Box 59, Item 681: Notes and cuttings on predation (for Cannibalism II)

Box 59, Item 681: Notes and cuttings on predation (for Cannibalism II)

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The University of Queensland's Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291, Box 59, Item 681

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Notes and cuttings

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IN DEFENCE OF CANNIBALISM
I.

TYPES OF ADMISSIBLE AND INADMISSIBLE
CANNIBALISM

Richard Routley
Philosophy Department
Research School of Social Sciences
Australian National University
and
Environmental Studies
University of Victoria
Canada

IN DEFENCE OF CANNIBALISM~

It is a commonplace of mainstream Western thought that
cannibalism - the eating of human flesh by humans, and, more
generally, the feeding of animals on members of their own species is, at least in the human case, morally outrageous.

© Ri chard Routley, 1982

This repugnan cy

thesis appears to be a legacy especially (but not only) of Christianity,
probably derived from Jewish teaching, which went much further and
excluded the eating of pig, for instance, as well as "long pig".

Also in this series:

It is a thesis reinforced by the substitution of Man for God of the

World rainforest destruction - the social factors

"Enlightenment" and consequent elevation and separation of humans

Semantical foundations for value theory

from other creatures.

Unravelling the meanings of life

substantially undermined, have for the most part been observed to

Nihilisms and nihilist logics

rest on a tangle of false views and prejudices about the world, its

Nuclear power - ethical, social and political
dimensions

origin, evolution and purposes , and about the creatures that inl~bit

Now that all these positions have been

it, their separateness, and their order (in an a lleged chain of be in g )
Disappearing species and vanishing rainforests:
wrong directions and the philosophical roots
of the problem

with humans at the apex, it is past time that major moral theses that
these positions have sustained are re-examined and reassessed.

The irrefutability of anarchism, enlarged
Up for re-examination are, in particular, all theses that
Roles and limits of paradigms in environmental
thought and action

depend essentially on the common but mistaken assumption that there
is something morally very special or distinctive about simply being
a human, that Homo sapiens

as a species deserves special treatment.

On the contrary, there is no morally relevant distinction between
humans and all other creatures.

Of course there are various morally

relevant distinctions between things, but none concerns the
biological species Homo sapiens.
What holds rather is an annular
1
model which can be depicted schematically as follows:-

3

instance in removing the idea that the wrongness of such practices

2

as cannibalism is not even open to question 3 .

Diagram 1:

High in a list of inherited moral assumptions that are ripe

ANNULAR PICTURE OF MORAL RINGS IN OBJECT SPACE (and the
position of humans).
of
sapiens

for reassessment are those concerning the almost universal ~oral

prohibition of and repugnance to cannibalism, a practice that used
to be extremely widespread, but that has now been almost e;.tirely
extirpated

4

with the very successful cultural conquest of the world

by Western thought.

But instead of the re-examination that should

follow the intellectual erosion of mainstream Western social thought,
the growing recognition of its theoretical inadequacy, not to say
~:Notional labels for the interiors of such
morally relevant rings (or ellipses), from outer
to inner:

Objects of value, objects of moral concern
Objects having well-being
Preference havers, choice makers

Rights holders
Obligation holders, responsibility bearers
Contractual obligation makers

poverty, what has followed is the often shoddy defence of many of its
leading moral theses, mostly on anthropocentric grounds, but sometimes
on other grounds, some of them drawn from contemporary philosophy
(e.g. the conventionalistic rejection of cannibalism of Diamond,
considered below).
Many of the defences preferred of total prohibition of

There are also more comprehensive philosophical reasons

cannibalism are ludicrously weak, and withstand little examination.

for the periodic intellectual review of deeper assumptions (and

Consider, to illustrate, the main argument in (what was until very

prejudices), reasons furnished by dialectics in combination with

recently one of the few books in English on cannibalism) Hogg,

the theory of objects.

namely 'the innate repugnance of contemporary man to touch human

According to the theory of objects there

is no assumption that has to be held,that cannot be disbelieved,

flesh' (p . 188, also earlier) .

while according to dialectics proper every assumption is open to

represented as a matter of fact, it does not appear to hold generally,

questioning and reconsideration by its methods , and assumptions in

and may be largely a matter of background and conditioning.

order to be rationally maintained should withstand such critical
scrutiny.

imply

2

Naturally these (methodological) considerations do not

that assumptions under examination do not (frequently) withstand

critical discussion, or that there are not (or never could be) good
reasons for adhering to them.

But the considerations are important

in opening larger moral assumptions to due reconsideration, for

Insofar as the repugnance is

There

is no evidence that - what seems unlikely given the former prevalence
of cannibalism - it is innate;

and insofar as it is a matter of fact

it does not support moral prohibition of eating human flesh, any more
than the apparently very widespread repugnance of urban Americans

5

4

as observed, it has recently been argued, successfully, that this

to eating raw snake underwrites a moral prohibition on consumption
of raw snake meat.

distinction will not carry very much of the moral weight that has
been imposed upon it. 7

On the other hand, if the repugnance in
With the breakdown of this sharp moral distinction

question is (intended to be) warranted moral repugnance, then the
argument is trivially circular, the premiss assuming the point at

between humans and other species.orthod ox anthropocentr ic options,
which sanction human consumption of animals other than humans but

issue.

never humans, collapse.

One reason why the proferred defences look weak is that it
has not been thought necessary to provide any defence;

for 'Directly

daylight falls on the habit it withers away' 5 - the "daylight" is
that of contemporary Western civilization.
appears in Langton (initial page):

A similar theme

cannibalism is 'a custom that

of civilization' - or, one might say, before the triumph of human

(pure) vegeta!ian options and on the other, cannibal(istic ) options
(mixes of these options which allow some human flesh eating will

it will be seen that by no means all forms of cannibalism are
morally inadmissable.
present exercise.

Showing as much is the main object of the

Though the results arrived at are part of the

process of elaborating a non-chauvinis tic ethics, and accordingly have
implications for policy, no policy conclusions are drawn in what
no recommendatio ns for the implementation , or institution-

The vegetarian options face, it

certainly seems, insuperable difficulties, especially concerning
such issues as animal predation (which is an important, immensely
frequent, and often _<!~~rab.!!'_,

What will be argued is that, on the contrary, when

some daylight does penetrate to the issues concerning cannibalism,

follows:

(at least as regards "higher" creatures) are, on the one side

fall under the latter head).

must soon become extinct all over the world before the great march

chauvinism.

Among the important options left open

ecological fact), and concerning the

reduction in numbers of animals, especially introduced animals, which
build up to "pest proportions" (some reduction is often required for
vegetable growing to operate successfully) .

But it is unnecessary

to elaborate these and connected points here because there are cases where

consumption of human flesh is perfectly admissible.

The main

argument advanced is modelled upon simple inductive arguments: a
base case is argued, and this base is expanded step by step to cover
other cases.

alisation, of cannibalistic practices are made 6.

Hardly necessary to say, better defences of the mainstream
anti-cannibal istic tradition can be devised or pieced together from
the literature than those so far alluded to.
for example, on the assumption of sanctity

Such defences - based,
of all human life, on

the theme that cannibalism is a brutalising experience, which puts
humans in the same category as the brutes - characteristic ally rely
on a sharp distinction between humans and other creatures.

But,

§1.

The Base Cases:

Eating the Dead.

In setting out the first

of these cases it is taken for granted that the practice in some
American states and Canadian provinces of allowing accident victims
(e.g. those of automobile casualties) to consent to the use of parts
of their bodies for organ transplants and also for other medical
purposes is admissible, and that the use itself in such cases is

Restricted forms of cannibalism in the interests of
6

survival are now quite widely accepted as admissible.
admissible 8.

Then, is there any good reason why persons should

So there

is really nothing extravagant at all in contending that sometimes

not similarly consent to the use of their bodies for food upon

cannibalism is perfectly alright:

their death?

fact that the admissible cases lead, naturally and coherently, once

For food transfusions, instead of blood or

transfuslons · or transplants.

plasma

And if they do, or so bequeath

their bodies, why should their bodies not be eaten?

What differences

human chauvinism is properly
cases.

any extravagance is due to the

left behind, to much more controversial

There are several examples of human cannibalism undertaken

there are in the types of cases can be minimized, and those that

for survival, which have won establishment approval, from

remain seem not to make much - or any relevant - moral difference.

or church hierarchies.

For example, in order for human parts to be intially taken and used,

of members of a Uruguayan rugby party who survived an airplane crash

the bodies have to be more or less butchered;

in the high Andes (dramatised by Read).

but then they may be

in much less pretty shape after a serious accident.

Again, in each

typ e of case, the parts may - or may not - be supplied to people
who are in genuine need;

etc.

Nor does internal ingestion appear

to differ, in any way that matters morally, from internal connection,
from organ transplantation.

It could be objected that with an organ

transplant a specific organ is required, whereas with a starving
or undernourished person alternative sources of food are - or ought

legal

A striking recent example is the cannibalism

Their eating of dead

companions, evidently necessary for survival, was condoned by the
Catholic Church of Uruguay and by other prominent Catholic thinkers.
Interestingly, Rubio, Auxiliary Bishop of Montevideo, justified such
cannibalism, necessary for survival, through a medical transplant
comparison 10
.•• Eating someone who has died in order to survive
is incorporating their substance, and it is quite
possible to compare this with a graft. Flesh
survives when assimilated by someone in extreme need,

to be - available.

But where the parts are used for nonspecific

just as it does when an eye or heart of a dead man
is grafted onto a living man ••. (as quoted in Read, p. 308).

medical testing, e.g. cell culture, or just disposed of (e.g. by
But the Bishop tactfully rejected, except 'as a source of inspiration',
incineration) without any other use, the specific need consideration
the equivalence, appealed to by some members of the team, between
does not work.

