Box 149, Item 1: War and peace I - On the ethics of large-scale nuclear war and nuclear deterrence and the political fallout

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Box 149, Item 1: War and peace I - On the ethics of large-scale nuclear war and nuclear deterrence and the political fallout

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Series: Discussion papers in environmental philosophy ; no. 5. Published by Australian National University. Department of Philosophy.

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The University of Queensland's Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291, Box 149, Item 1

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Discussion Papers
in environmental philosophy
Philosophy Departments
The Australian National University
PO Box 4, Canberra, Australia 2600.

NUMBER 5

WAR AND PEACE
Zgt

ON THE ETHICS OF LARGE-SCALE NUCLEAR WAR
AND NUCLEAR DETERRENCE AND THE POLITICAL FALL-OUT

<

RICHARD ROUTLEY

FOR CIRCULATION AND

EVENTUAL LIBRARY DEPOSIT

WAR AND PEACE.

I

ON THE ETHICS OF LARGE-SCALE NUCLEAR WAR
AND NUCLEAR DETERRENCE AND THE POLITICAL FALL-OUT

by

R. Routley

Number 5
Discussion Papers in Environmental Philosophy
Department of Philosophy
Australian National University
1984

INTRODUCTION.
Virtually all the philosophical literature on nuclear war is written from
either a superpower (predominantly American) or else European (mainly German,
British or French) viewpoint.
This article,
after connecting in initial
sections with Northern Catholic literature, adopts a very different Antipodean
stance.
Such regional perspectives, while the should not affect
the morality
of the matter, are highly politically relevant.

Much of the philosophical literature, especially that emanating from the
USA, also fails the test of morality.
It is concerned only or primarily with
what is good or "rational" or prudential for Americans, or for the American
state,
to do - whereas morality is independent of place, race, nationality and
the like. This article tries to take the morality of the matter, and the
resulting redistribution of moral and political obligations, seriously.
It
concludes, among other things, that the American and Russian states have no
moral business putting nonaligned peoples at such grave risk as present nuclear
arrangements involve.

CONTENTS AND OUTLINE: Italicised headings §3-§8 indicate the main
structure of the argument

Page No
§0.
Introduction. Nuclear vs conventional wars, and new moral
issues. Large-scale (LSN) vs limited nuclear wars, the focus on the
former, but the implications for the latter.

§1. How nuclear wars differ from other wars; wars and states, and the
resulting limited appropriateness of older models and theories of war.
War characterised. The essential role of the state. New and different
features of nuclear wars.
§2. The moral situation: the recent tendency of moral considerations
to become entirely submerged in the context of war.
The ancient distinction of morality and expediency. Strategic planning
based on expediency. Arguments that war must be expediency-based refuted.
Morality does not have to, and ought not to, give way to expediency.
Utilitarianism and expediency distinguished. Limits to consensus:
supermen and superhawks. National interest and expediency assimilated.
Limits of state entitlement.

§3. The initial argument to the immorality of LSN wars.
One key argument, from the wrongness of killing noncombatants in mass, is
presented, assessed, and criticisms met. Arguments for the premisses of
the key argument elaborated.
§4. Arguments from historical requirements on just wars, the important
argument from convergence, and environmental arguments.
Arguments from just war requirements: discrimination, proportionality,
prospect of success. The detailed convergence argument, from rival moral
positions. Arguments from environmental principles.
§5. The shift to nuclear deterrence: arguments to its immorality.
Deterrence seen as the only practical way to satisfy major desiderata:
prevention of war and maintenance of prudential values. Pure deterrence
not the policy. Deterrence as practiced has increased the probability of
nuclear war. The first argument to immorality of deterrence, from the
plausibility of probability of immorality. Further arguments through
deontic connecting principles: the probability linkage. Refuting the
counterargument from the success of deterrence. The way the onus of

1

2

5

11

14

17

Page No

proof falls on deterrence policy, which cannot meet evidential require­
ments. The second connecting principle: the wrongness of serious
preparation for nuclear war. The general form of connecting principles;
separating out those that are correct. The third connecting principle:
the wrongness of serious threats of nuclear devastation. Criticism of
this principle leads to further connecting principles, through intention
and through commitment. Meeting counterarguments from utilitarianism.
Applying the connecting principles to argue to the immorality of
deterrence. Arguments from limited convergence: pro- and anti-utilitarian
versions. Other reasons for deep dissatisfaction with deterrence.

§6. Practical, prudential and more moral arguments from national
dangers to nuclear build-up of the superstates, and the genesis of
nuclear dilemmas.
The arguments from nuclear blackmail and foreign domination, and from
risk of nuclear destruction. The crucial argument from basic rights and
fundamental values. The argument from isolated people to superstate
immorality. The superstate theme, and reasons for its appeal. The much
less persuasive dependent state theme. Challenging the assumptions of
the underlying relatiatory model.
§7. The resulting nuclear dilemmas - for aligned states and their
supporters.
Character of the nuclear fix. Subsidiary dilemmas: national security vs
freedom and democratic arrangements; personal and role dilemmas. Features
of deontic dilemmas. Deterrence presented as second-best escape from the
nuclear fix. The nuclear fix a fix of states' own making. Interconnections
between the nuclear fix and nation-state arrangements.

§8. Ways out of nuclear dilemmas: initial political fall-out from the
ethical results.
The inevitability of limitations on national sovereignty. Interstate
and extrastate approaches. The Way Up and the Way Down of extrastate
approaches. Arguments for the Way Up, and the decisive case against it.
Failure of international agreements, especially on human rights and
genocide. Exclusion of nuclear deterrence under the Genocide Convention.
Need for the reexamination of current political arrangements imposed by
the nuclear fix. Deficiencies in present antiquated political arrange­
ments revealed by nuclear problems. Further arguments from the nuclear
fix for political reassessment. The weak link: the sovereign nation­
state. Forfeiture of political obligation by many states. Alternative
political arrangements vs nuclear time horizons.
The multi-track Way Out of the nuclear dilemma. The main political
means lie outside state governmental apparatus. Laying the spectre of
ideological domination. Social restructuring and devolution of power.
Graduated disarmament and transarmament, and letting state sovereignty
go. Dissolving the arguments from national dangers. State resistance to
loss of power. Further lines of organised action against nuclear states.

Appendix 1: On the fate of mankind and the earth, according to
Schell and Anders.
Nuclear prophets and prophetic rubbish. The extinction assumption.
Common emerging themes of Schell and Anders. The extravagant anthro­
pocentric assumption, and some of what is wrong with it. Second death
dismissed. The universality of peril. The alleged universality of
responsibility: the Pogo theme. The correct, but undeveloped, whole
earth theme. Ultimately Schell offers little hope and superficiality.
Nuclear war is war. The logic and illogic of deterrence.

ii

37

43

49

Page No

Appendix 2:
On matters of collective and individual responsibility
and on regional strategies.
Individual and state responsibility. Opt-out positions, and arguments
to them.
Failure of the arguments, and the impact of group cooperation.
Arguments to direct obligations of individuals to the nuclear
dissociation.
Limitations of rival political obligations.

Different policy reorganisation for different regions.
Shallower and
deeper goals.
The important opportunity for deeper reorganisation
afforded by nuclear dilemmas.
Obligations of those in the Antipodes:
what is required, and justified.
Social and economic reorganisation
in the Antipodes, and reducing costs involved.
Blockages to social
and political adjustment.

iii

73

ON THE ETHICS OF LARGE-SCALE NUCLEAR WAR AND NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

AND THE POLITICAL FALL-OUT
Large-scale nuclear wars raise ethical questions not generated,

either

at

or nearly so forcefully, by previous human military encounters.This is at

all

bottom because of their projected effects, which are often

to

said

differ

so

those of even the largest conventional wars (the World Wars) as to yield a

from

difference in kind of war.

involve,

and

threatened

Certainly massive exchanges

such

as

nuclear

exchanges such as nuclear deterrence presupposes, are

neither envisaged nor fully accommodated by traditional theories of

Much

wars

just

wars.

new philosophical reflection and investigation is required, even if rather

well-tested and old-fashioned moral principles will

serve

as

initial

ethical

base.

Although nuclear wars are, thus

nonexistent

objects,

nuclear

wars

(extrapolated from a very limited
varieties.

In

far, only a decidedly

class

menacing

of

proper have several distinctive properties

nuclear

experience^)

and

come

in

several

particular, confined or limited nuclear wars, of which tactical

or strategic are subvarieties, contrast with Idrge-scale nuclear wars (LSN wars)

1.

The US Catholic Bishops in their Pastoral Letter (PL) make the point
forcefully:
'Nuclear weapons ... and nuclear warfare ... are new moral
issues ... There exists a capacity to do something no other age could
imagine:
we can threaten the created order ... We could destroy [God's]
work' (PL, p.312). While the independent analysis offered in what follows
has a great deal in common with the Bishop's position,
it differs
significantly in removing the religious backdrop and associated features
and, it is hoped,
in bringing out the logical structure of the argument
more clearly and sharply. To illustrate the differences that emerge with
removal of the religious backdrop and its the associated unity-of-evil
theme, consider what happens to two examples from PL,
p.323:- Firstly,
peace is possible without religious enlightenment if it is possible with
it:
religious enlightenment is not an essential condition as there
implied.
Secondly, violence does not take all the forms the Bishops try to
give it,
e.g.
sexual discrimination is hardly a form of violence,
pornography can operate without it, etc.
It is a serious mistake to try to
heap so many diverse and independent issues together under the one heading
(forms of violence) along with war as if they stood and fell together, e.g.
abortion and nuclear war.
Note that referencing, where not through an author's name, is by way of
acronym explained in the references at the end.

2.

an

The isolated, and unnecessary, bombing of two Japanese cities at the very
end of World War II did not render that war a genuine nuclear war. Nuclear
wars proper will be very different and very much more horrifying.
Nuclear
wars proper,
though elements of uncomfortably adjacent possible worlds,
ought therefore to be confined to merely possible worlds. Enough of their
features we can appreciate without their being brought to actuality.

2

A large-scale nuclear

which need not however be unlimited 3.

explosion

war

it is

of large quantities of nuclear devices over a sizeable region;

a function of two main parameters:

distribution.

war

strategic) nuclear

of

quantities

war

a

Such

quantity
markedly

differs

which

limited,

is

where

and

explosives,

(megatonnage

a

from

targets

to

are

and

explosive)

limited

assumption,

by

the

of

the

involves

(tactical

much

or

smaller

characteristically

circumscribed, for instance confined in principle to military installations in a

given

region.

Though

focus

the

in

what follows is upon LSN wars and their

prevention, limited nuclear wars are by no

a

separate

wars to LSN wars are high (given usual reasonable assumptions

second

strike,

since

issue,

a

is a prerequisite, and the probabilities of escalation of such

arsenal

nuclear

means

etc.).^

Because

of

these

of

follow-up

or

connections, much of the case made

against LSN wars transfers to more limited wars, as will become evident.

§1.

How nuclear wars

resulting

differ

from

other

wars

wars:

and

party

and

limited appropriateness of older models and theories of war.

of war that has dominated much thinking, including strategic

two

states

(or

thinking,

the

A model
is

the

several person) game or, as a complication of that, the clan or

tribe battle3.

A picture of

war

thus

on

requirements

for

legitimate and just wars, which technological

reflection

advances have

traditional

now
theory

rendered

of

war,

emerged,

inappropriate

hardly

and

especially

sometimes

surprisingly,

as

a

result

inapplicable.

of

The

made no allowance for such

3.

Another dimension of variation concerns the sequence of the war, especially
the type of strike involved.
Though the sequence is important for the
moral assessment, for example of the main actors, it in no way alters the
immorality of LSN wars, as will emerge.

4.

'The overwhelming probability [is] that a nuclear exchange would have no
limits'
(PL, p.314). Hence a major argument against limited nuclear wars:
that any such war risks, indeed renders highly probable, an unlimited war,
and the risk is far too large to take. The point in fact follows by
straightforward application of decision theory, multiplying the massive
undesirability (moral and otherwise) of an LSN war by its probability given
a limited nuclear war. Given the character of weapons development and
present communication arrangements,
the idea of a highly circumscribed
purely nuclear exchange between the superpowers, perhaps in the European
"theatre", is really a myth.

5.

There was a substantial element of sport (and connected features of
prowess)
in traditional wars that has been eroded in modern technological
wars. Nuclear wars may be not just unsporting, in that no notice is given,
etc.,
they are also remote and impersonal, and differently unjust, in a
much deeper way.

3
phenomena as mass bombing of large cities, such as

with

Dresden

and

nuclear bombing, with its many further crucial effects beyond mass

And

Tokyo.

occurred

bombing, adds further new dimensions.
Yet it is important for the argument

anchors,

retain

historical

were

accounted

unjust

war is essentially a matter of states and their control:

the Oxford English Dictionary account, war is 'hostile contention

armed

protagonists, antagonists or players;

of

contention

or

combat;

exchange is the actual experience.
but

other

are not literal, but transferred, metaphoric, etc.8

'war'

means

and

or

wrong.

to elaborate
by

means

of

forces, carried on between nations, states, or rulers, or between parties

in the same nation or state' for control of the state?;
noun

linkages

to be aware of what counted as war (the semantics of the matter^), and

of when, and why, wars and military actions

Firstly,

to

always

a

function

of

senses

of

the

States are the

forces comprising armed soldiers are

the

and combat or forceful and typically violent
Thus wars are external or internal

states or their rule.

(civil),

Thus too wars have grown in

quantity and frequency as states have expanded, wars have changed as states have
transformed,

and

nuclear

war

has

emerged 'with

nuclear states.

theoretical way then to eliminate wars is to remove states:

An obvious

in short, wars

are

6.

There are interesting sidelights concerning even the etymology of the term
'war', which was derived from a term meaning 'confusion'. In particular,
'it is a curious fact that no Germanic nation in early historic times had
in living use any word properly meaning 'war'':
Oxford English Dictionary
(OED) on war.

7.

But of course there can be something quite analogous to war waged between
clans,
gangs, multinational firms,
even against Nature, and still more
metaphorically against poverty, etc. To this extent, a strict definition
of 'war' is being insisted upon. Even so the diffusion of power structures
the argument will direct us to, has to extend beyond just the break-down of
nation-states .

8.

Into this category (since Nature is no nation)
falls the ubiquitous and
unwarranted war against Nature of modern times, which features just as
large in Marxism as in capitalism. As could have been guessed,
someone it was James - suggested channelling all war into "war" in the metaphorical
sense against that unarmed and nonaggressive "opponent", Nature.
James
proposed as a substitute for war proper, conscription of the youth for a
war against Nature (see Wasserstrom,
p.12).
What it boiled down to,
however, was that youth was to be channelled into all the dirty work, in
that way to acquire manly virtues military activities "rightly" instil,
especially discipline,
but also service, devotion, physical fitness,
constructive exertion, responsibility, and order. Another less diabolical
substitute for wars proper (in American ecotopian literature) is through
war games and other games of competitive cast.
Again specious arguments
enter for those bringing out the "best" in human males, etc.

4

an outcome of political and associated technological structure, and are

by

structure.

the

altering

state arrangements,
arrangements.

be

to

can thus be seen as a structural problem of

War

from

along

defective)

political organisation of states;

they are a

helps

these

This semantically based picture

situational fix, a structural malformation.

war

with

(otherwise

removed

arise

Wars

of

explain why the radical argument against nuclear wars and deterrence

argument

devolves into an

war-makers,

against

against

In

states.

the

fact

(self-legitimised)
on

and

war-declarers

traditional theory, wars were

the

restricted to external wars, which were construed as

the

right

or

states

of

rulers (princes) to conduct for certain political purposes;

their

removed

the argument

was that private persons with grievances had access to the courts^, while states
did

not (wars were, so to speak, the international analogue of the law courts).

But this is itself a very statist conception of the legitimate

place

of

wars;

the semantics is not so restrictive and permits internal wars within states, for
example to end wars, injustice, etc.
Let us however - to bring out what is different now - confine attention

a

basic and most familiar case, external wars between two states or sets (axes)

of states, two-player external wars,
games,

competitive

could

be

won,

attentuated form for some "victors")
the World Wars.

agglomerations
surrounding

traditionally

firstly

for

massive

armed

like

wars,

such

exchanges

as

there may well be no winning

in

areas

Northern

the

of

very

hemisphere

countryside.

Thus,

and

the

secondly,

for

waste

laying

the

point

of

of

substantially

substantially

obliterated^,

(exercised

and

most

as

nothing
all

worse off than at the outset of the "play".
are

huge

war

seen, to settle serious interstate disputes, is removed:

another point of difference, the phenomenon of wars that
prepared

that

That assumption still held good (though in

With LSN wars it no longer holds;

is settled with main protagonists
players

It was assumed

An LSN war could involve destruction of all main Western metropolitan

strategy.

9.

to

main
Hence

elaborately

for, etc.), but which can never be pointfully fought;

Thus Aquinas and Grotius for example (see Barnes,
p.776,
top).
The
argument
presupposes rather a lot,
including a neat public/private
distinction. Put Aquinas's way,
it looks as if it could be readily
transferred into an argument for international government, or at least
effective law-courts. Yet all Christendom was supposed at that time to be
one state!

5

hence the inevitable emphasis on pure deterrence.

and

the

other

elements of gamesmenship had a role in earlier wars, but it was

not pure deterrence.

military

to

Certainly, deterrence, bluff,

Lastly, traditional wars could be confined in

targets

and

military

principle

This feature is fundamental as

exchanges.

for, as will appear, wars that spill over in gross

regards just wars;

ways

to

The special effects of

uninvolved parties sacrifice any pretension to morality.

nuclear explosives, especially operated in mass, mean however that large nuclear

cannot

wars

be

legitimately

horrifying detail in popular sources

ozone

destruction,

These

confined.

shockwaves,

such

effects

gigantic fumigations

and

become

entirely

rapid

speed

include

pulses, fireball or firestorm

etc., etc.

As a result

of

these

of exchange, LSN wars will resemble

the

recent

tendency

submerged in the context of war.

of

moral

and expediency.

considerations

to

It is particularly important

in the case of war to maintain a firm grasp on the ancient
morality

radioactivity,

more than they resemble older-style wars.

The moral situation:

§2.

the

Schell)

electromagnetic

devastation, rogue bacteria and viruses, ...

compounded

as

special effects (presented in

distinction

between

What is done in war, especially for local or national

advantage, may be very different from what ought morally to be done, whether the

10. There is however the degenerate idea of war as involving annihilation or
extinction, and of winning a nuclear war as annihilation of the enemy while
not being entirely annihilated oneself:
the side that somehow "survives"
sufficiently to rebuild is said to "win".
But this is, at best, an
extremely tenuous sense of winning, which in any case neglects the medical
evidence concerning nuclear destruction.
Recent talk about winning or even surviving a nuclear war must
reflect a failure to appreciate a medical reality: Any nuclear
war would inevitably cause death, disease and suffering of
pandemonic proportions and without the possibility of effective
medical intervention ...
(PL, p.313).

Moreover any such phoenix war is radically unjust, because of violation of
the traditional requirement of proportionality, and for other reasons
developed in the text.

Unfortunately as documented in Scheer,
significant officials who are
responsible for the nuclear destiny of the USA - and so of the world think that the devastation of nuclear war can be survived by Americans and
that a global nuclear war can actually be "won"!
They rely, among other
things, on an incredibly low, and unacceptable, redefinition of "winning".
11.

In practice they often were not,they drained limited economies, they layed
waste countryside (though to a minor extent compared with nuclear or
chemical warfare or modern mining), impoverishing inhabitants, etc.

6
latter is determined using the codes and conventions

Much

not to be done in war i^ done, for one (alleged) advantage or

ought

that

otherwise^.

or

war,

of

another, despite modern military codes and conventions and the like.
we

not

live

go

a rather barbarous age:

in

unremarked,

the

if

Militarily

the horrors of the twentieth century will

history

gets

written

that

(accurately)

is.

Furthermore military thinking and strategic planning tend (as Nagel explains) to

induce a certain moral numbing, so that a range
as

such

wiping

rural populations, become real possibilities, included in

out

calculations.

consequentialist
characteristically

based

on

is

that

strategic

Each

side

in a military encounter

reasont

The

expediency

only

disadvantages,

its

own

gains

and

own

its

planning

advantages

is

and

losses as a result of alternative possible

it ought, morally, to consider those of the other side(s) as

moves:

actions,

excluded

morally

of

well.

In

this way strategic planning displaces morality.
Indeed it has been contended that war should be planned and conducted

way,

a

no-holds barred combat fought to the maximal (local) advantage, without

limits, moral or other (except insofar as technology limits the means of
etc.).

Such

the

classical

through

"bald

an

incremental

limit)

escalation

distinct

argument

terms.

from

an

that

the

It

would

And

(but
The

externally

will be broken by each player in turn for advantage.

an extraordinarily narrow motivational base is assumed.

the

argument

man" fallacy *3), that there can be no limit.

assumption is that any merely selected limit (as
enforced

force,

is the so-called "classic" view of Clausewicz, oft repeated.

Clausewicz tries to argue,
really

this

Thus too

follow

from

idea of a limited war is some sort of contradiction in

But it is not, though breaking off in the heat of war, or the

of a supposedly limited nuclear exchange, may be singularly improbable.

confusion

Nuclear

12.

For as Nagel contends (early on),
there are moral restrictions on the
conduct of warfare which are not legalistic only and which are neither
arbitrary nor merely conventional, nor a matter of usefulness.
These
themes run entirely counter to the classic theory of war of Clausewicz - a
theory outlined in Walzer.

13.

As one less hair doos not, at any stage, distinguish a bald man from a
hirsute man,
there are, starting from the hirsute end, no bald men. The
progressive escalation argument concerning war is an incremental argument
like the technical Sorites syllogisms, formalising the type of fallacious
argument which shows that one more straw never makes a heap.
The
fallacious escalation argument is part of the so-called "logic of war", for
more on which see the conclusion of Appendix 1.

7
wars thus appear decidedly Clausewiczian.
the

for

players

Still the argument

inconclusive;

is

can choose, at least in smaller calmer wars, not to escalate,

and, for example, agree to abide by arranged practices, types of weapons, etc.^

A state engaged in war seldom sees itself as entirely bound by
of

morality:

it is taken to be mere prudence on the part of those attacked to

take account of the no-immoral-holds-barred approach they
from the other side.

especially

constraints

the question not only

as

to

may

encounter,

well

So each group potentially engaged in war faces

ought

it

what

do

to

in

permissible

morally

situations, but also both what it ought really do, and what it can morally do in

the morally flawed situations it finds itself.

not,

But the last question does

in that case, reduce to one of expediency.

There is no question, then, of morality giving or having

even

expediency,

For it is not as if shaky considerations of

involves.
give

bound

are

morality

theoretical

fact

is

that

miraculously

deliver

us

from

value

the

theory.
to

Expediency

fact,

but

that

local values - of self, family, clan, class, or nation - are

considerations.

proper characterisation, a

therefore,

much

universalizable

more

universal

fairness,

equitability and

principles,

justice.

distribution

value

of

and,

And morality thereby imposes, through

principles.

intersubstitutivity

certain

requirements

of

general

Expediency yields an unfair, inequitable

value system, one that subscribers would not adhere to if differently

placed

\

deep theoretical unsatisfactoriness of expediency, and associated strategic

thinking, also derives from this failure
evaluations

14.

remote

By contrast, morality requires, as a matter of its

resultant

The

takes

It assumes, or

what really count, and override or are to be maximized at the expense of

foreign

not

does

simply

narrowly-construed local advantage or power as what is valuable.
urges,

crucial

But the

morality and* expediency fall within the same,

both

equally shaky or equally solid, domain of value

or

to

to the firm ground of expediency when the chips are down, since often

way

enough such moral erosion does not occur in crisis situations.

even

to

circumstances such as the prospect of LSN war

extreme

under

way

give

to

of

interreplacement,

from

the

same

and results not holding when persons X and Y are interchanged under

As Walzer argues, p.24. An historical example is the era of genuinely
limited wars in Europe following the barbarism of the Thirty Years war.

8

For expediency does not elude

expediency assessments^.
it

deontic

presentation:

be presented as through such popular slogans as "local might is right",

can

or given tight formal

characterisation.

