable.
Setting aside determinism (which renders aZZ actual wars along with all other events
unavoidable), it could be argued that a war sometimes simply boils up, without an aggressor,
an intensification of a conflagatory situation. There are grounds for scepticism regarding such
examples; for such intensification can only occur if provocative military moves are made, for
instance troops are stationed in provocative or risky positions.
The presumption that certain wars are unavoidable typically derives from a one-sided
perspective on war, a defender's perspective. A defender has no option, so it is routinely
averred, but to respond to a determined aggressor. Even if that should be so sometimes, when
there is no running away or going underground, it does not establish that such a war is
unavoidable; for it neglects the role of the aggressor. By a smarter formulation, relevant
features of unavoidability can be captured. Although wars may not be unavoidable, defensive
action in wars that have been initiated may be unavoidable. At least such action may be
unavoidable if unacceptably high costs (death, enslavement, etc.) are not to be avoided.
Thereupon another highly relevant feature emerges: the linkage of avoidability to costs. For
whether an action is unavoidable then depends upon what costs a party is prepared to incur
before and when insisting on action: but this appears entirely unacceptable. How can what is
""unavoidable"" cease to be so when some further costs are absorbed? However with basics like
survival, a certain liberty, and so on, we do reach such bounds. An important (ype of
unavoidability. We also reach scenarios, unavailable to Lao Tzu but kindly brought within
range by modem technology, which may appear to justify aggressive strikes.
State Z, while not an aggressor, is carrying out practices which will impose unacceptably
high costs upon peoples of other states and implacably refuses to desist. It could, for example,
be poisoning air or water flowing to other states. But"",to make the case vivid, let us suppose
that state Z is constructing, for reasons Zeders find convincing (they are committed to a faith
which depicts all humans as incorrigible sinners and unworthy of life), an effective doomsday
machine. Would an (aggressive) preemptory strike designed to disable or destroy the machine
be unavoidable?* In a sense, No; in another Yes. For different modalities can operate.
Physically outsiders need to do nothing, but watch Zeders go about their zealous work. But
deontically they are under heavy moral pressure, because of the costs of standing by idly: if the
human race is worth anything very substantial, then they are obliged to act, action is deontically
1
Whether it would be justifiable, or just, are separate issues. But it is evident enought that
such scenarios further damage the obsolescent idea of
war. For, according to received
doctrine, a just war is defensive. (How such a war can be fought at all is another matter;
coherence requires relativization to 'just warybr party d'.)
6
unavoidable. Here is a situation where a proposed reduction of deontic logic proves
illuminating. Obligation is explicated through not implying, or necessitating, the sanction, i.e.
excessive ethical costs such as extermination. Let us explain deontic unavoidability
analogously: an action is so unavoidable if not undertaking it would result in excessive ethical
costs. Then i/* it can be established that there is no other way than a military strike, an act of
war, to ensure that the Zeders desist (and certainly we can envisage scenarios like that), then
that is deontically unavoidable. It is also
for those committed to, or inclined
towards pacifism; and it is, for them at least, but paradoxically justifiable, as the negation is
also justifiable, on pacific grounds.
Scenarios like that sketched, that appear to render certain wars deontically unavoidable
require but little or no elaboration to render them evil. Evil indeed is such a standard feature of
standard wars that at least its great presence call for little supporting evidence. But it has taken
to vast stretch of human history to reach this general point of recognition.
The manifold evils of war Lao Tzu very early recognised and emphasized:
Wherever armies are stationed, briars and thorns grow.
Great wars are always followed by famines (p.152).
And nowadays followed by great tides of refugees. This passage includes not only recognition
of the widely-observed socio-environmental consequences of war, but, more striking, very
early recognition of the severe environmental impact of military forces. That critique is not
however developed in Taoism.^ Only recently has it been pushed substantially further. And
only recently could a new, most significant twist occur, the merging of resource security, long a
military objective, with environmental security.
The appalling idea has recently been floated that the military, in need of new work and
roles with the apparent warming of Wept-East relations and cooling of the Cold War, should
exchange usual military illness for meddling in environmental matters: regulation and policing
-
of environmental resources, ensurance of environmental security of powerful states, and
similar. This is a bit like reassigning those imprisoned for child abuse to managing
kindergartens; for consider the impressive military record of environmental vandalism. What
the military is alleged to offer is a structure appropriate and available for handling such matters.
But, to the contrary, it is precisely the sort of hierarchical, authoritarian expensive structure that
should be wound down and up as soon as the opportunity appears, as (briefly) now, rather than
being retained and shockingly reoriented (as a state-serving ""Greenwar"").
But a bridge to deep-green theory can be made through neo-Daoism, an updating of Taoism in
confirmity with deep ecology (which however is somewhat thin and threadbare on war; for
what there is so far, see Naess p.160). On neo-Daoism, see UT.
;
7
2.
On
divergence of deej?-green fron: Taoisn!.
Having arrived, by better or worse arguments, at the conclusion that wars, though
generally evil, may be sometimes unavoidable, it is evidently important to say something about
how they - those of the theoretical residue - are to be conducted. By appropriate conduct the
damage they do may be reduced; also the conduct should be appropriate to the funereal nature
of wars (to exceed Taoist resources for stating this sort of point). It is at this stage that deep
green theory begins to diverge from Taoism.
In further explaining the Taoist and deep-green critiques of war, and diverting objections
to them, a roMg/t and preliminary ryp/<9gy of wars is important. It is also of passing interest in
its own philosophical right. War, according to English Dictionaries, is a 'contest carried on by
force of arms, typically between nations or states'. More exactly, war is a gawc - in the
generous technical sense of game-theory, with players, rules, goals, strategies, and so on carried on in significant part by military means, normally between states or substates. Call the
contestants, (warring) parfzay. They typically represent of course larger populations. The set
up between parties resembles the arrangements of players in game theory. There are several
analogical extensions of the term war to cover games where one of the parties is an object,
construed as hostile (an enemy of the state), such as Crime, Drugs, Poverty or Nature. These
we can set aside as a/za/ogfca/ wars. Of course wars form only a part of military activities.
Military interests and objectives have always stretched significantly further than war, to include
surveillence and security, easily extended to resource security, environmental security and life
style security, and beyond that to political stability and other political matters. Evidently
military ambitions have far over-extended themselves in bagging such democratic concerns.
An anarchist solution to the whole problem of war, which some have seen Taoism as
reaching towards, is immediate: eliminate the source of war, -yfafe.y. Unfortunately it is not
quite that simple (and that's not simple). For wars can also occur between nations, cultures,
races or tribes (which are not such artifices as states, and not so readily or desirably abolished),
between inhabited regions, and between factions within states (thus civil wars) or, perhaps by
extension, between factions within other social structures (thus, for instance, gang wars). But
undoubtedly eliminating states and aspiring states would abolish most wars and virtually all the
worst wars.
While ""nonviolent wars"" are excluded by definition, by virtue of 'force of arms', token
wars, limited wars, and so on, are not: for instance, wars fought by small armed teams
representing competing sides (cf. medieval and science fiction war games). As wars are
hemmed in by conventions and agreed rules, there is no reason in principle why they should
not be reduced to two person contests, fought under strict rules like boxing or gladiatorial
contents. But in modern times wars have never taken such sensible forms, but have been
much larger affairs, making heavy (though fortunately restricted) use of latest technology. Let
us distinguish such wars as
wars. They have, directly or indirectly (for the
8
technology may be bought or bartered), a heavy research and development support structure
(indeed the bulk of contemporary science is devoted - misdirected - in one way or another to
this effort).
Among wars, an important distinction is that between
and
wars. An
offensive war is one which ventures off a given party's territory or recognised pad, ""invading""
that of another party or parties; correlatively defensive parties, if they have not also invaded.
Force projection typifies offensive practice. Plainly, offensiveness and defensiveness are not
strictly features of a war, but of parties to a war. In a two-party war, while both parties can
easily act offensively, the possibility of both parties proceeding defensively is excluded, unless
they share territory. (Even then issues may arise as to which party, if any, was the aggray-yor,
which started it, was responsible for starting it, and so on.) Thus mutually defensive wars
between contemporary states are impossible (but would be possible if states shared territory,
e.g. if Eire and Britain shared the territory of Northern Ireland). Tao-accredited wars were
defensive wars, never wars aiming at domination: last-resort wars, in which no pride was taken
(LT p. 152)3,
The pretence that offensive wars are defensive is widespread, and reflected in the
subterfuge that departments or ministries of war are those of defence, security or whatever. (If
they really were what they purport to be, we should be well on the way to an end to war.)