Anyway what would it show?
eating the flesh of their friends and participating in communion, as

The claim staked is accordingly this:_ where the human
initiated by Christ at the Last Supper, where he (figuratively) shared
eaten is dead, and certain other conditions are satisfied, cannibalism

his flesh and blood with his apostles (Read, p.309;
is admissr e.

also p. 299).

The other conditions~ comprise such things as
Exactly why this correlation, which undoubtedly helped the survivors,

the following:

that the whole thing is done decently (in ways,
gets discounted, remains tantalisingly obscure.

that is .

LO

be spelled out specifically); that the person eaten

consented (or, differently, would consent) to being eaten, perhaps
by the parties concerned, or more strongly that the person directed
tha t he or .;he be eaten (or otherwise used); or differently again,
tha t the ~onsumption was necessary for survival or well-being. etc.

seems worth pursuing further.

The correlation

For though survival was not a problem

9

Suc h d es pi cable motives as those of the ge t-even s yndrome ("we'll

8

fix the ba s t a rd, we'll eat him") are pointl ess (as well as stup id l y
for the apostles at the Last Supper (so destroying a strict
correlation), survival is not the only basis justifying the eating
of human flesh.

As with blood, the gift relation is another

v i ndi c tiv e ) wh e re the part y is already dead.
It can be argued that eating certain pieces of human flesh
out of respect is an exceptional case (like eating a fellow creature
to avoid starvation), and that a general principle of respect for

important basis.
A consent or bequeathal clause 11 is important in under-

the dead overrides

any consent that may be given.

The short

cutting various objections to the consumption of dead humans, for

answe r to this is, firstly, that grantin g of exceptional cases alr eady

in s tance, that it is an affront to human dignity, that it is a mark

allows that some cases of cannibalism are admissible, and secondly ,

of total d isr espec t, that the 'sanctity of the human being' is

that no general principle applies in a decisive way to exclude the

compl e tely disregarded (Hp. 186), that it is impious (Dp. 467).

exampl es alr ea dy considered.

Fo r if the person consents it can hardly be an affront to that

general principles can always be thwarted, it is instructive to consider

per s on's dignity, or violate that person's sanctity (as seen from

one po int of view).

Nor is it an affront to the dignity of creatures

of an irreligious cast, for whom a dead body whether of a human or an

animal is a d ead body - though perhaps a dead body of a fellow creature
o r of a friend.

So it is an affront only to those of particular

( religious) groups, perhaps the same groups for whom dead human bodies
are sacred and their disfigurement by humans (whether for medical or
5
other purposes) impious .

Just as it is legitimate for one to discount

the often illfounded views of such groups - insofar as the views are
int ended to have universal applicability - as regards medical use of
(forme rly ) consenting humans, as regards sexual relations, abortion,
e uthanasia, and so forth, so it is legitimate to discount them in

the case at hand.

Dev ine ' s argument against cannibalism, namely as a paradigmatic

applica tion of his overflow principle.

On the contrary, the eating of certain parts of the bodies of dead
humans was, amon g certain tribes who used to practice cannibalism,

for it was thought that in that way

the eaters could acquire or participate in some of the (former) virtues
o f the dead , e. g . wisdom, strength, hunting skills, etc.
still be, that eating is not disrespectful:

So it can

what is sometimes dis-

respectful is raising for food nnd killing, e.g. in order to ent.

The overflow principle~ formed

-chiefly to cope with the treatment of animals, is this:

Act towaPds that which, while not itself
a pePson, is clos ely associated with pePsonhood in a way cohePent with an attitude of
Pespect fop pePsons (Vp . 503) .
Instead of arguing directly for the principle, Devine suggests firstl y
that it may be argued for in rule-cons equ e ntial fashion, secondly tha t
it may be made plausible as part of a way of life having respect for
persons at its centre, and thirdly that th e prin ciple is well ensconced
in the moral consciousness of the plain man.

Each of these suggestions

can be faulted both in general and as regards the relevant application.
For instance, plain men mostly do not object to the bulldozing of old
cemeteries to make way for a development.

Nor need the eating of a dead human be a mark of disrespect.

an act of consider a ble res pect;

To illustrate how application of suc h

On the other hand, the

principle can be rendered analytic by taking up the slack

in

"associated with" and "coherent with" appropriately - only then it
won't yield the relevant substantive application.

In application of

the principle Devine makes two alternative moves.

First,

11

It is by no means obvious, however, that a cons~n

10

is required.

similarly if it is going to be incinerated and the ashes s pread,
it might better be carefully composted.

The point ma de does not exclude organ transplants, eating, and so

ecological alternatives to burial or cremation.

The most the overflow principle

The suggestion that the already dead can, at least in

s e ems to show, under this move, is - what does not exclude consumption,

certain circumstances, be eaten without moral qualm, innocuous though

and what one may well concur with - that the dead (and not merely
the human dead) ought to be eaten respectfully;

it is, is liable to spark off a series of protests.

and even this much

some ugly scenes could result i f "long pig" caught on;

is not shown if the tense change, the transformation from alive to
dead, destroys the requisite closeness of association.

outback Australia) competing to pick up "accident" victims.

ambulances or tow trucks, are readily enough avoided (by suitable

body, which forms the visible aspect of the
bulk of persons with whom we are acquainted,
and which persists when the person ceases to
exist in death. (Vp. 593)

organization), and more respectful practices adopted.

would, if the objection is to have force - lead to what is normally

a~sumcs, overflow to the subsequently dead body (which is no longer

inadmissible, for example, to a perverse lust for human flesh, and

And again respectful eating
be

marketable commodities, if there was commerce not just in human
flesh. but in bags, shoes, and belts made from human hides, decorations

from human bones and teeth, glue and fertilizer from other parts and
so on

12

in the way that there is commerce in animal parts?

Perhaps, disre sp ec t wo uld be an outcome, but perhaps for the wrong
re aso ns.

What s ee ms clear is that giving human flesh to the ne edful,

s ~y , i s one thing, a llowing commerce in human parts is another.

More serious

is the objection that such "admissible cannibalism" could - or rather

ov e rflow to thl' llvlng body docs not however guarantee, what Devine

Wouldn't disrespect be inevitable if human parts become

But

these types of scenes, which can already occur with competing

... respect for persons overflows to the human

to dead bodies.

e.g. the

the way that refrigerated trucks follow the kangaroo shooters in

some heavy assumptions as to features of persons, reveals:

could, it appears, be coherent with the alleged overflow of respect

It is true that

spectacle of the refrigerated vans patrolling the highways (in much

Devine

assumes it does not, as his second move which begins to buy into

the "visible aspect" of a person).

so in nci cher

case is value diminished, it seems, by (respectful) cannibalism or

ordinary garbage (in the literal sense) is not

eaten (except in desperation, etc.).

A dead body does nee have

the value of the person whose body it is in life;

Garbage is commonly thrown away, things in these end uses

are mostly not;

For i f a body is going to be buried and "eat,~" by

bacteria, or various carnivores, it might as well be eaten;

although a dead body is not a person, still
the fact that it (so to speak) was a person
means that it ought not to be treated like
ordinary garbage (Vp. 503).

forth.

clause

perhaps, thereby to the deliberate killing of humans for food.

Hogg

makes much of the first of these points, the (unintended) impression
he gives being that human flesh is so delicious that it is highly
addictive.

Whether this is so or not (it would seem unlikely with

a preponderance of older stringier humans, though the number of
"battery humans" is increasing).it appears not to matter, unless it

does lead to what would be more disconcerting, e.g. the establishment
of a black market or the like in human flesh, with inputs from killer
or Mafia syndicates.

But the problem is not substantially different

13

12

of our unwillingness to kill people for food or other purposes,

from problems that already arise with the treatment of animals
(e.g. traffic in rare species), and over the distribution of
dangerous drugs to humans, and can be met in similar ways, i.e.
through a similar range of political or organizationa l options.
The usual utilitarian defence of vegetarianism based on
suffering, pain, and the like caused in raising and killing creatures
for food, co llapses. 13

For no direct suff~ring, pain or the like

occurs, with the creatures eaten already dead;

and any sorts of

suffering that might be marshalled among some of the still living
who are pained by the consumption can be more than compensated for

by th e alleviation of suffering of the meat consumers, for a suitable

and secondly not a (direct) consequence of our unwillingness to
cause distress to people - not that it always would (contrary to
Diamond's assumption) - but rather 'what conditions our attitude
to not dining on ourselves is the view that a person is not something
The argument turns however on a slide on the

mi.ddl.e term 'something to eat' which is ambiguous between (i) something
that may be eaten and (ii) something that is eaten;

In the second

sense the justification given of the fact dead people are not eaten,
namely people are not eaten,

while in a sense "logically adequate"

is trivial, and proves no requisite grounding, and the "justification "
does not imply that dead people may not be eaten.

In the first sense,

a nontrivial justification is offered, that it is impermissible

choice of consumers.
to eat people,but in this case we cend to repeat the initial question;

Some vegetarians however (rightly) reject utilitarian
defenses;

Diamond, in particular, tries to argue that they involve

'fundamental confusions about the moral relations between people and

people and between people and animals ' (Dp. 465), and introduces
instead

convent ionalist arguments - unfortunately of wide philosophical

appea l - against eating people.

Some of the reasons for not eating

people, she subsequently argues, extend to grounds for not eating
animals either.

Diamond's argument begins from

certain quite central facts ... We do not eat
our dead, even when they have died in auto-

mobile accidents or been struck by lightning • .. (Dp. 467)
An

immediate objection is that this is little more than a local fact,

Why is it?

Diamond has a surprising answer:

in effect that it is

analytic on, or at least a consequence of, our notion of what a

person or human being is.
••• it is not respect for our interests which
is involved in our not eating each other . These
are all things which go to determine what sort of
concept 'human being' is

it is one of those

things which go to build our notion of human
beings (Opp. 469-70).
But such a thing as not eating other people is certainly not part of
the concept 'human being', indeed it is not merely ~ot analytic or
normic (near-analytic ) of human beings,it is not even true of them -

good for certain ' we ' but by no means generally, as the history of

given that, on well-authentic ated evidence, cannibalism was formerly

canniba lism shows.

widespread, and that it still persists in isolated place s today.

