Box 59, Item 680: Draft of On the alleged inconsistency and moral insensitivity of pacifism
Title
Box 59, Item 680: Draft of On the alleged inconsistency and moral insensitivity of pacifism
Subject
Computer printout (photocopy), with emendations and annotations. Paper published, Routley R (1984) 'On the alleged inconsistency, moral insensitivity and fanaticism of pacifism', Inquiry (Oslo), 27(1): 117-136. https://doi.org/10.1080/00201748408602030.
Description
Note, one of four papers digitised from item 680.
Creator
Source
The University of Queensland's Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291, Box 59, Item 680
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This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, Dr. N.A.J. Taylor.
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For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library.
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[27] leaves. 12.83 MB.
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Manuscript
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Como - Cupboard - Pile 3
Text
ON THE ALLEGED INCONSISTENCY AND MORAL INSENSITIVITY
OF PACIFISM
Pacifism , despite its.revival lit the nonviolent action movement
A
respectable
philooophieg-1 press.
another,
the
within
tradition
Catholic
church ,
It is commonly portrayed
characteristically
as
as
inconsistent.
as
a
continues to have a bad
incoherent
in
one
way
or
Even philosophical defences of
pacifism are liable to be extremely defensive, conceding only that
consistent,
and
pacifism
is
but insisting otherwise that^is as false as a moral position can be
2
and morally insensitive .
What follows challenges the prevailing wisdom put out
in the philosophical press, but using its approved analytic methods.
§1.
Slide arguments to inconsistency;and arguments from irresponsibili ty and
from rights.
In an influential and widely
disseminated
series
of
articles
attacking
.
pacficism3 , Narveson says that the pacifist's
position is
not only that [Tl] violence is evil but also that [T2] it is morally
wrong to use force [violence] to resist, punish, or prevent violence.
This further step makes pacifism a radical moral doctrine.
What I
shall try to establish below is that it is in fact, more than merely
radical - it is actually incoherent because self-contradictory
(p.408, italics added).
Subsequently (p.414) he characterises pacifism by way of T2, though it would
better characterised by
P2.
be
A
It is morally wrong to use violence.
However T2 captures the cases that
orthodox
opposition.
The
separate
comprehensive
pacifism
from
the
main form of pacifism under investigation is called
'comprehensive' to distinguish it from standard pacifism, in the usual
1
narrower
sense
which
is
restricted to certain theses concerning (state) order, notably
opposition to (violence in) war, and does
not
rule
necessarily
out
violence
elsewhere.
Narveson's location of incoherence in pacifism depends on several connected
slides,
all
of
which the pacifist should resist - without force.
The initial
slide is from the theme T2 italicised above to what results by deletion
the
of
crucial phase 'to use force', or as it should be 'to use violence', namely
R2.
It is morally wrong to resist, punish, or prevent violence -
and similarly from special and related cases of T2 to special and related
of
R2 (e.g.
from T2S, It is forbidden to use force to resist violence, to R2S,
forbidden
It is
cases
to
violence).
resist
The
slide
is
illegitimate
because
commitment to T2 does not entail commitment to the rejected proposition R2;
for
one thing there are many ways of confronting, reducing and controlling violence,
worked
out
by
pacifists
and others, which do not involve use of violence (or
perhaps force).
The initial slide is however that
assault
on
pacifism
(after
clearing
Narveson
several
exploits
confusions,
explain the popularity of pacifism, out of the way).
irresponsibility
of
pacifism,
in
This
his
first
main
which he takes to
argument,
from
the
does not actually lead to contradiction, but it
does suggest that there is a serious tension between pacifism and any method
maintaining social order, so serious that pacifism is socially irresponsible:
... to hold the pacifist position as a genuine full-blooded moral
principle is to hold nobody has a right to fight back when attacked
...
It means that we are all mistaken in supposing that we have the
right of self-protection ...
It appears to mean, for instance, that
we have no right to punish criminals,
that all our machinery of
criminal justice is, in fact, unjust.
Robbers, murderers, rapists, and miscellaneous delinquents ought, on
2
of
this [irresponsible] theory, to be let loose (pp.415-6).
Since one can protect oneself and avoid and resist aggression
back
violence),
(with
pacifism
unless a slide is made.
(tentatively)
by
Nor
does
T1
and
theses
does
without
fighting
not mean what Narveson claims it means,
comprehensive .pacifism,
T2 , imply
that
we
as
characterised
have no right to punish
criminals, but simply that such punishment will not apply violent methods.
Nor
does it imply that all the conventional machinery of criminal justice
therefore
is unjust, but only that some - perhaps a good deal - of that machinery is.
One
hardly needs to be a comprehensive pacifist to coherently think the latter.
All
this provides some confirmation for the key point, which is that
far
at
there
is,
so
least, no inconsistency evident in maintaining that those who hold that
violent methods are morally legitimate are mistaken.
The next slide is closely connected with, and really generalises upon,
initial
slide.
The
stunt
is to imbue a range of more neutral terms with the
connotation of -------------------------------------violence, or at least of -----------------------force which Narveson proceeds to
with
violence.
Thus
from among admissible pacifist methods.
of force is taken to by implied in R2.
resist
cannot
excluded
be
Hence the conflation of T2 and R2;
Hence too Narveson’s assumption
Hence
(p.415).
also
Narveson’s
that
against attack' (pp.417-8).
use
a
unwarranted
"recharacterisation" of pacifism as the position that 'no one ought ever
defended
equate
such activities as resisting, punishing, preventing, and
defending are taken to imply (use of) force or violence, and so to
pacifist
the
to
be
If the stunt were got away with, it would
deprive pacifism of, for instance, the general methods of nonviolent action
and
defensible position.
But
resistance,
and
so
render
pacifism
a
much
less
positions can be defended, as in this paper or on the field,
3
without
violence.
Things
be
can
resisted,
even
things like arrest, without violence (e.g.
sliding out of handcuffs and running away).
by
Force can be applied, as in opening
Violence implies force, but not vice versa;
and
it is violence, not all applications of force, that.comprehensive pacifists
are
a
jam
jar, without violence.
bound to exclude.
The attempt
nonviolent
castrate
to
depriving
It enjoys some popularity even
any case indefensible.
and
by
it
of
among
those
of
advocating
expansion of nonviolent methods, who no doubt want: to distance
themselves from older standard pacifism, whose methods they see as
confined
to
mediation, negotiation, and including the granting of concessions .
compromise,
But nothing in
standard,
range
the
is not confined to those who (want to) think pacifism in
practices,
development
pacifism,
so
the
characterisation
its
limits
of
pacifism,
admissible methods:
whether
comprehensive
or
nothing exclude^ uncompromising
methods and imposition of sanctions which offer no concessions. ?
It
is
simply
that standard pacifism has not yet developed its fuller potential, especially in
conflict resolution.
Subsequent slides in the elaboration of the argument against
just
variations
qualifier.
in
those
pacifism
are
given, writing violence-involving in as an internal
Thus the measure of a person’s opposition to something in
terms
of
’the amount of effort he is willing to put forth against it’ is taken - somewhat
perversely - to be violence-involving effort or opposition in the
pacifist’s
’opposition
to
violence'.
If
this
slide
were
pacifist would be caught in an elementary inconsistency since in
case
of
the
permissible any
being
opposed
to violence, by definition, he is prepared to use violence and so is not opposed
Even Narveson ’cannot make too much* of this inconsistency, though
to violence.
it
not so far removed from the alleged inconsistencies he does want to make
is
much of in his main inconsistency argument.
A similar slide, together with a further slide, Is made in the argument
based
inconsistency
the
on
to
notion of rights, especially as it figures in the
pacifist’s thesis as transformed to the claim that no one has a right to indulge
in
violence
(p.418).
Narveson
violence in the notion of right.
tries
to incorporate the right to indulge in
The initial move is to work in assumptions
of
defence from breaches of a right and of preventative action against infringement
Because ’a right just is a status
of it.
preventative
action
...
does follow logically is that one has a right to whatever may be necessary
what
to
justifying
prevent
necessary’
infringements
of
right'
his
(p.419).
That
'whatever
may
be
out to include force, now very generously construed - here is
turns
the further slide - to incorporate such things as social pressure.
Moreover ’it
is a logical truth, not merely a contingent one, that what might be necessary is
force’ (p.421).
of
preventative
For the presupposed logical transformations to work, the notion
action
must
have
the notion of violence built into it.
argument accordingly begs the question against pacifism.
it
enough
is
for
preventative
To block the
The
argument
action associated with rights to be, or to be
limited to, nonviolent action.
How the argument from rights leads
to
inconsistency
is
summed
up
thus
(p.421):
SAI.
’If we have any rights at all then we have a right to use force to prevent
the deprivation of the thing to which we are said to have a right’.
SA2.
We have, according to the pacifist ’the right not to have violence done to
us’,
as
have
the
a consequence of the obligation to avoid violence.
right
self-contradictory,
to
use
both
violence,
granting
so
the
pacifist’s
position
Narveson
is
that 'our standard concept of rights' yields SAI (cf.
right can be sustained by right-supporting or right-defending
require that that action is violent.
is
and not granting the right to use violence.
The argument fails because SAI is readily rejected.
claiming
But, therefore, we
mistaken
p.423).
action
in
That a
does
not
Pacifists can provide an adequate analysis
of rights - essentially the usual one - without letting themselves in for SAI by
6
simply rejecting the Narveson slide .
What appears in place of SAI is something
like
SAI#.
If we have any rights at all then we have a right to uphold them.
But the right to uphold them, defend them, protect them, etc.,
give
facto,
an entitlement to the use of violence.
no dilemma for the pacifist.
does
not,
ipso
Without the slide there is
The "pacifist's dilemma" and Narveson’s slide
are
two aspects of the one thing.
The arguments from lesser
§2.
argument
violence
and
evil.
lesser
In
outline
the
- which is independent of the notion of rights - is that the pacifists
must admit, in terms of their own principles, that there are cases where the use
of
violence
those
where
Inconsistency
would be morally permissible and morally justified.
some
is
use
of
immediate
violence
by
T2.
would
prevent
evil,
some
greater
violence.