Offensive practices are rendered defensive ones by shabby redefinitional strategems, such as
redefining ""defensive* to include defence of ideals like democracy or liberty, infringed (or
allegedly infringed) on territories abroad, or to include """"defence** of a third party or place
(whence every offensive war is """"defensive**). In the present war in which part of Arabia is
engulfed (February 1991), one party claims to be defending what really was (or should be) part
of its territory, namely Kuwait, another party to be defending (what Kuwait did not enjoy)
democracy. It is a doubly offensive war presented in this guise as jointly defensive.
Aggressive wars are waged for a variety of reasons, but usually for resources or access to
resources or markets, a matter often disguised by appeal to ideology (thus a war for oil is
represented as a war of liberation). But there are other reasons than narrowly economic ones,
such as religion (as with crusades), power and aggrandisement (as in building an empire), and
so on. Nor are those reasons necessarily far separated; Marxist and market capitalism, for
3
There is one line in LT that way suggest that attack was sometimes justifiable, namely Tor
deep love helps one to win in the case of attack' (p.219). But how can c Shelves > Top > Pile 3",https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/3044e76f70e17f7d2314623237b7068b.pdf,Text,"Draft Papers",1,0
162,https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/show/162,"Box 21, Item 708: Draft of War and peace IV: Tao and deep-green","Printout of draft, undated. First page is page 1 of later title of paper, On extirpating war: Tao and deep-green pacifism. Some pages printed on verso of duplicate printouts of same paper.","One of eight papers digitised from item 708.","Richard Sylvan","The University of Queensland's Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291, Box 21, Item 708","Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy",,"This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, Dr. N.A.J. Taylor.","For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library.",,"[27] leaves. 63.7 MB. ",,Manuscript,"https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:88ed71",,"ON EXTIRPATING WAR:
TAO AND DEEP-GREEN PACIFISM
Taoism and deep-green environmental theory, although closely aligned on very many
issues, diverge over war. For Taoism, by contrast for instance with Buddhism, is not a pacific
doctrine, but is committed to skilful defensive militarism. While it does not espouse a fortress
mentality, Taoism certainly condones limited defensive military operations for specific
purposes, a sort of guerilla warfare. By contrast, deep-green theory, whilp acknowledging the
role of organised social defence, stands opposed to professional militarism, and thereby to
military defence, and is committed to a principled pacifism. Conveniently a route through
Taoism, philosophically fascinating in its own right, will lead us to problems of pacifism and
towards deep-green theory.
FeaZi/res o/ a Tacts/
o/ war antZ wn#tarfs?n.
War did not receive a favourable press in ancient Chinese philosophy. Generally
aggression and war were to be avoided. Even Confucius itnposed very demanding conditions:
for example, ""when good men have instructed the people [in morals, agriculture, military
tactics] for seven years, they may be allowed to bear arms,' Tf a ruler ... does not set himself
right, even his commands will not be obeyed' (SB p.41, italics added). Mo Tzu went much
further than Confucius, roundly condemning war — on utilitarian grounds, that war yields no
net benefit at any level (SB p.227). What is more, he backed his heavy condemnation
practically (unlike some conspicuous contemporary theoretical utilitarians); ""he did not hesitate
to walk for ten days and ten nights in an effort to dissuade a ruler from making war' (SB
p.212). But none, it is said, went as far, in a detailed and sophisticated criticism of war, as Lao
Tzu; ""none has condemned war more strongly than Lao Tzu'. '[T]he opposition of Taoism to
the use of force is well-known, and the most bitter attack on militarism if found in the L<3<9 TzM
(Chan, p.154, p.17.)
/
But, after that splendid
the text is slightly disappointing. Lao Tzu does not
id build-up,
bu
assert outright that war is ann abomination, or even roundly condemn it. His critique of war,
militarism, and military teclhhology, is subtle and oblique, and, on the surface, far distanced
from pacifism. For he does/not
s/n< recommend an end to war - in that genuine Taoists, those who
possess Tao, will never participate in them - but expects wars to continue as
Worse, he even goes so far as to outline proper attitudes to war and conduct in war, and indeed
teqhi
to suggest military techniques
and strategies, some of which look decidedly devious. Among
the classical works ^f Taoism, we focus on the Lao Tza because, by contrast with other works,
a remarkable component of that book is devoted to war and militarism.
The apparent deviousness of the tactics Lao Tzu allocates serves to highlight what has
been seen as The most troublesome element' in his philosophy (Chan p.17) - not so much
however because they concern military operations, but because they are taken to apply much
more widely, To life in general' (p.17). But why should military activity obtain some special
WAR AND PEACE IV:
TAO AND DEEP-GREEN
Taoism and deep-green environmental theory, although closely aligned on very many
issues, diverge over war. For Taoism, by contrast for instance with Buddhism, is not a pacific
doctrine, but is committed to skilful defensive militarism. While it does not espouse a fortress
mentality, Taoism certainly condones limited defensive military operations for specific
purposes, a sort of guerilla warfare. By contrast, deep-green theory, while acknowledging the
role of organised social defence, stands opposed to professional militarism, and thereby to
military defence, and is committed to a principled pacifism. Conveniently a route through
Taoism, philosophically fascinating in its own right, will lead us to problems of pacifism and
towards deep-green theory.
7.
o/ a Taofsf endive o/
War did not receive a favourable press in ancient Chinese philosophy. Generally
aggression and war were to be avoided. Even Confucius imposed very demanding conditions:
for example, 'when good men have instructed the people [in morals, agriculture, military
tactics] for seven years, they may be allowed to bear arms/ Tf a ruler ... does not set himself
right, even his commands will not be obeyed' (SB p.41, italics added). Mo Tzu went much
further than Confucius, roundly condemning war - on utilitarian grounds, that war yields no
net benefit at any level (SB p.227). What is more, he backed his heavy condemnation
practically (unlike some conspicuous contemporary theoretical utilitarians); 'he did not hesitate
to walk for ten days and ten nights in an effort to dissuade a ruler from making war' (SB
p.212). But none, it is said, went as far, in a detailed and sophisticated criticism of war, as Lao
Tzu; 'none has condemned war more strongly than Lao Tzu'. '[T]he opposition of Taoism to
the use of force is well-known, and the most bitter attack on militarism if found in the Lao Tzz/
(Chan, p.154, p.17.)
But, after that splendid build-up, the text is slightly disappointing. Lao Tzu does not
assert outright that war is an abomination, or even roundly condemn it. His critique of war,
militarism, and military technology, is subtle and oblique, and, on the surface, far distanced
from pacifism. For he does not recommend an end to war - in that genuine Taoists, those who
possess Tao, will never participate in them - but expects wars to continue as
ewA.
Worse, he even goes so far as to outline proper attitudes to war and conduct in war, and indeed
to suggest military techniques and strategies, some of which look decidedly devious. Among
the classical works of Taoism, we focus on the Lap Tztv because, by contrast with other works,
a remarkable component of that book is devoted to war and militarism.
The apparent deviousness of the tactics Lao Tzu allocates serves to highlight what has
been seen as 'the most troublesome element' in his philosophy (Chan p.17) - not so much
however because they concern military operations, but because they are taken to apply much
2
more widely, 'to life in general' (p.17). But why should military activity obtain some special
dispensation? Why should what is
tolerated more generally be exonerated there? But given
that Taoism has here the virtue of consistency (i.e. uniformity on principles) and of
universalizability, that simply leaves /nare explaining to be done.