It is equally a fact in the context of quite

extensive groups, that

.EE~L2o not eat l'i~.·

So either the central

fact has to be morally grounded or has to have moral consequences.

The second option would involve a prescriptive fallacy (deduction of
an ought from an is);
followin g fashion:-

in any case, Diamond tries the first, in the
The fact is, firstly, not a (direct) consequence

The answer is, in short, radically unsatisfactory .

That this is

15

Tt may s eem ... I should find myself havin g
t o jus tify slav e ry. For do we not learn - if

14

we liv e in a slav e soci e ty - what slaves ar e

the answer Diamond is offering is however at once confirmed by how
she goes on (writing in speciesist assumptions 15 in the same
revolting fashion):

and what masters are through the structure of
a life in which we are here and do this, and
they are there and do that?
Do we not learn
the difference between a master and a slave
that way? (Dp. 470)
Diamond does not manage to escape these difficulties, though sh e

And so too - very much so - [built into the
notion] the idea of the difference between
human beings and animals. We learn what a
human being is in - among other things sitting at a table where WE eat THEM.
We
16
are around the table and they are on it
(Dp. 470) .
While we may learn something about what some human beings - not

makes various attempts (p. 470 and especially pp. 476-7):
the notion of a slave or an enemy or an
outlaw assumes a background of response to

persons, and recognition that what happens in
these cases is that we have something which
;;;;-;;,::-e not treating as what it - in a way - is

( Dp. 476).

vegetarians - are like in this way, in the way we can learn what
But this is to assume a background of norms, of how things morally
some other human beings are like from cannibal feasts where

11

we"

are, that a person is not something to enslave, etc. (and to attempt
are on the table as well as around it, we learn little of the
once more to build a presupposed morality into conv entional facts).
notion of human being in this way.

Nor does what correct information
Furthermore, as this reveals, the same ploy could be worked in the

we acquire in this way provide a firm basis for moral judgements
case of animals, namely that in hunting them, killing them, serving
about the possibility of eating humans, though Diamond appears to
them up for dinner, we are ~ treating them as what - in a way think that it does;

for she later says that the source of moral
they are (or, more accurately, as they mora lly

deserve treating).

life derives from ways in which we mark what human life is (Dp. 418),
Such comparisons make it evident then what Diamond is about, and that
another move which involves a prescriptive fallacy, as well as
he r conventionalistic approach fails.
obvious anthropoce ntri cit y .
However, to remove objections to eating the already dead,
Indeed many of the sorts of conventional patterns of response
under specified conditions, is simply to avoid, rather than face up
a nd conventional facts that Diamond alludes to are a fairly direct
to, the real opposition to even qualified cannibalism.

For an

o utcome of human chauvinism, e.g. that drivers mostly stop for
important part of the real opposition to qualified canniba lism relies
injured humans, not for injured animals, that humans are commonly
upon illicit assimilation of cases of eating already dead people
given funerals, animals mostly not.

Diamond needs to say, and
with killing humans for food, and, differently again, rearing some

proceeds to say, that these sorts of differences are appropriate,
but that is to slide to a value judgement which concedes to he rself
part of what is at issue.
Diamond's approach encounters serious difficulties when
applied to such matters as slavery, the treatment of outlaws and
enemies

of them, e.g. certain infants, for food .
and in an obvious sense ! .!1.~~~.,

Thus Devine's ambiguous,

17

what is entire l y different, permitting the killin g of humans for
16
food, or to, what is different again, the deliberate raisin g of
human s for food.
claim that 'a meat diet requires that animals be killed' (Vp. 483).
And thus Diamond again,

the cases are entirely different.

involved both rearing and slaughtering

Swift's "proposal"

of children for food.

Nor is the base position so far reached a new one, but an
ancient proposition.

it i s one thin g morally to eat an already dead deer,

another to let a deer die and then eat it, another again to shoo t

What we should be going against in adopting
Swift 's "Modest proposal" is something one
should be going against in salvaging the dead,
more generally useful organs for transplantation, and the rest for supper or the compost
heap.
(Dp. 469) 17
Not a t all:

animals:

The differences are already clea r as rega rds

For instance, Chrysippus,

the Stoic, in his

or otherwise kill it and then (perhaps) eat it, and yet another to
eat a deer raised (in one or another of very different ways) for
food.

Within each of these different categories, it is important

to distinguish cases.

For while eating a dead human, even after

it has been allowed to die (by omission), may be admissible, killing
humans for food is often not, and raising a human for food (and other
goods) is, it is now generally assumed by humans, certainly not.

treatise On Justice, 'permitt ed eating of the corpses of the dead• 18

There are several separate issues here, in particular the

So also apparently did Diogenes in his Republic, Zeno in his Republic,

~~ban~ or raising for food issue, on which much literature on

and Cleanthes, all of whom may have authorised cannibalism on a

the moral basis of vegetarianism has in fact focussed, and the

broader scale.

general l?I~'!_ati~ issue, which includes matters of killing and letting
die.

Limited extensions of cannibalism beyond the base cases, where

humans are allowed to die or are killed .
eat ing of (certain of) their parts .

Eating dead humans involves

But if eating such parts is (often)

The issues are separate because creatures may be killed for

food, e.g . in hunting, though they are not raised for food, and
conversely creatures may be raised for food (or treated as slaves)
without, for one reason or another, being killed.

Cases of humans

admiss ibl e , then so also presumably is consumption of such parts when

raising humans for food have apparently never occurred, though humans

they are (irrevocably or freely) severed from a living human, e.g.

have sometimes been fed up for the pot (e.g. in the Aztec empire and in Fiji).

ea ting the amputated limb of a friend or enemy or drinking the blood

Humans are the only creatures we in fact know who might (having l ost consider-

donated by another,

able touch with the natural world) just adopt such a practice:

These rather special cases, involving (what is

no other

ca lled, for s h o r t ) ~ human parts, provide a first set of extensions

animals ever raise creatures for food, not did cannibalistic cu ltures

of the base cases.

ever apparently raise humans for food.

These extensions include some bizarre cases, in

particular where the part concerned is one's own.

However, allowing the eating of dead humans and nonlive
hum~ n parts under certai n conditions offers no slippery slide to,

It is a serious and difficult

question (to which moral philosophers have not sufficiently addressed
themselves) why it is that if humans are not under !!.!!i'. conditions
entitled to raise other humans for food, they are entitled under many

19

18

th e gene ral i ss ue as to wh e n, or wh e n prec i se l y , killin g f o r food

i s jus tifiable can be largely skirt ed.

For it is justifiable , it is

conditions - indeed, it is often assumed, under a sweeping ra~

th e n claimed, whe n and only when killing itself i s justified, whe ne ve r

of factory conditions - to raise other animals for food?

that is.

They

can only be justified in so doing if there are significant and

While one half of the italicised equivalence is uncontrover s ial -

relevant differences between humans and other creatures raised,

if killing for food (or for purpose P) is permissible, so is what it

or that might be raised, for human or animal food.

involves, killing - the converse is not.

Yet there are,

For consider some circum-

it has already been pointed out, no such appropriate species-wide

stances (assuming you can find them) where killing of person x is

differences.

justifie d, e.g. in war, in retribution, in self-defence, in r e ducin g g reat

A fresh start can be made on the issue from a cannibalistic
perspective.

evil.

Since it is not eating human f l e s h ~ that is

Th e n killing x for these reasons is not killing for food, even

if x is in fact subsequently eaten.

There is an important intensional

wrong, what is it that is wrong, if anything, with raising humans

difference, so that being justified in killing x for some crime say ,

or other creatures for food?

does not justify killing him for food, much as thinking of killing him

or is it both?
both.

Is it the raising, or is it the killing,

The answer is, of course, that trouble lies with

for the one reason is very different from thinking of killing him for

Raising of creatures frequently has one or both of two

dama ging features accompanying it:

first,

the other purpose.

deprivation of the

What can be argued given the permissibility of- eating dead

rai s ed creatures, and secondly, treatment of the raised animal

humans, is that where killing of z is permissible, cannibalism of z

merely as a means (not as an end).

is also IN FACT permissible.

The second, attitudinal,

difference may have little or no impact beyond the first.

For example, if infanticide i s alri ght

under certain conditions (as Tooley contends, and others have hinted),

And the

first may be avoided, e.g. whe re the creatures stay by choice but

then in fact cannibalism of infants is alright also under the given

could depart if they wished.

conditions (but the issues as regards the raising of infants for fo od

Kept geese, for instance, may be in

that position; they are seemingly not deprived, but may live in rather

are, of course, not thereby resolved).

natural conditions (except that migration and much that goes with it

is permissible can, to this limited extent, be bypassed.

II

has been lost).

Thus the issue of when killing

It is worth elaborating these points, since important

Killing involves something different again:

extensions - not the only extensions - of cannibalism beyond the base

all that

goes with removing of a life, the termination of projects, purposes,

cases depend upon them, and since - very differently - they furnish

associations of value, etc. (and also the definitive end of con-

clear cases of inadmissible cannibalism.

sciousness, etc.).

of situations to distinguish:-

With the predation issue also, a central issue

ls as to when killing an animal for food is permissible.

It may

be thought indeed that the killing for food issue just is, or is
t a ntamount to, the general issue of killing, and that accordingly

•

There are several clas se s

21

survive themselves, the survivors of an aircrash in a remote area,
20

people on a life raft, etc.

Such examples, where defensible, as they

sometimes are, provide a further class of examples of admissible

la.

Killing , causing to die, is impermissible.

cannibalism - what might be called exceptional cannibalism, since the

lb.

