Box 7, Item 792: Is the universe (like) an artefact?

Box 7, Item 792: Is the universe (like) an artefact?

Computer printout with handwritten amendments, and handwritten notes on scrap paper.

Note, one item digitised from item 792.

The University of Queensland's Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291, Box 7, Item 792

This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, Dr. N.A.J. Taylor.

For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library.

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Manuscript

IS

The

UNIVERSE

THE

argument

design

HRTERHUTP

existence of a designer, a planner, a God,

the

for

RN

(LIKE)

regularly deploys the model of the universe as an artefact, A noteworthy part of

plants

from

universe,

the

planets on through naturally evolved systems,

If the whole arrangement Is an artefact,

contrasts with artefacts.

'artefact'

has

been

and

Its

contexts,

etc.,

and

to lose both Its normal contrasts, place,

much stretched,

e.g.

of

then, firstly

tools applied by external living

external

creatures, and secondly, the relevant features are extremely well hidden.

In the

face of elaboration of these points the artefact claim Is eroded or weakened to-,

the

universe

like an artefact.

Is

like In having a maker.

Is usually meant,

'like'

some

are

There

It s as If It were an artefact, etc. And by

features

curious

about Wilkinson s argument In his

universe Is artefact'. The usual moves to the artefact model
the

Intelligibility

universe

the

of

e.g.

(thus

premissed

are

Heynell).

But

concentrates on the limits to human knowledge and the apparent extent
the

universe
product

on

Wilkinson

which

to

not Intelligible to us and may never be. Wilkinson however Is

Is

Idealism:

not arguing for design In the universe, but for a kind of
the

The

nature

as

of the human mind! The traditional case for design In the universe

Is strangely subverted Into an argument for Idealism.
God's. Everything Intended by

It Is

our

not

artefact,

tells against this: but redefinition Is

artefact

one order of the day In philosophical argument.

Consider first Mrs. four arguments, none decvscve, but all with
to

limits to knowledge, human limits

severe practical limits to
etc.

equipment,

ascertaining

larger

And

that

limits

1. Levels of detail. There are

Is.

very

the

also,

appeal,

such

Size

small.

as

and

spaceship

cost

earth,

of

men s

lifetimes, etc. (One experiment-careers).

2.

forces?

Variety
The

(and

number) of forces. How many

(1)

Ignorance

lead us Into

l>

super-weak ,

««

super-strong

”

Issue of completeness Is serious here (as with Kant s philosophy).

As with forces, so with objects,
NB.

It

major

laws, etc.

of an (undiscovered) moderating or compensating force could

about

error

features

world,

of

e.g.

Into

postulating

granularity of space and time.

(2)

Classlf Icatlon

of

forces

In

sort of periodic table, and then deeper

explanation.
3.

Limits to human conception? Macro-objects of our dimensions can have no

conceptions of very small (micro seconds)

Involves

a

slide

from

or

very

no real personal experience

large.

to

No??

The

argument

no Imagination of

to

no conception of . Argues for limits to conception In both tIme and space. Goes
on to suggest limits to

description

using

everyday

-1-

household

language,

but

the

argument

Is bad:

It depends on standard (Copenhagen) quantum theory.

Ideas

that limits of' conception tied to limits of language.

4-. Human nature and Its essential prejudice-,

limits to what we are prepared

to accept or understand. Set of prejudices, etc., e.g. prejudices In

of

favour

numbers (In a fuaay world). Our constitution prevents understanding of world.

Wilkinson's further argument Is that In view of limits we humans cannot but

value

to

resort

'in reaching his judgements as to how the natural world Is

-

constructed, man cannot ultimately do more than say

this Is how It has to be

(p.96). Value ImposItIon,

has to be',

lie know that whether or

[whether

'should be',

quarks

No,

(p.98):

Is

here

like Leslie?
not

we

This Is how It

get

can

good'

feel

at

quarks

we shall continue to talk about them and discuss their

exist]

(p.97). Nature Is going to be what the mind

anatomy and domestic economy
It

me

this makes

the

same

makes

of [our] theory with the thing

confusion

theorised that pervades Idealistic approaches.

Wilkinson

also

to

wants

(as above and especially from orthodox

proceed

quantum theory) to reject any theme

of

the

closure

of

nature

to

mind.

He

contends (p.80) that objectivity - looking at nature from outside - dissolves to

be replaced by something Involving man essentially. The natural world depends on

man for Its definition: hence the universe as an artefact. But this Is In no way
established. The argument depends on the fallacy of

of

theory

nature

again,

find

nature

equating

with

the

It makes the erroneous assumption that the only

criteria for theory selection are at bottom those of value or feeling.

R question Wilkinson suggests, but sets aside (In the too-hard basket) Is:

How It Is that we manage to understand the universe, or

It s

e.g.

the

much

of

It?

mostly good luck. Historically rather different answers were favoured,
universe

Intelligible,

Is

natural,

the

world

Is

Intelligible.

It's

Since

sufficiently Intelligent creatures can come to understand It. The

Intelligibility theme Is not lacking for exponents. Here,

In

summary.

Is

Heynell argues for and applies It:

R.

If

the

It would not be that we can In

world were not Intelligible,

principle come to know. But the

world

Is

that

which

we

can

In

principle come to know.
Therefore the world Is Intelligible.

B.

If

Very

like: We don't; or, So far as we

different repsonses quickly suggest themselves,

do

so

there

were not something analogous to human Intelligence In the

constitution of the world? the world would not be Intelligible.

Therefore there Is something analogous to human Intelligence In
constitution of the world (68).

-2-

the

how

The

preMiss

first

of

B is flat out false, but present concern is with fl. The

Minor preMiss of fl is false, by virtue of llMltatlon arguments such as those
Wilkinson

and

elsewhere

take an analytical shape is
suffIclently

(e.g.

a

of

Routley). find the Major preMiss, though it can
distortion.

For

Instance,

the

world

May

be

intelligible for us to come to understand what we do of It without

being completely intelligible.

-3-

f~. i— i— i— r—i f— k i
r^. ez. r- ez. r*--. ez. i -i

H. fl e g n e 11,

London,

The

Intelligible

Universe

r— «~-

ez.

-

-=•

A cosMologlcal arguwent , flacwll I an,

1982.

D.H. Ullklnson,

The universe as an artefact

Models and Han, Clarendon, Oxford,

In

H.

1976, 88-98.

-4-

Harris

(ed. )

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