Box 71, Item 1: Working draft of Australia's defence philosophy: investigations of the nonexistent # MX504

Box 71, Item 1: Working draft of Australia's defence philosophy: investigations of the nonexistent # MX504

Computer printout of working draft. Paper published, Routley R (1984) 'On the alleged inconsistency, moral insensitivity and fanaticism of pacifism', Inquiry (Oslo), 27(1): 117-136. https://doi.org/10.1080/00201748408602030.

Unnumbered paper from collection, item number assigned by library staff

The University of Queensland's Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291, Box 71, Item 1

This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, Dr. N.A.J. Taylor.

For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library.

[48] leaves. 32.19 MB.

Manuscript

WORKING DRAFT

AUSTRALIA'S DEFENCE PHILOSOPHY? Investigations

of the nonexistent # MX504

'The opinions of philosophers, with regard to the conditions of the
possibility of a public peace,
shall be taken into consideration by
states armed for war'' (Kant,
'A [the only]
secret article for
perpetual
peace',
p.158,
an article flattering no doubt
to
philosophers, but neglecting their dominant bellicose tradition).

A defence philosophy is much more than a defence policy.

A policy can be

merely by a list of directives as to what do in various

given

at

even

its

philosophy

policy

best it need only involve practical

into a theoretical

setting,

contrast,

integration

of

a

the

which looks at the key concepts involved:

security, stability, control,

here,

By

wisdom.

goes deeper and requires theoretical wisdom,

circumstances;

protection, defence, interests, national

interests, intelligence, war, etc. Defence philosophy is a branch of political

and

social

philosophy,

and has long been treated as such,

though under such

more familiar and honest headings as "of war" and "of peace" (see Appendix
Like

most

of philosophy it can be applied,

parts

in

regional

3}.

among

ways

others.

defence

A

approaches

to

philosophy should embed appropriate defence arrangements

war

not merely

and peace,

or

superficially

into

and

"foreign

policy", but into the way and intended way of life of a country, both into on­

going

culture

policy

defence
power

and

into the intended or planned

typically takes prevailing socio-political

structures for granted;

questioning
of

merits

cultural

arrangements.

arrangements

a defence philosophy again penetrates

or rejecting features of these structures,

enquiring as

things and institutions of which defence is planned,

society should be defended by what sort of appropriate

sort

of

what

lengths.

What,

for

instance,

1

is Australia

what

are

A
and

deeper,

to

asking
methods

the

what
and

Australi ans,

concerned to defend, aiming to defend?

defending,

How much of what others have,

Abroad?

region?
defending,

Does

preserving?

defending?

Would

Indonesians

made

anyone

a

Randwick

stage

a

or what we have,

Eagle

or

racecourse,

last stand

for

is

worth

Farm,

merit

Estate?

Oaks

strike in Australia .just

lightning

In the

Here in Australia?

to

If

remove

the

B.jelke-

Petersen, should we resist?

of the necessary prerequisites have been adequately thought about in

Few

Australia,

unplanned

where

muddling

through

immediate problem - reactive contingency
1
generous
- is the main style of political

"planning",
life,

immediate
if

you

help

to

supply it with one or more,

to

problem

want

and ipso facto

of

be

to

defence

Its phi1osophers

Australia does not yet have a defence philosophy.

planning.

could

from

and to inject

some

depth

into

broader defence theorizing.

1.

Australian
defence
inappropriate

"policy";

incoherent,

obsolescent

American,

Indeed Australia seems to lack even a clear and coherent defence

This

pol icy.

charge (made even by friends of Defence

commonplace

interested
in
2
obtaining extra public funding for defence and elements of C3I).
The reasons

is

concern

not

merely

the

major unsolved issues

of

exactly

what

is

being

defended, what things and objects and what interests, and whose, what freedoms
and

values;

and

what

role American defence facilities

in

Australia

supposed to have in this - but a range of more detailed lacunae such as:

of

clearly-defined

on what needs defending and how it is

priorities

accomplished;

doubtful

contingencies

in

are

lack
to

be

capacity of present defence forces to handle low-level

and to the north of Australia and in

maritime

zones;

and

1.

The point, which is not uncontroversial, is argued in effect in Gilbert.

2.

Amazingly,
in
the Strategic Basis Papers, Australia criticizes New
Zealand because 'it has still developed no policy for national
defence
and
tends to
look
to ...
the US as its primary source of defence
guidance''
(p.29) .
Note
that C3I abbreviates the mouthful ,
Command,
Control, Communications and Intelligence.

2

unsatisfactory (or no)

defence

civil

and

administration,

arrangements and planning for

use

of

protection

civil

infrastructure,

key facilities and

of

"defence-in-depth",

wartime

mobilisation,

areas,

and

for

post-nuclear

organization.

is

equally damaqinq, if its policy makers do have a coherent policy it
3
nowhere satisfactorily revealed to the peoples of Australia.
It is
left

to

.journalists

And,

what

out

installations may be for and to make various conjectures as

defence
the

newspaper-watching academics to winkle

and

policy

may

Australian policy makers

As to coherence,

be.

local

to

what

have

only

recently found out that Australia has a (purely) regional defence role,
one.

global

they

were told by the Americans in

Hashington

to clarify commitments under treaty arrangements with the

designed

begins

thus

This

to look as if Australia's defence policy is as

much

not a
talks

in

It

USA.

determined

abroad, by US policy makers, as it is locally in Australia.

Much

circumstantial

evidence can be assembled to confirm the claim

Australia defence policy can now be stamped Made in USA,

the last Nor Id Har (and British abandonment),

one

thing,

as it

that

before

used,

to be stamped Made in UK.

Australia has had a bipartisan defence policy,

For

so it is claimed.

That "policy" has however been essentially shaped by the Liberal party,

has

governed most of the time (as senior partner in a

for ANZUS)

Hashington

the

Liberal

and still does.

US

and

in

of

US

The Strategic Basis

give virtually unqualified support

Military practices and to the American view of

situation,

the

the latest package from

packaged under a local cover.

endorsed by the Labor Government,

Papers,

planned

Party "Defence and Foreign Policy Unit" consists largely

Defence Department material

to

For instance,

But

coalition).

Party simply took over US arrangements for Australia (as

Liberal

which

commit Australia to supporting,

the

global

strategic

without any due reservation,

3. An Australian policy should moreover fit with the genuine needs and
shared aspirations of the people - to the extent, presumably, that these

are

commendable.

3

4
American positions in world forums.

be reached by more devious arguments.

out it had a regional defence role?
could

longer

no

The same dependent policy conclusion can
When,

for example, did Australia find

afford to police the world on their own and would

delegate some of that role

have

to

and offload some of the heavy associated costs, on

towards

and also after Labor took some faltering steps

reliable dogs-bodies;

they

After the Americans had found that

a broader foreign policy with some indigenous elements (Hayden was

developing

promptly flattened by Schultz).

Australian

but Iags it.

respects,

and

foreign policy simply copies American

older American defence policy,

American

war policy.

American

administration

main

in

The Australian defence policy presented by the Labor

to the extent that it is visible,

government,

with

defence

is conservative;

and diverges from the new

it coincides

(.post-Reagan)

the

For Australian Labor defence policy supports what
used to support, namely

DI.

nuclear

Multilateral

disarmament (within the framework of a series of treaties and agreements), and
D2.

Deterrence in the interim, deterrence through mutual

The

presence

.justified

assured destruction.

of American military facilities in Australia is supposed to

in the framework of these assumptions.

For they are to assist

be
in

making deterrence under D2 effective and to provide verification for the

arms

There is

much

reduction arrangements under DI (both stabilizing functions).
evidence

indicating

however that American policy makers have

both DI and D2 and any serious attempts at nuclear arms

they

4.

have

now
5
control .

moved on to the following highly destabilizing

abandoned
Certainly

doctrines;

namely

For theJe amq^ing evidence that Australia falls into the inexact class of
cl ient states the following Australian contribution is noteworthy:
'The
US prefers to act as a member of a group, and a contribution by Australia
can also assist in demonstrating to Congressional and public opinion that
the objectives sought are significant enough to attract allied support'
(SB, p.28)

5.

As to DI and arms control,
see, e.g. Mack PR. As to D2, 'USA has now an
announced
first-strike
nuclear
targeting
policy'
technologically
reinforced (Hayes, p.4).
The goal
of the Reagan administration
is
superiority (a conveniently ambiguous term).

4

war-fighting;

Nuclear

war

American

government,

al 1

Labor

1985

may

policy

nuclear wars;

Limited

of these

government.

well be accepted by
military doctrines,

and

Star

the

next

this

While

wars.

coalition

Liberal

are explicitly rejected by the

Since the American "Joint" facilities in

Australia

also facilitate the rejected objectives, the problems concerning these dubious
facilities are much aggravated.

information

withholding

their

particularly

Government

concerning the full range of

war-fighting

certainly unsatisfactory,
the

The Government's approach concerning them

appears

their

functions,

roles from Parliament and the

as several of its members realise;
in not atypical

disarray,

further

public

and
- is

and as a result

grist

for

the

incoherence theme.

is a coherent Australian defence policy somewhere
6
public exposure, it is almost certainly an ol d American policy.

If

there

away

from

But in that

case it certainly lacks - what it in any case appears to lack - justification.
7
For American interests by no means coincide with Australian .
Consider,
for
such

instance,

matters as enriching Americans,

American business,

for

undercutting

to

Nicaragua,
differently

Allende's

government in Chile to

again,

its

escalation of the nuclear arms

and all

Europe
Southern

as

Consider,

practices

methods.

race.

against
Consider,

consider

Or

the game- and decisi on-theoretic models

concern just USA and its adversary USSR,

which

its

its extensive export of arms and violent

strategic planning,

American

American.

promoting Americans and things

American practices in Latin America (or elsewhere in the world),

differently,
from

making conditions favourable

part of the monolithic West,

perhaps

occasionally

adding

but rarely or never considering

Hemisphere - so that either Australia is part of America

as

the

Poland

It had better be away from too much public exposure because Australians,
no more* th-atffrNew Zealanders, mostly do not like being pushed around, even
by Americans.

7.

Nor, though this is a longer story , does Australian culture by any means
coincide with American:
see CPD.
Thus a uniform treatment is entirely
inappropriate.
Similarly,
a single overarching treatment for a mono­
lithic West is thoroughly inadequate.

5

8

may be of Russia or it is nothing.

Or consider American interests not merely

in Soviet and communist containment, but. in containing socialism such as might

(under more auspicious conditions) flourish in Australia.

to

answering

inappropriate

American interests is accordingly inappropriate for

Australia,

for

their

defence

thinking

applies

also

and

to

work out a policy appropriate

Australian

do

Australians should

Antipodean socialism.

for

Australia.

representatives,

political

who

implausible American views and begin on developing

parroting

and original ones.)

local

An American policy

America,

like Russia,

own
(That

should

stop

genuinely

some

is busy meddling in Africa,

(SB, p.24) .

but 'Australian security interests are not directly involved'’

Should we be tagging along after the Americans in support of installation

of
the

their free-enterprise (rip-off) capitalism everywhere feasible (i.e.
socialists

state

seriously

course

- or

of

Much

opposition

governments,

in

has,

freedom umbrella,

active

already

this

sort

What

'keeping the free

world

of

context,

multiple

what mainstream American culture

to and undermining of social and

socialist

quite

free7?