The

will

characterisation

normally

that of utilitarianism, except that utilities are only assigned to, or

resemble

are biassed in favour of, certain individuals.

However, theories of utility

not have to be positions of expediency if utility is not locally confined.

do

Thus

utilitarianism proper is not to be dismissed as considering only expediency;
meet intersubstitutivity requirements of morality;

can

it

it does not, unlike the

methods of war game theory, assign different weights to the

individual

utility

of (certain) Americans, as opposed to Russians, say.
are

There

especially,

deontologists

regarding war^.

which

differences,

between

or

justify, ugly strategies and practices as regards

to

some

render

to

seemed

enemy civilians, that deontological principles would not permit.

effect

and

utilitarians

serve to further complicate the moral picture

In particular, utilitarian approaches have

permissible,

morally

significant

however

utilitarians

this

But

is

would

reject the

description of practices permitted under their principles as 'ugly';

whereas an

to

already

in

aim

what

follows

since

partisanship,

is

to

avoid

meta-ethical

meta-ethical neutrality, though of course not

there

is

a

moral

partisanship,
neutrality.

to

achieve

And

morally

large area of consensus, or at least moral convergence, from which

argument can begin.

Virtually all positions

agree

that

obliteration

of

several major cities in a LSN war would be wrong, indeed morally outrageous.

If

the

there is dissension, as there may be among nuclear strategists who seem to

feel

no qualms when it comes to trading loss of some American cities for some Russian
ones, simply increase the costs

involved,

up

to

loss

of

whole

nations

if

15.

The severe limitations of those lesser "virtues",
nationalism
and
patriotism, also come from the failure of replacement which excessive
applications of nationalism easily engender. Try for example swapping a
person from inside the homeland with one from outside as regards treatment.
The point of, and reasons for,
intersubstitutivity as a requirement of
morality,
is well explained in Hare, p.78ff. Hare applies the requirement
to make a telling case against nationalism (a case which extends to
strategic decision-theory).
Nationalism,
along with fanaticism, is the
main cause of war, so Hare contends, p.72.

16.

The case against expediency was developed in detail
especially the criticism of Thrasymachus in The Republic.

17.

Thus the differences between Nagel on the one side, and Brandt and Hare
the other, in Cohen et al.

by

Plato;

see

on

9
then try to work down

necessary, until moral repugnance ijs encountered;

The

again.

fact remains however that in the nuclear area things have got substantially

abandon

tended

Strategic thinking, in particular, has

out of perspective, morally.

to

suppress moral considerations (as indeed theories of the state also

or

do, sometimes flamboyantly, in favour of partisan values).

Naturally the fact of broad consensus as to the morality of the matter does

mean that there are none who would welcome such outrageous happenings, that

not

total nuclear destruction of the North even, would be

Consider

the

rising

world empire.

be

southern

(hemisphere)

no

advantage.

one's

strongman, SS, who has visions of

While the superpowers of the north remain, SS's dream can

realised.

Thus

his

best

strategy,

having

rid

submarines and southern lands of US bases, is to try

nuclear

to

exchange

in

the

North.

There

be

would

waters

southern

to

encourage

a

hardly
of US

all-out

an

point then in securing

institutional arrangements so that potential SS's do not accumulate much

given

especially

the

apparent instability of crucial world arrangements.

that is to anticipate:

the present point is that (the fact of) moral

has

and

its

power,

limitations,

is

an

inadequate

But

consensus

constraint without accompanying

structural adjustments.

national

For, typically,

differently

to

impose

interest

is

taken

hostages

or

override

morality,

even

holding

civilian

populations

as

of those

those of Eastern Europe.
things.

substitution

of

justification;
fails

in

The

first,

expediency

classes

regimes,

But morally national interest can do neither

the

overriding

for

morality,

of

morality,

which

the second, the alleged moral dominance of

important

And,

killing millions in the national interest*8).

unfortunately, these assumptions are not confined to more totalitarian
such

or

irresistible ethical claims that dominate more ordinary

ethical considerations (such as those concerning
nuclear

to

is

entirely
national

simply
lacks

the

moral

interests,

of cases, including, so the argument will go, the

case of LSN war.

18.

As Schell bluntly puts it, 'What is being claimed is that one or two
countries have the right to jeopardise all countries and their descendents
in the name of certain beliefs' (p.132). However this way of putting it
leaves room for ambiguity, since the beliefs may be morally grounded rather
than based on national interests.

10
States may insist upon operating on a selfish national interest basis,

let

it

not

be

that

pretended

expediency (namely,

that

of

is

it

a moral basis as distinct from one of

There

egoism").

"group

but

moral

special

no

is

dispensation

for governments.

individuals:

there is no logical difference in the pattern of justification, or

analysis of obligation.

Morality works in the same way for groups as for

For example, what ought to be as regards X is (analysed

semantically) what would happen as regards X in all ideal worlds;
no

whether

difference

is

an

reasons

aside,

just

behaving

as

system, group or

individual

or

individual

States such as Israel (in its recent invasion

organisation.

extenuating

X

immorally

of

as brigands or mass

Certainly there are grounds on which states or their agents
conceded, special moral dispensations;

been

more than that and do not stand up to criticism.
cannot

furnish

two

(incompatible)

claimed,

have

but the excuses offered are no
A

moralities,

satisfactory

a

state

theory

moral

or public one and a

private or individual citizen one — state expediency and individual

morality

because this would lead to violations of substitutivity, neutrality, etc.

instance, a state operative X could use state

cover

morally impermissible ways, ways ruled out (e.g.
Y are permuted.

special

are,

Lebanon)

there is no moral difference.

killers:

or

makes

and it

to

considerations

citizen

*

For
Y

in

by state interests) when X and

A group or organisation or person can be

derivative

damage

19

bound

of

course

by

in virtue of role, but these are derivative

principles - good for any such institution - which fit within and answer back to
general

moral principles.

So it is also with a state which is an institutional

arrangement justified (insofar as it is) by the way it answers back to some
least)

of

its

citizens:

its

charter does not legitimate emergent allegedly

moral principles which conveniently coincide with those of state expediency.
particular,

a

survival.

In

state is not (morally) entitled to risk the lives of many of its

own citizens and of other peoples and creatures for its own ends, even
own

(at

for

its

Thus it is not entitled to do what both nuclear war and nuclear

deterrence require, as will emerge.

19.

There are also other arguments against two (or

see Routley and Plumwood.

multiple)

morality

lines:

11
§3.

The initial argument

pacifism

yield

arguments

to

the

immorality

of

to

the

immorality

of war.

controversial in an area where there is no

LSN

for

But such arguments are

be

to

reason

good

Arguments

wars.

controversial.

Pacifism can accordingly be set aside as a special case, since the immorality of
LSN wars follows.
All but pacifist positions concede that war in itself is not a crime.

all

wars are immoral, though even inoffensive wars may be pointless or inferior

Among more or less admissible

ways of settling political issues between states.
wars

who

Not

are

the international "tournaments" of aristocratic young men or warriors

volunteer

as

and

soldiers

action

whose

not

does

spill

over

onto

noncombatants, and some early and medieval wars, where few or even no combatants

were killed in war.

conscription,

Since the establishment

press-gangs

and

recruitment

of

such

of

the

largely ceased to take these less offensive forms;

induction

practices

as

near-destitute, wars have

modern massive wars are

far

removed from the ideal war-tournament types (which feature now only in ecotopian
portrayals, in ways that are increasingly dubious).
immoral,

sorts

Most

of

wars

are

because of what is done to the essentially uninvolved, but few to such

an extent as LSN wars.

The first argument to the

immorality

of

LSN

and

wars

sufficiently

of

large-scale wars generally, takes the following form:
Pl.

The (deliberate) killing in mass of noncombatants is wrong.

P2.

LSN wars involve the killing in mass of noncombatants.

P3.

What involves what is wrong is wrong.

- (KA)

LSN wars are wrong.

The particular argument given is just one representative of a set

of

this

type.

taken

off

killing:

the

on

(KA)

replaces

But the

quite

'killing

sufficiently

evil.

creatures'.

can

Thus

a

first

in mass of noncombatants' by a suitable

clause concerning 'huge destruction of lifestyle of uninvolved or
involved

focus

destruction of lifestyle of nonhumans and humans

alike that an LSN war will bring is
variation

arguments

Characteristically, in Western culture, it is thought that mass

killing of humans is about the worst thing that can happen.
be

of

not

directly

Other variations will emerge in the discussion (including

that where the bracketed 'deliberate' figures).

but

The argument is valid,
attacked)

on

the

of

basis

be

may

attacked

(and

of its premisses.

each

has

in

effect

been

Let us consider these in

reverse order. The principle, P3, used in the argument, that what involves "what

is wrong" is wrong, has been challenged on rather Scholastic grounds. There are,
in particular, problems like those generated by Good Samaritan arguments,

purport to show that some proper obligations involve wrongdoing.
assisting an injured robbed person is said

robbed;

but, since the robbing is wrong,

"involve"

to

providing

For

which

instance,

that person's

assistance

being

is also wrong.

But these problems derive from too slack a notion of involvement; with a tighter
account of involvement the problems disappear and P3 stands.
As against P2, it may

legitimately

directed

be

argued

against

that

military

nuclear

targets.

20

can

wars

be

encounters

But given the character of

There is

nuclear weapons, LSN wars could in no way be confined to such targets.
not

merely

the likelihood that many missiles explode off target, there are all

the other effects of large-scale nuclear bombings.

fallout

down-wind

from

military

people, especially in the case of

targets

US

and

For example, the radioactive

will affect large concentrations of
European

targets,

and

may

affect

uninvolved countries such as Canada.
There may be an attempt to avoid the problem of massive civilian casualties

by

appeal

effect)21.

to such dubious principles as the doctrine of double effect (or side

if missiles were characteristically

reliably

on

target,

and

one

20.

The challenge to P3, which is often expanded to a "distribution of
obligation over entailment" principle, can be removed by a tighter
involvement connective, linked to a good paradox-free entailment.
For
details see Routley and Plumwood, where Good Samaritan problems are
diagnosed.

21.

According to the doctrine, which is one concerning responsibility, we are
responsible
only
for the intended effects or consequences of our
freely-chosen actions, and not for other (side) effects or consequences,
even if these are foreseen and/or intimately tied to the intended
consequences.
Unless carefully hedged, the doctrine is
pernicious,
allowing those who suitably adjust their intention to escape responsibility
for evil they knowingly perpetrate. Thus, for instance, a Russian supreme
command which intended only to take out US military targets would, under
double effect, have no responsibility for the resultant effect on American
and Canadian cities!

Taking the issues concerning double effect to a more
satisfactory
conclusion would however require a larger theory of action, which duly
distinguished acts (what is done) and outcomes from attached intentions.

13

which was

intended

unfortunately

went

only
off

to

destroy

an

underground

unmanned

course and destroyed a large city, it could be claimed

that the (unintended) mass destruction is legitimised under

principle.

a

make

Nonetheless

effect

double

the

circumstances

difference, for they may mitigate attitudes to those responsible

for firing the missile, since it was not as if they had

deliberately

aimed

at

The double effect principle conflates [diminution of] responsibility

city.

the

the

the action would be wrong, and the

Such claims should be rejected:

wrongness not lessened by the given intention.

could

silo

missile

assigned for an act with the [diminution of] wrongness of the act.

As against Pl, and as regards the middle term of

argued

that there is an important equivocation.

While it will

the bracketed term, 'deliberate'.

killing

and

Pl

P2,

may

it

be

The equivocation is induced by
conceded

be

that

deliberate

of genuine innocents is impermissible, two challenges will be made.

It

will be charged firstly that noncombatants, insofar as they are distinguishable,
are

no means all innocent, many being directly involved in military effort,

by

whether just as taxpayers or as suppliers of
military,

e.g.

farmers

or

goods

or

services

bootmakers or entertainers.

as

innocent.

The

second

defensible — version of premiss P2.
and

for

other

reasons,

it

properly

point concerns a much narrower - and less

Because P2 so amended is

is best to leave out the

less

defensible,

"modifier" 'deliberate'.

What is important for the present purposes is the moral status of what is

not

a

mixture

that with the motives of the perpetrators.

of

require

the

qualification

'deliberate'

or

done,

So 'deliberate'

gets left out, equivocation is avoided, P2 stands, and so does Pl.
not

the

Secondly, it will be

contended that LSN wars do not involve the deliberate killing of those

excluded

by

used

For Pl

does

'intentional' or the like.22

Admittedly also 'noncombatant' is a fuzzy term, but none the worse for that, and
there

is

noserious

people who are
is,

moreover,

problem

in

marking out a class of

notdirectly involved in the command and action
no need

to

adopt the practice, deriving

stating an initialversion of Pl in terms of innocents -

22.

clear noncombatants,

at

chains.

There

from Catholicism, of

least as problematic

Despite Nagel's suggestion that it does (p.158).
The suggestion depends
upon similar mistaken assimilations, of act with intention, and wrongness
with responsibility, to those of the double effect doctrine.

14
a class as that of noncombatants to try to characterize - and then

endeavouring

to make the difficult transition to noncombatants.

Not only can arguments against the premisses of the argument be met,
are

arguments

the

for

there

premisses, though for the substantive moral premiss Pl

they are of the characteristically nonconclusive moral sort

and

tend

will

For example, one argument for

vary somewhat with the underlying ethical theory.

Pl, and for objecting to the killing of noncombatants, is the Kantian one,

(to

seriously

understate

point)

the

doing

to

that

fails to treat them with the

so

minimal respect owed to them as persons 2 3.

§4.

Arguments

from

historical

requirements

on

just

argument from convergence, and environmental arguments.

wars,

The conclusion that LSN

wars cannot be justly waged - and accordingly are unjustified something

dreamed

up

by

contemporary

"free-enterprise" capitalist state (and

opponents

communist

important

the

of

is

America

inspired,

merely

not
or

the

of

The

etc).

same

conclusion falls out of various traditional requirements, worked out in medieval

times, for just wars.

One of the requirements gives but a variant on the

first

argument (KA). 2** For a necessary condition for fighting a war justly was that it
not be the case that large numbers of [innocent] noncombatants are bound
killed (cf.

to

be

Barnes, p.775).

A just war requires just means, that the war should be
means,

fought

by

morally

which

implies in particular that there is no indiscriminate

killing of noncombatants.

The implied principle was escapsulated in a principle

legitimate

of

discrimination

(between combatants and others) which 'prohibits all actions

directly intended to take the lives of

p.312)

25

.

civilians

and

of

noncombatants'

(PL,

LSN wars, where not only military installations are targeted, violate

this requirement 2 6.

23.

Of course there are counterarguments too, and not merely from the military
angle in the case of small numbers of obstructive noncombatants.
One
favored argument is a variation on the Bald Man:
there is no clear line
between combatants and noncombatants. However as Nagel argues (p.20) there
are distinctions between them, firstly in terms of their roles, e.g.
in
carrying or using arms or directing those who do, and secondly in terms of
their harmfulness, the threat they offer.
See also PL,
p.312, where a
simple and effective paradigm case argument is applied.

24.

Note that throughout, the text adopts the OED equations, reflecting common
usage,
of just with morally right or correct, and unjust with morally

15
Overlapping the requirement of just means is that of
being that of net evil to net good:

proportion

proportionality ,

'the damage to be inflicted and

costs incurred by the war must be proportionate to the good expected
up

arms'

(PL,

requirement:

the damage and costs,

to

goods

moral

proportionality requirement is
of

the

achieved

nationally

not

that

in

doctrine

through war.

"improvement"

are

which

way.

overall

consequences

of

war

conditions

way

bad,

(Barnes, p.782).

'a nation wages war

justly

the

than

Similarly

only

if

the

for that nation or the wronged nation it is supporting have a decent

chance of being better after the fighting ends' (Wakin, p.20).
no

and

According to the first, 'X wages war

abstaining from war'

improvement "puts wrongs to rights":

are

Entangled with the

"ameliorative"

of

confined,

justly upon Y if the overall consequences of war are better, or less

the

taking

by

p.312).2? It is not difficult to see that LSN wars violate this

disproportionate

criterion

the

satisfy

LSN wars can

in

these conditions, as scenarios depicting the aftermath of such

wars reveal.

Some of the lesser requirements for a just war are also
wars,

for

example

that

of

infringed

reasonable expectation of success.

by

LSN

It seems that

there can be no reasonable expectation of state success in an LSN war - whatever
the

very

differently,

exchanges.

limited

prospects

of

success

for

some

whatever the prospects of success in

What

small

strictly

state
limited

elite,

or

nuclear

is less clearcut is the question of whether LSN wars conflict

with the requirements of just cause or due fault, and of right

intention.

For

25.

The principle can be argued to in various ways.
One (by no means
conclusive) way is Nagel's way, from the requirements of directness and
relevance in combat, the underlying (controversial) principle being that,
'whatever one does to another person intentionally must be aimed at him as
a subject, with the intention that he receive it as a subject' (p.15).

26.

The situation with strictly limited nuclear wars where the targets are
essentially military ones, and noncombatants are unaccountably killed
"indirectly",would be different.
Such wars are not however excused by the
pernicious doctrine of double effect.
For such wars remain unjust on
several counts, e.g.
they inflict disproportionate damage, e.g.
on life
systems,
etc.
As Zuckermann says,
'It is still inevitable that were
military installations rather than cities to become the objectives of
nuclear attack, millions,
even tens of millions of civilians would be
killed ...' (quoted in Thompson and Smith,
p.14, where the italics are
added).

27.

This is not to be confused with what is very different, the vicious ancient
doctrine of proportional response - an eye for eye, tooth for tooth, and so
on - recently adapted by the Americans in their latest official policy of
flexible response, adjusted to the level of attack.

16

this depends on the sensitive issue of the weight assigned to what are

seen

as

basic human rights and fundamental values, and the extent to which just wars can

While the mainstream position

be ideologically justified.

theory

medieval

opposed to ideologically justified wars and "humanitarian" wars, these were

was

not definitively excluded by the traditional theory (cf.

is

of

merit,

little

when

(and

issues will arise again subsequently).

historical requirements
are

arguments

not

do

simply

not

There

in puzzling over dubiously effective requirements,

however,

when so many are decisive against LSN wars
sensitive

Barnes, p.778).

commit

arguments

any
from

matters

the

underlying

Finally, these arguments from

prescriptive

fallacy;

historical

authority

for
to

the
moral

conclusions, but use also premisses to the effect that the requirements imposed,
and sometimes applied, were justified.

As they are.

In the Christian tradition there were two main strands of reflection on the

moral

rightness

justness of wars, the just war theory and a rival pacifist

or

strand, prominent in early Christianity, but largely submerged from Augustine on

contemporary

until

times.

Both exclude nuclear wars, one strand because they

are inevitably unjust, the other because they are wars and
This

is

the

beginning of the convergence argument against nuclear wars:

that

is

duly

expediency

such wars are excluded from all ethical perspectives, once

removed

(and

even,

very

frequently, when it is not).

however you look at it morally.
consensus

violence^^.

involve

argument;

it

The argument is not

proceeds

They are morally wrong

the

same

as

the

weaker

from similar results from the full sweep of

genuinely ethical positions, not from massive agreement of opinion.

The detailed convergence argument is an exhaustive case by case
each

type

of

moral

theory.

Fortunately

details

can

be

deontological and contractual theories lead back to requirements

28.

one,

from

shortcut.

For

for

just

war

These alternatives are not as far removed practically as may appear.
For
the aim of just war theory is not 'to legitimize war but to prevent it.
The presumption is against the use of force' (PL, p.312). And most types
of wars are ruled out by the theory. However not all wars or violent
revolutions are excluded, and that is enough to guarantee the distinction
between the alternatives.
In particular, defensive wars are allowed - at
least for the defending side, though from a wider viewpoint these too may
be condemned 'the classic case [of the just war] ... was the use of
lethal force to prevent aggression against innocent victims'
(PL, p.311).
Under recent international law, defence, narrowly construed, is the only
legitimate basis for war;
Roman law was only slightly more generous,
in
allowing for the restitution of goods (see Barnes, p.780).

17

which, it has already been shown, LSN wars violate.
war

arrived

sometimes

were

defended through principles of such moral

or

at

In fact conditions for just

work

theories, so that a good deal of the requisite argumentative
been

The latter point holds also as regards utilitarianism, where it has

done.

in effect been shown that whatever brand of utilitarianism is

maximisation

utility

already

has

is

finally

LSN

accomplished,

adopted,

wars

however

excluded

are

utilitarian grounds.The reason for such convergence is not far to seek;

LSN

such massive infliction of pain and colossal removal of pleasure,

involve

wars

on

that this dominates in assessments however they are accomplished in

utilitarian

Thus any genuine alternative to LSN war is better30.

fashion.

The arguments

so

moral

overwhelming

far

case

outlined

against

principles

are

derivable

some

from

war

worse

substantially

are

of the theories just considered).

These

the obligation to maintain

to

accountable,

condition

than

the

these

we

violate

would

earth in proper shape and not degrade its systems:
we

exhaust

not

(again

LSN

principles include environmental ones, such as:

generations, to whom

do

wars

For there are other significant

wars.

such

moral principles which the waging of an

LSN

against

the

the responsibility to future
the

world

it".

Such

"pass

"received

on"

not

in

conservative
bound

principles - however they are finally satisfactorily formulated - are

to

be violated in the event of an LSN war.

§5.

The shift to nuclear deterrence:

support

nuclear

arguments to its immorality.

Those

arrangements have had a way of halting - and if not defeating,

certainly turning and deflating - arguments from the immorality of LSN wars,

engagement

done is, it is claimed, quite different from

is

most

important

precisely

in

preventing

LSN

in

such

war:

is

continued,

deterrence

is

the

only

practical

desiderata, prevention of war and maintenance of values.

way

indeed

wars from ever

occurring, as well as in maintaining other fundamental Western values.

it

by

What is being

pointing out that there is no actual engagement in any such wars.

deterrence

who

Indeed,

of obtaining both

Similar arguments

are

But compare Hardin.

29.

For details see, e.g., Lackey, especially MM.

30.

An argument of this sort is developed in more detail,
complete generality, in Goodin, especially 'Disarmament'.

though

not

in

18
advanced for all the various guises that deterrence is presented

in:

mutually

assured destruction as formerly, flexible response as latterly, or otherwise.

Such claims as to the roles and
dubious,

several

for

reasons.

objectives

of

If it were, "sufficiency" to deter would be an adequate goal.

superiority.

than

this,

and

sometimes

goal.

In fact there has

renewed

a

even

military

drive

for

Pure deterrence can account neither for actual nuclear weapons nor

for orthodox Western military strategy32.
process

decidedly

A first reason is that there is much evidence,

despite pronouncements, that deterrence is not the - the only -

been a quest for more

are

deterrence

Nor has deterrence set in motion

the

of disarmament to be expected to reduce armaments to levels appropriate

f<?r deterrence.

On the contrary, under "its"

impulse

there

has

been

almost

unlimited acceleration in building arms (to paraphrase PL p.318).
Another major reason for serious doubt about what

sold

31.

is

being

under "deterrence" labels concerns the probability factor:

marketed

and

deterrence has

It is important to observe that the discussion is not restricted to one
form of deterrence, such as that of mutually assured destruction (MAD), but
applies to all forms of response likely to engender LSN war. This includes
"flexible response",
since the likely further development is massive
retaliation to an initial Soviet nuclear raid. Part of the reason for this
is the extreme vulnerability of the US defence systems, especially the
communication systems, e.g.
to early strikes and to electromagnetic
pulses.
In the resulting great confusion, escalation appears the likely
outcome. In any case, flexible response includes massive retaliations, as
part of its range and is ultimately backed by it.
It is also important to observe that deterrence as practised is not
confined to responses to (nuclear) attack. The threat of nuclear action
has been made in cases where a rival encroaches on a zone of interest of a
nuclear power.
It is in part because deterrence includes nuclear responses
to what is construed as serious misbehaviour of rivals that the practice of
deterrence raises the probability of LSN war to the extent it does.

32.

