Box 20, Item 1: Draft of Moral matters matter - environmentally?

Box 20, Item 1: Draft of Moral matters matter - environmentally?

Typescript draft. Paper published, Sylvan R (1997) 'Do moral matters matter- environmentally?', Between the species, 3(4):163-176. https://doi.org/10.15368/bts.1987v3n4.2

Unnumbered paper from collection, item number assigned by library staff.

The University of Queensland's Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291, Box 20, Item 1

This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, Dr. N.A.J. Taylor.

For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library.

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MORRL fWERS WHER - EM-JIROtVEtfrOLLV?
Begond moraL extens ion isms.

Some

find

us

of

mereig

not

ourseives

at

with

odds

mainstream

environmentaL thinking - which remains shaLLow, heaviig exptoitative, and LikeLg

disastrous, not

ontg

for

mang other species but for mang humans as weLL - but

uneasg atso with main deeper environmentaL approaches, most of which now emanate
from North Rmerica. ELsewhere I have, to mg cost, taken issue with Deep Ecotogg,

a movement with European origins quickig captured Ln CaLifornia; but here I wLsh
to crLtLcLse forms of Norat Extensionism that now have a main base Ln Southern
USF)!, forms that etaborate moraL standtng, consLderabLLLtg, and rLghts theorLes.

the crLtLcLsm wLLL not be puretg negative; posLtLve atternatLve posLtLons

Rgain

wLLL beg Ln to emerge Ln earLg mornLng outLLne.
extensLonLsms extend moraL Ltg and convent Lona L chauvLnLstLc moraL

MoraL

apparatus

conventLonaL

Lts

begond

(but

certaLnLg

subjects and areas where Lt has not been appLLed,

certaLn

confLnes to

unwarranted)

or eLse, more LLkeLg,

has been used for dLscrLmLnatLon and other negatLve purposes. Theg sLmpLg extend

wag

the moraL apparatus wLthout much Ln the
assumptions

vatue,

(equaL

appLLed to a wider

cLass

equat
of

rLghts,

of

adjustment,

consLderatLons, etc.) sLmpLg

equaL

a

(Rs

subjects.

moraL

egaLLtarLan

wLth

tgpe,

generaL

moraL

ex tens Lon isms have been described and criticised Ln some detaiL Ln EE, p.lSSff.,
under

and

the

tgpicaL and usefuL weapon
movements

of

Liberation

with

proceed

couLd

Ln Rodman.) MoraL ex tens LonLsm is a

MoraLisms

Nature

LabLe

more

rLghts

and

accurate

movements
Less

but

equipment). Seen from a conservative opposition, moraL
to

moraLitg

bend

to

iLLegitimate

certain

interests,

etc),
are

equaLitg,

standing,

but in ang case evergthing is sufficientLg in order, at Least

on the boundaries, as it

ex tens Lon isms

endeavour

not onLg do the

since

(rights,

such

impressive

pubLLcLg

extensLonLsms

purposes,

extensions make nonsense of the notions invoLved

(though

is!

from

Seen

a

wider

perspective,

environmentaL

not aLwags unjustified in where theg go, but Ln how theg go,

in the pseudo-egaLitarian facades of the extensions, and more important in where
theg stop. For though priviLege is widened and so diiuted,

it remains. The zones

of extension remain too Limited, and things outside the usuai
as

forests,

species,

ecosgstems,

continue

mistreatment, expioitation and so on (see EE,
things

be

to

p.llf.1).

Nor

can

such

substantiaL

to

open

the

sorts

of

invoLved pLausibLg be brought within the extension foLd (though isoLated

efforts are not Lacking); for theg appear to Lack requisite
which

extensions,

extensions

operate,

such

as

sentience,

LndividuaLitg, or whatever. For exampLe,

the

verg

characteristics

pain-receptivitg,

idea

of

an

on

interests,

environmentaL

ethic, which serves to protect uninhabited environments and to Justifg requisite
respect

for

naturat

sgstems

and

communities,

founders

on the moraL rights

position propounded bg Regan in defence of certain animats (RR p.35^ff).

Mang

a

Ls

MoraLLtg

weapon,

purpose

depLoged bg pressure and

often

interest groups. Throughout Modern hLstorg Lt has tgpLcaLLg been used to
and

justLfg

wLde

a

actLvLtg

of

range

and

hostLLe

practices

ground

naturaL

to

envLronnents. HuMans are entLtLed to thLs or that, whLch interfere; thetr

needs

generate these or those requLreMents, whLch ought to be Met

there

though

even

are costs to LocaL envLronnents, and so forth. Those opposed to MoraLLtg - there

Ls a Long and dLstLnguLshed phLLosophLcaL chaLn froM Lao-tsu
and PLgden - have a poLnt

MoraLLtLes

Lt

when

MoraL-poLnts-of-vLew

and

to

coMes

The

MoraLLtg.

such

HLnckfuss

through

daMage

of

seeM substanttaLLg hLgher than the

often

benefLts conferred. For the restrLctLons theg LMpose are heavg, and

work

often

the wrong wags. R sort of cost/benefLt assessMent of MoraLLtg thus gets under
wag2, supposedLg gLetdLng negatLve resutts.

Mang are the arguMents for MoraLLtg, begLnntng wLth the cLaLM that Lt Ls

oneseLf and one s LLfe wLthout LapsLng Lnto Morat taLk,

conduct

to

LMpossLbLe

concepts, practLces and, generaLLsLng, back Lnto MoraLLtg. Part of the

response

to such fauttg arguMents Ls atwags that there are dLstLnctLons, LnsLsted upon bg
LeadLng MoraL theorLsts theMsetves, between vaLue Matters and MoraLLtg,

tougher

dLstLnctLon,

(practLcaL

hard

j^s

(whLch

axLoLogg

to

to

avoLd)

MaLntaLn,

between

there

Ls a further

deontLc

expressLons

Rnd

deontLes.

and

practLcat

between

expedLent oughts and shouLds for Lnstance) and MoraL ones. ULth

and

such dev Lees, antL-MoroLLsts, who do have a

soLLd

case

agaLnst

objectLve

or

absoLute MoraLLtLes, can escape MoraL hooks.

Hagbe
the

net

a

carefuL

practLtLoner can shun deontLc dLscourse, but wouLdn t

on the treatMent of envtronMents be worse rather than better?,

LMpact

soMe

of the grossest practLces? The quest Lons can

doesn t

MoraLLtg

coLLect

a range of answers, LncLudLng such uncharLtabLe ones as: Not so cLearLg

constraLn

that one wouLd notLce. The MaLn LMpact of MoraLLtg
affaLrs; and even here onLg the grossest

appear

to

be

turned

around

through

abuses,

of

an

Ls

Lnput

on

chauvLnLstLc,

as

such

froM

sLaverg,

huMan

MoraLLtg.

huMan

Even so the

persuavLve force and LnfLuence of MoraL consLderatLons, properLg redLrected, are
not thLngs to be LLghtLg abandoned. For rLghtLg dLrected theg

posLtLveLg

Ln

thLngs

contrLbute

couLd

that Matter socLaLLg and envLronMentaLLg. In partLcuLar,

MoraLLtg affords soMe needed protect Lon and, especLaLLg as rectLfLed, offers the
prospect of More, More protectLon,

Less dLscrLMLnatLon. But actuaL protectLon Ls

tgpLcaLLg provLded, where Lt Ls, through

verg

channeLLed

MoraL

ftowLng,

through
aLL

too

LegaL
often,

rather
to

the

than
wrong

dLfferent

LnstLtutLons;
wLth

fraMeworks,

part Les,

such

as

the

Lt

Ls

the benefLts

strong

and

estabLLshed.

HakLng MoraLLtg work the rLght wags, where Lt does ftgure serLousLg, Ls,
Moreover, uncoMfortabtg LLke MakLng weapons work for

peace

(MoraLLtg

beLng

a

MaLn force behLnd wars and preparatLon for wars), More LLke than Lt ought to be.

-2-

Nor is Lt nearLg as easg as Lt was: beating swords Lnto pioughshares, to provide

an assauit on the environMent instead of other

creatures,

subMarine to peaceful purposes (genuineLg peacefut ones,

or

a

prettg

easg

feat coMpared wLth converting an Fl-11 fighter-boMber or a Modern

technoLogicaL
LLke

was
that

course,

of

is;

Ln the Liest, theg re peacenakers). For Locat chauvLnLsn, Ln one fom

guns

another

or

(huMan,

Ls now deeptg

natLonat, state or race),

LLkeLg,

More

entrenched Ln Most bureaucratLc arrangeMents and an LntegaL part

supportLng

of

scLences and technoLogg. Even so, whatever Locat practLces, MoraL theorg

socLaL

can be rectified; the theorLsLng can be accoMpLLshed, even Lf a new MoraLLtg

not

and

appLLed,

successfuttg

Must

awaLt

Ls

Lts post-RrMeggedon dag. Thus the

protected battte to dutg expand MoraLLtg goes on.

There are two Ma Ln battLe—LLnes over whLch LdeoLogLcaL wars

antL-MoraLLsts)
equated)

nottons:

MoraL

status,

rLghts,

sag, even an outsLde surveg such as thLs

But the tern

can

scarceLg

escape

attogether

MoraL

def Ln Lt tons

Ls so stack (as dLet tonarg

reveaL)

that

tern (Ln LatLn ortgLn Just a substitute for the Greek expressLon for

to have becoMe Linked to features and behaviour of accountabLe
such

MoraL

group:

narrower

the

ang

Ls bound to be partLg LegLsLatLve. R Ma Ln Modern tendeneg Ls for the

use

ttght

of

as to what Makes soMethtng, a consLderatLon or perMLssLon, MoraL.

Lssue

coMMon

cLuster

consLderatLon, retevance,
a

on

foLLowLng

These LLnes wLLL be surveged Ln turn; needLess to

.

...

the

standing,

consLderabLLLtg,... The second LLne concentrates
perMissions,

to

are fought as regards MoraL extensLon Lssues, LLnes parportedLg

MarkLng MoraL outer bounds. The fLrst LLne concerns
(often

(guaLnt

ethicai )

(hunan)

actors,

as character, disposition, action, virtue. These are the areas where MoraL

attributes are at hoMe. Hence MoraL notions tend to occupg inner pLaces

Ln

the

Much Larger evaLuative circLe, and not to extend without sone forcing to naturaL
that are not accountabLe actors. PartLg for these reasons too, the terM

objects

MoraL , Much favoured Ln ex tens Lona List enterprises, tends

to

be

shunned

Ln

The

notion

of

deeper environMentaL theorg.

SiMoraL

RgaLnst MoraL standing and siMpiistic ethicaL tgpoLogies.

standing,

introduced

notion of LegaL standing, is coning to pLag

environMentaL
heavg,

but

ethics.

It

is

anaiogg

questionabte

bg

a

Major,

with the RngLo-RMerLcan
but

d3Maging,

danaging because, verg briefLg,

rote

it wouLd paint a

rather arbitrarg, bLack/white boundarg - segregating off those that

have not froM those
territorg.

that

have

MoraL

standing

-

across

Much

conpLex

More

Rs to its rote, it Ls soMetiMes ctaiMed that adoption and defence
criterion

in

of MoraL standing is

probieM soLving;

absoiuteLg basic

reasonabLg addressing

of

a

in environMentaL thinking and

the Lssue of MoraL

standLng

Must

be

vLewed as a benchMark of ang pLausLbLe "environMentaL ethic"' (PP, pl6). None of
thLs

Ls

so

evLdent,

especLaLLg

gLven

the

MurkLness of the not Lon of MoraL

standing. In the sane vein,

an

a necessarg condition ... for

Lt is stated that

ethicaL theorg is the Most [}] defensibLe criterion of moraL standing

adequate

Such statements are suretg overstatements.

For,

Ln

pLace,

fLrst

the

there can be, and Lndeed appear to be eth Les, which count as environmentaL ones,
which do not LncLude a not Lon of moraL

ecoLogLcat

Rodman s

deep

Naess s

(e.g.

ecotogg,

sensLbLLLtg). Secondtg, etaboratLons of these theorLes can

cLaLms to adequacg, wtthout introducing, and perhaps expLLcLttg

warranted

make

standing

rejecting (for the sorts of reasons gLven betow), a notLon of morat standing.