Of

meanings

and

admits

mainstream Australian culture would exclude:

bullying

they

control)?

heavily

is it laughingly - call

freedom

associations.

don't

that

under

the

for instance,
programs

and

of smal1 countries that impose barriers to US business
part of "free enterprise"), etc.

freedom Misinformation,

agree about,
to live and work where one chooses,

on. These are certainly important freedoms, better upheld in

some parts of the unaligned West (e.g. Sweden, Switzerland)

of

the

Eastern Block.

But many of the older freedoms

century,

such as freedom to travel,

requires

permits,

8.

licences,

than in most parts

have

to work and live abroad,

passports,

...

vanished
etc.;

And many more of these

this

now one

former

Australian planning should be looking at strategic models (game-theoretic
and other) which include Australia.
For,
as argued below,
adandoning
the uniformity assumption of the monolithic West,
of the West as one
parish, makes very significant differences to the results yielded.

6

are being or have been eroded;

•freedoms

restricted

zones,

nuclearism

in

soon it will be identity documents-,

as already in parts of the "free

ID cards,

Now

West".

to

protect,

[the Greens] point to the new laws proposed in 1983 designed to keep

citizens

Europe 'is devouring the very freedom it is said

assembling to protest deployment of the Pershing II and cruise missiles'

from

of

security

'secrecy,

the

lack

state,

of

Further structural changes required for

pp.58-9).

(Capra and Spretnak,

incompatible

with

permanent

commentability,

freedoms,

democratic

emergency,

the

include

of

concentration

authority, peacetime militarism, extensive apparatus of state intelligence and

Nuclearism is not a smart strategy to preserve

police'’ (Falk, in Feith p.24) .
remaining freedoms.

Inherited

2.

other-reliance,

and

the

populist

and

elitist___ cases—for

patronaqe.

Australia's

defence

rather than regularly

policy,

such as it is,

(re)thought through.

the legal method of precedence,

may wel1,

furthermore

But that procedure - essentially

and here does,

applied to defence.

exclude significant

The unsatisfactory decision-making practices that will

For

al ternatives.

be revealed in the

of defence are by no means restricted to defence but are typical of

case

kind of advanced age (or aged)
1abours
those
both

inheri.ted

whatever its very limited satisfactoriness in

legalistic decision making - is defective when

precedence

is

under.

Cock

capi tali sm Australia operates under,

has summed up these practices neatly in

features of aged capitalism (what he calls
the

or rather

setting

the Corporate State)

New Left and the Alternative Australia movements were

the

down

which

reacting

revoI ting against:
Decisions were made from the top and on the basis of vested political
interests,
rather than by rational goals and means that served public
interests.
The people were rarely consulted effectively before a
decision and often only partially informed afterwards.
Pl an ni ng..was.
based on a mere extension of the present.
...
activists felt
they
were given little opportunity to choose how they lived or worked. The
availability of space,
time,
trees and air was also determined by

others . ..(2/(p.l8 italics added).

7

or

As also is one's defence,

military and civil, the matter of whether one lives

in a nuclear target or not, etc.

A major inherited assumption is that of other reliance,
defence depends on other more powerful allies.

Australia

That ally was firstly Britain,

but in any event the assumption is that to be

and since World War II America;

safe

that Australia's

needs a powerful patron,

a protector.

A corollary is

that

Australia adopts a suitably submissive relation to its patron, making expected
And for the most part it has;
10
policy does not come cheap.

concessions.

The

however such a defence insurance

other-reliance assumption is unsound,

important,

it

for

several

reasons.

characteristically depends upon the following themes,

Most

all

which lack solid foundation:
1.

Austral i ar/ is threatened - or at least

1A. Australia/ is likely to be threatened in the near future.

2.

Australia cannot defend itself.

3.

It can however rely upon its patron (or ally?, i.e. upon the USA.

three themes in fact make up what has been cal led the populist case for
11
the ANZUS alliance.
It is very different from the elitist case for ANZUS,

These

said to hold sway with the Australian government,

which, while insisting upon

premiss 3, essentially rejects 1 and 2 and claims instead

4.

Australia has a vital

interest in global stability.

9, (From previous page)
Cock goes on:
'These basic
issues
increasingly
become lost in the array of consumer choices'.
[Add Covernment__ react_ive

poi n t].
10.

It costs not only money,
but independence.'... the serf societies - more
or less willingly - accept the status of "allies",
i.e. protection with
rights and duties as in feudal societies.
They become client countries'
(Galtung, p.169).

11.

So-called by Mack PC.
But
the formulation presented follows G.
Davidson's more satisfactory account in Canberra Times, Wednesday, May 8,
1985,
p.2.
Mack considers that what amounts to the elitist case is the
'altogether more sophisticated argument
[which]
holds sway
...
in

government' (p.l).

8

Global

5.

stability is under threat (constantly)

by an expansionist

Soviet

Un ion.

6.

Only USA can contain the Soviet threat and hold the global balance.

But the USA technique for holding global balance is in part through a

network

of alliances like ANZUS.
further

Obviously

premisses are required to reach the

that

conclusion

Australia should be participating in an alliance, and what is more, hosting US

defence

facilities

and so forth.

A first such premise is

no-shirking

the

theme that Australia should be contributing its part to "holding the balance".

Even this first further step is pretty shaky;
in

a

rather ramshackle case,

(and

since premisses 5 and 6 are decidedly

4 may involve some equivocation).

Australia’s

vital

interests

as we shall see, one shaky step

are not

dubious

For it can be plausibly argued

guaranteed

by

US

techniques,

that

which

threaten to upset the whole applecart, and can be obtained by alternative more
satisfactory means outside of such soft alliances as ANZUS.

contends,

Mack

it

In any case,

is unclear that our contribution enhances global

as

nuclear

stability (see Davidson).
There

is a more pernicious regionalist version of the elitist

which might be called the offshore el i t i st. position.
Australia can defend itself against regional

2R)t.

position,

This position grants

threats, and can look after

i tself regional Iy.
But

it does not (as indeed other qualified elitist positions may

1A.

Nhat the offshore position insists is

1AH.

Since

these

interests

companies abroad,

internal

Australian

Australians

or

or whatever - may have little or nothing to

do

-perhaps

security,

concerned

with

this premiss

trade,

represents

an

extremely

important shift (a shift not unrelated to the inverse bureaucratic shift
war

In

grant

Australia's interests could be threatened in the near future.

Australian
with

not)

to defence).

extended

form

from

It goes further than what has been called forward defence.

the offshore position does call

9

for some

sort

of

global

or police force ready to intervene whenever a "free port"

policeman

looks like closing its doors,.

the

elitist

position

is

anywhere

Part of the difficulty in getting to grips with

that it tends to slide

to

through

the

offshore

position (by way of now evident immediate positions).

against both the populist and elitist cases,

arguments

The

against

virtually

justify

but a fairly brief outline of some of the main points

course

a

just

couple

of themes 1 through 7 are

but there have been

through

some

indeed

familiar

sufficiently

of defections from themes 1

both cases,

defeat

logically

al 1

and

Of

involved.

would

7

to

serve

repair

interesting

attempts, designed to float the arguments on diminished premisses.

3.

The brief against the popular populist case.

While Australia is not at present under notice of

Contra

1 and 1A.

veiled

threat or harassment from abroad,

appears

to

believe that it is.

or parliamentary view,

view

as

persists,

kept

deliberately

parties

are

populist

well

case

alliance (e.g.
the public.

in

way

in

the dark (or even

purposes.

enough

false,

are

aware that the

misinformed),

main

main

this

because

assumptions

the

to

interest

In particular they have gone out of their

cast doubt upon the connected assumption that US is

to

the

American

are much more difficult to sell

a

reliable

threats.

Thus long-standing Australian psychological
allowed

suits

underlying

Accordingly the parties and Government have no political

to

been

political

Australian

the reasons for which they support

those of the elitist case)

guarantor against all

been

informed,

the

The populace has

it has.

Although both

undermining the populist case.
not

not

it is worth inquiring why the popular

the opinion polls reveal

government

bipartisan

a (bare) majority of its population

As the popular view is

administrative,

threat,

stand,,

and

has

informational and educational effort.

10

not

been

insecurity about security has
assuaged

In particular,

by

any

requisite

older attitudes to Asia

X

persist not far below the surface of popular Australia:

fear,

and

mistrust

xenophobia, patched over by a pragmatic attachment to trade and tourism.

This

misplaced insecurity is fuelled by popular misconceptions of Australia and its
place in the world: metaphorically, that Australia is a luscious plum ripe for

instead of the Asian view that Australia, so far as they are

Eastern picking,

as a remote desiccated place perhaps good for some trade.

aware of it at all,

to get towards more concrete assumptions,

Or,

Australians apparently tend to

view their country as affluent but underpopulated,

resource rich but

largely

Yet not far to the north are Asian hordes who are impoverished,

defenceless.

12

resource poor, etc.
The view is seriously out of touch with reality.

Parts of Asia are

at least as affluent (on conventional economic indicators.)

do

not see themselves as overpopulated,

as Australia.

now
They

in a way that calls for mass exodus;

and in those areas which are as overpopulated as Europe,

such as Java, bribes

and force are required to move people on transmigration programs to relatively
unoccupied parts of the Indonesian empire.

can

So far as they require them, they

purchase Australian resources - which are not unique - much more

(even

carrying significant local

cheaply

subsidies) and easily than they could obtain

13
them by seizure.
For these sorts of reasons, and because Australia itself poses no threat,

no

other state has an interest in attempting to invade Australia.

for interests,

to

launch

so it is for capabilities.

a successful

invasion of Australia,

capacity in the near future.

TF.

No regional

As it

is

power has the capacity

or is likely to have

such

a

As the joint Parliamentary Committee concluded,

The
"Asian hordes" fd\dn one of the less spoken about successors
to
Yellow Peril,
of immediate past days of the Asian communist threat

the
and

the Domino theory.

13.

As Stephenson argued,
less fortunately, 20 years ago.
Even when around
World War
II
Japan,
did have interest in access
to strategic raw
materials,
the Japanese High Command decided against invading Australia
because of
the difficulty of dealing with the people - a point of much

impor tance.

11

Currently

only the United States would have the physical

launch a -full scale invasion of Australia,
motive to do so (TAS, p.94) .

to

capacity

and it clearly lacks

any

As the report also stated, quoting Synnot (former Chief of Defence Staff),

...
to raise the sort of force which would be required for a mass
invasion of Australia could not possibly be done in under five years
by other than the superpowers (TAS) .

But

neither superpower is at all

likely to expend effort or resources to such

an end.

obvious

An

which

at once arises is:

(A later serious question to entertain is:

defence?

on

question

security,

collectively provided global

forthwith

to unilateral disarmament?

now-standard

telling

bother

Why

with

why not be a free-rider

Why

such as it is?)