As to the first point, there is not only overkill capacity and the drive
for superiority (often represented as "negotiating" strength) but the
matter of counterforce weapons which are offensive weapons. As regards the
second point, US policy has been decidedly expansionist with regular
intervention in other nations;
there have been repeated US threats to use
nuclear weapons,
especially to deal with revolutionary activities in the
third world, but also in Europe in "limited" nuclear war;
and in official
military strategy no sharp line has been drawn between conventional and
nuclear weapons:
on these and other related points see further Lackey MM,
p.l91ff., and also Thompson and Smith.
The argument can be pressed
further, to the alarming conclusion that deterrence is largely a front,
which plays only a minor,
but justificatory, role in actual US policy.
Among further evidence is behavioural data:
a government with a genuine
deterrence policy would repeatedly emphasize its strength (even when it
lacks strength), whereas the US government often parades its vulnerability
and weakness in public. For other evidence see Smith, e.g.
p.46ff.

19
of

increased the probability

type

arms-race

that

war.

LSN

deterrence

precisely,

More

of

the

is being practised, which involves full-scale preparation

for total nuclear war, has prepared the conditions for nuclear war to occur, and

has

to

that

extent

reasons also, connected with pure

the last 30 years.

deterrence

with

and

(its

war"

"cold

the

probability of a LSN war has increased considerably in

the

setting),

original

For other

least enhanced its prospects of occurring.

at

The reasons include the threatening posture

called

for

by

deterrence, the propaganda, which comes to be believed, that must be promulgated
to maintain credibility

overridden

or

with

"sacrificed

a
for

etc.

many

there

analysts

century, i.e

think

before 2000.

real

The situation has
is

a

high

There are several

are

interests

being

the dangerous and risky

military objectives!

state of military readiness;
sober

whose

population

now

where

reached

been

probability of an LSN war this

routes

to

a

such

probability

assignment.33 It would only require one incident with a 20% chance of leading to
an escalating war every 8 years between 1960 and

2000.

alerts,

Cuban missile crisis, carry a considerably higher chance

been

have

lucky

already.

In

of

nuclear

For

markedly.

the years ahead it appears likely that the

the

danger

supplicant

nations

resources declines.
and

the

worsens

and

the

extent

The danger is enhanced by

connected

increasing

chance

of
the

lot.

33.

Cox).

easily

as

the

plight

extractable

continuation

of

of

crucial

the

arms

of nuclear accident and human or

technical error, none of them negligible factors as

(cf.

increase

zones separating the superstates are increasing in

size and number, with Soviet and American expansionism, and

reveals

the

exchange.

number of incidents with a real chance of engendering nuclear war will

race,

on

side alone, have been at least as frequent, and sometimes, as with the

American

We

Full

past

experience

copiously

Such a sketch can of course be elaborated and tidied up a

Even so every substantial point involved can be contested,

and

many

are

Another route to a more than subjective assessment is to apply Delphi
methods:
weigh up the experts' assessments.
In this regard it is worth
noting that it is not only "nuclear doves" who consider the probability of
nuclear war has increased in recent years.

American officials have themselves admitted that the policies of
realising the strategic potential of counterforce attacks and of
selective and flexible responses have increased the probability
of nuclear war (Ball, p.128).

20

For better

contentious (though not always for good reasons).

way

no

seems

worse,

or

there

to make such an overall probability argument particularly tight;

and there are plausible arguments, from the complexity of the data concerned and
the contingency of the future, that it cannot be made tight.

It is bad enough however that it is decidedly plausible that it

that

probable

LSN

an

war

distribution principles) that it

probable

that

century.

And that is enough

grossly

a

is

immoral
to

decidedly

morally

on moral grounds, to change deterrence as

policy

is

immoral.

that

plausible

it

highly

is

sequence of events will be perpetrated this

evasive

warrant

morally to take action to avert the outcome.

deterrence

highly

For then it follows (by

occur this century.

will

is

action.

ought

We

That in turn implies taking steps,

presently

practised.

Thus

present

That is but the first of several ways we shall

arrive at that damaging conclusion for present super-state deterrence policies.

The plausibility of claims as to the high or increasing probability of
war has of course been disputed.

*

The main counterargument runs as follows:

Nuclear war is unlikely, because the consequences are too horrifying.

The underlying assumption is that wars and the like, with

are

LSN

improbable.

assumption.

Unfortunately

however

horrifying

outcomes,

much available evidence counters this

More than enough humans have not shrunk from brutal

exchanges

horrifying wars, or even from genocide, as human history attests (cf.

Kuper).

What is less assailable than the high probability claim, what the
certainly

have

already

got

into

since

LSN

thereby perhaps helping to bring it about, in the sense

war,

the probability.

immoral

of

raising

The more detailed underlying arguments, then,to the immorality

of nuclear deterrence proceed by
LSN

an

deterrence operates by the perverse practice of preparing for

situation,

against

evidence

seems to support, is that there is a non-negligible probability of an

Thereby, through deterrence, we

LSN war.

and

way

of

principles

mapping

war into arguments against deterrence of LSN war

might appropriately be called deontic

connecting

principles

moral

arguments

Such principles

The

first

of

these principles takes the following preliminary form:

Cl.
should

If it is wrong that X should occur, then not only

be

probable

is

it

wrong

that

it

that X occur, but, more important, it is wrong to directly

21

increase the probability that X occur.

Thus, for

example,

it

since

wrong

is

to

kill

large

a

noncombatant

population in LSN war (by §4) it is also wrong to put the population at risk and
wrong to increase the chance that the hostage population is wiped out,

which

both

of

For similar reasons a superstate is not morally

nuclear deterrence does.

entitled to impose nuclear risks upon uninvolved noncombatants, especially those

of third party nonaligned states.

most

Like

situations.

defeat by

example,

substantive

moral

Unless

counterexamples,

X

that

in

and

of

accordingly,
Cl

encounters

to

into

runs

require

dilemma

For

complication.

apparent trouble where clash of

order

to

that

the

passenger

he

plane

is

flying

sure that the troubled aircraft does not hit city

make

Such a defeating condition does not apply in the case of

where

deterrence,

Consider for example the

to avoid a greater evil.

occurs

apartment buildings 3**.

nuclear

Cl

dilemmas are duly allowed for, Cl appears liable to

pilot who increases the probability

crashes,

ethics,

in

Thus it may be argued that it is permissible to increase the

principles occurs.
probability

part

second

the

principles

(though

there

explains) wrongness of a practice is not

is

a

offset

or

principles, as §6

of

clash

removed

by

its

role

in

avoiding greater evil.

It can be argued that it is:
argument

the

from

previous

argument deserves little

perhaps

from

more

such is part of

success
credence

the

deterrence.
than

the

of

the

popular

However this inductive

driver's

racing

world

As Barnett argues,

argument,

'the

happy

accident

has survived the first thirty-five years of the nuclear era is

unimpressive evidence that we can avoid nuclear war

34.

point

a similar time base, that because he hasn't had a fatal crash yet

(despite some close calls), he won't.

that

of

the

in

the

coming

era,

...'

This dilemma example was supplied by D.
Johnston.
There are more
difficult putative counterexamples.
For example, in inciting people to
civil disobedience, the risk of state violence in retaliation is increased.
Thus,
to take C.
Pigden's example, in encouraging disobedience, Gandhi
increased the probability of wrongdoing by the British Raj.
But surely
Gandhi, unlike the Raj, did not act wrongly? It can be claimed that Gandhi
did not directly increase the probability of violence.
But spelling out
what
'directly'
means - in terms of short causal chains over which
responsibility can be distributed - is not only problematic but leads on to
other connecting principles.

22

(p.100).

He offers familiar reasons such as the changing power

increase

in

Russian

the

strength,

rise

the

relations,

of other nuclear powers, etc.

(cf.

similarly Cox).
There are, accordingly, powerful reasons for concluding that

Deterrence will not continue to work,

DI.

and, more important for the present argument, that

Deterrence does increase the probability of LSN war.

D2.

The themes are of course interrelated, and the reasons for them (which are again

persuasive but inconclusive) can be taken together:
some respects) weaker D2 - the probability factor.

proliferation,

the

but the focus is on the (in

An initial

of lesser nuclear powers.

emergence

reason

concerns

As a result there are

many more ways of starting a nuclear conflagration, and so enhanced prospect

it.3$

Some analysts consider that a very likely route to LSN war is the initial

use of nuclear weapons by

confrontation

a

lesser

state.

Moreover

scarcity

the

growing

and

weapon

systems,

more

or

terror

situations,

deterrence

power

involves 36,

being maintained:

balance

of

have an exceedingly bad historical track record.

increasing as the race proceeds.
of

With so many more

Arms races, and interwoven

There is substantial inductive evidence that

present

costs

widely distributed, the probability of war

through accident or error is increased.

power

resource

A second group of reasons concerns the

of cheaper supplies, etc.

nuclear arms race which deterrence, as practised, is tied to.
weapons

for

opportunities

to lead on to war are increasing, with increasing world political

instability, relating to third world economic decline,
and

of

lead

escalating

eventually

to

races,

arms

war,

with

such

as

probability

Next, deterrence depends on a certain

balance

if that balance is unduly disturbed, as can happen

during escalation, deterrence may well fail.

A related reason for

supposing

that

deterrence

practice

increases

the

35.

It can be theoretically argued
that the fewer the nations
nuclear weapons,
the less the chance of nuclear war: cf.
p.230n.

36.

The standard argument for
deterrence as significantly decreasing
the
probability of war,would
be decidedly better if the arms race were
abandoned, and weapons held at the much smaller levels required just for
deterrence.
Of course such a probability-well assumption is only one of
several things required if deterrence is to be justified.

armed with
Lackey, MM,

23
probability of war concerns the continuing shifts in US policy,

especially

the

renewed quest for superiority which is increasing the incentive of both sides to

resort to nuclear war, the USSR to avoid being
of

advantage

the

overwhelmed,

USA

to

take

superiority achieved.3? Recent dangerous shifts in US policy

the

towards war fighting are in part induced by a much increased accuracy of nuclear
missiles, which both weakens the case for MAD deterrence (since military targets

can be selected for strike and cities to some extent removed as
thereby

also

weakens

against

case

the

resort

to

leaders, and even some

nuclear

shared

understanding,

mutual

principles,
and

cooperation

Finally,
level

judgement

among

information

of

and

important)

of

soundness

transmission

war.

nuclear

deterrence requires a certain (admittedly rather minimal, yet
of

hostages),

between

It is not just that the increasing numbers of operators

super-states.

in a position to launch nuclear weapons must remain of "sound mind" and not, for
through on delusions of one sort or another.

follow

instance,

deterrence depends upon judgements
seriously

mistaken:

'each

is

regarding

other

the

It is also that
which

side,

side's

is to the other' (PL, p.313).

threat

we

But

think'.38

about

what

the

other

considerable, and perhaps catastrophic, margin of
evidence,

that

one

perception of what is
possible

result

As

side

thinks

side

error.

Not

thinks,

there
only

not

can be a

is

there

side (the USA) has misjudged the other side's (the USSR's)

rational,

as

regards

limited

nuclear

war,

of a first strike countered by massive retaliation;

must now be severe doubts

effectively.

"convincing"

There is a grain of truth in

the claim that 'deterrence is primarily about what the other

what

be

at the mercy of the other's perception of what

strategy is "rational", what kind of damage is "unacceptable", how
one

may

as

to

whether

rational

principles

are

with

the

but there
operating

to the last consider, to take just one example, the erroneous

37.

The point is discussed in Dahlitz, e.g. p.213, where the US quest for
superiority is documented. The vicissitudes of US "defence" policy - not
to say its shiftiness and occasional incoherence (as in strategic forward
defence) - have confused many of its supporters even. Perhaps there is
some advantage in the very incomplete and limited exposure of USSR war and
imperial policies:
we don't see, with alarm,
their incoherence and
irrationality.

38.

Pym, quoted in Thompson, p.19. Yet a fundamental problem Russia and the
West face,
it is sometimes claimed,
is not merely that they do not
understand one another but that 'there is a lack of a wish to understand'.
This casts into doubt the psychological basis of nuclear deterrence.

idea (already alluded to, as held in high places of power in USA and in UK) that
LSN war can be survived in rudimentary shelters, and also won.

The supporter of deterrence

connecting

such

principles

has

not

defeat

to

only

arguments

Cl, but, more difficult, to field a convincing

as

For the onus of proof lies in showing that the costly

rival case.

deterrence is justified.

through

practice

of

But far from the fairly decisive case that is required

(to contrast with the argument through Cl),

feeble

a

only

through

case

the

questionable obverse of Cl,

Clt.

If X is wrong then it is right to reduce the probability of X,

For it has to be shown that

appears open.
*

deterrence (substantially) reduces the probability of LSN war,

and strictly (this indicates part of the trouble with Clt) that

*

deterrence does this better (more morally) than available options.

The latter uniqueness condition certainly fails, so it will be argued.

reasons already given, does the probability claim.
up the very

conditions

probability

of

such

for
a

LSN

an

war,

it

So,

for

When nuclear deterrence sets

can

hardly

reduced

have

the

war, especially over the situation a mere 25 years ago

when such an LSN war was not technically possible.

More generally, in showing that nuclear deterrence is justified, it is
refute the theme that deterrence is wrong.

enough to

out that deterrence is permissible, or alright.

alternative

permissible

courses

action

of

deterrence, which appear more morally satisfactory.
uniqueness

condition has to be established;

to be not merely

alright,

but

right.

But

It is not enough to make

For there certainly seem to
without

not

be

the costs or problems of

To surpass these options, a

nuclear deterrence has to be shown
establishing

such

a

claim,

to

fear

or

acceptable evidential standards, is virtually impossible.39
Deterrence consists in preventing something (often some wrong) by

threats

including

fright

OED)**°.

(cf.

For

most

people,

portraying the horror of LSN wars would serve adequately enough
from

39.

LSN

wars,

without

all

the

enormous

expense,

trouble

vivid scenarios

to

deter

them

and wastage of

An analogous point will appear when it is asked whether deterrence is the
way out of the nuclear fix, the thing to persist with in the circumstances.
Given that there are apparently superior, less dangerous procedures,
the

answer has to be, No.

25
preparing to engage in them.
deterrence

And

deterrence

by

such

means

(which

in any case depends upon) is of course not immoral.

military

(Schell was not

immoral in publishing his graphic descriptions of the nuclear destruction of New

York.)

But though deterrence per se is permissible, nuclear deterrence, that is

deterrence by complete preparation for the object to be prevented, is not, where

this

object,

a

war, itself is not permissible.

LSN

The argument for this is

through the principle
If X is wrong then complete preparation for (carrying out) X is wrong.

C2.
Hence

since

preparation,

LSN

wars

nuclear

are

wrong

and

nuclear

deterrence

deterrence of LSN wars is wrong.

claimed that preparing for X is just as bad as doing X:

wrong and Z (much) worse than Y.

complete

It is not however being

Y and

may

Z

both

What is wrong is by no means uniformly evil

In 1945 there would have been little doubt that

LSN war was wrong.

implies

complete

preparation

be

41
for

Among the three types of crime specified in Article 6 of the

Charter for the International Military Tribunals

(which

tried

the

major

war

criminals at Nuremburg) were
Crimes against peace: namely planning,
preparation,
initiation or
waging of a war of aggression, or a war in violation of international
treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation in a common plan
or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the following (cited in
Kuper, p.21;
italics added).

But after many years of nuclear deterrence, the
become

increasingly

liable

to

question.

wrongness

implied

in

C2

has

However the doubts mainly come from

40.

Deterrence also commonly includes elements of mendacity,
deception,
misinformation, that is elements of what are, for the most part, morally
undesirable traits.

41.

Nor are
ordered
because
wrong,
equally

degrees of wrongness required:
wrongs can simply be partially
as regards relative worseness. The point requires some labouring
it has been quite erroneously assumed that if Y and Z are both
categorically or absolutely, then they must be equally "wrong" or
evil. Thus, e.g. Williams:

there is no moral difference between running a deterrent strategy
on the one hand, and intentionally - indeed wantonly - starting a
nuclear war on the other;
so that the first is as totally evil
as the second.
This is because both are held to be absolutely
forbidden.

Not at all. The arguments from "Y and Z are both absolutely forbidden"
to
"So Y is as totally evil as Z"
and
to "Therefore Y and Z do not differ
morally" are both entirely without validity.
Compare:
2 is a number,
and
3 is a number;
so 2 is the same number as 3, or does not differ
numerically from 3!

26

assuming that complete preparation includes less than it needs to or does.

Complete preparation for something, such as
several

other

LSN

war,

already

writes

in

In particular, it presupposes the preparation is not

features.

half-hearted but is serious, is not merely for show and is not simply

pretence.

Observe that mere pretence, or other more psychological ploys, cannot substitute

for complete preparation in nuclear deterrence.
too

sophisticated

bluff

for

alone

to

there

succeed:

preparation for war accompanying the threats involved in

the

other

has

is

now

be serious

to

deterrence.

But,

on

complete preparation does not imply that what is prepared for

hand,

will be attempted other than conditonally:
imply attempted X.

complete preparation for X does

not

It does however involve a conditional undertaking to proceed

with what is prepared
whether

intelligence

Military

under

for

certain

Complete

conditions.

preparation,

for a wedding or murder or whatever, would be pointless otherwise, so a

(proclaimed) commitment to proceed under given circumstances can

for

be

taken

of

connecting

granted.

Principle C2

A

principles.

is

part

way

not

the

in

line

a

series

principle of the same sort that is higher in the series is that
if X is wrong then attempted X is wrong

connecting X with attempted X:
perhaps

down

as bad), whether X succeeds or not.

But the series ends;

off well before the lower limits of intensionality, contrary to
various religious positions.

then

the

contemplation

consideration

of

of

it cuts

claims

of

For example, it does not follow that if X is wrong

X

is

wrong

carrying out X is wrong.

or

that

mere

non-action-oriented

The point applies equally to sexual

fantasies, power fantasies, and nuclear nightmares.

nothing

the

(though

In

particular,

there

is

wrong with contemplating nuclear war, or reflecting upon it, as we are:

nuclear wars, even if their horrors don't bear thinking on, are not unthinkable,

and in some senses are all too thinkable.
Indeed one of the reasons why the connecting principles appeal is that each

commonly

involves

it connects with.

decidedly increased probability of the wrongdoing or outcome

Accompanying the increased probability are

certain

reprehensible attitudes tied to the action the evil outcome involves;

not

those

of

mere

passive

contemplation*^.

However

all

the

sets

of

these are
connecting

27
principles

except Cl hold, where they do, even when the probability of

invoked

wrongdoing eventuating is not increased.

One reason for this is that the

means

to reprehensible ends may be inefficacious, for instance intending to do

chosen

someone harm using witchcraft.

The increased probability

evil

an

of

outcome

simply makes things worse.

announcement

Nuclear deterrence involves not only war preparation, but
this

threats

by

accompanied

and

a threatening posture.

For some party, the

if

potential enemy, has to be suitably frightened or moved,

of

deterrence

succeed:

the threat must be recognised as such and be credible.

nuclear

deterrence yields a further connecting principle:

is

to

This aspect of

If X is wrong then serious threatening of X under given conditions is also

C3.

or, in brief, If X is wrong then conditional threatening of X is wrong.

wrong;

The remaining connecting conditions invoked all take this general form

CG.

If X is wrong so is a conditional

requires

further

some

explanation.

intension

to

is some intensional functor,

threatening

from

Apart

intentions

that).
C

to

'the

the

most

is the

not

are

impossible

or even remote or improbable:

claim

in

what

(specifically those involving
commitment)

for

follows

certain

is

that

sorts

there

of

discussed

an

conditions

the conditions

typically concern those specifying a nuclear strike by a potential

fundamental

credible

functor:

To remove complication it can be assumed henceforth that the

involved

which

it is obligatory

in propositional rather than event style:

(or

form

a

e.g.

themselves,

conditional intensions are conditional obligations where

obligation

-

A conditional intension is a judgement of

the form, ^(X if C), where

of'.**3

X

do

enemy.

The

are intensional functors

threatening,

intending,

and

which CG holds, and that these versions suffice to demonstrate
of

Naturally

again

many

the

immorality

42.

There is plenty of scope for further
elaboration
here.
Passive
spectatorship of evil events where one is in an appropriate position to
make a difference is quite another thing,
from contemplation of other
worlds where evil occurs.

43.

The conditional intension, ^(X if C), which is an intension, should not be
confused with the provisional form,
if C then^X, which is not. The
Americans are threatening the Russians with retaliatory action if they
strike:
it is not that if the Russians strike the Americans will threaten
them with retaliatory action.
Such confusion has arisen because of the
problems of formalising conditional obligation given usual defective
theories of conditionality.

nuclear

deterrence.

there

are

28
non-action-oriented functors for which versions

contemplation,

thinking,

dreaming, etc.

GC

of

fail,

of

those

e.g.

There is also an interesting group of

more borderline functors, those of hoping (for),

expecting,

the

and

awaiting

like, for which CG is only dubiously correct.

Connecting principle C3 evolved from the simpler principle, if X
then

threatening

to do...
into

X is also wrong, or, as formulated by Ramsay:

is wrong to threaten...'**** The reason is that

practice

(e.g.

'What is wrong

putting

if

wrong

is

something

committing rape) is wrong then so also is what goes into

threatening to put that into practice, in particular the declared intent to
that

into

practice.

beginning as follows:

The

point

can

if worlds where

alternatively

X

are

happens

be

put

argued semantically,

excluded

so

then

are

adjacent worlds where X is poised to happen.
The complication of the simple form is required for two reasons.
only conditionally threatened, i.e.

is

should certain conditions

nuclear

war

obtain.

However the required conditional form can be derived

through

form,

the

following

argument:-

which is perfectly general, X if C.

particular,

by

earlier

arguments

44.

so

also

is

the

simple

Observe, furthermore that if something X is

if it weren't it wouldn't

(The converse route fails

(of

§§3-4)

LSN

opposition has struck, or not, and so wrong when it
wrong,

from

substitute for X in the simple form,

wrong, it is also wrong under restrictive conditions;

have been wrong in the first place.

Firstly,

threatening X if C.

war
has.

of

course.)

In

is wrong whether the
Hence,

where

X

is

More generally, to establish CG it is

Ramsay's formulation of simplified C3 is considered in Walzer,
p.272.
It
is this principle especially that forces Ramsay, a Protestant theologian
who is a nuclear hawk, into the awkward position he ends in, which as
Walzer explains, really leaves no room to move.
For in virtue o
simplified 03 it must be allowed that the threatened wars are permissible
to carry out. Ramsay tries to limit these to military exchanges. But to
be effective as a deterrent, the exchange permitted must both threaten a
also
in view of C3, not threaten nonmilitary targets, collateral
non-combatant populations.
It appears that Ramsay's position,
if worked
out, would be inconsistent.
see
Simplified principle C3 is also invoked by the US Catholic Bishops:
PL
p.316.
They put the point both in terms of threat and of declared
intent to use nuclear weapons, which they pronounce morally wrong.
simplified C3 is rejected by Hare and Joynt (pp.106-7), who want to
However
the moral status of a threat by way of expected utility. This is
assess all the objections to expected utility as a test of morality
open to
mentioned below.

29

enough to establish the simpler

If X is wrong so is an intension to do X.

CG'.

The second complication in C3, modifying the threat to

causes

threat,

Some modification appears required, because it is often

trouble.

more

serious

a

contended that empty threats or bluff are warranted on occasion even where

is wrong, to prevent the occurrence of something worse .**$ And in

threatened

is

what

fact one way of trying to vindicate deterrence, as morally permissible, has been
by presenting deterrence as involving threats which do not involve any intention

at all to proceed to action on

plausible
threats.

it

the

support

removes

basis

for

of

simplified C3.

sense

one that is not a pretence, empty or a bluff, but credible.

says

which

intended,

consider a

For the challenge

immoral

grossly

where

case

conduct

under

certain

not

and calls for moral double-think.
the

circumstances*

result

To bring this
an

from

improbable

intricate

Either the threat is followed through, automatically (as ordered, by

Doomsday Machine circuitry, etc.) or with further choice, or - somehow -

not.

is

Principle C3 is not

simplified and unqualified C3.

is unconvincing,

conditions,

accident.

is

in effect that itis perfectly morally permissible to issue serious

threats to undertake

out

this

Hence the shift to serious

A serious threat then, in the slightly technical

open to thesame challenges as

as

Insofar

threats.