For these sorts of reasons, too, Regan's

moraL

of

notLon

attempt

(Ln

NP)

to

a

make

standing Lntegrat to the verg Ldea of an environmentaL ethic,

part of the conditions of adequacg for such as ethic, is far off course (as weii

as ahistoricai, a piece of

footnoted

Regan s

retrospective

account

of

Legisiation).

as

But,

it

happens,

standing, according to which a being has

moraL

morat standing if and onig if we moratig ought to consider how it is affected bg
a given action or poiieg, both enabies elimination of the notion

as a parasitic middieman) bg substitution using the

exposed

(thus

biconditionaL

invoLved

in

the conditions of adequacg, and aiso enabies straightforward satisfaction of the

conditions

tgpes of ethics that are hardLg environmental. Consider a forest

bg

sgstem about

be

to

buiidozed,

or

the

Moon

about

to

be

bg

tourized

an

Rmerican—based transnational Hang the development or progress ethics these dags

that

wiii

at Low

we ought to consider how the forest or the Moon wiLL be

that

affected, but then cLaim that we shouid proceed, though perhaps

in

a

modified

wag. Thus, in such contexts, the forest and the Moon have moraL standing. Rn so,
such

a

deveiopment ethics meets Regan s conditions for an environmentaL ethic;

for the forest and the Moon are nonhuman beings, and indeed nonconscious beings,

which have moraL standing. The resuLt is not what Regan intended; for he proceed
to suggest (p.21^,p.3O) that intrinsic vaLue is a necessarg condition
standLng,

something

his

footnoted

for

moraL

account does not guarantee. The LegaListic

notion of moraL standing is not so cLear and distinct after aLL.
Rn

initiaL tacticaL point against the notion of moraL standing concerns

its origin, on the modei of LegaL standing. LegaL standing is

for

ang

sufficientLg

comprehensive

notion

of

a

sometimes entering into moraL

consideration (which can be true of aLmost angthing). For one reason,
some decidedtg restrictive

assumptions,

concerning

interests

and

whatever has such standing. But mang things of vaLue, which enter

assessment

on

modeL

dubious

it imports

rights

into

ethicaL

occasions, do not have, and are not the sorts of things that can

significantig have, interests or hoLd rights. LegaL standing aLwags operates
terms

of

having

of

thing

in

certain sorts of interests, which can be represented, whereas

what has or deserves environmentaL standing mag not have interests,
sort

of

that

couLd

or

be

the

have interests, even as derived (as in the case of

LegaL persons, such as companies) from those of its members. More often

-4-

indeed,

Legat

have

to

standing

to have certain rights, duties, protectton, etc.,

is

begtnntng with the rtght of betng abLe to proceed to the courts.

room

Of course there ts constderabte

standtng

not ton

the

widen

to

Legat

of

tn RustraLia can even exctude environmentaL organtsattons) and

(which

"cLaimants

to admit, through representatton, other

to

the

PresentLg,

courts.

for sure, the modeL ts Much too narrow, restrtcttng access to certatn capitalist
cLaimants. But there are severe conceptuat dtfftcutttes tn the wag

and

persons

of broadentng the standtng not ton

objects,

agatn

because

to

encompass

Limitations

the

the

mang

requisite

environmentaL

nottons of tnterests and rtghts

impose. Organtsattons of persons, such as partnershtps, coattttons and so on, do
not exceed (easg stretchtng at Most of) these Limits, stnce tnterests and rtghts

accrue frow coMponent members: untnhabtted ecosgsteMs,
the

MonuMents,

and

bg a brazen, and tMptaustbte, overrtdtng of

Ontg

constderabtg.

do,

Like

naturat

these conceptuat ttMttattons (such as Stone ts prepared to fancg Rmerican courts

tndutgtng tn) can the in-buiLt severe tnternat restrtcttons of the

wodet

Legat

be overcome.
coutd

be

recogntsed,

account

of

the

Stttt the tnadequactes of Lts Legat 3natogg
anaLogg

behtnd,

Left

unimpeded

fresh

a

and

now

standtng

woraL

rather
propose

free-fLoattng not Lon offered. Van De Veer and Pterce are rash enough to

an expLLcatton of
Recordtng to them,

can be construed atong these LLnes.

whtch

For ang thtng X, X has woraL standtng Lff the continued extstence of X

fISl.

tnterests

Lts

theg sag

Ln

that

weLL-betng

have postttve moraL weight

stLpuLattng

theg re

the

but

this;

theg re

or

(PP. p.3). RctuaLLg,

not

free

simpig

to

given that Lt ts a notton wtth some currencg aLreadg, soMethtng theg

sttputate,

recogntze Ln proceeding at once to

consider various

to their

standard answers

basic question Llhich things have MoraL standing? . The account proposed is wore

in

LittLe curious, not to sag obscure and scarceLg graMMaticat. Later theg

a

than

effect

substitute

a

tortuous

Less

nameLg

account,

generaLLtg

(in

interpretation)

MS2. X has moraL standing iff the (continued) existence

positive moraL weight (see e.g. p^., plG:
pureLg

since

future

items

mag

have

ancestors). Either wag the account is
weight

and

having

moraL

continued
some

moraL

circutar,

or

shouLd however be
significance,

since

having

X

of

wetfare

has

deLeted,

as mag dead

positive

moraL

standing are interdependent notions (cf. Goodpaster.

p-311). In fact some of the probLems with the account coutd have been avoided bg

cutting out the troubLesome middLe part and moving on to the simpLer, expLLcitLg
circutar,

H33.
But

has

X

then

as

moraL standing Lff X possesses (or obtains) positive moraL weight.

a

expLication,

the definition might aimost as weLL drop out; Lt

expticates nothing, connecting some near sgnongms onLg.
Perhaps it is better to ask: Uhat work does the notion do?

-5-

The

troubie

Ls

except

that

theories, whLch LegLsLate as to what has moraL

partLcuLar

on

standing, the notion Ln fact does verg

because

hoMe

Ma Ln

whose

eth Les,

chauvLnLstLc

base

does

whLch

LLes

wLthLn

the

not

extend

or

traveL

unsatLsfactorg;

wLth

as

coMpetence,

or

m s Ln sorts of reason for theLr Lnadequacg are weLL

The

personhood).

are

(such

cLassLfLcatLons

bLoLogLcaL

socLopsgchoLogLcsL dLstLnctLons (such as LLnguLstLc capacLtg or

potentLaL

standLng

MoraL

Homo sap Lens or of the zooLogLcaL bLngdon) or wLth

spec Les

the

of

the wLder

to

onLg unstabLe and rather arbLtrarg, but tend to

not

ctassLfLcatLons

ethLcaL

MeMbershLp

are

theg

trad Lt LonaL

of

weLL

for

ethLcs,

It Ls one of those

confLnes

envLronMentaL settLng. RLL the MaLn crLterLa proposed

confuse

envLronmentaL

Ln

work

Ls LLttLe agreement about what determLnes Lt.

there

not Lons,

LLttLe

enough documented Ln PP (and Ln Much other earLLer LLterature, e.g. EE)

DespLte the enthusLasM shown for the not Lon of Morat standLng, then,

no

satLsfactorg crLterLon for Morat standLng eMerges, or Ls Ln ctear sLght, Ln PP -

or

Lt

eLsewhere

It remaLns to be denonstrated that there Ls a stabLe,

seens.

non-arbttrarg context-LnvarLant notLon of MoraL standLng worth pursuLng.

Rather

the notLon tends to force awkward choLces (e.g. those offered Ln PP on p.S.) The

for

reason

the

needs

what

cost-benefLt
LMperatLves

be

to

Looked

at

presuppose

a

Morat

Ln

appLLcatLons

assessments,

(whLch

thLs dLffLcuLt notLon, that does no present

Lt wouLd decLsLvetg

Ls evLdent enough:

usefuL work,

space,

about

enthusLasM

and

deLLMLt

of

the

categorLcaL

of

deLLMLtatLons

behLnd

proposed

some

notLon, for Lnstance use of the dLstLnctLon to reduce the
humanLstLc/chauvLnLstLc

foLd

(partLg

moraL ). MoraL standLng Ls not a MoraLLg

bg use of the term

achLeved

Ls

search

unLverse, usuaLLg of persons), and so

Morat

search space towards the confLnes of the

thLs

MoraL

confLLct Lssues, utLLLtarLan

forth. There are as weLL More sLnLster uLterLor purposes
appLLcatLons

the

neutraL notLon, but a fraMework and cuLturaLLg dependent one; hence some of

Lts

LLmLtatLons.
ConsLder

standLng

moraL

Lnstead

of

work, Lnstead of straLghtforward pragmatLcs, what

supposed to confer or remove? It Ls assumed that Lf X has moraL

standLng

(m-s) then moraL agents have presumptLve obLLgatLons, and dutLes to X,

e.g.

Let

to

Lt

theg

otherwLse

not

atone,
do

not

to

confLne

Lt

or underMLne Lts Lnterests; but

(cf-p.3-p.tt). Or, to put Lt the other wag around,

thLng has m-s Lt Ls entLtLed to conttnued exLstence, pursuLt of

whereas

Lf

Lacks m-s,

Lt

Lt does not have thLs protectLon,

3

Lnstead there Ls entLtLement to Lnterfere wLth Lt .

def Ln Lt Lon

of

moraL

standLng

...

Lf

somethLng

weLL-beLng Just does not LtseLf moraLLg count

Lts

Lf a

Lnterests,

Lt does not count,

....

Indeed, so Lt Ls
Lacks

(p.t+).

The

moraL

saLd,

standLng,

defLnLtLon

Bg

Lts

however

deLLvers no such resuLt; a further LmpLausLbLe assumptLons, (reductLon of weLght
to weLL-beLng, equaLLtg condLtLons for countLng) from an underLgLng
moraL

wLthout

pLcture

of

assessment are LmpLLcLtLg Lncorporated (a utLLLtarLan pLcture where Ltems
m-s

are

dLscounted,

and

trade-offs

contempLated, p.16).

-6-

of

Ltems

wLth

m-s

are

soon

Such

appLication

an

if

division;

accordingtg

LmpLies

an

unfortunate

aLL-or-nothing

item is tn tt gets (carefut) constderatton, otherwise Lt gets

nothing - exacttg what the Legat anatogg impLies: a proper heartng

Lf

be

and otherwise nothtng. Hhat this bLack-and-white division shoutd

standing

contrasted

with ts not removaL of att distinctions, but rather a wore sophisticated ethicat

such

tgpoLogg,

that of the annutar picture (of EE, p.107 and DC, p.2). The

as

tgpoiogg is based on a Listing of ethicaiLg re Levant

such as having vaiue, weLL-being,
appropriate
p.!2).^

the

character

aLL-or-nothing

from

at Least Modified becomes evident

of

various

(e.g. p.5) to keep it afLoat, e.g. duties

capacities,

so

and

and

forth;

to

moraL

standing

distinctions

soon

duties)

(direct

to

needs

be

introduced

as

opposed

to

(indirect, and perhaps derivative, duties). The wain strategg

regarding

duties

autonomg,

and

postuLates and princ ip Les are geared to these (cf. aLso PP

ethicaL

That

preferences,

features

adopted in PP to save the aLL-or-nothing context-independent

boundarg

consists

in appeaL to the speciaLLg-adjusted notion of presumptive duties. MoraL standing

is

assumed

to be necessarg and sufficient for presumptive duties: specificaLLg

PSI. floraL agents
iff

But

have a presumptive dutg to

X has moraL standing (this takes up the content of signposted item 1, p.t*.).

presumptive

are

duties

even

more

prone

to

be

bg

upset

circumstances than the oider prima facie duties (which the notion
the

notion

overriding

expands);

standing,

p.S),

the

forged

connections

things

than

without

much too simpLe, as wiLL

are

for

appear. FirstLg, a more comptex cLassification of things is required

purposes

so

operates even more as a theorg-saving device. But even as so hedged

around, and so extended (bg derivative duties, duties regarding
moraL

decentLg]

X [to treat it moraLLg

moraL

a hard division into moraL countabLes and others, a nonarbitrarg

cLassification such as that of the annutar picture. SecondLg, rights and duties,

which the notion of moraL standing is supposed to bound. Link rather with vaLue,
and extent of vaLue (see SM).

Much of the importance ascribed to moraL standing or moraL consideration
comes from confLating it with vaLue consideration, which is in turn equated with

having some (non-negLigibLe) vaLue, bearing
account,

and

counted,

perhaps

(if

sometimes

that

wouLd

be

taken

into

in ang compLete vaLue assessment. Though moraL

attributes are evidentLg a subcLass
commonpLace

vaLue

of

surprising,

vaLue
as

attributes,
e.g.

in

the

confiation

CaLLicott).

is

Possessing

intrinsic or inherent vaLue is even offered sometimes as an aLternative to moraL
status (cf. PP, p.16 fn 3); but more often the confusion is Less bLatant.

Indeed

PP begin bg warning us about sLipperiness (fn 3), soon stides itsetf from m-s to
intrinsic

vaLue

with their being
evident,

and

considerabLe,

(p.S)

and before Long has identified moraL standing of things

vaLuabte

prove

in

damaging.

Goodpaster

themseLves

Towards

Lapses

(p.I6).

Such

equations

are

not

the end of his essag, on being moraLLg
from

-7-

moraL

considerabiLitg

into

that

Hag that natters for ctains wade. For exanpte,

Ln

vatue-for-itsetf,

psgchotogicat or hedonLstLc capacities

sophLstLcated

unnecessaritg

seen

Lt Ls true

when Lt cones to Locating the ntnLnaL condLtLons for sonethLng s deserving to be

Lts

for

vatued

own

(p.320);

sake

Lt not so obvious that theg are too

but

sophLstLcated for the capture of norat consLderabLLLtg. R sLnLLar conftatLon

at

work Ln Goodpaster s

hgpothesis that that there Ls a nonaccLdentaL affLnLtg

between a person s or a socLetg s conceptLon of

and

vatue

ontg

—

consLderabLLLtg

to

appears

obtaLn

where

vatue Ls

unreduced

(LLLLcLtg) contracted to a range where norat considerations enter;

for

exanpte

tn Goodpaster's sotitarg LLLustration, the setting is hedonisn (when

as

where,

of

conceptLon

Lts

(p.3t*). The affLnLtg — nore than accLdentat for vatue and

noraL consLderabLLLtg
vatue

Ls

no doubt norat considerabititg Ls, so far as norat natters are attowed to enter,

characteristicattg bounded at botton bg sone sentience criterion).