Letting die (passive killing, as it is sometimes
misleadingly , but conveniently , called) is

circumstances are, at present anyway, among higher mammals, rather

impermissible .

exceptional .

Then, in either case , killing or letting die for eating or followed by

An important and often times questionable practice, which

eating is also impermissible, by preceding principles (essentially

can in principle at any rate, deliver exceptional examples 20 , is

~Pp ➔ ~P (p & q)),

hunting (in the intransitive form, which involves capture or killing

So in particular it is where the creature is of

the same species.

That is, cannibalism is in these cases inadmissible .

But some of these cases are clear;

for instance, where creature (or

if the object sought is duly located).

Men continue to hunt in the

French fields, and sometimes still their own species 21 , not at present

human) x is leading a worthwhile nonaggressive independent and pro-

in the shape of enemy soldiers , but those cast as outlaws (manhunts) .

ductive life in a peaceful countryside.

(Intransitive) Hunting divides into several types, according to its

2a.

Killing is permissible.

2b.

Letting die is permissible.

end purpose, for sport , for food, for extermination, for capture.

Hunting humans for sport (hunting for "sport " , so called, typically

In common reckoning there are many examples of both second classes,

involves killing) is a practice that has persisted well into this

"passive" infanticide, suicide and gambling with life, euthanasia,

century, in Australia for example .

killing or allowing to die to maximise community values where there

though it can be given philosophical support by chauvinistic theories

are large numbers of people or choices between them, execution and

such as a limited and racially prejudiced group-utilitarianism or by

assassination, self-defence , killing in war (the list follows roughly

appeal to the "ideal" of pure subspecies (the stud ideal).

t he later chapter headings in Glover, where these well-known types

such hunting is impermissible, so, for the same sorts of reasons, is

of examp les are set out in some detail).

the hunting of many animals for sport .

In all these types of cases,

It has nothing to recommend it,

But if

Hunting otherwise, except for

death can be followed by eating, provided the base class conditions

capture, is a restricted form of killing, and to what extent it is

are satisfied .

permissible turns on when that sort of killing is permissible .

In such cases, henceforth called de facto extensions,

cannibalism is also in fact admissible .

The position arrived at thus far is pulled together in rhe

Almost always the killing or letting die in 2a and 2b is
not spec ifically for eating.
conjoined:

Eating the resulting dead is simply

th e source of food is adventitious.

Sometimes, however,

in unusual circumstances some members of a party of the one species

kill certain members of the party or allow them to die in order to

fo ll owing diagram, which subsequent sections (and parts) endeavol1r to
fil l out and render more precise:-

23

§3.
22

Unavoidable detours:

when is killing a creature wrong, and

when is letting a creature die wrong?

It is not necessary, nor is

it easy or desirable, to avoid entirely the issues of when killing
Diagram 2:

TYPES OF ADMISSIBLE AND INADMISSIBLE CANNIBALISM

is wrong and when killing for food is wrong, and when such kinds of

l(

,-

killing are not wrong .

Type 1 cases (exemplified
e.g. in hunting for sport)

- - -- ___ _]
Base case

I

,<

conditions
fail

I

X

other than rather weak or circular principles.

had seemed to be clear turn out on further reflection to be much l ess

,<

obvious.

\

ESSENTIAL /
,-...__ _ _ _ _ _'-! \ PREDATION..,,

For example, it had seemed evident that the onus of

jus tification (where this makes sense) characteristically lay with the

WATERSHED

J(.

XCEPTIONAL EXTENSIONS

Worse, things chat

INADMISSIBLE
ADMISSIBLE

BASE
CASES

But it is not so easy to elicit or to defend

action-taking party;

\t
'I,(

that it is the killing or removal of life that

muse be justified, not the letting live.

Some things, however, are

clearer .

'J{

NONLIVE
EXTENSIONS

First and foremost, a satisfacto ry (nonchauvinistic) a c count

K

-J
KILLING BOUNDARY

of when and why killing a creature is wrong won't make exceptions for

REARING FOR SLAUGHTER BOUNDARY

humans and, more generally, won't contain the term 'human' or logical

So far, in considering examples of killing, issue has not

equivalents.

This important requirement disposes of much of the

been taken with enlightened conventional wisdom, with the result chat

philosophical literature.

a serious , and perhaps unwarranted, discrepancy between the treatment

(9p. 135-9), which refer to the (contractual) conditions for human

dished out to animals and that accorded humans is beginning to emerge.

social life (the mixed account given should be faulted on several other

So the judgements made tend to follow conventional practice:

grounds as well).

killing

It wipes out, for example, Ewin's attempts

Similarly it removes the main condition eventually

humans for food is admitted but happens only in exceptional circumstances,

achieved in Glover (a whole text devoted to moral issues concerning

killing

killing, which fails to present, or seriously address, the matter of

animals for food is a pervasive practice.

More generally,

killing animals for food is considered permissible in a wide range of
circumstances where killing humans is not , yet on what solid grounds?

.

As regards killing, even enlightened conventional moral wisdom returns
us to the heartlands of human chauvinism.

necessary and sufficient conditions for when killing is wrong) .

The

first main condition Glover arrives at is that ' taking human life
is normally directly wrong:

that most acts of killing people would be

J/

To avoid it, the matter of

wrong in the absence of harmful side-effects' (Gp . 42), i.e . so long

killing and letting die will have (like most moral issues) to be

as 'the best total outcome' does not involve killing (cf. p . 286), to

reconsidered, nonchauvinistically.

set down the underlying utilitarian recipe .

Other conditions Glover

outlines - similarly unacceptable even to their author when 'animal'
replaces 'human' - are likewise faulted as damagingly cha,·vinistic,

25

24

for instance that it is wrong to kill a human whose life is worth

l iv i ng (Gp . 53) , whenever that is.

e . g. burning a collection of seeds (er seedlings) is one thing, burning

Secondly , unremarkably, most of the recipes suggested in the

a forest is another, slicing up or eating a raw egg is one thing, slicing

literature are defective, first among them utili t arian proposals , which,

as is well-known can sanction unjust killing. 22

up or eating an eagle is another, etc.

Other (non- utilitarian)

potential ys me rit the same consideration as ys, as if th ey we r e ys.

recipes are also problematic, as a proposal by Young, wh i ch will he l p

Call the r.esult of making the required deletio n, th e

us on our way, serves to indicate:

modified proposal .
. . . what makes killing another person [more genera lly a

considered .

realisation either of the victim's life purposes or of
such life- purposes as the victim may reasonably have been

narrower utilitarian frameworks and induces a decided circularity,

The proposa l requires some brief explanation.

The term ' unjust ' , which takes the proposal outside

is qualified in the final proposal (p.519) by 'maximally' , the point

expected to resume or to come to have (Yp.518; repeated
p.519 with 'maximally ' included).

of which (though it is not fully explained) is to permit killing or
The qualifying term

sacrificing of one person in order to save others .

'irrevocable' is inserted to separate killing from life imprisonment

I

It is the modified proposal that will be chiefly

creature] wrong on occasions is its characte r as an

irrevocable, [maximally] unjust preventing of their

I

It is a popular fallacy that

which may, as a matter of fact , defeat the prisoner ' s purposes .

The long

some members of a group (on a lifeboat or from a remote airplane crash)

final disjunction is designed to delegitimize killing of sometime comatose

are sacrificed for, or by, others of the group .

persons (it also would include people undergoing reform programs) -

-,hat is ac counled [maximally] unjust.

an additional clause is required - and killing of potential future

in way, and almost (but not) captial punishment.

debatable judgements , such as that in the common case (on Young ' s

ified' (p . 528) ,
ified.

23

from which it follows that abortion is commonly unjust-

The disjunct should, it certainly seems, be deleted -

especially since what justifies the main part of Young ' s proposal,
considerations of what has value, does not justify the final disjunct,
because merely potential persons do not appear to have requisite value,

though they might (or might not) come to have such.

Generally, potential

ys do not have the same range of features (including acquired value, etc.)

ll

Similarly what

one is entitled t o do , or feels like doing with r espect to them may differ;

If , however, there

are no just wars then most killing in war is wrong;

and if punishment

by death is sometimes just , capital punishment is sometimes not wr.ong.
If, for instance, a person's life purposes are sufficiently evil~ e.g.

they include genocide, then their fulfilment is certainly pro1, ~ rJ y ,

justly, thwarted.

0 1·

Thus some proviso as to the chara c t e r or qua lit y

of life purposes , such as the term 'unjustly ' obliquely supplies , is
essential (but often omitted in ethical discussions) .

It is not

evident however that killing such a person (as distinct, e.g. from
imprisonment , re-education, etc.) is permissible, exc ept perhaps in
worst cases.

~ • what they become if their potential is realised .

For example, Young claims

(Ypp.520-1) that the proposal lets through various types of killing

persons such as infants and foetl1ses - thereby writing in some very

has only 'morally trivial or no moral support abortion will be unjust-

But generally what

the proposal permits and what it excludes depends critically upon

cases already apparently covered, so that it is not obvious that such

construal of 'moral') where the expressed wish of the pregnant woman

The qualification

makes way for certain cases of cannibalism, for instance those where

I
26

Ther e is no good r eason to restrict the proposal to
persons , and Young does not intend to.

27
Many killings of animals

constitute , he t ells us (Yp.526), maximally unjust prevention of
their realisation of life purposes, and accordingl y are wrong.
' Killing such animals for food is only justifiable when no adequate

of other crea tures).

acts are avoided.

food supply is available and food i s needful' (Yp . 526), in which
event, presumably, justice prevails.

A characteris tic remnant of

Further it is simply assumed - though it

could no doubt be argued (rather as below) - that requisite unjust

Young's proposal as applied has bite;

human chauvinism also intrudes , with Young a ppealing to the ' greater

eschewing killing of creatures for food. 25

range of life-purpose s normally human beings have' (Yp.527, italics

that the modified proposal has bite:

amended) ; 24

and thereby smuggling in a greater value assumptio n as

regards humans.