There are rwo puzzles here in Taoism rather than one. There is the
paradox, and, varying and generalising on that, there are
paradoxes. The special
paradox is generated by the following incompatible elements: on the one side, 'the most bitter
attack on militarism', the well-known opposition of Taoism to the use of force (p.17) and to the
possession and use of smart military weapons and technology - implying that war is far from
all right - and on the other, advocacy of certain (devious) military tactics, outlines of (deceitful)
conduct in war, and so on - implying that war is all right after all. A straightforward
generalisation of this paradox would look at other morally-sensitive parts of life, where some
practice was strongly condemned yet engaged in (for many examples, see the dilemmas
assembled in MD). But the variation of concern to Chan and the neo-Confucians concerns the
conjunction of upright with devious practices in life, in particular in the life of the sage. For a
Taoist sage is presumed to lead an upright straightforward life, yet appears to engage in devious
and even deceitful practices incompatible with such a life-style. Call this the
paradox.
Evidently a good deal of explaining is required, as to how Taoism can
take the
positions it appears to presume, both on war and peace, and on life more generally. A desirable
preliminary would seem to be a little investigation of what position A? taken, especially on war
and militarism. One key pasage runs:
Fine weapons are instruments of evil
They are hated by creatures
Therefore those who possess the Tao turn away from them. ...
Weapons are instruments of evil, not the instruments of a good ruler.
When he uses them unavoidably, he regards calm restraint as the best
principle
Even when he is victorious, he does not regard it as praiseworthy,
For to praise victory is to delight in the slaughter of men.
He who delights in the slaughter of men will not succeed in the empire. ...
For a victory, let us observe the occasion with funeral-ceremonies
(LT p.154).
Wars, which involve the use of weapons, instruments of evil, are accordingly themselves evil.
They are also evil because they involve the slaughter of men. But they are also sometimes
unavoidable (also p. 152). Therefore such wars are unavoidable evils. Such discourse,
obtained by almost immediate inference from the passage, is within the standard orbit of
dilemma talk. But Taoism lacks, through deliberately eschewing deontic talk, the discourse
which enables direct expression of such dilemmas, or even direct condemnation of wars or of
clever weapons. Instead the points are made by
what the possesser of Tao
3
does, how the good ruler conducts himself, or by a/M/ogy, of victory in war with death.
Unavoidable evils are the very stuff of deontic dilemmas (though many theories,
underpinned by shonky logic, lack the resources for representing this stuff properly). Where
something is unavoidably evil, it is
&<2<7, because evil,
also
doing it is
excusable, because it is unavoidable. So, given such an argument (which has its weaknesses),
an unavoidable evil is a genuinely dilemmatic object with inconsistent features. Certain wars
have looked, since ancient times, like such dilemmatic objects.
Revealingly, Chan tries to explain that ""most troublesome element' in Taoism, the
military-practice paradox, through the following exercise in lateral thinking:
It can ... be argued that Lao Tzu uses warfare to illustrate his principles of
taking no action and weakness because warfare is among the most dynamic
and critical of human experiences, just as the Indian classic, the
chooses fighting as the theme on which to discuss the terrible dilemma
whether one should fulfil his duty, as in the case of a soldier, and kill, or
should fail in his duty and refrain from killing (p.17).
'Just as'? The Indian classic prevents a classic moral dilemma, a dilemma represented in
contemporary philosophy (following its rediscovery by Sartre), where there are incompatible
duties: the duty to kill, because of one's role as a soldier, and the duty not to kill, because of
one's human condition, and the supervenient dilemma of failing in and fulfilling one's duties.
These dilemmas for an individual (male, as it then was) are replicated in dilemmas regarding
war for group institutions: at bottom, the obligation to engage in war (for one set of compelling
reasons) as contraposed with the obligation not to engage in war (for another, perhaps
overlapping, set of reasons).
A theory of moral dilemmas (as worked out for example in MD) is crucial for an adequate
treatment of major issues in war and peace, especially (as will become evident) for a viable
strong pacifism. But Taoism, eschewing deontic discourse, lacks the apparatus to state or
develop moral dilemmas. Hence it is logically excluded from giving a full or adequate account
of what is going on conceptually. One of the philosophically fascinating feature of Taoism is
the fashion in which it manages to avoid deontic discourse, and to substitute for direct deontic
discourse or improvise circumlocutions when deontic discourse would otherwise appear
inevitable (cf. UT for examples). But there are costs. One is inability to display the mechanism
of deontic dilemmas, or to show what reasons and argument lie behind Taoist prounouncements
and conclusions (the shortage of Taoism on argument is another philosophically conspicious
feature, also observed in UT). As conceptual apparatus for analysizing moral dilemmas is
missing, most of the machinery involved has to be passed over. Only the outcomes, as Taoism
sees them, are presented, as if from a black box. Taoism blacks out the story on deontic
dilemmas that deep-green theory can tell, as the following diagram tries to show:
4
Digrams .
r/zg
q/^zzrzc 6Zz7gw/?z^ r/z^zr ^zrg ""r&wZvg^"".
Z)gg/?-grggzz c/^rr;
Arguments to
dilemmii
' incompatible
input/^^ prescriptions
-*
Processing of dilemma,
situational procedures
directive
output
C(?rrgjpgzz<7z7zg TzzcAr c/z^rr:
Black
directive
Box
output
It is evident that Taoism can be gxfgn^M; information can be put into the Black BoR
rendering it less opaque. That extension can be made so as to conform to deep-green theory,
i.e. so that the extended Taoist chart, a neo-Daoist chart, looks like the deep-green one. That is
indeed essentially how neo-Daoism get characterised, in terms of conformity of the extension to
deep ecological theory (see UT).
We are now placed to explain how to dissolve, or at least neutralize, the paradoxes
deriving from repudiation of militarism, an awkwardly qualified repudiation in the case of
Taoism. In a significant sense there is /i<9 resolving of genuine deontic dilemmas. The
principles delineating the fix may
incompatible, signalling the persisting suboptimality
(or better, sublimenality) of the dilemmatic situation. Where there is a dilemma, involved
parties should try to do well enough in the sublimenal circumstances (for a much fuller account,
see MD). Thus where there is a war, itself a non-Taoist process, engaged or caught up Taoists
will not abandon Taoism. Taoist methods will be applied, Taoist strategies pursued.
So much for theoretical representation and (non-)resolution of life-practices and other
dilemmas, details of which are readily elaborated in deep-green extensions of Taoism. A prior
substantive issue is whether dilemmas always arg generated: not whether wars are evil
(typically they are, an issue we shall come to), but whether wars are unavoidable. Analysis of
wars does not bear that familiar claim out decisively. Many wars could have been avoided,
through conciliation, negotiation, restraint, etc., and no worse results apparently obtained,
through sanctions, exchange, trade, etc. Through a typology of wars (coming up) that
conjecture can be given some substance. Consider, for instance, what would be walk-overs.
Then there is little point in making a military response. So war can be avoided. Certainly an
occupation, to be met in a different way, may still occur. And so on, perhaps, for various other
types of war. But, more generally, try this:-
Every war involves an aggressor, who makes an aggressive move. Such an aggressor
could always avoid that move, taking a different (or a do-nothing) course of action. Therefore,
every war can be avoided. No war is entirely unavoidable.
Setting aside determinism (which renders a// actual wars along with all other events
unavoidable), it could be argued that a war sometimes simply boils up, without an aggressor,
an intensification of a conflagatory situation. There are grounds for scepticism regarding such
examples; for such intensification can only occur if provocative military moves are made, for
instance troops are stationed in provocative or risky positions.
The presumption that certain wars are unavoidable typically derives from a one-sided
perspective on war, a defender's perspective. A defender has no option, so it is routinely
averred, but to respond to a determined aggressor. Even (/""that should be so sometimes, when
there is no running away or going underground, it does not establish that such a war is
unavoidable; for it neglects the role of the aggressor. By a smarter formulation, relevant
features of unavoidability can be captured. Although wars may not be unavoidable, defensive
action in wars that have been initiated may be unavoidable. At least such action may b^
unavoidable if unacceptably high costs (death, enslavement, etc.) are not to be avoided.
Thereupon another highly relevant feature emerges: the linkage of avoidability to costs. For
whether an action is unavoidable then depends upon what costs a party is prepared to incur
before and when insisting on action: but this appears entirely unacceptable. How can what is
""unavoidable"" cease to be so when some further costs are absorbed? However with basics like
survival, a certain liberty, and so on, we do reach such bounds. An important
of
unavoidability. We also reach scenarios, unavailable to Lao Tzu but kindly brought within
range by modem technology, which may appear to justify aggressive strikes.