Mack for one,

then

not

proceed

having reassembled

the

for

the

case that Australia is not threatened 'now or

foreseeable future', and so having broken the populist argument, is confronted
by

the awkward option of unilateral disarmament for Australia.

proceeds

and

points to the dependence of premisses 1 and 1A on premiss

retreat,

hasty

to claim that 'the populist case for ANZUS is

without premisses 1 and 1A.

While

it

sustained'

assumptions
which

is

approximating

appears

capabilities

it

decisive

of potential

2,
even

may sometimes take

it is true that the arguments against 1 and 1A

resistance,

a

It is however a decidedly problematic retreat.

for granted that Australia can look after itself to some

some

He stages

far

from clear that

premiss 2.
given

the

invaders.

they

Consider the

(estimated)

put

up

essentially

on

extent,

depend

no-interests

argument,

limited

invasion

very

The main consideration adduced

appears

to depend in no essential way, indeed in no obvious way at all, on Australia s
dynamic

fighting forces.

Australia mineral

resources,

for

instance,

obtained more readily and cheaply by market methods than

simply

be

ones.

What this seems to show is that a rather minimal

military

streamlined force, if

any, would presently meet Australia's military requirements.

12

can

It

is

as

not

if

Australia

The whole

nonmilitary defence is available on a continent well

popular training in defence methods,

character

that

apparatus

of

suited to its use, though
requisite

to

Australia would be a difficult place

govern, Australians a difficult lot to subjugate.

Australian

a

But even without

a population trained in its techniques.

lacking

without

defenceless'’

'entirely

1 ike a babe-in-arms.

mi 1itary force,

conventional

is

deterred

It was such features of the

the Japanese

a

on

previous

occasion

^If
the invasion is attempted,
the Australians,
in view of
their
national
character, would resist to the end.
Also,
because
the
geographical
conditions of Australia present numerous difficulties in
a military sense,
it is apparent that a military venture in
that
country would be a diff icul t one** (.TAS, p.62) .
The

still hold good,

points

parts

any such program of nonmilitary

to

putting

and could be strengthened.
defence:

making

it

abroad (ideally with dinkum Australian exaggeration)

it

several

There are

happen,

and

that it

has

happened.

the issue of alternative defence we are bound to

To

when

Australia is not threatened,

appropriate,

is a good occasion to reconsider

adapt defence arrangements.

now,

For

return.

and,

if

For example, it looks very much as

if enormous sums, which could be valuably directed elsewhere, are being spent,

But a much more effective and

to make many Australians feel secure.

largely

inexpensive way to such results would be through requisite mass education
therapy - with,

psychological

if it were well

done,

much more

and

satisfactory

results, a more secure and better informa^~popu1 ace.

Contra

2.

As

capabilities,
basically
enormous

isolation.
well

in

a

a result of post-War developments in weapons systems and

the military defence of Australia has become much easier.
matter

advantages

strategic

In
advance

of enhancing through robust

particular,
of

and

Australia enjoys by

reliable
virtue

of

systems

through modern

destroyed by precision guided munitions.

radar

warning

It is
the

geographical

any maritime invading force can now be

arrival,

C3I

detected

systems,

and

And any invaders that did manage to

gain a foothold on Australian soil would face severe logistic problems, and be

13

subject

deal

There is

to disproportionate response -from local defence.

Boys'’

of

and

weapon

Own War Games stuff concerning contemporary

great

a

which would serve to turn Australia into a pretty invulnerable

systems

C3I

armed

fortress, and into an extremely difficult territory even were the oceanic moat

crossed and the fortress entered (see especially D. Martin).

such

Under

invasion

even

armed neutrality and fortified Australia defence
from outside the region by an inimical world

resisted with reasonable prospect of success.
to

such an invasion;

mount

There is no power at all

Nonetheless the threat

their

elected

representatives.

But

the

Soviet

undertaken such a long-range massive force projection,
so,

be

likely

one

ooviet

a

of

is taken seriously not only by the larger populace but by committees

invasion

of

could

there is apparently (according to TAS) only

the Australian population!).

of

power

our good ally the USA (reckoned however a likely invader by

power that could,

6-77.

scenarios,

has

military

never

is ill-equipped to

do

lacks any plausible reason to try such a stunt (for details see e.g.

and

The only credible Soviet threat to Australia is in the context of

D. Martin).

a superpower war, when American facilities in Australia and perhaps Australian
would be struck at by intercontinental missiles.

cities,

it is highly unlikely that it would be followed or accompanied by

bad enough,

an

Soviet forces are once again not sufficent,

invasion.

sufficient
elsewhere

While this would be

by the Soviets for that sort of diversion;
in a superpower war;

and

not

thought

they would be required

and they would be devastated,

unless UoA

is

militarily even more incompetent than sometimes depicted.

Contra

3.

cannot

be relied upon,

rash

What will be argued is not the negation of 3,

but that premiss 3 is dubious,

to place excess reliance on American protection.

that the Americans

and that it would
That

being

so,

be
and

other patrons being even less promising, Australia should look more to its own

resources, as the American administration is kindly advising.

Especially

since the American "Vietnam debacle" and the fall of

14

Saigon,

things

have changed in important ways which cast doubt on the reliability

of

American patronage.

The relative economic and military strength of the USA has declined.

a.

no longer has such a large share of world product(ivity)

a

of policy,

matter

(see Appendix 1);

US world warfighting aspirations have

Its ability to act as,

reduced.

It

as

explicitly

been

and afford to be, global policeman has also

significantly declined (see further Appendix 1) .

b.

The willingness of Americans to engage in foreign wars has correspondingly

tumbled.
hawks,

sure,

be

to

American administration includes

the

Although

more

people and Congress are no longer in

the

enough

than

for

a /mood

gratuitous foreign adventures, especially when the fun may not appear to be in
American

This "Vietnam syndrome"

popular opposition to overseas military involvement.

has

major

a

as

served

strong

US opinion polls regularly show

Since Vietnam,

interests.

constraint

on

US

military

policy

foreign

and

involvement.

c.

One

Doctrine

manifestation

important

called

which

196'?,

of

the foregoing

of

elements

upon US regional allies

responsibility for their own defence in regional conflicts.

to

the

is

take

Guam

primary

Another important

are

outcome is Defense statements to the pointed effect that before US troops
committed

abroad

there

must be reasonable assurance

no US vital

each

and

'such

is impossible to guarantee - especially for remote countries

where

national

Certainly

that

Congressional

As Mack comments,

popular support (Weinberger,

assurance

of

no

interests are at stake''.

more is assured under the ANZUS treaty which only

signatory

constitutional

consultation;

reported in PC p.14).

'act to meet the common danger in accordance

processes'

(article 4).

All

reassurances?

15

its

is

Isn't the treaty backed

None that are not undermined by

in American administrative multiple-speak.

with

the treaty strictly requires

there is no undertaking or commitment.

up by informal verbal

provide

others,

the elite view is that Australia has to 'work ...

Even

'the threshold of direct US combat involvement could be quite

For

the

of US support'" and that the Americans cannot be counted upon always.

prospect

to help Australia in other ways'".

a

However

special

case

has

been made

American

for

military undertakings (in Vietnam, Cambodia, Iran)

common

friendship,

and shared values and democratic

interests,

second,

and,

culture

earlier

traditions.

as

first,

and slow constitutional

already indicated, the basis is shaky.

And here, a

common

pleading:

hardly sustains the adequacy of the basis

evidence

in

to

as to the adequacy of the basis for the possibility

the American people,

Congress,

cases.

reliability

- on the basis of permanent

There are two difficul ties with this type of special

His tori cal

(SB, pp. 29-30) .

case - as opposed to examples of American abandonment of

Australia's

and

cannot rely upon Ub support in a

...

defence emer qen c y ar i s i n g w i t h i n ou r own n e i gh bou r h ood'

the basis,

high,

at the time could significantly limit US willingness or ability

circumstances

a

to maximize

significantly on quite crucial

issues.

rather

America:

shared by Australia and

processes.

analogous

in

For there is not
values

diverge

interests always common,

Even

as missile testing and nuclear ships issues in the South Pacific have recently

confirmed.

Common
Indonesia

opposing

did not appear wheir? Australia was

interests
claim

to West Papua.

It is

dubious

at

considering

least

that

American interests would coincide with Australian in disputes or confrontation
with Asian nations to the North, e.g. Indonesia, Japan, etc.

special

case argument did hold water, Australia and America really were mates,
There was in fact no treaty in operation in

then the treaty would be otiose.
1942;

Of course if the

but

by

then

American

interests

in

countering

the

are at

present

Japanese

were

independently aroused.

14.

Although

neighbourhood

contingencies ...

impossible', as the pauper ap-i+e-’

16

assessed

a

4.

Other-reliance and regional self-reliance

A major problem with other-reliance for defence is then that it cannot be

entirely reliable,

deemed

be tolerated.

yet this is a place where unreliability can hardly

for

When the Indonesians are rolling into Brisbane it won't do

Defence to call up with a message like that from Services, "We can't get there
tomorrow",

till

"Or

until

after Congress meets".

More

seriously,

handing

defence over to others means handing control of our lives over to others,

nuclear defence,

given

very

which Antipodean administrations have opted

means for many of us handing our lives

likely

In principle,

Another problem is its cost.

over,

and

for,

it

literally.

quite

if a btate hires out its defence

it would no doubt look, other things being equal, for the cheaper bidder - if,

that

defence

is,

meterological

market

is

complexion

is

a

services,

monopolistic,

15

,

who

commodity

a

sort,

like

The trouble with global

etc.
with

currently

only one

at a national

level,

All

shipping,

national

of

supplier

right

the

i •
making

and has

this part of the case,

the

that

defence is

accordingly can exact a very high price,

the whole country a nuclear target.
appreciated

of

enough

well,

for not trying to force defence,

which

is

plainly a collective good, into a marketable commodity.

When a country can provide its own defence,

it certainly makes very good

for it to do so, since it normally has a stronger interest in

sense

its

own

defence

than

matter,

then self-reliance not Just makes good sense but pays; other-reliance

does not.

most other parties.

Should it also be cheaper

in

costs

that

But in that event, it does not need nuclear patrons, or to farm out

some of its defence.

15.

The French, who operate a global network second only to the Americans and
more extensive than the Russians, with many forces in the Pacific region,
have never been seriously considered. Yet in certain significant respects
French social and cultural
arrangements are closer to Antipodean ones
than American arrangements are.
In these days of technological warfare,
the post-Waterloo loss record of the French should not be given too much
weight; we don't
after all look very hard at the American record of
defeats and incompetence.

17

r

self-reliance

Such

as ANZUS and much of the apparent point

such

alliances

undermines an important part of the older

such

of

alliances.

newer bipartisan approaches to defence try to combine them (thus e.g.

