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Handwritten annotation on page 1: War & Peace III.","Note, one of four papers digitised from item 680.","Richard Sylvan","The University of Queensland's Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291, Box 59, Item 680","Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy",,"This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, Dr. N.A.J. Taylor.","For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library.",,"[43] leaves. 25.63 MB. ",,Manuscript,"https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:23d96cf","Como - Cupboard - Pile 3","AUSTRALIA’S DEFENCE PHILOSOPHY: Further investigations of the nonexistent. ‘The opinions of philosophers, with regard to the conditions of the possibility of a public peace, shall be taken into consideration by states armed for war’ (Kant, ‘A [the only!] secret article for perpetual peace’, p.158 - a surprising article, flattering no doubt to philosophers, but neglecting their dominant bellicose tradition). A defence philosophy is much more than a defence policy, just as a philosophy of technology comprises much more than a technology policy. A policy can be given merely by a list of directives as to what do in various circumstances; even at its best it need only involve practical wisdom. By contrast, a philosophy goes deeper and requires theoretical wisdom, integration of the policy into a theoretical setting, which looks, among other things, at the central arguments and key concepts involved: here, security, stability, control, protection, defence, interests, national interests, intelligence, war, etc. Defence philosophy is thus a branch of political and social philosophy, and has long been treated as such, though under such more familiar and honest headings as “of war” and “of peace”. Like most parts of philosophy, it can be applied, for instance in shaping policies, in regional ways among others. A defence philosophy should integrate appropriate defence arrangements and approaches to war and peace, not merely or superficially into “foreign policy” or assumed “international relations”, but into the way and intended way of life of a country, both into on-going culture and into the intended or planned cultural arrangements. A defence policy typically takes prevailing socio-political arrangements and power structures for granted; a defence philosophy again penetrates deeper, questioning or rejecting features of these structures, enquiring as to the merits of things and institutions of which defence is planned, asking what sort of society should be defended by what sort of appropriate methods and at what lengths. What, for instance, is Australia, what are Australians, defending, concerned to defend, aiming to defend? Here in Australia? In the region? Abroad? How much of what others have, or what we have, is worth defending, preserving? Does Randwick Racecourse, or Pine Gap, merit defending? Would anyone stage a last stand for Oaks Estate, one of Canberra’s dreariest suburbs? If the Indonesians made a lightning strike in Australia just to remove Bjelke-Petersen,1 should we resist? Few of the necessary prerequisites have been adequately thought about in Australia, where unplanned muddling through from immediate problem to immediate problem - reactive contingency “planning”, if you want to be generous - is the main style of political life , and, along with the traditional political game of “follow the leader”, of defence planning. Australia 2 does not yet have a defence philosophy. Some of its critical philosophers could help to supply it with the rudiments of one or more, and to inject some depth into broader defence theorizing. What follows is intended as a modest beginning: much of what is attempted, unearthing arguments and assumptions, followed by analysis and criticism, and some elaboration of alternative principles, falls squarely within the domains both of applied philosophy and traditional philosophical practice. 1. Australia’s inappropriate. defence “policy”: incoherent, obsolescent Australia seems to lack even a clear and coherent defence policy. American, This is a commonplace charge (made even by friends of Defence, interested in obtaining extra public funding for defence and elements of C3I).^ The reasons concern not merely the major unsolved issues of exactly what is being defended, what things and objects and what interests, and whose, what freedoms and values, and what role American defence facilities in Australia are supposed to have in this. They concern the status of present treaty arrangements, such as the “cornerstone”/“millstone” ANZUS treaty, signed between Australia, New Zealand and the US, now in disarray (still ’‘maintained” by New Zealand, whom the US has unilaterally announced expelled), and of subsequent associated memoranda of understanding (some secret, involving the local storage of US nuclear weapons, entry of American personnel, etc.). They also concern a range of more detailed lucunae such as: lack of clearly-defined priorities on what needs defending and how it is to be accomplished; doubtful capacity of present defence forces to handle low-level contingencies in and to the north of Australia and in maritime zones; and unsatisfactory (or no) arrangements and planning for “defence-in-depth”, for civil defence and use of civil infrastructure, mobilisation, wartime administration, protection of key facilities and areas, and post-nuclear organization. And, equally damaging, if its policy makers do have a coherent policy it is nowhere satisfactorily revealed to the peoples of Australia.It is left to journalists and newspaper­ watching academics to winkle out what local defence installations may be for and to make various conjectures as to what the policy may be. Of course there are many administrators and policy makers who think that is the way it should be; the public should not be informed, but kept satisfied with some “generalised” statements.As to coherence, Australian policy makers have only recently found out that Australia has a (purely) regional defence role, not a global one. This they were told by the Americans in Washington in talks allegedly designed to clarify commitments under treaty arrangements with the USA. It thus begins to look as if Australia’s defence policy, such as it is, is still as much determined abroad, by US policy makers, as it is locally in Australia. 3 Much circumstantial evidence can be assembled to confirm the claim that Australia’s vague defence policy can now be stamped Made in USA, as it used, before the last World War (and British abandonment), to be stamped Made in UK. For one thing, Australia has had a bipartisan defence policy, so it is claimed. That “policy” has however been essentially shaped by the Liberal party, which has governed most of the time (as senior partner in a coalition). But the Liberal party simply took over US arrangements for Australia (as planned in Washington for ANZUS) and still does. For instance, the latest package® from the Liberal Party “Defence and Foreign Policy Unit” consists largely of US Defence Department material packaged under a local cover. The Strategic Basis Papers, endorsed by the Labor Government, give virtually unqualified support to US military practices and to the American view of the global strategic situation, and commit Australia to supporting, without any due reservation, American positions in world forums.' The same dependent-policy conclusion can be reached by more devious arguments. regional defence role? When, for example, did Australia find out it had a After the Americans had found that they could no longer afford to police the world on their own and would have to delegate some of that role and offload some of the heavy associated costs, on reliable dogs-bodies; and also after Labor took some faltering steps towards developing a broader foreign more independent policy with some indigenous elements (Australian Minister Hayden was promptly flattened by US heavies such as Schultz). Australian defence and foreign policy copies American policy in main respects, but lags it. The Australian defence policy presented by the Labor government, to the extend that it is visible, is conservative; it coincides with older American defence policy, and diverges from the new (post-Reagan) American war policy. For Australian Labor defence policy supports what the American administration supposedly used to support, namely DI. Multilateral nuclear disarmament (within the framework of series of treaties and agreements), and D2. Deterrence in the interim, deterrence through mutual assured destruction (i.e. MAD). The presence of American military facilities in Australia is supposed to be justified in the framework of these assumptions. For they are to assist in making deterrence under D2 effective, and to provide verification for the arms reduction arrangements under DI (both stabilizing functions). There is much evidence indicating however that American policy makers have now abandoned both Dl and D2 and any serious attempts at nuclear arms control8. Certainly they have moved on to the following highly destabilizing doctrines: Nuclear war-fighting, Limited nuclear wars, and Star-Wars (i.e. Strategic Defense Initiative). While this American war policy may well be accepted by the next Liberal coalition government, all of these military doctrines are explicitly rejected by the 1985 Labor government. Since the American “joint” facilities in Australia also facilitate the rejected 4 objectives, the problems concerning these dubious facilities are much aggravated. The Government’s approach concerning them - withholding information concerning the full range of their functions, and particularly their war-fighting roles from parliament and the public - is certainly unsatisfactory, as several of its members realise; and as a result the Government appear in not atypical disarray, further grist for the incoherence theme. If there is perhaps a coherent Australian global defence approach somewhere away from public exposure, it is most likely then an old abandoned American policy.9 But in that case it certainly lacks - what it in any case appears to lack - justification. For Australia, in supporting US defence policy and activity, for instance in world forums, is supporting present offensive American policy, not what it reputedly adheres to, deterrence (through MAD). The point holds good whether or not American global policy still includes such deterrence as a proper part10; for it certainly involves other very different and dubious strategies. The commonplace, but increasingly feeble, justification given for Australian’s tagging along after America is that Australian interests are the same as American11. American interests by no means coincide with Australian . However Consider, for instance, such matters as enriching Americans, making conditions favourable for American business, promoting Americans and things American. Consider, differently, American practices in Latin America, from undercutting Allende’s government in Chile to its practices against Nicaragua, to its extensive export of arms and violent methods, there and elsewhere in the world. Thus America, like Russia, is busy meddling in Africa, but ‘Australian security interests are not directly involved’ (SB, p.24). Consider, differently again, escalation of the nuclear arms race. Or consider American strategic planning, and all the game- and decision- theoretic models which concern just USA and its adversary USSR, perhaps occasionally adding Europe as part of the monolithic West, but rarely or never considering the Southern Hemisphere - so that either Australia is part of America as Poland may be of Russia or it is nothing. Or consider American interests not merely in Soviet and communist containment, but in containing socialism such as might (under more auspicious conditions) flourish in Australia. An American policy answering to American interests is accordingly inappropriate for Australia, inappropriate for Antipodean socialism. Australians should do their own defence thinking and work out a policy appropriate for Australia. (That applies also to Australian political representatives, who should stop parroting implausible American views and begin developing some genuinely local and original ones.) Should Australia be tagging along after the Americans in support of installation of their style of free-enterprise capitalism everywhere feasible (i.e. that the state socialists don’t already heavily control)? What they quite seriously call ‘keeping the free world free’? Of 5 course freedom has, in this sort of context, multiple meanings and associations (as well as multiple inconsistencies, appearing information” and the like). overtly in subsidized “free trade”, selective “free Significant parts of what mainstream American culture admits under the freedom umbrella, mainstream Australian culture would exclude: for instance, active opposition to and undermining of social and socialist programs and governments, bullying of small countries that impose barriers to US business or military practices (all part of “free enterprise”), etc. What of those intangible freedoms the cultures supposedly agree about, civil liberties, freedom to information, to live and work where one chooses, to travel, and so on? These are certainly important freedoms, better upheld in some parts of the unaligned West (e.g. Sweden, Switzerland) than in most parts of the Eastern Block. But such freedoms, which run counter to dependent policies, hardly require defence subservience. influenced state practices are fast reducing freedom. Moreover, military- Many of the older freedoms have vanished this century, such as freedom to travel, to work and live abroad, etc.; now one requires permits, licences, passports, ... . And many more former freedoms are being or have been eroded; soon it will be identity documents, restricted zones, ID cards, as already in parts of the “free West”. Now nuclearism in Europe ‘is devouring the very freedom it is said to protect: [the Greens] point to the new laws proposed in 1983 designed to keep citizens from assembling to protest deployment of the Pershing II and cruise missiles’ (Capra and Spretnak, pp.58-9). Further structural changes required for the security of the state, imcompatible with democratic freedoms, include ‘secrecy, lack of commentability, permanent emergency, concentration of authority, peacetime militarism, extensive apparatus of state intelligence and police’ (Falk, in Feith p.24). Nuclearism is not a smart strategy to preserve remaining freedoms. 