Either

it

is

way the outcome is morally wrong, in the first case obviously, in

the second case because the intermediate reconsideration makes it plain that the
threat

nor

ought not to have been issued at all, being justifiable on neither moral

more

"practical"

representatives

Furthermore,

grounds.

natures,

to

the

kinds

of

themselves to be (as Benn explains).

insignificant

their

and

may accept moral double attitudes, such as morally assenting to

immoral threats, less corrupt agents cannot:
moral

states

while

proportion

morally

it

would

run

counter

to

their

principled agents they are or take

For such agents, who may

comprise

a

not

of the electorate of a nuclear state, principles such

as C3 are not in doubt.

The argument against nuclear deterrence using C3 is as follows:- Either the

45.

For a discussion of threats where the threatener has no intention of
carrying out the threat, or incentive to do so, see Schelling, p.35ff. The
question of the morality of these threats, where the item threatened is
immoral, can be left open.

30

threat involved in deterrence is serious or it is not.

is

then by C3 deterrence

wrong.

The

sub-argument

depends on serious threats is a practical one:

not

is

it

inadequate, so deterrence is not maintained.

is

it

then

If

serious

But if it is serious
nuclear

that

deterrence

namely, that if the threats were

not serious, but merely gave the impression that they would be followed through,
then

would find out, in one way or another.

opposition

the

could not be endorsed in an open or democratic political

A policy of bluff

system,

for

example,

gaining some discussion, and so giving the game away to the opposition.

without

Even in closed non-democratic systems
maintaining

a

such

policy

weapons, especially

during

there

the

down

of

times

would

be

major

difficulties

in

chains of command involved with nuclear
in

change

governing

elites,

and

the

opposition intelligence.

But then,

since the bluff could be called, deterrence would not have succeeded.

There are

as

likely

would

information

through

escape

well other arguments that the threats involved must be serious.

One is that

nuclear deterrence already faces a credibility problem, namely that doubts about
the

rationality

of

carrying out the big nuclear threat weaken the credibility

essential to its effectiveness.

To be effective then it must

serious

be

(cf.

Benn).
Meeting objections to principle C3 leads on to two further versions of
one

centred on intention, one on commitment.

CG,

Principle C3 is intimately linked

with, and it sometimes considered but a variant upon, the principle

C4.

If X is wrong then to conditionally intend to do X [knowing it is wrong] is

also wrong.

The principles are intimately associated because a threat is, according to
dictionaries,

etc.'.
of

'a

declaration

of

intent

to inflict punishment, loss, injury,

It is their interconnection which lies at the bottom of

which

deterrence,

intending to go to war.

principle,

that

turn

C4

is

some

paradoxes

on the problem of credibly threatening war without

Principle

04

is

justified

through

the

simplified

intending to do wrong is wrong, and so also is intending to do

wrong unless favourable circumstances for one's

principle

some

an

extremely

position

prevail.

Simplified

widely assumed moral thesis,*^ perhaps for the

excellent reason that it holds analytically.

Its elaboration C4 can be used

to

31
since proceeding to LSN war when

against nuclear deterrence, as follows:

argue

the enemy duly misbehaves is wrong (by §§3-4), by C4, intending to go to LSN war
the enemy duly misbehaves is also wrong.

when

Nuclear deterrence involves such

Hence

an intention, all the available evidence shows.

deterrence

nuclear

is

wrong.
But like virtually every

utilitarian

themselves,

principles

utilitarian grounds.

deontic

principle,

principles

For it is not difficult to

those

except

from

flowing

C3 and C4 can be challenged on
outline

strategic

situations

where maximum expected utility results from a policy of nuclear deterrence.

But

on its own this concession casts but little doubt upon

C4.

For

it

likewise

is

not

principles

difficult to outline situations where the hanging of

innocent people, or other injustices, are sanctioned or enjoined by

maximum

expected

and

C3

utility.

pursuit

Those who appeal to utilitarian assumptions try to

avoid such more obvious difficulties with reliance upon utilitarianism,
scrapping

the

spots

not

by

doctrine, but by hedging applications of their principles around

with qualifications, which, they hope, will
trouble

of

with

utilitarianism.

enable

it

So

them

evade

to

the

worst

is with Kavka, whose work nicely

illustrates that whatever (little) deterrence has in its

moral

favour

depends

upon utilitarian assumptions.
Kavka 'begin[s] by noting that any reasonable system of

substantial

utilitarian

elements'

(PD,

p.287).

Even

observation were correct — it is not, depending for one
consequential

elements

systems

include

must

infiltrate,

an

with
the

'assumption

if

thing

ethics

this
upon

must

have

astonishing
conflating

utilitarian - it would not follow that reasonable
particular

that

assumption

produces

normative assumption involved is that the

act

Kavka

thereupon

tries

the paradoxes of deterrence'.

with

maximum

expected

to

The

utility

'(the most useful act) should be performed whenever a very great deal of utility

46.

Kavka, who labels simplified C4 the Wrongful Intentions Principle (PD,
p.289), attributes the principle to Abelard, Aquinas, Butler, Bentham,
Kant, Sidgwick, Kenny and Narveson.
Kavka also gives reasons as to why the
principle appears 'so obviously true'. Kenny and others apply C4 to argue,
like the US Catholic Bishops, that 'nuclear deterrence is immoral'
(cf.
Kavka p.291).
It is the clash of C4 with certain utilitarian principles (especially the
maximisation principle of p.287)
that directly generates Kavka's first
paradox of deterrence and lies behind his other "paradoxes":
see PD.

32
is at stake' (p.287).
objections

This assumption is open to essentially the same batch

utilitarianism

as

it is mainly a matter of increasing or

itself:

varying the stakes involved sufficiently in any counterexample.

strategy

usual

of

Kavka tries the

weakening and fudging the normative assumption to avoid the

of

worst problems of distributive injustice, and the like, that maximising

utility

can morally enjoin.
But the crucial defect in Kavka's argument lies

follow

normative

the

from

overridden

supposed

to

assumptions

utilitarian

by

way, as if it dominated C4 (see especially p.290), what

C4

is

Though Kavka tends to apply the fudged normative assumptions in this

(p.287).**?

and

what

assumption however fudged, namely that 'this means

other moral assumptions are

that ...

in

when

produce,

situations,

are

moral

combined

situations

in

dilemmas.

These

are

the

cases

assumption

special

as

such

not

fudged

deterrent

one

where

deontic

principle, that yielded by utilitarianism, overrides others, but where there are
competing, even contradictory deontic principles, such as that it

is

right

to

to proceed to LSN war when the enemy misbehaves (on specious utilitarian

intend

grounds) and also wrong to intend to do so (by C4).
that judgement is not overriden.

wrong:

remains

Nuclear deterrence

Nor does it in any way follow that C4

is in need of qualification as a result (Kavka's assumption,

p.290).

situations,

However,

there

are

countervailing utilitarian considerations suggesting different imperatives.

For

what

is

in

these

is

wrong.

the

also

case

is

that

these

in

special

special circumstances a greater utility can be realised by doing what
However

it

is

hardly

news,

but

a

objection,

standing

that

utilitarianism sometimes enjoins what is wrong.

Special
sponsonship

deterrent

may

appear

situations,

where

under

utilitarian

to get a foot in the moral door, are very special.

characterised by Kavka, they are such that the

47

deterrence

deterrence

is

very

likely

As

to

Lackey's utilitarian approach rests on a similar fallacy, that utilitarian
considerations predominate where stakes are large enough:
see his argument
for the approach in MM p.192.

What happens is not that important consequences override moral principles,
but that application of one principle with important consequences conflicts
with that of another principle with less significant consequences,
and in
the weigh-up of what to do in the problematic circumstances the principle

with important consequence prevails.

33

succeed, and nothing else is likely to succeed (see p.286), i.e.

is

deterrence

This is very far removed from the real world

lodged in a deep probability-well.

situation where nuclear deterrence appears to be increasing the

probability

of

LSN war, and where other procedures such as graduated nuclear disarmament are at
least as likely to succeed as deterrence.

that

principles

deontic

Even if it were

supposed

mistakenly

to real-life dilemmas should be qualified to

subject

avoid dilemmas, there is little point in qualifying working

deontic

principles

such as C4, given the remoteness of the special deterrent situations.

Instead of pulling nuclear deterrence down though the immoral intentions it
involves, it can be criticized more broadly through the commitments it requires,
by way of the following principle:

If X is wrong then a conditional commitment to carry out X is also wrong.

C5.

The reason is that the commitment is a commitment

and

circumstances;

that

commitment

is

to

act

in

wrongly

certain

Nuclear deterrence is

itself wrong.

however a policy which commits states to war under certain conditions.

with

conditional

intention,

that

superstates

and

and

commitment

controlling

to

use

representatives

nuclear weapons.

not

did

occur)

is

to

enough

establish

have

relevant

the

The dangerous strategy of

launch-on-warning (which could, for instance, result in a

that

as

so with conditional commitment, there is no doubt

their

intention

And

response

to

attacks

the point, for which there is

otherwise quite sufficient factual evidence.

are

Now the connecting principles

suffice

but

logically,

nuclear

deterrence,

for

weighty

case.

instance

conditional commitment to LSN war, is wrong.
This

one

principle

would

By

detachment

from

the

by complete preparation for and

Deterrence of this type is

wrong.

also reveals why the suggestion, that the morality of the whole deterrence

trip depended on war itself never occurring, was so

paradoxical:

deterrence.

itself

sound

when all are liable to be disputed, several defensible

ones, ideally in concert, make for a
principles

applied:

it

out

the

connections

between

and

not

be

engaged

in

(unless

its

has

appeared

nuclear war and nuclear

Nuclear deterrence should not be practised given that

should

changed, e.g.

left

bizarre

nuclear

war

direction can be drastically

at least limited, per impossibile in the case of nuclear warfare,

34
to purely military targets).

The arguments through connecting principles, can be reinforced by different
sorts

arguments against the moral correctness of nuclear deterrence.

of

There

are arguments from limited convergence of ethical theories, which start from the

commonplace observation that
All the ethical arguments in

*

favour

of

nuclear

deterrence

broadly

are

utilitarian.
In fact most of the arguments in favour of deterrence, including many
that

infiltrated

have

the

ethical

literature,

are

of

those

generally drawn from game theory, and primarily interested in the

one

player,

the

USA.

Utilitarianism,

though

still

looking

of

those

expediency advantage

of

basically

at

advantages, interests and (typically individual) utilities, has to take

a

partisan

pain of

position,

and

forfeiting its claim to morality
supported

by

other

consider

nationalities

otherwise.

The

as

well,

commonplace

on

less

observation

is

the fact that such qualified moral support as deterrence obtains,

derives from utilitarianism.

48

There are two directions on to a general claim against

deterrence,

either

by way of the pro-utilitarian theme
*

Utilitarianism properly applied also comes out against deterrence

or, more strongly, by way of the anti-utilitarian theme,

*

Utilitarianism does not furnish satisfactory moral arguments.

Then, by the anti-utilitarian theme, there are no satisfactory
in

favour

direction:

48.

of deterrence.

moral

arguments

Naturally, it would be easy to strengthen the second

after all it is widely

thought

that

utilitarianism

is

a

false,

Thus the hedged utilitarian defences of Kavka and of Hare and Joynt, and
Showing that cogent
also within the broadly utilitarian range, of Gautier.
______
defences of nuclear deterrence have to take
a utilitarian route would be a
Though it is a reasonable conjecture that the
much tougher enterprise.
T'
' , much would depend on what was
enterprise could be carried through,
For certainly bizarre principles, e.g. obverses of the
connecting principles, can be introduced, which afford deontological routes

to deterrence.
despite some backsliding by bishops, all other ethical positions; can
A deontological
made to speak against deterrence and its continuation,
be 1___ —
.
connecting
deontic
case against deterrence,
primarily the way
of
principles, has been argued in some detail.
In the light of these
principles, it is not difficult to see how cases from other ethical
2 go..
After all C4 has been defended from a wide range of
positions would
Af--- -1......

And

stances, e.g.

contractual,
natural law, utilitarian even.
<—

35
seriously astray, or even shabby ethical position.

political

which

system

depends

in

some

utilitarian arguments for its policies.

It hardly does

measure

for

then

a

upon consensus, to rely on

Yet with nuclear deterrence

just

that

appears to be happening, with readily overturned arguments at that.

For whether even utilitarianism supports deterrence depends essentially on:
it

how

with

applied;

is

which

maximisation recipes; along with what other

restrictive assumptions (such as those of a deep probability-well);

are

generous

With

sovereignty, national security, etc.

or

assumptions,

different

arguably

(and

superior)

varying the guestimation methods, very different results

upon

The

emerge, opposing deterrence and favouring unilateral nuclear disarmament.

reason for this is straightforward (and like that ending §4).

basic

LSN war has an extremely large negative utility.
deterrence

out to
recipes

Any

policy

such

It is that

as

nuclear

which increases the probability of this, or even risks it, must lose

feasible

other
of

how

for such things as preservation of national

assignments

utility

and on

a

alternatives,

consequentialist

type

whatever
are

initially

applied

(e.g.

plausible

decision

Minimax, Dominance,

Disaster Avoidance, Expected Value).
The anti-utilitarian theme can be defended either by a full-scale criticism
of

utilitarianism,

beginning for instance with its well-known justification of

localised injustices, $0 or else

utilitarianism

when

applied

One obvious deficiency is this:

by
to

addressing

some

of

the

inadequacies

of

issues like that at hand, nuclear deterrence.
on standard utilitarianism, what to do, whether

to proceed with deterrence, depends on the probability of its success and on the

improbability of other options working.

deep,

utilitarianism

If the deterrence

probability-well

is

morally requires deterrence, otherwise not.$* But what is

morally required, or wrong, does not fluctuate with what outcomes are

probable.

49.

The instability of utilitarianism is illustrated by the
discussion
involving Kavka, Lackey and Hardin,
continued in Philosophy and Public
Affairs 12(3), 1983, where, on the basis of utilitarianism, diametrically
opposed conclusions are reached.
(Hardin's approach tends however to
expediency reasoning of the strategic type.)

50.

Such wider criticisms of utilitarianism, in all its forms, as an ethical
theory are too well-known to repeat.
Some of the main defects are
considered in another article in this series, 'An expensive repair kit for
utilitarianism' .
The point that utilitarianism gives no firm place to
stand comes from L. Mirlin.

36

Whether deterrence is morally wrong or not, is

likely

work

to

independent

it

is

are

princip]gs

Moral

not

through expected values, whether utilities or otherwise - though how

determined

bad some outcome is may be.

are

deterrence

decidedly

essentially

nowhere

whether

If nuclear deterrence is wrong where it increases the

or not.

probability of war, then is it wrong, simpliciter.

depend

of

upon

firm to stand.

Worse, since the expected utilities in the case

uncertain,
these

of

the results utilitarianism delivers

and

uncertainty

measures,

offers

utilitarianism

In contrast with the solid deontic ground of principle,

utilitarianism provides only shifting sand.

The objections made apply especially against act utilitarianism.
form

shows

special

interests,

such

as

conditions
security

(the

probability-well

state,

of

estimation rules are pulled in).

high

have

is

deep,

utilities,

nation-state

and

special

It does not yield a deterrence policy;

indeed

hardly yields policies at all (other than act utilitarianism itself).

and certain other difficulties may be avoided by considering instead a
of

act

most that nuclear deterrence is "wrong" according to its lights

at

under very

it

The

acts.52 But the method lacks stability;

These

sequence

different prescriptions will result

depending upon how the sequence is selected, what is included and what left
(as

also

associated probabilities depend critically on the sequence selected).

No unequivocal recipe is delivered.

selected

out

to

To

see

this,

suppose

the

sequence

is

include worst cases, for instance cases where deterrence fails and

war breaks out.

In this event it can hardly be argued that

deterrence

is

the

policy that maximizes utility over the sequence.

Along with the arguments, there are
dissatisfaction with nuclear deterrence.

other

conventional wars.

for

Firstly, the peace it has provided

only nuclear peace, or rather lack of nuclear war, as there
smaller-scale

reasons

concomitant

is

deep

is

shortage of

no

And the "peace" provided is at best a tenuous

peace, which is not stable, but liable to upset at

any

stage

by

a

range

of

51.

Though this is to oversimplify, the points made are not affected by the
simplification.
In any case the simplified picture reflects well enough
the differences between Kavka and Lackey that matter in their debate
(referred to in footnote 49).

52.

Whether this is rule utilitarianism, or still act utilitarianism
the sequence can be construed as one long act, may be left open.

because

37

factors, including error, both human and technical.

It does not

genuine

offer

of the sort required for a stable international life, but only a fragile

Peace,

peace of a sort

opportunity

is

enormous

the

cost,

moral

cost of deterrence, because expenditure on it excludes other urgent

moral priorities.

way,

Marxist

Secondly, there

(PL, p.316).

in

The US Bishops put this familiar
terms

of

'the

destructive capacity and what

is

for

in

between

contradiction

needed

point,

spent

is

what

constructive

surprisingly

a

for

(PL,

development'

p.316).

§6 -

Practical, prudential and more moral arguments from

dangers

national

nuclear build-up of the superstates, and the genesis of nuclear dilemmas.

to

While

there are arguments to the immorality of nuclear war preparation, there are also
counter-arguments,

that

have

Americans), to the moral

proved

justifiability

persuasive

remarkably
of

nuclear

war

(especially

preparation

in

to

the

present circumstances .

The underlying style of argument is simply an elaboration, or state-uplift,
of that for the escalation of weapons at the local level, for acquiring a gun or
for stocking-up the neighbourhood armoury - and every bit

argument

from

local dangers.

and

domination;

dubious

first

of

all

second of nuclear destruction.

atomic

surrender

and

so

avoid the destruction' (Walzer, p.273).

preparation is supposed to guard against more than these;
third

element,

namely,

loss

of

basic

rights

there

with these.

blackmail

of

foreign

appeasement

In fact nuclear

is

a

crucial

of

ways

life

This further set of elements is linked to the danger of

foreign domination - which is really a separate element from risk of

Though

and

(freedom, equality, etc.) and

fundamental values (upholding of truth, human dignity, etc.) and
integrated

that

The two go together,

since if we did not fear the blackmail, we might adopt a policy
or

as

It is that nuclear preparation, 'so we have been

told, guards against the double danger:

foreign

as

blackmail.

domination need not imply the loss of most basic values it does

imply the loss of at least of one, self-determination, freedom to choose various
national objectives;

conversely loss or erosion or infringement of basic values

can occur without foreign domination, for instance, as

is

commonplace

in

the

38
"free" world, by internal change of government or governmental approach, through
the increased security and control a

nuclear

risks,

increasingly

preparation

state

nuclear

demands,

But

etc.

what

nuclear destruction, also

extensive

involves loss of basic rights and values, through destruction

of

the

material

of the cherished life-style.^ So nuclear preparation is hardly a clearcut

base

means of guaranteeing basic values.5^
In other respects too the argument from loss of

lacks

cogency

rings

and

It

hollow.

is

basic

values

and

rights

hard to avoid the feeling that the

oft-appealed-to basic values often function as something of a front, like
citation

values at political ceremonies;

religious

of

clean cover for economic consideration of one sort

demands

from

of

of

wealth

private

appealed

to

category:

in

and

them

to

having

arising

with

do

the

an argument isn't, or

However

associations.

And

rights

the

and

But not all the values commonly appealed to fall into

particular nationalistic ones do not.

And one of the main

alleged values of deterrence, the resistance to and containment
or

many

another,

are, mostly, of the utmost importance, indeed fundamental,

and worth much sacrifice.
this

of

power.

and

oughtn't to be, defeated by its unsavoury
values

that the argument is a

military-industrial complex, many concerned with foreign

the

domination of other lesser states, and many

concentration

pious

"communism"

of

of "socialism", can hardly be accounted fundamental, any more than retention

of capitalism.
communism

has

happened

What has
been

here

with

confused

of

(the

totalitarianism, which does remove certain more
freedoms

(of

opinion,

association,

is

course

that

reality
basic

information,

of)

values,

etc.,

(the

ideal

of)

socialist

state

namely

certain

and

so does

etc.),

derivatively threaten basic values.

One critical question, then, is whether extensive nuclear

LSN

war,

and

indeed

for

rational way of preserving

nuclear

those

holocaust,

fundamenmtal

preparation

for

is a good or effective or even

values,

which

we

have

left.

53.

The converse obviously does not hold. Basic values and
cherished
life-style can be lost without nuclear destruction, or nuclear preparation,
as when a more powerful state imposes its values and way of life.

54.

The argument from freedom, advanced by Jaspers and repeatedly rolled out by
state representatives, is further considered early in Appendix 1.

39

arise

Similar questions

and

domination

as

regards

arguments

the

preparation depends essentially on an arrangement of hostile

structure

which

itself

is

open

questioned (in §8), both from the

serious

to

question,

view

of

point

foreign

of

danger

of the methods of extensive nuclear

Justification

blackmail.

from

and

basic

of

states,

nation

a

is subsequently

values,

such

as

freedom, and otherwise.

But whether ultimately justified or
dangers

not,

these

national

those that have been taken to morally underwrite extensive nuclear

are

preparation, and

have

They

justification.

been

accepted

outlook.

moral

by

policy

Within

particular, that extensive nuclear

the

as

affording

moral

arguments

preparation
do

not

such

Northern

conventional

a

It is within such a framework, in

framework the moral justification holds good.

however,

makers

fact been widely accepted, and undoubtedly form

in

have

part of many people's

others,

from

arguments

engenders

establish

moral

a

fix.

For

the morality of extensive

nuclear preparation, but only make a prudential case for such preparation.
people

face a nuclear dilemma, but, though evaluative in character, it is

also

not a specifically moral one.

And

for

many

others

and their respective rights and freedoms, there is no serious dilemma.
people

who

not

are

who

again,

so

or as familiar with Soviet and American culture and ways of life,

by

impressed

Such

beyond

live

For such

the "beneficial" reach of the superstates, prudential

counter-arguments from national dangers carry little weight, and the moral

case

against deterrence is not offset but stands unchallenged.
This is the genesis of the argument from isolated

people

who

Consider

some

a comparatively remote area, whose freedoms are not (yet)

in

live

people.

under threat from superpower expansionism, but whose lifestyle is put at risk by
nuclear

(as under principle Cl).

deterrence

For such isolated people, who may

have little interest in the preservation of nuclear states, there is no

nuclear

dilemma,

and

nuclear

locations may have problems

to

national

is wrong.
dangers,

People in less fortunate
but

in

meeting

these

they are not entitled to impose grave risks on the uninvolved isolated

problems
people.

as

deterrence

genuine

In doing so

immorally;

and

for

through

similar

nuclear

reasons

deterrence, superstates

the

are

proceeding

conventional Northern framework is

40

The same conclusion can be alternatively reached

impugned.

argument:

a

put

isolated person, and check

the

resulting

substitution

Russian in the position of such an

or

American

reflective

a

by

assessment

of

nuclear

deterrence.

it would be the same as that of a reflective isolated person, stripped of

Since

superstate bias, morally opposed to deterrence and not morally

transfixed,

the

conventional framework fails to satisfy requirements of morality.

The outcome of the arguments from dangers is, then,very different depending
on

the

whether

are

arguments

applied

regards a superstate or not.

as

The

superstate theme which emerges is, in brief,

SST.
Because of multiple connected dangers from other states which have
nuclear weapons, a state - any state that is too large to rely upon other states
- is obliged to invest in at least matching nuclear weapons.
Hence, by detachment, a super-nation-state, such as USA, ought to have something

in

the

the nuclear armoury that it has.

of

order

meet objections concerning excess,

a

least

at

retain

Or, weakening the theme to

"overkill" capacity, it

core of the nuclear devices it has.

solid

[morally]

ought

to

For subsequent

argument it can be left open whether the obligation involved is a moral one, for

instance

of

because

the

character

of

the

protected, or only (as argued above) one of

to

grounds

supporting

those

against

disarmament

a

the

SS

reason $5.

prudential

theme

nuclear

dangerous

Northern values supposedly being
on

similar

it can be argued that unilateral

opponent

would

be

prudentially

irrational.
It will be freely admitted that what is prudentially or morally required is

a

suboptimal

strategy,

like the familiar strategies of the prisoners' dilemma

situations and of certain related competitive games.

that

like could be achieved, would
agreement

would

be

cooperative

draining

of

For

such

resources,

the details are well-enough known.
future

55.

admitted

arrangements.