However

Beazley as reported by Davidson) - approaches which thus begin to empty
of

what

content it had.

little

understanding,

content,

a

but

are

merely

vague

ANZUS

clear

no

contain

of

articles

simple course is of course to allow them to be

emptied

an expensive and outdated insurance

that the alliance,

so

Since the arrangements

consultations

beyond

commitments

of

policy,

It may however be death by seizure or convulsion should

dies a natural death.
American

defence

facilities

American

nuclear

equipped or powered transport be excluded

passage

be c1osed or internationalised and

from

of

Australia.

treaty

would no doubt sacrifice the deterrence and other advantages the

That

for

case

16
supposedly

affords

,

while

making

way

for

the

greater

advantages

o+

neutralized nonalignment, of no longer being a nuclear target, etc.

self-reliance pure and simple is insufficient.

But

consist of separable isolated pieces,
dramatically,

picture

Australia

will

self-sufficient

not

as becomes increasingly evident.

Most

winter.

The

such as plants which are

not

not escape the effects of nuclear

is much the same as for other objects,

internally

The world does

but depend crucially on their

environment

- and

indeed as for States themselves. The question then is what form the additional
holistic component of policy should take?

that

appropriate

the

cricket

game

move is not taking sides (as in a kids'

that is already set up) and doing one's bit for

For that will not contribute to stability,

rather

to

Put this way, it is almost obvious

sectionalism and fragmentation,

war

game

or

confrontation.

to a proper holistic approach, but
and to

bringing

nuclear

winter

cIoser .

757

If Australia is not likely to be threatened there is no real
deterrence
advantage because nothinq to deter.
Other advantages of
the ANZUS
alliance such as access to high-level intelligence are not only dubious
(see PC, Martin) but not always guaranteed by
the alliance as the black
out of New Zealand shows.

18

Other-re 1iance and self-reliance typically present a false contract,

certainly

do with pure self-reliance - a false contrast like that of

partism

and

(EE,

or

p.223),

at a particular level

of

and

holism
versus

dependence

In between lie a range of positions, one of which - favoured by

isolationism.

a long line of peacefully-disposed philosophers from Rousseau and Kant onwards
- might be called integrated reliance or federated reliance.
reach only certain inadequate levels,

may

which

alignment,

the monolithic East (or West).

5.

Against elitist arguments

stability,

very

as

related arguments revolve around that

securi ty

and

side,

are

value-laden

terms,

of
are

which

But

security.

not

cultural

What stability comprehends in American administrative perception

invariants.

is

other

and

4 and 5 of the elitist argument turn around the crucial notion

Premisses

stabi1i ty

the level of modern alliances

are essentially coupled with opposition to an

e.g.

of

But integration

different from what highland villagers take it to

include.

In each case a system is stable if it returns to a given stationary state
But relevant states and

under perturbations of sufficiently small magnitude.

the stationary among them are both relative to given frames of reference, /e.g,

what

is stable at a macrolevel may well not be at a microlevel.

said

of the superpowers,

even

remote events can threaten their interests or their associates '

and

stability.

disturb

Trudeau

As

'they share a global perception according to

But lesser states or people,

not

counting

which
(p.10)
remote

IVA

business

or

military^ as

invariably

view

stability;

by

relevant,

report

bombs a* necessary to stability,
contrast philosophers

increasingly

terrorism and as characteristically antithetical

ad 4:

a vital

no

and the
see

nuclear

bombs

as

fix

a*

tools

of

to peace.

interest in global stability and secur i ty?

1?

Bureaucrats

instability.

Of course Australia

have,

does

what sizeable nation does not.

interpretation conceals crucial differences,

For

Australia.

in

highly material

to the argument.

stability may well mean something different in USA from

global

means

Certainly vitai

interests are different.

interested in containing socialism (in Australia as elsewhere),

in

rhetoric at least,

popular

more

to socialism (or Mon-Soviet communism)
global

upset

to

containing

equate

communism and both with Soviet containment.

containing

motherhood

But the determinable

stability

on

American

in Latin America,

it

America

is

and it tends,
wi th

socialism

A continental

swing

or i n Africa,

wou 1 d

indeed

wou I d

and

perception

what

significant effects on US business and investment; but it wou 1 d not on its own

or affect most Australians or directly threaten

upset

and it certainly need not affect nuclear stability.

Antipodean

stability,

Australians generally are

not opposed in principle to socialism or notably interested in containing

perhaps the opposite).

(indeed

spread

not

ought

to be interested in defence of the
the

in

system,

Australia is not interested

defence

(American)

it

in,

or

enterprise"

“free

wherever

of advanced capitalism

its

is

presently

initiated or imposed.

It can be conceded, without granting the main thrust of the premiss

Contra 5.
that

the Soviets are expansi onistic,
in

interested

empires,

extending their influence where they can.

including

American

academics and sales people).

spread,

Marxism-Leninism,

everywhere.

in at least a weak sense that they

The

and

are

So also

are

most

matter

are

many

Indonesian (so for that

But the Soviets have an ideological message

an

ideology

they

anticipate

Americans also have a capitalist message,

being

installed

free enterprise,

which they are working to sell pretty much everywhere accessible to them;
they

need to be expansi onistic to have it adopted,

Chinese
little

would

and

whereas the Russians

and

need simply wait for history to take its determined course (though

assistance
surely

- reflecting legitimate doubt about

spread progress wi thou t interfering).

message is pernicious:

this

a

determinism?

Bu t (^he\^jreb^ Russian

both are pernicious (for familiar reasons;

20

to

see

e.g.,

Erlichs).

some

in

threatens,

proper question is whether Soviet international activity

The

damaging

way,

stability.

global

Soviet-American

doubt

No

confrontation, as in the Cuba missile affair, does threaten stability; but not
in

way that has any bearing on Australian defence.

a

expansionary

none

Australia,

military

tendency,

or

has

otherwise,

fact

In

direct

a

of significance reaches into the Antipodes.

Russian

no

effect

on

bo what is all

the local excitement and anticipation about?

The effect of Soviet expansionism is much exaggerated and
from the Antipodes it is hardly a problem,

Viewed

qet

locked

addressed.
of

into

unless the Soviets

confrontation with USA - a real

military

internationalism,

be

hardly

the

heavies

But confrontation apart, Soviet

a great success story,

does not seriously

disturb

stability, as seen from Australia.

should

distinguished

be

military

access,

involvement

World

control

involving

anything

since

influence.

War II,

In actual

of

global

on

the

militarily,

that of Afghanistan,

have

accomplished,

especially in Europe.

but

success

in

western

strategic

lacks

Europe,

has

they

the force ratio

And

21

case
little

had

concerns

might.

not

attempt

lacking much plausibility.

needed to

be

assured

of

both by their own standards of what is required

standards.

by

But the idea of Soviet military adventure

Europe is a Western invention and bogey,
military

what

striking

conspicuous

The usual Western apprehension

stability.

and

expansion

the Russian record is hardly

new territory,

Soviets

military

The one

with

influence

military,

with the USA or several other states.

comparison

effect

mere

and

potential

-military,

expansion

types of

a proper assessment of Soviet internationalism,

For

Soviet

to

problem

a third nonaligned group which helps to referee and to prize

global

should

With that problem however, the Antipodes can better assist as part

apart, not by seconding and inciting the USA.

in

overexploited.

the

Soviets have

no

good

The

military

and

by

reasons

or

in undertaking such an exercise which would draw them into

interests

war.

They

client

nuclear

already -Face economic difficulties and trouble with East European

states which they cannot control satisfactorily.

The

of Soviet inf1uence has largely been in the Third

extension

But it has hardly been successful,

with as many failures and losses to record

as Soviet "gains" - gains which add to the imperial burden

countries wracked with problems,

world.

such as Uietnam.

since they involve

The Third World exercises

are marred by Soviet ineptitude and limited by the state of their own economy.
They scarcely displace the global

structure enough to test its stability;

and

they produce no shock waves or even ripples in the Antipodes.

6.

Contra

the

dancers

the

in

East-West dance

confrontation between the lead dancers.

have

destabilizing
new

weapons

arms

tension

control
an

from

escalating

the

With this US policies and

Recent US

practices

and indeed highly destabilising,

and weapons systems,

because of rejection of arms

race on earth and begin a new one in space.

A

vast

practices

more

are

because of

control

and because of star wars preparation which both

and

accelerate

increase

in

and suspicion accompanies the arms race which is in large measure due

to US intransigence and US war-fighting doctrines,
built-in

but

than Soviet ones,

Soviet proposals,
the

death,

of

as much to do as USSR ones.

least

at

of

The main current threat to world stability comes not from one

incentives
(see FAC).

alliance

or

for pre-emption,

new weapons systems,

and deliberate abandonment

of

with

arms

Such considerations duly assembled demolish the theme that

alignment

with

USA

helps

increase

stability.

American

practices are to be resisted as much as Soviet.

6.

The East-West balance argument; alignment versus neutrality.

The need for Australian alignment with the USA is supposed to be shown by

the

East-W^st

balance argument.

This balance argument,

which
17
premisses with the related elitist argument, runs as follows
;

7. Global

stability is the key to world peace.

shares

key

8.

of the international order is a matter of maintaining a

Stability

global

But

balance.

5. The global balance is constantly threatened by an expansionist USSR.
The threat is [only] checked by the USA, which (6A.1) guarantees an open

6A.

and pluralistic international

■?.

order.

indeed most vital

Australia's primary security concern,

is this

interest,

stability. Hence

Australia's

10.

role is to help America maintain the balance.

The rest of Australia's in tervolvement

to follow.

taken

then

before

practical

assumes much that has already been rebutted,

argument

threat

argument

But there are many reasons for halting the

reaches this stage of moral and

it

Soviet

with American military arrangements is

thesis is correct (i.e.

detail.

The

for instance that

the

stabilizing

5) and that US policy is

It also takes for granted,

balance

what now is at least

(part

of 6A).

doubt,

that American policy is directed at balance and deterrence, rather than

serious

in

what the administration appears to be aiming at, straight superiority.

event,

that

is not really engaged

Australia

balancing

in some longer term

so much as in helping USA win a nuclear war,

feat,

But in

contradicting the goal

of

world peace of premiss 7.

and its derivation.

Contra

10

follow

that

strength

is

indicate,
the

Ta

role is such a lackey's one.

leaning

America's direction,

in

as

be

If

most

the

Presumably

premiss

balance

of

seems

to

evidence

5A.1 is designed to exclude

putting its weight where it is effective,

this

not

does

team (that is what such images as the balanced tug-of-war

of Australia teaming up with totalitarians.

thouqht,

should

Australia's

it

then Australia should surely be throwing its slight weight in

Eastern

suggest).

The derivation is inadequate;

with
would

deplorable

Nevertheless Australia
given its

own

broader

(From previous page)
After some reconstruction,
that
is.
For
the
argument, curiously referred as that of "central balance in newspaper
level publications of academics, is never presented in requisite detail
which is one reason why it has proved hard to criticise and refute.

interests

objectives,

could

Australia

fulfil

and

principles.

which would enable it to make

to world peace,

contribution

There are several

satisfactory

more

among them nonalignment and neutrality.

A more direct approach may

Thus 10 is hardly wel1-supported or evident.

be

a

better than throwing our Australian weight unrefIectively on one

the balance.

roles

different

of

side

the balance images and argument

As a little reflection attests,

points not in the direction intended, but towards nonalignment.