The biocentric criterion for norat considerabititg that Goodpaster Leaps
to (p.313) has itsetf to be differenttg Looked at if

exchanged for vatue-in-itsetf. For Life is
point

even

norat

the

obvioustg

Less

stopping

vatue consideration. Rssune, for instance, that Wars or the Moon has

for

estate

no [significient] Life. Theg stitt have vatue; indeed theg nag have reat
vatue

verg chauvinistic vatue "neasure ) now that theg are beconing hunantg

(a

accessibte

nining, residentiat and other transfiguring purposes). Suppose

(for

further, what is not at att untiketg, that

sgstens

natch

that

Moon

the

has

fornations

sone

shoutd

be

the

that

thensetves,

into account in ang environnentat inpact assessnent of

taken

projects interfering with parts of the Moon. But

insist

or

naturat nonunents of the Rnerican arid Lands. It is a

the

defensible ctain, these dags, that the Moon nonunents have vatue in
which

is

considerabititg

Lt

woutd

be

LnptausLbte

to

Moon nonunents are norattg considerabte; for theg are not the

right sorts of things (as a natter of significance) to have noraL attributes.

It

is

just

not

the

feature of having intrinsic vatue that shoutd be

separated fron that of having norat status. Sone of the

circte have
suggests

different

sone

exanpte,

For

connotations.

notions

beLng

Ln

noraL

the

consLderabLe

norat dinension, sone weight to be taken into account,

suitabte

not neretg sone retevance. Consideration atso characteristicattg

requires

the iten in question has interests or at Least a

such

tetos),

an

that

agent

discussion-setting

can

phrase

be

deserves

norat

weLL-being

towards

considerate

notions are deptoged that wag (eg. p.31

does

norat

retevance,

R

different

get

nere

artifacts

are

norattg

etc.,

dependent,

quarrg

that

(a

Goodpaster s

Rnd nornattg the
notion

do

presunabtg

nornattg
woutd

not.

Nor,

not

it

erroneoustg,

reLevant on occasions (for sinitar reasons

norat significance differs fron standing). MoraL retevance renains

context

Like

that

another different notion sonetines

equated with norat standing (e.g. PLuhar p.^7), though
since

does

nornattg an organisn'; PP p.3

inpose these Linitations, e.g. those of awe, respect,
appear,

(as

or

consideration ).

certain organisns'; and in Goodpaster's Leap.)

woutd

norat

an

etusive,

has evaded contenporarg norat phitosophers of

-8-

high standing, despite Much effort put Lnto
other

chase.

the

however,

Since

these

are not goLng to be put to serLous work - Most of theM are, Like

notLons

MoraL standing, better MothbaLLed or

-

scrapped

we

qutetLg

can

bgpass

the

vaiue

the

nuances and differences.

CertaLnLg MoraL considerations and vaiue interconnect,

wider notion and Moraiitg,

if

wag

theg

inportant

in

which

not

at

derivative,

Least

with

R

dependent.

Most

connect is through LiMitat ions on interference.

MoraLitg preciudes the gross reduction of vaLue.

LittLe

R

More

preciseLg,

a

actor is not norMaLLg entitLed to interfere deLiberateLg in such a wag as

MoraL

to reduce signifLeantLg overaLL vaLue (or risk the various possibiLitg of such
reduction^). But exact forMuLation of such noninterference princ ip Les is a
sensitive Matter

MainLg

because

deontic

principLes

do

not excLude

soMe

vaLue, provided it is sufficientLg Linited - a Matter to which we

of

reduction

-

shaLL be obLiged to return.
Bg contrast with MoraL considerabiLitg,

and

standing

Like,

the

vaLue

notions are fundaMentaL, and not at aLL easiLg avoided, even bg anti-Moraiists,
in the regions of environMentat ethics.^ SoMe of the anaiogue notions are

however, e.g. a thing warrants vaLue consideration iff it has vaLue; it

triviaL

is of vaLue reLevance iff it has nonnegiigibte

vaLue

circuMstances);

the

(in

Even so the ana Logue notions heLp in shifting the issues and showing where
the reaL prob ten Lies with the group of MoraL notions, naneig in what Makes
soMething Morai.
It
this notion too that has induced the unwarranted
narrow ing of focus,
to chauvinistic concerns. For a coMMonp Lace answer,
certainig wrong,
to what deternines what is MoraL is: hunan concerns. Rather,
etc.

what

is

MoraL

has

to

do

with interest-independent vaLue and with a certain

iMpartiaLitg and Lack of discrininations (i.e. in More oLd-fashioned forMs, with
justice
and
goodness),
features
refLected
fornaLLg
in
suitabLe
universaLizabiiitg of principie.^
So conceived, MoraL Matters do not terMinate
at

narrower

certain

ethicaL

tgpes,

which excLude the wider environnent. The

width of concern wouLd be better revested bg repLacing

ethicaL*.

equivaLent

ethics

a

of

(For

coMparison,

rec Lass ification

as

consider

"environMentat

bg

MoraL

its

originaL

the effect in environMentat
MoraLs"

environMentat

or

Moratitg").

$2.

Rgainst environMentaLLg-restrictive rights packages.

EthicaL standing does

not striettg get or grant a thing rights. Standing gets an iteM
door

for

hearing.

a

hearing;

in

an

ethicaL

it Mag, or Mag not, be conceded or granted rights in the

Rights inpLg sone standing, but not vice versa; sone standing is even,

if gou Like, a proper part of a right. MhiLe such an equation is not Much excuse
for identifging standing and rights (short
assuMption

that

of

the

astonishing

but

prevaLent

aLL reLations are identities), stiLL too often the differences

are giossed over, having MoraL rights is

equated

with

having

MoraL

standing

The stoppage between the notions Goodpaster exptoits (p.3I8)

CaLLicott).

(e.g.

Ln converting conditions on having rights into conditions

(expioitation

consideration

free

not

exersibie rights is Much Less piausibie

for

Underneath

consideration).

MoraL

these equations and conventions Lie important assunptions;

triviaL

MoraL

deserving

since wh3t is piausibie for

costs,

of

for

just

not

the

More

that what has a status therebg has a right, for instance to get in

one

but

the ethicaL door,

consideration

are

assuMption

the

rendered

that

equivaLent

having

and

rights

standing

or

a coMMon Middie terM, such as

through

having interests, being capabLe of being represented, being abLe to benefit. For
exaMpte, an iteM has MoraL standing (or deserves MoraL consideration) iff it has

iff it has (or even have) rights.

(or can have) interests, i.e.

iMpiicit

appear

but

(with

Minor

Such

equations

quaLifications) in Goodpaster, and exp Lie it

etsewhere, for a wide notion if "interests" extending to aLL Living things;

but

Much More coMMontg theg appear (e.g. as in Freg) for a verg Much More restricted

of (huManoid) interest.

notion

If such fauLtg equations did hoLd, what has been

said against MoraL standing wouLd appLg to that extend aiso against rights.

But

theg do not, and rights require More independent investigation.

contrast

Bg

with

anti-Moratists, who wouLd reject (MoraL) rights taLk

and institutions aitogether, and with Mang

utiLitarians,

who

view

notion

of

considerabte suspicion at Least, it wiLL be argued, in
g
passing, that rights are aLrcght . The chief targets for criticisM wiLL be
(MoraL)

rights

with

certain

unduLg

narrow

theories

rights,

of

which wouLd have, if theg stood,

decidedLg unfavourabLe environMentat consequences. RLthough
for which he has iLLegitiMateig bagged the titie

view,

Regan's

particuLar

the rights view

(as if

an aniMat rights supporter had to adopt his sort of view), is verg far froM the

attention,

worst of these theories, it is worth singLing out for speciaL

it

has

score

heaviLg

been

proMoted

since

in environMentat ethics Literature and it does

exceedingig weLL, coMpared with its usuaL chauvinistic rivaLs,

in certain

areas of Major environMentat concern, such as the (Mis-)treatMent of aniMats.
R

theorg

of

rights

a

coMprises

representation (in the fashion of other

package,

which can be given fornaL

theories)

genetic

as

containing

the

foLLowing coMponents:
D. a definition of a right, and

P. further postuLates (perhaps independentLg argued for) deLiMiting rights.
Rs

MatheMaticaL

exaMpLes

(such

as those of vector space and categorg) reveaL

there is a good deat of stippage between D

ord inarg

usage

controts

and

P.

But

because

of

the

More

on phiLosophicaL theories, onLg so Much in the wag of

postuLates can be puMped into the definitions offered. The package aLso coMMontg
includes as weLL

0.

a

set

of canonicaL forMS into which aLL (nondiscarded) rights Locutions or

cases can be put, and perhaps aLso (with ground prepared through C)
R. a set

of

reduction

scheMes

for

eiiMinating

transLation, reduction ruLes, etc.

-10-

rights

Locutions,

e.g.

bg

The

of rLghts advocated bg Regan convenLentLg Lends

theory

partLcuLar

LtseLf to separatLon Lnto these components, as weLL as suggestLng

genetLc

such

breakdown. It begLns wLth a neat defLnLtLon of rLght drawn from HLLL,

accordLng

to whLch a rLght Ls, roughLg, a vaLLd (or suffLcLent) cLaLm whLch socLetg shouLd

It

guarantee.

Ls coup Led wLth a serLes of prLncLpLes or postubates, each gLven

some Lndependent support, of whLch the most basLc Ls the rLght of
and

treatment.

respectfuL

to

patLents

canonLcat

RLthough

expLLcLtLg addressed, one does emerge, whLch takes the form

to

[not]

, where

-

onLg rLghts-hotder on the theorg, but Lt

X[s]

of

The rLght

as

for

Lnstance

not

Ln

to

permtts

(the

pLuraLLsatLon

partLcuLar to some sort of utLLLtarLan anatgsLs, Ls strongLg resisted
the rLghts vLew

features

onto LndLvLduaLs). FLnaLLg reductLon of rLghts, Ln

back

dLstrLbutLng

context

not

are

The basLc form Ls sLnguLar, appLgLng to LndLvLduaLs, who are the

harm .

LncLuded

forms

Lntroduces an LnfLnLtLvaL ctause LndLcatLng a tgpe of

to

actLon or actLvLtg. The cLauses mag be negated,

unduLg

agents

moraL

has a LLttLe

more

thLs

LrreducLbLe

the

Ls

Lt

poLnt,

(Ln

rLghts vLew as opposed to a mot Leg arrag of reduct LonLstLc posLtLons, wLth 'the'
sLgnLfgLng a coLLectLve.)

be

UhLLe Regan s rLghts package wLLL

crLtLcLsed,

Ln

sLgnLfLeant

rejected, through Lts varLatLon a dLfferent rLghts theorg wLLL emerge.

respects

Some of the crucLaL prLncLpLes Regan arrLves at depend
theg

and

heavLLg

upon

-

though

do not foLLow from - defLnLtLon of rLght(s) he defends. Hnd severaL of the

unnecessarLLg restrLctLve features of the vLew do fLow from eLaboratLon of

thLs

defLnLtLon, Ln partLcuLar the LLmLtatLon of rLghts to certaLn LndLvLduaL thLngs,

to

anLmaLs. It Ls Lmportant then to begLn wLth, and hard to avoLd, the

certaLn

Lssue of defLnLtLon.
To ground the varLant defLnLtLon and theorg of rLghts to be reached
fLrmLg Ln usage, consLder fLrst the maLn reLevant sense^' of rLght (to) gLven bg

the Oxford EngLLsh DLctLonarg, vLz.

11.7 JustLfLabLe cLaLms, on LegaL or

grounds, to have or obtaLn some thLng, or to act Ln a certaLn wag.

of

gLven

rLghts

sLmLLar core:
hLm

the

Ln

bg

MLLL

(whLch

of

...

account

Regan cLaLms to endorse, p.369.) contaLns a

a person s rLght ....[Ls] a vaLLd cLaLm upon socLetg
possessLon

The

moraL

somethLng

socLetg

to

protect

ought to defend...', MLLL

provtdes, however, an Lmportant Lnsurance or cover cLause, as to who Ls supposed
to cover the cLaLm, whLch the OED account does

whLch

Regan

after a brLef dLscussLon aLso correctLg omLts (begLnnLng p.270). That Ls,

rLght

not

LncLude,

and

quLckLg contracts to the Less than adequate vaLLd cLaLm; but the force of MLLL s

Lnsurance

cover

Ls

supposed

to foLLow, prLmarLLg Ln vLrtue of what Ls pushed

Lnto the Ldea of a cLaLm. Rs Lt turns out,

Regan, now
features

of

rLghts

LmLtatLng

FeLnberg s

Lt does foLLow, but not Ln that wag.

trLcks,

trLes

to

puLL

substantLve

out of the notLon of a cLaLm. But the notLon does not bear

the weLght theg trg to Lmpose upon Lt; a stronger rope Ls needed for

-11-

such

acts

than ciaim can suppig. The cruciai act, which tries to read anticipated features
of the notion of riqht into that of ciaim, faiis at the outset:

is entitied to treatment of a certain kind

is to assert that someone...

...

To wake a ciaim
and

that the treatment is due or owed directig to the individuai ... in question. To

a

make

individuais,

ciaim thus, invoives both ciaims-to and ciaims-against...