State Z, while not an aggressor, is carrying out practices which will impose unacceptably
high costs upon peoples of other states and implacably refuses to desist. It could, for example,
be poisoning air or water flowing to other states. But ,to make the case vivid, let us suppose
that state Z is constructing, for reasons Zeders End convincing (they are committed to a faith
which depicts all humans as incorrigible sinners and unworthy of life), an effective doomsday
machine. Would an (aggressive) preemptory strike designed to disable or destroy the machine
be unavoidable?! In a sense, No; in another Yes. For different modalities can operate.
Physically outsiders need to do nothing, but watch Zeders go about their zealous work. But
deontically they are under heavy moral pressure, because of the costs of standing by idly: if the
human race is worth anything very substantial, then they are obliged to act, action is deontically
1
Whether it would be justifiable, or just, are separate issues. But it is evident enought that
such scenarios further damage the obsolescent idea of
war. For, according to received
doctrine, a just war is defensive. (How such a war can be fought at all is another matter;
coherence requires relativization to 'just war /hr party d'.)
6
unavoidable. Here is a situation where a proposed reduction of deontic logic proves
illuminating. Obligation is explicated through not implying, or necessitating, the sanction, i.e.
excessive ethical costs such as extermination. Let us explain deontic unavoidability
analogously: an action is so unavoidable if not undertaking it would result in excessive ethical
costs. Then i/*it can be established that there is no other way than a military strike, an act of
war, to ensure that the Zeders desist (and certainly we can envisage scenarios like that), then
that is deontically unavoidable. It is also
for those committed to, or inclined
towards pacifism; and it is, for them at least, but paradoxically justifiable, as the negation is
also justifiable, on pacific grounds.
Scenarios like that sketched, that appear to render certain wars deontically unavoidable
require but little or no elaboration to render them evil. Evil indeed is such a standard feature of
standard wars that at least its great presence call for little supporting evidence. But it has taken
to vast stretch of human history to reach this general point of recognition.
The manifold evils of war Lao Tzu very early recognised and emphasized:
Wherever armies are stationed, briars and thorns grow.
Great wars are always followed by famines (p.152).
And nowadays followed by great tides of refugees. This passage includes not only recognition
of the widely-observed socio-environmental consequences of war, but, more striking, very
early recognition of the severe environmental impact of military forces. That critique is not
however developed in Taoism.2 Only recently has it been pushed substantially further. And
only recently could a new, most significant twist occur, the merging of resource security, long a
military objective, with environmental security.
The appalling idea has recently been floated that the military, in need of new work and
roles with the apparent warming of West-East relations and cooling of the Cold War, should
exchange usual military idleness for meddling in environmental matters: regulation and policing
of environmental resources, ensurance of environmental security of powerful states, and
similar. This is a bit like reassigning those imprisoned for child abuse to managing
kindergartens; for consider the impressive military record of environmental vandalism. What
the military is alleged to offer is a structure appropriate and available for handling such matters.
But, to the contrary, it is precisely the sort of hierarchical, authoritarian expensive structure that
should be wound down and up as soon as the opportunity appears, as (briefly) now, rather than
being retained and shockingly reoriented (as a state-serving ""Greenwar"").
2
But a bridge to deep-green theory can be made through neo-Daoism, an updating of Taoism in
confirm ity with deep ecology (which however is somewhat thin and threadbare on war; for
what there is so far, see Naess p.160). On neo-Daoism, see UT.
7
2.
On //ze Jtrergence o/
yrow T^o/yw.
Having arrived, by better or worse arguments, at the conclusion that wars, though
generally evil, may be sometimes unavoidable, it is evidently important to say something about
how they - those of the theoretical residue - are to be conducted. By appropriate conduct the
damage they do may be reduced; also the conduct should be appropriate to the funereal nature
of wars (to exceed Taoist resources for stating this sort of point). It is at this stage that deep
green theory begins to diverge from Taoism.
In further explaining the Taoist and deep-green critiques of war, and diverting objections
to them, <2 roMgA and preliminary %?<9/<9gy
is important. It is also of passing interest in
its own philosophical right. War, according to English Dictionaries, is a 'contest carried on by
force of arms, typically between nations or states'. More exactly, war is a
- in the
generous technical sense of game-theory, with players, rules, goals, strategies, and so on carried on in significant part by military means, normally between states or substates. Call the
contestants, (warring) para&y. They typically represent of course larger populations. The set
up between parties resembles the arrangements of players in game theory. There are several
analogical extensions of the term war to cover games where one of the parties is an object,
construed as hostile (an enemy of the state), such as Crime, Drugs, Poverty or Nature. These
we can set aside as ana/agma/ wars. Of course wars form only a part of military activities.
Military interests and objectives have always stretched significantly further than war, to include
surveillence and security, easily extended to resource security, environmental security and life
style security, and beyond that to political stability and other political matters. Evidently
military ambitions have far over-extended themselves in bagging such democratic concerns.
An anarchist solution to the whole problem of war, which some have seen Taoism as
reaching towards, is immediate: eliminate the source of war, yfafgy. Unfortunately it is not
quite that simple (and that's not simple). For wars can also occur between nations, cultures,
races or tribes (which are not such artifices as states, and not always so readily or desirably
abolished), between inhabited regions, and between factions within states (thus civil wars) or,
perhaps by extension, between factions within other social structures (thus, for instance, gang
wars). But undoubtedly eliminating states and aspiring states would abolish most wars and
virtually all the worst wars.
While ""nonviolent wars"" are excluded by definition, by virtue of 'force of arms', token
wars, limited wars, and so on, are not: for instance, wars fought by small armed teams
representing competing sides (cf. medieval and science fiction war games). As wars are
hemmed in by conventions and agreed rules, there is no reason in principle why they should
not be reduced to two person contests, fought under strict rules like boxing or gladiatorial
contests. But in modem times wars have never taken such sensible forms, but have been much
larger affairs, making heavy (though fortunately restricted) use of latest technology. Let us
distinguish such wars as
wars. They have, directly or indirectly (for the
20
There is no inconsistency. JWS has confused universal with particular. As well he has
wTongly contracted all situational decision making to consequentialist modes.
There is a third part to the criticism, that the defence is too easy; the 'strategy will allow
rot?
violence to be (perpetrated and) justified to suit the tastes of any real pacifist"" (p.153).
This another part of the so-called trivialization, this time however ^VHrion rather than
populatization, weakening the moral stand against violence. This third contention is premissed
on a mistake: that one can 'justify on consequentialist grounds any number of violent acts,
providing that such acts are lesser evils than other real alternatives facing social agents"" (p.153).
Moral pacifism offers no such licence; allowing such consequentialism to take over was never
part of the position. The slide to such consequentialism is made on the strength of a similarly
erroneous example. The potential victim of an aspiring rapist 'is supposed to flee or wriggle
free if possible. But it is
to consequentially justify the use of violence by the woman to
prevent herself from being raped"" (p.153 italics added). In the example so far described there is
no dilemma, and no such easy resort to consequentially 'justified"" violence.
What allows too much violence is the lesser evil JWS assumes is easily consequentially
justified; for example that the woman is entitled to inflict, and escalate, violence so long as it
remains 'a lesser evil than the violence of attempted rape"" (p.153). Since she may thereby
inflict quite unreasonable damage (esp. if she is a Kung Fu expert), the result is inconsistent
with 'the basic principle of self-defence"" which JWS earlier adduced according to which what is
'appropriate, in response is 0/7/y that level of force necessary to defend oneself against the
threat"" (p.150). There is evidence in JWS's work of some enthusiasm for levels of violence
which exceed his 'basic principle"", his appeal to 'lesser evil"" generates some instances. The
'basic principle"", itself fraught with difficulties (cf. the contorted discussion of what weapons
are appropriate in response to what attacks, p.150), still exceeds what stretched pacifism would
enjoin; for instance, it may not be appropriate to respond with force. But in a technical sense
stretched pacifism is compatible with the 'basic principle"", since it only imposes the upper
bound on level of force.
As for easiness, moral pacifism is not an easy position to live by, or to justify. Removing
objections to pacifism is one thing; solidifying a positive case for it is quite another, and so far
hardly conclusive (as Al tried to explain, pp 29-31). Stretched pacifism was advanced,
to put it more precisely, as a still viable option. It was not presented as a morally
compulsory position, or, for that matter, as one that this defender adhered to or affirmed.