2. Inherited other-reliance, and the populist and elitist cases for patronage and subservience. Australia’s defence policy, such as it is, is furthermore inherited rather than regularly (re)thought through. But that procedure - essentially the legal method of precedence, whatever its very limited satisfactoriness in legalistic decision making - is defective when applied in politics or to defence, especially where immediate independent action is required. For precedence methods are extraordinarily slow, as well as characteristically conservative, and as in defence exclude significant and rather urgent alternatives. The unsatisfactory decision-making practices to be revealed in the case of defence are by no means restricted to defence but are typical of the kind of advanced age capitalism Australia operates under, or rather labours under, down under. In setting down those 4. 6 features of aged capitalism (‘of the Corporate State') that the New Left and Alternative Australia movements were reacting against, Cock neatly summed up these practices: Decisions were made from the top and on the basis of vested political interests, rather than by rational goals and means that served public interests. The people were rarely consulted effectively before a decision and often only partially informed afterwards. Planning was based on a mere extension of the present. ... activists felt they were given little opportunity to choose how they lived or worked. The availability of space, time, trees and air was also determined by others ... (p.18 italics added).14 As it was and is with one’s defence, military and civil, so it is with the matter of whether one lives in a nuclear target zone or not, and so on (though immigration policy, uranium and woodchip export policies, etc.) In these areas planning remains top-down, with at best consultative elements. No real choices are offered to people. A major inherited assumption is that of other reliance, that Australia’s defence depends on other more powerful allies. That ally was firstly Britain, and since World War II America; but in any event the assumption is that to be safe Australia needs a powerful patron, a protector. A corollary is that Australia adopts a suitably submissive relation to its patron, making expected concessions. And for the most part it has; however such a defence insurance policy does not come cheap.15 It costs not only money and resources, but quality of life, freedom and independence. The assumption of other-reliance is however unsound, for several reasons. Most important, it characteristically depends upon the following themes, all of which lack solid foundation: 1. Australia is threatened - or at least 1A. Australia is likely to be threatened in the near future. 2. Australia cannot defend itself. 3. Australia can however depend upon its patron (or ally), i.e. upon the USA. These three themes in fact make up what has been called the populist case for the ANZUS alliance.16 It is very different from the elitist case for ANZUS, said to hold sway with the Australian government, which, while insisting upon premiss 3, essentially rejects 1 and 2 and claims instead 4. Australian has a vital interest in global stability. 5. Global stability is under threat (constantly) by an expansionist Soviet Union. 6. Only USA can contain the Soviet threat and hold the global balance. Some of techniques the US deploys for holding global balance operate through dependent states and a network of alliances like ANZUS. But obviously further premisses are required to reach the intended conclusions that Australia should be participating in any such alliance, and what is more, hosting US defence facilities and exercises. A first such premise is the no-shirking theme, that Australia should be contributing its part to “holding the balance’’ (cf. Bell). Even this first further step is pretty shaky; as we shall see, one shaky step in a rather ramshackle case, since premisses 5 and 6 are decidedly dubious (and 4 may involve equivocation). For it can be plausibly argued that Australia’s vital interests are not guaranteed by US techniques, which threaten to upset the whole applecart, and can be obtained by alternative more satisfactory means outside of such soft alliances as ANZUS. In any case, it is unclear that local contributions enhance global (nuclear) stability (see e.g. Mack and Davidson). But first, there is more pernicious regionalist version of the elitist position to be considered, what might be called the offshore elitist position. This position grants 2A*. Australia can defend itself against regional threats, and can look after itself regionally. But it does not (as indeed other qualified elitist positions may not) grant 1A. What the offshore position insists upon is 1AI*. Australia’s interests could be threatened in the near future. Since these interests - perhaps concerned with trade, Australian companies or Australians abroad, or whatever - may have little or nothing to do with internal Australian security, this premiss represents an extremely important shift (a shift not unrelated to the inverse bureaucratic shift from war to defence). It goes further than what has been called forward defence. In extended form the offshore position does call for some sort of global policeman or police force ready to intervene whenever a “free port” anywhere looks like closing its doors. Part of the difficulty in getting to grips with the elitist position is that it tends to slide through to the offshore position (by way of now evident immediate positions). The arguments against both the populist and elitist cases, and indeed against virtually all of themes 1 through 7 are sufficiently familiar to justify but a fairly brief outline of some of the main points involved. Of course just a couple of defections from themes 1 through 7 would serve logically defeat both cases, but there have been some interesting repair attempts, designed to float the arguments on diminished premisses. 3. The brief against the popular populist case; the need for new directions. Contra 1 and 1A. While Australia is not at present under notice of threat, veiled threat or harassment from abroad, a majority of its population appears to believe that it is. As the popular view is not the informed, administrative, or parliamentary view, it is worth inquiring 8 why the popular view persists, as the opinion polls reveal it has. The populace has been deliberately kept in the dark (or even misinformed), because this suits bipartisan government purposes. Although both main Australian political parties are well enough aware that the main assumptions underlying the populist case are false, the reasons for which they support the American alliance (e.g. those of the elitist case) are much more difficult to sell to the public. Accordingly the parties and Government have no political interest in undermining the unsound populist case. In particular they have gone out of their way not to cast doubt upon the connected assumption that US is a reliable guarantor against all threats. Thus long-standing Australian psychological insecurity about security has been allowed to stand, and has not been assuaged by any requisite informational and educational effort. In particular, older attitudes to Asia persist not far below the surface of popular Australia: fear, mistrust and xenophobia, patched over by a pragmatic attachment to trade and tourism. This misplaced insecurity is fuelled by popular misconceptions of Australia and its place in the world: metaphorically, that Australia is a luscious plum ripe for Eastern picking, instead of the Asians view that Australia, so far as they are aware of it at all, is a remote desiccated uncouth place perhaps good for some trade and investment. Or, to get towards more concrete assumptions, Australians apparently tend to their view country as affluent but underpopulated, resource rich but largely defenceless; yet not far to the north are Asian hordes who are impoverished, resource poor, and so on . Such a view is seriously out of touch with reality. Parts of Asia are now at least as affluent (on conventional economic indicators) as Australia. They do not see themselves as overpopulated, in a way that calls for mass exodus; and in those areas which are as overpopulated as Europe, such as Java, bribes and force are required to move people on transmigration programs to relatively unoccupied parts of the Indonesian empire. So far as they require them, they can purchase Australian resources - which are not unique - much more easily and cheaply (because they even carry significant local subsidies) than they could obtain • them by seizure. 1s For these sorts of reasons, and because Australia itself poses no threat, no other state has a genuine interest in attempting to invade Australia. As it is for interests, so it is for capabilities. No regional power has the capacity to launch a successful invasion of Australia, or is likely to have such a capacity in the near future. As the joint Parliamentary Committee concluded, Currently only the United States would have the physical capacity to launch a full scale invasion of Australia, and it clearly lacks any motive to do so (TAS, p.94). 9 As the report also stated, quoting Synnot (former Chief of Defence Staff), ... to raise the sort of force which would be required for a mass invasion of Australia could not possibly be done in under five years by other than the superpowers (TAS). But neither superpower is at all likely to expend effort or resources to such an end. An obvious naive question which at once arises is: Why bother then with much defence? (A later question to entertain is: why not be a free-rider on collectively provided global security, such as it is?) Why not proceed forthwith to unilateral disarmament? Mack for one, having reassembled the now-standard telling case that Australia is not threatened ‘now or for the foreseeable future’, and so having broken the populist argument, is confronted by the awkward option of unilateral disarmament for Australia. He stages a hasty retreat, points to the dependence of premisses 1 and 1A on premiss 2, and proceeds to claim that ‘the populist case for ANZUS is sustained’ even without premisses 1 and 1A. It is however a decidedly problematic retreat. While it is true that the arguments against 1 and 1A may sometimes take it for granted that Australia can look after itself to some extend, put up some resistance, it is far from clear that they depend essentially on assumptions approximating premiss 2. Consider the no­ interests argument, which appears decisive given the (estimated) very limited invasion capabilities of potential invaders. The main consideration adduced appears to depend in no essential way, indeed in no obvious way at all, on Australia’s dynamic fighting forces. Australian mineral resources, to repeat one of the more sensitive examples involved, can be obtained more readily and cheaply by trade methods than military ones. What all this seems to show is that a rather minimal streamlined force, if any, would presently meet Australia’s military requirements. It is not as if Australia is ‘entirely defenceless’ without a conventional military force, like a babe-in-arms. The whole apparatus of nonmilitary defence is available on a continent well suited to its use, though lacking a population trained in its techniques. But even without requisite popular training in defence methods, Australia would be a difficult place to govern, Australians a difficult lot to subjugate. It was such features of the Australian character that deterred the Japanese on a previous occasion “If the invasion is attempted, the Australians, in view of their national character, would resist to the end. Also, because the geographical conditions of Australia present numerous difficulties in a military sense, it is apparent that a military venture in that country would be a difficult one” (TAS, p.62). The points still hold good, and could be strengthened. There are several parts to any such 10 program of nonmilitary defence: making it happen, and putting it abroad (ideally with dinkum Australian exaggeration) that it has happened. To the issue of alternative defence we are bound to return. For now, when Australia is not threatened, is a good occasion to reconsider, and begin to adapt, defence arrangements. For example, it looks very much as if enormous sums, which could be valuably directed elsewhere, are being spent, largely to make many Australians feel secure.But a much more effective and inexpensive way to such results would be through requisite popular education and psychological therapy - with, if it were well done, much more satisfactory results, a more secure and better informed people. Contra 2. As a result of post-War developments in weapons systems and C3I capabilities, the military defence of Australia has become much easier. It comes down to enhancing, through new robust and reliable systems, the enormous strategic advantages Australia enjoys by virtue of geographical isolation. In principle, any maritime invading force can now be detected well in advance of arrival, through modern radar warning systems, and destroyed by precision guided munitions. And any invaders that did manage to gain a foothold on Australian soil would face severe logistic problems, and be subject to disproportionate responses from local defence. Standard discussions (as in Dibb, Mack) proceed to introduce a great deal of “Boys’ Own War Games” stuff concerning contemporary weapon and C3I systems; the essential point is that these could serve to turn Australia into a pretty unvulnerable armed fortress, and into an extremely difficult territory were the oceanic moat crossed and the fortress entered (see especially D. Martin). Under such armed neutrality and (differently) fortified Australia defence scenarios, even invasion from outside the region by an inimical world power could be resisted with reasonable prospect of success. There is no power at all likely to mount such an invasion; there is apparently (as noted above) only one power that could, that good ally the USA (reckoned however a likely invader by 6-7% of the Australian population!). Nonetheless the threat of a Soviet invasion is taken seriously not only by the larger populace but by committees of their elected representatives. But the Soviet military has never undertaken such a long-range massive force projection, is ill-equipped to do so, and lacks any plausible reason to try such a stunt (for details see, e.g., D. Martin; also SS, ST). The only credible Soviet threat to Australia is in the context of a superpower war, when American facilities in Australia and perhaps Australian cities, would be struck at by intercontinental missiles. While this would be bad enough, it is highly unlikely that it would be followed or accompanied by an