(p.271). Such an anaigsis of making a

ciaim

imports

much

the

that

ordinarg

notion does not support, nameig, in the first piace, that it invoives or asserts

entitiement, entitiement to treatment of a certain sort, secondig, that it is a
transaction between individuais^,
thirdig, that the imputed treatment is owed
it is a ciaim-against given individuais. But in making

directig to the ciaimant,

such ciaims as that one has visited Mount Rthos, has seen the iark ascend,

at

tea

one

sunset,

doing ang of those things in ang straightforward

not

is

sense. There is nothing significant due or owed,
directed at

other

took

individuais

in

the

the

demanding

assertions

wag,

or

at

need

not

be

aii;

and

no

entitiement to speciai treatment is asked for. Ciaim is a transitive verb, so it
as

requires

weii

as subjects, ciaimants, objects, ciaims, propositionai items

tgpicaiig introduced bg

or 'to . Someone who makes a

that

ciaims

ciaim

that

something or to (have or have done) something. But that is aii. Onig some ciaims

are directed against others, onig some ciaims are entitiements.

Rnd

if

is

it

ciaims that are entitiements that are to be distinguished, it wouid be better to
start with entitiements (cf McCioskeg).

Just such a fresh start wiii be made, in the first stage of modification
of

the

definitions

OED

integration

and

it with Miii's definition. Upon

of

separating off iegai rights (which Regan correctig distinguishes in prettg

much

the standard wag, p.267), the foiiowing then resuits:
M2.

Vaiid

entitiement, on morai grounds, to something (of a correct categorg).

The changes (from 11.7) deserve some justification. Firstig,

or

have

obtain

or

something,

characteristic fiii to

to

in

act

a

certain

"justifiabie

justifiabie

to

(to) something , iogicaiig adds iittie content. For each

something

entaiis

and
mag

to

be

entitiement
ciaims

sufficient,

ent ireig

warrant

vaiid.

from

Thirdig,

and

ang case entitiing ones, and that

in

are

i.e.

dubious ciaims-against preconceptions,
without

be

regarded

appears

most

need

not

ciaim

restrict

to
on

but

aiso

the

ciaim

because

make

or

the
sheds

unduig

and

expected ciass of rights havers or
haver

of

a

it, but it is hard to escape the assumption that if

something has a ciaim then it shouid be the sort of thing

potentiaiig?)

important

entitiement

hoiders, what can have or ho id rights, to ciaimants. Of course the

right

as

grounds

morai

ciaim , not mereig for the reasons given, that

improves upon

invoived

an

sort of justification, which as it turns out is not fuiig

some

adequate, can be given, whereas for a right the derivation

has

converseig

an entitiement to have something. Secondig,

is not strong enough; a ciaimed entitiement
if

(To)

phrase

wag , which gives the

of the sorts of entitiement is an entitiement to something,
entitiement

the

stake

that

ciaims. Thus use of the term

-12-

can

ciaim

(at

ieast

makes it an

even tougher uphiLL struggLe to work the powerfut rights medicine on

behatf

of

wttd animats and wiLde messes. Of course too, what cLaims are wade coutd be wade

through

indirectLg,

representatives;

the tern

but

representatives" suggests

verg easiig that rights havers have interests to be represented. Opportunitg

wake

the

to

interests" shouid not be afforded

rights" to

dubious inference from

bg the basic definition; and "entitLement" gives appropriate distance.

R Lot hangs on choice of basic

(as

then

terms

other

in

chaiienging

phiiosophicai areas, such as the fundamentsLs of reasoning), even if it seems to

right'

newcomers, as it does to dictionaries, that

entitLement

cLaim'

and

are more or Less interchangeabLe (each is characterised in standard dictionaries

partLg in terms of the others)
tautoLogous.

and

expticative

satisfactorg

UeLL,

Like

definitions

that

M2

definitions

virtuaLLg

are

are

but

anaLgtic,

preferabLg not trivaLLg circuiar, eLse informativeness is sacrificed. R weakness

of the entitLement account (hard to credit after Regan's attack upon it) is that

it risks the Latter. Mhat is needed in pLace of
entitLement,

putative

entitLement'

expression,

right , i.e. it

a

since

doesn t

a

becomes an entitLement, or right, when vaLiditg is

that

appropriateLg estabLished, and so on. From this angLe,

better

something,

is

write

in

To

vaLiditg.

avoid

a

is

sLightLg

a reaL or supposed

to

amounts

sometimes

cLaim

cLaim'

these

probLems

with

avaiiabie terminoiogg, there is a case for coining a rather immediate expression
basic definition

something,
R

vaLid

in that something (after

fiLL

to

into

in M2) and avoid disappearance of the

VaLid

something,

on

to something , which couLd embrace Lots of items other than rights).

term

suitabie

entitLement,

titiement ;

is

which

a

or

a

is

titiement

aLLeged

or

putative

mag or mag not be correctLg vaLidated, en-ed (cf. titLe *6.

That which justifies or substantiates a cLaim; a
aLLeged

(e.g.

vacuitg

quant ificationaL

recognised

right',

Const,

with

cLaimed .) R titiement is a transformation

ground

inf.

of

a

or

right;

of

to,

suitabie

hence,

an

of the thing

in,
deontic

principLe,

cat Led a susta in ing principLe. For instance, the form It is mostig permissibie
[for X] to R , where suitabie, gieLds the titiement form There is a titiement
[for

X]

R .

Requirements

for

what conditions objects (Rs) and

suitabiLitg,

subjects (Xs) shouLd satisfg, are investigated in what foLLows.
Before trging for a mark-3 definition of right (to),
MiLL,

as

interpreted bg Regan (pp.270-1). MiLL

titiements are to be vaLidated:

depend

on

compLiance

its

independentLg

estabLished'

the vaLiditg of

with

(p.270),

derivation from these correct moraL

stack, the vaguer

a

right (to)

moraL

principLes

us

return

a

right,
whose

correct
that

he

beiieves,

takes

up,

must

have been

vaLiditg

principLes.

to

as to how

provides...guidance

princ ip Les

i.e.

Let

It

is

the

removing

the

"moraL grounds" (cf. M2 and 11.7). Then in the mark-3 version,

is a

M3. VaLid titiement,

from

correct

moraL

principLes,

appropriate) item. The LogicaL form is aLmost immediate:

-13-

to

some

(categoriaLLg

H3S.

premLsses

correct worst prtncLpLes

SustaLnLng prtnctpLe as
to R

vaLLd dertvatton
cone Lus con

There Ls a tttLement to
R

RssumLng evergthtng Ls Ln order Ln the scheme H3S, the inference to a rLght-to R
Ls

then

LmmedLate,

bg

f13. The whoLe pattern Ls at once duLg reLatLvLsabLe to

suLtabLe havers. Thus X has a rLght to R Lff

X

has

a

tttLement,

vaLLd

Trow

correct woraL prtncLpLes, to R, somethtng that a suLtabLe reLatLvLsed derLvatLon

wag

estabLLsh.

candLdates

The

fLLL

to

R provLde a famLLLar LLst, e.g.

out

freedom from unnecessarg sufferLng, respectfuL treatment, satLsfg

sound

LLfe,

needs,

support, rewarding work, a fatr go, etc.. Bg no means aLL of these

candLdates can be vaLLdated, wLthout at Least
severaL

basLc

restrLct

the

quaLLftcatLon,

consLderabLe

and

categorg of subjects, L.e. the LogLcaL sort of Ltem that

can have the purported tttLement.

Such a scheme, as f13S

not

(whLLe

entLretg

wLthout

adequate

eLaborated notLon of tLtLement) both enabLes further features of
and revests much about rtghts.

derLved

important addttLon to the deftnLtLon of

ought

to

protect

can

hoLders,

be

regards

as

correct

moraL

rLght , of a requLrement

and

therefore

rLghts, to Lnsure protectLon,
dLffuse

correLatLve

dutLes

3pptg

prtncLpLes,
to

Ls

no

doubt

Ls thus a consequentLaL

over

vaLLd

characterLstLc poLnt of

R

tLtLements.

as socLetLes

Lt

transmLt

uphoLd,

feature.

SLmLLarLg

such

obLLgatLons to uphoLd rLghts are not
feature

from

thetr

character. In parttcuLar, the FeLnberg-Regan cLaLm-agaLnst component

of thetr proposed anaLgsts Ls not part of the meanLng of
that

soctetg

that

that reLevant soctettes ought to

part of the deftnLtLon of rLghts, but a LogLcaLLg emergent
dertvatLve

be

separated as a consequence; Lt Ls not (as

uphoLd them. But such functors, as obLLgatLon to

derLvatLons;

to

rtghts

In the fLrst pLace, Lt shows that HLLLs

dLcttonarg defLnLtLons atso LndLcate) a deftntng feature. For

true

duLg

3

rLght,

but

somethtng

foLLows from the prtncLpLes sustatntng a rLght to somethtng. For Lnstance,

Lf Lt Ls generaLLg permtsstbLe to LLve
others,

free

from

unnecessarg

suffering

then

moraL agents are therebg prohtbLted from causing unnecessarg sufferLng;

-14-

and

prohLbLtLon

the

functor

Ls

transnLtted

the

down

cLaLn-agaLnst certain, tgpLcaLLg unspecLfLed, norat agents

R

derLvatLon.^

Ls

consequentLaL

a

feature of vaLLd tLtLenents to, transnLtted fron the sustaLnLng noraL prLncLpLe.

(ThLs

Ls

whg

Regan

can aLwags easLLg nanage to fLLL out a cLaLn-agaLnst forn

where a McCLoskeg ent Lt Lenent can be estabLLshed; see RR p.231).
SecondLg, the schene and defLnLtLon nake Lt evLdent that

seLf-evLdent

puretg

or

rLghts.

axLonatLc

a

aLwags

defence

It foLLows, then, that ang theorg

rLghts bg reference to such derLvatLons.

cLaLns

are

no

For ang rLght that stands up, that

connands the tLtte, has a vaLLd derLvatLon. Rnd there Ls

Lags

there

of

that

seLf-evLdent rLghts (such as FIcCLoskeg s), or axLonatLc rLghts

to

(such as DworkLn's), and ang decLaratLons, constLtuttons or bLLL of rLghts (such
as

that

RnerLcan)

the

announces seLf-evLdent rLghts,

Ls nLstaken. RLghts are

aLwags derLvatLve fron other parts of an ethLcaL sgsten.
ThLrdLg, the theorg shows dLrectLg the "derLvatLve character" of rLghts,

and hetps to LndLcate the extent of theLr eLLnLnabLLLtg. For Lf rLghts are ever

to be estabLLshed, then there nust, Ln the end, be correct noraL prLncLpLes,

as

there are, fron whLch tLtLenents do derLve. Thus a requLrenent of ground hoLds,
are

rLghts

and

generated

fron other noraL prLncLpLes, Ln partLcuLar those of

pernLssLon and obLLgatLon. RLghts are derLvatLve, not Ln the sense that there Ls

a precLse recLpe for transLatLng rLghts dLscourse out - ang adequate transLatLon
renaLns wLthLn the rLghts cLrcLe, of entLtLenent, cLaLns,

etc.

-

but

Ln

the

derLvatLonaL sense, that theg derLve fron another part of the deontLc area, that

argunents and JustLfLcatLons for then go back to deontLc prLncLpLes.

Because

of

theLr nuLtLpLg derLvatLve character, rLghts are dLspensLbLe

after a fashLon, and at sone cost. So theg

envLronnentaL

ethLcaL

enterprLses.

not

are

But

Ln

essentLaL

absoLuteLg

a

strongLg

for

LndLvLduaLLstLc

rLghts-orLented socLetg, such as the USR, where rLghts notLons (and partLcuLarLg
LndLvLduaL propertg notLons) are taken verg serLousLg,

Lt Ls a snart strategg to

nake heavg use of then, after the node of Regan. EnvLronnentaL posLtLons can do

thLs aLso, bg derLvLng approprLate tLtLenents.

RLghts are not nereLg derLvatLve, because, for Lnstance,

of

the

force

theg are accorded and the rotes theg can pLag when adnLtted. Rs RnerLcan wrLters

stress, rLghts are anong the weLghtLest of

others

(hence

the

Lnportance

Ln

a

noraL

consLderatLons,

whLch

noraL or evLronnentaL cause of obtaLnLng

rLghts accredLtatLon). RLghts certaLnLg have Lnportant protectLve and

rotes,
of

Ln

persuasLve
so

Lnsurance

sheLterLng Ltens fron powerfuL actors and Lnterests. For those sorts

prLncLpLes,

and

truno

on.

argunentatLve

reasons

too,

Lnputed

rLghts

are

Lnportant

Ln

reLnforcLng

gettLng others to take Ltens serLousLg, to treat then decentLg,

Ln

The

socLaL

advantages

LnstLtutLonaLLsatLon

of

rLghts

accordLngLg

offers

not to be taken LLghtLg or abandoned. For these sorts

of reasons, too, rLghts are not superfLuous (as Freg Ls LncLLned to suggest:

-15-

he

aLso incLined to suggest, not aLtogether consistentLg, that there aren t ang

is

woraL rtghts, p.7, p.17). Granted that for Mang purposes we can proceed back

Lt ts not a consequence that Me

prtnctpLes froM which rtghts derive; stLLL,

the

can get a Long as weLL without theM, stLLL Less that there
potnt

no

ts

advantage

or

Set-theorettctans can get a Long without nunbers; woMen can get

theM.

to

to

aLong wtthout thetr bras, soMe of theM teLL us; nucLear reactors can

get

aLong

wtthout doubLe shteLdtng, so Russ Lan experts used to teLL us.