Here, as elsewl1ere also , the account of when killin g

is wrong is progressive ly l oaded , almost manipulated , to yield the
sought r esults :

in particular , what is unjust - including which

killings are unjust and which class of life-purpos es are more valuable relevant to det e rmining maximal injustice - are bot h open to rigging.

These points help to bring out too how back of Young's
accoun t and application s of his proposal lie more basic consideratio ns
of justice and value (and it is to such considera tions that we should

no doubt eventually turn).

Consider, for instance, the route to the

permissibil ity of systematic cullings of a herd.

Wants , now substituting for li fe -purpose s , are simply supposed to be
summed up utilitarian- fashion, except th at (somewhat as with Mill ' s
utilitariani sm) a weighting is imposed to reflect the respective

values of different wants (those of humans, e . g ., as opposed to those

It is an illusion however

the bite all turns on Young's

cunning application , since the modified proposal itself reduces to near
tautologous ness.
purposes occur?

taken.

For when does irrevocable

prevention of a life's

When, and only when (since it is irrevocable) that life is

So the modified proposal reduces effectively to

AP. Killing x is wrong iff taking x's life is maximally unjust.
But killing x is, according to OED, causing the death of x, which is
tantamount, in terms of sense, to taking the life of x.

And what is

wrong is, according to OED again, what is unjust, and would be, if the
OED were sharpened 1,1p a little, what is maximally unjust.

Whence the

adjusted proposal, AP.

The

proposal does not rule out killings which have the
effect overall of fostering th e wants of the largest
subset of some group like a wild herd where otherwise
the wants of an even larger subset will be thwarted.
Systematic cullings in the absence of feasible
alternative s, therefore, may be morally pe rmissible. (Yp.527)

for example, it

would oblige most of us to adopt a largely vegetarian life-style

We have come round a circle, but much was glimpsed on the
way, so the circuitous route was not without its rewards.

By

working through other l ess chauvinistic accounts of the wrongness
of killing (e.g. the nonchauvin istic base of Ewin's account) we can
come a similar circular way and arrive at the same fairly stable
result.

Moveover, in the adjusted proposal we do have an account,

not yet a hi ghly usable account, since circular, but an account

nonetheless .

In terms of this account clear cases where cannibalism

is morally inadmissable can be distinguishe d, for example as follows:
Cannibalism of x is wrong wherever it involves maximally unjust
taking of x's life.

Conversely, there are many cases where

28

the killing of one creature by another creature is, because not
maximally unjust, quite permissible;

29

e.g. certain instances of

killing in self-defenc e, exceptional cannibalism , abortion, etc .

But if the creature is killed, then it is dead, so by the earli er

Now let x and y be of the same species, say Homo Sapiens:

argument it is permissible to eat it (under certain conditions) .

CAP provides exact conditions for when cannibalism is wrong, in

So there are many cases where killing a creature and then eating it,

cases where cannibalism involves killing.

or its then being eaten, are permissible .

conditions are satisfied;

If some of the many cases

of permissible killing are, as they seem to be, cases of killing a

then

Sometimes these

often they are not.

Sorting out when

they are, and when they are not, will occupy many a controversi al

creature of the same species, then active cannibalism involving
killing is, in such cases, permissible .

The argument needs of

course filling out in crucial respects, especially by some enumeration

of types of cases where killing is permissible , and a sub-listing of
cases where these are intra-specie s killings.

Would this suffice?

However, it

of the) distinction between killing and letting die, by blurring or rejecting the distinction on which it is based~ that betweem omission and

One question is whether the account

determines (even in its circular way) the precise conditions under
which killing for food can permissibly occur.

Letting die is not the same as (active) killing .

has recently become fashionable to try to remove the (moral significance

The question reduces

commission (or else it is pretended that it is frightfully difficl1lt
to make this distinction s out, etc.).

Rejection of the omission/

commission distinction appears to rest on a mix of fallacious moves:-

to the logical issue of whether AP as a strong logical equivalence

FMl. A some to all argument,

warrants intersubsti tutivity in more highly intensional frames such

FM2. A confusion of the thesis that the distinction is morally

as those declaring purposes.

Though I've tended to vacillate on

this issue, my feeling increasingly is that substitutiv ity is warranted,

important with the quite different thesis that only commi.ssions can

be morally blameworthy and that omissions are morally guiltless (the

the reason being that the equivalence of AP is of virtually synonymity

position reportedly held by some religious groups in the past).

strength, which legitimates replacement in all but quotational (type)

FM3. An extensional approach to nonextensio nal differences .

sentence contexts.

But purpose sentence contexts, such as' ... for

eating' are not quotational .

FAP.

Hence it follows using AP that

Killing x for food purposes is wrong iff taking
x's life for food is maximally unjust,

heavily upon the fact that there are some cases where it is morally
difficult to distinguish between certain commissions and certain

and that
CAP.

These points are considered briefly in turn:-

ad FMl. Those attempting to discredit the distinction usually rely

y's killing x for (and followed by) eating is wrong
iff y's taking x's life for eating is maximally

unjust.

omissions, e.g. that in appropriate circumstanc es exposing the baby

may be little different morally from directly smothering it.

(The

Greeks believed it wasn't but that was because exposure gave the gods
a chance to intervene and save from death those who were fated to

perform especially important tasks).

r
JO

But the fact that there a r c ~ cases where the

JI

distinctio n is not of great moral significan ce does not show that
it

is dispensabl e.

In order to show that lt is dispensabl e it is

extension ality assumption which removes scope.

The principle

necessa ry to show that there are no cases where it is needed, that

appears to be that failing to provide a condition which would have

for all cases failing to provide a condition which would prevent

been causally responsibl e for preventing x is morally equivalent to

~x is (morally) equivalent to providing a condition for x.

providing a condition which is causally responsibl e for x .

But

Moral

it is easy to produce some cases where the distinctio n seems
to be

equivalenc e requires interchang eability witin deonitic contexts,

essential if we are to account for what we wish intuitivel y to
say.

indeed it could be characteri sed in terms of such substituti bility .

For example, to take a case those who wish to abolish the distinctio
n

The equivalenc e yielded is of the form -F-x

are fnnd nf appealing to, we may wish to say that the people who did

commonly falls, especially where Fis not extensiona l.

not attempt to help in the Kitty Genovese case were morally culpable,

moveover that the causal responsib ility functor is not extension al,

perhaps to a high degree, but few of us would wish to say that their

and that such a principle fails for it.

moral culpabilit y was exactly the same or of exactly the same kind
as that of the murderer, and that they should equally be brought to
trial on murder ch~rges.

Or, to take another case, placing poison

in your husband ' s tea is not the moral equivalent of failing to
give

him the antidote when he has placed it in himself.

In order to say

+->

Fx.

But such a principle
It is clear

Though letting die differs significan tly, then, from killing,
conditions upon when it is wrong may be reached in similar ways.
How the condition for letting die correspond ing to AP should go becomes
rather more obvious if the righthand side of AP is expanded to:
taking (the) action which terminates x's life is maximally unjust.

what is evident in such cases, some equivalent of the omission/c
ommission

The parallel passive condition can th en presumably be formulated

distinctio n is needed .

thus:-

ad FM2. But the thesis that the distinctio n is needed and is morally

DP.

significan t in many, or at l e a s t ~ , cases must be clearly dis-

which continues x ' s life is maximally unjust. 26

tinguished from the very much stronger thesis that all omissions
are blameless, and that any commission s are morally open ~o blame
- or praisewort hy.

This thesis is, rather plainly, indefensib le,

yet has been responsibl e for much of the bad light in which appeal
to distinctio n appears .
ad FMJ.

Then in turn, substituti on principles again yield clauses EDP and CDP,
correspond ing to EAP and CAP, special cases of which yield conditions
under which cannibalism is wrong where it involves letting die.
Principle CDP which supplies this condition, where x and y are of
the same species, runs as follows:-

The principle of moral symmetry between omissions and

commission s is in fact refutable.

Letting x die is wrong iff refraining from taking (the) action

It appears to be based on an

CDP.

y ' s letting x die for eating purposes is wrong iff y's refraining

from taking (the) action which continues x's life, for purposes of
eating x, is maximally unjust.

Since letting die is, for the most

32

part, less heinous than killing, cannibalism involving letting die

33

i s more widely permissible than cannibalism involving killing . 27

§4 .

The matter of predation, and important cases of l egit imat e

killing and letting die for food.

One tempting model that underlies the conflict picture of

Paradigmatic examples of legitimate

predation, of predation as basically undesirable but an unavoidable

killing are provided by predation, where bis prey of a and a depen ds

fact, a model that leads to human vegetarianism, is the following

(essentially) for its livelihood, indeed for its survival, on eating

kind of atomistic axiological theory (or utilitarianism):-

bs.28

Such predat ion i s a n essential part of any su ffici e ntl y rich

ecosystem .

Essential pr eda tio n i s pre dation which is essent i a l to

according

to the initial positive value thesis, every living creature (every
sentient creature , every higher animal , etc .) has an initial positive

the nor,~11 livelihood of tl1e predat or , and where the prcd alor takes

non-instrumental value which it retains unless it does something to

for itself no more than it requires for it s livelihood.

forf eit that value.

carn.ivores , such as the big cats , but some humans, such
traditional Eskimos, are essential predators.

Not only
ilS

some

(On the even simpler position of biospheric

egalitarianism, discussed below, all living things have equal worth,

The fact that humans

ar e part of the natural predatory food chains should not be lost s i g ht o[ .
Observe that the argument to permissibility of essential pre-

in some nontrivial sense.)

These positive values just sum ; and

maximisation of value (or suitably averaged value) is, of course , the
(or an) ethical objective .