To reiterate, while a cumulative case can be made for stetched pacifism as principled non
violence, that case was not conclusive, and is hard to improve. For, further, some serious
difficulties standing in the way of stretched pacifism were assembled, the most important of
which derives from the extent of violence apparent in transactions within the natural world.
Simply consider the practices of carnivores, essential to their natural way of life. In order to
meet their life needs for sustenance, these creatures do, and are often obliged to, engage
8
technology may be bought or bartered), a heavy research and development support structure
(indeed the bulk of contemporary science is devoted - misdirected - in one way or another to
this effort).
and
wars. An
offensive war is one which ventures off a given party's territory or recognised pad, ""invading""
that of another party or parties; correlatively defensive parties, if they have not also invaded.
Force projection typifies offensive practice. Plainly, offensiveness and defensiveness are not
Among wars, an important distinction is that between
strictly features of a war, but of parties to a war. In a two-party war, while both parties can
easily act offensively, the possibility of both parties proceeding defensively is excluded, unless
they share territory. (Even then issues may arise as to which party, if any, was the aggr&yxor,
which started it, was responsible for starting it, and so on.) Thus mutually defensive wars
between contemporary states are impossible (but would be possible if states shared territory,
e.g. if Eire and Britain shared the territory of Northern Ireland). Tao-accredited wars were
defensive wars, never wars aiming at domination: last-resort wars, in which no pride was taken
(LTp.l52).3
The pretence that offensive wars are defensive is widespread, and reflected in the
subterfuge that departments or ministries of war are those of defence, security or whatever. (If
they really were what they purport to be, we should be well on the way to an end to war.)
Offensive practices are rendered defensive ones by shabby redefinitional strategems, such as
redefining 'defensive' to include defence of ideals like democracy or liberty, infringed (or
allegedly infringed) on territories abroad, or to include ""defence"" of a third party or place
(whence every offensive war is ""defensive""). In the present war in which part of Arabia is
engulfed (February 1991), one party claims to be defending what really was (or should be) part
of its territory, namely Kuwait, another party to be defending (what Kuwait did not enjoy)
democracy. It is a doubly offensive war presented in this guise as jointly defensive.
Aggressive wars are waged for a variety of reasons, but usually for resources or access to
resources or markets, a matter often disguised by appeal to ideology (thus a war for oil is
represented as a war of liberation). But there are other reasons than narrowly economic ones,
such as religion (as with crusades), power and aggrandisement (as in building an empire), and
so on. Nor are those reasons necessarily far separated; ideologies like Marxism and market
3
There is one line in LT that way suggest that attack was sometimes justifiable, namely 'For
deep love helps one to win in the case of attack' (p.219). But how can cow/?a.y.yz'<9/i be
appropriate unless this attack is wn/u'/i a defensive setting, a larger context of unavoidability
or such like. A passage shortly below confirms this interpretation:
I dare not take the offensive but I take the defensive:
I dare not advance an inch but I retreat a foot (p.222).
These are advances and attacks within a defensive setting.
23
followed with another invasion. Nor have we ever managed to glimpse much of what is now
supposed, when we are no longer engaged, to come 'out of the horror of war': a 'new world
order ... which governs the conflict of nations'; a 'rule of law', not war. How the one,
enforcable law, is achieved, unless backed by the the other, is not explained (Medlin's paradox
hits back). Similarly what we now hear from many militarists, as they rush to war, is that
'peace is a great good, war a great evil'. But, for the most part, only the rhetoric has shifted;
practice has scarcely changed at all.
REFERENCES
W.-T. Chan, A
referred to as ST.
Paa/: on C7zzm?yg P/zz7a.ya/?/zy, Princeton University Press, 1963;
W.-T. Chan (ed.), 77za Way a/Lao 7za(Taa-m C/zzrzg), Bobbs-Merrill, New York, 1963;
referred to as LT.
B. Martin, U/zraarz'/zg War, Freedom Press, London, 1984.
A. Naess, Eca/agy, cam/Mmzz'zy a/zb /z/byzy/g, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge UK,
1989.
R.A. Rapaport, Pzgy/ar z7z^ Anc^yrary : rima/ zn r/zg eca/agy a/* a
University Press, New Haven, 1967.
Gamoa P^a/z/e, Yale
R. Routley, 'War and Peace II. On the alleged inconsistency, moral insensitivity and fanaticism
of pacifism', Dz'yczzyyzan /za/z^ry zzz g/zvzrazzm^zzra/ jz/zz/aya/z/zy #9, Research School of
Social Science, Australian National University, 1983 (also in Ezz/zzzzy ); referred to as AL
R. Routley and V. Plumwood, 'Moral dilemmas and the logic of deontic notions', Dzycayyza/z
^a/z^ry z/z oma'ronmoma/ p/zz/aya/z/zy #6, Research School of Social Science, Australian
National University, 1984 (also in Paracazzyz'y^mLagz'c); referred to as AID.
R. Routley, 'War and Peace I. On the ethics of large-scale nuclear war and nuclear-deterrence
and the political fall-out', Dz'yczzyyz'a/z pa/z^ry z/z e/zvzra/z/?z^/zfa/ /z/zz/aya/z/zy, #5, Research
School Of Social Science, Australian National University, 1984.
G. Sharp, Sacz'a/ Pavt^r am/ Pa/z'aca/ Priborn, Porter Sargent, Boston, 1980.
J.W. Smith, 77zg War/?zy af zTzg H^arf a/T/zz'/zgy , Public Relations Unit, Flinders University,
1989.
R. Sylvan, 'War and Peace III, Australia's defence philosophy', Sacz'a/ P/zz7aya/z/zy, for Nuclear
Conference, University of Queensland, 1985.
R. Sylvan and D. Bennett, 'Of Utopias, Tao and Deep Ecology', Dz'yczzyyza/z /za/z^ry z/z
a/zvz'ra/z/?z^/zra/ /z/zz/aya/z/zy #19, Research School of Social Science, Australian National
University, 1990; referred to as UT.
9
capitalism, for example, exhibit many of the features of religion.
The economic reasons for war appear to have become much more complex with the
advent of an integrated world economy. At the same time many of the independent reasons for
economic wars are now obsolete. For to powerful states accrue the advantages of war without
war. At least most of the former economic advantages of war can be obtained without
expensive wars, through trade, institution of economic dependence, etc. Small medieval wars
were sometimes instituted for the collection of neighbouring riches and booty, a kind of piracy
meeting conditions of war. ""Small"" contemporary wars can be waged for a remarkable mix of
political-economy ends: to establish a regime favourable to economic penetration and profit
repatriation, to subjugate markets and to remove competition, to boost a sagging weapons
economy by using up old stocks and also testing new equipment, to restart a depressed
economy, and so on. Such wars, along with the economic aims which motivate them, are in
effect heavily castigated by Lao Tzu:
When Tao prevails in the world, galloping horses are turned back to
fertilize (the fields ...}.
When Tao does not prevail in the world, war horses thrive in the suburbs.
There is no calamity greater than lavish desires. (LT p.181).
But it does exceed evidential warrant to claim that Tao is not only sufficient, but
for
cessation of such practices.
The practice of regularly stimulating complex military-saturated economies through war is
reminiscent of older, much ridiculed practices in simpler societies. They now ridicule the
Tsembaga, who proceeded to destroy much of their surplus product by going to war every 5-15
years (cf Rapaport). But they do not similarly ridicule the most powerful nation on the Earth,
the USA, which proceeds to write off a colossal amount of surplus in war every 10-20 years
(the Gulf war liquidated some $1.7 billion per day). Taoists would. For ridicule was a
favoured method, an important rhetorical strategem, and war and its idiocy were favourite
targets.
Some classification of defensive wars is also important, for various reasons: reducing and
abolishing wars, their costs and damage, restructuring societies away from war and military
practices, and, not least, for appreciating Taoism.
A main distinction is between
* conventional defence, maintained by armies of armed soldiers, many of them professionals,
and
* social defence, where there are no such armies or but fragments of them, and defence is
carried out through social networks of a significant part of society A
4
Details of social defence are presented in Sharp and in Martin.