Cooperation

and

be better not merely in removing the nuclear dilemma, but in a

range of other respects.
expensive,

be

strategy for nuclear adversaries, if sufficient trust and the

superior

a

So it should

arrangements

would

be

much

less

risky,

destructive of the environment, and so on;
However for the present and the

foreseeable

the prospects of cooperation appear - so we are repeatedly told by state

It can

still,

and

presumably

does,

amount

to

more

than

mere

expediency, since the 'freedom of Europe' is part of what is at issue.

local

41
representatives, who are (not always wittingly) helping to make

true

-

unfortunately

rather

remote:

only

the

policies

their

sure insurance is extensive

nuclear preparation and full preparedness to apply nuclear force.
At least this is so where one is a superstate:

proceed,

largely

unabated.

nuclear

preparation

Where one is not a superstate, but a lesser state

one must, the representatives continue, rely on a larger ally who has a
arsenal,

one's

nuclear

preparation,

one

under

huddles

and

which

contrasts

the lack of trust displayed, and encouraged elsewhere.

Does a

state, one which relies for its nuclear cover on a super-ally,

ground

for

another's

But here a level of trust and cooperation is^ called for, by

umbrella.

dependent states, which is far from foolproof,

with

nuclear

insurance (which is presumably not free) is obtained indirectly

through some superstate's

nuclear

confidence

in

its

rather

super-ally

strangely
dependent

have

exchange

on its territory?

much

that

its ally's opponent?

than

Confidence, for instance, that its ally will not render it a target or

nuclear

must

stage

a

Given the proclivity of states, especially

large states, to resort to expediency, and given the recent historical record of

superstates and their leaders, too much faith would.be misplaced.
Thus, whatever the limited force of the argument for the superstate

it

does

theme,

not extend to the analogous theme for a dependent state, which differs

from SST and ends as follows:

DST.
Because ..., a state without adequate (or any) nuclear weapons is obliged
to rely upon a superstate ally, and within that arrangement, to accommodate the
facilities and nuclear installations of the protecting ally.

In part for reasons already given, principle DST is not very plausible (and
same

goes for more obvious variants upon it).

Nor do the arguments offered for

SST transpose particularly well to direct arguments

strikingly

illustrated

by

the

case

the

for

DST.56

This

is

more

of more remote nuclear dependent states.

Consider the argument from basic values, for instance, from the angle of nuclear

dependent Australia.

Basic values in Australia are not threatened by, or put in

jeopardy through, the actions or plans

of

the

Soviet

Union.

Nor

are

they

threatened by the other superstate, the USA, the only country with 'the physical

56.

As is widely known, inadmissible and usually much overrated considerations
of expediency frequently enter into reasons why states allow foreign
nuclear facilities upon their territories, e.g.
economic considerations
such as trade or local revenue and short-term jobs.

42

capacity to launch a full scale invasion of Australia', but

'clearly

lack[ing]

motive to do so', so far.5? Clearly the argument from basic values does not

any

look convincing.

carries

reasons

For similar
In

weight.

little

the

with

fact,

from

argument

little care, the present level of

a

economic and political domination could be much reduced.

of

force

For there

only

is

questionable

of

because

danger

such

superstate

In this way

too,

nuclear

umbrella,

and

facilities

superstate

the

that would be removed with

danger

non-aligned practices.$8 With less remote dependent European states these

of

the

from danger of nuclear destruction could be nullified.

argument

the

domination

foreign

sorts

arguments from national dangers are only marginally more convincing, and may

be defeated along analogous lines.

The differences in the situations of states, and
peoples,

break

the

theme

of

a

of

situated

differently

This is a theme especially

monolithic West.

favoured by US and the West European representatives, who present the West,
its

freedom,

as threatened by Soviet domination.

undifferentiated unit.

dependent

states

with

But

this

leading

idea,

NATO

designed

powers,

and

In this the West is a single
in

part

to

align

lesser

to justify putting them at

and

nuclear risk is as much a myth as the idea of the Golden West.

not

The West is

so monolithic, it is not so comprehensive, some of it is not so free, much of it
(including the Antipodes) is not threatened by Soviet domination.
Principle DST - likewise what it depends upon, SST - is

now

under

coming

attack by European disarmament groups, who challenge the core assumptions of the

underlying retaliatory model that
*

Safety lies in weapons,

*

More weapons imply more securityS9.

Certainly, for more isolated states, such as New Zealand,

safety

from

nuclear

attack lies not in weapons but in excluding nuclear facilities (including visits

from nuclear submarines).
present

system

is

more

Europeans are arguing in

of

a

similar

way,

that

the

a risk, indeed liability, than a protection (e.g.

57.

For the quoted claim, and some of the
Australia's Security, p.94.

58.

The issue is further pursued in Appendix 2.

59.

See, for example, the last article in Thompson.

argument

for

it,

see

Threats

to

43

envisaged

the

and that without nuclear installations, Europe cannot be

Thompson, p.251);
theatre

limited nuclear war, in the way it is now seen by US

a

for

(but not Soviet) strategists.
Once the weapons

assumptions

are

questioned,

other

the

assumptions of

and its variants come up for examination, namely

retaliatory model
*

Whether

the proper response to danger is armament, in particular

,

Whether

the proper response is through nuclear armament,

asopposed,

say, to other military responses, such as conventional arms, or,
taking off from the previous point,
Whether military approaches and procedures (through

*

are

proper

methods,

etc.)

armaments,

or should be such dominant methods, of conflict

resolution at the international level.

It is plausibly argued, against military procedures, that at no

level

ordinary

do we sensibly set about meeting danger or settling disputes by acquiring lethal
weapons and threatening to use them - except perhaps on an out-dated, and
really

frontier

warranted,

ethics.

This leads into the issue of alternative

defence systems, a vital matter beginning to obtain the contemporary6°
and

explanation

it

deserves,

questioning of the framework

of

but

never

one

that

nation-states.

already
While

emphasis

anticipates subsequent
the

state

system

is

intact, force is far from exceptional and military procedures are to be expected
and are likely inevitable.

nation-state

system':

For 'force has

[a]

...

permanent

place

the

in

thus Ramsay (on p.xv), who uses this as part of his very

orthodox case for nuclear war arrangements.

§7.

The resulting nuclear dilemmas for aligned states

Assembling
referred

the
to

as

themes

the

so

far

nuclear

developed

fix:-

States

war-deterrence, because (as argued in §3-§5)

to engage in war-deterrence, at least

60.

the

yields

both

and__ their—supporter^.

deontic dilemma, often

ought

not

for prudential reasons (as

conversion to such arrangements.

engage

in

it is immoral, and also ought

Alternative defence systems were considered long ago in
Mohists.
For contemporary work on alternative systems, see
survey in Sharp. There is in fact a considerable literature
and social defence arrangements, and a growing literature on
i.e.

to

argued

using

China by the
especially the
on non-violent
transarmament,

44

SST and DST).
the

This dilemma is no idle construction

paraconsistent

of

virtues

but

logic),

(concocted

to

demonstrate

a serious real-life dilemma, the

outlines of which are repeatedly encountered in texts on

nuclear

and

war

its

aspects 61, as well as being virtually ubiquitous in nuclear war discussions.

The nuclear fix is in part simply a more intense
dilemma

produced

by

the

deontic

war itself &2, or at least war which spreads beyond purely

military targets, as larger wars inevitably

do

(since

military

arrangements,

The main dilemma arises

rail transport, typically rely on civilian ones).

e.g.

of

version

from a combination of the retaliatory model with the features of

War

war.

is

required for defence of the state and values it upholds (or pretends to uphold);

but war also involves immoral acts and evil consequences.
can

war"

under

certain

justified.

be

also

seen

as attempting a reconciliation by trying to show that

circumstances

Thus

'some

these

really

justifications

evil

consequences

aegis

of

war'

(Walls,

p.260).

acceptable than fallacious asymptotic

are

morally

of war aim to show that actions deemed

normally forbidden by moral mandates are now permissible
the

The doctrine of "just

But

this

arguments

when

under

performed

is no better or more morally

for

utilitarianism

being

as

correct when the stakes are large.
War and preparedness for

61.

war

also

generate

subsidiary

dilemmas

-

for

Thus Green, along with many others, 'find[s] nuclear deterrence ...
the
best of practical policies available to us now ... given the realities of
world politics' but 'still demur[s] because of moral qualms'
(p.xii).
Green
also represents both Morgenthau and Halle as having 'rather
agonisingly presented a ... case for a deterrence strategy,
even while
asserting that the strategy is morally indefensible according to the
traditional ethical codes' (p.252). Walzer ends in a similar dilemma (he
is committed to a stronger and less qualified form of it than he sets
down):
'...
though it [deterrence] is a bad way, there may well be no
other that is practical in a world of sovereign and suspicious states'
(p.274) - an indictment of the state system that Walzer does not pursue.
Similarly the US Catholic Bishops
dilemma;
they speak of 'the
dilemma of how to prevent the use
Paskins and Dockrill and in Benn
terms of moral dilemmas.

present the situation in terms of a moral
political paradox of deterrence ...
the
of nuclear weapons ...' (PL, p.313).
In
too the nuclear situation is presented in

The nuclear dilemma is of course not a dilemma for everyone, for those who
think they have seen the clear admissibility of deterrence, or differently
for those who have seen through the arguments from national dangers.
But
it is a dilemma for those locked into the conventional framework.

62.

Situations in war are also a major source of moral dilemmas:
see Routley
and Plumwood where several examples are given. A general logical account
of and theory of moral dilemmas is elaborated therein.

45

authority:

instance, a severe tension between freedom and
difficult

'one

of

most

the

of war involves defending a free society without destroying

problems

p.324).

the values that give it meaning and validity' (PL,

The

problems

are

greatly enhanced by modern nuclear arrangements.
The nuclear fix not only intensifies and complicates other dilemmas induced
by

the

contemporary sovereign state^^, in particular the deep tensions between

national security and the operation of liberal-democratic arrangements (such

individual

liberty, popular control of institutions, etc).

other more personal subsidiary dilemmas, as for
(political)

obligations

to

example

question

(the

It also accentuates

the

extent

one's

of

a nuclear state, and role-induced dilemmas such as

one's conflicting obligations as a doctor or a nuclear

researcher

as

of

political

obligations

armaments

and

their

processor

or

evasion

is

considered further in Appendix 2).
At the more personal level, that of individual and group action, there

several

questions

be disentangled - questions different from the key issue

to

'What should my state

be

doing

and

influence, depending on who one is.

do?',

on

which

one

may

exert

lives,

and

influences, i.e.

in

what

little

There is not only the question 'What should

I do?' - a question which will have a quite different force depending
one

are

on

where

sort of state, where one works, what one controls or

on who one is and one's roles - but also the

questions

'What

sort of person do I want to be?', 'What am I prepared to answer for morally?'^"
Answers to these latter character questions will feed back to influence those to

action-oriented

questions.

Each

of those questions can, in given situations,

induce subsidiary dilemmas.

The essential feature of a deontic dilemma is that both A and the
of

A

are

wrong

(or

differently,

pursuing a nuclear defence policy.

obligatory),

negation

for some suitable A, such as

The place and essential role of deontic

and

63.

The nuclear dilemma is not alone responsible for these other dilemmas.
Large-scale nuclear power generation, and other types of warfare and
security arrangements, also contribute.
But a conflict of
ree om a
authority is already an outcome of the large central state.

64.

For group formulation of the questions replace 'I' by 'my group', etc. The
importance of distilling out these questions, and the moral undesirability
of deterrence in terms of what it does to people morally, are brought out
in Benn, where however the issues are made to look somewhat more separate
than they are.

46

moral dilemmas are not

widely

well

or

particularly

understood,

ethical

in

This is partly because currently dominant ethical positions like

literature^^.

utilitarianism cannot at all easily accommodate moral dilemmas or the data which
gives

to

rise

them

then such positions do not really offer reportive

but

-

accounts of wrong and obligation anyway.

Contrary to utilitarian perceptions

a

dilemma does not necessarily have any moral solution, though there may be better

and worse ways out.

By

assessments,

form

which

contrast
the

with

ethical

such

preanalytical

theories,

of sensitive theories, do recognise moral

basis

dilemmas and reflect their features.
Reactions and responses that are characteristic of deontic dilemmas

the

from

There is an unsteadiness, an uncertainty as to what to

fix.

nuclear

do, which way to proceed, which principles in watered-down form to

temporary

crutch.

for

Thus,

as

way

a

of

never

exercising

"morally

our

world'66, that is in a morally-strapped world.

best"

ethical

Bishops who

the

of

A similar

'strictly

conditional'

Deterrence has a strictly temporary role
the

object

must

and

deterrence

circumstances.
deterrence,

is

"morally

in a fallen

acceptability'

certainly

one

strictly

wrong,

is

of

from the

conditional

option

as

to

of

what

nuclear

the

to

do

nevertheless

the

policy

to

fix.

awkward

in

Thus Walzer, for example, struggles to the conclusion
though

"second

a

to

be to move beyond deterrence, 'towards a

world free of the threat of deterrence' (PL, p.317), out
And

be

try to escape 'the paradox of deterrence', i.e.

moral fix.

but

shift

'moral

while

acceptability,

can

good",

responsibility

moral

deterrence

we

a

(as from good to acceptable) is made by the US Catholic

functor

speak

as

grasp

example, the Bishop of London contends that the

possession of nuclear weapons 'while

acceptable"

emerge

that

war

in

the

pursue

circumstances (p.274).6? However as more than an immediate stepping stone

to

a

65.

There are exceptions of course, e.g.
in the Catholic educated such as
Sartre;
and Nagel's final example is very instructive. For a fuller
theory of moral dilemmas see however Routley and Plumwood.

66.

Reported in The Economist;
reprinted in
1983, Weekend Magazine p.2.

67.

As a response to a moral dilemma, Walzer's approach is perfectly in order
logically. Those who, like Benn, 'find it neither coherent nor acceptable'

The

have not grasped the logic of moral dilemmas.

Australian,

February

12-13

47
superior

it

policy,

(in

assembled

is

reasons

§5-§6),

of

option,

poor

decidedly

a

the

sort

reasons

for

are

that

decisive

for those,

outside the conventional Northern framework, who find

sufficiently

already

no

genuine

of

nuclear

nuclear dilemma.
To make matters worse the nuclear fix is, furthermore,

own making.

states'

a

fix

It is not something they blundered into, by accident.

initial nuclear involvement was deliberately chosen, primarily by the
the

the USA and the USSR in interaction.

and

In these respects the

situation

is

like

people who deliberately let themselves be involved in two incompatible

of

relationships, and build up conflicting obligations

though

USA,

has by and large also been deliberately chosen, again mainly by

escalation

that

The

build-up, in North America occurred on a defensive basis in response

nuclear

to

Soviet

The fact is that the USA initiated nuclear armament, and has

build-up.

frequently led escalation, and apparently still does.
programme is to be in addition to existing
resources

myth,

a

is

some currency, that adoption of nuclear weaponry, and nuclear

with

one

It

thereby.

are

(which

agreed

generally

The recent (1980)

United

States'

strategic

be already in excess of

to

Russia's, and which always have been so) (Thompson, p.21).

The present dilemma, that many people feel acutely, is then a direct outcome

state

policy,

allies, and
Naturally

not
the

USSR policies.
that

indicates

especially

a

merely

route

by

taken

advanced

response

to

capitalist
the

USA and its NATO

nations,

Soviets

(or

of

socialism).

state

would not have been feasible without complementing

And independent evidence,

such

as

Soviet-Sino

confrontation,

is a strong internal military dynamic in state socialist

there

nations.

There is a two-way connection between world political arrangements
nation-states

the

and

nuclear

fix.

arrangements are an evident source of the
nuclear

situation

is

increasingly

present world political structure.
is

widely

promulgated

arrangements:

it is '...

seen

On

the

dilemma

as

one

hand,

with

the

these

result

through

political
that

the

indicating the inadequacy of the

Indeed it is no longer a radical

theme

but

that the source of the nuclear problem comes from state
a world of sovereign states ...

which

brought

the

48

world

the present dangerous situation' (PL, p.313).

to

nuclear fix tends to lock political arrangements into

On the other hand, the

the

statist

form,

into

The

arrangements of an increasingly authoritarian and centralist cast.

statist

espoused purpose of nuclear weapons may be to keep the

national

defend

to

and

security,

interests,

reasons such as perpetuating the system
state

advantageous

confrontation,

and

provide

to

but underneath there are other

sovereign

of

(!),

peace

and

states

of

framework

the

military-industrial interests, dependent state exploitation, and

politically

favoured

inequality

it

supports.
The emerging theme is then that the very nuclear situation arising from the

statist

and

arrangements

interrelations

(economic

ideologies, etc.) tends to, and is used to, lock
arrangements

of

states and zones of interest.

sovereign

theme is a piecemeal practical one.

where

side

the

pattern

world

the

conflicting

rivalries,
into

the

present

The argument to this

Consider first, the matter from the

Soviet

of national control and progressive military-economic

reorientation common to all nuclear states is clearer.

The threat from the West, whether it exists or not (and in Soviet
perception it certainly does), has become a necessary legitimation for
the power of the ruling elites, an excuse for their many economic and
social failures, and an argument to isolate and silence critics within
their own borders.
In the West we have ... carefully controlled
...
and selective release of 'official information' (Thompson, p.20).
"We" in the West, especially the Americans, also

integrated

with

state

apparatus,

have,

in

forms

increasingly

the military-industrial complex, which is a

major beneficiary and promoter of the nuclear arms race.68
Secondly, there is evidence of entrenchment of the arrangements,

by

things

such

as

the

SALT negotiations;

there are fixed superpowers and a

(growing) nuclear club of nations all governed by a

rules, partly held in place by deterrence.

shown

as

flimsy

negotiated

set

Connected with this, there are cases

revealing the fixing of zones of interest, such as the Afghanistan example.

Soviet

US is

68.

of

The

invasion is not regarded as threatening US "vital interests", and so the

not

overduly

worried

about

Afghanistan

and

its

people.

What

was

The role of the military-industrial complex in present US escalation is
sketched in Cox. Marxists, with their dogma of economic determinism, would
assign even more weight to this point.
As some of them would freely
concede, a similar complex has figured prominently in USSR escalation.

49

different, what it was worried about and made nuclear threats

adjacent

Western

oil

supplies:

were

concerning,

these lay within the US zone of interest (cf.

the discussion in Schell, p.212).

§8.

initial political fall-out from the ethical

Ways out of nuclear dilemmas:

Virtually all the ways are ways of limitation, and they all involve in

results.

one way or another limitations on nuclear arms or the way they are deployed, and
limitations

the

on

thus inevitable.
and

more

powers of states.

Limitations on national sovereignty are

The limitations may be reached by agreement

and

negotiation,

less voluntarily agreed to^^, or they may be imposed, or possibly

or

worst of all, they may emerge from an initial war.
As with other fixes produced by

are

there

suggested

the

structural

arrangements

of

states,

out which do not interfere with these arrangements,

ways

interstate approaches, and there are ways which do seriously alter the structure

and

power

relations

extrastate approaches.

of

states

(and,

in the limit, remove them altogether),

All the familiar, allegedly

practical

and

realistic ,

attempts to resolve the nuclear problem, for instance disarmament by mutual arms
limitations, etc., are interstate;
sovereign

state.

The

same

goes

(graduated) unilateral disarmament.

about the nation-state;

they do not tamper with that sacred cow, the

for

less

"realistic"

But in fact there is

proposals,

nothing

or

empirical

fact,

is it particularly a stable one.

nor,

and

its

replacement by alternative arrangements.

as

a

We are certainly

free - in more liberal states, it should be everywhere - to theorise as
demise

sacred

it is not a particularly well justified political form;

it is not even a very long-standing form of political arrangement;

matter

very

such as

to

its

And nuclear dilemmas

should have encouraged such reflection.

69.

In principle it would be relatively easy for states to agree to settlement
of their disputes by less damaging and expensive contests than military
ones, e.g. by contests of selected representatives, and not just through
fighting in some form, but by contests of footballers, singers, dancers,
lawyers, or etc.
In practice, however, such more civilized alternatives
are never much considered in these days of superstates. Animals, by
contrast, are smart enough to settle disputes by means much more like
these.
Even the ancient Greeks - though they had a clear appreciation of
limits, which has been lost by post-Enlightenment leaders - regarded the
institution of war as final (allegedly inevitable) means of arbitration
between city-states, not seeing
its
social,
structurally-emergent,
character.

50

Extrastate approaches take one of
international

of states.

routes,

the

way

up,

to

genuine

power, or the way down, through fractionation or deunionisation

The ways up and down are by no means one and the same;

but they are

Some of the important machinery, for a way up to

necessarily incompatible.

not

two

world government,is already there in the

international

Were

law-courts.

the

courts assigned sufficient authority and power, the remedy, namely through legal

action, that medieval

theorists

saw

all

to

intrastate

and T superseded by the just case of S versus T.
sufficient

war deterrence,

though

Law courts, as usually conceived, are not
equivalent

super—statist

But if

the

law

courts

were

power then their authority and efficacy would likely rely (at

upon

least initially)

their

in

could

be extended to interstate disputes, and the just war between states S

principle

given

disputes,

back-up

equivalent

for
of

economic

perhaps

not by military means.

effective without police and jails or

and

other

penalties;

and

the

either will involve the capacity to inflict quite

substantial amounts of damage on "delinquents" - which, because delinquents will
be

typically

organisations,

will also involve damage to innocent, and perhaps

dissenting, participants in those organisations, as well as to other

In

parties.

uninvolved

short, such an approach does not resolve the problem but tends to

repeat it.

The Way Up is one more statist, legalistic, authoritarian way of trying
get

to

grips

with

the

nuclear

though mostly in passing to be

70.

to

problem, and accordingly is often mentioned,

dismissed

in

orthodox

strategic

texts

on

Americans, for example, tend to forget that their state (like the USSR)
is
a union, of fairly recent origin, and that a differently-oriented State of
the Union message could well consider dissolution of the union.
Regional
movements in USA unfortunately lack much popular support at present.
By
contrast, there are significant separation movements,
some deserving aid
and encouragement, which affect most other nuclear states, especially USSR,
UK and France. The USSR already has trouble in holding its (supposedly
voluntarily integrated)
satellite empire together;
and the one recent
attempted addition right on its frontier is proving extremely recalcitrant.
Nor should powerful political unions under centralised state apparatus be
fostered elsewhere.
The same applies to state empire expansion, as
illustrated in contemporary Indonesia. Most important,
the reunification
of
Germany
should be resisted;
instead a more rational regional
deunification than the present East-West division of post-war Germany
should be sought, along with removal of nuclear weapons from the border
region, and so on.

71.

Thus for example, Kahn, where such a "solution" is quickly dismissed as,
impractical, etc.
Hardly necessary to say the Way Up has won most favour
with the legal fraternity, and from more authoritarian organisations.

51

the

By contrast, the Way Down, though like

thermonuclear war.

an appearance (a comeback) in some more radical discussions,

with the Way Up (in "world order" models:

combined

unlike the Way Down, is

considered

however

beginning

is

and

more

much

international

system';

and

'the

'towards

a

no

sometimes

sympathetically

There is

by those who take a moral rather than strategic viewpoint.

a renewed emphasis on world order, in reaching

by

The Way Up,

Galtung).

cf.

be

to

Up

but it is making

new, is scarcely mentioned in the orthodox discussions;

means

Way

integrated

morally

missing element of world order today is the

absence of a properly constituted political authority' (PL, p.320).

A main argument for the Way Up is

just

repetition

a

that

of

which

is

commonly supposed to underpin statist arrangements in the first place, namely an

argument from (generous) variations upon the Prisoners'

of the Commons.

Tragedy

traditionally,

ecological order.

not

as

best

regards

problems

to

solutions

nation-states,

of superstate.

of

organisation,

and one of the prospects is destruction of a
said

to

be

some

Of course, this begins to undermine an earlier application

of the "tragedy" argument, since states will lose their sovereignty and some

their

order—imposing

correspondingly weakened.

arguments

role,

and

But all

obligation

political

this

is

assume

to

,

only sound under quite restrictive assumptions.