invasion. Soviet forces are once again not sufficient, and not thought sufficient by the Soviets for that sort of diversion; they would be required elsewhere in a superpower war; and they would be devastated, unless USA is militarily even more incompetent than sometimes depicted. i. 11 Contra 3. What will be argued is not the negation of 3, that the Americans cannot be relied upon, but rather that 3 is dubious, and that it would be rash to place excess reliance on American protection. That being so, and other patrons being even less promising, Australia should look more to its own resources, as the American administration is kindly advising. Especially since the American “Vietnam debacle” and the fall of Saigon, things have changed in important ways which cast doubt on the reliability of American patronage. First, the relative economic and military strength of the USA has declined significantly. It no longer has such a large share of world product(ivity); as a connected matter of policy, US world warfighting aspirations have been reduced. Its ability to act as, and afford to be, global policeman has also markedly declined/ Secondly, the willingness of Americans to engage in remote foreign wars has correspondingly tumbled. Although the American administration includes more than enough hawks, to be sure, the people and Congress are not longer in a mood for gratuitous foreign adventures, especially when the fun may not appear to be in American interests. Since Vietnam, US opinion polls regularly show strong popular opposition to overseas military involvement. This “Vietnam syndrome” has served as a major constraint on US military policy and foreign involvement. An important manifestation of these changes is the Guam Doctrine, calling upon US regional allies to take primary responsibility for their own defence in regional conflicts. Another important outcome is Defense statements to the pointed effect that before US troops are committed abroad there must be reasonable assurance of Congressional and popular support (Weinberger, reported in PC p.14). As Mack comments, ‘such assurance is impossible to guarantee - especially for remote countries where no US vital national interests are at stake’. Certainly no more is assured under the ANZUS treaty which provides only that each signatory ‘act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes’ (article 4). All the treaty strictly requires is consultation; there is no undertaking or commitment. Isn’t the treaty backed up by informal verbal reassurances? None that are not undermined by others, in American administrative multiple-speak. Even the elite view is that Australia has to ‘work ... to maximize the prospect of US support’ and that the Americans cannot be counted upon. For ‘the threshold of direct US combat involvement could be quite high, and circumstances at the time could significantly limit US willingness or ability to help Australia in other ways?. ‘... we cannot rely upon US support in a defence emergency arising within our own neighbourhood’ (SB, pp.29-30). However a special case has been made for American reliability in Australia’s case - as 12 opposed to examples of American abandonment of earlier military undertakings (in Vietnam, Cambodia, Iran) - on the basis of permanent friendship, common interests, and shared values and democratic traditions. There are two difficulties with this type of special pleading: first, as to the basis, and, second, as to the adequacy of such a basis in by-passing Congress, the American people, and slow constitutional processes. Historical evidence hardly sustains the adequacy of the basis in analogous cases. And here, as already indicated, the basis is shaky. For there is not a common culture shared by Australia and America: rather values diverge significantly on quite crucial issues. Even less are interests always common, as the matter of subsidised agricultural produce reveals, and as missile testing and nuclear ships issues in the South Pacific have recently confirmed. Interests diverged, for instance, when Australia toyed with opposing Indonesia’s claim to West Papua. So it is dubious at least that American interests would coincide with Australian in disputes or confrontation with Asian nations to the North, e.g. with Indonesia or Japan. Of course if the special case argument did hold water, Australia and America really were mates, then the treaty would be otiose. There was in fact no treaty in operation in 1942; but by then American interests in countering the Japanese were independently aroused. 4. Other-reliance and regional self-reliance A major problem with other-reliance for defence is then that it cannot be deemed entirely reliable, yet precisely here unreliability can hardly be tolerated. When the Indonesians are rolling into Brisbane it won’t do for Defense to call up with a message like that from local Services, ""We can’t get there till tomorrow’’, or “until after Congress meets”, or “Sorry, Mate!”. More seriously, handing defence over to others means handing control of our lives over to others; and given nuclear defence, which too many Antipodean administrations have opted for, it quite likely means literally handing our lives over for many of us. Another problem of other-reliance is thus its adequacy. A further problem is its cost. In principle, if a State hires out its defence it would no doubt look, other things being equal, for the cheaper bidder - if, that is, defence is a commodity of a sort, like national shipping, meterological services, etc. The trouble with global defence is that the market is monopolistic, with currently only one supplier of the right complexion22, who accordingly can exact a very high price, and has - making the whole country a nuclear target and demanding substantial subservience. Similar points make part of the case, well-enough appreciated, for not trying to press defence, plainly a collective good, into a marketable commodity. When a country can supply its own defence, it therefore makes very good sense for it to do so, since it normally has a stronger interest in its own proper defence than most other parties. Should it also be cheaper in costs that matter, then self-reliance not just makes good sense but pays; other-reliance does not. But in that event, it surely does not need nuclear 13 patrons, or to farm out some of its defence. Such self-reliance undermines an important part of the older case based on other-reliance for alliances such as ANZUS. However newer bipartisan approaches to defence try to combine them (thus e.g. Australian minister Beazley as reported by Davidson) - approaches which thus begin to empty ANZUS of what little content it had, and remove much of the apparent point of such older alliances. Since the ANZUS arrangements contain no clear commitments beyond consultation but are merely vague articles of understanding, a simple course is of course to allow them to be emptied of content, so that the alliance, an expensive and outdated “insurance” policy, dies a natural death. It may however be death by seizure or convulsion should American defence facilities be closed or internationalised and passage of American nuclear equipped or powered transport be excluded from Australia. That would no doubt sacrifice the deterrence and other advantages the treaty supposedly affords , while making way for the greater advantages of friendly nonalignment, of no longer being a nuclear target, or so on. But self-reliance pure and simple is insufficient. The world does not consist of separable isolated pieces, as becomes increasingly evident. Most dramatically, Australia will not escape the effects of nuclear winter. The picture is much the same as for other dynamic subjects, such as plants which are not internally self-sufficient but depend crucially on their environment - and indeed as for States themselves. The question then is what form the additional holistic component of policy should take? Put this way, it is almost obvious that the appropriate move is not taking sides (as in a kids’ war game or tug-of-war game that is already set up) and doing one’s bit for confrontation. For that will not contribute to stability, to a proper holistic approach, but rather to sectionalism and fragmentation, and to bringing nuclear winter closer. Other-reliance and self-reliance typically present a false contrast, and certainly do with pure self-reliance - a false contrast like that of holism and partism (EE, p.223), and of dependence versus isolationism. In between lie a range of positions, one of which - favoured by a long line of peacefully-disposed philosophers from Rousseau and Kant onwards - might be called integrated reliance or federated reliance. The elitist case, insofar as it were to call for such reliance (e.g. in assumption 4), could hardly be faulted. But it doesn’t; and is satisfied with much less. Integration may reach only certain inadequate levels, the level of modern alliances and alignment, which are essentially coupled with opposition to an other side, e.g. the monolithic East (or West). It is into just this trap that elitist arguments fall. 14 5. The decline and fall of elitist arguments. Premisses 4 and 5 of the elitist argument turn around the crucial notion of stability, as related arguments revolve around that of security. But stability and security are value-laden terms, which are not cultural invariants. What stability comprehends in American administrative perception is very different from what highland villages take it to include. In each case a system is stable if it returns to a given stationary state under perturbations of sufficiently small magnitude. But both the relevant states and the stationary among them are relative to given frames of reference; for instance, what is stable at a macrolevel may well not be at a microlevel. As Trudeau has said of the superpowers, ‘they share a global perception according to which even remote events can threaten their interests or their associates’ (p.10) and disturb stability. But lesser states or regional people, not counting remote business or military interests as relevant, report no instability. Bureaucrats invariably view bombs as necessary to stability, and the nuclear fix as stability; by contrast, gentle people increasingly see bombs as tools of terrorism and as characteristically antithetical to peace. ad 4: Of course Australia has a vital interest in global stability and security: what sizeable nation does not? But the determinable motherhood interpretation (of italicised terms), while no doubt diplomatically convenient, conceals crucial differences, highly material to the argument. For one global stability means something different in USA from what it means in Costa Rica and likely what it intends in Australia. Certainly vital interests are different. America is interested in containing socialism (in Australia as elsewhere), and it tends, in more popular rhetoric at least, to equate containing socialism with containing communism and both with Soviet containment. A continental swing to socialism (or Non-Soviet communism) in Latin America, or in Africa, would upset global stability, on American perception, and would indeed have significant effects on US business or investment; but it would not on its own upset or affect most Australians or directly threaten Antipodean stability, and it certainly need not affect nuclear stability. Australians generally are not opposed in principle to socialism or notably interested in containing its spread (indeed perhaps the opposite). Australia is not interested in (and oughtn’t to be charmed by the idea of) defence of the (American) “free enterprise” system, or in the defence of uglier forms of capitalism wherever they are presently initiated or opposed (cf. Chomsky and Herman). Contra 5. It can be conceded, without granting the main thrust of the premiss, that the Soviets are expansionistic, at least in that they are interested in extending their influence where they can. So also are most empires, including American and Indonesian (so for that matter are many academics and most sales-people). But the Soviets have an ideological 15 message to spread, Marxism-Leninism, an ideology they used to anticipate being installed everywhere. But the Americans also have a message, a capitalist message, Free Enterprise Inc, which they are working to sell pretty much everywhere accessible to them. And they need to be expansionistic to have it adopted, whereas the Russians and Chinese need simply wait for history to take its allegedly determined course (though a little assistance - reflecting legitimate doubt about this determinism? - would surely spread their disconcertingly different forms of “progress” without interfering). But surely the Russian message is pernicious? All these messages are pernicious (for familiar reasons: see e.g. Erlich). The proper question is whether on its own Soviet international activity threatens, in some damaging way, global stability. Undoubtedly Soviet-American confrontation, as in the Cuban missile affair, does threaten global stability; though not in a way that has any bearing on Australian defence. In fact no Russian expansionary tendency, military or otherwise, has an untoward direct effect on Australia, little of significance reaches into the Antipodes (see Dibb SS). So what is the local excitement about? In large measure the excitement has been drummed up by the political right, East European expatriates, and pork-barrelling politicians. The effect of Soviet expansionism is much exaggerated and overexploited (Mack ST). Viewed from the Antipodes it is hardly a problem, unless the Soviets should get locked into military confrontation with USA - a real problem to be addressed. With that problem however, the Antipodes can better assist as part of a third nonaligned group which helps to referee and to prize apart the heavies, not by seconding and inciting the USA. But confrontation apart, Soviet internationalism, hardly a great success story, does not seriously disturb global stability, as seen from Australia. For a proper assessment of Soviet internationalism, types of expansion should be distinguished - military, potential military, influence with military access, and mere influence. In actual military expansion and involvement since W’orld War II, the Russian record is hardly striking by comparison with the USA or several other states. The one conspicuous case involving control of new territory, that of Afghanistan, has actually had little effect on global stability. The usual Western apprehension concerns not anything the Soviets have accomplished, but what they might attempt militarily, especially in Europe. But the idea of Soviet military adventure in Europe is a Western invention and bogey, lacking in plausibility. The Soviet military lacks the force ratio needed to be assured of military success in Europe, both by their own standards of what is required and by Western strategic standards. And the Soviets have no good reasons or interests in undertaking such an exercise which would draw them into nuclear war. They already face enough economic difficulties and troubles with East European client states which they cannot control satisfactorily. 