Then killing is generally undesirable ,

dation does ~ take the invalid form:

such predation is a fact (a fact

because it results in a reduction in net value, and survival is generally

of life), therefore it is permissible.

That arguments of this type ,

desirable.

29

The exceptions occur when a creature has forfeited its

selectively relied upon by Diamond and (earlier) Hegel, are inval id is

value, e . g . it per sists in value-reducing behaviour, so that killing

well-enough known (they commit a prescriptive fallacy), and is evident

it would prevent a further decline in net value or lead to increase in

from such fallacious arguments as the diplomacists' argument, e.g. it is

total value .

a fact of life that Indonesia has occupied (absorbed) East Timar;

when it leads to an overall reduction in value .

the re-

The underlying theme is that killing is unjustifiable
The onus of proof,

fore it is pe rfectly alright that Indonesia occupied (absorbed) East Timar.

when it can be assigned, lies with those who make the exceptions, who

Naturally it would be decidedly awkward if the fact of essential predation

do or license the killing .

turned out to be impermissible:

since, with one item of value consuming another item of value, it

trouble.

the whole natural order would be in moral

This brings us to another defect of the argument from· "facts",

Predation now appears as an awkward fact ,

leads to an overall reduction in value.

Since inessential preda tion

that it suggests that essential predation is really, at base, something

is inessential, it is ruled out as inadmissible.

pretty undesirable, but nonetheless something we have to live with - in

(nonindigenous) humans for whom predation is, it is plausibl~ argu ed ,

Thus in particular,

contrast with predation, in its associated meaning, as plunder, which we

iness en tial, are not entitled to kill for f ood :

do n't, or rather oughtn 't to, have to live with morally, and which is

usual rai si ng of animals for food, etc . are all excluded in one st r oke ,

commonly reprehensible.

and a l eading feature of vegetarianism imposed .

therewith hunting,

34

35

Essential predation is not so satisfactorily dispos ed o f,
but introduces conflict.

For either one creature, the prey, is

sacrificed or another creature, the predator, is:
value de c lines .

Similar objections apply against biological egalitarianism,

either way tot 8 1

In the interim, while vegetarian scientists work

even when it is qualified as in Drengson and Naess by an in principle
30

on new diets and new lifestyles for predators, there is an obvious

clause.

recipe to be applied, which while not eliminating conflict, minimises

that predation is rather suboptimal:

its effe c t:

is strictly ruled out as a general practice.

just as steam gives way to sail, so the less valuable

gives way to t h e ~ valuable.

Thus if humans are reckoned to be

It is not (or not only) that it is taken for granted
the trouble is that predation
Since each lion and

each antelope is assigned one unit of whatever is assigned equally,

mo re valuable than polar bears - the usual human evaluation - then

there is no way of justifying the lifestyle of a lion that consumes

polar bea rs are not going to be entitled to prey on humans, in the sens e

several antelopes.

at least that their predation is not justified.

Any equalitarian approach that is E££ atomistic is liable

Application of the recip e

31

presupposes a value ranking on creatures under which some are more valuabl e

to further incoherence, as Drengson's holism reveals.

than others:

some living system of living things, e.g . the Earth as on the Gaia

otherwise if all are equal, predation is never admissible, and

Lets be

essential predators just die out - at least that is the simple ethical pic t -

hypothesis (p. 233).

ure.

least of the living things that comprise it, has the same value as

This points up one of the many problems for biological egaltarianism.
But the picture presented so far is too simple, and tl1e

recipes suggested dubious.

Then s, which should(?) have the value at

each of them (in effect 1 = n, for n>l).
Some of t~e ecological consequences of implementing the

For if the matter is properly considered

not at a given time, but over a time interval, dynamically and not

suggested recipes, and reform of essential predators, can now be

just statically, it is not so simple, and a rather different result

gauged.

emerges .

the chains of predation are long and complex;

One predator takes, over a typical lifetime, rather a

lot of prey .

Unless the predator ranks very much more highly than

Massive environmental interference would be required, since

distortions especially in lower-level prey would occur, with resulting

the prey, the value of the sum of the prey will exceed that of the

ecological instability and often catastrophe.

predator.

that is, are ecologically highly undesirable.

These considerations, in combination with a positive

and gross population

The consequences,

What this and the

value thesis, suggest a very different result, that predators should

summation problems begin to reveal is that the initial atomistic

be allowed to, or encouraged to, die out - unless they are somehow,

value distribution picture is inadequate because it leaves out systems

what seems improbable for predators that remain wild, converted to

and systemic connections such as a more ecological approach would

vegetarianism,

include,
The dynamic picture resorted to is still too simple in one
important respect, that over a time interval, prey, which would often

exceed natural (and sometimes reasonable) population levels without
predation, are replaced.

Where population of a preyed-upon species

of creature is at an ecological limit, and minor culling of the sort

36

natural predation induces does not, owing to replacement, reduce

37

population levels significantly below that limit, predation has no
significant effect on total value,

So results yet another, different,

recipe, one which is a little nearer the

ecologica l mark. 32

farm animals (all of them) can be appropriately filled out, to

Some utilitarians, Singer in particular, have recognised

exclude replacement of animals with unusual or special properties,

the role of replacement a·,1d made some allowance for it (at a serious

cost to Singer ' s vegetarianism , it should be added),

e.g. those carrying valuable genes, and to allow slaughter, without

Singer now allows

for killing and replacement of nonselfconscious life, but advances a
nonreplaceabllity thesis for self-conscious life.

Furthermore, even if a replacement thesis for free-range

shorter-term replacement, of those carrying damaging diseases or

genes - as it no doubt can, in a modified replacement thesis - still

For the basic division

Singer appeals to 'Tooley 's distinction' between

a nonreplacement thesis fails to allow even for essential predation

of selfconscious creatures, and accordingly should be scrapped,

beings that are merely conscious and ••• those that

Since this pronouncement is likely to be disputed, at least

are also self -conscious, in the sense of being able to
conceive of themselves as distinct entities, existing

by some vegetarians, it is worth trying to indicate why essential

over time with a past and a future (Sp.151),

At the same time it can be

In fact most of the sorts of free-range farmyard animals that Singer

predation is perfectly admissible,

seems to be envisaging as nonselfconscious, and accordingly replaceable,

explained what is still wrong with the tempting dynamic picture and

creatures, for instance geese and hens, appear to satisfy Tooley's

the initial positive value thesis.

tests for selfconsciousness.

what is put in as what is left out,

Geese are certainly aware of themselves

they value members of their own community ;

trees, and inanimate such as rocks and buildings,~ have initial

and they remember

value, but that complexes and wholes, in particular ecosystems, may

elements of their past and, in things like nest building (practice),
anticipate the future.

More important, what has selfconsciousness (reflex-

ive consciousness), or consciousness to do with the moral dimension?

Until

well have initial value,

The reduction assumptions underlying value decomposition

thereof,

itself, because by no means all consciousness of conscious life is _ 32 a

to atoms fail ,

Singer's theses lack foundation and look, while perhaps convenient for

that it cannot be duly explained;

There are grounds for anticipating

for instance, being too valuable to be

Such wholes may have value furthermore

which is not dissolvable into values of component parts, or atoms

this is duly explained - it is not satisfactorily explained as valuable in

some traditional farmers, rather ad hoe,

What is left out is not just that

objects other than living creatures, both animate such as plants and

as distinct entities, and of geese as distinct from (and superior to)
hens;

What is wrong is not So much

In terms of the value of wholes such as ecosystems, one
of the arguments for essential predation is disarmingly elementary .
It takes the form:

(sufficiently) rich (natural) ecosystems are

Predation is an essential part of these systems .

simply replaced, in the sense of having irreplaceable experiences, worth-

very valuable,

while projects, etc., does not have the requisite linkage with self-

What is an essential part of what is very valuable is admissible.

consc iousness.

Therefore, predation is admissible.

Such predation, which may be argued for in other ways ,
admits of extension by the following principle :

38

EP.

If something is entitled to kill for food under certain

39

conditions, e.g. respectfully and when in need, then so are others
under the same conditions.

§5.

The argument for EP is of the same type as that for other

Postscript .

The paper is very incomplete .

It fails to address

several issues intimately connected with cannibalism, such as hunting

similar indifference, or interchangeability, principles in ethics.

of humans and other animals, in particular for food, and as raising

It follows from EP and essential predation that, since a tiger may

humans and other animals, especially defective infants, for food.

when in need kill a cow to eat, then so may humans in need.

If

Worse,

it is evasive on some fundamental issues, and it fails to penetrate very

taking the cow's life is not maximally unjust in the one case, nor

deeply into some of the issues it does begin to consider, such as

is it in the other, since the circumstances are similar.

predation, or as the necessary and/or sufficient conditions for admiss-

The results

reached may be alternatively argued for using principle CP. 33
Perhaps Singer is also on the right track, though he has
latched onto the wrong distinction.

Perhaps there is a (descriptive)

condition q (or a condition qs for each sorts of agent), appropriately

ible killing.
position.

It is little consolation that others are in the same

Hopefully some of these deficiencies will be compensated

for in subsequent parts.

At the same time several themes will be developed that may

tied with causing to die, such that while killing creatures without q

not have been evident so far, e.g. that in

under suitable conditions is permissible, killing creatures with q

is far too much killing taken much too lightly, but far too little

is not, except under special conditions . 34

general experience of killing and death when it does occur, that is

Given that q is

11

modern 11 societies there

appropriately morally connected such a procedure would fit into the

except usually among small groups mostly of inured professionals,

annular picture (given earlier: q would mark out the interior of the

which "shield" most humans from the phenomena involved.

dotted elipse).

Nor need the distinction be chauvinistic, because

it cuts across species in a morally defensible way.
anything, is q?
located?
made good?