There are, then, many problems

through

that

states

will

these

tragedy

A

further

theoretical

with

the

hitch

is

Way

Up,

that

a

both

theoretical

and

the Way Up merely repeats

arrangements.

It

is

contingency, of there being no rival intelligent civilisations

nearby, that the problems of interstate relations are not repeated

72.

be

72

statist arrangements at a level up, by way of superstate
only

to

of

good ones in the first place, when in fact they are not, but are

are

practical.

the

public order and, more recently, as to

good part of the commons by nuclear war, the solution is now

sort

as

So with the "tragedy of nation-states", where the players are

but

herdsmen

such

It is that authority and coercion - in the form of the

state * are required to ensure
especially,

Dilemma,

See further Routley and Routley

and

material

referred

to

a

level

therein,

up

and

especially Griffin.
The real reasons for the state are of course very different from the
theoretical cover such arguments afford. Among other things, the state
enables and guarantees the accumulation of power, privilege and capital.

The major practical hitch is that there is no prospect at all of getting

again.

such a "solution" to work in time to serve its intended purpose.

In reality, we are no nearer a world government than we were a century
ago,
....
In fact, it is even arguable that since World War II we
have moved further away from a world government than we were before
World
War
II.
The disintegration of empires has multiplied
sovereignties. It is true that we have something called the United
Nations, but even the United Nations has declined in power as it has
grown in membership. By the beginning of the 1970's the United
Nations had become, in some ways, a less powerful and even less
influential organisation than it was at the end of the 1950's (Mazrui,
pp.2-3).

For

The reasons for this Mazrui goes on to outline.
future

foreseeable

the

nuclear

ideological differences between states, including especially differences

as to how political arrangements should be effected, exclude any prospect of

an

world government or a world legal system capable of resolving nuclear

operative

In some ways, this is just as well.

hostilities.

monolithic,

extremely

would

World

would

government

foster economism, would entrench bureaucracy with

all its damaging features, and could easily tend to totalitarianism.
whatever

certainly,

its

be

(gray?)

colour,

political

exploitative economic system which would do immense

impose

damage

It

would

the world an

on

many

remaining

crucial

respects,

to

natural systems.?3
The Way Up thus presupposes an unlikely

undesirable
ideological,
requisite

of

level

indeed

unity

political

cannot

be

economic

and

paradigmatic,

and,

separation

in

some

Moreover,

unity.
of

main

Northern

within nuclear deadlines.

expected

given

cultures,

When not even

nuclear weapons limitations can be worked out, how much less likely is

more

much

sovereignty, could
blockages

agreements,

sweeping

and

be

negotiated?

deadlocks

in

the

involving

genuine

There

an

way

is

endless

(e.g.

of

of

state

series

of such state reconciliation.

applies to interstate arrangements, which may make limited use

that

it

limitations

almost

the

the

of

The same

Way

Up

negotiations or other conciliation procedures within a framework arranged

through the United Nations) .?**

73.

For a more detailed (but decidedly mediocre) critique of the idea of a
world
government,
see Galtung.
Naturally the objections to world
government, and difficulties in the way of obtaining it, do not extend to
more flexible world arrangements, such a world federation of cultures (cf.
Mazrui).
Such a pluralistic anarchistic Way Up can
be
genuinely
synthesized with the Way Down.

53
There is

regrettably

and

arrangements

much

also

conventions

are

evidence

frequently

concerning war and human rights?$), and are
sentiments

smoothly

not

not

observed (especially those

worth

into despicable deeds.

not

bode

convention

in

great

a

deal:

Even agreements states have
openly

violated.

Indeed there already appears to be at least one

any

force,

of

It

to

which

international

all the major nuclear states are signatories,

which would rule out LSN war and nuclear deterrence, that on genocide.

includes

lofty

for nuclear arms limitations, should sufficient agreement

well

ever be reached.

treaties,

international

are often enough disregarded, skirted around, or

signed

does

slide

that

the

following

Genocide

acts committed, in time of peace or war, with

intent to destroy in whole or part a natural, ethical, racial or religious group
killing members of the group, causing serious bodily or mental harm to

as such:

the members of the group, deliberately inflicting conditions of life

to

bring about physical

destruction

direct

and

public

shall

conspiracy to

commit

be

Persons committing genocide or any of

punished,

whether

they

are

the

other

acts

responsible rulers, private

individuals or public officials.?6 it is not difficult to argue
nuclear

genocide,

incitement to commit genocide, attempts to commit genocide,

complicity in genocide.
mentioned

Beside genocide the

in whole or in part.

following associated acts are also punishable:

calculated

that

larger

a

strike (such as deterrence policy requires as a back-up response) would

almost certainly constitute an act of genocide, through what

minority

groups.

to

does

some

But then, by virtue of connecting principles like 05, nuclear

deterrence stands indicted

particular

it

conspiracy

representatives of the

and

as

involving

incitement.

nuclear

states

acts

associated

with

genocide,

in

Some well-known political and military

would

thus

appear

to

be

liable

to

indictment and punishment under international law.

74.

Even Dahlitz, who gives a detailed and sympathetic account of nuclear arms
control attempts and lost opportunities,
is by no means confident that
suitable arrangements can now be achieved (see pp.
210-13).
Reasons
include technological advances now taking place, and the renewed American
drive for strategic superiority.

75.

See Brownlie, Kuper, and Amnesty International reports.
in this paragraph were suggested by C. Pigden.

76.

The account of genocide given is taken directly from the
Genocide Convention, which is reproduced in Kuper, p.210ff.

Most of the points

text

of

the

54

The nuclear fix emerging from nation-state arrangements - combined with the
impotence

apparent

interstate relations to alleviate the situation, indeed

of

with the apparent ability only to push the world further into the situation
nearer

to

the

nuclear

"brink"



taken

now

is

to

contemporary angle) the inadequacy of nation-state political
has

given

new

impetus

sovereignty

the best-seller

and

to consideration of other extrastate resolutions.

The

the

indicates

the

namely

nuclear

in

The

Schell's

situation

should

reexamination of the foundations of political thought'
world's

political

unsatisfactoriness

radical

of

the present system of nation states has even reached

stands

Schell

to

According

and

book

a new

arrangements,

thesis that the nuclear problem
national

(from

indicate

and

of

Fate

lead

to

required

Earth.

the

a

full-scale

to

make

'the

consonant with the global reality in which

institutions ...

they operate ...' and in 'work[ing] out the practical steps by which mankind ...
can

reorganise

political

its

life' (p.219).

However Schell himself tries to

avoid these 'awesome urgent tasks, which, imposed on us by
the

political

work of our age' ??.

else overimpressed

by

the

history,

constitute

So, not feeling the pressures of history or

realities

of

(unstable)

nation-states,

do

most

But there is no good reason to avoid the task of political

political theorists.

reassessment, made so much more urgent by the nuclear situation.

There is little doubt but that we live (too
unthinkingly)

with

an

antiquated

system

many

present

state

arrangements,

communications
condition;

especially,

were

in

a

of

(allegedly

when

17th

century

very

different

and

the main outlines of the modern totalitarian state

and its manifold deficiencies recognised, even earlier.

77.

willingly,

The features

representative

government, were largely fashioned in the

us

even

of political arrangements which the

nuclear impasse, among others, calls into question.
best

of

even

democratic)

technology,

more

were

the

and

primitive

discerned,

In the briefs presented

A similar theme, similarly questioning 'such sacred traditions as absolute
national sovereignty', was pressed by Bradley, a significant US general
(see Cox, p.225).
Schell (like Bradley) does not make it entirely clear whether he is
thinking of the Way Up or the Way Down, but the names he drops suggest the
Way Up.
So does the main thrust of what he says, e.g.
'Thus the peril of
extinction is the price that the world pays not for "safety" or "survival"
but for its [sic!] insistence on continuing to divide itself up into
sovereign nations'
(p.210),
as if the natural or original state were an
undivided one? On Schell's position, see further Appendix 1.

55

for political arrangements such as representative government, the excessive size

and complexity of modern states was not envisaged.

But such systems continue to

operate, insufficiently questioned, though their justificatory bases

undermined.
present

Nuclear

representative

emphasized

have

problems

political

have

been

several other deficiencies in

arrangements.

particular,

In

they

have

revealed how governments can thwart popular opinion, and act against the evident

will of the people on an issue, for instance in installing US missiles
European

Now that modern communications and information-processing

countries.

make it feasible to determine the mix of public positions on major
case for representative procedures is dissolved.

century

19th

issues,

a

issues.

The

reduced

power

excessive

back

at

developments,

issue-regulated

and

large

imposes

complex

other

modern

What

requirements.

by

states

government

recent

technological

Firstly,

smaller

initial

grouping

than

giant

states,

integration of groups by principles of federation.
as it is

to

informed

citizens

of

satisfactory

a

approximate

goodwill.

As

there are serious deficiencies in

the

information

in

present

progressive

and

procedure,

depends

control,

nation-states,

even

and

release
the

distribution

information,

channels, and so forth.

acceptable

the

from

These

distortion
restrictive

of

most liberal of them (and

Again, especially with new and less

But there are

evidently vested interests which stand to benefit from the limited
of

upon

nuclear problems have again made patent,

systems, there is little excuse for this.

information

upward

Secondly, democracy, insofar

political

related deficiencies as regards education).

publicly

democratic

like many other social arrangements, appear to function better with

procedures,

flow

and

called for are smaller

are

groupings, information flow, communication and education.

and

major

on

governmental power to more participatory democratic forms, a route made

possible even in

expensive

least

of governments would, to that extent at

But the route down through

least, be reduced.

much

elected

way that is thoroughly ambiguous on most issues) are not given an almost

free hand on every issue, but are required to answer

policy

the

It is past time

for more issue-controlled democratic procedures, where governments once
(in

some

in

of

data

features

in
have

availability

major communication
helped

in

making

present deliberately fostered pattern of nation-state

56

confrontation, and in establishing the prisoner's
superstates

nuclear

are

often

seen

to

be

dilemma

type

the

situation

locked into (on which see, e.g.,

Hardin).

A central argument, arising from the nuclear fix, for

current

questioning

arrangements and seriously considering their adjustment (in theory at

political

least), takes the following shape:e

Political arrangements should answer back to certain

in

justified

terms

doing

of

at

where

least

are

so.These requirements include such things as

enabling good and meaningful and moral lives for those
arrangements,

and

requirements

(as

certainly

in

who

under

operate

the

much of the West) the basic

material conditions for such lives are met.
*

Because of the nuclear fix, nation-state arrangements have

these

requirements.

For

guarantee the prospect of

arrangements.

nation-states,
good

and

at least in the North, can no longer

meaningful

to

lives

their

yet there is a non-negligible probability that

person's morality is jeopardised if the person is obliged

a

under

those

such lives may terminate, less than fulfilled, in this way.

support

meet

A life's meaningfulness is certainly diminished if it ends before

its prime in a nuclear disaster;
many

to

ceased

state

to

Furthermore a
in

acquiesce

or

engaged in nuclear war preparation or nuclear deterrence (cf.

Benn).
Therefore, nation-state arrangements have

should

be

not all) nation-states:
have

their

justification,

and

Variations on this type of argument apply to many (though

amended.

nation-states

forfeited

it is not only because of the

forfeited

their

mandate.

nuclear

Political

fix

that

some

obligations to such

states are correspondingly dissolved.
There is enough evidence that power-brokers who control
sight

of,

or

worse

have

lost

don't care about, the point of political arrangements, of

what justifies or is supposed to justify their states.

78.

states

This

applies

both

to

How they answer back admits of expansion in various ways, depending on the
underlying political theory.
Rawls,
for example,
puts it in familiar
contractual form:
that the political order is 'a cooperative venture for
mutual advantage' (p.4). Mao puts it in a standard democratic way:
'since
the purpose of all political processes is nothing but to serve the people
and their interests,
it is the people who should control in a meaningful
way, the government' (see Soo, p.68).

57

more powerful states and to lesser states, both
claim

popular

to

a

put

value

higher

on

military situations:

sovereignty

they do on human

than

for copious evidence see

principles

the

just

of

warfare

repeatedly, as have many other principles.

violated

'nuclear

where

Kuper).

This

by Israel, Vietnam and many other states in nonnuclear

illustrated

already

some

have

more often, they act without it or

as

national

survival' (Schell's conclusion, p.210;

is

brokers

The situation has been reached

against the will of the people.

powers

where,

and

mandate

the

where

blatantly

been

have

Such states have forfeited

much of what claim they had to external respect or internal political obedience;
so, on other grounds, have many other states.
It could just be, of course, as is often

alternatives,

that have

or

been

insinuated,

though

effort

little

but

option of world government).

for

dismissed,

As

to

all

whether

little

opportunity

not

do

to

and

work,

appear

to

we

Down.

There

working towards the weakening

especially

on

the

alternatives

can

be

may

and

have

given

been

know very little about how humans

sufficient

give

organising and trying out alternative

Way

such

alternatives

But,

operate under substantially different arrangements.

accessible

expended

been

has

instance as lacking feasibility, it is difficult to be entirely

sure without taking the risk of being dogmatic;

deadlines

no

the range of alternatives or their features (except perhaps for the

researching

very

are

there

But alternatives there are,

no possibly better alternatives.
glimpsed,

that

to

time

arrangements,

even

again,

once

very far on

proceed

those

nuclear

of

the

more

be time to proceed a little way however, in
breakdown

of

the

larger

superunions, which are the immediate problem.

invalid to simply conclude that alternative political and

nuclear

states,

Thus it would be

social

arrangements,

theoretically feasible and certainly a longer-term goal, do not presently

while

offer a part of the practical response to the nuclear fix.

But there is no need to insist upon a single-track Way Out of
dilemma

to

the

exclusion of all others:

quite the contrary.

the

nuclear

We can not only

afford to be fairly catholic about "second best" approaches and embrace whatever

seems to be working or looks like helping, within recognised ethical (and other)

constraints;

indeed, given the urgency,

the

direness

of

the

situation,

we

58

should
as

fairly catholic and not inflexibly committed to narrow methods, such

be

bogged

down

(and

very

on

arms

limitations

negotiations

should

methods

perservered

be

unrepresentative)

certainly

and

between main nuclear states.

made

attempts

and

with,

No-first-use declaration, a ban on weapons in space, etc.

But even such

to

e.g.

superstates,

the

from

concessions

significant

undemocratic

further

wring

jointly

a

signed

The direction of most

hope for progress has however come into view, a direction that is not especially

The political means of the Way Out are what they have

new.

larger

every

liberal

on

issue that has mattered:

humanitarian

or

been

from outside

state governmental apparatus by organised pressure from within or
and

it,

characteristically Bottom-Up

methods

are

considerations

familiar

alternatives

self-organising

furnishing

by

and

practically

virtually

upon

without

bypass

which

it,

Top-Down.

never

Such

but part of the more general, and very effective,

case against reliance upon states for a range of things they are now supposed to

but

supply,

which

can

almost

that

effectively and for

invariably

matter

be

obtained, where required, more

expensively

less

without

(and

them

their

monopolies).

In the case of security it is states, with very few exceptions,

imposed,

or

frequently

The opposition to the

local

from

have

in, military solutions involving nuclear installations

acquiesced

and nuclear weapons.

that

neighbourhood

and

escalating

groups,

fix

nuclear

has

come

some of them now federated

across nations (so the direction is not really interstate).

These

have

groups

been successful in blocking some nuclear installations and establishing, for the
time

being,

against

movement

nuclear-free

some

nuclear

neighbourhoods.

equipment

The

patchwork

grass-roots

is strongest in Europe, which is - as the

movement realised, and what gave it impetus - a leading theatre, on US strategic
thinking,

for

a

limited

nuclear

war

not

touching

extremely doubtful that increasing NATO and American

Europe

will

make

it

a

safer

place:

American shores.

nuclear

installations

removed

installations

in

on the contrary it seems probable that

Europe will become much safer if the anti-nuclear movements
these

It is

succeed

and Europe rendered nuclear-free.

grossly immoral conduct will thereby also be considerably reduced.

in

having

The chances of

59
What of the spectre of Soviet domination, military, ideological and

in

Except

case

the

Europe,

of

other?

where the inexcusable suppression of Eastern

Europe all too evidently persists, this is an obvious fabrication.

Does

anyone

expect the united Soviets to absorb China, let alone take over Canada

seriously

or Brasil say?

And even in Western Europe the spectre is

failing

partly

giant

fashioned

financially

dominated

and

economically

politically and ideologically, by the USA.
ideologically,

dominated

propped

exaggerated,

up by the NATO powers'

and

some

in

and,

some measure,

Indeed much of the "free"

world

is

adequately

not

countered

military

by

The

means.

domination to which nuclear weapons are considered relevant

insofar

as

is

basic

any

in

mode of
But

military.

military, and associated political, domination of Western Europe by

the Soviets is a

problem,

there

are

several

ways

other

predominantly American nuclear weapons to mitigate it.
only local defence arrangements - whether top-down

alternative

is

it dominated economically, by the USA.

of

That is not generally considered so much of a problem (as it is?9), and

case

a

Since the last World War, Western Europe has been

military-industrial alliance.
increasingly

largely

and

much

methods

social



but

also

some

on

methods,

or

restructuring, such as

social

power

to

dispersed

local

more cooperation and interchange with the Soviets and

much

and

reliance

These should include not

state-supplied

decentralisation, regionalisation and devolution of

organisations,

than

Eastern Europe.
Part of the point of

whether

external

or

restructuring

internal,

so

is

especially

situations, is to

state-contrived

79.

break

make

military

any

takeover,

much more difficult and pointless, and the

restoration of local control easier.Part of

interchange,

to

the

point

of

cooperation

and

at the level of more ordinary people, in more ordinary

down

conditions

of

hostility

and

distrust

and

to

sabotage

the

West-East confrontations, and thereby to remove

For many peoples of the world, and in its impact on the natural world,
advanced corporate capitalism is an oppressive and damaging doctrine. But,
in contrast with austere Marxism-Leninism which would improve the lot of
some of the oppressed world while even worsening the impact on the natural
world, corporate capitalism admits a certain pluralism, and recognises many
more individual rights and liberties. Certainly Marxism-Leninism which
appears to degenerate in practice to an authoritarian and totalitarian
position is a less welcome alternative.
It is fortunate, then, that we need
be saddled with neither:

there are superior options.

60

other

expenditures.81

popular

and

for,

motives

Western

support

Europe,

for

for,

long

military

much

too

adventures

partial

to

and

military

adventures, should now be helping itself rather than relying on a leaky American

nuclear

umbrella

for its defence.

Moreover it ought to be, at the very least,

uncomfortable about the risks of catastrophically damaging
the

world

in

the

of

interests

its own security.

extensive

parts

of

Nor should other "nuclear

dependent" states be prepared to acquiesce in this not uncharacteristic European
imposition.

world, what

There
LSN

is

war

no

risks,

enormous

for

virtue

Western

in sacrificing other parts of the
Europe,

military-based domination to other parts of the world.

which

has

long

exported

There are better options

than dubious and risky nuclear shields for Europe.

80.

Thus, for example, to the extent that local defence groups are integrated
under more centralised direction, it would be a built-in principle that
surrender of the central directing section absolved the federated groups
from following suit or following further directions. That is, through
devolution of power,
surrender becomes structurally impossible (though
individuals or basic groups may surrender). Moreover, the central section
would hold only limited information about the federated
units
it
integrated.
The locally organised groups themselves, which would merge
with local populations, would be trained in tactics of passive resistance,
sabotage,
(nonviolent) guerilla warfare, etc.
The net effect (as C.
Pigden, who made most of these points, argues) would be to make the cost of
military conquest, occupations and exploitation prohibitively high.
One reason why the Japanese Army High Command decided against invasion of
Australia in March 1942 was the character of Australians and the fact that
they 'would resist to the end' (Threats to Australia's Security, p.62).
Yet
the 1942 (war reduced) Australian population was substantially
untrained and unorganised for locally—based defence. With such a defence
restructuring, Australia would not only much reduce its vulnerability to
military adventures, but remove standard reasons for succumbing to threats
of outside military domination, blackmail, and the like.

81.

In particular, with sufficient cooperation
and
trust,
competitive
prisoner's dilemma situations, which depend on the prisoners being kept
separate, are removed.
So too a main model supporting deterrence policy
would be undercut.
And the arguments from national dangers would be

further corroded.

In the same direction, it is important to extend cooperation between USA
and USSR down below the level of state trade deals, e.g.
in grain and gas,
to communication and cooperation between people. For such commercial deals
there is sufficient trust, even in periods of intensive confrontation: why
should it not be so also at more significant people-to-people levels? Many
further sorts of interrelationship are feasible, and inexpensive by
military standards, e.g. sister cities, common clubs, worker exchanges,
gift projects.
If, for instance, 100,000 or more ordinary Americans were
living, working or holidaying in USSR (and vice versa), Americans would
feel less enthusiasm for hurling nuclear missiles into Russia (or vice
versa).
Only quite inadequate efforts have been made to build up mutual
respect and trust; on the contrary, a lot of resources have been expended
to encourage precisely the opposite attitudes, e.g.
as part of the

strategy of the "cold war".

61
What the anti-nuclear movements must press

for

and disarmament (and, on the more

perceptive

transarmament,

to

conversion

i.e.

outer

of

edges

graduated

movements,

the

alternative social defence arrangements).

But the argument also makes it clearer how far this should go,
through

in

in part it is what they have been pushing for, nuclear reduction

broad outline:

way

clear

accordingly

is

namely

all

the

disarmament^^ to total nuclear disarmament,

unilateral

certainly to local disarmament across progressively larger parts of the planet's
surface,

including

especially

Europe.

For

once

state is demoted, its

the

importance and the necessity of its maintenance properly downgraded and reliance
on

decision-making

its

diminished

decision-making - once all that is

happen),

in

duly

of

favour

more localised control and

for

allowed

not

does

(it

need

to

major component in the nuclear fix is removed, namely the problem

one

of reduction or even loss of state sovereignty.

Maintenance of that sovereignty

has been assigned a mistaken importance, which in turn accounts for the mistaken
weight assigned to the arguments from national dangers.

What is

and

important

worth preserving is not the sovereign state, but certain ways of life within the

state.

The nation-state and dangers to it, and accompanying

features

such

as

misplaced nationalism, are the weakest links in the nuclear fix situation.
Once the demise of the sovereign nation-state is allowed for, the arguments

from

national

concerning

particular.

dangers

individual

also

and

group

rights

and

In

freedoms,

by

the

that

nation-state.

matter

The

are

82.

to

arguments

liberties

in

for

them,

as

smaller

exclusively

or

nation-state is neither sufficient for

are

disappearing,

nor

community arrangements can ensure them.

But

arguments from individual and group dangers remain, do they not?

risks

are

civil

necessarily

them, since in increasingly many states these liberties

necessary

place

their

None of these require national sovereignty or even a national life.

None of the rights and freedoms
guaranteed

disintegrate.

individuals and groups remain:

To

be

sure,

that has always been so,83 and is not

The initial but important steps are at zero cost as regards deterrence.
Were deterrence really the policy there would be little case for more than
a fraction of present nuclear arsenals.
The steps to disarmament are
well-known, e.g.
the scrapping of obsolete weapons, and an end to
modernisation, the removal of nuclear weapons in crucial theatres such as
Europe, etc.

62

being changed but only worsened in this age of

mostly

to

want

that

sure

be

or

other

outsiders.

People

their lives will continue to run their course,

ideally in a flourishing fashion, and will not be

Russians

nation-states.

nuclear

controlled

Americans

by

or

Nuclear arrangements which threaten their lives

are not a rational route to these ends.

In the weigh-up that should occur in charting a way

as

dilemmas

the

out

of

deontic

such

fix and its subsidiary dilemmas, there are then much

nuclear

more important elements than features of the nation-state, namely some of

those

the state is supposed to safeguard, such as individual and local welfare

things

and autonomy;
weapons.

but those things are better ensured by

main reasons are familiar:

The

threaten the loss of basic values,

such

removal

the

nuclear

of

in particular, nuclear circumstances
as

and

welfare

autonomy,

many

for

creatures and regions, and the potential loss is in general much greater than in

a nuclear-free situation (even should another

with

example, the production of nuclear weapons reduces both local

of

the

opportunity

remain

armed

There are also well-known supplementary reasons;

weapons).

nuclear

party

ideological

welfare

for

(because

costs of weapons manufacture) and autonomy (because of the

accompanying security measures).