More explicitly, and in Narveson’s terms
which also import the notion of evil, pacifists have
lesser
much
The cases are
to
admit
both
that
the
use of evil, is admissible, in preventing greater evil, and
that it is not admissible, because it involves violence.
6
Narveson summarizes an
argument like this as follows
It seems to me logically true, in any moral theory whatever, that [LI]
the lesser evil must be preferred to the greater.
If the use of force
by me, now, is necessary to avoid the use of more physical force (by
others, perhaps) later, then to say that physical force is the supreme
(kind of) evil is precisely to say that under these circumstances I am
committed to the use of physical force'7.
Now there are several somewhat different arguments snarled up in these sketches,
p
It is important to get them unsnagged , especially if a clearer view of the
ethical role pacifism can assume is to result.
lesser
The basic argument, from
violence, goes as follows
Cl.
There are cases where use of violence would prevent greater violence.
C2.
One ought to minimize violence.
Therefore
C3.
There are cases where one ought to use violence, since in this way, in
any
arbitrary one of the cases indicated, violence is minimized.
Therefore
~P2. It is not (always) morally wrong to use violence,
contradicting the pacifist principle, P2,
according
which
to
it
is
morally
wrong, always, to resort to violence.
All the ingredients
premisses,
can
be
of
argument,
this
together
with
pulled together from Narveson’s work.
support
for
He not only expouses
C2, but suggests two distinct arguments for it, the first of which connects
argument with the lesser evil argument
El.
(Use of) violence is an evil.
E2.
Evil should be minimized.
9
The second argument to C2 is simply from the pacifist premiss, varying P2,
7
the
the
E3.
One ought not to undertake violence
-
period;
that
the
is,
level
of
violence ought to be zero.
Neither argument is decisive;
of
that
reference
both in fact begin easing.pacifists into a
should
they
resist, where moral absolutes are warped into
moral relatives, where obligations give, way to obligations
all, and says nothing about minimizing it when one
compatible
being
does
it.
into
got
has
E3
is
directives quite different from minimization where violence is
with
involved, e.g.
E3
things
other
In any event E3 only directs one not to get involved in violence at
equal, etc.
Thus
frame
rooting it out which may
involve
strategies.
non-minimization
not entail E2, and commitment to E3 does not commit pacifists to
C2.
Nor do El and E2 entail C2;
so neither does commitment, by
to El and E2 oblige them to accept C2.
instance,
10
,
e.g.
evil-perpetrating
but
argument
Narveson's
well-known
Such
nonviolent
fails
for
similar
some
as
cases
hypothetical
dictators.
for
For in particular violence is
not the only evil and (so) evil may sometimes be reduced by
violence
pacifists
Regan’s
increases
in
slaying
of
the
reconstruction
of
Regan argues from premisses
reasons.
concerning the ranking of evil and a premiss like E2, specifically
3.
4.
The use of force is a substantive evil.
Therefore, a lesser quuantity of force must
great quantity of force (Rp.79).
The argument is invalid:
ordering
of
an
ordering
of
evils
force, even though force is an evil.
increasing force may still reduce evil, and so, on
be preferrable \
8
does
be
preferred
not
induce
to
a
a
similar
It is enough to observe that
Regan-Narveson
assumptions,
Resort to the theme that
Elt,
Violence is an irredeemable evil
in
(proposed by Regan
by
investigated
his
Narveson,
Np.118)
irredeemable evil is figuratively
(lesser
or
evils)
whites
pacifism,
of
"defence"
promises
so
black
Rp.80,
and
subsequently
a way around the difficulty.
that
no
combination
(goods) will lighten its hue;
with
An
grays
it always dominates.
Elt together with E2 will yield C2, but now the problem with Che argument shifts
to
What are the grounds for that?
Elt.
not widely acceptable, most people being
amount
of
As Narveson points out (Np.119), it is
prepared
to
countenance
violence in exchange for considerable goods.
some
(But then, not so long
ago, most people were tolerant of cruelty to animals so long as it was
gross.)
small
/not
too
Moreover, so Narveson implies, appeal to Elt does not get. pacifists out
of the argument from lesser violence;
underwriting C2.
indeed it seems to get them in deeper, by
for it removes Cl and, more importantly,
It does not however;
the corresponding premiss of the more difficult argument from lesser evil, which
starts from
DI.
There are cases where the use of violence would avoid greater evil.
For given, by Elt, that use of
greater
evil
than
that
cases such as DI requires.
Rp.80ff.),
which
however
violence
is
irredeemably
with violence;
tainted
evil,
there
is
no
and there are accordingly no
This is the core of Regan's defence in pacifism (see
he
sees
as converting pacifism into a 'bizarre and
vaguely ludicrous’ position (Rp.86), extreme pacifism, some of the
12
which he outlines
9
features
of
The approach through
violence
as
an
irredeemable
evil
is
mistaken
a
(utilitarian inspired) attempt to get at moral absolutes, which is what pacifism
is, like other deontological positions, grounded upon.
But such
absolutes
expressed in such commandments as, One ought not to commit violence,
adequately
meaning thereby, as it says, ought not, not just for the time being, or so
as
reasons
prima
are
facie,
otherwise don’t arise, or other things being equal, or
acting
for
ought
but
long
come
not
what
may,
period.
old-fashioned
Such
deontological, moral absolutist positions such as pacifism is at bottom, collide
head-on
with
utilitarianism
both
that
pacifism'.
For
the
moral
’utilitarianism
'that
utility
will
be
...
who
is
incompatible
brought out by doing some
violence may be greater than that produced by any alternative'
he
like
positions
and Regan (at the time) were working from.
Narveson
The reason for collision is simply that
with
malleable
highly
fashionable,
more
(Np.121)
13
.
So
acccording to the utilitarian-commandment to maximize utility may
acts
sometimes commit violence, contravening pacifist principles.
On its own inconsistency with a false doctrine such as utilitarianism shows
little:
position
every
suffers inconsistency with very many false doctrines.
Narveson does have another (small) argument to the effect that pacifism is
at
odds
with
contractarianism.
correct,
if
other
the
the
ethical
positions
he
presents, libertarianism and
But this argument would only carry weight, were it.
positions
were
suitably
exhaustive;
including no deeper ecological position for instance.
is
more
also
otherwise
however they are not,
What has
happened
which
insidious, however, is that utilitarian thinking has permeated much of
the rest of ethical thought, thus helping to establish a climate unfavourable to
incompatible
ethical
positions
such as pacifism.
10
There are two more specific
features.
damaging
consequentalist
Firstly,
as
more
approaches
have
we
of
consequentialist
Secondly,
facie
prima
principles
positions
out
utilitarianism,
of
This is entirely
mistaken.
The
is a theory-saving device, designed to get
difficulties
such
dilemmas.
moral
as
consequentialist positions tend to suggest that only consequentialist
reasons carry argumentative weight, and so try to ease rival positions, such
pacifism,
and
generally, have made it seem as if no deontic
principle were firm, but all are provisional.
theory
seen,
into
as
sometimes incongruous consequential support for their
offering
themes.
Narveson takes such procedures a
assumptions
upon
violence is that it
These
(p.425).
thus
pacifists:
produces
stage
further,
and
foists
utilitarian
says that the pacifist's 'objection to
he
suffering,
unwanted
pain,
in
the
recipients'
incongrous utilitarian grounds are something of a travesty of
pacifists' reasons for objecting to violence, which concern rather the
action
involved
and
what
it
does,
not
astonishing
such
of
only or always at all in the way of
suffering, to the perpetrators as well as those in whom it is
more
type
inflicted.
Even
utilitarian-style considerations are supposed to commit
the pacifist to the follow three statements, one of which however he
must
deny
(!):
[N]l.
To will the end (as mostly good) is to will the means to it (at
least pjotTce prima facie).
[N]2.
Other things being equal, the lesser evil is to be preferred to
the greater.
[N]3.
There are no "privileged" moral persons ...
(p.425^ ' .
'These three principles' which appear in Narveson's 'sum up [of] the
problem',
11
pacifist's
among them imply, as far as I can see, both the commitment to force
when it is necessary to prevent more violence and also the conception
of a right as an entitlement to defense.
And they therefore leave
pacifism, as a moral doctrine, in a logically untenable position
(p.425).
consequences
out
of
the
substantive terms such as
implicans;
otherwise
but
logic,
It would take not merely
statements
’violence’
the
deal
good
a
of
magic,
coax
to
given.
For implications to hold the
, /''I
<</<<-</ ,■/"
<
F^
and
’right’ must also figure , in the
just
fail
implications
on
formal
grounds.
intended argument to the "commitment to force” conclusion appears however to
some
for
e.g.
The
be
of variant, on the lesser violence argument, with N2 replacing, as it
sort
may C2.
such
(N3 and N1 then have oblique roles, N3 to stop
exceptions
being
made
oneself, N1 to ensure that violence adopted as a means has its full import,
in
as reflected in Cl,
construction
work
the
ethical
an
end).
But,
without
need not worry pacifists;
arguments
much
further
they hardly leave
pacifism as untenable.
Much more threatening is the argument from lesser evil, which has yet to be
This
countered.
is
argument from DI (cases of violence to avoid greater
the
evil) and N2 or E2 (minimization of evil) to C3 (admissibility of violence)
inconsistency
in
comprehensive
stock examples concern murder,
What are these cases^?
pacifism.
one
of
them
being
the
Narveson’s
situation
where
(Narveson in fact) must kill the (potential) mass-murderer B (Np.119).
is the moral situation here?