But, what, if

Can a suitable morally-unloaded category-based distinction

And how disconcerting would it be if some such distinction could no
Wait for the next exciting episode . 35

'

40

FOOTNOTES
41

It was singularly appropriate that this paper should have otained
its first (and only) public presentation at the Alfred E. Packer
Memorial Center, University of Colorado. I am indepted to
several members of the audience for comments and references, and
in particular for the first extension of the base case .

It is noticeable how people who have never been
cannibals despise the horrible thing; and how
quickly it disappears when a cannibal tribe
comes into contact with a wider world than that
Directly
merely of their own bush village.
daylight falls on the habit, it Withers away .
This is remarkable when we remember the sanctity
The cannibal
of it in primitive man's eyes .
is not necessarily a hopelessly degraded brute,
but-;-man who has not yet lived out of the dark
obscurity of bush tribalism, and so had bli~dly_
followed a practice deep-rooted in the sacrificial

These themes are defended, and the annular model explained, in
The themes are also defended in
HC, p. 103ff., and in AHC.
other recent work, e.g. by Tooley and Singer.
As the schematic diagram shows, humans do not occupy a central

ring.

Thus adoption of the model does not imply, what Pickering

assumes (p. 374), that 'humans are more~ntral ' or, for that
matter, that 'humans are owed more extensive moral consideration

Nothing in the model itself depends on humans .
than plants'.
The model is not species based, or biologically based, but
category basect";-and designed to reflect the different sorts of
things there are, e . g. things capable of entering into contracts
conferring obligations, and things not so capable, things that
can have preferences and make choices as opposed to things that
cannot (truly, or significantly), things, including systems and
Nor, therefore,
organisations, with a telos and things without.
does the model write in a new type of chauvinism, or confer

privilege or moral advantage on things in more central rings.
Indeed, things in central rings will have obligations and
commitments, and be subject to limitations on what they do, in
ways that things further out cannot be; so there will be some
As this
moral disadvantages in occupying a more central place.
indicates, the categories selected are intended to have moral
And different sorts of behaviour are morally
linkages .
appropriate with respect to the different categories of objects.
2.

3.

4.

The popular view that dialectics and adoption fraction of assumption
themes are dangerous is partly based on a modal fallacy,
For the fallacy
e.g. that what can be believed is believed .
in operation in more intellectually respectable quarters see
WW.
the Epilogue of Harris
Some dialectics are accordingly recommended for anyone
convinced that cannibalism must be wrong. The investigations
undertaken in this paper alwshare other features with
(classic) dialectics: there are many loose ends, and in
several crucial areas firm conclusions are not reached. Later
parts of the paper will take care of some of these things.
Thus Hogg (p. 188),
Cannibalism . .. can hardly be said to exist in
There may be isolated
the world of today.
pockets of survival in the heart of New Guinea
and among some of the tribes in the remotest
corner of South America or African jungles; but
they will be no more than the rarest of phenomena.

5.

Hopkins, given the last word by Hogg, p. 192.
quote from Hopkins is of passing interest:

The whole

ideas common to man the world over from his

earliest days.
6.

Some of the advantages of institutionalisation of certain
cannibalistic practices are evident, e.g. a_much enh~nced
Various disadvantages if not evident should
supply of protein.
become so in the course of the text.

7.

See again in HC and similar.

Although the human/nonhuman distinction

is not, so it is argued, one of moral significance, not all
Other distinctions of moral importance
distinctions vanish.

- those of the annular model - naturally remain.
8.

Of coures, this practice is (still) controversial, and
But a
offensive to various religious and other groups.
great advantage of a pluralistic society is t~at it can
acconnnodate (better than alternatives) such differences
Issues such as human_ .
over the morality of practices .
burial and restricted cannibalism, however, make the limits
of present pluralism evident .

9.

Or else did not incur official establishment disapproval,
though the acts strictly appeared to infringe the
Every s~~ond_ra~onteur has
prevailing law of the land.
examples of cannibals not brought to Justice .

10.

.
This clearly anticipates an initial argument of this
My thanks to W. Berryman for drawing my attention
paper.
to the attitude of the Catholic Church, as presented in
Read.

11.

Consent in principle will carry the requisited load, and
for this it is normally enough that the person would consent.
This indicates one logical route to the liberalisation,
and removal, of the consent clause.

12.

There would (so far) be no trophies, e.g. Z's head ~n the hall,
Y's skull on a stand, because trophies involve hunting and
killing (for which see below).

13.

As some vegetarians would freely admit;

other

11

vegetar i ans II

f rther and regard the killing of certain (nonself) an1•mals for food as admissible provided no suffering
u,
go
i
conscious
is incurred and that the animals are replaced. . But it s
true that usually 'vegeta;ians do not touch the issue of

our attitudes to the dead

(D., p.9) .

42

14.

15.

In a like vein it is suggested that Singer and Regan do not
see that 'a cow is not something to eat; (for them) it is
only that one must not help the process along' (D., p. 468).
The latter incidentally would not exclude the use of dead
creatures for food, leather goods, etc.; things that
animal liberationists like Singer definitely exclude.

43

21.

Diamond recognizes this objection, p. 471, but does not meet

Pace

K. Bell, according to whom,

Men have always hunted in the fields around Potigny
and Falaise .
They still do, but no longer their

it.

own species.

16.
17.

18.

In similar ways we are said to gain the concept of an
animal; s~~ p. 476.
-Diamond introduces this piece of serious confusion in the
course of emphasizing why the 'assumption that we all agree
that it is morally wrong to raise people for meat ... is not,
or not merely, ... too weak' (D.• p . 469).
Diogenes Laertius, vol. 11, p. 297.

Some of the complex issues concerning hunting will be considered
in subsequent parts, others elsewhere.
22.

See, e.g., Henson, and also Ewin and RKU .

23.

A notable piece of male chauvinism also slides through, in the
suggestion that, in Lhe absence of more weighty moral backing,
the expressed wish of a pregnant woman is morally trivial.

And Sayre reports (p. 25),

Cannibalism (uv0pwno~ayCa) is alleged to have been
a practice of the Cynics by Philodemus and by
Theophilus Antiochenus; but, if so, it must have
been confined to their early history, for they had
a number of critics during the Christian era who
would have mentioned it if they had known of it.
Both Philodemus and Theophilus were biassed and we
must remember that similar stories were told of the
early Christians.
However, cannibalism is said
to have been authorized by the Republic and Thyestes
(or Atreus) attributed to Diogenes and also by the
Republic of Zeno and by Cleanthes and Chrysippus
(Philodemus, On the Stoics; Theophilus Antiochenus,
Ad. Autolycum 3, 5; D.L. 6, 73; Ibid. 7, 188;
cf. 28th Letter of Diogenes; Dio Chrysostom 8, 14).
As Diogenes Laertius goes on to explain, that 'Chrysippus did
countenance the eating of dead humans was one of the points
brought against him by those who 'ran him down as having
written much in a tone that was gross and indecent'. As regards
such attitudes to the dead, times have not changed that much.
The (idea of) eating "the dead" (dead humans, of course), under
~ circumstances, is still widely regarded as scandalous, and
highly newsworthy (see Read, p . 296 ff).
19.

Cannibalism which involves explicit killing for food is a kind
of reflexive predation, but generally (cases of) cannibalism
and predation only properly overlap.

20.

An example would be where some of the survivors of a crash or
wreck hunt other "survivors" in order to survive; cf. W. Golding,
Lord of the Flies.

24.

But one's life-purposes are diminished lhow can this be on
Young's picture?)
if they jeopDrdise those of others. Hence

Young's preparedness to let Amin be killed by the stampeding
horses, Yp. 527.
25 .

Indeed it leads, as Young interprets it, to a more sensible
vegetarianism than Singer's initial position (in Animal

Liberation, not as significantly modified in Sp.153).
neither culling nor predation are simply ruled out.
26.

For

Action and taking action should be construed in a wide, but
common enough fashion, e.g. the action taken may amount to

doing nothing or getting-the-hell-out-of-it.
27.

It is tempting to try to prove this on the basis of a proper
inclusion assumption, that where letting die is wrong so is
killing, but not conversely.
The assumption may, however, need

qualification; e . g. killing may sometimes be preferable to
letting died in a lingering way .
28.

'Predation" is a singularly unfortunate word to be stuck with
to describe this universal phenomenon. It is unfortunate both
because of its etymology, and because of its other meaning .
At to the first, ' predation' derives from praedari, 'to plunder',
which derives in turn from praedo, 'booty',
As to the second,
'predation' also means a 'practice or addiction to plunder or
robbery'.
Both carry strong negative connotations.
There is
a similar damaging duality in the expressions 'prey' and 'prey
upon'.

29.

These defective considerations also lead to a maximisati~n of

population of creatures of the base class assigned values, up to
the limit - if any (on frontier philosophers there are none)
where declining returns set in .

Where, further, humans are

typically, but erroneously, assigned greater value than other
creatures, the considerations support the rapid biassing of

terrestial fauna! population in favour of humans that we are
witnessing.

The second point does not apply, in that form,

.

against biol0gical egalitarianism, and the first objection fails
where total value is replaced, as under some utilitarianisms (with
what justification is less clear, since surely we want to maximise
value so far as constraints permit: see RKU), by average value,

average value per (base class) life lived, etc.

44

The argument in the text is not affected materially by switching
from value analogues of total utilitarianism to analogues of some
form of average utilitarianism.
On some of the serious problems
with these utilitarianisms, see Jamieson.
30.

Drengson, following Naess and others, espouses 'biospheric
egalitarianism and the intrinsic value of all life' (p. 222).
According to the theory, each (living) being has intrinsic value
(pp.233-4), and hence each presumably has equal worth (and is
entitled, in Singer's terms, to equal consideration , if not equal
treatment).
In Naess and Drengson this biospheric egalitarianism
is qualified by an in principle clause. According to Naess, 'The
'in principle' clause is inserted because any realistic praxis
necessitates some killing, exploitation and suppression' (p.95),
and according to Drengson, 'This qualification is made with the
simple recognition that we cannot live without affecting the
world to some degree' (the latter claim is inadequate, because
it is not just 'we' who are involved).