Contra

4A

(and

peace,

the

preserves

if of course false.

USSR in this munitions dance,

the

escalation

(the

USSR

relation).

balance,

hence

and

Again it takes two at

least

to

checks

the

the history of the dance reveals that

pace flowed from the interaction of the one partner

of

with

the

but for the USA, the USA would not be required to check the

That is,

other.

the

it can be granted that the USA is interlocked with and

While

tango.

The theme that US maintains

4).

interaction

is

two-way

as

with

Hegel's

master-slave

famous

Furthermore it looks as if, on a different historical

trajectory,

the main states of Western Europe could match the Soviet Union militarily (for
they have comparable combined GNP,

etc.)

Thus

it

is doubtful

see Appendix 1,

resources,

technological

that the current Soviet

build-up,

produced

in

interaction with the USA, could only be, or have been, checked by the US.
de

6A.1.

As the premiss is only of marginal relevance to the

argument,

need only be noted that the international order the USA helps maintain
very much to be desired.

In its intervention,

militarily,

it

leaves

economically and

indirectly, USA has assisted substantially in reducing plurality and openness,

as well as in establishing or propping up rotten regimes,

side of American imperialism is well enough documented,

etc.

The negative

if not widely

enough

read or known by Americans.
ad

8

and

maintaining

pass,

the

the

equivocation on the balance.

While balance is

one

stabi1i ty in the world arrangements that have presently
balance

structure can only carry so much loading.

24

way

of

come

to

Add too

much

weight (of arms,

and so forth)

tension,

The increasing probability of catastrophic

probably catastrophically.

fail,

to both sides and the structure will

breakdown, for a variety of reasons (accident, miscalculation, computer error,
human interference, etc.), has been argued elsewhere (e.g. WPI) .

While a certain neither overloaded nor overstressed balance may serve for
stability,

the present increasingly stressed balance will probably not.

however,

balance argument,

neglects this dynamical situation,

illegitimately

balance

switching from a (certain) balance in premiss 8 to the (on-going)

subsequent

premisses.

The

balance

argument

itself

The

breaks

in

down

through

of

removing

equivocati on.
What

dynamic picture also indicates is the importance

the

weight -from the balance,

some

reduction.
position

It

most obviously by arms limitation and

tension

to a

neutral

points to a different role for Australia,

too

within the nonaligned grouping.

It is to the emerging case

for

a

different role for Australia, and to action for achieving this different role,

that the positive argument will now gradually swing.

The
attacks

inadequate

upon

East-West

proposals

(its

to repair it.
alleged
good

administrators
This

For example,

Australia

than

with

American

trade

argue,

is a nonsequitur,

and

lots

to the argument, and do not

against nonalignment or neutralism is set

pervasiveness of nuclear winter.

for

for

The additions are inessential

confusion and dust.

the

for a different role

combined

The main effect of these additions is to generate extra

alliance and service.

serve

balance argument is typically

of

other

He might as well

things),

so

aligned

be

our

sagacious

because if the control balance fails we are all

worse than ex nihilo quodlibet (for it also

that balance is necessary for the stability).

dead.

suggests

But, in the main, the attack is

irrelevant because the point of nonalignment, is to help remove overload and to

break down confrontation and its escalation to war;

before winter descends,

it is a thing to do

to delay or halt its descent,

25

now,

and most important,

to

reduce its severity.
Australia's weight may be slight,

another irrelevant addition goes,

psychologically it is important for the West.

disease" would show the weakening
f or

Sovi e t ex pan s i on ism.

virtual 1y

alignment,
Australi a

gives

the

Bell,

Any further spread of the "Kiwi

of Western resolve, and give the green light
a leading exponent of the balance argument,

impression that if Australia dropped

through
the isles to
Russians would be on the road down
18
the
tomorrow.
Much of this sort of rhetoric i =■ reminiscent of

f

such military interests,
set

route,
major

American

of

out

the

The Russians have no

baseless fear-mongering of an earlier pre-Uietnam time,

and

but

out,

t ie
or present capabli
A

of
they would be met by substantial resistance along most

the

for one,

has

and

the

resistance obtaining Western assistance.

interests,

Philippines,

strengthening

And if they were to gear up

different

as well

the

from

Australia's,

as elsewhere in East Asia.

depends,

argument,

in

For America,

Indonesia

in both

The addition,

its "green light

from

so far

for

expansion"

comparison, on the previously faulted premiss 5 of Soviet expansionism.

or another
In fact most of the case against alignment of one sort
it is argued. for often nonalignment and neutrality are,

au th or i tar i an

assumptions.

style,
Cat 1ey,

simply

for

denounced

example,

- turns

- when

in good old-fashioned

upon

al ready

another exponent of "central

fau1 ted
balance",

presents the following 'consideration'':
... whatever the Swedes or Swiss may think about the matter, Australia
is
locked by considerations of culture,
economics,
and political
philosophy into the defence of the Western world.

It has both an obligation and a duty to contribute its share to that
cannot
easily be
defence
if necessary by hosting facilities which
located elsewhere (p.15).
The premiss is false for reasons essentially indicated:
Nay

sustains the conclusion,

prescriptive

18.

and the premiss in no

the argument involving among other things,

(is-ought) fallacy.

Consider the premiss.

Australia is

See the discussion of Bell's claims in D. Martin and in Mack PC.

26

the

not,

k

unless Catley has information withheld from most of the rest of us,locked into

Western nuclear defence,

its

but in principle free to reconsider and rethink

use of the "facilities" is not irrevocable,

and shortly

options.

(American

comes up .

>,

economics

and political philosophy provide locks and chains for Australia but

f©.r reconsideration.)

in principle at least,

not for nonaligned Western European states?

part

USA or altogether a client

of

frameworks

economic

and

They do not:

state;

and

philosophies

political

significantly different (for details,

defence

(as,

practices

e.g.,

ANZUS in al 1

of

culture,

Australia is not a

cultures,
the

interests,
are

nations

two

But even if the ideological

see CPD) .

frameworks were much more similar than they are,

the

How do

that would not entail

its weakness

similar

nor

shows),

any

defence obligations.

of

Most
worse.

the arguments against nonalignment are of Catley

Fortunately,

calibre

- or

the case against nonalignment is (as with several

then,

o-f the above points) developed in detail elsewhere, especially by 0. Martin in

his

examination

of counter-arguments to

Australian

armed

neutrality,

legally recognised nonbelligerent form of nonalignment he favours.

al 1

of Martin's argument is couched in negative form;

very brief.

make

this

his positive brief

us secure against such dangers as we may one day have to meet,

needlessless

is

exposes to other dangers,

correct enough,

Virtual 1y

alignment or alliance with the USA

It reduces to thi

including nuclear war'

and in need of wide propagation,

exhausts

the positive case for nonalignment.

posi t ive

case of much theoretical

interest,

the

it

cannot

while

means

no

In particular there is a
to be drawn from the

it

Wh i 1 e

(p.l).
by

is

more

burgeon i ng

theory of collective goods and action.

7.

Free riding, group size, and increasing variety.

The
with

strategic

more

convenience)

world situation we now confront can be viewed as

than 100 players,
major

a

game

counting in nation-states and leaving out

(for

organisations

such

as

the

largest

100

transnational

These

compan i es.

organisational players align themselves around

two

arge

poles. East and West, as indicated:

EAST

NON-ALIGNED
N

WEST

N

India
N

Sweden#

Swi tzer 1 and#

Tanzani a

Most Latin
.
American States!

##

Costa Rica

State
commmun i st

State
capitali st

N: Nuclear weapons states
#:
Neutral states
##: Nonmi 1i tary states

Key:

There are various - a great many - games these state players are playing,

Some of these

of which are practically important for peace and for stability.
such

games,

as

representation),

World

are

Empire

and

Chicken

(already

There

are several problems about East-Nest games:

have,

the

Russian

what

under

played

played essentially between the East-Nest

representation

negative sum characters of some games.

may,

as they will with the Big One),

end after one round,

And the monolithic East -

way

simplifications may).

So game theoretical

representation

they

like

the

monolithic

Nest dichotomy is misleading, and, as will appear, discards crucial detail
the

one

superplayers.

repeatability of the games (clearly some nuclear games

roulette,

=ome

will

(in
be

approached differently and more obliquely.

Nor 1d

security,

(technically,

in

like regional and local

joint

security,

is a collective good

supply and precluding exclusion).

28

That is not

of

to

course

say that there are not conditions under which security

for instance where security is guaranteed by a narrow and

much to be desired,

intolerant despotism;

provisioning,

it can be argued,

but then,

not the particular product.

collection of N nation-states.

It is,

the trouble lies with the

It is a collective good G for the

furthermore,

a collective good

permits the possibility of free-riding by nation-states.

perspective

the American complaint about its allies,

insufficient expenditure on defence,

their

leave

may

which

Looked at from this

and

Japan for example,

is a complaint about their

free

riding.

Within the balance of power framework the conditions for free-riding
extracted by Pettit) are satisfied,
disarming states.

For

to

the achievement (or maintenance) of G by any will make every member­

and

any,

unilaterally

is available to all N members of the collective if it is available

G

1.

for instance by neutral and

(as

better off.
2.

G

is

achieved iff some number m^K contribute towards

its

provision,

where under the balance of power assumption
IICTK^N and II = (USA, USSR}.

The

3.

expected value of contributing to G or its maintenance is less

than

the expected value of not doing so, i.e. likely costs exceed likely benefits
except for perhaps members of II given that G is provided by II.
is

There

pegged

by

what

free-rider

problem,

members of II for whom the free-rider option is not open

- within

ran be called a pegged (or

asymmetric)

the confines of the balance of power assumption - and for whom condition 3
only satisfied under certain ways of looking at the matter (e.g.

a

war

10

years down the road so the expected costs

each—year

is

there will be
exceed

the

expected benefits).
There

regional)

is

a

straightforward

case

for

recommending

free riding on the balance of power provision of 6.

2?

Australian

(and

Some arguments,

beyond or adding to those already in effect presented, are these:-

Either

If it does then the region is better off than it would be if

or it does not.
(strongly)

the
as

and there is a large-scale war

stability breaks down catastrophically

aligned because it is unlikely to be (so heavily)

targetted.

(Here

dreadful new argument that nuclear winter means that the Antipodes

might

well

be involved gets challenged and rejected:

see

MF).

doesn't break down then the region has the benefits in any case,

enhances global

USA

stability,

indeed, as remarked and wi11

etc.;

regional

weight

significant?
of

delusional

the

in

That

power?

framework.

Ne shouldn't:

we

believe

seriously

it

and if we do we're

is

the

in

living

in

a

Australia has been left out of the picture in virtually

strategic planning exercises,

all

do

Australian voice makes much real difference

the

Northern

Western block,

be

As regards Australasian

further argued, the evidence points to the contrary.

halls

the

without

For there is no clear evidence that our alignment and cooperation with

costs.

the

stability

If

most difference-making peace

initiative^,

etc., etc.
Now

riding,

Eastern

rather

countries would hardly

block

th an

suppor t

of f ering

object

(h owever

to

free

Antipodean

c omf or t

trifling),

an d

Furthermore free riding is how the Americans,

incitement to their opposition.

the rational

would expect Australia to act,

on their theoretical principles

self interested procedure (see CPD). It is economically rational; contributing
is not.