R fourth set of consequences of the rtghts package offered Ls that there
Ls no basts for various restrtcttons wtdetg tMposed upon the having

senttence,

tnterest,

as

such

etc.

(a

rather

now

rtghts,

of

faniLiar test). Constder

tnterests ftrst, stnee an "tnterests" restr Let Lon on rights-havers Ls pervasive.
Nothtng Ln the deftnttton and dertvatton schene gtven, or Ln
Ln

the

Ln suttabLLLtg requtreMents). Yet a cruciaL

theg coutd be incorporated,

Ln

defLntttons

McCLoskeg, MiLL, ...), requtres such tnterests (though

(OED,

vLctnttg

other

preMtss

the issue of whether things other than persons, aninats especiaLLg, can have

rights Links rights-hoLding with interest. R tgpicaL bridge princLpLe is

RI. OnLg iteMs which (can) have MoraL rights (cf. Freg, p.5). Rs Freg
RI

is

observes,

not obvious (he Later appLies a strong forM of RI, without 3ngthing Much

in the wag of argunent, nonetheiess), and has

had

Mang

with

notabtg

rivaLs,

interests
repLaced bg other candidates put up for gaining MoraL standing
(rationaLitg, Language, sentience, etc. - the saMe tiresoMe List).^

How then does the interest requireMent, RI, gain its wide

accreditation

and grip? For an astonishing series of bad reasons (as FreedMan Ln effect brings

out),
1)

inc Lud ing: we

Usage;

speak of Ltens Lacking interests (individuaLitg, etc.) as

don't

possessing rights (thus Ln effect McCLoskeg).
and

non-usage

to

has

be

backed

In fact we do,

bg other consideration if arbitrariness and

prejudice are to be avoided (FreedMan pp.

160-1).

2) RbgsMaL anaigses, such as TooLeg s anaLgsis of X has a right to R as
to refrain fron actions that wouLd deprive hiM
(again dissected bg FreedMan p.161 ff.)^

it

of

and

coupied

3) Mistaken thenes, such as Feinberg s (drawn fron McCLoskeg) that

protection of an interest, and hence [it is ciaiMed] for
right

it

cLaiM).

Must

have

Nothing

characteristicaLLg

an

interest

however

requires

afford

(FreedMan,

is

that

reasoning

a right is a

sonething

to

a

have

p.16^., who upsets the inferred
the

protection

rights

that

of an interest; as far as the Meaning of

goes it can be of a thing or a sgsteM. t*)

exercising

roughig

if R desires X, then others are under a prina-facie obLLgation

with

sgnongnous

have;

others

and

Confusion

of

having

right
with

right

a

a right (pp.162-3), or even with being abLe to cLain a right. Though

these are evidentLg different, and entaitMents froM having to exercising

or

to

cLaining evidentLg faiL, such confLations are encouraged bg easg but unwarranted

transition,

such as those froM having a cLaiM to Making or being abLe to Make a

cLain. But, to reiterate, rights have nothing highig intiMate

-16-

to

do

with

the

Mak Lng

bg

c La LMS

of

a

hoLder (though no doubt an art Lou Late Maker of cLaLMS

hoLds soMe advantage Ln achLevLng Lts and others cLaLns).

R

creature

or

LteM

wLth cLaLMS Mag have no abLLLtg or coMpetence to Make or present theM; or be the
sort of thLng that can. ^a) ContractLons of rLghts to a subcLass of rLghts, such
as exercLsabLe rLghts,

Lndeed

Lnterest-protectLng rLghts, accountabLe rLghts, etc. Then

conatLve requLreMents do foLLow (e.g. what has an exercLsabLe rLght Must

presunabLg at sone stage be suLtabLg aLLve and capabLe

but

reLevant

actLvLtg),

requLreMents foLLow froM the subcLassLfLcatLon LnvoLved, not froM the

such

notLon

of

rLght.

of

For

Lnstance,

the

Lnterest-protectLng

aspect

of

tnterest-protecttng rLghts foLLows froM the Lnterest-protectLng restrLctLon, not

froM

the

notLon of rLghts, whLch Mag serve to protect thLngs LackLng interests

(especLaLLg under chauvLnLstLcaLLg-favoured hLgh redefLnLtLons of

Lnterests).

R reLated cLuster of poLnts appLLes to attenpts to

rLghts

restrLct

to

persons or to LndLvLduaLs, atteMpts aLso tgpLcaLLg underpLnned bg the assuMptton

that

what has or can have rLghts Must have Lnterests, or desLres, or a suLtabLe

conatLve LLfe, or whatever. But nothLng Ln the notLon of rLghts restrLcts rLghts

to persons, or to

LndLvLduaLs,

or

persons" Ln a generous LegaL sense; nothLng restrLcts theM to
LndLvLduaLs

and

"persons".

RLL

these

restr Let Lons

on

rLght-hoLders are Lnposed, wLthout Much or suffLcLent justLfLcatLon, usuaLLg for
LdeoLogLcaL reasons, such as bLockLng LegLtLMate cLaLMS on behaLf of daMaged

dLsadvantaqe LteMs or sgsteMs, MerLtLng protect Lon.

or

§3.

and rebuiLding environMentaLLg.

the rLghts vLew

Deconstructing

Most iMportant, Regan's sharp LiMitation of rLghts

LndLvLduaL

to

Consider,

a

subjects,

LLMLtatLon whLch has a Most daMaging effect on the abLLLtg of hLs rLghts vLew to
cope

decentLg

spec Les,

concernLng rare 3nd endangered
(e.g.

Regan s

pp.395-6).

prob Lens of our tines, such as those

envLronnentaL

Major

wLth

forest

does

restrLctLon

ecosgsteMs,

wLLderness,

foLLow

froM

not

even

etc.

hLs

own

defLnLtLon of a rLght, as a vaLLd ciaiM. Rather the restrLctLon Ls progressLveLg
LnfLLtrated,

as

postuLates

the

concerning

are eLaborated. It is not

rights

uniforMig inf titrated (and in other work Rgan appears to abandon restrictions to

individuaLs, e.g. HP, p.32). For instance at a cLosing stage (in

p.39S)

RR,

a

arguMent against priviLeged status for rare or endangered species begins,

brief

because paradigMatic right-hoLders are individuaLs

(In

sgLLogistic

extended

IndividuaLs

forM the arguMents runs: ParadigM3tic right-hoLders are individuaLs.

not acquire ang further rights if theg beLong to rare or endangered species.

do

Therefore, paradigMatic right-hoLders do not so acquire further rights. So

the

rights view does not acknow Ledge ang priviLeged MoraL status on the part of rare

endangered

or

species

right-hoLders needn t be

individuaLs,

aniMais.)

of
so

The

restricted

beginning

after

aLL,

onLg

the

species

(with

a

if

are

paradigMs

MoraL

the

about

or

MeMbers

species

e.g., as Hutiean entities, certaintg then

treated,

individuaLs, at Least BoodnanesqLg). But earLier Regan

view

as

Look

undercutting the brief argunent. For siMpig consider sone

further

non-paradignatic right-hoLders, such as endangered species

theiisetves.

it

Makes

of

announces,

rights

The

Species

are not

individuaLs, and the rights view does not recognise the MoraL rights of

species

to

is

view

3ngthing

rights

individuaLs.

(p.3S9). Thus individuaLs, whatever theg are (no characterisation

is actuaLLg offered),

are

not

MereLg

the

right-hoLders;

paradigMatic

theg

right-hoLders. The More conciiiatorg paradigMatic Line gives wag to the

exhaust

iron-fisted thene of

(p.361),

according

the
to

aLLeged

individuaListic

nature

of

MoraL

rights

which the notion of MoraL rights cannot be neaningfuLLg

appiied other than to individuaLs (p.36I). Rs far as evergdag, MoraL

and

LegaL

usage goes this just isn t true; there is no such categoriaL restriction.

Uhg

trg

to

iMpose

such

an

iMpLausibLe and environnentaLLg daMaginq

atoMistic restriction on a rights view? Or, siMiLarLg, on a MoraL standing view?
EMending the brief arguMent awag froM anti-environMentaL ends indicates whg.

a

rebuiit

rights view, an individuaL Mag acquire More rights, and warrant More

protection, bg be Longing to an endangered group,

in virtue of princ ip Les such as

that significant endangered species ought to be protected.
creatures

wouLd

hoLd

different

But

then

different

rights, contradicting Regan's assuMption that

aLL aniMaLs are equaL* (p.395) - at Least in rights heid,
this,

On

but as a Matter of definition) in

and

basis

(the

of

inherent vaLue'. Here is the source of

the troubLe, of individuaListic restrictions, not the basic account
but the adjoined equaLitg assuMptions.

-18-

of

rights,

restriction to individuats Ls not just an optionaL extra Ln Regan s

The

package, that can simpig be pee Led off.

rLghts

appt LeatLons

of

super-imposed

theorg,

the

but

Ls

essentLaL

wLth

for

the

given

coherence

a super-individuaL, such as a specLes,

If

postuLates.

equaLLtg

hetd rLghts on an equaL basts

It Ls requLred not ontg Ln major

Lt,

composLng

LndLvLduaLs

the

then

the

wouLd both have more rLghts than Lts LndLvLduaLs (those of aLL

super-individuaL

Lts components) and the same rLghts (cf.DE

on

bLocentrLc

egaLitarianism;

DC,

Furthermore, equaLLtg assumptLons are verg heavLLg depLoged Ln foLLowing

p.3S).

through LmpLLcatLons of the LndLvLduaL rLghts view, where dLfferentLaL treatment

of different sorts of creatures Ls repeatedLg ruLed out bg appeats to equaLLtg.

IntegraL as equaLLtg assumptLons are to Regan s LndLvLduaL-rLghts

view,

theg are neLther part of more ordLnarg ref Leet Lons on rLghts nor part of what Ls

meant bg rLghts, but addLtLonat postuLates. Theg can accordLngLg be removed, and
deconstructLon

on

of

the

rLghts

exactLg

view

thLs

Ls

EquaLLtg

done.

assumptLons concernLng moraL rLghts are supposed, Ln the fLrst pLace, to

from

dLrectLg

dLstLnguLshLng moraL rLghts, for Lnstance unLversaLLtg

features

absoLute

are

quaLLt Les, theg do

Ls

aspect ref Leets

and equaLLtg features (p.267). But aLL thLs "equaLLtg

rLghts

foLLow

that

(p.368). It does

not come Ln degrees

not foLLow that one Ltem cannot have more rLghts than another (because, e.g., of

Ltems

the sort of thLng Lt Ls), or therefore that aLL

bund Les

equaL

that

have

have

rLghts

of (even baste) rLghts. Nor does equaLLtg of basLc rLghts foLLow

from unLversaLLtg requLrements, but ontg a

certain

Ln

LmpartLaLLtg

treatment

(often confused however wLth egatttartanLsm).
equaLLtg

NeLther

nor

assumptLons

LndLvLduaLLstLc restrtctLons emerge

then; and Ln fact theg do not fLgure eLsewhere Ln the anaLgsLs of rLghts
To

them

fend

we

have

to

foLLow

gLven.

the text past the anaLgsLs, through to the

LntroductLon of the fundamentaL respect prtncLpLe and the

rLght

respectfuL

to

treatment (p.277 ff.), where both equaLLtg and LndLvLduaLLtg enter Ln a bLg wag,

both

beLng

imported

parts of the theorg of Lnherent vaLue (and assocLated

as

justLce prLncLpLe) from a previous chapter. For what Ls
rLght

those

of

who

have

argued

Ls

basic

the

Lnherent vaLue to... respectfuL treatment

(p.277),

where Lnherent vaLue Ls bg def Ln Lt Lon confLned to LndLvLduaLs and somethLng

aLL

suLtabLg conatLve LndLvLduaLs (those subject-of-a-Life) have equaLLg.

ConsLder

subjects'

vaLue

as

- what we LL caLL Lnherent

LndLvLduaLs

vaLue. ... aLL who have Lnherent vaLue have Lt equaLLg

p.23S ff.).

(pp p.37;

Inherent vaLue Ls thus a theoretLcaL notLon, conforming

sLmLLarLg
to

HR

various

postuLates, notabLg LndLvLduaLLtg and equaLLtg. ObviousLg the theorg of Lnherent
vaLue

can

be

varied,

pLace of Lnherent vaLue,

LndLvLduaL

as Regan effectiveLg admits (p.362). Consider, then,

Ln

LnLtLaL or connate vaLue,

X,

or not, as foLLows: the vaLue of X,

defined,

for

ang

Ltem

if ang, as an Ltem (and not as a

mere receptacLe). In pLace of the equaLitg postuLated for Lnherent vaLue, Lt
assumed

that,

for

Ls

ang X and Y of the same ethicaL tgpe, X and Y have the came

-17-

connate vaLue. Then, white connate vaLue Ls not verg Mett characterised,

Ls

Lt

as adequateLg specified as Lnherent V3tue, and can carrg Lts work-Load.

showing

Before

that Let s Look at differences, and Limitations, of the

notion. Mhite inherent vaLue is an aLL-or-nothing

(certain

affairs

individual

tgpes have Lt, nothing eLse does, but has zero vaLue), connate vaLue Ls not. Not
that have (non-zero) connate vaLue need have equaL positive vaLue or

tgpes

aLL

positive vaLue at aLL. DeviLs, certainLg if theg existed, wouLd
negative

vaLue

connate

disboLicainess,

if

(their

ontoLogicaL

no

nonexistence

proofs

objects are to be beLLeved.) Connate

doubt

have

decidedLg

to

adding

their

the existence of top connate vaLue

of

are

vaLues

somewhat

thus

initiaL

Like

LeveLs of perfection. Connate vaLue Ls, Like inherent vaLue properLg understood,
at

an

best

initiaL

assignment.