10
It is here that Taoism and deep-green theory part company. Under Taoism, the state w;7/
have a standing army, but a defensive army operating by strange, surprise tactics (p.201). No
doubt defensive wars are to remain last resort action. Nonetheless the state will operate in
secrecy, in a way incompatible with decentralised
defence; people will be kept in the dark
about smart weapons of the state; and they too will be surprised, along with presumed enemies
of the state. By contrast, under deep-green theory, there should be no hidden smart weapons
of state; information would flow more freely and not be hidden from the people (who should
retain influence in informed decision making). Under deep-green, standing armies, and more
generally military organisation, will be wound down altogether.
Taoism should have pushed its searching criticism further. For military objectives, easily
acquired by standing armies with time on their hands, are frequently incompatible with Taoism.
For example, Taoism is opposed to domination (LT p.152), whereas military operations
frequently seek or involve domination; and military structure is invariably hierarchical and
authoritarian. Taoism aims for self-regulation, wherever feasible (cf. p.201); so does deep
green theory, which is one reasons why it aims to dispose of standing armies, as an important
preliminary to the withering away of states themselves (military forces being major props of
state control and power, and often maintained primarily for internal state security). Taoism has
no project for ending the era of wars; deep-green theory does. That project involves an
elimination of standing armies, too often poised for fighting or political interference.
A recommended route to ^<7 war consists in progressive scaling down: reduction of the
means and manpower. The initial stages are well-known, and include
* elimination of nuclear, biological and chemical weaponry, and
* force reduction. It can hardly be pretended that the Earth's states have managed to proceed
very far on even this complex of stages. The next stage consists in
* contraction to defensive capacities only, and the final stage consists in
* elimination of remaining military defensive forces, and adoption, so far as required, of social
defence practices. The complete route thus involves complete demilitarisation.
Reasons why deep-green aims to proceed the /a// distance are readily grasped by
considering the environmental shallowness of an otherwise cogent traditional case for the sharp
curtailment of wars and militarism. The traditional Western case against wars has been
primarily along two dimensions: social and moral. Wars are highly disruptive of the social
fabric; wars may be unjust. From these joint features, it was argued that wars should be a
matter of last resort, to be fought to ensure peace. It was argued further that only just wars
should be fought. Just wars were rare objects. But as there was little evidence of the decline
and fall of wars, much effort was expended, more practically and unsuccessfully, upon
endeavouring to improve the calibre of wars, and more theoretically, upon trying to characterize
war satisfactorily, or rather to bend the notion in an effort to approximate the gory unjust
facts.
11
Progress was long hindered, furthermore, because there was always a rival positive
perspective on wars, which encouraged the exaltation of wars and military feats. It also
facilitated the transfer of the favourable image of war to other problem areas, whence the long
and apparently successful war against Nature (but the short-term successes are turning into
long-term problems), the short and unsuccessful war against Poverty, and so on. Behind all
this is the complex idea of war as rejuvenating, even cleansing, like fire; of war as heroic, and
glorious, of war as the supreme testing ground of men. These pictures of war - finally
shattered by the first World War (where even the poets began to tell of horrors and atrocities)
and subsequent technological wars - though no longer in ascendency, have by no means
vanished. The notion of war as rejuvenating a flagging economy persists, along with the
practice of keeping capitalism running smoothly by integrating substantial military components
into the industrial engine.
With the development of highly technological wars - the celebrated development of the
dirty industrial age is substantially military - the traditional negative case has grown in strength.
Wars have become much more damaging, with the potential for much more that is significantly
worse, and the possibility of a just war has correspondingly contracted, virtually to zero The
opposition to war has likewise grown, but more than correspondingly with the rise of women
in social and political influence. Wars have almost always and everywhere been Men's affairs;
likewise conquest.
Deep-green theory accepts much of the traditional negative case, but would further
strengthen it. For example, the stricture against unjust wars, as out and out immoral, can be
strengthened, through the following syllogism:
All wars should be fully just wars.
Modem wars cannot be fully just wars.
Therefore, there should be no modern wars.
A fully just war is not merely a just war, but a war those just character can be reliably forecast
in advance. A modern war is of course a war that deploys modern technology, at least that
available this century. The evidential basis for the second premiss derives from much
information that collateral damage, damage to innocent bystanders and involved citizens is
always likely and cannot be excluded. Such wars are always liable to violate uncontroversial
requirements for a just war, even if they are purely ""conventional"" wars, not throwing radiation
or chemical or biological weapons around.
From a contemporary viewpoint the traditional doctrine of a just war, really of a just
war, is seriously out of date. The reasons for this reach wider than the new features
introduced by modem technological wars and the character of modem civilization, with its giant
cities littered with dangerous and vulnerable military targets. They have also to do with the
chauvinism of the justice proposed, which is shallow human justice, not natural or
environmental justice. There is no consideration of justice to other creatures or to the Earth (cf
12
Naess p.160). Two troubles are really intertwined here: conceptual difficulties with too narrow
a notion of justice, and ideological difficulties with too narrow a vision of what is an object of
value, of what counts.
The deep-green case against war adds to the traditional case a further dimension,
neglected until very recently: the environmental dimension. It has suddenly been seen that wars
are typically environmental atrocities. Earlier, of course, ""environments"" were simply
backgrounds, backdrops in paintings and plays, to the real drama.
Contemporary technological wars tend to be not merely social tragedies but environmental
ones as well. There is a doctrine of just war, but it is a human chauvinistic affair. There is no
similarly developed doctrine of an gco/og/c^Z/y
war, a deep ecological war. Unless any
such war were literally different from modern wars, that is from contemporary technological
wars, it would overstep permitted bounds. For such wars are characteristically ecological
disasters. Hardened military people, desensitized by a rigorous unethical training, feel even
less compunction about degrading or destroying environments or members of other species
than they do of maiming or killing civilians through ""collateral"" activity.
Matching the no-just-war syllogism is a no-sound-war syllogism:
All wars should be environmentally sound wars.
Modern wars cannot be environmentally sound.
Therefore, there should be no modern wars.
The argument for the second premiss has of course to be different. It looks to the information
accumulating on what wars do to natural and built environments. The Vietnam and Gulf wars
both inflicted immense damage on natural environments or what was left of them.
The environmental effects of war are not confined to direct and collateral damage. There
are indirect effects also. Thus, for instance, war also supplied the mechanism of, and the
technology for, modern environmental destruction: explosives, bulldozers from tanks, etc. As
well, training for war and engagement in war have much fostered, along with attitudes that
make for social callousness or ruthlessness, those that contribute to environmental insensitivity
and cruelty.
3. PMzzZes
sfrafegy and /Zs
o/ fec/tno/ogy an;? woZence
Tt is surprising how much of the E<2 TzM is devoted to military strategy"". Which
strategies? Surprise, above all. But why such strategies? 'Do they not contradict the Taoists""
strong opposition to the use of force"" (Chan p.222), the implied commitment to quietism?
Briefly, Taoism is not committed to quietism, and while certainly antagonistic to violence, does
not oppose certain uses of force (only really ///-forcing, as will be explained). Even so, the
emphasis on military strategy remains puzzling.
*
The strategies, many of them relevant to social defence, include
not 'making light of the enemy"" (p.222)
13
*
and nonvisibility (p.201). The defensive strategy involves guerilla tactics:
marching without formation, holding weapons without seeming to have them, confronting
enemies without seeming to meet them (p.222). But even in times of peace, 'smart weapons of
the state should not be displayed to the people"" (p.164). Such recommendations helped to fpeT
the charge of deviousness lodged against Lao Tzu. But look at part of the reason for concealing
smart weapons: 'The more smart weapons the people have, the more troubled the state will be""
(p.201). Smart weapons are carried in corrupt states, where the rich engage in conspicuous
consumption and the people are suppressed, not where Tao is practiced (LT p. 194).
* advance from
flexibility but firmness. Weakness is the principle of life and will
overcome strength (LT p.164, p.233).
* coolness and
(LT p.233, p.164). Like these, most of the general strategies
are standard Taoist practices simply applied to military conduct. For these standard practices
the charge of deviousness looks feeble.