16 The extension of Soviet influence has largely been in the Third world. But it has hardly been successful, with as many failures and losses to record as Soviet “gains” - gains which add to the imperial burden since they involve countries wracked with problems, such as Vietnam. The Third World exercises are marred by Soviet inaptitude and limited by the state of their own economy. They scarcely displace the global structure enough to test its stability; and they produce no shock waves or even significant ripples in the Antipodes. Contra 6. The main current threat to world stability appears to come not from one of the dancers in the East-West dance of death, but from the escalating confrontation, easily ignited, between the lead dancers. With this US policies and practices have at least as much to do as USSR ones. Recent US practices are more destabilizing than Soviet ones, and indeed highly destabilising, because of new weapons and weapons systems, because of rejection of arms control and Soviet proposals, and because of “star wars” preparation which both accelerates the arms race on earth and begins a new one in space. A vast increase in tension and suspicion accompanies the “arms race” which is in large measure due to US intransigence and US war-fighting doctrines, new weapons systems, with built-in incentives for pre-emption, and deliberate abandonment of arms control (see PR). Such considerations, duly assembled, demolish the received (but nonetheless crazy) theme that an alliance or alignment with USA helps increase stability. American practices are to be resisted as much as Soviet. 6. The East-West balance argument: American alignment versus friendly independence The need for Australian alignment with the USA is supposed to be shown by the East-West This politically-important balance argument, which shares key premisses nr with the related elitist argument, runs as follows : balance argument. 7. Global stability is the key to world peace. 8. Stability of the international order is a matter of maintaining a global balance. But 5. The global balance is constantly threatened by an expansionist USSR. 6A. The threat is [only] checked by the USA, which (6A.1) guarantees an open and pluralistic international order. 9. Australia’s primary security concern, indeed most vital interest, is this stability. Hence 10. Australia’s role is to help America maintain the balance. The rest of Australia’s intervolvement with American military arrangements is then taken to follow. But there are many reasons for halting the argument before it reaches this stage of practical (and allegedly moral) detail. The balance argument assumes much that has already been rebutted, for instance that the Soviet threat thesis is correct (i.e. 5) and that US 17 policy is stabilizing (part of 6A). It also takes for granted, what now is at least in serious doubt, that American policy is directed at balance and deterrence, rather than what the American administration appears to be aiming at, superiority. But in that event, Australia is not really engaged in some longer term balancing feat, so much as in helping USA prevail in nuclear race, contradicting the goal of world peace of premiss 7. Contra 10. and its derivation. The derivation is inadequate: it does not follow that Australia’s role is such a lackey’s one. If the balance of strength is leaning in America’s direction, as most less-biassed evidence indicates, then Australia should surely be throwing its slight weight in with the Eastern team (that is what such images as the balanced tug-of-war would suggest). Presumably premiss 6A.1 is designed to exclude this deplorable thought, of Australia teaming up with totalitarians. Nevertheless Australia should be putting its slight weight where it is effective, given its own broader objectives, interests, principles and supposedly pluralistic ideals. There are several different roles Australia could fulfil which would enable it to make a more satisfactory, less passive, contribution to world peace, among them de-escalation through active nonalignment, appropriate aid, and so forth. Thus 10 is hardly well-supported or evident. A more direct approach would be better than throwing Australian weight unreflectively on one side of the balance. As a little reflection attests, the balance image and argument point not in the direction intended, but towards nonalignment. Contra 6A (and 6). The theme that US maintains the balance, and hence preserves the peace, is of course false. For again, it takes two to tango. While it can be granted that the USA is interlocked with and checks the USSR in this munitions dance, the history of the dance reveals that the pace-escalation has flowed from the interaction of the one partner with the other. That is, but for the USA, the USA would not be required to check the USSR (the interaction is two-way as with Hegel’s famous master-slave relation). In any case, it looks as if, on a different historical trajectory, the main states of Western Europe could match the Soviet Union militarily (for they have comparable combined GNP, technological resources, etc.; cf. note 20) Thus it is doubtful that the current Soviet build-up, produced in interaction with the USA, could only be, or have been, checked by the US. ad 6A.1. As the premiss is only of marginal relevance to the argument, it is enough to observe that the international order the USA helps maintain leaves very much to be desired. In its intervention, militarily, economically and indirectly, USA has assisted substantially in reducing plurality and openness, is well as in establishing or propping up rotten regimes, etc. The negative side of American imperialism as well-enough documented, if not widely enough read or known by Americans themselves (cf. again Chomsky and Herman). Only under scandalously low redefinitions of ‘open’ and ‘pluralistic’ is the present “free” world order 18 either open or pluralistic. ad 8, and the damaging equivocation on ‘the balance’. While balance is one way of maintaining stability in the world arrangements that have presently come to pass, the balance structure can only carry so much loading. Add too much weight (of arms tension, and so forth) to both sides and the precarious structure will fail, probably catastrophically. increasing probability of catastrophic breakdown, for a variety of reasons The (accident, miscalculation, computer error, human interference, etc.), has been argued elsewhere (e.g. WPI). While a certain neither overloaded nor overstressed balance may serve for stability, the present increasingly stressed balance will probably not. The balance argument, however, neglects this dynamical situation, illegitimately switching from a (certain post) balance in premiss 8 to the (on-going) balance in subsequent premisses. The balance argument itself breaks down through equivocation. What the dynamic picture also indicates is the importance of removing some weight from the balance, most obviously by arms limitation and tension reduction. It points too to a different role for Australasia, to a less aligned position genuinely directed at stability. It is to the emerging case for a different role for Australia, and to action for achieving this different role, that the positive argument will now begin to swing. The inadequate East-West balance argument is typically combined with attacks upon proposals for a different role for Australia than American alliance and. service. effect of these additions is to generate extra confusion and dust. The main For the additions are inessential to the argument, and do not serve to repair it or reinforce it. For example, against nonalignment or neutralism is set the alleged pervasiveness of nuclear winter. We might as well be aligned (it’s good for trade and other economic perquisites), so it is sometimes argued from up top, because if the central balance fails we are all dead. This is a conspicuous nonsequitur^, worse than ex nihilo quodlibet (because it also suggests that balance is a prerequisite for stability). But, in the main, the attack is irrelevant, because the point of nonalignment is to help remove overload and to break down confrontation and its escalation to war; it is a thing to do now, be fore winter descends, to delay or halt its descent, and most important, to reduce its extent and severity. Australia’s weight may be slight, another irrelevant addition goes, but psychologically it is important for the West. Any further spread of the “Kiwi disease” (from New Zealand) would show the weakening of Western resolve, and give the green light for Soviet expansionism. Bell, a leading exponent of the balance argument, virtually gives the impression that if Australia dropped out of American alignment, the Russians would be on the road down through the isles to Australia tomorrow/ Much of this sort of rhetoric is reminiscent of the baseless fear-mongering of an earlier pre-Vietnam time. The Russians have no such military interests, or present capabilities. And if they were to gear up and set out, they would be met by substantial resistance along most of the route, resistance obtaining Western assistance. For America, for one, has major interests, different from Australia’s, in both Indonesia and the Philippines, as well as elsewhere in East Asia. The addition, so far from strengthening the argument, depends, in its “green light for expansion” comparison, on the previously faulted premiss 5 of Soviet expansionism. In fact most of the further case for American alignment of one sort or another - when it is argued-, often nonalignment and neutrality are simply denounced in good old-fashioned authoritarian style - turns upon already-faulted assumptions. Catley, for example, another exponent of “central balance”, presents the following ‘consideration’: ... whatever the Swedes or Swiss may think about the matter, Australia is locked by considerations of culture, economics, and political philosophy into the defence of the Western world. It has both an obligation and a duty to contribute its share to that defence if necessary by hosting facilities which cannot easily be located elsewhere (p.15). The premiss is false for reasons essentially indicated: and the premiss in no way sustains the conclusion, the argument involving among other things, the prescriptive (is-ought) fallacy. Consider the premiss. Australia is not, unless Catley has information withheld from most of the rest of us, locked into Western nuclear defence, but in principle independent and free to reconsider and rethink its options. (American use of the “facilities” is not irrevocable, and shortly comes up, in principle at least, for reconsideration.) How do culture, economics and political philosophy provide locks and chains for Australia but not for nonaligned Western European states? They do not: Australia is not a part of USA or altogether a client state; and the cultures, interests, economic frameworks and political philosophies of the two nations are significantly different (for details, see CPD). But even if the ideological frameworks were much more similar than they are, that would not entail similar defence practices (as, e.g., ANZUS in all its weakness shows), nor any such defence obligations. Most of the arguments against nonalignment are of Catley calibre - or worse. Fortunately, then, such arguments are examined in detail elsewhere, notably by D. Martin in his examination of counter-arguments to Australian armed neutrality, the legally-recognised non-belligerent form of nonalignment he favours. Virtually none of Martin’s counter-case depends for its success on features of neutrality, which is not advocated here. Virtually all of Martin’s argument is moreover couched in negative form; his positive brief is very brief. It 20 reduces to this: alignment or alliance with the USA 'cannot make us secure against such dangers as we may one day have to meet, while it needlessless exposes to other dangers, including nuclear war (p.l, italics added). While the message is correct enough, and in need of wide propagation, it does little on its own to support neutrality, and it by no means exhausts the positive case for weakening alignment. In particular, there are more positive arguments of much theoretical interest, to be drawn from systems theory and from the burgeoning theory of collective goods and action. 7. Contributions towards stability: free-riding, enlarging group size, and increasing variety. The strategic world situation we now confront can be viewed as a game with more than 100 players, counting in nation-states and leaving out (for convenience) major organisations such as the largest 100 transnational companies. These organisational players align themselves around two large poles, East and West, as indicated: NON-ALIGNED N N WEST EAST India NATO States Japan, Israel Sweden* Switzerland* NZUS: Australi I Ireland1* ^Most Latin ' American States I Tanzania Costa Rica** State capitalist Key: N: *: **: State communist Nuclear weapons states Neutral states Nonmilitary states There are various - a great many - games these state players are playing, some of which are practically important for peace and for stability. Some of these games, such as World Empire and Chicken (already played under one representation), are played essentially between the East-West superplayers. There are several problems about East-West games: for instance, what representation they have, the repeatability of the games (clearly some nuclear games 21 may, like Russian roulette, end after one round, as they will with the Big One), and the negative sum characters of some games. And the monolithic East/monolithic West dichotomy is misleading, and, as will appear, discards crucial detail (in the way simplifications may). So game-theoretical modelling will be approached differently and more obliquely. World Security, like regional and local security, is a collective good (technically, an item, quality unspecified, in joint supply and precluding exclusion). That is not of course to say that there are not conditions under which security may leave much to be desired, for instance where security is guaranteed by a narrow and intolerant despotism; but then, so it can be argued, the trouble lies with the provisioning, not the particular product. collective good G for the collection of N nation-states. It is a It is, furthermore, a collective good which permits the possibility of free-riding by nation-states. Looked at from this perspective the recent American complaint about its allies, Japan for example, and their insufficient expenditure on defence, is a complaint about their free-riding. Within the balance of power framework the conditions for free-riding are satisfied, for instance by unaligned and unilaterally disarming states. For 1. G is available to all N members of the collective if it is available to any, and the achievement (or maintenance) of G by any will make every member better off. 2. G is achieved iff some number m (no larger than that of group K) contribute towards its provision, where under the balance of power assumption Il C K C N and II = {USA, USSR}. 