But won't the Americans make things economically dear for Australia?

In threats and theory,
do

yes; but in practice, no more than they threatened

already in the case of New Zealand with the nuclear-ships issue.

short

term

arrangements:

aberrations,

America

will

never

give

up

trade

But
or

to

for

market

one gets the impression that America would trade with the Devil

Himself if it could open some new markets in Hell.

Despite its political stigma,

way

immoral or irregular.

voluntary payment system,

free riding need be no problem,

Perhaps the buses are free;

perhaps there

to which only some need contribute,

30

or in any

etc.

i =>

a

Hi th the

contributing is not (see

nuclear fix, free riding is indeed the moral course;

HPI).

Free riding, though often portrayed as a problem, is only a problem in

certain

and

desirable

sufficiently

riders.

collective

of

cases

is

This

in

Australia

stays

the

the escalating treadmill or gets

is,

off

is

involved

many

too

free

which

will

whether

or

security,

and precarious way that it

curious

on

good

will not be provided because of

the situation with global

not

the

provided,

where

provisioning,

rides

and

be

not
free.

Australia's free riding may be a problem for America; it is not for Australia.

Interests diverge again.

of

stability

by

building,

tripod

or

bipedal

one,

for example,

if it is a wind tower or

of

supports

increases stability.

instance in the theory of "spreading the risks"
certain

a

cybernetics.
free

The

increases

and

by

similar

Then

a

than

a

has

in

diversity

ecology,

for

The related theme,

(see EH).

stability,

that

theme

The

elaborated

been

in

core eco-systemic idea to be developed is that Australia's

and consequent nonalignment in defence

riding

variety,

variety

topple

point

the

Increasing the diversity,

with stability has been sharpened and confirmed

correlates

that

ground.

a quadrapod tower is much less likely to

and requires less guying to stay up.

variety,

certain

increasing its rigid ties or supports to the
better

terms,

pictorial

structure is typically increased up to a

it more adequately;

securing

or

a

In

riding increases stability.

free

Judicious

enhances

diversity

accordingly increases stability (especially if done in

and

concert

with other client states).

Two

hardly

interlocked

well

precarious

guyed,

structure

well dug

in

but

stability

of

the

Hhat makes engineering sense

is

not

supports in tension,

are

inadequate

of world peace.

East and Hest,

for the

long

term

however

strengthening the supports that are there,

balance

is disturbed by the Host's surging ahead and likely overburdening the

structure,

helping the East when the

but increasing the variety of supports, enlarging and diversifying

31

group size.

East-monolithic

monolithic

The

West

picture

misconceptualism perhaps convenient ■for some players.

in conceptualism,

main reason for mistakes concerns group size.

collective

but

is

significantly

differs

behaviour of large groups

theory

in

group size is a highly significant factor (though

group

■from that of smal I

One

Whereas 11+ = (West, East) is a

N of nation-states is not.

number

the

group,

a

It may ■force mistakes

convenient simplification, e.g. for strategic thinking.

smal1

than

more

much

is

i t s pr ec i se i mpor t is increasingly contested).
N of nation-states is a large

group

The

group,

of

interested parties, indeed of substantially economic actors.

the American theory of collective action applies:

that

interest,

counterintuitive way.

a

in

behave

self

essentially

So we may expect

wi 1 1

that the groups

Though expec ted to act

in

the

to obtain security in particular, the collection will not.

common
On this

account (that elaborated by Olson), the common interest can only be guaranteed
by outside influence or imposition (coercion in Olson's rapid thinking).

there is, as experience has shown, no outside

with the collective of nations,

mediator
collective

or

influence

good.

The

But

of sufficient authority to ensure attainment

prognosis

looks very

gloomy:

this

of

the

important

most

(though far from unique) collective good will not be provided.

Fortunately the reasoning,

has

been

containing
shift

economic

virtually

(subjectively)
back

actors

though large.

highly

is

to basics,

all

privileged,

for whom costs of war exceed benefits

in perspective from the earlier free riding condi t i on

important
that

The group,

too swift.

several

like much of the "logic" of collective action,

3).

effect of the knowledge of an ominous nuclear
actors involved should now be

expected

in

that

(note

in

the

Indeed

an

winter

is

posit i on;

costs of nuclear war have become very high.

for

go

Olson's grand theory is based on the accountants/-----tautology

(defining 'net')

32

gross agent benefits - gross agent costs.

net agent benefit

i.e.
A

for each agent or actor i

ymbols,

in

show

i
for virtually all

that

in N.

is positive for some i

is privi1eqed if A

group

(in collective N) ,

European

to

benefi t s

of global security are decidedly positive (e.g.

respective future GDPs would expectedly fal 1

needs

1
the

net

wi th a nuclear

war

nation-states

argument

their

It

to near zero).

The

fact

the group of nation-states is privileged does not however imply that the

that

good i nvo1ved,

c o1 Iec t i ve
longer term.

error,

stability

■ JI

instabi1i ty.

dynamics,

An

achieved

improved

particularly in

wi11 be supplied,

secur i ty,

dynami c ;

it takes no account of mistake.

through

superiority

modelling

or

intermediate

- which can take some account

iterated games — is gained by returning to

through

the

the

of

game theoretic

ground

A free rider "problem" is tantamount to a dilemma of some sort; according

to

conventional wisdom,

the

contrast

Taylor

and

Hard).

it is a prisoners'

(cf.

dilemma

The argument can go this

but

Pettit,

way;- a

free

rider

problem or issue is defined in terms of the provisioning of a collective good;

theory

the

but

of collective goods is equivalent to that

of

a

prisoners

20

dilemma.
dilemma;
in

detail

which

more

Certainly

the

global nuclear situation

as much is a commonplace claim.

appears

Elsewhere (HPI)

that it does indeed present a moral dilemma.

to

present

a

it has been argued

Here the argument

can proceed through the theoretical route just sketched above or in the

piecemeal way to be indicated - is that it is also a prudential

dilemma

21
(for members of N).

19.

The
less than perspicuous symbolism is that used in Hardin
(82,
p.20,
p.39),
but with agents'
costs or contributions,
C,
duly agent
relativized.
Hardin misleadingly treats C as a fixed parameter,
thus
strictly falsifying the tautology.

20.

Thus Hardin who (in 82) claims to 'demonstrate the equivalence of
the
logic of collective action and the Prisoners'
Dilemma'
(p.4).
The
demonstration, which will be contested elsewhere, is given on p.x.5ff.

21.

But of course the two types of dilemma interconnect.

the range of apparent two party games being played by the US

Hardin 83),

Union

Soviet

(labelled US and SU respectively)

administration

regards the moves of further nuclear armament.

(It is supposed,

A,

from

the

or nuclear disarmament, N.

It is important here,

as other

French

that

The American people seem rather

more

were clearly opposed to the new nuclear missiles their

people

the

towards nuclear disarmament than their administration;

inclined

to

proceeded

German

administration

The strategy games involved are then

install.

shots

It is administrations or governments

etc.

take people into war;

to

places,

administration - which for the most part calls the

the society and the people.

generally

as

that the game is set in some background context,

naturally,

Chinese nuclear armament).

distinguish

and

1985

in

nuclear disarmament is not considered in isolation from on-going

e.q.

and

(e.q.

since these have obtained some discussion

us consider -first,

Let

administration

which we can suppose to be played over successive time intervals, e.q.

games,

years; so there is interaction and feedback as the games go on - until

the Big

Ones explode.

The

apparent games of US and SU are those diagrammed next:

Pr i soners'

A
4,1

D
2,2

O

1,4

this

being

played.

According

professions!1ez

the

A

1,4

CP

presumably

also

represented US policy,
it

no

aggressive,

D

A
4,1

D
3,2

US

CP

1,4

to Hardin, 'giving evidence of

Dilemma

Prisoners'

ordering of virtually all

that

A
4,1

that

simplistic setting those represent the apparent games

Within

and

D

D
3,3

US

IJS

A

SU

SU

SU
D

New Initial Game

Revised Game

Dilemma Game

in

(PD)

'represents

[his]

deformation

the

preference

the articulate policy analysts in the United

the

Soviet Union'

(p.248) .

While

PD

there is considerable evidence (as already

longer does,
war-fighting,

34

That

is,

the

US has

States

may

have

indicated)

that the US administration has shifted to

phase.

are

a

interchanged

more
its

rankings of (D,D)
Soviets,

The

have

who

been

much

more consistent

no

(and

bound to try to keep up with the Americans,

their

changed

However they are

have stuck with deterrence and no-first-strike.

but

better

doubt

appear not to have

in their policy pronouncements,

censored)

game,

and (A,A), presumably some time between 1978 and 1984 games.

and so pushed towards the Revised

Game shown, which p1easan11y restores symmetry.

Stable or equilibrium outcomes for each game are circled.
said

be

to

stable

if neither player has

unilaterally on the strength of the game,
influencing
provide

in

broad sense,

a

and dangerous outcome.

strategy for each player;

dominant

that equilibirum

In all

All

strategies.
is

hence

its

economic fascination.

results

which

are

socially suboptimal

(and

games that might plausibly be taken to represent

situation,

and

A

recognisably

guaranteed by the independent "stable" strategies.
substantial

to

political

substantially

the

games

satisficing

the

suboptimal

superpower
outcome

socially

superior

is

there are

What is worse,

and military incentives for the superpower players

adjust their preferences in

after repeated games,

an

And the same applies to suggested

alternative

Chicken.

other
a

below

all

as

in

Pareto-

even

But as the

threshold),

such

achieved

yet in the PD game that is

these games are di 1emmas.

games

these

the apparent games arming is

and

suboptimal,

strategies

switch

i.e. to alter the outcome except by

player also to alter

other

dilemmas

undesirable

deliver

the

to

incentive

An outcome is

not

directions

but to do what the US appears to have done, to make the

situation worse.

socially preferable would be change to a coordination game of

Much

some

sort, for instance, to the game which neutrals tend to play (and which Lackey,
in contrast to other more bellicose utilitarians, sees utilitarian superpowers

playing;

hence Hardin's label

diagrammed,

WN

inclined neutral

represents

a

for this game,

'Lackey's Game').

Western-inclined

(e.g. Yugos1avi a):

neutral and

EN

In the game
an

Eastern

A
3,2

D
D

(D

A

2,3

NN

Now

4,4

dilemmatic and coordination games are not played in

the

integrated
since

[Other coordination games, with
(D,D) assigned (1,1) 1

in

settings

such as Uni ted Nations' committees

games

coordination

are

(and

games

peoples'

-frequently

but

isolation,

elsewhere,

as

well).

Superimposing the games, as applied to US and SU games, leads to the following
augmented games:

SU

SU

SU

A

D

A

2,2

4,1

1

2/3

3,3
•
1

4,1
.
2/3

1,4
•
2/3

2,2

D

J,3
■
4

1,4
■

A

2/3!