Thus

the

appropriately
devices

and

fix

nuclear

resolved,

it

can

deploy,

and

considerable reduction of state sovereignty.

how),

and

since

rate,

any

by

by

allowing

for

the

But, although that is a reasonable

Way Out, at little cost in the circumstances, it will be
practice,

at

theoretically

sovereignty of the state (especially as to what nuclear

limiting
weapons

is

strongly

resisted

in

those who hold power hold it, in one way or another, under the

auspices of the state.

This is a main reason why people must organise

and

act

against the state.
Again the resolution also looks practical enough, since

sovereignty

reduction

in

need apply essentially only to the the production and deployment of

nuclear weapons.

83.

the

Indeed

it

could

in

principle

be

obtained

by

negotiated

It will remain so under any satisfactory political arrangements.
Until
human social arrangements change substantially, there is no substitute for
on-going vigilance to ensure or maintain political liberty.

63
agreement (at the top levels of state).

However

to

get

this

far

with

the

superstates, the limitations of state-power will likely have to proceed further:
for nuclear weaponry does not stand in splendid isolation.
into

both

concerned.

systems

military

and

(civil)

Rather

it

tied

is

industrial production of the states

So, unsurprisingly, practical-looking resolutions are being

solidly

resisted by superstates.

Accordingly more popular (bottom up) action against nuclear-involved states

especially

and

the superstates, after all the states causing the most

against

serious dilemmas, will have to be taken much further.
variety

of

organised

forms.

Once again it will take a

These include a refusal to contribute to nuclear
of

war preparation, either directly or

indirectly.

widely,

blockading of shipments of uranium, and the

from

such

steps

as

the

forms

The

action

range

refusal of supplies and services to sailors on nuclear ships and submarines,

to

withholding or redirection of taxes destined for nuclear security purposes.

the

They include as well the whole
nuclear

installations

and

range

of

nonviolent

facilities

protest

which

(methods

methods

against

do

exclude

not

incapacitation and decommissioning of equipment, and which do include new

model

resistance and defence organisations). 8**

It is important to realise that petitioning of
power

state

representatives

and

holders, for instance through letter campaigns, demonstrations and direct

appeal, is far from a complete strategy, and may be ineffective or ignored,
the results discouraging.

and

This is one reason why popular action should be based

on a more comprehensive political

strategy,

which

also

involves

withdrawing

support from prevailing state arrangements, and working out and participating in

alternative arrangements, especially

alternative

defence

forms.Sufficient

details as to what to do are already known, enough to make an immediate start.

84.

For some impression of the range of methods, see again Sharp.

85.

For much more on all these points, see e.g.
further Appendix 2.

Martin.

As to what to do, see

64

APPENDIX 1. ON THE FATE OF MANKIND AND THE EARTH,
according to Schell, and to Anders.

A
series
of
nuclear
prophets
has
produced
a
series
of
philosophically-oriented works on nuclear war and the alleged implications of
human extinction.^ The series is important for its deeper penetration into the
nuclear dilemma, down to metaphysical levels;
in this the series contrasts with
the transient superficialities of much of the political commentary.
The most
widely circulated and influential text of the series is undoubtedly that of the
slightest of the "prophets , Schell's The Fate of the Earth.
This skillful
piece of media—philosophy uncannily redeploys some of the apparently deep
phenomenological themes of Anders. So, conveniently, main assumptions of Schell
and Anders can often be considered together. To criticise their assumptions is
not of course to belittle their work.
In particular, Schell's little book, for
all its political shortcomings, is having a significant and much needed effect
in shifting attitudes towards nuclear arrangements.
It is especially valuable
for its vivid and horrifying scenarios of the aftermath of nuclear attack.
Unfortunately it also exhibits, both philosophically and factually,
severe
defects.
Some of it is simply garbage:

to select one example,

consider

the

claim

that

'without ... a world-wide program of action for preserving the
[human] species .... nothing else that we undertake together can make
any practical or moral sense ...
(p.173, rearranged).
This should certainly be rejected philosophically; for there is no separate
moral issue of such overwhelming importance that all other issues become morally
neutral. Moral issues remain moral issues:
they don't cease to be so when
compared with more important moral issues (as Schell effectively acknowledges
elsewhere, p.130). And the claim should also be junked on more factual grounds.
Humans form a highly resilient species, like rabbits in Australia a survivor
species,
unlikely to be exterminated under
presently
arranged
nuclear

holocausts.

1.

The distinguishing term is from Foley's Nuclear Prophets, where many of the
leading prophets are assessed. One well-known prophet not so considered
there is Jaspers, presumably because his main work (which might equally
well have been translated as The Fate of Mankind) comes out in entirely the
wrong direction.
For it gives heavy philosophical attire
to
the

better-dead-than-red abomination.
A main argument against Jaspers so presented is simple. However bad being
red might become (at present it is debatably worse than living under some
of the totalitarian regimes the free West props up), it still gives humans
a further chance for good lives, since regimes fall or can be toppled: but
total annihilation removes that all-important opportunity.

But Jaspers does not present his position so simply. Rather his contention
is that there are circumstances where and principles for which a person or
group of persons ought to sacrifice even their lives. Freedom is such:
a
life worth living is a free life. But the latter point can be granted
without conceding that sacrifice is a possible means to it.
While the
sacrifice of one or a few lives may be a possible (if dubiously effective)
way to free lives for others, certainly the sacrifice of all lives is not a
possible route to free lives for all, since no human lives remain.
To this
extent Schell is right (on p.131) in accusing Jaspers of an each to__ all
fallacy.
Jasper's idea that "the free life that they try to save by all
possible means is more than mere life or lives" breaks down when applied to
all participating people. None can gain free lives by extinction of all:
that is not a possible route to life even.

65
The example was selected however because it leads into, indeed presupposes,
two of the major defective assumptions in the work of Schell and Anders:
51.
Nuclear war will eliminate life, human life at least, on earth (the
extinction assumption);
and
52.
In the absence of humans, very many notions, not only those of morality
and value, but those of time and space for example, make no sense; or, to put
it into a more sympathetic philosophical form, these notions depend for their
sense on an actual human context (the extravagant anthropocentric assumption).
It is applications of S2 which give Anders'
and Schell's work ^ some of its
apparent philosophical depth, and certainly induce much philosophical puzzlement
through the paradoxical propositions generated. But the frequent applications
of S2 depend essentially on SI. For without total extinction there will be
humans about, to make past and future, good and evil, go on making sense!

Granted the factual assumption SI is by no means ruled out as a real
possibility; granted the technological means are now available to make it true,
to render Homo sapiens extinct;^
granted the prospect of nuclear war does

threaten leading centres of Western civilization with obliteration. Even so SI
appears unlikely in the light of present - admittedly inadequate - information.
Even in Canada, which lies on the polar route of Soviet missiles, human life
should be able to continue in certain northern areas (according to Canadian
medical studies). Schell's argument to SI is extremely flimsy. It depends, for
example, on an unjustified extrapolation from the Northern to the Southern
Hemisphere, but for the most part it does that very North American thing, of
contracting the world to North America.
(All that matters, all worthwhile
civilization,
is in USA, or at least, to be more charitable, in North America
and Europe, which will also be wiped out, i.e. its human population will be
eliminated in the nuclear holocaust.) Some of the data Schell relies upon, for
example the effect of nuclear explosions on the ozone layer, is significantly
out of date. Other effects than ozone destruction apparently transfer even less
well from North to South. A factually superior study of nuclear disaster than
Schell's,
by Preddey and others,
indicates that parts of the Southern
Hemisphere, New Zealand and southern latitudes of Africa and Latin America could
escape relatively unscathed from even most massive northern exchanges.*'
Both Anders and Schell remark on the "impossibility of unlearning" the
means of manufacturing nuclear bombs.
It would seem that extinction, which they
both foresee as at least a live possibility, would furnish a good medium for
unlearning nuclear technology (something very like this emerges from van
Daniken's theory of an earlier "high" technology). In virtue of S2, they would
however exclude such a possibility as a case of unlearning, contending wrongly
2.

For a detailed comparison of Schell and Anders' remarkably similar versions
of S2, see Foley JS.

3.

Thus the Last Man argument, important in environmental ethics, is no longer
merely hypothetical, awaiting the remote death of the Sun, but assumes new
urgency.
It is this sort of argument that connects environmental ethics
and nuclear ethics, at a deeper metaphysical level. The Bomb and Bulldozer
are out of the same technological Pandora's box.
Nuclear technology is not the only route to human extinction, nor the only
Pandora's box.
Biological and chemical means are perhaps even more
effective, and certainly can be more selective in what gets extinguished.

4.

However, new modellings and estimates, none so far very reliable, keep
appearing, and amending the picture. On the basis of one recent scenario,
generated by a computer modelling of a 5000 megaton nuclear exchange,
the
immunity of the Southern Hemisphere to the dire consequences of a northern
LSN war has been questioned.
In particular, Sagan, no doubt overreaching
the evidence, has 'warn[ed] that the nuclear blasts would create enormous
differences in temperature between south and north,
shifting normal wind
patterns and carrying smoke and radioactivity south' (Newsweek, November 7
1983, p.56).
Some sections of the environmental and peace movements have a
vested interest in exaggerating the probable effects of nuclear holocaust
for life on earth, much as many statesmen have an interest in minimizing
them.

66
that the notion no longer made sense.
But what they seem to want to suggest
with the impossibility-of-unlearning message is the inevitability of the
development and eventual use of the technology - as if having learnt the means
all else was determined, and manufacture and use ceased to be a matter of
choice. Certainly such views have been floated $.
But they are not tenable.
There are many examples of technological advances that have not been taken
advantage of, and there are even cases of technological developments that have
been manufactured but not marketed or used. There is not something very special
about nuclear apparatus that puts it beyond the scope of such generalisations.

Both Schell and Anders do claim that there are very special things about
nuclear weapons, in particular that they do not allow "experiments . Even if
this were true - it is certainly not of smaller weapons - it would not tell
against the previous argument against the inevitability of nuclear weapons. And
in fact Anders and (even) Schell hedge their claims about testing, and the
limits to nuclear scientific work,
to large-scale weapons and independent
experiments which do not interfere with the observers and those outside the
"laboratories".
Again they have latched onto major points:
in particular, we
have at present no way of testing the cumulative effects of large nuclear
weapons in concert, e.g.
for more holistic effects such as fireballs or
firestorms, electromagnetic pulse or ozone destruction. Short of an LSN war,
and likely enough with it, these crucial effects must remain largely untested
and hypothetical in character.
The penetration of human chauvinism, as in S2, is not something peculiar to
Schell, but is a product of Western philosophy, European philosophy especially.
This chauvinism is unfortunately alive and still well, Anders'
version of S2
being just one striking illustration(cf. AA
p.252ff.).
It has also deeply
penetrated Anglo-American philosophy,
and has
recently been extended
by
Wittgenstein's work, where even the necessary truths of mathematics are taken to
be a product of human conventions, and would vanish with humans!
Such are
alleged implications of
extinction;
but the
fact is that the truths of
arithmetic are in no way dependent on the existence of humans or humanoids or of
gods or giraffes.
In Schell, human chauvinism is dished up in a particularly
powerful and obnoxious Kantian form.
Thoughts and propositions, time and
tenses, history and memories, values and morality, all depend on the life-giving
presence of human beings — past or future or merely potential humans are not
enough,
persons that are not humans are certainly not enough. Thus, according
to Schell (p.140, e.g.), '...
the thought "Humanity is now extinct" is an
impossible one for a rational person, because as soon as tt is, we^ are not.
In
imagining any other event, we look ahead to a moment that is still within the
stream of human time,
...
'. The thought is however perfectly possible for
humans; we can have it right now. Though we no doubt have it falsely, a later
rational creature may well be able to have it truly.
Schell erroneously denies
that:
there is no "later" '... outside the human tenses of past, present, and
future
...'
(p.140)6.
Human extinction eliminates 'the creature that divides
time into past, present and future':
so annihilation cannot
'come to pass'
(p.143).
But it is simply false that the tenses are human;
the tenses depend
on a local time ordering (perceptible to many creatures other than humans, but
not depending at all on that perceptibility for its viability) relating other
times to the present, to now (also a human-independent location,
evident to
other creatures, and borne witness to by such sequences as the passing seasons).
And annihilation may also too easily come to pass, for many humans in the North
at least, as it came to pass in recent geological times that humans began to
exist upon earth. Before that there was a time before there were any human
beings.

5.

Not merely by technological determinists of marxist persuasion. Hackworth,
a former US general, argues by straight induction, that if the US military
has a weapon it will use it.

6.

The appalling theme that humans create past, present and future
repeated elsewhere, e.g.

p.173.

(etc.)

is

67

Anders' argument for the demise of time, that 'what has been will no longer
be even what has been', is also explicitly and narrowly verificationist:
'for
what would the difference be between what has only been and what has never been,
if there is no one to remember the things that have been' (AA p.245). There
would still remain many sorts of difference;
for one, the history recorded in
many
other organisms would be different.
Temporal themes do not lack
'legitimacy because not registered [or
verified]
by
anyone';
truth,
significance, still less meaning, are not matters of human verification.
Here, as elsewhere, the human chauvinism is mixed with other distorting
metaphysical assumptions of our Western heritage, in particular, verificationism
and ontological assumptions (to the effect that there are severe difficulties in
talking about what does not exist).
Thus,
for example, Schell takes over
dubious metaphysics from Freud, according to whom "it is indeed impossible to
imagine our own death; and whenever we attempt to do so, we can perceive that
we are in fact still present as spectators" (p.138). The second clause goes a
good distance towards refuting the first.
In fact there is no great difficulty
in describing counterfactual situations which undermine both Freud's claims.
The same goes for Schell's extensions of human chauvinism into one of its main
traditional strongholds, value theory:
'...
the simple and basic fact [sic!]
that before there can be good or evil, service or harm, lamenting or rejoicing
there must be life', human life (p.171).
These are no facts, but deeply
entrenched
philosophical
dogmas which have been exposed and criticised
elsewhere?.
Naturally some things will disappear with the extinction of humans:
trivially there will be no more humans (unless humans re-evolve or are
recreated), and thus no more human institutions,
human activities, human
emotions, and so forth. But it is already going too far to suggest, as Anders
does, that there will accordingly be 'no thought, no love, no struggle, no pain,
no hope,
no comfort, no sacrifice, no image, no song
For there are, and
may continue to exist, other creatures than humans with emotion,
struggles,
songs..........
Nor will the ending of all such human ventures, if it comes to
pass, show that all past human ventures have been 'all in vain', meaningless,
and already so to say dead. The decay of the solar system, or the heat-death of
the universe even, will not show that worthwhile human activities were not
worthwhile.

Several of the other notions and themes common to Schell and Anders derive
from their shared assumptions SI and S2. It is these that underlie the biblical
notion (in Revelations) of a Second Death, redeployed by both.
'The death of
mankind', under SI, is reckoned a 'second death', because by S2 and SI remaining
life is rendered meaningless and already 'seems to be dead' (AA p.244, S p.166)
and is already 'overhung with death' (S p.166). Thus, too, more trivially, a
person faces 'a second death', not merely one's own but in addition that greater
death of the species and all future generations (S p.166, p.115). However even
if nuclear extinction came to pass, the stronger notion would not be vindicated,
because it depends on the fallacious inference to the meaninglessness of
preceding life and on the
very
questionable
representation
of
this
meaninglessness as a sort of death. There is no Second Death: creatures die
just once, perhaps all at about the same time. The idea of a Second Death lacks
even a solid metaphysical base.

From SI, together with the minor principle that extinction being an
absolute doesn't differ in degree, comes the universality of peril theme that
'we are all exposed to peril in the same degree', which is accordingly
'disguised' and 'difficult to recognise', because there is no contrast (AE p.64;
S p.150). This theme falls with SI.
In any event, not all peoples are equally
imperilled by the nuclear situation, the Indians of southern Patagonia being
7.

See, e.g., 'Human chauvinism and environmental ethics',
in Environmental
Philosophy (edited D.
Mannison and others), Research School of Social
Sciences, Australian National University, 1980.

8.

Anders is here (AA pp.244-5) relying upon a version of the
perserverence, criticised in detail in Routley and Griffin.

argument

from

68

rather better placed than the Germans of northern Europe. Nor are all people
equally locked into the situation or incapacitated by it;
as explained, the
position is different in different countries and places.
Nor, likewise, are all people equally responsible, an obnoxious theme,
which Schell (in contrast to Anders) repeatedly infiltrates. This is the Pogo
theme, according to which
S3. Responsibility for the present
nuclear
situation (fiasco,
really)
distributes onto everybody, it belongs to every human in the world.
But there is also, mixed in, a weaker more plausible claim that gives lie to the
stronger one, namely that we have some responsibility (the Nazi situation is
compared). An especially blatant example of the Pogo themeruns as follows:
'...
the world's political leaders ...
though they now menace the earth with
nuclear weapons, do so only with our permission, and even at our bidding.
At
least,
this is true for democracies'
(pp.229-30). The theme is elaborated
elsewhere:
'... we are the authors of that extinction. (For the populations
of the superpowers this is true in a positive sense, since we pay for extinction
and support the governments that pose the threat of it, while for the peoples of
the non-nuclear-armed world it is true only in the negative sense that they fail
to try to do anything about the danger)'
(p.152).
But this is more of an
argument indicting representative government, by revealing its insensitivity and
unresponsiveness to many of the populace they allegedly govern, not to mention
those affected by its activities who are not represented at all (namely
foreigners). But Schell conveniently neglects all such points:
'...
we are
potential mass killers. The moral cost of nuclear armaments is that it makes of
all of us underwriters of the slaughter of hundreds of millions'
(p.152).
And
again '[as]
perpetrators
... we convey the steady message ...
that life not
only is not sacred but is worthless;
that ...
it had been judged acceptable
for everyone to be killed' (p.153). Little of this is true. Those who campaign
against nuclear arrangements, vote against nuclear-committed parties so far as
is possible,
and the like, are certainly not the authors of potential
destruction, and responsibility for the nuclear situation does not simply
distribute onto them. Nor does responsibility - or the unlikely opinions as to
worth Schell illegitimately attributes to everyone - fall on those who have done
less.
Responsibility for decisions taken in "liberal democracies" even by
representatives (in the unlikely event of this happening in the case of anything
as important as defence) cannot be traced back to those represented, since among
9.

An interesting converse of this theme is sometimes advanced, that no one is
responsible, the whole thing is out of control. The technological version
of this no-responsibility theme is discussed shortly. More satisfactory is
the theme that nuclear arrangements are out of political control, but for
reasons, in terms of vested interests in keeping nuclear things going,
which enable responsibility to be distributed. The vested interests, which
bear considerable responsibility, include the military weapons industry,
and research and academic communities. Under pressures for re-election
especially, politicians give in to these powerful groups, so losing control
of political processes. The argument fails at its final stage. For many
politicians either belong to or represent vested interests. Thus political
processes
tend rather to reflect vested interests than to run out of

political control.
10.

Another example of spreading the responsibility runs as follows:
'The
self-extinction of our species is not an act that anyone describes as sane
or sensible; nevertheless, it is an act that, without quite admitting it
to ourselves, we plan in certain circumstances to commit' (p.186). Even
for most of the planners, extinction is presumably not part of "the plan",
but an unintended consequence; and most of us have little or no role in
the planning, enough of us even campaign against the planning.
Further
'the world
... chose the course of attempting to refashion the system of
sovereignty to accommodate nuclear weapons'
(p.194):
the world?
This
connects
of
course with the ideological argument from defence of
fundamentals,
e.g.
for liberty,
for the (USA) nation,
and against
socialism.
In the course of this argument yet another fallacious
assumption is rolled out:
'The means to the end are not limited, for the
end itself sets the limits in each case' (p.189).

69

many other things, a representative is only representative of a party which
offers a complex and often ill-characterised package of policies, and a voter
may vote for zero or more policies of this package.
Only in the (uncommon)
event of a clear single issue referendum, which is adopted, can responsibility,
still of a qualified sort, be sheeted home, to those who voted for it, not to
every one in the community. While S3 is false, there is an important related
theme that is much more plausible; namely that the present nuclear situation
generates responsibilities for every socially involved person (this theme is
discussed in Appendix 2).

When moreover the Pogo assumption is disentangled from accompanying themes,
part of what results is decidedly along the right lines; namely
S4. The controllers [not to be confused, in Schell's fashion, with all of us]
have failed to change our pre-nuclear institutions. The sovereign system is out
of step with the nuclear age, the one-earth system,
etc.
(the whole earth
theme). Though Schell remains relatively clear about the serious defects of the
state and the frequently immoral purposes for which the state is used,
unfortunately he often loses sight of this important theme (indicated pp.187-8).
Yet S4 forms part of Schell's critique of the state which is, by and large,
scattered and fragmentary.
As observed (in §8),
Schell arrives at the
conclusion that the nation-state has outlasted its usefulness, and that new
political institutions more 'consonant with the global reality' are required as
a matter of urgency. But he evades what he admits is the major task, making out
viable alternatives.
At most he makes some passing gestures, some pointing
towards the Way Up.
Solutions to the nuclear dilemma come,
if not easily,
in a similar
simplistic way,
from the Top Down;
those who can must appeal to the Top (cf.
p.230). Schell places his hope in treaties for arms reduction and limitations
(such as SALT) and in world government (as with the United Nations).
Given the
record of these organisations and treaties, the negotiations and regulators,
it
is by now a pathetic faith. Nor is a serious need felt for further analysis of
the nuclear situation, to investigate the origins of nuclear technology,
to
explore the roots of nuclear blindness,
to consider effective changes to
military-industrial organisation and ways of life.

But some of the requisite deeper analysis of the nuclear situation and,
more generally,
of the roots of war can be found elsewhere.*2 The roots of the
nuclear fix are not confined to the ideologically-aligned arrangements of
nation-states, but penetrate also into key components of those states, their
military, their controlling classes, and their supporting bureaucracies.
And
both within the arrangements of states, what accounts in part for the
arrangements, and in key components of the states, a conspicuous and crucial
feature is the drive for power and domination.^ Thus the push for [nuclear]
superiority by the super-states,
to be achieved through military-oriented
science and technology, which involves and enables domination, in several
interrelated forms. The main power-base is the large nation-state, where enough
surplus product can be accumulated (from at home and from abroad, and bled from
nature) to proceed with military and bureaucratic ambitions and to found the
high-technology research and development means to ever more expendable power and
energy.
In changing the structural arrangements to eliminate the prospect of
nuclear war, it is not ultimately enough just to downgrade the main power-base,
it is also important to alter key components of the state,
the nation-state;
and, more sweepingly,
to remove trouble-making patterns embedded in all these
social and political arrangements, namely patterns of domination, patterns
manifested not only in state political organisation, but in white-coloured
relations,
male-female
relations,
human-animal
relations,
human-nature
relations;
to remove, in short, chauvinistic relations. However not everything

and especially p.227, bottom paragraph.

11.

See p.225ff.

12.

In Anders and elaborated in Foley, and more straightforwardly,
in Martin.
The incomplete list of items given above, to be investigated in a deeper
analysis of the nuclear situation, paraphrases Foley JS p.164.

70

needs to be accomplished at once;
and the cluster of damaging power and
domination relations tied into war can be tackled separately. And there the
problems can largely be narrowed to certain problems of states and certain key
components of states.

In what analysis he does offer of the problem with states,
Schell repeats
the familiar false contrast of state expediency with morality, as a contrast
between "raison d'etat and the Socratic—Christian ethics.
The teaching that
'the end justifies the means is the basis on which governments, in all times,
have licensed themselves to commit crimes of every sort'
(p.134).
So
'states
may do virtually anything whatever in the name of [their] survival'.
Schell
then argues however,
that extinction nullifies end-means justification by
destroying every end; but again the argument is far from sound, and depends on
human chauvinism (as under S2) combined with ontological assumptions.
Even if
all humans were extinguished (as under SI) ends could remain, for instance for
nonhumans such as animals and extraterrestrials, actual or not. The ends—means
argument can however be repaired to remove such objections:
instead it is

13.