Narveson ought to prevent
but
mass-murder,
that
of
a
paradigmatic
moral
In fact the example is
dilemma,
that
of
very
similar
also
The
to
Pedro and Jim, where Pedro
volunteers to call off his firing squad about to shoot several captives
12
one
But what
Narveson ought not to kill B, because that is murder and involves violence.
situation is that of a moral dilemma.
and
if
Jim
one
shoots
Now almost everything turns on what account is given of
What a comprehensive pacifist does
moral dilemmas.
trouble,
coherence
.
of them
is
to
take
do,
not
inadequate utilitarian line of trying to
the
explain moral dilemmas away, as if they didn’t ever, occur
an
than
initial
intuitive
negotiable, etc., etc.
is
as
level),
wants
he
unless
if
(at
at
least
other
all obligations were prime facie,
The conflicting obligations stand.
What is to
done
be
however a very consequentialist thing, to try to determine the best thing to
do in the circumstances.
action
In trying to determine what
circumstances
is
a
satisfied.
violent
sense
this
the
best
e.g.
Narveson
had
better
a
fix.
Narveson
dilemma,
but
no
B.
shoot
(not a deontic one) evil should be minimized;
not
ought
circumstances, he had better do so
moral
of
17
.
to
the
in
course
Granted, it is preferable to minimize
follow that Narveson ought to resort to violence.
remains
course
best
that
Suppose
one,
inconsistency in pacifism follows.
in
the
principles like N2 and its mate, N2M, that it is preferrable to minimize
evil, will presumably be
and
is
evil,
it does not
On the contrary the situation
shoot
B,
but
in
the
appalling
There is the real-life complication of
inconsistency
No
a
through arguments like that from lesser
evil.
Narveson’s jackpot question, entangled in his discussion
from rights, can now be met.
of
the
argument
The question presents a dilemma:
If force is the only way to prevent violence in a given case,
use justified in that case? (p.420)
is
its
Narveson is thinking of cases where one is about to be murdered, Regan where one
is to be raped.
qualified No:
Given that force again entails violence, the pacifist answer is
No, it is not
deontically
13
justified
18
.
It
is
certainly
not
morally
it is not justified in the sense of ’justified* which
and
obligatory,
reflects its deontic origin in ’making right*.
may
and
because
just
some
might
force
in
solution,
a
making
to
amount
dilemma
be
out
But justification is
The response is qualified then
a case.
consequentially
situation.
ambiguous,
as
justified,
a
second-best
Narveson, proposes on the contrary, that
enough violence for the given occasion is morally justified - it can go at least
as
as killing another person - but he presents no back-up argument, taking
far
his proposal as evident.
jackpot
the
question
As it is not - the pacifist can simply
does
not
dispute
it
to a decisive a^rument against pacifism
lead
(though Narveson gives the impression that it does, e.g. , p.423).
What
it
can
lead to is the argument from lesser evil over again.
The charge of moral insensitivity.
§3.
This
is
less
argument
an
than
a
damaging charge:
A person committed to an extreme pacifism,
though he need make no
logical mistake, yet lacks a fully developed moral sensitivity to the
vagaries and complexities of human existence (Rp.86).
The smear is not without basis.
is
applied
avert
to
greater
Regan is envisaging situations
evil;
where
violence
and he points to what he takes to be the
evident moral permissibility of a woman's using ’what physical power she has
free
herself
from
an
Interestingly, Regan has not
aspiring rapist* (Rp.86).
described the situation in a way which is incompatible with
there
is
violence,
which
implies
What is at issue
the
intentional,
non-negligible damage, including pain, injury or
(cf.
a
pacifist
stand:
nothing in that to prevent a woman wriggling free (even in a way that
involves some force) and fleeing.
using
to
is
(or
death,
the
permissibility
of
infliction
of
wilful)
by
forceful
means /
Np.110), that is, which involves much more than mere use of physical force
And it is by no means so
or power.
violence
inflict
upon
evident
A
rapist.
aspiring
the
the
that
woman
is
entitled
to
can hardly now be
pacifist
accused, in a way that can be made to stick, of crass moral insensitivity.
More generally, arguments
pacifism,
the
on
like
Regan’s
the
to
insensitivity
moral
of
basis of pacifists' not taking obvious steps to prevent evil
I
occurrences, depend upon a confusion of passivity and pacifity.
Narveson
p.425)
(e.g.
Both Regan
and
assume that pacifism is a passive do-nothing position.
20
This is far from true, as the variety of
nonviolent
action
methods
groups has made plain.
comprehend the real possibilities of
considered
or
adopted
by
Neither Regan nor Narveson correctly
nonviolent
action.
Otherwise,
Narveson
would hardly be able to assert, in the automatic (but carping) way he does, that
the pacifist is
Narveson's
standing
negative
later
'not
by
doing
assessment
does not change the situation:
anything
about’
violence
(p.425).
of what he calls 'poslLlve nonviolence'
for this positive approach is simply nonviolence
practised in an exemplary way, as by Christ, in the hope that others will follow
suit, and fails to recognise the potential of nonviolent training and the
and
effectiveness
when
assembled
21
,
of nonviolent practices.
much
reduce
the
impact
scope
Fuller details of these practices,
of
the
argument
from
social
irresponsiblity, which is part of what lies behind the change of insensitivity.
Pacifism, however, like most positions, has
them
22
its
weaknesses,
one
of
undoubtedly derives from the fact that violence is a quantitative matter
and there is no sharp cut-off point at the bottom end of the
amounts
and
of
violence
greater
than
zero.
Yet
scale
with
minute (non-foot-in-the-door )
amounts do not seem to matter all that much morally, at least compared with
15
small
the
that
evils
gross
us
confront
on most sides when we look.
Morally sensitive
pacifists will not focus or fixate on small quantities of violence to the
of
exclusion
larger
moral
They
problems.
give
certainly
will
understood that by ’violence' in principles such as. P2
mean
they
it
undue
to be
'non-trivial
violence'.
§4.
and
The argument from radical political corollaries
The
corollaries.
out war by definition.
so clear.
Although
War
situations?
normally
would
Standard
war
always
would
be
what
excluded,
be
morally
counted
brought
progressively
then
second
dilemma
the
impermissible,
best
but
in
thing
to
closer
to
Comprehensive pacifism can of course
extreme
principles emphasizing the evil of violence.
weighing
of
Comprehensive pacifism thus does not include standard
A strange pacifism!
pacifism, in contrast to extreme pacifism.
be
pacifism
But the position of comprehensive pacifism is not
exceptional extenuating circumstances it might be the (second-)
do.
awkward
of extreme pacifism would certainly eliminate war.
practice
For war involves violence, typically on an extensive scale.
takes
other
from
best
choices
will
pacifism, in
practice, through
If evil is given a suitably
yield
the
large
same results as extreme
A
pacifism does (deontically), and entirely exclude war.
Now it can hardly be cogently argued that it tells against pacifism that it
would
eliminate wars, since wars are exchanges that should certainly be avoided
at all reasonable costs;
nor therefore can an
argument
Wz/Acuf
desirability
fHur/l
of war as an institution against pacifism,!
mounted from the
or Cldc.
However wars are by no
be
means the only social arrangements or institutions which dispense^ or rely u
violence
extensively.
The
state and many of its institutions, most obviously
police
inadmissibility
of
characteriscally are
contraposition
do.
also
forces,
coercive
23
institutions
and hence
;
pacifism
Comprehensive
it
as
such
implies
police
anarchism
provides no refutation of pacifism..
the
implies
24
moral
forces and states
But
once
again
For anarchism itself is (to
25
stick with a bold claim) irrefutable
Pacifism as an
ideal
brought
not
is
.down by its political corollaries.
Pacifism yields not only a qualified anarchism but qualified vegetarianism.
While
does
it
not
eating of meat, it does morally forbid violence to
forbid
animals.
At least it does this so long as what normally counts as violence,
animals,
continues to rank as valence, and is not removed from the category by
restriction of the application of violence to humans
little
good
for
however
basis
corollaries naturally
spread
suicide,
capt^al
euthenasia,
(or
such a chauvinistic restriction.
several
into
punishment,
controversial
indeed
There
persons).
is
The radical
moral,
wherever
to
e.g.
areas,
violence
plays a
significant role in many cases'1. The sheer moral power of pacifism is one reason
/7j Qc4>
for giving it some pause. And there are others.
/
One is that, like vegetarianism, it runs counter to "natural" behaviour
of
creatures to which the principles are supposed to apply. Aggression is a fairly
S' X
common feature of animal and human behavioZur, and it sometimes (though by no
means so often is as made out) involves violence. /Ze /cVXC o/1 //>£
Ao'jje.tjw
enable
ct/ony
Ac
/Aggression is assumed to be an evolutionary adaption
/ZeSG-
creatures
offspring) in their
artificial
h
to
be
better
natural
environments
fitted
environment.
substantially
17
developed
to
for survival (of themselves and their
most
humans
removed
from
now
live
situations
in
for
rather
which
there is no way they are
evolution gradually adapted their features:
adapt in time to absorb massive doses of radiation for instance.
have
substantially
living
their
adjusted
adjust
environment,
along
so
with
^oing
to
Much as humans
should
they
it
their social practices - including aggressive and violent
practices, now ill-adapted to their situation and mostly counter productive.
There is a residual problem,
practices
of
living
creatures
like
in
that
confronting
natural
(relatively)
vegetarianism.
conditions, such as
predators and tribal people, to be condemned as morally wrong when they
Sometimes,
violence?
involve
when the violence grossly exceeds what is required
yes,
Though a way can be beaten around the
given the end to be attained; but always?
edge of this problem
Are
26
it is an unsatisfactory way. What this suggests is that
<u t be^t
nonviolence is not an absolute but^an ideal. The arguments for nonviolence
which
are
mostly
violence and do not strictly
suggest
a
to
apply
since
it
in
creatures
natural
surroundings
opens
door
the
a
approaches would categorically exclude.
chink
to
other
options
The further suggestion that
emerges is that moral thinking and associated principles in this area are
pretty
primitive
aimed, among
principles
state;
other
than
P2.
and
what
-
But the suggestion is a dangerous one,
sort of conclusion.
similar
practically at least,
nonviolent
arguments which do not exclude occasional uses of
practical
is
things,
at
sharper,
This
is
to
in
a
called for is much more investigation
more
concede
an
sensitive,
attentuated
and
less
charge
insensitivity against comprehensive pacifism so long as P2 remains
blanket
of moral
unqualified.