3. The expected value of contributing to G or its maintenance is less than the expected value of not doing so, i.e. likely costs of contribution exceed likely benefits - except perhaps for members of II given that G is largely provided by II. There is what can be called a pegged (or asymmetric) free-rider problem, pegged by members of II for whom the free-rider option is not open - within the confines of the balance of power assumption - and for whom condition 3 is only satisfied under certain ways of looking at the matter (e.g. there will be a war 10 years down the road so the expected costs each year exceed the expected benefits). For most members of N, by contrast, the benefits of G are available even should they reduce their contributions. There is a straightforward case (in narrow game-theoretical terms) for recommending Australian, and regional, free-riding on the balance of power provision of G. Some arguments, beyond or adding to those already in effect presented, are these:- Either stability breaks down catastrophically and there is a large-scale war or it does not. If it does then the region is 22 better off than it would be if (strongly) aligned because it is unlikely to be (so heavily) targetted. (Here the dreadful new argument that nuclear winter means that the Antipodes might as well be involved gets challenged and rejected: as to how see e.g. MF and B. Martin). If, alternatively, stability doesn’t break down then the region has the benefits in any case, without the costs. For there is no clear evidence that our alignment and cooperation with the USA enhances global stability, etc.; indeed, as remarked and will be further argued, the evidence points to the contrary. As regards Australasian regional weight in the Western block, do we seriously believe it is significant? That the Australian voice, though useful for propaganda purposes, makes much real difference in the halls of Northern power? We shouldn’t: and if we do we’re living in a delusional framework. Australia has been left out of the picture in virtually all major strategic planning exercises, most difference-making peace initiatives, etc.,etc. Now Eastern block countries would hardly object to Antipodean free-riding, rather than no offering support (however trifling), comfort and incitement to their opposition/ Furthermore free-riding is how the Americans, on their theoretical principles, would expect Australia to act, the rational self-interested procedure (see CPD). It is how lesser nations should act. For it is economically rational; contributing is not. But won’t the US make things economically dear for Australia? In threats and theory, yes; but in practice, no more than it has already done with subsidized wheat deals to the Soviets, no more than it threatened to do already in the case of New Zealand over the nuclear-ships issue. For except for short term aberrations, America will never give up trade or business arrangements: one gets the impressions that America would trade with the Devil Himself, if doing so would open some new markets in Hell. Despite its political stigma, free-riding need be no problem, or in any way immoral or irregular. Perhaps the buses are free; perhaps there is a voluntary payment system, to which only some need contribute, etc. With the nuclear fix, free-riding is indeed the moral course; contributing is not.29 Free-riding, though often protrayed as a problem, is only a problem in certain cases of collective provisioning, where the good involved is sufficiently desirable and will not be provided because of too many free- riders. This is not the situation with global security, which will be provided, in the curious and precarious way that it is, whether or not Australia stays on the escalating treadmill or gets off and rides free. Australia's free-riding may be a problem for America; it is not for Australia. Interests diverge again. What is more, judicious free-riding can increase stability. In pictorial terms, the stability of a structure is typically increased up to a certain point by securing it more 23 adequately; for example, if it is a wind tower or similar building, by increasing its rigid ties or supports to the ground. Then a tripod (or better still a quadrapod) tower is much less likely to topple than a bipedal one, and requires less guying to stay up. Increasing the diversity, or variety, of supports increases stability. The theme that diversity correlates with stability has been sharpened and confirmed in ecology, for instance in the theory of “spreading the risks” (see EW). The related theme, that a certain variety increases stability, has been elaborated in cybernetics. The core eco-systemic idea to be developed is that Australia’s free-riding in defence, and consequent nonalignment, could help to enhance diversity and variety, and accordingly to increase stability (especially if done in concert with other client and suppliant states). Two interlocked supports in tension, East and West, well dug in but hardly well guyed, are inadequate for the long-term stability of the precarious structure of world peace. What makes engineering sense is not however adding weight to the structure, or even strengthening the supports that are there, helping the East when the balance is disturbed by the more powerful West’s surging ahead and likely overburdening the structure. What makes more sense is increasing the variety of supports, enlarging and diversifying group size, as significant independent grouping could do. The monolithic East/monolithic West picture is much more than a convenient simplification, for instance for strategic thinking. It may force damaging mistakes in conceptualisation, mzsconceptualisation perhaps convenient for some larger players. One main reason for mistakes concerns group size. Whereas 11+ = {West, East} is a small group, the number N of nation-states is not, but is considerably larger. But the collective behaviour of large groups differs in theory from that of small groups; group size is a highly significant factor (though its precise import remains contentious). The group N of nation-states is a large group, of essentially self-interested parties, indeed of substantially economic actors. collective action applies: So we may expect that the American theory of that the groups will behave in a counterintuitive way. Though expected to act in the common interest, to obtain security in particular, the collection will not. On this account (that elaborated by Olson), the common interest can only be guaranteed by outside influence or imposition (coercion in Olson’s rapid thinking). But with the collective of nations, there is, as experience has shown, no outside mediator or influence of sufficient authority to ensure attainment of the collective good. The prognosis looks very gloomy: this most important (though far from unique) collective good will not be provided. Fortunately the reasoning, like much of the “logic” of collective action, has been too 21 swift. The group, though large, is highly privileged, in containing several actors for whom costs of war exceed benefits (note the shift in perspective from the earlier free-riding condition 3). Indeed an important economic effect of the knowledge of an ominous nuclear winter is that virtually all actors involved should now be in that position; for (subjectively) expected costs of nuclear war have become very high. To go back to basics, Olson's grand theory is based on the accountants’ tautology (defining ‘net’) net agent benefit = gross agent benefits - gross agent costs, i.e. in symbols, for each agent or o actor i (in collective N), A- = V-Cj. A group is privileged if Aj is positive for some i in N. It needs little argument to show that for vulnerable European nation-states the net benefits of global security are decidedly positive (e.g. with a nuclear war their respective future GDPs would expectedly fall to near zero). The fact that the group of nation-states is privileged does not however imply that the collective good involved, security, will be supplied, particularly in the longer term. The simple logic is not dynamic; it takes no account of mistake, error, or the like, or of stability achieved through superiority or intermediate instability. An improved modelling - which can take some account of group size and of the dynamics, through iterated games - is gained by returning to game-theoretic grounds. A free rider “problem” is tantamount to a dilemma of some sort; according to the conventional wisdom, it is a prisoners’ dilemma (cf. Pettit, but contrast Taylor and Ward). The argument can go this way:- a free rider problem or issue is defined in terms of the provisioning of a collective good; but the theory of collective goods is equivalent to that of a .QI, generalised prisoners’ dilemma. Certainly the global nuclear situation appears to present a dilemma; as much is a commonplace claim. Elsewhere (e.g. WPI) it is argued in detail that it does indeed present a moral dilemma. Here the argument - which can proceed through the theoretical route just sketched above or in the more piecemeal way to be indicated - is that it is also a prudential dilemma (for many members of N).°2 Consider first, since these have obtained some investigation (e.g. Hardin), the range of apparent two party games being played by the US and Soviet Union administration (labelled US and SU respectively) in 1985 as regards the moves of further nuclear armament, A, or nuclear disarmament, N. (It is supposed, naturally, that the game is set in some background context, e.g. nuclear disarmament is not considered in isolation from on-going French and Chinese nuclear armament). It is important here, as other places, to distinguish the administration - which for the most part calls the shots - from the society and the people. It is administrations or governments that generally take people into war; etc. The American people seem rather more inclined towards nuclear de-escalation than their administration; the German people were clearly opposed to the new nuclear missiles their administration proceeded to install. The strategy games involved are then administration games, which we 25 can suppose to be played over successive time intervals, e.g. years; so there is interaction and feedback as the games go on - until the Big Ones explode. Within this simplistic setting, the apparent games being played by US and SU are those diagrammed next: New Initial game Prisoners’ Dilemma Game SU SU D US A Revised Game D 2,2 A 4,1 1,4 3,3 D US A SU D 3,2 A 4,1 1,4 2,3 D US A D 3,3 A 4,1 1,4 2,2 According to Hardin, ‘giving evidence of [his] deformation professionelle’, the Prisoners’ Dilemma (PD) ‘represents the preference ordering of virtually all the articulate policy analysts in the United States and presumably also in the Soviet Union’ (p.248). While PD may have represented US policy, there is considerable evidence (as already indicated) that it no longer does, that the US administration has shifted to a more aggressive, war-fighting, phase. That is, the US has interchanged its rankings of (D,D) and (A,A), presumably some time between 1978 and 1984 games. The Soviets, who have been much more consistent (and no doubt better censored) in their policy pronouncements, appear not to have changed their game, but have stuck with their form of deterrence and no-first-strike. However they are bound to try to keep up with the Americans, and so are presumably pushed towards the Revised Game shown, which pleasantly restores symmetry. Stable or equilibrium outcomes for each game are circled. An outcome is said to be stable if neither player has incentive to switch strategies unilaterally on the strength of the game, i.e. to alter the outcome except by influencing the other player also to alter strategies. All these games provide dilemmas, in a broad sense, that equilibrium is achieved in an undesirable and dangerous outcome. In all the apparent games, arming is the dominant strategy for each player; yet in the PD game that is even Pareto-suboptimal, whence the economic fascination. But as the other games deliver results which are socially suboptimal (and below a satisfying threshold), all these games are dilemmas. And the same applies to suggested alternative games that might plausibly be taken to represent the superpower situation, and such as Chicken. A recognisably suboptimal outcome is guaranteed by the independent ‘‘stable” strategies. What is worse, iteration of games does not help (as it may in other political circumstances). For there are substantial political and military incentives for the superpower players not to adjust their preferences substantially in socially superior directions after repeated games, but to do what the US at least appears to have done, to make the situation worse. 26 It is important then to attempt to modify or curtail these self-interested superpower games. There are various connected ways of going about this. One is for other parties to combine to limit or discourage these games. Another alternative is for them to try to alter the games. Thus much socially preferable would be a switch to a coordination game of some sort; for instance, to the game which neutrals tend to play (and which Lackey, in contrast to other more bellicose utilitarians, sees utilitarian superpowers playing; hence Hardin’s provocative label for this game, ‘Lackey’s game’). In the coordination game diagrammed, WN represents a western-inclined neutral and EN an Eastern inclined neutral (e.g. Yugoslavia): EN WN D D 1,1 A 3,2 A 2,3 4,4 [Other coordination games, with (D,D) assigned (1,1)] Now the dilemmatic and coordination games are not played in isolation; they come together in international settings such as United Nations’ committees (and elsewhere, since coordination games are frequently peoples’ games as well). Superimposing the games, with coordination games of the first sort applied to previously given US and SU games, leads to the following augmented East (E) and West (W) games: New Game, Augmented Prisoners’ Dilemma Augmented E E A D Revised Game, Augmented A 4,1 2,2 : *4,1' \ : 3^2 ’ D 1 : W ......... 