The

assignments

Like those of initiaL

are

probabiLLtg under a principLe of indifference (particuLarLg

vaLue;

connate

out

themseLves

presumptive

those

of

inherent

vaLue invoLves a further tgpoLogg). UntiL actors, objects, sort

their

bg

initiaL

Life-stgLes,

can

which

vaLue,

then

intrinsic vaLue gets cLarified; compare a

be

theg

states

worLd-Lines,
posteriori

a

diminished as

or

increased

receive

probabiLLtg

assignments.

Thus too connate vaLue is not aLL that is taken into account in discerning moraL
and so Ln deriving rights. Further vaLue-making or vaiue-detracting

prtncLpLes,

features of things which affect intrinsic vaLue are aLso reLevant.
0 criticaL question is whether connate vaLue can serve to

carrg

enough

(not aLL, of course) of the requisite argument; in particuLar, that to a respect

principLe.

appears

Examination

to

show that it can, at Least to this extent:

insofar as the argument (pp.277-9) based on

respectfuL

fact,

Ln

individuat

bg

to

item

substitute

connate

made

is

principLe,
principLe

as

aLso

to

repLace

required,

nameig

resuLts

defence

of

the

modified, succeeds. It does, as inspection of the
bg

shows,

where

the

the same substitutions as before. The modified

principLe Looks near-anaLgtic: Ue are to treat those items

which

have

connate

that respect their connate vaLue (pp.2t+8). The modified respect

wags

in

and

presupposed

argument (pp.258-60) for the modified respect principLe soon

vaLue

right

throughout, and to verifg bg inspection that aLL detaiLs

that evergthing does work as weLL, given that the

modified

the

features of moraL rights. But it is straightforward to verifg

concerning

respect

to

inherent

for

work just as weLL. Minor use of some points aireadg

those

vaLue

succeeds, so does that based instead on connate vaLue. It

treatment

suffices,

inherent

principLe appLies of course to species and sgstems, as weLL as for

individuaLs,

and so does the expanded right to respectfuL treatment.

Much of the remainder of Regan's text can be simiLarLg reinterpreted,
but again bg no means aLL.15 (Limitations of space, time, and energg preciude a

fuLLer

de-

and

re-construction). Some initiaL indication onLg of the expanded

environmentaL rights theorg
offered.

But

it

which

repLaces

the

moraL

rights

view

wiLL

be

is important to observe right awag, that mang of the goats of

-20-

the anLmaL rights Movement, as Regan conceives Lt
Largetg intact under the expanded rLghts

theorg

(e.g.

can

PP,p.32),

perhaps

(minus

remain

totaLitg

the

cLaims), for instance, the theme of aboLition of the use of animats Ln scLence.
But not aLL the further postulates of Regan's rLghts view remain intact,

most notabLg that of vegetarianism, which Ls not a consequence of themes of

rLghts movement. Nonethe Less?

animat

the rLghts view hotds that the LndLvLduaL

h3s a dutg to Lead a vegetarian Mag of LLfe
supererogatorg;

Lt

(p.351,p.3^.6) to

thLs

permLssLbLe

Ls

vegetarianism Ls

(p.39!+);

But

(p.3^6).

obLLgatorg'

cone Lus Lon

the

appear

to

most

the

arguments

the

not

Ls

Lt

that

Ls

estab LLsh

not

to consume the products of commercLaL animat agrLcuLture (LncLudLng

Since the anLmaL Lndustrg routLneLg

presumabLg eggs and pureLg bread sausages).

vLoLates the rLghts of these anLmaLs, for the reasons

Ls

Lt

given,

wrong

to

purchase Lts products. That Ls whg, on the rLghts view, vegetarLanLsm Ls moraLLg

obLLgatorg, (p.3SI,LtaLLs added). Rs an argument to vegetarLanLsm (a

vegetarLan

beLng, one who abstaLns from anLmaL food, and LLves on veqatabLe food, and,
'16
----usuaLLg eggs, mitk, etc
), the argument Ls a major nonsequLtur (Likewise the
argument, p.3^.6)^\ For there are mang wags of obtaLnLng anLmaL food whLch do

not LnvoLve commercLaL anLmaL agrLcuLture or commercLaL practLces (the no

proper

of

focus

Regan's

sLnce

attach,

such

practLces

tgpLcaLLg

dLsrespectfuL and insensitive use and rLghts vLoLatLons). Examp Les
of

practLces

huntLng-gatherLng

LLfestgLes,

of

doubt

Lead

LncLude

to
the

the gardenLng cuLtures of the

Pie Lanes La and PoLgnesia, of subsLstence farmLng and of some of the new communes.
Regan's further argument (Lt wouLd be unfaLr to stick hLm wLth the awfuL page

3nd

351

with

eatLng

dogs) commLts hLm, moreover, to the moraL LmproprLetg of

(as

these extensive tradLtLonaL LLfestgLes

weLL

as

mtnor

ones),

newfangLed

Lnsofar as theg LnvoLve the kiLLLng of pLgs and fLsh and occasLonaL wLLdLLfe and
so

R chLef reason gLven Ls that

on.

end
theLr

LLves are brought to an untLmeLg

antmaLs'

(e.g. p.39^.). But suppose, to dLspose fLrst of strLct
tLme

has

come,

vegetarLanLsm,

that

or, more straLghtforwardLg, that theg are aLreadg dead.

Mhat precLudes respectfuL use?
Rn expanded rLghts theorg does not entaLL vegetarLanLsm - ang more

connected

theorLes,

such

as

aLL

that

consLderatLon, or rLvaL theorLes such as

restrLctLons,

wLthout

further

Large

sent Lent

utLLLtarLanLsm,

are

Longer

no

sentient

or

entaLL

moraL

deserve
such

dLetarg

assumptLons. For there are mang tgpes of

circumstance where Lt Ls perfectLg permLssLbLe to

which

beLngs

than

eat

dead

creatures,

things

which wLLL not now attain sentience (as DC

exp Lains and argues). The more probLematic area Ls not that of consuming what is

aLreadg dead, but of causing

prematureLg,

Ln

order

death

(or,

to

a

Lesser

extent,

Letting

die)

to achieve that option or, to gieLd it as a bg-product.

For this appears to infringe rights to Life and LLveLihood and to vioLate

moraL

standing of creatures interfered with so drasticaLLg.

Rppears to. For even ethicaL theorLes that now concede various rLghts to

-21-

anLmaLs

bauLk

anLmaLs.

Rnd

at

for

sone

patLents,

Papuans

the

rLghts

extensive

to LLfe and LLveLhood to

own vLew provLdes, Ln the categorLaL dLstLnctLon between

Regan's

noraL agents and moraL
treatment,

such

admLttLng

ground

of

treatment

dLfferentLaL

further

and pLgs, a

peopLe

dLstLnctLon Ln whLch Regan hLmseLf takes refuge when pressed.
Regan s

dLfferentLaL

justLfgLng

for

So how tLght

Ls

Ln partLcuLar when reconsLdered as appLgLng agaLnst

arguMent,

tradLtLonaL LLfestgLes rather than agaLnst modern commercLaL practLces? The buLk

of the crucLaL argument

ff.)

dLd

not

treat

resources.

Nor

dLd

theg

(p.3{+^);

receptacLes

does

sLmpLg

cuLtures

tradLtLonaL

renewabLe

(p.3t*3

appLg.

not

anLmaLs just as resources, stLLL Less as
as

anLmaLs

treat

Lnstruments

mere

excLude some kLLLLng of anLmaLs - or do theg? It wouLd seem that
of

tradLtLonaL

unLLke

peopLes,

provLsLon (p.3t*3), are

prLncLpLe

dubLous

admLtted

commercLaL
under

derLved

supposedLg

who

farmers

Regan's
from

prLncLpLe

LLbertg

respect prLncLpLe, p.332). R

the

LncLudLng

fundumentaL respect prLncLpLe LtseLf. On a straLght readLng

requLres

whLch

that

treatment

creatures

of

vaLue

Lnherent

are

however

Some

excLuded.

Ls

not

of

for

prLncLpLe,

the

countervaLLLng

respectfuL
No

excLuded.

LnfrLnged because a creature of Lnher- nt vaLue
persLst, come what mag.

There

use

Ls respectfuL of the kLnd of vatue theg have

(p.277), such uses of anLmaLs are not

wLth

a

(p.331,

stgLe of better tradLtLonaL practLces Ls excLuded under the more

the

Ln

practLces

the

vLoLate the respect

crLtLcaL quest Lon Ls whether the respectfuL use of anLmaLs,
food,

Papua,

pLgs before kLLLLng. CarefuL, respectfuL practLces do not

exchanged

often

or

consLder the respectfuL treatment of mang hunter-gatherer

groups Ln aborLgLnaL RustraLLa, or the practLces of gardenLng peopLes Ln

who

Large

and

Bg

does

rLghts are therebg

a

acquLre

not

Ln

LndLctLons

Lnterference
rLght

text

Regan s

to

(and

eLsewhere Ln hLs "preservatLon prLncLpLe") whLch wouLd go far towards sustaLnLng
the vegetarLan concLusLons he faLLs to reach, and therebg to ruLLng

tradLtLonaL

the bLoconatLvLst assumptLons

that Lt Ls

LLfestgLes

LnadmLssLbLe.

Such

are

aLwags wrong to destrog LLfe (verg specLat cLrcumstances apart perhaps), that Lt
Ls never permLssLbLe to reduce vaLue catastrophLcaLLg the wag that

LLfe

anLmaLs

brLnqtrg

to an untLMeLg end does. But Ln fact Regan does not endorse such

prLncLpLes, strongLg rejectLng prLncLpLes LLke the pacLfLst prLncLpLe

use

or

harmfuL

destructLve

wLth

LncompatLbLe

bLoconatLvLst

the

vLoLence

"LLbertg"

assumptLons,

no

(p.287);

prLncLpLes

matter

as

Lnterpreted.

dLffLcuLt

how

wouLd

maxLMLae

never

to

bLoconatLvLsm appears

Lndeed

to

NonetheLess,

LLve bg, are hLghLg

appeaLLng to mang ethLcaL pacesetters and theorg desLgners, especLaLLg
who

an

to

mang

vaLue. But theg throw the whoLe naturaL order Lnto ethLcaL

dLsorder; predatLon, fuLL terrLtorLaL defence and mang other commonpLace naturaL
happenLngs are thrown Lnto ethLcaL doubt or
MorLd

magbe a

Ls

not

verg

rendered

LnadmLssLbLe.

ilagbe

The

RequLred the wag Lt surprLsLngLg Ls (LesLLe's thesLs) after aLL;
dLfferent

predator-free

sLn-eradLcated

RequLred, where V3tue j^s maxLmLzed?

-22-

post-naturaL

worLd

Ls

$4.' Ti'tt'eMsnts

and

substantiaL prob tews.

tivehood:

and

predation, territoriatitg

other

the dust that status-quo-supporting phiiosophers

Despite

have raised, there is no doubt, tooking through the ctoud, but that
* Rnimats have various interests, mang of then of the
human

as

those

of

instance, sustenance, survivat, sex, species, sheiter (see

for

animats,

sort

sane

e.g. RR, PR).

* Rnimats

have

various

For exampte, theg have, in the same wag that

rights.

humans do, a right to iive free from unnecessarg suffering, and

from

excessive

interference.
these ciaims are substantiaitg independent (having interests is Logicaitg

Mhite

neither necessarg nor sufficient

significant

connections,

inasmuch

rights),

having

for

as

rights

are

nonethetess

protect

permissibie

there

to

serve

worthwhiie interests which more powerfui operators, such

de-foresters,

as

mag

otherwise override or ignore. There is no doubt, furthermore, that present human
practices

sgstematicaLLg infringe animai rights, especiatig those tied to their

interests. For exampie, much animai
suffering.

causes

experimentation

unnecessarg

quite

there is a powerfui case for changing these practices (compare

Thus

and contrast Freg p.t*.), a case both enhanced,

and

easier

obtain

to

positive

action upon, bg the due admission of relevant rights. Rttainment of the sorts of
sociai

protection

the widespread admission of rights can iead to shouid not be

underestimated, in the wag it is bg utiiitarians and anti-moraiists.
Granted animats have rights, some of them

higher

humans

rights

nohumans,

widespread

a

have,

main

animats

phenomenon

of

predation,

a

par

with

those

that

question (pace Freg) concerns which

outstanding

particutartg,

on

have.