There is no reason however why a genuine pacifism (making for real peace) should
not be built on a modified version of P2 which permits such natural phenomena as
predation.
Nothing
logically
rules
18
out
such
a
genuine and more sensitive
pacifism
27
There are other requiriments the position to be worked out should meet.
in
should,
particular, be integrated into a Larger framework of nondestructive
practices, which
are
involve violence, e.g.
a
of
a
practices
metaphorically,
damaging
wild
nonviolent* practices.
are
practices
But,
except
destructive to the environment, for instance, do not
such
river,
with
piece
things
dumping
vandalism.
wastes
toxic
But
mining
strip
as
extended sense, which gets beyond the confines
these
It
of
in
a
valley,
fertile
in streams and oceans.
the
property
In an
picture,
all
even metaphorically, vandalism does not
such
cover violence against persons (and certainly not nonphysical violence
as
I
"psychological
violence").
What is sought /is an appropriate synthesis of these
notions covering destructive practices - and
better than 'vandolence'.
an
Then P2 is superseded
accompanying synthetic term,
4/Z2°.
It is morally wrong to
use vandolence./ It remains to characterise the cluster of destructive practices
(/V
that count as vandolence and to try to justify the principle - no easy tasks.
FOOTNOTES
1.
’a valid Christian
According to the US Catholic Bishops, pacifism is
to
Christ
and the early
long
tradition
going
back
position’, with a
lifestyle:
see Origins
Christians who were committed to a nonviolent
pp.310-311.
2.
Thus, in particular, T. Regan ’A defence of pacifism', Canadian Journal of
Philosophy
11 (1972) 73-86. Page references to this article are prefixed by
_
3.
J. Narveson 'Pacifism: a philosophical analysis’, Ethics 75 (1968) and ’Is
pacifism consistent’, Ethics 78 (1868). The first article is reprinted in
War and Morality (ed.
R.
Wasserstrom) Wadsworth, Belmont, California,
T97O7 pp.63-77. The first article is also rewritten and combined with part
of the second in 'Pacifism: a philosophical analysis’, Moral Problems (ed.
19
77ju
/
/A
ZAC
A
IZ(M2
J.
Rachels), Third Edition, Harper .Row, New York, 1979, pp.408-425. Page
references without further citation are to this latter article.
Narveson's
theme that pacifism is incoherent is headlined and further elaborated in his
’Violence and war’, Matters of Life and Death (ed.
T.
Regan), Temple
University Press, Philadelphia, 1980, pp.109-147. Page references prefixed
by 'N' are to this article.
4.
Pacifism, as involving the active use of defensive methods, can be traced
back as far as the Mohist philosophers of ancient China. On modern methods
see especially G.
Sharp, Exploring Nonviolent Alternatives, Boston,
1971.
As will emerge, it is important to distinguish fas Narveson does not in his
earlier work) force from violence; they not equivalent.
/\
5.
Thus, e.g., G.
Sharp in several works: see for instance the unduly narrow
definition of pacifism given in Social Power and Political Freedom, Porter
Sargent Publishers, Boston, 1980, p.198.
6.
Narveson, in responding to a suggestion of Armour (pp.423-4) sees nothing
between (0) defence of rights, with the slide to violence in, and (1)
nothing really answering to rights at all, where words like 'rights’ occur
without stuffing. This shows a serious blindspot. What lies in between are
a range of notions which do not guarantee the slide to violence.
An account of rights which will serve is that given in R. and V.
Routley
’Human chauvinism and environment ethics' in Environmental Philosophy (ed.
D. Mannison and others) Research School of Social Sciences, Australian
National University, 1980; see especially p.
Narveson 'Is pacifism inconsistent' Ethics 78 (1968) p.148.
7.
J.
8.
Without getting into the level of complication, not to say epicycling,
that
Regan lands himself in:
he is obliged to distinguish three mirage-like
senses of 'lesser evil': quantitative, qualitative, and resultant (Rp.78).
9.
See Np.127 where it is asserted that violence as a source of evil should be
minimized, and Np.119> where the point is put in terms of absolute evil.
That way of putting it already starts to give the game away, since Narveson
is all too evidently interested in negotiable evil which can be traded off
against other evils.
10.
An argument like the argument from lesser violence itself would appear to
undercut the argument for
El and E2 to premiss 02 for the argument for
lesser violence.
11.
That is by no means the onlyelement in Regan's torturous reformulation
of
Narveson's argument that can
be faulted. Consider, for example, premiss '5.
If any given action, A, is necessary to bring about a lesser rather than a
greater quantity of qualitatively equivalent evil, then one's obligation is
to do A.' While the premiss has considerable appeal as a principle of
supererogation, there is little reason to accept it as one supplying
obligations.
20
12.
Extreme pacifism can be seen as taking the rule that one ought never to use
violence as having priority over all other moral rules - which Is indeed an
extreme position even if a consistent one.
Such a priority rule is an
unsatisfactory way to deal with moral dilemmas.
13.
To show what Narveson goes on to claim that people are sometimes justified
in using force rather more is required, as Regan points out, Rp 85, n.18.
It has also to be shown that there are cases of these types (as in Cl) and
that agents can know that use of force will increase utility, reduce evil,
etc. A pacifist, rightly sceptical of utilitarian tracing of consequences,
and fond of noting that violence begets violence, could, with a small dose
of scepticism also, dig in at this point and claim that because no one can
be sure that use of force will reduce evil, so no one is justified in using
force. This is sceptically-based pacifism.
14.
Narveson also wants to contend that ’all of these may be defended on purely
logical or "meta-ethical" grounds’. This is likely false, especially the
claim as to logical status, since some of the principles are rejected in
substantive ethical theories.
15.
A surprising feature of Narveson’s argument, also Regan’s "reconstruction",
is that these cases are nowhere in sight, as if again one got to conclusions
logically out of the air, without any of the hard work the cases involve.
16.
The example was first discussed in B.
17.
This terminology matches the account of moral dilemma, given in much more
technical detail in R.
Routley and V.
Plumwood ’Moral dilemmas and the
logic of deontic notions’ in Paraconsistent Logic (ed.
G.
Priest and
others) 1983, to appear.
18.
An extreme pacifist would answer with an unqualified No.
19.
Directed against other creatures and more generally against ecological
systems such as ecosystems which can be hurt. There is a difference here
between live(go al-direct ed")~systerns and property, and comprehensive pacifism
does not necessarily exclude wilful damage to property. Thus eco-pacifists
may destroy, or at least disable, bulldozers but not harm those who use
bulldozers to destroy habitat.
However sensitive eco-pacifists will not
condone "violent" destruction of property either: disab^ling of equipment
is different.
20.
The methods also include anticipatory action, e.g., the policemen going off
to enact violence find their vehicles won’t start, e.g. because components
have been removed
21
the peace movement should be preparing for
B. Martin ’How
See e.g
of
Peace
Proposals 13 (1982) 149-159, and references
Bulletin
war
’
nuclear
cited therein pp.152-3.
Williams,
//.( Zc (V, /, ( 1
J n l »'
/? o C-, /
/ /'
/\ <. ?
/
< / / i ’'i
*7 z*
//4
’Conflict: of values’.
22.
Another comes from the necessary circumscription of permissible nonviolent
action, to ensure that it does not include actions worse than nontrivial
violent action.
23.
These organisations may be ruled out directly as violence-dispensing or else
because they have individuals, delegates, who effect violence on their
behalf.
24.
In the sufficiently comprehensive form that the coercive state is without
moral basis or legitimacy.
Of course the "state" may have nonviolent
methods available to it; it may not be a purely voluntary arrangement.
25.
See R. Routley and V.
Alternatives, (1982).
26.
As Singer has in the analogous case of vegetarianism.
27.
The position has been called 'pacificism*.
Plumwood 'The irrefutability of
22
anarchism’,
Social
On the alleged impracticality of pacifism in the real world.
Appendix §5.
Even if it is conceded that pacifism is a viable moral ideal, that it
does
not fall down as incoherent or ludicrous, still the feasibility of pacifism as a
sensible practice to live by will bo contested - despite, or perhaps because of,
major
examples
such
as Christ and Gandhi.
And it has to be admitted that the
real world, with all its horror and squalor, does put pacifism to severe tests.
Nowhere is the practice of
nonviolence
than in replacing war \
succeed
usually
been
given
a
dress rehearsal.
defence of a region can vary
convention
observed
is
or
less
likely
to
Yet nonviolent defence methods, to replace the
2
detail ,
usual violent methods, have been described in some
never
thought
though
they
have
The prospects for success of nonviolent
significantly,
depending
upon
whether
the
war
If the convention Is observed then pacifism
not.
stands reasonable prospects of success.
The difficult cases are where the war convention
unleashed,
perhaps
broken,
is
in massive ways, on noncombatants.
his superficially sympathetic sketch and assessment of
resistance,
'success ...
may
all
sorts
of
this:
According to Walzer, in
nonviolent
defence
and
This is presumably false.
that
The invaders may give up and depart
reasons, some of them irrelevant, e.g., they needed a quick
decisive victory, they got homesick.
like
is
attained - there is never any guarantee of it, without or with
be
war - even if some conventions are flouted.
for
violence
is possible only if the invaders are committed to the
3
war convention - and they won’t always be’ (Wp.331~).
Success
and
sufficiently
What Walzer no doubt
ruthless
invaders
sufficient time and sufficient support lines, etc.
23
means
is
something
in sufficient numbers with
can eventually succeed.
But
sort of thing is also true even if the defending side resorts to violence.
that
The difference lies in the pattern of events;
is
more
difficult
and
costly
for
if the defence is
invaders
the
to
well-armed
it
with and easier
start
afterwards than with well-prepared civil resistance-.