A

m represents a sequence of ms,
and 3s in some order.

As the agumented games reveal,

a stable deadlock.

on the superpowers.

4

i ■ e? ■

2/3

4

■

2/3 a sequence of 2s

m < m w rn

in fact in several ways.

on

For example,

would

For one, enough significant

much

greater

as a

Superpower

militarism

Australia's

nonaligned

free

impact,

rider

for disarmament and regional nuclear freedom (instead of by

wash polemics and token ambassadors,
US support) .

36

strategy

with less support, unilateral action by US

arms build-up can be exposed.

be

in

much more pressure can be brought to bear-

power excursions would stand naked, and unsupported.

seriously

<2,3

to play with a superpower is to help reinforce

For another,

towards disarmament.

particular,

1,4

A

a coordination game can alter the overall dominant

playing

administration

4,1
•
2/3

But playing an independent coordination game can help

breaking the deadlock,
players

3,2
■
D
1
US

US

US

A

D

D

D

New
Game, Augmented

Revi sed
Game, Augmented

Prisoners" Dilemma
Augmented

and
in

pressing

white­

undermined by a none-too-tacit policy of

8.

On the need for, possibility of, and prospect of basic structural change-

The
peace
(in

world has changed enormously since the time of Kant's proposals
and even since the time of Veblen's more cynical

(of 1795),

additions

Hard science and destructive power have grown enormously; and even

1917).

especially that admitting

knowledge of collective behaviour,

theoretical

game-theoretic treatment,

what

for

though still

has increased markedly.

slight,

be accomplished politically has in certain

can

little, since Rousseau complained (around 1761)

of

respects

But

changed

very

that governments were probably

too short-sighted to appreciate the merits of his project for perpetual peace.
Governments

have

obstacles to peace.

long

of

source

been seen as Xthe main (contingent)

if the peace is

Thus Veblen rightly maintains that ' ...

to be kept it will have to come about irrespective of governmental management,
- in spite of the State rather than by its good offices'- (p.7) .

against

the

State

on the basis that 'governmental

Veblen argues
and

establishments

powers ... are derived from feudal establishments of the Middle Ages; which in
turn,
However

a predatory origin and of an irresponsible

of

are

character

Christian-feudal origin of the State provides only one

the

(p.r).
- and

a

coercive - evolutionary pattern of organisation (pp. 12-13).

There are major blockages to peace proposals and projects at two main and

critical

levels

of

organisation,

that,

organisation of collectives of states and,
organisation

deep,

and

domination

of

removal

and

to

nothing

set

in part by devolution,

themselves.

these blockages,

and

exploitation of other forms,

sights rather lower,

short

organisation

of

states,

upon,

The problems involved
ones

intertangled

appears to call

genuine global

appear

adequate.

impossible in present political climates.

37

Yet even much

the

for

are

concerning

extensive
reached,

to

be

attained,

levels

of

political

stability

of extensive structural changes at both
would

of

that of the

Indeed if a permanent and satisfactory peace is to be

adjustments.
or

individual

focussed

already

smaller

changes

look

There is little doubt that certain sorts of structural change are
to

conducive

peace and that certain fundamental

permanent peace.

for

changes would be

With that in view they have long been

least from Rousseau and Kant onwards.

transform the structures that lead to war'- (B.
theme

immune

to

criticisms,

obvious

further desiderata,
modest material

freedoms,

~ at

advocated

for

'it is also necessary

instance

to

To render this

Martin, p.12).

that

straightforward

extension of certain established structures could bring an

authoritarian

to war,

sufficient

But it has also long been supposed that

such changes are necessary for lasting peace:

some

highly

end

typically presupposed, are invoked, e.g. certain

standards of life, etc., and the type of necessity

involved is set at some lower technical

level

(not excluded however by present

These adjustments make the necessity theme more difficult to

practicalities).

assess, but also difficult to sustain.

are

There

part,

critical

positive

part,

part

negative

According

marxist

demolishing

and

range of arguments

a

defence,

from

a

negative

determinism,

of

comprising

direct arguments for

the

theme.
22
this enterprise will simply be illustrated.

to deterministic and mechanistic approaches,

technological

determinism,

human

nuclear

weapons,

The

large

such as that

like

of

megamachines

They are an integral part of the business of

generally,

are

no aberration.

industrial

and

ecological conquest,

a further stage in

human

intervention

which has already involved substantial disruption through pesticides,
etc.

The argument tends to the fatalistic.

made,

and once made they wi11

22.

and

etc., that arrangements have to be more or less the way they are, and

nature,
a

parts to its assessment

two

be used.

wastes,

The megamachines of conquest are

No change in political

arrangement,

More of the negative enterprise is attempted elsewhere,
e.g.
a critique
of
the supposed strait-jacket of human nature is begun
in CPD.
From
Plato through Hegel and into contemporary times it has been supposed that
war,
like aggression,
is part of human nature,
that war is a permanent
condition of human and social existence.

38

would

which

enthusiasts

any

make

difference,

possible.

is

their position and luck,

push

While there is, unfortunately, a

induction from the manufacture of weapons,

batches

machines

are

to this one,

depl oyed) ,

never

(and

organisation

deterministic

position

would

possible either; political

not frustrate

the

and

other,

is false,

Different political arrangements,

been

have

inductions.

broader

The

are

changes

arrangements too, like the rest of social

not

life, are

But (nonanalytical) determinism,

technologically or economically determined.

technological

many

that a change in background

of course that such background

is

made

of

But even the good inductions do not

that weapons of various sorts must be used,

political

many

invention

from

induction's:-

machines that do eventually get

many

reinvented or independently discovered).

show

of any given type (for

or the like to their manufacture are unreliable and subject to

counterexamples

or

weapon

there is no stopping progress.

But in doing so they overextend themsleves.

fair

technological

that a

even further,

once invented by humans will be used:

device

Sometimes

so it is argued

which alleviate problems,

are

possible and would be different in differently evolved worlds.

CPD).

(JB,

elsewhere

technically

Things did not

and do not have to be the way they are or the social and political sort of way
they are.

Many routes,
dominant

require

none of deductive strength,

political

extensive

lead to the conclusion that the

structures of our time,

evolved from feudal

structural alteration.

In particular,

institutions,

they need

to

superseded by alternative structures which do not promote or lead to war.
theme has been argued directly from the nuclear fix (see e.g.

But

suppose,

improbable as it may seem,

thereby removing the current nuclear fix;

quietly

seif-destructing,or

nuclear

disarmament

HF I,

p.4/ft.).

that nuclear weapons all

vanished,

for instance,

thermodynamic

actually took place.

The

they turned out to be

miracle

occurred,

or

not

be

The problem of war would

t-hat of nuclear war would only be given a short respite.
23
Conventional
the structural arrangements for war would remain intact.

removed
For

a massive

be

and

even

3'?

remain,

weapons

would

weapons

such as chemical and biological ones,

were

they

prevent

the

in sot ar

3S

could seem

be

Nu clear weapon s,

if nuclear power plants remained

especially

nothing

and

intact;

development of (Star wars) weapons more

nuclear-

as

dangerous

caches are easily hidden away),

removed ("for smal 1

replaced,
would

along with weapons perhaps as

than

diabolical

nuclear ones.

War cannot be eliminated while leaving the rest of society as it is
by freezing the status quo.
... The structural conditions for war
need to be removed - not reinforced as appeals to elites may do - and
superseded by alternative structures which do not lead to war
(B.

Martin, p.12).

Structural adjustments
peace.

An

can provide conditions for

Kantian

initial

for the

argument

satisfactory

lasting

proposition

that

is

peace

possible, presented by Latta (introducing Permanent Peace), runs as follows:Peace, perpetual peace, is an ideal, not merely of a speculative kind but a

practical

ideal, a moral principle.
ought to be realised, i.e. there ought (morally)

Hence this ideal

to be peace.

But ought entails can; therefore peace is possible.

From

Heracleitus

philosophers
by

24

be

with war as one limit, is essential

swarm

more

widely

conceded,

ought

to

though

often

not

on

of

Some are even captivated

stop,

to motion and progress.

the recent shift in philosophical fashions the second premiss would

Kantian

grounds,

now

but

Such grounds do support the theme that peace ...is—desirable

be realised,

indicate what sort of peace.

but are more discriminating in

Unfortunately,

premiss does not sustain the conclusion,

23?

impressive

such extravagant counter-claims as that with peace everything would

consequentialist.
and

there buzzes an

Hegel

who have rejected the second premiss.

that competition,

With

through

that

they

help

however/ it is done, the second

ought does not entail can,

as

many

(From previous page)
As B. Martin, who uses this important form of
argument for institutional change to get his thick book
started,
points
ou t (pp. 12-13).

24.

The

swarm includes some anomalies,

ecology, Spinoza: see Appendix 3.

40

such as that tarnished hero of

deep

dilemmas reveal

moral

Fortunately

(see MD) .

conclusion that peace is possible,

method of (semantical) modelling:

societies

where

recall

persists

present in detail

scenarios

of

it may be

necessary

to

(for the sceptical

with n = 1 or n = 0).

n-human models,

the

to

That is the more

and indeed is feasible.

elaborate

peace

route

a more satisfactory and revealing

is

there

This sort of thing is of course

in more pleasing fashion than logicians could hope to emulate if
25
less precisely,
by novelists.
Hhat all these scenarios point
to,

already done,

rather
however,

are societies considerably different from our own, not in the people

involved

who have their weaknesses,

forth,

and so

their power drives,

but

because of significant structural alterations in the societies depi c ted.
way of such modellings we can not merely argue to the feasibi1i ty

By

peace,

sorts

restructured

push ahead with the argument - that societies

but

desirable alternatives to contemporary

are

For those of us

industrial arrangements.

pacific

the

alternatives,

Heilbroner

is

has

and

possible
said

thoroughly entrenched,

of

the

desirable,

human

and enforced,

power.

That has not deterred social

before

him and many after him,

Kant,

25.

in

his

search

these

military

or

then who want to move towards such

from

inference,

feasibility

and

we shou1d begin on the real work of structural change.

desirability is clear:

Peace

practical

of

of

but

the

prospect).

prospects
Present

poor

(as

arrangements

are

are

both ideologically and by much physical
theorists such as Kant, who like Rousseau

were concerned with obtaining lasting

for the indispensible conditions

peace.

for__ 1 asting—peace,

Perhaps Kant had some such modellings in view in his theme that peace is
empirically possible, which he coupled with his striking claim that it is
morally and rationally imperative.
The latter claim,
running in direct
opposition
to the longline of bellicose philosophers,
really relies on
the correct but controversial assumption that states are subject to
the
same moral relations as individual persons.
Both then have an obligation
to seek peace derived from forms of the categorial morality, notably from
rational autonomy , the universality of maxims, and the ultimate value of

persons (or, more chauvinistically, of humanity).