/
The response applies more generally to other allegedly devious political strategies. For
the strategies are but application of Taoist principles and techniques to warfare, politics and
elsewhere. Nothing excludes application of these techniques to what are accounted, in general,
unnecessary evils (which must sometimes, on other Taoist grounds, be countered). Nor, to
meet the main criticism, need any deceit or deviousness be involved; nor is it. In particular, the
legalist tactic, Tn order to grasp, it is necessary first to give"" (LT p.164), is cited as involving
'an element of deceit"" 'undeniably"", and 'worse"" it is 'morally questionable"" (Chan p.17). But
in order for me to grasp your hand in a normal handshake, it is necessary first for me to give
my hand. There is no deceit here, nothing morally questionable. All the tactics permit of
benign construals, of a Taoist kind. Consider, for instance, Tn order to contract, it is necessary
first to expand"" (LT p.164). In order to bend a copper pipe to the intended angle, it is better to
bend it first a little further than required. The transformation of water to ice (both favoured
natural items for symbolic purposes: natural processes which may look devious!) neatly
illustrates the Taoist principle (which is however hardly necessary), and shows softness and
weakness turned hardness and strength.
The Taoist critique of militarism is as much a critique of technology as of war. Sharp
weapons, 'smart weapons' as we might now say, come in for much critical attention, as we
have already noticed. Only in corrupt and degenerate states are they displayed or flaunted
(p.194, p.164); in deep-green regions smart weapons of state"" would not be retained
unexhibited. The people will not have them for they mean trouble (p.201); for similar reasons
deep-green regions will be free of them. So, it seems, will ideal Taoist regions: 'Even if there
are arrows and weapons, none will display them"" (LT p.238). Much technology, military and
other, is excluded under the Taoist edict against violence (a further facet of the military-practices
paradox).5
The powerful critique of militarism in the
CA&ig is coupled with strong opposition
to violence. Some of the linkage is evident enough. Militarism as practised represents an
ultimate form of state (or party) violence. A basic theme is that violent practices will come to an
unnatural end, and accordingly to a non-Taoist end (generalising LT p.176). While force may
occur in spectacular, but satisfactory, natural forms, force is duly distinguished from violence.
To force the growth of life means ill omen.
For the mind to employ the vital force without restraint means violence
(LT p. 197).
One who follows Tao does not apply dominating force, which usually has had results bringing
requital (p.152). Dominating force, like power, is in general castigated, under doctrine of wuno forced actions, no violence. To force natural growth is deviant, destroying harmony.
To stop natural growth is deviant. But there is a significant difference between force and
violence. To intentionally employ destructive force is to do violence. To so force things is
condemned. To remain in harmony with things one does not so force things or practice
violence. There is a non-interference principle at work, which also indicates types of non
interference that are excluded.
However Taoism does not always get the distinction between force and violence quite
5
Under contemporary technology and technological arrangements, such as the storage of
quantities of oil and nuclear and chemical materials in great cities, wars have assumed new and
very destructive dimensions, to the point of being utterly irresponsible.
A different approach to technology, as to war, is now mandatory. These are no longer things
that can in principle be nicely confined and need not touch parties outside the fray. An
important part of ending wars, ""winning the war against wars"", is removing the technology of
war, above all from irresponsible state power.
As for which technology to try to jettison and which to try to retain or improve, it is not so
difficult to indicate, provided evaluative terminology is not outlawed. What is wanted is
technology that is good in its place, what should be excluded is technology that is indifferent
or bad or potentially so. Technology to be justified has to do something worthwhile, it has
to address identifiable respectable needs. That is why merely indifferent technology is out;
there is no virtue in technology for technology's sake, as it is a mere
technique. It is
because of the crucial evaluative component in choice of technology that
itself evaluative, comes closer to encapsulating the criterion than other recent efforts. Size,
such as smallness, or intermediateness, are not what matter, though modest and not excessive
technologies are likely to fare better in satisfying appropriateness. In simpler societies, small
technology is of course more appropriate; for that is what is good there. From known criteria
for what is good these other features for locally appropriate technology can be read off:
reliability, esp. in maintenance, functioning well and safely under the expected range of
operating conditions (which may be difficult), ease of repair, capital cheapness and repair
inexpensiveness, environmental benignness, and meeting sound social needs.
15
right. 'Vital force without restraint', intentionally excessive force, is only part of what counts
as vzo/^zzc^, which is more generally
w/zz'c/z
i.e. transgresses, descrecrates,
profanes, injures, outrages, etc. It is thus a negatively connoted force, an evil force in some
specified intentional respect. There is a tendency for Taoist commentators, not Taoists, to
regard Taoism as condemning all uses, or even occurrences, of force, but this is not so. Rather
intentional ill-forcing is what is castigated, what is deviant. Thus Taoism does not exclude a
range of defensive practices, which make satisfactory use of natural forces, like letting the
machines of war industry stop.
Those who would abolish war and its machinery, substituting for it nonwarlike and
ideally nonviolent methods, technology, and strategies, have been confronted not merely with
much sub-rational abuse but with plenty of criticism and even some paradoxes. Here is a recent
paradox concerning war and nonviolence:
* War must be abolished. One reason is simply economic. We can no longer afford it, and
the opportunity costs are enormous. Along with other extraordinarily wasteful activities, it is an
anachronism.
* Doing so cannot be accomplished without violence, i.e. in effect, given the types of violence
involved, without what amounts to war. According to a fuller version of this premiss, the
process of abolishing a war would only be achieved through a revolution so profound that it
could not succeed without extensive and extreme violence, amounting to (civil) war.
° But then war cannot be abolished without war.
Therefore, war which must be abolished cannot be abolished.^
This ""paradox"" has been compared with the Liar paradox, but the parallel does not persist far.
For this paradox does not involve self-referential features, and is easily broken, as follows. Let
the ""last war"" be not the last standard war but the revolution abolishing war. Then, given that
the revolution is successful, war will be abolished therewith, i.e. with that last war. There need
be no regress, given again a successful outcome. All the premisses stand intact, but the
conclusion, following the 'therefore' is a nonsequitur. However, while the dissolution of the
argument is accordingly logically fine, the route is repugnant. Standard pacifism challenges the
6
Brian Medlin, who forcefully propounded this puzzle, set other analogous puzzles alongside it
- designed to reveal deep difficulties in contemporary political, and especially alternative,
thought. Another puzzle, concerning liberty and repression in the context of capitalism,
revolved around the following inconsistent triad:
* capitalism must be removed, but liberty retained.
* capitalism cannot be removed without repression.
* repression is antithetical to liberty.
The puzzle is resolved as with the analogous puzzle of abolishing. Let the ""last capitalist""
action
the days of liberty be the repressive but liberating revolution overthrowing
capitalism.
second premiss.
4.
anJ nioraZ jz^cf/zy/T!.
Although Taoism is strongly opposed to war, and much in favour of peace - and
accordingly by prevailing standards a substantially pacz/zc position - it is not (nowhere in the
central texts) committed to pacifism in usual senses, for two different reasons:* It is not, by contrast with pacifism, opposed to all types of warfare, for example smart
defensive wars.
* It eschews deontology in terms of which moral pacifism is commonly stated, for instance
through the watershed thesis
P2.
It is morally wrong to use violence.
By contrast with Taoism, deep environmentalism does not avoid deontic claims, and is
committed zVz /?rzzzcz/?/g to nonviolent technologies and ways and to pacifistic principles.
Moreover, certain forms of deep environmentalism are completely committed to pacifism,
notably European forms. Is deep green?
There is heavy contemporary opposition to pacifism, as there also was to Taoism in the
warring times when Taoism was first being promulgated. Many of the central institutions of
contemporary life are intricated in coercion, violence and war. The most prominent
contemporary institutions, states, are premissed on these elements of damaging force; they
claim entitlement to use them widely, and even claim a certain territorial monopoly on their use.
As a result they are having constantly to engage in them in attempt to maintain that monopoly.
They are certainly the main perpetrators of wars, and of violence. They are indeed inured to
wars, are in constant preparation for wars, yet propound dialectial (and normally dishonest and
cynical) doctrines of peace through war (for a recent example see the appendix).