Walzer is thinking, however, like many who
jump
to
the
that
conclusion
nonviolent defence cannot succeed when the war convention is abandoned, in terms
of inappropriate examples.
command,
total
in
the
He is thinking of an extreme totalitarian state,
way
the
Nazis
were
in Germany, the Jews of Germany
The
providing the model of the enslaved population, the ’‘resistance".
is
highly misleading.
picture
The Nazis, who never invaded Germany, were in control of
all the infrastructure and had the cooperation (at least) of
the
bulk
of
the
For Walzer‘s comparison to work, there would have to be an enormous
population.
occupying army which took over and managed all key infrastructure.
island
With
such as Australia it is not even so clear that this is logistically
territories
feasible against a largely united and actively resisting
of
impression
in
the
acquiscence (e.g.
resistance
Walzer's
population.
fragmenting and the populace moving into dulled
Wp.332) might have got things
the
wrong
way
around,
the
test
with
4
disbelieving and frustrated soldiers ready to leave .
Nonviolent resistance is however unlikely to be put
adequate
way
in
present
state-determined
prepared to risk training its populace
(civil
defence
the police:
is different).
in
to
any
No state would be
circumstances.
full
in
action
nonviolent
techniques
It would then be. all to easy for them to "rout"
civil obedience, for example, could no longer
customary violent means.
24
be
ensured
by
the
FOOTNOTES
The replacement of the state is considered
op.cit.
For example, in Sharp, op.cit.
given there.
See also
in
Routley
Martin,
All page references prefixed by ’W’ are to M.
Allen Lane, London, 1977.
and
op.cit.,
Plumwood,
and
82,
references
Walzer, Just and Unjust: Wars,
The argument suggested in Walzer (e.g. p.333) that nonviolent methods would
increase evil, or at least its distribution, is weak.
It is countered by
Sharp’s observation that the suffering likely to be induced is less than in
comparable wars.
§6.
On the positive case for pacifism.
defensive,
meeting
itself is revealing.
deviations
enough:
a
The argument thus far has been largely
That in
of objections to comprehensive pacifism.
range
Pacifism
is
the
rest
position
from it are what require explanation.
and
state)
(inertial
-The reason for this is simple
violence is, on most ethical systems, at least a prima facie
evil,
so
use of it has to be justified.
Positive arguments for pacifdism
position
and
merely
try
supposed to be justified.
violent
opponent:
to
can
advantage
take
of
privileged
dispose of "exceptional cases" where violence is
The favourite exception
is
self-defence
against
a
the case is curious in that the defender (person or nation)
is already in a morally-excluded situation, since the attacker
moral bounds.
its
has
overstepped
Still the defender is not normally committed to violence whatever
he does - as in a dilemma situation.
And since
it
is
at
least
facie
prima
wrong, and he does not have to use it, he should not resort to it.
An elementary syllogistic argument, given by Narveson (Np.117), can
be
adapted
to give a similar result:Violence is (intrinsically) wrong
Violence in any excepted cases (e.g.
self-defence) is still violence
Violence in any excepted cases is still (intrinsically) wrong.
Naturally those opposed to pacifism will challenge
the
first
premiss,
and
a
dialectic already glimpsed will begin.
None of the
arguments
are
arguments
for
pacifism
are
conclusive,
since
even
where
deductively tight assumptions can be challenged (as above).
are all the arguments for pacificism particularly good ones.
26
One of the
Nor
poorer
positive arguments for pacifism, for example, makes similar assumptions to those
of the classic theory of war, namely that once war is embarked upon it cannot be
limited,
the
e.g.
that
hope
or
nuclear
selectively and restrictively is an illusion,
(moral)
limits
in
Although
the
chances
overstated.
war
-
of
whatever
they
eXcalation
are
exchanges
Limited
escalation
are
be
used
inevitable.
The
weapons
chemical
is
will
- are bound to be overstepped.
often
real
enough,
and confrontation are possible.
more social arrangements and much more conventional than
the
the
case
is
Wars are much
theory
classical
Wars can, for example, be started and stopped in midstream should more
allows.
important
things
intervene
(e.g.
pollution
a
crisis
affecting
other
neighbouring states).
The main reasons for pacifism are, inevitably, those for nonviolence.
They
include (as support for the first premiss above) a range of consequentialist and
practical reasons, e.g.
suffering
of modern industrial societies, the broader popular
avoidance
and
anguish
of
support
base
obtained
None of these well-known
types
are separately decisive, but their cumulative effect is considerable.
' Cz/
//
Z'1
1
Is Ct' i
L>
) s' *4
/
/
27
— >
A
by
of violence, the desirable social consequences of nonviolence such as
a more open, less furtive, society.
)
violent
futility and counterproductiveness of violence within the setting
the
methods,
the cost in pain,
? . z.. z .
of
reason
OF PACIFISM
Pacifism , despite its.revival lit the nonviolent action movement
A
respectable
philooophieg-1 press.
another,
the
within
tradition
Catholic
church ,
It is commonly portrayed
characteristically
as
as
inconsistent.
as
a
continues to have a bad
incoherent
in
one
way
or
Even philosophical defences of
pacifism are liable to be extremely defensive, conceding only that
consistent,
and
pacifism
is
but insisting otherwise that^is as false as a moral position can be
2
and morally insensitive .
What follows challenges the prevailing wisdom put out
in the philosophical press, but using its approved analytic methods.
§1.
Slide arguments to inconsistency;and arguments from irresponsibili ty and
from rights.
In an influential and widely
disseminated
series
of
articles
attacking
.
pacficism3 , Narveson says that the pacifist's
position is
not only that [Tl] violence is evil but also that [T2] it is morally
wrong to use force [violence] to resist, punish, or prevent violence.
This further step makes pacifism a radical moral doctrine.
What I
shall try to establish below is that it is in fact, more than merely
radical - it is actually incoherent because self-contradictory
(p.408, italics added).
Subsequently (p.414) he characterises pacifism by way of T2, though it would
better characterised by
P2.
be
A
It is morally wrong to use violence.
However T2 captures the cases that
orthodox
opposition.
The
separate
comprehensive
pacifism
from
the
main form of pacifism under investigation is called
'comprehensive' to distinguish it from standard pacifism, in the usual
1
narrower
sense
which
is
restricted to certain theses concerning (state) order, notably
opposition to (violence in) war, and does
not
rule
necessarily
out
violence
elsewhere.
Narveson's location of incoherence in pacifism depends on several connected
slides,
all
of
which the pacifist should resist - without force.
The initial
slide is from the theme T2 italicised above to what results by deletion
the
of
crucial phase 'to use force', or as it should be 'to use violence', namely
R2.
It is morally wrong to resist, punish, or prevent violence -
and similarly from special and related cases of T2 to special and related
of
R2 (e.g.
from T2S, It is forbidden to use force to resist violence, to R2S,
forbidden
It is
cases
to
violence).
resist
The
slide
is
illegitimate
because
commitment to T2 does not entail commitment to the rejected proposition R2;
for
one thing there are many ways of confronting, reducing and controlling violence,
worked
out
by
pacifists
and others, which do not involve use of violence (or
perhaps force).
The initial slide is however that
assault
on
pacifism
(after
clearing
Narveson
several
exploits
confusions,
explain the popularity of pacifism, out of the way).
irresponsibility
of
pacifism,
in
This
his
first
main
which he takes to
argument,
from
the
does not actually lead to contradiction, but it
does suggest that there is a serious tension between pacifism and any method
maintaining social order, so serious that pacifism is socially irresponsible:
... to hold the pacifist position as a genuine full-blooded moral
principle is to hold nobody has a right to fight back when attacked
...
It means that we are all mistaken in supposing that we have the
right of self-protection ...
It appears to mean, for instance, that
we have no right to punish criminals,
that all our machinery of
criminal justice is, in fact, unjust.
Robbers, murderers, rapists, and miscellaneous delinquents ought, on
2
of
this [irresponsible] theory, to be let loose (pp.415-6).
Since one can protect oneself and avoid and resist aggression
back
violence),
(with
pacifism
unless a slide is made.
(tentatively)
by
Nor
does
T1
and
theses
does
without
fighting
not mean what Narveson claims it means,
comprehensive .pacifism,
T2 , imply
that
we
as
characterised
have no right to punish
criminals, but simply that such punishment will not apply violent methods.
Nor
does it imply that all the conventional machinery of criminal justice
therefore
is unjust, but only that some - perhaps a good deal - of that machinery is.
One
hardly needs to be a comprehensive pacifist to coherently think the latter.
All
this provides some confirmation for the key point, which is that
far
at
there
is,
so
least, no inconsistency evident in maintaining that those who hold that
violent methods are morally legitimate are mistaken.
The next slide is closely connected with, and really generalises upon,
initial
slide.
The
stunt
is to imbue a range of more neutral terms with the
connotation of -------------------------------------violence, or at least of -----------------------force which Narveson proceeds to
with
violence.
Thus
from among admissible pacifist methods.
of force is taken to by implied in R2.
resist
cannot
excluded
be
Hence the conflation of T2 and R2;
Hence too Narveson’s assumption
Hence
(p.415).
also
Narveson’s
that
against attack' (pp.417-8).
use
a
unwarranted
"recharacterisation" of pacifism as the position that 'no one ought ever
defended
equate
such activities as resisting, punishing, preventing, and
defending are taken to imply (use of) force or violence, and so to
pacifist
the
to
be
If the stunt were got away with, it would
deprive pacifism of, for instance, the general methods of nonviolent action
and
defensible position.
But
resistance,
and
so
render
pacifism
a
much
less
positions can be defended, as in this paper or on the field,
3
without
violence.
Things
be
can
resisted,
even
things like arrest, without violence (e.g.
sliding out of handcuffs and running away).
by
Force can be applied, as in opening
Violence implies force, but not vice versa;
and
it is violence, not all applications of force, that.comprehensive pacifists
are
a
jam
jar, without violence.
bound to exclude.