Because

especiatig

of

the

essential to the continued tivetihood of

mang creatures, the issue can took tike an exceedingtg difficult

one

(and

one

comes to grief upon). There are undoubtedtg serious confticts of interest

Regan

induced through the phenomenon, some of them unavoidable as when

a

herbivore s

interest in continued existence ctashes with a carnivore s interest in continued

sustenance,

avoidabte

others

as

in

human

Predation is not of course the ontg source of
territoriatitg,

slaughter of whates and dotphins.
serious

conflict

of

interests;

for instance, C3n atso iead to serious encounters, particutartg

in situations of expanding poputations (thus too the issues are connected).
Such matters as predation, territoriatitg and population
been

converted

into

increase

serious prob terns bg mistaken atomistic views of vaiue and

associated excessive ciaims as to rights. Removing these defective

the

but

integral

part

much

of atomistic non-utititarian positions such as Regan's,

hotds that vaiue (or utititg) is a feature, at bottom, of atomistic
as

themes

probtematic. The vatue theorg involved, tgpified bg utilitarianism

reduces
an

have

individuats,

that

those

items

items

such

(constituting the base ctass) have a fixed

-23-

(equaL) vaLue whLLe theg persist, which Ls not substitutibLe for

and

that

vaLues

(derived)

Ls

ecosystems,

of

whaLes

additive

an

simpLy

functLon

the

of

aLLenabLe,

such

structures,

organised

and

or

atoms

as

Lt.

within

CharacteristicaLLg aLso theses of maximization and preservatLon of present vaLue
are incorporated Lnto the theorg. On such assumptions, predatLon

and

LnvoLve a reductLon Ln vaLue, at Least Ln the shorter tern, and so a
infringing

path,

and

maximization

preservatLon

enhances the prob Lens bg postuLating a rLght to

has

that

LndLvLduaL

(Lnherent)

LnLtLaL

to

everg

simiLarLy

woraL

exLstence

(and

vaLue

suboptimaL

The rights view

desLderata.

contLnued

Like

the

considerabLLitg posLtLons add to the dLffLcuLtLes). But the assumptions LnvoLved
shouLd be removed. Both the wag the probLems are generated fron the assumptions,

and the reasons for revising the vaLue

eLsewhere

than

which are wore

LncLude

sun

the

of

predators,

theLr

LndLvLduaL

escaLation

The

the

of

theg

though

components,

be hLghLg vaLuabLe Ln theLr own rLght, wLth

mag

LLves of herbLvores substituted for wLthtn
vaLue.

detaLL

Ln

the Breen SerLes, especLaLLg OC ^). Host important, ecosystems,

(Ln

tgpLcaLLg

expLaLned

are

assumptions,

the

through

probLems

wLthout

system,

reductLon

of

theorLes deserves,

rights

however, some eLaboratLon.
R

serLous

cLash

of

Lnterest,

as

between carnLvores and herbLvores,

fortunateLg does not therebg Lnduce an imcompatibLLLtg

rLghts,

of

unLess

too

Lnterests are eievated to rLghts. But just thLs appears to happen when the

many

extensLve (but not LnvarLabLe) Lnterests of LLvLng creatures

exLst are sharpLg upgraded to unquaLLfLed rLghts to LLfe (a

Ln

contLnuLng

mistaken

to

eLevatLon

that Ls common Ln ethLcaL thought). The rLght to LLfe of a success Lon of gnus Ls
LnfrLnged

bg

LLon whLch aLso has a rLght to sustenance to sustaLn Lts LLfe.

a

MLth the advance of technoLogg Lt wouLd now be possLbLe
cases

of

to

Lnterfere

some

Ln

predatLon, e.g. that of the remaLnLng Large carnLvores, to uphoLd gnu

rLghts , bg switchLng the carnLvores to an appropriate vegetarian dLet (and, to

avoLd cuLLLng, our spLended contraceptLve technoLogg couLd be

appLLed

hoLd

to

gnu popuLatLon Ln check). But to deaL wLth aLL cases of predatLon and assocLated

issues

in

these

bizarre sorts of wags Ls not onig practicaLLg LmpossLbLe; but

at

further, such extensLve interference with naturaL ecosgstems is LtseLf,
verg

Least,

dubiousLg

permissibLe.

High-tech vegetarLan-stgLe resoLutLons of

probLems of predatLon, territoriaLitg and so on, are

On

contrary,

the

virtuaLLy

aLL

the

remaining

naturaL

radicaLLg

unsatisfactory.

systems containing Large

carnLvores shouLd be Left substantiaLLg intact or restored towards their naturaL

states. These ecosystems ought to persist, and have a

Can t

an

rights

to,

right

fLourishing LnvoLves reguLar vioLation of aLLeged absoLute

though

their

rLghts to Life.

to LLfe be Left intact (L.e. mereLg moraLLg extended from

unauthentic human setting), and the probLems skirted around? Rfter aLL, some

confLict,

and

inconsistency

even, of

rights,

obLigations

and

so

on,

is

inevitabLe, and can be LogLcaLLg Lived with in these Latter paraconsistent dags.

Some

can,

but

not too much. ConfLict shouLd be confined to exceptionaL (often

-24-

significant) sorts of cases. In these terns,

bg

accommodated

Mag

of

up

confLLct

sgstematic

reguLar

such

confLLct

anatogous

S3tisfactoriig

It Ls too reguLar,

deontLc

does

sgstem

not

because theg remove part of the poLnt of deontLc

cases,

structures: for then much too much
rather

not

of rLghts or prLncLpLes.

confLLet

sgstematic and commonpLace. R sufficientLg effLcLent
muLtipLg

is

predatton

Ls

time

cases.

R

confLLct,

repuzziing

spent

undermines

MhLch

fash Lon to deaL wLth

sattsfactorg

more

redecLdLng

and

the

point and force of

prLncLpLes, is revision of principLe. Furthermore, a confLLct of rights approach
(no more than a confLLct of vaLues approach:

right.

feeL

doesn't

p.33)

DC,

at

aLL

Lion Ls not acting MrongLg or infringing rights MhoLesaLe, everg Meek

R

Mhen it mag kLLL an anteLope or other creature.

R

aLternative, atreadg indicated, consists then in Minding in

superior

excessive titLement concessions, so as to avoid extensive confLLct. R strong and
Legitimate interest in a continuing LiveLihood

to

right

does

not

an

give

unquaLified

Life, which can be conferred against associated predators. It affords

onLg a defeasibLe right, which can be forfeited or Lapse.

In these terms, a Lion

that takes a Meaker aged gnu, taiLing or separated from a herd, does not vioLate

Lts defeasibLe right to Life. The
different.

Mith

situation

their

take

chances.

rights to Life are not

predatorg

is

essentiaLLg

not

LLL-equipped or reck Less humans who put themseLves Ln or find

LJeak,

themseives in threatening situations, such as
traveL

humans

animats

or

wiiderness

If theg therebu Lose their Lives, their defeasibLe

therebg

or

action

highspeed

infringed

animats

where

(and

defending

their

animats

are

territories

LnvoLved,

not

shouid

be

HL id animats such as gnus are aLmost aiwags on Mitderness traveL,

persecuted).

except when imprisoned in zoos; theg properLg take their

chances

with

naturaL

predators.

Rs pursuit of this approach suggests, a hetpfuL wag of coming
with

predation

and

Like

issues

happens,

what

grips

is through zoning, or more generaLLg through

bioregionaLLsm, which zones regions of the earth s surface
what

to

and

eisewhere.

is protected, what Ls permissibie and right, Ln wiiderness

can be significantLg different from that in urban areas. R tiger that moves

of

out

a wiiderness to a supposedLg easier Life in a citg where incautious citizens

are pLentifuL, cannot expect 3nd doesn t merit the same treatment as Lt did

wiiderness, nameLg being Left LargeLg atone. Moreover, with bioregions

big

For

wiiderness

as

Locus,

Lt

is

much

to think hoLLsticaLLg,

easier

predation as an LntegraL and significant part of

such

a

rich

naturaL

the
as

to see

structure

rather than isoLated action of individuaLs without a further just ifg ing setting.

(The

adjustment

of

ethicaL principtes to regions, and Large communities, need

invoLves no Loss of universaLizabLLitg;

wiiderness

is an appropriatetg generat

notion, not get a proper name.)
The

action

of carnivores (LncLuding traditionaL peoptes) in wiiderness

areas, in taking preg conservativeLg,

Ln defending their territories and so

-25-

on,

LnvoLves

no

LtseLf

Ln

infringeMents of rLghts then, whether what Ls taken Ls

huMan or not (Ls "repL3cabLe" or not). There Ls Moreover no need
for Lnstance Lf a carnLvore had coMsuMed a

career.

that

tresspassLng

Darwin

Ln

earLg

hLs

brash utLLLtarLan wouLd LnsLst, or pretend, that, when aLL the

a

OnLg

deng

Lts frequent vioLence and death, nag LnvoLve Loss of vaLue, as

with

predatLon,

to

undo-abLe cowputat tons are done, the sufferLng and Losses

and

repLacenents

of

sgsteMS, net vaLue of overaLL naturaL processes Ls aLwags approxtMattng

naturaL

MaxtMaLLtg. On the other stde,

thought

Lt wouLd be a supreMe technoLogtcaL opttMtst

sgsteMS couLd perforw nearLg as sattsfactortLg,

huMan-engtneered

that

even on a qutte Modest scaLe. HuMan

breakdown,

who

efforts,

whtch

especLaLLg

are

prone

to

soMettMes Make soMe SMaLL iMproveMents around the edges; MostLg

can

theg reLg upon expottLng what Ls aLreadg there or nearbg. Rs a worktng ruLe, the

More huMans interfere wLth naturaL processes, the More probLeMs

the

as

there

are

and

More thtngs go wrong. Med LeaL experience wLth intervention, even in Matters
norMaLLg

straightforward

huMan

chLLdbirth,

provide

weLL-docuMented

ruLe at work. The chances of huMans iMproving, technicaLLg or

the

of

evidence

as

MoraLLg, upon Nature Ln wLLderness areas Ls exceedLngLg sLight. To adapt one

the

ecoLogicaL

Laws

to

of

encapsuLate the working ruLe: Nature generaLLg does

better than huMans. Its coroLLarg Ls: CurtaLL excessive

huMan

interference

Ln

naturaL regions.

It does not Matter if, because of predation and the Like, vaLue

a Lwags

as

poLiticaL

high

wickedness,

evoLutionarg

not

it Might be. Mith the persistence of sin and prevaLence of

as

Ls copious reason for conjecturing that we do not

there

inhabit the best of possibLe worLds. Besides we 3re free to specuLate
Long

is

process

-

that

the

no doubt a rather restricted, heaviLg interfered

with, and verg hit and Miss business - did not turn out as perfectLg as Lt Might

have. Major ecosgsteMs certainLg do not appear to have evoLved
adapted

in

weLL

wag

a

to (or anticipating, so to sag) the 3rrivai of Modern huMans with their

enorMOUs destructive capacitg and wLLL to power. But, even apart froM the advent
it is far froM cLear that Nature

of such huMans,

provides

rather Nature satisizes (an adjustMent of ecoLogicaL

an

optiMat

sgsteM;

Law" argued for eLsewhere:

see SM).
The facts of satisization do not put Nature out of step

with

deontic
best

MoraLLtg,

principLes. For deontic principLes aLso answer back eventuaLLg to

sufficient LeveLs of vaLue, not to MaxiMaL consequences (see

were

with

that

vaLue

SH).

Even

it

be Maximized, obLigation certainLg does not require Lt.

Predation can take a rightfuL pLace Ln such a satisizing

environnent;

naturaL sgsteMS which have evoLved with predation seeM to offer quite
and often dazzLing,

Lf

LeveLs of vaLue.

Richard SgLvan
via Bungendore

-26-

for

the

adequate,

RustraLia 2621

NOTES

1-

For aLL that I an crLtLcaL of Much of

that

thought

environmentaL

Lt far

of southern and western Rmerican schooLs,

out

fLows

the

surpasses the drearg and reactionary anti-environmentaL dross that

emerges

typLcaLLy

the

froM

prestigious

More

universities

Ln

LndustrLaL north-eastern USR and British LLght-engLneerLng centres

LLke Oxford.
2.

May

ThLs

a

strike

MoraL

as

theorist

aiMost

cost/benefit ana Lysis of (mainstream) econoMics -

as curious as a

order

in

aLso

and having reaL point - wouLd strike econoMists. But the cases are
different.

assessMents

Cost/benefit

depend on a vaLue theory of

soMe (perhaps degenerate) sort, but not necessarily on MoraLity.
3-

EntitLement to whom? On traditionaL views, and
amounts

what

choice

seLf-appointed chosen,

(p.!*).

makers

entitLement

a

to

in

There

are

probiems

according

PP,

to

we free and rationaL

use

regarding

of

contexts, since entitLement moves in the

these

rights-circLe and items with m-s May Lack rights.

The annuLar picture is open to the separate charges of being but a
devious sort of moraL ex tens ion ism and of introducing or invoLving
a

moraL hierarchy, both of which set scenes for condemnation. But

neither charge is justified in a form that wouLd do damage.

MoraL

notions are not extended, rather their proper significience ranges

and

catagoriaL

features

are

investigated and put to principLed

work. Rs to the matter of hierarchy, the

dLvisions

of

ref Leets

cLassification

things in terms of such features, where theg appLy,

as capacities and capabiiities. This wouLd yieLd a hierarchy

these

features ranked, which on the annuLar picture they are not.