31.

Axiological approaches that are atomistic have other problems,
some reminiscent of those Wittgenstein discusses
for logical atomism.
In particular, how do we locate the atoms
to which value is supposed to adhere fundamentally.
A first bad
feature of this approach is invariance failure: it matters for
final summations how the atoms are chosen, for different choices
will assign complexes quite different values.
Secondly (Wittgenstein's
question), why are some things said to be atoms not complexes, and
vice versa.
A third group of problems, brought out in HC, concerns
the choice of a base class.

32.

An

environmental ethic s:1oul.:l. also be an ccologic:1 I et!dc,

sense of an ecologically realistic ethic.
facts are certainly relevant.
32a. A detailed case for this claim
33.

j:1 t lH·

In this resepct too the

appears in Routley and Griffin.

Thus rp can be made to yield a good deal more than Young's
application of his proposal (for which he offers no proper justification):
A creature is entitled to kill another creature of
lesser value when its life (and so all its functions,
prospects, etc.) depends on it and when it does not
kill more creatures than it needs for these purposes.
And the dubious business of imposing such order rankings on
creatures can be bypassed.

34.

The qualifications are necessary.
If the latter exceptional
conditions clause were not adjoined, the prospe ct of finding a
condition q would be wiped out by such cases of essential predation
as exceptional human cannibalism.
The qualifications, although
they enhance the prospects of locating such a q, do not appear to
make it analytic or near analytic that such a descriptive q can be
found.

45

35.

Not only are there many proposals for q to sift through - most
of which however seem to fail for reasons already indicated in the
text - but also there are apparent options to finding such a
distinction, such as resetting the problem, in a less individualistic way, in the framework of (ecological) communities.

REFERENCES
K. Bell, Not in Vain, University of Toronto Press, 1973,
REFERENCES CONTINUED

P.E, Devine, 'The moral basis of vegetarianism ', Philosophy 53 (1978)
· 481-505 . (all references prefixed with 'V' are to this article) ,
C. Diamond, ' Eating meat and eating people', Philosophy
(references hereto are prefixed by 'D').

53 (1978) 465-77,

Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers (edited, with English
translation, by R. D. Hicks), Heinemann , London, 1925,
A.R . Drengson, ' Shifting paradigms: from the Technocratic to the PersonPlanetary', Environmental Ethics 2 (1980) 221-40,
R. E. Ewin, ' What is wrong with killing people? ' Philosophical Quarterly
tl..<. (197;t) 126-39.

M, Harris, Cows, Pigs, Wars and Witches, Fontana, London , 1977

(hereafter

prefixed by 'W.W.').

M, Harris, Cannibals and Kings , Collins , London, 1978 (hereafter prefixed
by ' CK '),
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80 (1971) :1.u,- n7.
D. Jamieson,'Utilitarianis m and the value of life', typescript, University of

Colorado, 1981.

J, Glover, Causing Death and Saving Lives, Penguin, Middlesex, England, 1977 .

L.P. Pickering, Review of ' Ethics and Problems of the 21st Century ',
Environmental£.£,.~-~ 2 (1980) 373-78 .

G. Hogg , Cannibalism and Human Sacrifice, Robert Hale, London, 1958.
(references hereto are prefixed by 'H'),

R. and V. Routley, 'Against the inevitability of human chauvinism ' in Ethics

and Problems of the 21st Century, eds , K, E. Goodpaster and K. M. Sayre,
University of Notre Dame Press, 1979, (Hereafter prefixed by ' AHC') .

J. Langton, Cannibal Feast, Herbert Joseph, London, 1937.

L, Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, Blackwell, Oxford, 1953.

A. Naess, 'Self-realisation in a mixed community of humans ·, bears, sheep and

wolves', Inquiry

22 (1971) 231-41 ,

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Inquiry

A

s11mmr1ry'~

16 (1':173) 95-100.

P.P, Read, Alive, Avon, New York, 1974.
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1976 (hereafter referred to as ' RKU ' ).

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Philos~ (ed. D. Mannison, M. McRobbie and R. Routley), RSSS ,
Australian National University , 1980 (the article is referred to as
' HC' , the book as ' EP ' ),
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University , Baltimore, 1938.
P. Singer, 'Killing humans and killing animals', Inquiry 22 (1979) 146- 56,
(references hereto are prefixed by ' S ').
R. Tannahill, Flesh and Blood. A History of the Cannibal Complex ,
Hamilton , London, 1975 .

Hamish

M. Tooley , Abortion and Infanticide, typescript, Australian National University,
1980,
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(all references prefixed with ' Y' are to this article) ,
515-528

R. Routley and N. Griffin, 'Unravelling the meanings of life', available in
this series , 1982.

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Typescript, with handwritten emendations and annotation. Two reference reports on
Cannibalism I. (2 leaves)
Cutting (photocopy) of 'Necessity as a common law doctrine? [6.40] R v Dudley and
Systems', The system of criminal law: cases and materials, 544-551. (4 leaves)

The following have been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions.
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Cutting (photocopy) of 20 pages from unidentified publication on Pioneers-Donner
Party-The Mormons, 526-545. (10 leaves)
Letter, Bill to Richard, 7 Oct 1981 re feedback on Richard Sylvan's paper on cannibalism.
(2 leaves)
Letter, Robert to Richard, 7 Oct 1981 re feedback on Richard Sylvan’s paper on
cannibalism. (2 leaves)

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§5

.

Raising humans and other animals for food.

Humans have lit tle

compuncti on, for the most part, in rearing other animals for food .
Since healthy animals that are raised for food often excell humans,
especially humans that are "defective " in one way or another ,
little , except considera tions of species , seems to stand in the
way of raising such humans for food .

We are in the region of

Swift ' s modest proposal again .
What distinguis hes creatures humans

(and other creatures

capable of animal husbandry) are entitled to raise for food from
creatures that they are not?

It is not difficult to state some

constrain ts on t he solution of this problem, which also rule out
usual solutions .

First , the distinctio n should be independe nt of

reference to particula r species , especially of reference to the
human species , and also indirect reference thereto, by way of
phrases such as ' standard ... ' ,

' normal ... . '

'potential ... ' .

Secondly - and this furnishes the ground of the first requireme nt the basis of the distinctio n should be morally relevant i n the way
that mere zoologica l distinctio ns are not:

otherwise chauvinism

is not avoided . ' The replaceme nt principle Singer adopts for benign
farmyard husbandry fails on this score , among others (the others
being that many farmyard animals seem to satisfy the requireme nts
for being selfconsci ous beings) .

Not being selfconsc ious , which

is supposed to justify replaceme nt, under ideal farming condition s ,
lacks requisite moral linkage .

Singer ' s move does however emphasi ze

'
31.

two important things .

First , the familiar objections to animal

husbandry, e.g. on grounds of cruelty or deprivation to animals,
are remove.e\

by considering only (ideal) free-range individualised

farmyard husbandry .

Secondly, some distinction (fit to take its

place in the annular picture) with requisite moral linkage is
what is sought .

Any distinction that is going to work will have

to involve the capacities of the creatures concerned , in such a
way that the capacities tie with moral features .

The capacities

concerned are, obviously, capacities connected with being aware
of being raised for food .

But this is not sufficiently general,

being raised for killing or for cartage or for skin or fur or feathers
would be similar, and similarly bad or whatever;
lacks moral connection .

and it still

What all the cases have in common which

is general, one which has (as already noted) moral connections ,
is being used as a means .

The sought distinction is accordingly

made in terms of creatures that are capable of being aware of
their case primarily as means for other, for their food , etc. U-creatures, say, as opposed to A-creatures . 21
no means all, are A-creatures:

infants are not .

Many humans, but
Why this

distinction?

21

There are probably other requir e ments as we ll:
e . g. that
not in midst of present worthwhile projects; e.g. Mrs. Goose
is not raising young, etc.

The following have been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions.
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Photocopy of Young R (1979) 'What is so wrong with killing people?', Philosophy,
54(21):515-528, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0031819100063531. (8 leaves)
Cutting, Ewin R (1972) 'What is so wrong with killing people?', The Philosophical
Quarterly, 22(87): 126-139, https://doi.org/10.2307/2217540. (14 leaves)
Typescript (carbon copy) of untitled paper attached to Ewin cutting. (18 leaves)
Photocopy of Singer P (1979) 'Killing humans and killing animals', Inquiry, 22:1-4, 145156, https://doi.org/10.1080/00201747908601869. (6 leaves)
Photocopy of one page (157) from Lockwood M (1979) 'Singer on killing and the
preference for Life', Inquiry, 22:1-4, 157-170,
https://doi.org/10.1080/00201747908601870. (1 leaf)

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The following have been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions.
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Photocopy of Diamond C (1978). 'Eating meat and eating people', Philosophy, 53(206):
465-479, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3749876. (8 leaves)
Photocopy from The Encyclopedia Americana (1978) 'Cannibalism', The Encyclopedia
Americana, 2: 543-544. (2 leaves)
Photocopy from Britannica Encyclopedia (1969) 'Cannibalism', Britannica Encyclopedia,
4: 785. (1 leaf)
Photocopy from Chambers's Encyclopaedia (1966) 'Cannibalism', Chambers's
Encyclopaedia, 3: 50. (1 leaf)
Photocopy of Naess A (1979) 'Self‐realization in mixed communities of humans, bears,
Sheep, and Wolves', Inquiry, 22:1-4, 231-241,
https://doi.org/10.1080/00201747908601874. (6 leaves).
Photocopy of one page (2273) from unidentified dictionary, Pre-collection to Predecree.
(1 leaf)

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They still do, but no
• longer their own species.
(K. Bell, Not in Vain, University of ~oronto Press, 1973)

.,, Petigny and Falaise .