The attempt
nonviolent
castrate
to
depriving
It enjoys some popularity even
any case indefensible.
and
by
it
of
among
those
of
advocating
expansion of nonviolent methods, who no doubt want: to distance
themselves from older standard pacifism, whose methods they see as
confined
to
mediation, negotiation, and including the granting of concessions .
compromise,
But nothing in
standard,
range
the
is not confined to those who (want to) think pacifism in
practices,
development
pacifism,
so
the
characterisation
its
limits
of
pacifism,
admissible methods:
whether
comprehensive
or
nothing exclude^ uncompromising
methods and imposition of sanctions which offer no concessions. ?
It
is
simply
that standard pacifism has not yet developed its fuller potential, especially in
conflict resolution.
Subsequent slides in the elaboration of the argument against
just
variations
qualifier.
in
those
pacifism
are
given, writing violence-involving in as an internal
Thus the measure of a person’s opposition to something in
terms
of
’the amount of effort he is willing to put forth against it’ is taken - somewhat
perversely - to be violence-involving effort or opposition in the
pacifist’s
’opposition
to
violence'.
If
this
slide
were
pacifist would be caught in an elementary inconsistency since in
case
of
the
permissible any
being
opposed
to violence, by definition, he is prepared to use violence and so is not opposed
Even Narveson ’cannot make too much* of this inconsistency, though
to violence.
it
not so far removed from the alleged inconsistencies he does want to make
is
much of in his main inconsistency argument.
A similar slide, together with a further slide, Is made in the argument
based
inconsistency
the
on
to
notion of rights, especially as it figures in the
pacifist’s thesis as transformed to the claim that no one has a right to indulge
in
violence
(p.418).
Narveson
violence in the notion of right.
tries
to incorporate the right to indulge in
The initial move is to work in assumptions
of
defence from breaches of a right and of preventative action against infringement
Because ’a right just is a status
of it.
preventative
action
...
does follow logically is that one has a right to whatever may be necessary
what
to
justifying
prevent
necessary’
infringements
of
right'
his
(p.419).
That
'whatever
may
be
out to include force, now very generously construed - here is
turns
the further slide - to incorporate such things as social pressure.
Moreover ’it
is a logical truth, not merely a contingent one, that what might be necessary is
force’ (p.421).
of
preventative
For the presupposed logical transformations to work, the notion
action
must
have
the notion of violence built into it.
argument accordingly begs the question against pacifism.
it
enough
is
for
preventative
To block the
The
argument
action associated with rights to be, or to be
limited to, nonviolent action.
How the argument from rights leads
to
inconsistency
is
summed
up
thus
(p.421):
SAI.
’If we have any rights at all then we have a right to use force to prevent
the deprivation of the thing to which we are said to have a right’.
SA2.
We have, according to the pacifist ’the right not to have violence done to
us’,
as
have
the
a consequence of the obligation to avoid violence.
right
self-contradictory,
to
use
both
violence,
granting
so
the
pacifist’s
position
Narveson
is
that 'our standard concept of rights' yields SAI (cf.
right can be sustained by right-supporting or right-defending
require that that action is violent.
is
and not granting the right to use violence.
The argument fails because SAI is readily rejected.
claiming
But, therefore, we
mistaken
p.423).
action
in
That a
does
not
Pacifists can provide an adequate analysis
of rights - essentially the usual one - without letting themselves in for SAI by
6
simply rejecting the Narveson slide .
What appears in place of SAI is something
like
SAI#.
If we have any rights at all then we have a right to uphold them.
But the right to uphold them, defend them, protect them, etc.,
give
facto,
an entitlement to the use of violence.
no dilemma for the pacifist.
does
not,
ipso
Without the slide there is
The "pacifist's dilemma" and Narveson’s slide
are
two aspects of the one thing.
The arguments from lesser
§2.
argument
violence
and
evil.
lesser
In
outline
the
- which is independent of the notion of rights - is that the pacifists
must admit, in terms of their own principles, that there are cases where the use
of
violence
those
where
Inconsistency
would be morally permissible and morally justified.
some
is
use
of
immediate
violence
by
T2.
would
prevent
evil,
some
greater
violence.
More explicitly, and in Narveson’s terms
which also import the notion of evil, pacifists have
lesser
much
The cases are
to
admit
both
that
the
use of evil, is admissible, in preventing greater evil, and
that it is not admissible, because it involves violence.
6
Narveson summarizes an
argument like this as follows
It seems to me logically true, in any moral theory whatever, that [LI]
the lesser evil must be preferred to the greater.
If the use of force
by me, now, is necessary to avoid the use of more physical force (by
others, perhaps) later, then to say that physical force is the supreme
(kind of) evil is precisely to say that under these circumstances I am
committed to the use of physical force'7.
Now there are several somewhat different arguments snarled up in these sketches,
p
It is important to get them unsnagged , especially if a clearer view of the
ethical role pacifism can assume is to result.
lesser
The basic argument, from
violence, goes as follows
Cl.
There are cases where use of violence would prevent greater violence.
C2.
One ought to minimize violence.
Therefore
C3.
There are cases where one ought to use violence, since in this way, in
any
arbitrary one of the cases indicated, violence is minimized.
Therefore
~P2. It is not (always) morally wrong to use violence,
contradicting the pacifist principle, P2,
according
which
to
it
is
morally
wrong, always, to resort to violence.
All the ingredients
premisses,
can
be
of
argument,
this
together
with
pulled together from Narveson’s work.
support
for
He not only expouses
C2, but suggests two distinct arguments for it, the first of which connects
argument with the lesser evil argument
El.
(Use of) violence is an evil.
E2.
Evil should be minimized.
9
The second argument to C2 is simply from the pacifist premiss, varying P2,
7
the
the
E3.
One ought not to undertake violence
-
period;
that
the
is,
level
of
violence ought to be zero.
Neither argument is decisive;
of
that
reference
both in fact begin easing.pacifists into a
should
they
resist, where moral absolutes are warped into
moral relatives, where obligations give, way to obligations
all, and says nothing about minimizing it when one
compatible
being
does
it.
into
got
has
E3
is
directives quite different from minimization where violence is
with
involved, e.g.
E3
things
other
In any event E3 only directs one not to get involved in violence at
equal, etc.
Thus
frame
rooting it out which may
involve
strategies.
non-minimization
not entail E2, and commitment to E3 does not commit pacifists to
C2.
Nor do El and E2 entail C2;
so neither does commitment, by
to El and E2 oblige them to accept C2.
instance,
10
,
e.g.
evil-perpetrating
but
argument
Narveson's
well-known
Such
nonviolent
fails
for
similar
some
as
cases
hypothetical
dictators.
for
For in particular violence is
not the only evil and (so) evil may sometimes be reduced by
violence
pacifists
Regan’s
increases
in
slaying
of
the
reconstruction
of
Regan argues from premisses
reasons.
concerning the ranking of evil and a premiss like E2, specifically
3.
4.
The use of force is a substantive evil.
Therefore, a lesser quuantity of force must
great quantity of force (Rp.79).
The argument is invalid:
ordering
of
an
ordering
of
evils
force, even though force is an evil.
increasing force may still reduce evil, and so, on
be preferrable \
8
does
be
preferred
not
induce
to
a
a
similar
It is enough to observe that
Regan-Narveson
assumptions,
Resort to the theme that
Elt,
Violence is an irredeemable evil
in
(proposed by Regan
by
investigated
his
Narveson,
Np.118)
irredeemable evil is figuratively
(lesser
or
evils)
whites
pacifism,
of
"defence"
promises
so
black
Rp.80,
and
subsequently
a way around the difficulty.
that
no
combination
(goods) will lighten its hue;
with
An
grays
it always dominates.
Elt together with E2 will yield C2, but now the problem with Che argument shifts
to
What are the grounds for that?
Elt.
not widely acceptable, most people being
amount
of
As Narveson points out (Np.119), it is
prepared
to
countenance
violence in exchange for considerable goods.
some
(But then, not so long
ago, most people were tolerant of cruelty to animals so long as it was
gross.)
small
/not
too
Moreover, so Narveson implies, appeal to Elt does not get. pacifists out
of the argument from lesser violence;
underwriting C2.
indeed it seems to get them in deeper, by
for it removes Cl and, more importantly,
It does not however;
the corresponding premiss of the more difficult argument from lesser evil, which
starts from
DI.
There are cases where the use of violence would avoid greater evil.
For given, by Elt, that use of
greater
evil
than
that
cases such as DI requires.
Rp.80ff.),
which
however
violence
is
irredeemably
with violence;
tainted
evil,
there
is
no
and there are accordingly no
This is the core of Regan's defence in pacifism (see
he
sees
as converting pacifism into a 'bizarre and
vaguely ludicrous’ position (Rp.86), extreme pacifism, some of the
12
which he outlines
9
features
of
The approach through
violence
as
an
irredeemable
evil
is
mistaken
a
(utilitarian inspired) attempt to get at moral absolutes, which is what pacifism
is, like other deontological positions, grounded upon.
But such
absolutes
expressed in such commandments as, One ought not to commit violence,
adequately
meaning thereby, as it says, ought not, not just for the time being, or so
as
reasons
prima
are
facie,
otherwise don’t arise, or other things being equal, or
acting
for
ought
but
long
come
not
what
may,
period.
old-fashioned
Such
deontological, moral absolutist positions such as pacifism is at bottom, collide
head-on
with
utilitarianism
both
that
pacifism'.
For
the
moral
’utilitarianism
'that
utility
will
be
...
who
is
incompatible
brought out by doing some
violence may be greater than that produced by any alternative'
he
like
positions
and Regan (at the time) were working from.
Narveson
The reason for collision is simply that
with
malleable
highly
fashionable,
more
(Np.121)
13
.
So
acccording to the utilitarian-commandment to maximize utility may
acts
sometimes commit violence, contravening pacifist principles.
On its own inconsistency with a false doctrine such as utilitarianism shows
little:
position
every
suffers inconsistency with very many false doctrines.