41

claimed,

others

as

have claimed since,

that peace is

not

possible

present structural arrangements of a competing nation-states kind.

times

changed,

have

and so have state structural

In particular there is now,

under

To be sure

since

arrangements,

in the shape of the United

Kant

Nations,

a

very weak reflection of what Kant looked for, a world (or European) federation

of nations.

namely,

But crucial

the

at

ingredients in Kant's resolution are still

upper level,

what is required for a standard resolution

Dilemma type situations - some surrender of

Prisoners

lacking:-

of

sovereignty,

national

26
especially as regards war;

Much

has now accumulated that more

evidence
the

and, at the lower level, "republican" state*.

nation-state level

far-reaching

changes

if peace is to be secured,

or

required

at

movement

is even to get its message through already fixed channels

control

systems.

succeed,

tn

informational

and democratic

are

practical

27.

and

not

(p.52) ,

to

alter

which

the

theoretical arguments for

not that it has fallen very

Kant's

claim,

as

well

as

arguments of an inductive sort.

Such is also the new message from America:
for the peace movement to get
through to the administration, American democracy must be overhauled and
revitalised,
capitalist democracy superseded by
true democracy or
"republicanism"
(see e.g.
Cohen and Ragers).
But the message, like the
US peace movements'" very limited demands for peace,
leaves the state, as
the bringer of wars, and the main source of violence, essentially intac.;
the structural changes suggested, which will be slow to achieve, are much

too narrowly conceived.
28.

state

has traced some of the economic consequences of 'the rise and

subsequent fall of the American imperium'’

There

to

The significant decline of the American imperium

Heilbroner

26^

peace

Movements on a single front, such as peace, are unlikely to

channels,
27
character and membership of state control system^.
widen

APPENDIX 1;

a

need to be linked into a broader plurality of movements,

but

are

My thanks for information to David Bennett and Andrew Mack.

'Empires

f ar .

empire

was

no

Thp =h<=pr military cost ... for the United States a 1 one ...
12

px c e p t i on «
is

always been expensive and the American

have

ten

roughly

imperial

American

dol1ars)".

GNP for the last 25 years

...

percent of

supplemented

spending

enhanced poverty,

countries fueled inflation,

what it was represented as required by,

$2X10

in

capitalist

other

by

1972

etc., and was complemented by,

counterexpenditure and efforts by the

USSR.

establishment of an American hegemony [consisted and] resulted

'The

just

in

American

large

very

capital

American-owned
billion"

payments

and

Between 1950 and 1970,

equipment abroad 1 eaped from $ 12

(negative

build-up

of

value

of

the

to

billion

"capital

flows" and

balances),

and

a

$78

growing

On this sort of basis Heilbroner speculates that

of IOUs.

operation

rapid

A result of the expenditure abroad was a serious balance of

problem

accumulation
mere

investments abroad.

plant

(p.54).

but in the

military expenditures,

not

of the American imperium by itself - deemed of such

'the

critical

importance to preserve the peace and security of the capitalist world - was in
likelihood

all

a

inflationary phenomena'

the

for

the

globalisation

of

the

(p.57 with insert from p.56).

According to Heilbroner,
that

condition

sufficient

'Long before the Vietnam debacle,

it was clear

American arms could not prevent the rise of revolutionary governments in
under-developed

collapse
there

world"

(p.57).

is presented by Heilbroner;

But

and seemingly there

little
is

evidence

little.

is more substantial evidence for is the marked dec H ng of *he

imperium in the period (1973-3) concerned.
decline

really very

in

America's

select leading national

share of World GDP,

economies:

43

of
What

American

One piece of evidence is the sharp

shown in the following

table

of

POPULATION
SHARE
(1984 est)

SHARE OF WORLD GDP (X)
RANK

1968

1975

1984

USA

1

35.0

24.3

25.0

5.2

USSR

2

11.1

11.0

13.8

6.2

.JAPAN

3

5.2

3.0

9.5

2.7

GERMANY FDR

4

5.1

6.7

5.7

1.5

FRANCE

5

4.6

5.4

4.4

1.3

CHINA

6

2.9

4.8

4.3

22.6

UK

8

2.8

2.8

2.3

1.3

INDIA

12

1.3

1.5

1.1

15.1

AUSTRALIA

15

1.1

1.4

1.0

0.3

COUNTRY

The
qrand

table

empire,

also make it clear that if the USA cannot

should

nor can the USSR.

sustain

A totalitarian Pax Sovietica is even

a

le=s

likely than a capitalistic Pax Americana was.

APPENDIX 2:

A pluralistic framework for defence policy

The policy (broadeni ng Cami11 er izs suggest ions)

1.

ensures Australian security to some minimal but reasonable extent;

2.

is entirely non-nuclear (.and so is not aligned);

3.

is

defensive

in

posture

with

weapons

system

devoid

of

offensive

application and capacity, focussing on direct defence of Continent,

is decentralised, comprising wel1-trained, dispersed but coordinated small

units.
is partly at least social,

defence,

nonmilitary

deploying,

in combination [?] with territorial

forms of popular resistance trained in

noncooperat i on.

44

sabotage

a

APPENDIX 3?

The philosophical record; a preliminary tabulation.

Reflection on war and peace has had a strong polarising effect,

dividing

philosophers into two main groups:

Group B.

Those who regard war as inevitable, perhaps even as desirable;

Group G.

Those who consider war an evil, capable of being replaced by lasting

and

peace through goodwill or improved social arrangements.

The groups are not however exhaustive;
fence-sitters;

and

there

are

there are ambivalent philosophers, and

those who have

the

supported

battered themes of a war to end wars and of world empire.

at one stage in his development,

to

a despotic world state,

peace.

Russell,

idealists.

reached by imposition or war,

B and G are sometimes described,
But

while

Thus, for example,

who looked, like Dante before him,

So strictly the classification is (once again)

Groups

historically-

as a guarantor

of

four valued.

respectively,

as realists

and

these overworked terms reflect accurately enough

the

historic human condition and the present prospects,

they are prejudicial, and

they conflict with other classifications using these terms; for instance, both
Plato

and

Hegel,

condition

of human existence.

idealists

would

Northedge,

accept war as

normally accounted idealists,

have

been

a

Such concoctions as war-realists
preferable

to the

labels

from whom much of the record is drawn,

the

c on serva t i ve t r ad i t i on a n d aboli t i on i sts.

the

concoctions,

45

terms

and

of

sets the contrast:

peace-

which
namely

We shall prefer adaptions

namely war-riors and peace-niks,

simply (real) baddies and goodies.

in

permanent

or,

not to be

of

partisan,

DEFINING POLES

R adi c a 1 s

GROUP 8:
war-riors

RESIDUE GROUP

GROUP G
peace-niks

Virtually all classic
Greek phi1osophers
except early Stoics:
especially Heracleitus,
Plato (P)

Author of
Revel at ions

Early Christians
(non-violence
pr i n c i p 1 e)

Dubois (1306);
but with anti­
Musi im aim
Erasmus ( 1570)
Cruce (1623; early
world order model

Roman Stoics and Christians
Scholastics: Aquinas (P)
Dante

•Just war theorists:
(Au Qu s t i n e) , SuIr ez,
Grotius (1425)
IJ t op i an s: More (war­
games of modern
utopias in direct
descen t)

European peace
projects, some extended
to (Christian)
wor1d:
Bel 1ers ( 1710),
Penn (1693), abb£ de
Saint-Pierre (1713)

European peace
and hegemony:
Duke of Sully
(1620)

Nation-state theorists
Machiave1 1 i, Hobbes,
Locke, Spinoza
I-<2'1 b n /f’-j

German idealists:
Hegel, Schopenhauer

Perpetual peace:
Rousseau, Kant

Mili t ar i st s: Nietzsche;
Treitschke, Bernhardi,
Clausewi tz

Some utili tar i ans:
Bentham, the Mil Is,
Bren tano
Some anarchists and
1ibertarians:
Kropotkin (?),
Spencer

Russel 1

■James
Hi t tgenstei n

Key:

In

Dewey

P, peace a prime objective.

sort of investigation there are disappointments as

this

Spinoza

was

admiration
madness

to

a

major disappointment,

of Greek thought,

allow

Brentano a

find.

well

For,

as

finds.

despite

his

'Brentano was a decided pacifist and thought it

questions of international

fortunes of war'- (Kraus in Brentano, p.122).

46

justice to be

decided

by

the

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Birch,

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The Ecological Neb,

1984.

Press,

H.R. Ashby, Design -for a Brain, Second edition. Hi ley. New York,

I960.

S. Beer, Desiqninq Freedom, Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, Toronto,
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The

Origin of our Knowledge of Right and Wrong,

Keegan Paul, London

1969.

'Setting

the

J. Camilleri,

disarmament

agenda",

l?/4.

Routledge

and

Peace------ Studies

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F. Capra and C. Spretnak, Green Politics, Hutchinson, London,

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Martin),

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1979.

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1984.

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H. Feith,

197x.

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Peace Studies 24 (June 1985)

World order radical',

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September 1983)

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1985;

referred to as PC.

B. Martin, Uprooting War, Freedom Press, London,

1984.

D. Martin, Armed Neutrality for Australia, Drummond Books, Melbourne,

47

1984.

Northedge,
'Peace , war and philosophy',
in Encyclopedia of Phi 1osophy
(ed. P. Edwards), Volume 6, Macmillan, New York, 1767, 63 t>< .
M. Olson, The Logic of Collective Action, Harvard University Press, Cambridge,
Mass.,

1965.

P. Pettit, 'Tree riding and foul

dealing', typescript, Canberra,

J.-J. Rousseau, A Project for Perpetual Peace C trans.
1927 (first published 1761).

E.M.

1985

Nut tai), London,

large-scale nuclear war and nuclear deterrence,
'On the ethics of
R. Rout ley,
out' ,
Discussion__ Papers__ in
Environmental
and
the political
fall
School of Social Sciences, Australian National
Ph i1osophy #5,
Research
University, 1984.

R.

R.

Routlpy,
'Metaphysical fall-out from the nuclear predicament', 1 Ph 11osophy
"and 1 Social Criticism 3/4 ( 1984) 19-34; referred to as MF.

Rout ley and V. Plumwood, 'Moral dilemmas and the logic of deontic^notions ,
'ni\r,.^.ign Papers in Environmen tai ..Philosophy #4,
Research School
of
SociaT~Sciences, Australian National University, 1984; referred to as MD.

P.R. Stephen son, The Foundation s of Cu1t u r e, N.J. M i1es, oydn ey,

R. Sylvan,

'Culture

Canberra,

1985;

and

the

roots of

political

divergence',

1 ? 36.

typescript,

referred to as CPD.

M. Taylor and H. Hard, 'Chickens, whales, and bumpy goods: al ternative models
of public-goods provision', Poli tical Studies 30 (19821 350 370.
The Strategic Basis of Australian Defence .Policy,
the National Times, March 30-April 5,

leaked extracts published in

1984, 23-30.

to Australian Security,
Pariiamentary Joint Committee for Foreign
Affairs and Defence, Australian Government Printer, Canberra; referred .o

3. s TAS.
T. Veblen, An
Inquiry into the Nature of Peace and the Terms of
Perpetuation, Viking Press, New York, 1945 (first published 191,).

48

its