1,4: A 2/3: 2/3; D ; 1 w ........ : 1,4 3,3 ; a 4 ; E D 2/3 • • — •- : 3-3’**: D ; 1 W I 2,3 ; . • 2.3 A D 2/3 2,2 a 4 ■ 4,1* ! . ; : 2/3 J 4 Key: rh represents a sequence of ms, i.e. m, m, m ... for each coordination player; 2/3 a sequence of 2s and 3s in some order. As augmenting games reveals, to play with a superpower is to help reinforce a stable deadlock. But playing an independent coordination game increases variety and can help in breaking the deadlock, in fact in several ways. For one, enough significant players playing a coordination game can alter the overall dominant strategy towards disarmament. For another, much more pressure can be brought to bear on the superpowers. For example, with less support, unilateral action by the US administration on Star-Wars and arms build-up can be exposed. Superpower militarism and power excursions would stand naked and 27 unsupported. Australia’s impact, in particular, would be rather greater as a nonaligned free-rider pressing seriously for disarmament and regional nuclear-freedom (instead of, as at present, white-wash polemics and token ambassadors, undermined by a none-too-tacit policy of US support). The strategy suggested by game-theoretic modelling converges then with that suggested by other approaches, notably regional and ecological approaches. The strategy is that of limitation, of disengagement from escalating US/USSR war games, and progressive alteration of their likely outcomes by defusing coordination moves. In more practical terms, the approaches mean trying to limit and modify superpower games by restricting their games and supporting regional or local coordination of players, in forms of organisations both of nations and of people. Such organisations would work, as many have already been doing, to contract the regions and spheres of influence and access of US and USSR military administrations, and to diminish support for their war-fighting objectives. For example, Antipodean groups could, and should, coordinate to ease the American military out of the South Pacific region, meanwhile resisting any intrusion of Russian military. Then, while the Europeans are doing their coordinated de-escalating, denuclearising things right across Europe, the Russian and American war games are progressively excluded from the entire Southern Hemisphere. An eventual aim geographically is, to send their weapons of war back home, to restrict their (and French and other) global military enterprises to their “own” backyards, where they would not always be so enthusiastically received. Fortunately such an ambitious and optimistic project, so unlikely to come to pass given present nation-state arrangments, can be accomplished piecemeal, from small and significant beginnings, already to be seen. As a result of recent movements in the region, a South Pacific nuclear-free region is now a politically-achievable option. A first token step has already been taken. But next steps, towards genuine nuclear-freedom, require above all cooperation of a less aligned Australia, joining other disengaging “free-riders” in the region. That in turn requires, as a practical component, closure of American bases in Australia as their leases terminate, cessation of American nuclear ship visits and aircraft staging, and an end to uranium mining and sales. As Australia is the only country in the region supplying uranium, and the main location of US bases, such steps would be most significant. Even so, the Pacific regional effect would remain unduly limited, so long as France and the US are based within the region, and transit of nuclear ships is internationally sanctioned everywhere on the shrinking high seas. Plainly there are further more difficult steps on the way to southern Pacific nuclear-freedom and independence, i.e. even for one of the easier oceanic regions. But there is no good reason to 28 expect that removing the nuclear scourge, any more than eliminating other major politico­ social evils, will be easy. Permanent removal and a less dubious “peace” than we presently enjoy is not something that will be achieved by more of what we have witnessed, or even through clever diplomacy and smart technological tricks, such as new defensive weapons; it will take difficult structural and radical design change. 8. On the need for, possibility of, and prospect of appropriate structural change. There is little doubt that certain sorts of structural political change would be highly conducive to peace (e.g. democratic reorganisation of the superpowers), and that certain fundamental changes may even be sufficient for permanent peace. With that in view they have long been advocated - at least from Rousseau and Kant onwards. But it has also been supposed that some such changes are necessary for lasting peace; ‘it is also necessary to transform the structures that lead to war’ (B. Martin, p.12). To render this theme immune to obvious criticisms - for example, that straightforward authoritarian extension of certain established structures could bring an end to war - further desiderata, typically presupposed, are invoked, for instance that certain freedoms, modest material standards of life, and so on, are duly guaranteed, and also the type of necessity involved is wound back to some lower technical level (not excluded however by present practicalities). These adjustments make the necessity theme more difficult to assess, but also more difficult to sustain. There are two parts to its assessment and defence, a negative and critical part, demolishing a range of arguments from determinism, human nature, and the like, to the effect that arrangements have to be more or less the way they are, and a positive part, comprising direct arguments for the theme. The large negative part of this enterprise will simply be illustrated.34 According to deterministic and mechanistic approaches, such as that of (marxist) technological determinism, nuclear weapons, like megamachines generally, are no aberration. They are an integral part of the business of industrial and ecological conquest, a further stage in human intervention which has already involved substantial disruption through pesticides, wastes, etc. The argument tends to the fatalistic. The megamachines of conquest are made, and once made they will be used. No change in political arrangement, which would make any difference, is possible. Sometimes technological enthusiasts push their position and luck, even further, that a weapon or device once invented by humans will be used: there is no stopping progress. But in doing so they overextend themselves. While there is, sadly a fair induction from the manufacture of weapons (of any given type, for many batches are never deployed) to their use, inductions from invention of machines or the like to their manufacture are c 29 unreliable and subject to many counterexamples (and many machines that do eventually get made have been reinvented or independently rediscovered). But even the good inductions do not show that weapons of various sorts must be used, that a change in background political organisation would not frustrate the inductions. The broader deterministic position is of course that such background changes are not possible either; political arrangements too, like the rest of social life, are technologically or economically determined. But (nonanalytical) determinism, technological and other, is false, so it is argued elsewhere (JB, CPD). Different political arrangements, which alleviate problems, are technically possible, and arrangements would be different in differently evolved worlds. Things did not and do not have to be the way they are, or the social and political sort of way they are. Many routes, none of deductive strength, lead to the conclusion that the dominant political structures of our time, fashioned (with much input from schemes of past philosophers) from feudal institutions, require extensive structural alteration. In particular, they need to be superseded by alternative structures less intricately tied to war, which do not promote or lead so readily to war. Such a theme has been argued directly from the nuclear fix itself (as e.g. WP1, p.47ff.). But suppose, improbable as it may seem, that nuclear weapons all vanished, thereby removing the current nuclear fix; for instance, they turned out to be quietly self-destructing, or a disarmament actually took place. massive thermodynamic miracle occurred, or nuclear The problem of war would not be thereby removed, and even that of nuclear war would only be given some respite. For the structural arrangements for war would remain intact.04 Conventional weapons would remain, along with weapons perhaps as dangerous as nuclear weapons, such as chemical and biological ones. Nuclear weapons, insofar as they were removed (for small caches are easily hidden away), could soon be replaced, especially if nuclear power plants remained intact; and nothing would prevent the development of (Star-Wars) weapons more diabolical than nuclear ones. War cannot be eliminated while leaving the rest of society as it is - by freezing the status quo. ... The structural conditions for war need to be removed - not reinforced as appeals to elites may do - and superseded by alternative structures which do not lead to war (B. Martin, p.12: Martin goes on to indicate the types of structures, and how to reach them). Structural adjustments can provide conditions for lasting satisfactory peace. An initial, somewhat simplistic, Kantian argument for the proposition that peace is possible (presented by Latta, introducing Permanent Peace), runs as follows:- Peace, perpetual peace, is an ideal, not merely of a speculative kind but a practical idea, a moral principle. Hence this ideal ought to be realised, i.e. there ought (morally) to be peace. But ought entails can; therefore peace is possible. 30 From Heracleit.us through Hegel there buzzes an impressive swarm of philosophers""*6 who have rejected the second premiss. Some are even captivated by such extravagant counter-claims as that with peace everything would stop, that competition, with war as one limit, is essential to motion and progress! would now be With the recent shift in philosophical fashions, the second premiss more widely conceded, though often not on Kantian grounds, but consequentialist. Such grounds to support the theme that peace is desirable and ought to be realised, but are more discriminating in that they help indicate what sort of peace. Unfortunately, however it is done, the second premiss does not sustain the conclusion, ought does not entail can, as many moral dilemmas reveal (see MD, WP1). So fortunately, there is a more satisfactory and revealing route to the conclusion that peace is possible, and indeed is feasible. That is the more elaborate method of (semantical) modelling: present in detail scenarios of societies where peace persists (for the sceptical it may be necessary to recall n-human models, with n small). This sort of thing is of course already done, in more pleasing fashion than logicians could hope to emulate, if rather less precisely, by OQ novelists and science-fiction writers, and by activists like the different Martins. What all these scenarios point to, however, are societies considerably different from our own - though not in the people involved, who have their weaknesses, their power drives, and so forth, but because of significant structural alterations in the societies depicted. By way of such modellings we can not merely argue to the feasibility of lasting peace, but push ahead with the argument, that societies of these restructured sorts are desirable alternatives to contemporary military- industrial arrangements. For those of us then who want to move towards such pacific alternatives, the practical inference, from feasibility and desirability is clear: we should begin on the real work of structural change. Peace is possible and desirable, but the prospects are poor (as Heilbroner has said of the human prospect). Present arrangements, though contingent and fashioned in large measure from the schemes of past intellectuals, are thoroughly entrenched, and enforced, both ideologically and by much physical power, often as if along with natural law they were God­ given, though they are no longer appropriate. Even small nonstructural changes look difficult to achieve in present political climates. Through climates have not changed that much, major social improvements have been gained, not instantanously, but in longer-term struggles with government. Such short-term difficulties did not deter social theorists such as Kant, who like Rousseau before him and many after him, were concerned with obtaining lasting peace. The world has changed enormously since the time of Kant’s proposals for peace (of 1795), and even since the time of Veblen’s more cynical additions (in 1917). Hard science and 31 destructive power have grown enormously; and even theoretical knowledge of collective behaviour, especially that admitting of game-theoretic treatment, though still slight, has advanced. But political arrangements and what can be accomplished politically have, in important respects, changed very little, since Rousseau complained (around 1761) that governments were probably too short-sighted to appreciate the merits of his project for perpetual peace. Governments have long been, and been seen as, main obstacles to peace. Thus Veblen rightly maintained that ‘... if the peace is to be kept it will have to come about irrespective of governmental management, - in spite of the State rather than by its good offices’ (p.7).