Narveson does have another (small) argument to the effect that pacifism is
at
odds
with
contractarianism.
correct,
if
other
the
the
ethical
positions
he
presents, libertarianism and
But this argument would only carry weight, were it.
positions
were
suitably
exhaustive;
including no deeper ecological position for instance.
is
more
also
otherwise
however they are not,
What has
happened
which
insidious, however, is that utilitarian thinking has permeated much of
the rest of ethical thought, thus helping to establish a climate unfavourable to
incompatible
ethical
positions
such as pacifism.
10
There are two more specific
features.
damaging
consequentalist
Firstly,
as
more
approaches
have
we
of
consequentialist
Secondly,
facie
prima
principles
positions
out
utilitarianism,
of
This is entirely
mistaken.
The
is a theory-saving device, designed to get
difficulties
such
dilemmas.
moral
as
consequentialist positions tend to suggest that only consequentialist
reasons carry argumentative weight, and so try to ease rival positions, such
pacifism,
and
generally, have made it seem as if no deontic
principle were firm, but all are provisional.
theory
seen,
into
as
sometimes incongruous consequential support for their
offering
themes.
Narveson takes such procedures a
assumptions
upon
violence is that it
These
(p.425).
thus
pacifists:
produces
stage
further,
and
foists
utilitarian
says that the pacifist's 'objection to
he
suffering,
unwanted
pain,
in
the
recipients'
incongrous utilitarian grounds are something of a travesty of
pacifists' reasons for objecting to violence, which concern rather the
action
involved
and
what
it
does,
not
astonishing
such
of
only or always at all in the way of
suffering, to the perpetrators as well as those in whom it is
more
type
inflicted.
Even
utilitarian-style considerations are supposed to commit
the pacifist to the follow three statements, one of which however he
must
deny
(!):
[N]l.
To will the end (as mostly good) is to will the means to it (at
least pjotTce prima facie).
[N]2.
Other things being equal, the lesser evil is to be preferred to
the greater.
[N]3.
There are no "privileged" moral persons ...
(p.425^ ' .
'These three principles' which appear in Narveson's 'sum up [of] the
problem',
11
pacifist's
among them imply, as far as I can see, both the commitment to force
when it is necessary to prevent more violence and also the conception
of a right as an entitlement to defense.
And they therefore leave
pacifism, as a moral doctrine, in a logically untenable position
(p.425).
consequences
out
of
the
substantive terms such as
implicans;
otherwise
but
logic,
It would take not merely
statements
’violence’
the
deal
good
a
of
magic,
coax
to
given.
For implications to hold the
, /''I
<</<<-</ ,■/"
<
F^
and
’right’ must also figure , in the
just
fail
implications
on
formal
grounds.
intended argument to the "commitment to force” conclusion appears however to
some
for
e.g.
The
be
of variant, on the lesser violence argument, with N2 replacing, as it
sort
may C2.
such
(N3 and N1 then have oblique roles, N3 to stop
exceptions
being
made
oneself, N1 to ensure that violence adopted as a means has its full import,
in
as reflected in Cl,
construction
work
the
ethical
an
end).
But,
without
need not worry pacifists;
arguments
much
further
they hardly leave
pacifism as untenable.
Much more threatening is the argument from lesser evil, which has yet to be
This
countered.
is
argument from DI (cases of violence to avoid greater
the
evil) and N2 or E2 (minimization of evil) to C3 (admissibility of violence)
inconsistency
in
comprehensive
stock examples concern murder,
What are these cases^?
pacifism.
one
of
them
being
the
Narveson’s
situation
where
(Narveson in fact) must kill the (potential) mass-murderer B (Np.119).
is the moral situation here?
Narveson ought to prevent
but
mass-murder,
that
of
a
paradigmatic
moral
In fact the example is
dilemma,
that
of
very
similar
also
The
to
Pedro and Jim, where Pedro
volunteers to call off his firing squad about to shoot several captives
12
one
But what
Narveson ought not to kill B, because that is murder and involves violence.
situation is that of a moral dilemma.
and
if
Jim
one
shoots
Now almost everything turns on what account is given of
What a comprehensive pacifist does
moral dilemmas.
trouble,
coherence
.
of them
is
to
take
do,
not
inadequate utilitarian line of trying to
the
explain moral dilemmas away, as if they didn’t ever, occur
an
than
initial
intuitive
negotiable, etc., etc.
is
as
level),
wants
he
unless
if
(at
at
least
other
all obligations were prime facie,
The conflicting obligations stand.
What is to
done
be
however a very consequentialist thing, to try to determine the best thing to
do in the circumstances.
action
In trying to determine what
circumstances
is
a
satisfied.
violent
sense
this
the
best
e.g.
Narveson
had
better
a
fix.
Narveson
dilemma,
but
no
B.
shoot
(not a deontic one) evil should be minimized;
not
ought
circumstances, he had better do so
moral
of
17
.
to
the
in
course
Granted, it is preferable to minimize
follow that Narveson ought to resort to violence.
remains
course
best
that
Suppose
one,
inconsistency in pacifism follows.
in
the
principles like N2 and its mate, N2M, that it is preferrable to minimize
evil, will presumably be
and
is
evil,
it does not
On the contrary the situation
shoot
B,
but
in
the
appalling
There is the real-life complication of
inconsistency
No
a
through arguments like that from lesser
evil.
Narveson’s jackpot question, entangled in his discussion
from rights, can now be met.
of
the
argument
The question presents a dilemma:
If force is the only way to prevent violence in a given case,
use justified in that case? (p.420)
is
its
Narveson is thinking of cases where one is about to be murdered, Regan where one
is to be raped.
qualified No:
Given that force again entails violence, the pacifist answer is
No, it is not
deontically
13
justified
18
.
It
is
certainly
not
morally
it is not justified in the sense of ’justified* which
and
obligatory,
reflects its deontic origin in ’making right*.
may
and
because
just
some
might
force
in
solution,
a
making
to
amount
dilemma
be
out
But justification is
The response is qualified then
a case.
consequentially
situation.
ambiguous,
as
justified,
a
second-best
Narveson, proposes on the contrary, that
enough violence for the given occasion is morally justified - it can go at least
as
as killing another person - but he presents no back-up argument, taking
far
his proposal as evident.
jackpot
the
question
As it is not - the pacifist can simply
does
not
dispute
it
to a decisive a^rument against pacifism
lead
(though Narveson gives the impression that it does, e.g. , p.423).
What
it
can
lead to is the argument from lesser evil over again.
The charge of moral insensitivity.
§3.
This
is
less
argument
an
than
a
damaging charge:
A person committed to an extreme pacifism,
though he need make no
logical mistake, yet lacks a fully developed moral sensitivity to the
vagaries and complexities of human existence (Rp.86).
The smear is not without basis.
is
applied
avert
to
greater
Regan is envisaging situations
evil;
where
violence
and he points to what he takes to be the
evident moral permissibility of a woman's using ’what physical power she has
free
herself
from
an
Interestingly, Regan has not
aspiring rapist* (Rp.86).
described the situation in a way which is incompatible with
there
is
violence,
which
implies
What is at issue
the
intentional,
non-negligible damage, including pain, injury or
(cf.
a
pacifist
stand:
nothing in that to prevent a woman wriggling free (even in a way that
involves some force) and fleeing.
using
to
is
(or
death,
the
permissibility
of
infliction
of
wilful)
by
forceful
means /
Np.110), that is, which involves much more than mere use of physical force
And it is by no means so
or power.
violence
inflict
upon
evident
A
rapist.
aspiring
the
the
that
woman
is
entitled
to
can hardly now be
pacifist
accused, in a way that can be made to stick, of crass moral insensitivity.
More generally, arguments
pacifism,
the
on
like
Regan’s
the
to
insensitivity
moral
of
basis of pacifists' not taking obvious steps to prevent evil
I
occurrences, depend upon a confusion of passivity and pacifity.
Narveson
p.425)
(e.g.
Both Regan
and
assume that pacifism is a passive do-nothing position.
20
This is far from true, as the variety of
nonviolent
action
methods
groups has made plain.
comprehend the real possibilities of
considered
or
adopted
by
Neither Regan nor Narveson correctly
nonviolent
action.
Otherwise,
Narveson
would hardly be able to assert, in the automatic (but carping) way he does, that
the pacifist is
Narveson's
standing
negative
later
'not
by
doing
assessment
does not change the situation:
anything
about’
violence
(p.425).
of what he calls 'poslLlve nonviolence'
for this positive approach is simply nonviolence
practised in an exemplary way, as by Christ, in the hope that others will follow
suit, and fails to recognise the potential of nonviolent training and the
and
effectiveness
when
assembled
21
,
of nonviolent practices.
much
reduce
the
impact
scope
Fuller details of these practices,
of
the
argument
from
social
irresponsiblity, which is part of what lies behind the change of insensitivity.
Pacifism, however, like most positions, has
them
22
its
weaknesses,
one
of
undoubtedly derives from the fact that violence is a quantitative matter
and there is no sharp cut-off point at the bottom end of the
amounts
and
of
violence
greater
than
zero.
Yet
scale
with
minute (non-foot-in-the-door )
amounts do not seem to matter all that much morally, at least compared with
15
small
the
that
evils
gross
us
confront
on most sides when we look.
Morally sensitive
pacifists will not focus or fixate on small quantities of violence to the
of
exclusion
larger
moral
They
problems.
give
certainly
will
understood that by ’violence' in principles such as. P2
mean
they
it
undue
to be
'non-trivial
violence'.
§4.
and
The argument from radical political corollaries
The
corollaries.
out war by definition.
so clear.
Although
War
situations?
normally
would
Standard
war
always
would
be
what
excluded,
be
morally
counted
brought
progressively
then
second
dilemma
the
impermissible,
best
but
in
thing
to
closer
to
Comprehensive pacifism can of course
extreme
principles emphasizing the evil of violence.
weighing
of
Comprehensive pacifism thus does not include standard
A strange pacifism!
pacifism, in contrast to extreme pacifism.
be
pacifism
But the position of comprehensive pacifism is not
exceptional extenuating circumstances it might be the (second-)
do.
awkward
of extreme pacifism would certainly eliminate war.
practice
For war involves violence, typically on an extensive scale.
takes
other
from
best
choices
will
pacifism, in
practice, through
If evil is given a suitably
yield
the
large
same results as extreme
A
pacifism does (deontically), and entirely exclude war.