Unremarkably then, the extensive propagandistic machinery of state has invested heavily
in ""justificatory"" exercises in favour of controlled use, z^ own use, of destructive force, and
continues to inveigh against pacifism. Because a routine trick in this sophistical repetoire
consists in conflating pacifism with extreme, naive and inplausible, forms, an inevitable and
important early task commits in unscrambling senses of 'pacifism'. Semantical skulduggery
can be thwarted in this way.
/^cz/zym, as explained by English dictionaries, invariably concerns wars and warfare, and
contains two components, negative and, elaborating on that, positive:- The negative component
opposition (in ways to be further specified) to all forms of
warfare (see OED). The positive component supplies alternative ways of settling disputes (what
is, in Amauld's word,
it is supposed that wars with some semblance of justification involve), such as negotiation,
arbitration, ... - and, adding to too narrow dictionary accounts - sanctions, substitutions (e.g.
of sporting events, operatic contests, cooperative ventures), .... In brief ^a/z^ar^ /zacz/Aw is
opposition to all warfare and resolution of potential wars by other nonmilitary means.
17
to warfare, like the sanctions and so on, cannot itself be military
(using soldiers and other devices of war), on pain of some incoherence. But otherwise the
ways of opposition can be many and various! they can certainly be
as with nonviolent
demonstrations, resistance movements, and so forth, and they may also be devious (e.g.
turning the forces of war upon themselves so they are neutralised). It quickly becomes evident,
then, that some of the dictionaries offer but loaded definitions which, by restricting the negative
Plainly the
components, reduce the initial appeal and plausibility of pacifism. Consider the
Eng/fy/? definition of the negative component: 'the doctrine of non-resistance to hostilities and
of total non-co-operation with any form of warfare'. Thereby excluded are forms of pacifism
which offer active and plausible alternatives to warfare such as social defence. The
Eng/7y/z tends to force pacifism into what the
Eng/fy/i Efcfforza/y lists as its final item:
'often, with depreciatory implication, the advocacy of peace at any price', 'in any
circumstance'. Pacifism can easily resist being forced into these sorts of circumstances: it has
many resources, as an extensive series of texts on alternatives to war, such as negotiation, non
violent action and social defence, from Taoism to contemporary environmentalism attest.
Academic philosophers have much advanced the semantical strategy of some dictionaries,
of rendering pacifism more difficult from the very outset by narrow and biassed definitions.
They have stretched the term from its restricted setting of warfare, confined to state and
organised gang violence, to cover all forms of violence, from state and interstate to, what is
very different, personal and interpersonal violence. Call the resulting considerably stretched
notion of pacifism, according to which it is morally wrong to use violence, according to which
P2 holds,
p<2c(/Ts7??.7 While stretched pacifism certainly includes standard pacifism
(unless the notions of war and warfare are tampered with), the converse is very far from being
the case. A pacifist is in no way committed to stretched pacifism, which is a much more
problematic and difficult position than standard pacifism. There are several, substantially
different reasons for this, which will be picked up seriatim.
Stretched pacifism, also misleadingly called wora/ pacifism, has looked a very easy
critical target to moral philosophers. Many the effusive philosopher who, upon sighting such a
target, has charged, whooping such rhetoric as ""incoherent"", ""inconsistent"", ""insensitive"",
""fanatical"". However, with improved logical technology now available for accommodating and
treating moral dilemmas, it is no great feat to resist such attacks, in the fashion of previous
investigations (see esp. Al, also MD). A main aim was to demonstrate that stretched pacifism
was not so stupid as it was made out to be or appeared to be to these inured to present dominant
violent ways. So far from being stupid, it is viable. In future gentler times stretched pacifism
7
In Al this notion was contrasted with standard pacifism as
might have been better.
pacifism:
18
could even be realised for whole communities of creatures (as some genuinely Christian sects
envisaged); whence it will finally be seen to be feasible not merely for sages and supermen, and
many ordinary women, but much more extensively.
The method of philosophical accommodation was through moral dilemmas. The sort of
moral dilemma that stretched pacifism can induce derives as follows. On the one side stands
the theme P2, Wv, in convenient symbols, for Wrong V-ing, violencing. Now this implies to
WB, where B presents a case of of violence. On the other side, particular circumstances
develop which lead to W -B, because -B would produce in the circumstances considerable
wrong, for instance extensive violence, mass murder, etc. One stock example from the
literature concerns calling off the firing squad about to shoot several captives the pacifist
shoots one of them (it is elaborated in Al p.13). Interestingly, another stock example from the
literature concerns standard pacifism (it can also be presented in terms of patriotism; for details
of both see MD p.10).
Resolution of intractable moral dilemmas is, where it is required, situational. The agent
decides in the situation, wifAi/r the fix, what to do. There are many ways in which such
decision making can proceed, less rational, such as those applying chance or involving bad
faith, or more rational, such as those applying consequentialist decision theory (for details see
MD, pp.32-9). A decision theory taking account of <2// that should be included will not however
be purely consequential. It would also take account of relevant motivation.
This defence and rehabilitation of moral pacifism has been challenged, in particular by
Smith (hereafter JWS). JWS claims the defence offered is a 'failure because it trivializes
pacifism' (p. 153 twice). The rehabilitation
trivializes pacifism because it entails that pacifism doesn't substantially differ
from a form of acfzvz.S7?z which holds that while violence is a/wayy wrong
one is
justified on consequentialist grounds for preferring violent
acts, if these acts are lesser evils than any other real alternatives. This is the
commonsense position which most people hold - yet -- pacifism after all was
supposed to be radical moral doctrine - (p.153 rearranged).^
of the criticism is, then, not so much that pacifism is trivialized - JWS ""activism'' is
hardly trivial - as that pacifism is /?r?/?zz/d:rz\y^(/, deflated from a radical position to the
commonsense position most people hold (p.154 also). Yet not a shred of evidence is adduced
that JWS activism is such a populist position. Available evidence, for example from peace
movements and oppositional opinion polls, suggests the very opposite: that, for instance, most
people support state-justified conventional wars with the military violence they incur, and
8
JWS now informs me that he has changed his position. Whether the move effects his
criticism, I don't know.
19
accordingly do not hold that violence is always wrong. From such a commonsense angle,
pacifism with its condemnation of conventional wars and the violence they involve remains a
radical doctrine.
As regards wars and other violence-incurring social authorities, contemporary pacificism
is, as previous explained (e.g. Al p.3), a form of activism. Pacifism does not imply utter
pacifity, but may actively involve social defence, resistance and so on. However a certain level
of misrepresentation enters into the JWS challenge in the details of what forms of activism
pacifism may include. That misrepresentation begins in the second clause concerning what is
said to be sometimes justified. For the situational procedure where dilemmas arise will not
generally be consequential applying a principle of lesser evil. In dilemmatic situations such
principles are suspended, and such a principle is in any case unacceptable to moral pacifists. A
small amount of violence may be less bad in its consequences than verbal offence, but a
principled pacifist will choose the slightly greater evil where other obligations do not exclude it.
A more serious distortion occurs in JWS's effort to force procedures in dilemma
situations into purely consequentialist form. In fact consequential decision theory was
deployed as a
only for how to proceed rationally in a situational setting where deontic
procedures were suspended (see MD p.38). What was said, still misleadingly retrospective
vision reveals, was this: ""what is done is a very consequentialist thing' (Al p.13), nor 'one acts
in a consequentialist fashion to do the sufficiently good thing in the circumstances' (JWS
p.152). Situationally or/zgr procedures than those resembling orthodox rational decision
making (modified from maximizing to satisizing objectives) may be adopted (MD p.38).
Further the orthodox consequentialist theory is inadequate because it leaves out, or tries to
reduce to consequences, nonconsequential elements, notably motives. It is not difficult, in
principle (in advance of attempted consequentialization of modves), to design situations where
modves, such as integrity or maintaining faith, enter to yield outcomes upsetting consequential
calculations. More elaborate decision making procedures than those of consequentialism,
sometimes at variance with consequentialism, are thus presupposed.
A further part of JWS's criticism accordingly goes by the board, the alleged appeal 'to
""second best"" consequentialist considerations,... already explicitly condemned' (p.154). What
was condemned was stock universal consequentialism, 'that Shelves > Top > Pile 3",https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/eda41b7e99ab429778e36fdfc2dc6228.pdf,Text,"Draft Papers",1,0