^^ So it has been with most major social changes; for they have involved structural political change disturbing to governmental conservatism. In his search for the indispensible conditions for lasting peace, Kant claimed, as others have claimed since, that peace is not possible under present structural arrangements of an unregulated competing nation-state kind. As times have changed, so, to a limited extent, have state structural arrangements, since Kant compiled his conditions. In particular, there is now, in the shape of the United Nations, a very weak reflection of what Kant looks for, a world (or European!) federation of nations. But crucial ingredients in Kant’s resolution are still lacking:- namely, at the upper level, what is required for a standard resolution of Prisoners Dilemma type situations - some surrender of national sovereignty, especially as regards war, and, at the lower level, “republican” states. Major blockages to adequate arrangements for peace remain at two critical levels of organisation, that concentrated upon of the organisation of collectives of states and, in part by devolution, that of the internal organisation of individual states themselves. Much evidence has now accumulated that more far-reaching changes than Kant, Rousseau and Veblen envisaged are required at both international and nation-state levels if genuine peace is to be secured. Indeed significant changes are wanted even in republician states for peace movements to get their mixed message through already fixed channels to state control systems. For this sort of reason, movements on a single front, such as peace, are unlikely to succeed on their own, but should be linked into a broader plurality of movements, which seek to widen informational and democratic channels, and to alter the character and membership of state systems, and thereby render them much more controllable and accountable.40 Many longer-haul structural changes depend upon diverting nuclear war in the meantime. Thus arguing for more far-reaching changes, for an altered nonaligned Australia, 32 for a nuclear-free South Pacific, for regional structural changes, certainly does not exclude arguing and working for obvious measures for reducing risks of nuclear war. These include: a serious commitment to arms control by the superpowers (whose practices threaten our futures, though most of us lack representation in either); a move away from war-fighting strategies and associated destabilising weapons-systems; moderation of confrontational rhetoric and other tensions-inducing practices by superpower administrations, and improved efforts at mutual understanding (as well some appreciation of the elements of political pluralism); and then, remote though it may appear, significant steps towards nuclear disarmament. Richard Sylvan 41 Bungendore NSW 33 NOTES 1. Queensland premier, with destructive deep-South policies. 2. The point, which has become controversial, is argued in effect in Gilbert. 3. See especially Dibb, as reported in the ANU Reporter, and for a more guarded elaboration, his IAD (e.g. p.163 ‘At present, planning for the defence of Australia lack coherence because there is no clear definition, in priority order, of what needs defending’); see also Sharp, p.l48ff and differently Langtry and Ball, p.575ff., p.6O5ff. The much-heralded Dibb Review of mid-1986 would, if (as already seems unlikely) it were adopted, remove some of the lesser incoherence in Australian policy, that involving details of regional defensive defence (as would also Langtry and Ball, if followed through). While Dibb appears to have demolished what he refers to scathingly as the ‘largely mythical “core force” concept’, a new controversy has sprung up over whether Australia’s more self-reliant defence should be purely defensive defence, Dibb’s ill-named ‘strategy of denial’, or whether it should include an offensive component. Dibb himself has rather rapidly shifted ground on this important issue. In late 1983 he was contending that ‘Australia should have in the force-in-being significant deterrent capabilities, based on present air and naval strike assets, which can mount defensive and offensive operations against attacking forces, their staging bases and lines of resupply’ (IAP, p.166). But in the otherwise conservative Review of 1986 such offensive defence is abandoned; no such forces and equipment for offensive off-shore operations are recommended. Instead ‘the review proposes a layered strategy of defence within our area of direct military interest. Our most important defence planning concern is to ensure that an enemy would have substantial difficulty in crossing the sea and air gap’. The new offensive/defensive defence controversy puts the Review’s adoption in increasing doubt - in which event the local incoherence in strategic planning processes and militational difficulties Dibb alludes to early in his statement will presumably persist. The Review not merely fails to address significant regional issues, as to defence priorities, and as to multiple purpose roles for Australian armed forces given that they will be involved in virtually no military activity other than maintenance and a certain “preparedness” (for on Dibb’s overstatement of the prevailing view of Australia’s very favourable regional security prospects, ‘there is no conceivable prospect of any power contemplating invasion of our continent and subjugation of our population’). But further, the Review is itself vague to incoherent, concerning wider defence issues, vague as to the post-ANZUS situation, and incoherent about Australia’s role in US global “defence” activity. According the Dibb (CT, p.16), ‘there is no requirement for Australia to become involved in United States contingency planning for global war. The presence of the joint facilities, together with the access that we provide to visits by United States warships and the staging through of Australia of B-52 bombers, are a sufficient tangible contribution to the Alliance.’ These contributions are not involvement? That is not how the USSR views the matter: they are the reported sole 34 basis of USSR nuclear targetting of Australia (see Dibb. SS p.13). global stance is left essentially to the USA. And Australia's Amazingly, in the Strategic Basis Papers (SB), Australia criticizes New Zealand because ‘it has still developed no policy for national defence and tends to look to ... the US as its primary source of defence guidance’ (p.29). Note that C3I abbreviates the mouthful, Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence. 4. See Sharp, p.l46ff. An Australian policy should moreover fit with the genuine needs and shared aspirations of local people - to the extent, presumably, that these are commendable; again the presupposed value framework is critical. 5. Thus e.g. Gray (p.17) on the Reagan Administration’s ‘foolhardy brief willingness to talk publicly about nuclear strategy’, and his distain for public involvement or input. There is some concern, especially among neo-conservatives, about US defence strategies being ‘undermined by well-meaning persons who believe they are helping the cause of peace’ (Bell p.10; similarly Gray). Even those not so far right support partial information releases which maintain public confidence; e.g. Dibb on ‘the release of a generalised statement about ;the] functions of the US bases in Australia ... to give Australians more confidence about their crucial contribution to the Allied cause’ (ISA, p.166). ‘Our defence policy-making process is probably more “closed” than that of any other advanced Western democracy’ according to Langtry and Ball (p.608), who contend that ‘the public needs to be involved much more in our defence planning and operations'. For a justified critique of public exclusion and leave-it-to-the-experts approaches, see B. Martin; also Sharp. 6. The paper was drafted in mid-1985. 7. For those amassing evidence that Australia falls into the inexact class of client states, the following Australian contribution is noteworthy: ‘The US prefers to act as a member of a group, and a contribution by Australia can also assist in demonstrating to Congressional and public opinion that the objectives sought are significant enough to attract allied support’ (SB, p.28) 8. As to DI and arms control, see, e.g. Mack PR and Gray. As to D2, ‘USA has now an announced first-strike nuclear targeting policy’ technologically reinforced, Hayes, p.4; and see also Mack AC, p.111. The goal of the Reagan administration is superiority (a conveniently ambiguous term). Thus e.g. Gray (p.32): ‘it is of course essential that the United States modernize its offensive forces so as to render the Soviet Union genuinely offensive-counterforce incompetent.’ 9. On the major changes in American policy, see e.g. Gray p.118 ff. Though America is now said to have a ‘new national security concept of which SDI is the centerpiece’ it may still lack an ‘arms control policy’ (Gray, p.25,pll). Not only arms control, but American commitment to the security of allies, remain at least decidedly cloudy matters. Thus it is of little avail to contend that Australia does have a coherent secondorder global policy, namely the (discreditable) one of following prevailing American policy. For the US lacks a first-order policy which is sufficiently clear in relevant respects. The American direction of Australian policy had better be away from too much public exposure because Australians, no more than New Zealanders, mostly do not like being pushed around, even by Americans. 35 10. Thus we can avoid the important debate as to whether, and to what extent, deterrence remains part of US global “defence” policy (though it certainly remains part of the policy sold to the American public). As to the philosophical significance of the debate, see Gay, p.l29ff. and Benn. 11. The common-interest theme is often traced to (partly self-interested) American action in the Pacific in World War II. Curiously Australia’s interests are are now said also to converge with those of Japan, but to be diametrically opposed to those of the USSR (despite increasing trade). 12. Nor, though this is a longer story, does Australian culture by any means coincide with American: see CPD. Thus a uniform treatment is entirely inappropriate. Similarly, a single overarching treatment for a monolithic West is thoroughly inadequate: see further below in the text. 13. Australian planning should be looking at strategic models (game-theoretic and other) which include Australia. For, as argued below, abandoning the uniformity assumption of the monolithic West, of the West as one parish, makes significant differences to the results yielded. 14. As Cock goes on: ‘These basic issues increasingly become lost in the array of consumer choices’. 15. ‘The serf societies - more or less willingly - accept the status of “allies”, i.e. protection with rights and duties as in feudal societies. They become client countries’ (Galtung, p.169). 16. So-called by Mack PC. But the formulation presented follows G. Davidson’s more satisfactory account in Canberra Times, Wednesday, May 8, 1985, p.2. Mack considers that what amounts to the elitist case is the ‘altogether more sophisticated argument [which] holds sway ... in government’ (p.l, italics added)! 17. The “Asian hordes” derive from one of the less spoken about successors to the Yellow Peril, from the immediate past days of the Asian communist threat, the Domino theory, and White Australia. 18. As Stephenson argued, less fortunately, 20 years ago. Even when around World War II Japan, did have interest in access to strategic raw materials, the Japanese High Command decided against invading Australia because of the difficulty of dealing with the people - a point of much importance. 19. Of course, such military expenditure is also encouraged by economic forces, e.g. like much Third World hard currency expenditure it helps the American economy along a bit. 20. Heilbroner has traced some of the economic components and consequences of what, with excess exaggeration and insufficient irony, he calls ‘the rise and subsequent fall of the American imperium’ (p.52): it hasn’t fallen that far yet. ‘Empires have always been expensive and the American empire was no exception. ... The sheer military cost ... for the United States alone ... is roughly ten percent of ... GNP for the last 25 years ($2 x 10) in 1972 dollars)’. American imperial spending supplemented by other capitalist countries fueled inflation, enhanced poverty, etc., and was complements by, what it was represented as required by, counterexpenditure and efforts by the USSR. 36 ‘The establishment of an American hegemony [consisted and: resulted not just in very large military expenditures, but in the rapid build-up of American capital investments abroad. Between 1950 and 1970, the value of American-owned plant and equipment abroad leaped from $12 billion to $78 billion’ (p.54). A result of the expenditure abroad was a serious balance of payments problem (negative “capital flows” and balances), and a growing accumulation of IOUs. On this sort of basis, Heilbroner speculates that ‘the mere operations of the American imperium by itself - deemed of such critical importance to preserve the peace and security of the capitalist world - was in all likelihood a sufficient condition for the globalisation of the inflationary phenomena’ (p.57 with insert from p.56). According to Heilbroner, ‘Long before the Vietnam debacle, it was clear that American arms could not prevent the rise of revolutionary governments in the under-developed world’ (p.57). But really very little evidence of collapse is presented by Heilbroner; and seemingly there is little. What there is more substantial evidence for is the marked decline of the American imperium in the period (1973-8) concerned. One piece of evidence is the sharp decline in America’s share of World GDP, shown in the following table of select leading national economies: SHARE OF WORLD GDP (%) POPULATION SHARE COUNTRY RANK 1968 1975 1984 (1984 est) USA 1 35.0 24.3 25.0 5.2 USSR 2 11.1 11.0 13.8 6.2 JAPAN 3 5.2 8.0 9.5 2.7 GERMANY FDR 4 5.1 6.7 5.7 1.5 FRANCE 5 4.6 5.4 CHINA 6 2.9 4.8 4.3 22.6 UK 8 2.8 2.8 2.3 1.3 4.4 1.3 INDIA 12 1.3 1.5 1.1 15.1 AUSTRALIA 15 1.1 1.4 1.0 0.3 37 The table should also make it clear that if the USA cannot sustain a grand empire, nor can the USSR. A totalitarian Pax Sovietica is even less likely than a capitalistic Pax American was. 21. Although, so the documents continue, ‘neighbourhood contingencies .... are at present assessed as impossible’! The theme that the USA affords no sure guarantee of Australian defence is reiterated in Langtry and Bell, e.g. p.608. They go on there to outline the major points that reliance upon the US has distorted Australian arrangements (with forces better equipped to fight alongside the Americans in Asia than on their own in defending Australia) and has led to neglect of the regional priorities, ‘to defence planning which at least would recently paid little attention to the direct defence of our continent and the protection of our remote communities’ (p.608). 22. The French, who operate a global network second only to the Americans and more extensive than the Russians, with many forces in the Pacific region, have never been seriously considered. Yet in certain significant respects French social and cultural arrangements are closer to Antipodean ones than American arrangements are. In these days of technological warfare, the post-Waterloo loss record of the French should not be given too much weight; we don’t after all look very hard at the American record of defeats and incompetence. Etc. 23. If Australia is not likely to be threatened there is no real deterrence advantage because nothing to deter. Other advantages of the ANZUS alliance such as access to high-level intelligence are not only dubious (see PC, D. Martin), but not always guaranteed by the alliance as the blackout of New Zealand shows. 