These motivating drives form part of a larger integrated
package,
comprising maximisation drives for power, knowledge,
control, wealth,
energy, speed,
satisfaction,
...,
for the "newer" Enlightenment (but
Faustian) virtues.
Frequently there are attempts (the human failing for
excessive neatness and simplicity manifested) to reduce the package to one
main component, preference—satisfaction for instance, or utility. And the
type of drive is justified (especially for those who have it, but worry
about it) not only as virtuous, which it is not, but also as rational,
which again it is not. Rationality, the deeply entrenched myth has it,

consists in maximisation, of the virtues.

Maximisation of the objects of the drives runs, however,
into limitation
theorems and associated paradoxes. The maximisation of power, as with the
Christian-Islamic God, encounters the paradox of omnipotence, the parallel
maximisation
of knowledge,
paradoxes of omniscience.
There are no
consistent objects which are omnipotent or omniscient.
The drive for
maximum consistency,
often taken to be the epitome of rationality, also
leads to inconsistency in the case of more important theories,
such as
arithmetic and set theory (Godel's theorem and associated limitative

theorems).
14.

R & D, though directed by military requirements and the arms race, also
drives the arms race. Its role is partly disguised by the myth of neutral
science.
have been attempts, not only by those committed to technological
determinism, to involve technology more deeply as the main, or single,
source of the nuclear fix.
It is technology, the mega-machine, running out
of control,
that has brought us to this predicament, the nuclear abyss.
Sometimes this serves to exonerate states and their key components and
those
who
control
them,
for they are simply caught up by this
out—of—control machine;
but sometimes the state itself is seen as a
machine also running out of control. But technological determinism, like
other varieties of stronger (nonanalytic) determinism, is false.
Nuclear
technology was selected and proceeded with, after a well-known political
dispute involving distinguished scientists;
it was deliberated, funded and

promoted, while other alternatives were not.
Damaging
technologies of the nuclear age were not inevitable,
but
deliberately chosen by certain components of the large nation-states. And
much as they need not have been chosen, so they do not have to be persisted
with.
The fashionable inevitability/determinism themes admit not only of
refutation by bringing out the many choices made in persisting with often
recalcitrant
technologies.
They also admit of being made to look
ridiculous.
If the Bomb is determined, as part of human evolution, then if
it functions (as it probably will, a matter also determined), it will serve
as a human population control device, a matter also determined.
That is,
the Bomb has its fixed evolutionary place in human population regulation.

71
claimed that extinction nullifies ends-means justification by frustrating the
realisation of every relevant end - meaning by 'relevant', in this context,
those ends the realisation of which the state appeals to in justification of its
nuclear policies.1$
An LSN-war, even without human extinction but with severe
enough losses, would undoubtedly frustrate the realisation of relevant state
ends.
So even from an expediency perspective, superstate policies are open to
severe criticism, for example as motivationally irrational.
As to the part of the state and (state) sovereignty in war, Schell leaves
us in no doubt. A sovereign state is virtually defined as one that enjoys the
right and power to go to war in defence or pursuit of its interests (p.187).
War arises from how things are; from the arrangement of political affairs via
jealous nation states (p.188).
Indeed there is a two-way linkage between having
sovereignty and capacity to wage war. On the one side, sovereignty is, Schell
contends, necessary for people to organise for war. On the other side, without
war it is impossible to preserve sovereignty. Neither of these contentions is
transparently clear as they stand. The first is damaged by civil war and the
like, the second by the persistence of small nonmilitary states. Now that the
macro-state system is entrenched, it is however easy for conservatives (in
particular)
to argue from the "realities" of international life, which include
self-interest, aggression, fear, hatred.
It is on this basis that peace
arrangements are readily dismissed as unrealistic, utopian, even (amusingly) as
extremist (cf. p.185).
Schell's further theme that nuclear "war" is not war threatens, however, to
undermine his case against the sovereign state;
for example, his ends-means
argument and the argument based on its nuclear war-making capacity. Fortunately
the not-war theme needs much qualification, and starts out from an erroneous
characterisation of war as 'a violent means employed by a nation to achieve an
end'
(p.189):
but this is neither necessary nor sufficient for war. What is
right (so it is argued in §1) is that nuclear wars are very different from
earlier conventional wars.
Schell goes on to claim that war requires an end
which nuclear "war" does not have. But nuclear attacks can certainly have ends
(even if LSN wars cannot be won in the older sense: but not all wars or games
are won).
It is also claimed that war depends on weakness;
on one side being
defeated on a decision by arms. But in nuclear "war" this doesn't happen, 'no
one's strength fails until both sides have been annihilated' (p.190). But what
these sorts of considerations contribute to showing is again not that nuclear
wars are not wars, but that they are not wars of certain sorts, e.g., not just
wars (because they fail on such criteria as reasonable prospect of success and
improvement), not rational wars (in a good sense), and so on. That conventional
wars have persisted into nuclear times does damage to Schell's argument that
nuclear weapons have also ruined "conventional" wars, and his connected theme
that the demise of war has left no means to finally settle disputes between
nations, for the final court of appeal has been removed (pp.192-193). The theme
depends on the mistaken proposition concerning the demise of conventional war
and the mistaken proposition that war of some sort has to be the final "court of
appeal" between nations (for, as observed, there are other types of contests
that could serve, and there is also the possibility of more cooperative
behaviour,
e.g. joint referenda). The theme also imports the social-Darwinian
assumption of Clausewicz (the "logic of war" theme criticised in §2) that war
has to proceed to the technological limit - as if war and violence were
thoroughly natural activities independent of recognised social settings (for
winning,
surrender,
etc.) and rule-less activities. On the contrary, wars are
parasitic on social organisations such as states and are governed by a range of
understandings, conventions and rules.
They are a social phenomenon, with a
rule structure, if not a logic.

Much capital has been made not merely from "the logic of war" but from what
is now called "the logic of deterrence" and the "logic of nuclear [strategic]
planning". The message that is usually supposed to emerge is that the massive
nuclear arrangements the world is now entangled in are perfectly logical, sound,

15.

This reformulation was proposed by N. Griffin, who suggested that the main
qualification can be inferred from Schell's context.

72

reasonable,
rational.
However this represents little more than a cheap
semantical trick.
Logic in no way justifies the present arrangements, or
anything like them, or renders them reasonable. There is a logic of decision
(as presented, e.g.,
in Jeffrey) which can be applied in strategic planning;
but it does not yield specific results without desirability measures being
assigned to alternative outcomes,
that is without values being pumped in,
extralogically.
There are various ways these value assignments may
be
determined,
to meet moral requirements or not;
but in nuclear strategic
planning they have invariably been settled on the basis of expediency.In
fact,
'logic of'
tends to be used very generously,
as a word of general
commendation, to cover something like 'rational considerations entering into the
policy or strategy of'.
In these terms, Schell, who like others enjoys playing
with the term 'logic of', should write of 'the illogic of deterrence',
for he
emphasizes (p.213) the disparity between the supposed rationality of threatening
use of nuclear weapons and the irrationality (even from a national interest
viewpoint)
of actually using them should the threat fail: 7 yet the success of
deterrence doctrine depends on the credibility of the threat
of
this
unjustifiable and irrational use.
Indeed Schell wants to go still further and
locate a contradiction in deterrence (e.g.
pp.201-2): but the argument depends
on an interesting confusion of contradiction with cancellation,18 along with the
assumption that deterrence involves cancellation. Nuclear deterrence may well
be irrational, it is immoral, but it is not inconsistent.

16.

Selecting the usual game theory setting sees to this almost automatically;
for it is then assumed that each player plays to maximize his or her own
advantage. Thus too the presumption in Walzer, p.277, that 'the logic of
deterrence' is based on eye—for—eye and tooth—for—tooth assumptions.

17.

Even the irrationality of the use has been contested, e.g.
it
wishfully
thought that America will rise like a phoenix
radioactive ashes.

has been
from the

There is moreover a simple solution to Schell's problem of the missing
motive for retaliating to a first strike (p.204), namely, not a retributive
one, but an ideological one:
eliminate the prospect of the future
dominance of the rival ideology.

18.

An analogous confusion of negation with cancellation or obliteration
appears in recent US "star war" thinking, where US missiles are supposed to
"negate" incoming USSR missiles.
Moral paradoxes of deterrence take a different direction;
although
involving negation they depend upon perhaps questionable interconnexions of
intensional functors. One type of paradox (considered in §5) derives from
a policy of credibly threatening LSN war without however intending to
proceed to LSN war, though credible threats [appear to] imply an intention
to proceed.
Another style derives from acclaimed intention to reduce the
number of nuclear missiles when the persistent practice, which implies an
intention,
is to increase the number. This paradox is technically removed
- how satisfactorily i& another matter - by a distinction between
longer-term aims and immediate practice, a time-honoured method of removing
contradictions by conveniently discerned temporal distinctions.

73

APPENDIX 2. On the Matter of Collective and Individual Responsibility
and on Regional Strategies

What one does depends, naturally, on where one lives and what means one
has, as well as on what one should do and what sort of person one seeks to be.
So too what strategy a state should adopt depends on where it is located and
what sort of power it is, on national as well as on moral considerations.
In
present circumstances states have an evident responsibility to work out their
policies.
There are however some persuasive arguments that this is where all
responsibility ends:
these major responsibilities accrue entirely to states,
and there is no individual, or (smaller scale) collective, responsibility to
work out a policy or stance on such matters as nuclear arrangements and still
less to act, perhaps against a state, on the basis of such a stance. While such
a no-responsibility or opt-out position no doubt suits many people - many for
themselves,
some (especially more authoritarian power-holders) on behalf of
others - it does involve inadmissibly opting out of moral responsibilities,
responsibilities acquired by virtue of being a person within the framework of
certain social arrangements.

Now there is no doubt that individuals and groups can do this, can opt out.
They can neglect their moral responsibilities;
but they are not justified in
doing so. Against this claim, which is based ultimately upon each person's
being set in a web of responsibility-inducing social relations, whether they
like it or not so long as they choose to live with others, there are some neat
arguments which appear to permit, or even warrant, opting out. One influential
argument takes the following lines:
1.
The (ordinary) individual,
or group, has no possibility of making a
difference to what happens. Therefore
2.
Such individuals,
or groups, have no obligation to try to make a
difference. Hence
3.
Such individuals, or groups, are not morally responsible, for instance when
things go wrong.
There are two main assumptions in this argument, both of which should be
resisted:
firstly, in getting from 1 to 2, a variant of the "ought implies can"
themel, and secondly, the assumption that individuals can't make a difference.
While it is true that individuals cannot accomplish much on their own, together
they can. What an individual can achieve depends on what sufficiently many
other individuals do.
In highly competitive communities,
full of hopeful
free-riders, a person may encounter a familiar impasse:
that he or she acts in
manner
M
(e.g.
morally,
against nuclear arrangements, rationally), at
considerable personal cost, with no guarantee that others will also act M-ly.
Such an impasse no longer faces so many in the West, at least as regards initial
steps against nuclear arrangements. The individual can cooperate with others in
ways that do make a difference.
An individual is not exonerated from
responsibility by the argument.
While individuals can respond by joining organisations whose activities are
directed at making some difference, many individuals also have the option of
more individualistic action in such forms as boycotts, go slows,
political
disobedience.
An important form of individual resistance, already adopted in
Canada and north-western USA, is refusal to pay income taxes directed towards
defence
or various parts thereof (e.g.
nuclear weapons production and
deployment), or alternatively redirection of such taxes, for instance to peace
funds.
Evidently,
however,
all these more individualistic forms of political
activity work more effectively if individuals integrate their activities,
since
the impacts aggregate (and appear after a certain stage to exponentiate). As
well collective action helps in distributing the impact of retribution or
punitive action by state authorities.

1.

Any satisfactory deontic theory which takes moral dilemmas with due
seriousness is bound
to reject this theme.
There are also independent
grounds for jettisoning this Kantian theme:
see Routley and Plumwood.

74

There are, furthermore, arguments of some weight that individuals are under
some sort of moral obligation to take political action to disaffiliate
themselves from what contributes to the prospects of nuclear war. What type of
action this is depends on the sort of state one resides in, for instance,
whether it is a nuclear power, whether it provides nuclear bases or facilities,
etc.,
and on such complicating issues as what kind of preventive action the
state is likely to take in return.
(Any state seriously practising deterrence
is bound to take some action against effective protest,
or risk losing
credibility;
but there are limits to the amount of state coercion any one
individual need bear.)

One argument - it is one of a type that can be varied from making nuclear
weapons to,
for example,
providing facilities for them - proceeds from the
wrongness of nuclear war to the position that it is not right to be making the
weapons for such war.
The argument here applies connecting principles (like
those of §5), while appealing to such background information as that the
manufacture and deployment of such weapons increases the risk of such war. But
if it is not morally right to be making such weapons then those who live in a
state that is doing so ought to disaffiliate themselves from such defence
production, and disaffiliation includes not paying for such production through
defence taxes .
The argument is not without substantive assumption, but the
assumptions appear morally reasonable and defensible.
Another
effective
argument proceeds from the question of the type of moral person one wants to be:
Does one want to be, or effectively to be seen as, the kind of person who goes
along with the nuclear destruction of human populations?
Or with making
credible a threat to do so, or the like?
What follows applies primarily to
people who do not want to be, or be seen as, such people.
Arguments like these not only put opt-outers and do-nothingers on the spot
insofar as
they contribute to national objectives;
they also raise questions,
perhaps even dilemmas, as to political obligation for those who would take
action,
even limited action such as redirection of taxes 3. For are there not
political obligations to the state, such as paying due taxes and supporting the
national defence effort?
It is usually assumed that there are. However, no
dilemma occurs under a theory which, properly, takes political obligations to be
regulated in some fashion by moral obligations;
for in this case moral
obligations override political obligations.
In fact political obligations are
already significantly limited by moral constraints. The nuclear situation does
not so much bring out new limits on political obligation,
as emphasize the
respects in which those obligations are already limited, and introduce further
moral considerations against sponsorship of national defence arrangements.

An obligation to try ** to dissociate oneself from

preparation

for

nuclear

war or from nuclear-deterrence,
for instance by not spending part of one's
working life contributing indirectly to it, does not commit one to more than
this:
to an obligation, for example,
to work for an alternative national
defence policy which avoids nuclear elements. But no doubt this would be a good
thing to try to contribute towards. Once again, what one attempts depends on
where one lives, the level of one's commitments, e.g.
to nonviolence, and so
forth. For not only are different types of policy reorientation appropriate for
different nations and regions, but there are more superficial and deeper
reorientations that can be worked out and promoted, e.g.
schemes that leave

2.

An argument of this type was deployed by Bishop Hunthaussen of
support of his refusal to pay defense taxes.

3.

This dilemma and option is now removed in practice for most wage earners by
Pay As You Earn taxation schemes - schemes apparently introduced to give
the state interest on gross earnings,
but obviously very effective in
removing taxation power from most workers, and so in further transferring
power from individuals to the state.

4.

Given the power of institutions and the state one may be able to do little
more than try, without giving up one's work and thereby one's ability to
contribute to other deserving causes. For example,
it may be virtually
impossible for one to avoid contributing to a superannuation fund which is
investing in projects which one opposes or ought to oppose, or both.

Seattle

in

75

"conventional" warfare apparatus more or less intact,
schemes that change that.

and

deeper

(ecological)

The US Bishops, for example, present a rather shallow set of goals for a
superpower such as the USA, which includes such objectives as preventing the
development and deployment of destabilizing nuclear weapons systems and working
for better control of already operational systems (see PL, p.317). The nuclear
situation affords an important opportunity to press however for a much deeper
set of changes in the superstates.
For those whose very limited political
influence is exerted in considerably less powerful states, even the shallow
goals may look quite different:
there are no nuclear weapons (except perhaps
those of another power stationed on local territory) to redeploy or to better
control.
The view from the very minor powers in the Antipodes is furthermore
different from that of the medium powers in Europe. There is some prospect in
much of the Antipodes of avoiding the more immediate effects of an LSN war,
while there is little such prospect in Europe (cf. Preddey and others).
There
is accordingly some obligation — an obligation little considered and not grasped
by the power holders - on those in the Antipodes to make some effort to preserve
there in the South elements of what is valuable in world civilization. Local
and regional self-interest would also suggest substantial steps
towards
self-preservation that (foolishly) have not been initiated.
What is broadly required in the Antipodes is not difficult to discern once
Steps include withdrawal from the American alliance,
the goals are glimpsed.
which is in any case of questionable merit since its main advantages lie with
the US and it affords no guarantee of local defence;$ closure of American bases

and withdrawal of American access rights for nuclear—carrying equipment to
ports, air bases and other facilities, especially so as to remove local nuclear
targets; pursuit of a more evenhanded policy of nonalignment (something quite
small powers elsewhere have managed to achieve).
That much is easy, in
principle;
and justified.
It is justified because local commitment to the
American military operations in the region lacks a solid foundation;
it is
premissed primarily on the acceptance of deterrence, which,
so it has been
argued (in §5ff.),
lacks justification. That Australian commitment to joint
Australian—US facilities and to US military operations in the region is
explicitly based on acceptance of deterrence emerges from several recent
statements of government policy. The joint facilities are 'part of a system of
deterrence'. &

More difficult to ensure, at least without much preparation, is that
economic and cultural collapse does not follow an LSN war in the North.
Secondly, then, the building of increased socio-economic independence in the
Antipodes is required. It is not enough to make the region a nuclear-free zone
not worth targeting militarily:
the region must also have a sustainable life of
its own. For a small region, that looks a very costly exercise unless combined
with other desirable objectives;
for example,
in Preddey and others it is
estimated that a substantial portion of GDP would have to be diverted to build
up New Zealand's economic independence.? For a larger region which included
Australia,
the costs would be less. They would compare favourably with many
Northern military budgets, and have the advantage that much of the expenditure
is genuinely productive.
If furthermore - what seems unlikely - the structural
readjustment were combined with the independently desirable aims of moving the

5.

See the discussion in Ball, chapter 13, especially pp.140-1.
How slight
the commitments are, under the ANZUS treaty in particular, has been
emphasized again in recent defence discussions between Australia and the
USA.
Of course,
the ANZUS Treaty is only one, and a comparatively minor
one, of the many military treaties that should be terminated:
from a
European and world viewpoint the winding down of NATO and the Warsaw Pact
arrangements, and the removal of American and Russian forces from Europe
(and elsewhere), are very much more important.
A fuller discussion of Australia's defence philosophy
will appear in a subsequent publication in this series.

and

alternatives,

76

whole region towards a multi-cultural conserver society and perhaps even
diverting "defence" spending to connected self—management and social defence
goals, the costs would be very considerably lessened. They only appear so great
in the setting of a consumer-satellite society.
In any case, where life and
culture themselves are concerned, the costs do not appear excessive.

In sum, Southern countries should be severing their military linkages with
Northern
nuclear
powers^,
and
should be preparing now,
socially and
economically, for the time after the LSN war, the great Northern war.
However
there are serious blockages in the way of such things in the Antipodes, and
indeed impeding any substantial attempts to lessen the impact of LSN war.
Some
of the blockages derive again from the fact that present nuclear arrangements
favour many of the power holders and suit strong corporate interests which wield
political power.
But the main blockages to more popular action are sloganised
in the false dichotomy:
"either it won't happen or we're all dead anyway;
so
why bother".
One reason for blockage is then the extinction assumption (SI of
Appendix 1), the unwarranted adoption of which is excessively nihilistic.
A
more important reason is that most people, and most of their political
representatives, do not believe that major repercussions of LSN war are going to
befall them.
These are events which, like starvation and torture, happen to
other (remote) people, not them.
It is not that LSN war is unthinkable:
rather it is that it seems
unbelievable that it should make any difference. Most people in the Antipodes
really do not believe that their lives are likely to be shattered by nuclear
war.
Waking up and mobilising these people is a major part of the problem in

6.

See the letter by R.G. Hawke, Prime Minister, replying to a symposium on
consequences of nuclear war, Canberra Times, Saturday July 23, 1983. The
point is also made by the Foreign Minister in his Evatt Memorial Lecture,
as Hawke notes.
The point is softened by representing the facilities as
also having a role in verification, as well as deterrence, 'that makes arms
control and reduction feasible':
the known role of the facilities in war
fighting is not alluded to, and nor is the fact that any verification role
can be alternatively accomplished using satellites. However the matter is
not in any doubt:
'successive Australian governments ...
have taken the
view that our primary concern should be to support the effectiveness of the
United States deterrent to war itself' (D.J. Killen, Minister for Defence;
quoted in Threats to Australia's Security, p.17).
Government representatives (e.g. Hawke) concede that the joint facilities
put Australia at nuclear risk.
'However it is the judgement of this
Government that the benefits to Australia in terms of its immediate
interest and global strategic consideration outweigh potential risks'. A
proper decision-theoretic analysis would not support Hawke's claim:
since
Australia is known to be a nuclear target because of American bases (cf.
Ball, pp.130-8),
the potential risks given that an LSN war has
a
non-negligible probability far outweigh any immediate benefits.
Since
Australia has only a regional strategic role,
the global strategic
considerations are, as could be otherwise inferred, primarily those of the
main user of the facilities, the USA. The Government is prepared to put
Australia,
its peoples and ecosystems, at what is decidedly serious risk
for immediate and American interests.
A
worthwhile
representative
government does not hold its peoples hostage for such reasons. Not only is
that short-sighted expediency decision making:
it seems virtually certain
that the details of the decision making, were they ever revealed, would not
justify the policy in the longer term even on the basis of expediency, but
would turn on such things as present trade advantages and short-term
commercial considerations.

7.

As to the economic and social problems Australia would face in the event of
an LSN war, see Coombs for a preliminary assessment.

8.

Ideally the removal of significant nuclear targets should take place across
the whole Southern Hemisphere, because this is the zone that is relatively
insulated, atmospherically, from the Northern Hemisphere.

77
achieving requisite social and political adjustment.
Even those who believe
that LSN war is not improbable (but may well not be totally destructive of life)
do little to reorganise their lives in a way that would reflect their
assessment.

Richard Routley*

9.

Again, for some of what to do,

for

some

ways

to

reorganise,

see

e.g.

Martin.
There is also much intellectual work to be undertaken, for
example, searching out details of alternative arrangements, and also
discrediting establishment experts, especially economists and political
scientists, who intellectually underwrite present nuclear arrangements.
*

The text has been much improved as a result of detailed comments by C.
Pigden, R.
Goodin, N.
Griffin, B. Martin and L. Mirlin, and through
correspondence with G.
Foley.
J.
Norman has helped in its final
organisation.
The initial outlines of the paper were worked out in
Victoria, Canada;
and an early version was read at Simon Fraser University
in 1982.

78

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18,

OTHER PUBLICATIONS OF THE PHILOSOPHY DEPARTMENT, RESEARCH SCHOOL
OF SOCIAL SCIENCES, AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY
School Publications
R. and V. Routley, The Fight
1974, Third edition 1975.

for

the Forests,

First edition

1973, Second

edition

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R. Routley, Exploring Meinong's Jungle and Beyond, 1980.
Yellow series (Research Papers of the Logic Group):

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

13.
14.

15.
16.

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1983.
R.K. Meyer, S. Giambrone and R. Brady, Where gamma fails.
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relevant affixing logics, and other Polish connections, 1983.

Green Series (Discussion papers in environmental philosophy)

1. R. Routley, Roles and limits of paradigms in environmental thought and
action, 1982.
2. R. Routley,
In defence of cannibalism I. Types
of admissible and

inadmissible cannibalism, 1982.
3. R. Routley and N. Griffin, Unravelling the meanings of life?, 1982.
4. R. Routley, Nihilisms, and nihilist logics, 1983.
5. R. Routley, War and peace I. On the ethics of large-scale nuclear war and
nuclear-deterrence and the political fall-out, 1984.
6. R. Routley and V. Plumwood, Moral dilemmas and the logic of deontic
notions.
7. R. Routley and V. Plumwood, An expensive repair-kit for utilitarianism.
8. N. Griffin, Lifeboat U.S.A., 1984.
9. R. Routley, War and peace II.
On the alleged inconsistency, moral
insensitivity and fanaticism of pacifism, 1983.

n

w

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[j

Citation

Richard Routley, “Box 149, Item 1: War and peace I - On the ethics of large-scale nuclear war and nuclear deterrence and the political fallout,” Antipodean Antinuclearism, accessed March 28, 2024, https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/show/155.

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