(Even if they were and a hierarchy
aLL

Not

probiematic.

resuLted,

hierarchies

are

need

that

damaging,

e.g.

ciassificatoru ones, such as BioLogicaL divisions may
oniy

were

when

be.

not

be

mereLy

It

is

hierarchies serve to distribute, or become a means to,

power or priviLege or favour,

that

theg

warrant

the

criticism

hierarchies have encountered. That criticism wouLd have deservedLy
been

directed

at

certain

power

hierarchies are of this sort.)

-27-

hierarchies;

but

not

aLL

UorrLes

about LnstaLLLng a MoraL power hterarchg or pecktng order

and accoMpangtng MoraL eLLtes are one reason whg sone philosophers

an

(west go qutteLg atong wLth eLLtes) operate wtth

LMpoverLshed

ethLcaL tgpotogg. For instance, a Mtsp Laced egaLLtartantsM appears
both

as

deep ecoLogg, Ln bLo-con3ttvtsM 3nd Ln rLghts vLews such

Ln

where both Lnherent vaLue and the equaL basLc rLghts

Regan's,

Lt supports behave Ln an aLL-or-nothLng fash Lon.

5.

StwLLar funng busLness Ls goLng on

standLng

vaLue-Ln-LtseLf

wLth

Freg,

Ln

equates

who

worst

and proceeds to bound Lt

(p.!+S),

beLow, not bLocentrLcaLLg as Ln Goodpaster, but bg sentLence. ThLs

part

happens as

coLLapse

of

a

of

wore

wLdespread

huwanLstLc

utLLLtarLan

Major ethtcaL dtsttnctLons, wLth rLghts as a further

casuaLLtg.

6.

PossLbLLLtg

and

forws of nonLnterference prLncLpLes

probabtLLtg

are basLc to the Ma Ln

arguwents

the

to

LMMoraLLtg

of

nucLear arrangements: see LiP.

7.

But

Fox

has

M3de

a sustaLned - though now apparentLg parttaLLg

repeated - attewpt to do so, tn hts crtttctsM of axtotogg. Such an

attempt

Ls

bound to faLL. VaLues are baste and LnescapabLe (theg

enter even Lnto truth cLatms). Thus, for Lnstance, a crtttctsM
woraLLtg

as

Ln

a

generaL

bad

Lnstttutton,

cost/beneftt record and, has wrought Much
enMeshed

whtch

damage,

Ls

of

has a poor

thoroughtg

Ln vaLue concerns. RntL-MoraLtsm depends on axLoLogg;

Lt

does not sustain and antt-axtoLogg.

8.

UnLversaLLzabLLLtg Ls used Ln the text because Lt Ls famLLLar. But
what

are reaLLg Lwportant are LntersubstLtutLvLLg and reptaceMent

prLncLpLes, whtch underLLe generaLLztbLLLtg and other features.

8.

SoMe of opposttton and standard objeettons to rLghts

taLk

resuLt

froM Mtsgutded ontoLogtcaL assuMpttons. For exaMpLe, Lt Ls aLteged

that

rLghts

are

verg curtous sorts of entctLes, untversaLs that

sctence casts no LLght upon and does not need. RccordtngLg,

prtncLpLe

of

such

p3rstMong,

as

OccuM s

weLL

as

provLdtng

a

pasttng

such

propertLes,

such

as

betng

objeettons

of such crude LnstruMents as

OccoM s razor: consutt JB, Lndex). Creatures have
have

a

razor, such ent Lt Les

shouLd be dLscarded. Object-theorg shortcLrcuLts

(as

bg

derLvatLve

rLghts;
froM

rLghts

certaLn

obLtgattons; but rLghts do not exLst, soMewhere, or at aLL. RLghts

are LogtcaLLg weLL-enough behaved nonexLatent objects.

-28-

10.

The not Lon of right[sj, though -a coMparativetg Modern

Ls

one,

a

verg coMpLex one, sone of the conpLexLtg beLng ref Leoted Ln the 20
right' LLsted Ln the OED. Rn atteMpt to

senses of the substantive

brLng sone order and sgsteM to thLs coMptexLtg Ls Made Ln SN.

RLthough

the

takes

anaLgsis

frow

off

one Ma Ln OED sense, the

eLaboratLon wLLL Lead bg or through other connected
1.3

as

whLch

that

MoraLLg just or due

concerned

Ls

(as in

LnvoLveMent

activities);

be

no

issues concerning opportunitg (as in

rights to work) or LLbertg (as in rights

state-iMposed

such

equitg or ... which is

right-doing ). But there wiLL

Main

Ln

wLth

senses,

not

to

in

participate

are priMariig issues for MoraL

these

actors.

11.

reLevant

or coMMunities to capabie or

individuats

within

theM,

i.e. he reguLarLg resorts to individualizing strategies.

The

status of iterated deontic princ ip Les invoLved in such

exact

arguMents can be Left open, e.g. whether OOC is entaLLed bg 00
is

or

further substantive principie which can be asserted when 00

a

is.
13.

Not aLL these substitutes are incoMpatibLe, fortunateLg for
who

Leaps

to the cone Lus ion that sentience,

beings and the "higher

...

is

an

the fact that huMan

aniMats have experiences or MentaL

states

the uLtiMate and fundaMentai basis of the ctaiM that theg
(p.^3). No arguMent at aLL

are possessors of MoraL rights

than

appeaL

to

(other

is to be found for this ciatM, a

authoritg)

surprising OMission in an author who is fond of LaMbasting

for

Freg,

faiLure

suppig

to

others

arguMents (e.g. p.7) - especiaLLg in the

MereLg citing

Light of his eartier reMarks that

sentieneg

as

a

criterion for the possession of MoraL rights neither shows that it

is one nor even creates the presuMption that it is, ... untiL soMe
respects are provided ...

arguMents in these

subsequent chapters, such arguMents

are

. Rs we shaLL see in

scarce

on

the

ground

(p.33).

lit-

Too Leg s

anaLgsis

standard

account

substituting

can

"right

of

for

desires ,

an

wouLd Mark out

onLg

subcLass

rights,

of

be

upgraded,

and brought into Line with

(adopted

to"

Ln

EE,

p.176),

chooses or wouLd chose . Even so Lt

iMportant

roughLg

consequentiai

exercisabLe

criticisM teLLs against EE).

-2?-

feature

rLghts

(a

of

a

siMLLar

IS.

Rn important exanpLe is the argunent
which

bg

broken

is

concedLng

to

that

vaLue,

equat
not

p.33,

PP

aLL hunans, serLousLg

genet LeaLLg defectLve and weLL-endowed contractuaLLg-capabLe, need
have equat connate vaLue, and thus renoving the preniss.

16.

London,1932).

RecordLng to the Concise EngLLsh DLcttonarg (Onega,

the

But

qutte

not

Ls

natter

not a reputation of

sLnpLe,

so

vegetartantsn on the basts of the avaiLabititg of dead aninats

decisive.

carefuL definition, which wouLd however render

nore

R

sone hunter-gathers (and even sone cannibats) vegetarians, is

'one who Lives whoLLg or principaLLg

OED account,

so

upon

the

vegetabie

a person who on principle abstains fron ang forn of aninaL

foods;

food, or at Least such as Ls obtained bg the direct destruction of

Life'.
17.

that

not

decisivetg

support vegetartantsn, even

inproved

connerciat

faming

does

UtLLitarianisn
invoLving

s Laugh ter

and

of

so Regan correctLg contends (p.3S0 suns up his extensive

aninats,

argunent).

Ln

Rnd

fact

fLawed

the

case

utititarian

vegetartantsn Ls effectiveLg abandoned in the recent work

for

of

one

choice

of

of its Leading proponents, Singer (see DC, p.36).
13.

sone

Uhite

such

terntnoLogg

distinction

singuLarLg

is

unfortunate

given

the

non-obsoiete

patient . Most aninats are not patients.

senses of the noun
13.

the

inportant,

is

For exanpLe, in a range of, adnittedLg difficuLt, confiict

such

as Lifeboat situations (p.32^,p.351), and nore inportant, as

regards interspecies reL3tions (p.357 ff.). and

threats

to

rabid

foxes

to

the

crunch;

hunans aLwags outrank aninats. (So nuch for the

then

strict

norat restrictions, grounded in ... inherent vaiue , the sane

aLL

and

hunans (e.g. p.353). Despite his discLainers, Regan s

egaLitarian princ ip Les ring hoLLow when Lt cones
for

cases,

for

subjects-of-a-LLfe, on the strength of which even carefuL and

respectfuL

defective

farngard
greater

C3n

practices

vaLue

assunption

be

p.3^.2).

condenned,

R

is snuggLed into the rights

view, seriousLg detracting fron its environnentaL depth

(see

DE,

si).

20.

On bioconativisn see CaLLicott; Leading ideas go back to -Jainisn.

21.

Predation bg Large carnivores can

conpared

with

hunan

travet

be

usefuLLg,

sporting

and

predation

(no

accident

of

-30-

course)

favourabig,

accidents. UhiLe the

nunber of kiLLings annuaLLg are of a siniLar order

aninaL

and
of

nagnitude,

appears

to invoLve

rather Less suffertng and pstn. Rnd though
reduct ton

tn

vatue

tn

the

removat

tt

tnvotve

may

some

of on-gotng ttves, tt atso

offers some very constderabte compensattng ecosystemtc beneftts.

REFERENCES

J.B.

A
t

Catttcott,
On
the
tntrtnstc
vatues
of
nonhuman
spectes'
tn
The Preservatton of Spectes (e.d. B.G.Norton) Prtnceton Untverstty Press,
1386; pp.138-172.

R. Dworktns, Taktng Rtghts Sertousty, Duckworth, London,

1377.

J.

Fetnberg,
The rtghts of antmats and unborn generattons, tn Phttosophy and
Envtronmentat Crtsts (e.d. M.J. Btackstone) Untverstty of Georgta Press;
Rthens, 1371+, pp. 1+3-68.

U.

Fox,

R postcrtpt on
2(1+) (1385) 17-23.

deep

ecotogy

and

tntrtnstc vatue , The Trumoeter

The enttty-restrtctton of rights: Notes on a fashion tn ethtcs
B. Freedman,
Hetaphttosophy 12(1381) 153-168.
R.G. Frey,
Interests and Rtghts. The Case Rgatnst Rntmats,
1880.

K.E. Goodpaster,
308-325.

Ctarendon,

Oxford,

On betnq moratty constderabte , Journat of Phttosophy 75(1378)

I. H tnckf uss, The Morat Soctety: Its Structure and Effects, rev used ve rs con,
Untverstty of Queenstand, 1386.

J. Lestte, Vatue and Extstence, Oxford, 1373.
H.J. McCtoskey, Respect for humans morat rtghts versus maxtmtztng good
tn
Uttttty and Rtghts (e.d. R.6. Frey), Btackwett, Oxford, 1385 pp.121-136.

C. Ptgden, Nthtttsm: a Defence, Ph.D Thests, LaTrobe Untverstty,

1385.

E.B. PLuhar, The Justtftcatton for envtronmentat etttc , Envtronmentat Ethtcs
5(1383 )l+7-61.

T. Regan, The Case for Rntmat Rtghts, Routtedge & Kegan Paut, London, 1383;
to as HR.
T. Regan, On the nature and posstbtttty of on envtronmentat ethtcs',
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J. Rodman,

Theory and practtce tn the envtronnentat Movement: notes towards an

-31-

ecoiogg of experience', Ln The Search for Rbsotute VaLues Ln a Changing
UorLd, InternationaL CuLturaL Foundation, New Yorh 1978, pp.1+5-56.
J. Rodman, Ecoiogg sensibiLitg , in Ethics and the Environment (ed. D. Scherer
and T. Rttig), Prentice HiLL, NJ, 1983, pp.88-92; reprinted in VanDeVeer
and Pierce, pp.185-8.

R. RoutLeg, RLLeged probLems in attributing beLiefs and intensionaiitg to
animats , Inquirg 21+ (1981) 387-L17; referred to as PR.
R. Rout Leg,
In defence of cannibaLism. I. Tgpes of admissibte and LnadmissibLe
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R. Rout Leg, Exp Loring Pie inong's JungLe and Begond, RSSS, RustraLian NationaL
Universitg, 1979; referred to as JB.
R. Rout Leg, Liar and Peace I On the ethics of Large-scaLe nucLear Mar and
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R. and V. Rout Leg, Human chauvinism and environmentaL ethics , in Environmental
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Universitg, 1980, pp.98-189; referred to as EE.
'
1

T. Rgan,

The case for animaL rights'

in VanDeVeer and Pierce, pp.32-39.

%

C.D. Stone, ShouLd Trees have Standing? Towards Legat Rights for NaturaL Objects
Kaufmann, Los RLtos, 197!+.
R.

SgLvan,
R critique of deep ecoiogg',
1+1(1985); referred to as DE.

Radicatj^hiLosophg

1+0(1985) ana

R. SgLvan, SuppLanting maximization, and other utiLitarian assumptions, in
Western ethicai ideoiogg , Topci, 1986, to appear; referred to as SN.
D. VanDeVeer
and
C. Pierce (e.ds), PeopLe, Penguins, and PLas tic Trees,
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