24. Soviet activity is undoubtedly perceived rather differently by American administrations than Antipodean ones. ‘An agressive, treacherous, ruthlessly self-interested, expansionist increasingly powerful, and hence increasingly threatening state - that is the image of the Soviet Union in America. It is the image which has legitimised the strategic modernation and Star Wars programs’ (to adopt Mack ST, pl). To see that this is indeed the intellectually shoddy route by which these grand and dangerous programs are justified, it is enough to work through fundamentalist sources, such as Gray. It is almost as if Americans had projected some of their own occasionally-manifested worst features into the giant enemy. 25. After some considerable reconstruction, that is. For the argument, curiously referred as that of “central balance” in newspaper-level publications of academics (e.g. Catley, Bell), is never presented in requisite detail - which is one reason why it has proved hard to criticise and refute. 26. As well both the premiss and its usual substitutes are false (see MF). The type of argument exhibited is a good example of prevalent Australian consequentialist thinking. A parallel argument, enjoying unwarranted popularity, runs: We might as well sell uranium (e.g. to France), because if we don’t someone else will - as if motives counted morally for nothing. 27. See also the discussion of Bell’s claims in D. Martin and in Mack PC. 28. Since the New Zealand restrictions on nuclear ships, ‘the Soviet media has been full of gloating references to the prospect of the collapse of the ANZUS treaty’ according to Dibb (SS, p.14). Given the unimportance of the Antipodes to Soviet interests (as Dibb 38 himself explains), Dibb is surely exaggerating, at least, when he later claims that ‘the prospect of the breakup of the AN ZUS treaty would be of enormous benefit to the USSR’s world-wide interests’ (SS p.31). Soviet support for Antipodean independence and for ‘a real nuclear weapon-free zones' in the South Pacific has its disconcerting elements (‘with friends like that ...’); but luckily the quality of ideas does not depend essentially on their sources and supporters. 29. As WPI serves to show. In a different context, Bell objects to Australian free-loading ‘on other people’s risks and burdens. That has certainly not been our tradition, and I hope it will not become so, since it is morally quite indefensible’ (p.7). Not so: bludging, for instance, is a well-established, if disapproved of, part of the tradition; and in some cases it is morally in order. However, free-riding is not being proposed merely for self interested reasons, e.g. to remove the present risks of nuclear targetting; it is being proposed with a view to altering the two great alliance structures that at present dominate international politics. Bell’s objection to such a course is that it ‘would on the one hand tend to increase the tendency of the superpowers to unilateralism, and on the other hand tend to induce many of the minor powers in question (including Australia) to consider acquiring nuclear capacity’ (p.7). The second alternative neglects the non­ proliferation treaty, to which Australia is a signatory; the first appears to assume erroneously that friendly relations with America are foregone; both are pretty minor considerations (and both can be dealt with in other negotiated ways) compared with the major problem of nuclear war. 30. The less than perspicuous symbolism is that used in Hardin (CA, p.20, p.39), but with agents’ costs or contributions, C, duly agent relativized. Hardin misleadingly treats C as a fixed parameter, thus strictly falsifying the tautology. 31. Thus Hardin who (in CA) claims to ‘demonstrate the equivalence of the logic of collective action and the Prisoners’ Dilemma’ (p.4) The demonstration is given on p.25ff. 32. But of course the two types of dilemma interconnect. 33. Even so, significant change in USA looks unlikely. Present arrangements suit not only the American corporate-administrative power elite, which can direct public opinion through its control of the main communications media, but many other fat-cat Americans, rather well. The polarisation of the world into two camps increases US control of the larger and far wealthier camp, yet scarcely reduces US trade or markets. While it does limit the global coverage of US business and multinationals, and somewhat restricts the transfer of other regions’ surplus value to the USA, it ensures the much greater advantage of being able to maintain the US domestic political economy on a military basis. The US and the USSR not only dance together; they were made for each other. Abroad US hegemony is maintained through a series of alliances and economic control strategies. Particularly ominous for the South Pacific are the Trilateral and Pacific Rim arrangements (which, with much local assistance, are helping to send Australia on its present economic trajectory). When advice or persuasion directed at allies and client states fail, economic measures can be resorted to (capital outflows, for instance, being a highly effective mechanism, “aid” a lesser device). For the most part, the imperial war machine can remain in the background. At home updated and improved imperial measures also work well. The mass consumerist society affords a rich and diverting selection of bread (much of it again imported) for a majority of Americans; television 39 and its entertainment variants offer a constant diet of circuses. For passive middle mainstream America, the vast police and security network remains a largely background and even unnoticed phenomenon; what is seen is even welcomed as a necessary shield from that other, dangerous, minority America. American social, educational and media management of opinion is obviously successful. Of present relevance, most Americans have been convinced that unilateral disarmament would be unAmerican. Thus the American administration, being hedged in by opinion they have helped to generate, cannot move in any such directions. For, given popular opinion, it would of course be politically disastrous, as well as undemojl’cratic! In the USSR, where political control is exercised to a much greater extent through overt power, present change of substance appears even less likely. 34. More of the negative enterprise is attempted elsewhere, e.g. a critique of the supposed strait-jacket of human nature is begun in CPD. From Plato through Hegel and into contemporary times it has been erroneously supposed that war, like aggression, is part of human nature, that war is a permanent (and perhaps even desirable) condition of human and social existence. For a refutation, see e.g. Trainer and Waite. 35. As observed by B. Martin, who uses this important form of argument for institutional change to get this thick book started (pp.12-13). 36. The swarm includes some anomalies, such as that somewhat tarnished hero of deep ecology, Spinoza: see e.g. Northedge. 37. Perhaps Kant had some such scenario in view in his theme that peace is empirically possible, which he coupled with his striking claim that peace is morally and rationally imperative. The latter claim, running in direct opposition to the long line of bellicose philosophers, really relies on the correct, but controversial, assumption that states are subject to the same moral relations as individual persons. Both then have an obligation to seek peace derived from forms of the categorial morality, notably from rational autonomy, the universality of maxims, and the ultimate value of persons (or, yet more chauvinistically, of humanity). 38. Veblen argued against the State on the basis that ‘governmental establishments and ... powers ... are derived from feudal establishments of the Middle Ages; which in turn, are of a predatory origin and of an irresponsible character’ (p.9), however the Christianfeudal origin of the State provided only one - and a coersive - evolutionary pattern of organisation (pp. 12-13), a pattern much influenced moreover by schemes of intellectuals. Other patterns remain feasible. 39. There are now theoretical arguments for Kant’s claim, as well as practical arguments of an inductive sort. 40. Such is also the new message from America: for the peace movement to get through to the administration, American democracy must be overhauled and revitalised, capitalist democracy superseded by true democracy or “republicanism” (see especially Cohen and Rogers, and earlier Chomsky). But the message, like the US peace movements’ very limited demands for peace, leaves the State, as the bringer of wars, and main source of violence essentially intact; the structural changes suggested, which will be slow to achieve, are much too narrowly conceived. 41. My thanks for information to Andrew Mack and David Bennett, and for comments to Grover Foley and Russell Hardin. REFERENCES G. H. Andrewartha and L.C. Birch, The Ecological Web, University of Chicago Press, 1984. W.R. Ashby, Design for a Brain, Second edition, Wiley, New York, 1960. S.Beer, Designing Freedom, Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, Toronto, 1974. C. Bell, ‘The case against neutrality’, Current Affairs Bulletin 61(4) (1984) 4-10. S.I. Benn, ‘Deterrence or appeasement? or, On trying to be rational about nuclear war’, Journal of Applied Philosophy 1(1984) 5-19. F. Capra and C. Spretnak, Green Politics, Hutchinson, London, 1984. R. Catley, ‘Along with the Bomb ...’ (Review of D. Martin), The Weekend Australian Magazine, 7-8 April, 1984. N. Chomsky and E.S. Herman, The Political Economy of Human Rights, Black Rose Books, Montreal, 1979. P. Cock, Alternative Australia, Quartet Books, Melbourne, 1979. J. Cohen and J. Rogers, On Democracy, Penguin, New York, 1984. P. Dibb (as reported) ‘Defence Planning “lacks coherence” - researcher’, ANU Reporter, 1983. P. Dibb, ‘Issues in Australian defence’, Australian Outlook 37 (1983) 160-166; referred to as IAD. P. Dibb, ‘Soviet strategy towards Australia, New Zealand and Oceania’ paper prepared for Soviet Strategy Against Asia converence, Tokyo, November 1984; referred to as SS. P. Dibb, Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities, Report to the Minister of Defence, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1986; edited text also published in The Canberra Times, 4 June 1986, pp.16-18; referred to as the Dibb Review. P. and A. Erlich, Population, Resources, Environment, Second edition, Freeman, San Francisco, 1976. H. Feith,‘Richard Falk, World order radical’, Peace Studies 24 (1985) 24-5. J. Galtung, There are Alternatives, Spokesman, Nottingham, 1984. W.C. Gay, ‘Myths about nuclear war: misconceptions in public beliefs and governmental plans’, Philosophy and Social Criticism, 9(1982) 117-144. A. Gilbert, ‘The state and nature in Australia’, Australian Cultural History 1981 (ed. S. Goldberg and F.B. Smith), Canberra, 1982, pp.9-28. 42 C.S. Gray, ‘The Reagan administration and arms control’, paper presented at The Future of Arms Control Conference, Canberra. August 1985. R. Hardin, Collective Action, Resources for the Future, Washington, 1982; referred to as CA. R. Hardin, ‘Unilateral versus mutual disarmament’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 12(1983) 236-254. M.D. Hayes, ‘Defending the sunburnt country’, Chain Reaction 33(August-September 1983) 11-17. R.L. Heilbroner, Beyond Boom and Bust, Norton, New York, 1978. I. Kant, Perpetual Peace (trans, and introd. M. Campbell Smith), Swan Sonnerschein, London, 1903 (first published 1795). J. O. Langtry and D Ball (eds), A Vunerable Country, Australian National University Press, Canberra, 1986. A. Mack, ‘Farewell to Arms Controls’, Peace Research 9(1984) 9ff.; referred to as PR. A. Mack, ‘The pros and cons of ANZUS’, Fabian ANZUS Conference, Lome, 4-5 May 1985; referred to as PC. A. Mack, ‘Arms control, disarmament and the concept of defensive defence’, Disarmament 8(3)(1984) 109-119; referred to as AC. A. Mack, ‘The Soviet threat thesis: perceptions, capabilities and interests’ typescript, Canberra, May 1985; referred to as ST. B. Martin, Uprooting War, Freedom Press, London, 1984. B. Martin, Armed Neutrality for Australia, Drummond Books, Melbourne, 1984. F.S. Northedge, ‘Peace, war and philosophy’, in Encyclopedia of Philosophy (ed P. Edwards), Volume 6, Macmillan, New York, 1967, 63-67. M. Olson, The Logic of Collective Action, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1965. P. Pettit, ‘Free riding and foul dealing’, Journal of Philosophy, to appear, J.J. Rousseau, A Project for Perpetual Peace (trans. E.M. Nuttal), London, 1927 (first Published 1761). R. Routley, ‘On the ethics of large-scale nuclear war and nuclear deterrence, and the political fall out’, Discussion papers in Environmental philosophy #5, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, 1984. R. Routley, ‘Metaphysical fall-out from the nuclear predicament’, Philosophy and Social Criticism 3/4(1984) 19-34; referred to as MF. R. Routley and V. Plumwood, ‘Moral dilemmas and the logic of deontic notions’, Discussion Papers in Environmental Philosophy #6, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, 1984; referred to as MD. 43 R. Sharp (ed.), Apocalypse No. Pluto Press, Sydney, 1984. P.R. Stephenson, The Foundations of Culture, W.J. Miles, Sydney, 1936. R. Sylvan, ‘Culture and the roots of political divergence’, typescript, Canberra, 1985; referred to as CPD. M. Taylor and H. Ward, ""Chickens, whales, and bumpy goods: alternative models of public­ goods provision’, Political Studies 30(1982) 350-370. T. Trainer and H. Waite, ‘Culture and the production of aggression’, in Sharp, ep.cit, 205-226. The Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy, leaked extracts published in the National Times, March 30-April 5, 1984, 23-30; referred to as SB. Threats to Australian Security, Parliamentary Joint Committee for Foreign Affairs and Defence, Australian Government Printer, Canberra; referred to as TAS. T. Veblen, An Inquiry into the Nature of Peace and the Terms of its Perpetuation, Viking Press, New York, 1945 (first published 1917). ",,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,"Box 59: Nuclear,Como House,Como House > Cupboard > Pile 3",https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/ccd54bbcfae9fe07cf40299850560203.pdf,Text,"Draft Papers",1,0