Now it can hardly be cogently argued that it tells against pacifism that it
would
eliminate wars, since wars are exchanges that should certainly be avoided
at all reasonable costs;
nor therefore can an
argument
Wz/Acuf
desirability
fHur/l
of war as an institution against pacifism,!
mounted from the
or Cldc.
However wars are by no
be
means the only social arrangements or institutions which dispense^ or rely u
violence
extensively.
The
state and many of its institutions, most obviously
police
inadmissibility
of
characteriscally are
contraposition
do.
also
forces,
coercive
23
institutions
and hence
;
pacifism
Comprehensive
it
as
such
implies
police
anarchism
provides no refutation of pacifism..
the
implies
24
moral
forces and states
But
once
again
For anarchism itself is (to
25
stick with a bold claim) irrefutable
Pacifism as an
ideal
brought
not
is
.down by its political corollaries.
Pacifism yields not only a qualified anarchism but qualified vegetarianism.
While
does
it
not
eating of meat, it does morally forbid violence to
forbid
animals.
At least it does this so long as what normally counts as violence,
animals,
continues to rank as valence, and is not removed from the category by
restriction of the application of violence to humans
little
good
for
however
basis
corollaries naturally
spread
suicide,
capt^al
euthenasia,
(or
such a chauvinistic restriction.
several
into
punishment,
controversial
indeed
There
persons).
is
The radical
moral,
wherever
to
e.g.
areas,
violence
plays a
significant role in many cases'1. The sheer moral power of pacifism is one reason
/7j Qc4>
for giving it some pause. And there are others.
/
One is that, like vegetarianism, it runs counter to "natural" behaviour
of
creatures to which the principles are supposed to apply. Aggression is a fairly
S' X
common feature of animal and human behavioZur, and it sometimes (though by no
means so often is as made out) involves violence. /Ze /cVXC o/1 //>£
Ao'jje.tjw
enable
ct/ony
Ac
/Aggression is assumed to be an evolutionary adaption
/ZeSG-
creatures
offspring) in their
artificial
h
to
be
better
natural
environments
fitted
environment.
substantially
17
developed
to
for survival (of themselves and their
most
humans
removed
from
now
live
situations
in
for
rather
which
there is no way they are
evolution gradually adapted their features:
adapt in time to absorb massive doses of radiation for instance.
have
substantially
living
their
adjusted
adjust
environment,
along
so
with
^oing
to
Much as humans
should
they
it
their social practices - including aggressive and violent
practices, now ill-adapted to their situation and mostly counter productive.
There is a residual problem,
practices
of
living
creatures
like
in
that
confronting
natural
(relatively)
vegetarianism.
conditions, such as
predators and tribal people, to be condemned as morally wrong when they
Sometimes,
violence?
involve
when the violence grossly exceeds what is required
yes,
Though a way can be beaten around the
given the end to be attained; but always?
edge of this problem
Are
26
it is an unsatisfactory way. What this suggests is that
<u t be^t
nonviolence is not an absolute but^an ideal. The arguments for nonviolence
which
are
mostly
violence and do not strictly
suggest
a
to
apply
since
it
in
creatures
natural
surroundings
opens
door
the
a
approaches would categorically exclude.
chink
to
other
options
The further suggestion that
emerges is that moral thinking and associated principles in this area are
pretty
primitive
aimed, among
principles
state;
other
than
P2.
and
what
-
But the suggestion is a dangerous one,
sort of conclusion.
similar
practically at least,
nonviolent
arguments which do not exclude occasional uses of
practical
is
things,
at
sharper,
This
is
to
in
a
called for is much more investigation
more
concede
an
sensitive,
attentuated
and
less
charge
insensitivity against comprehensive pacifism so long as P2 remains
blanket
of moral
unqualified.
There is no reason however why a genuine pacifism (making for real peace) should
not be built on a modified version of P2 which permits such natural phenomena as
predation.
Nothing
logically
rules
18
out
such
a
genuine and more sensitive
pacifism
27
There are other requiriments the position to be worked out should meet.
in
should,
particular, be integrated into a Larger framework of nondestructive
practices, which
are
involve violence, e.g.
a
of
a
practices
metaphorically,
damaging
wild
nonviolent* practices.
are
practices
But,
except
destructive to the environment, for instance, do not
such
river,
with
piece
things
dumping
vandalism.
wastes
toxic
But
mining
strip
as
extended sense, which gets beyond the confines
these
It
of
in
a
valley,
fertile
in streams and oceans.
the
property
In an
picture,
all
even metaphorically, vandalism does not
such
cover violence against persons (and certainly not nonphysical violence
as
I
"psychological
violence").
What is sought /is an appropriate synthesis of these
notions covering destructive practices - and
better than 'vandolence'.
an
Then P2 is superseded
accompanying synthetic term,
4/Z2°.
It is morally wrong to
use vandolence./ It remains to characterise the cluster of destructive practices
(/V
that count as vandolence and to try to justify the principle - no easy tasks.
FOOTNOTES
1.
’a valid Christian
According to the US Catholic Bishops, pacifism is
to
Christ
and the early
long
tradition
going
back
position’, with a
lifestyle:
see Origins
Christians who were committed to a nonviolent
pp.310-311.
2.
Thus, in particular, T. Regan ’A defence of pacifism', Canadian Journal of
Philosophy
11 (1972) 73-86. Page references to this article are prefixed by
_
3.
J. Narveson 'Pacifism: a philosophical analysis’, Ethics 75 (1968) and ’Is
pacifism consistent’, Ethics 78 (1868). The first article is reprinted in
War and Morality (ed.
R.
Wasserstrom) Wadsworth, Belmont, California,
T97O7 pp.63-77. The first article is also rewritten and combined with part
of the second in 'Pacifism: a philosophical analysis’, Moral Problems (ed.
19
77ju
/
/A
ZAC
A
IZ(M2
J.
Rachels), Third Edition, Harper .Row, New York, 1979, pp.408-425. Page
references without further citation are to this latter article.
Narveson's
theme that pacifism is incoherent is headlined and further elaborated in his
’Violence and war’, Matters of Life and Death (ed.
T.
Regan), Temple
University Press, Philadelphia, 1980, pp.109-147. Page references prefixed
by 'N' are to this article.
4.
Pacifism, as involving the active use of defensive methods, can be traced
back as far as the Mohist philosophers of ancient China. On modern methods
see especially G.
Sharp, Exploring Nonviolent Alternatives, Boston,
1971.
As will emerge, it is important to distinguish fas Narveson does not in his
earlier work) force from violence; they not equivalent.
/\
5.
Thus, e.g., G.
Sharp in several works: see for instance the unduly narrow
definition of pacifism given in Social Power and Political Freedom, Porter
Sargent Publishers, Boston, 1980, p.198.
6.
Narveson, in responding to a suggestion of Armour (pp.423-4) sees nothing
between (0) defence of rights, with the slide to violence in, and (1)
nothing really answering to rights at all, where words like 'rights’ occur
without stuffing. This shows a serious blindspot. What lies in between are
a range of notions which do not guarantee the slide to violence.
An account of rights which will serve is that given in R. and V.
Routley
’Human chauvinism and environment ethics' in Environmental Philosophy (ed.
D. Mannison and others) Research School of Social Sciences, Australian
National University, 1980; see especially p.
Narveson 'Is pacifism inconsistent' Ethics 78 (1968) p.148.
7.
J.
8.
Without getting into the level of complication, not to say epicycling,
that
Regan lands himself in:
he is obliged to distinguish three mirage-like
senses of 'lesser evil': quantitative, qualitative, and resultant (Rp.78).
9.
See Np.127 where it is asserted that violence as a source of evil should be
minimized, and Np.119> where the point is put in terms of absolute evil.
That way of putting it already starts to give the game away, since Narveson
is all too evidently interested in negotiable evil which can be traded off
against other evils.
10.
An argument like the argument from lesser violence itself would appear to
undercut the argument for
El and E2 to premiss 02 for the argument for
lesser violence.
11.
That is by no means the onlyelement in Regan's torturous reformulation
of
Narveson's argument that can
be faulted. Consider, for example, premiss '5.
If any given action, A, is necessary to bring about a lesser rather than a
greater quantity of qualitatively equivalent evil, then one's obligation is
to do A.' While the premiss has considerable appeal as a principle of
supererogation, there is little reason to accept it as one supplying
obligations.
20
12.
Extreme pacifism can be seen as taking the rule that one ought never to use
violence as having priority over all other moral rules - which Is indeed an
extreme position even if a consistent one.
Such a priority rule is an
unsatisfactory way to deal with moral dilemmas.
13.
To show what Narveson goes on to claim that people are sometimes justified
in using force rather more is required, as Regan points out, Rp 85, n.18.
It has also to be shown that there are cases of these types (as in Cl) and
that agents can know that use of force will increase utility, reduce evil,
etc. A pacifist, rightly sceptical of utilitarian tracing of consequences,
and fond of noting that violence begets violence, could, with a small dose
of scepticism also, dig in at this point and claim that because no one can
be sure that use of force will reduce evil, so no one is justified in using
force. This is sceptically-based pacifism.
14.
Narveson also wants to contend that ’all of these may be defended on purely
logical or "meta-ethical" grounds’. This is likely false, especially the
claim as to logical status, since some of the principles are rejected in
substantive ethical theories.
15.
A surprising feature of Narveson’s argument, also Regan’s "reconstruction",
is that these cases are nowhere in sight, as if again one got to conclusions
logically out of the air, without any of the hard work the cases involve.
16.
The example was first discussed in B.
17.
This terminology matches the account of moral dilemma, given in much more
technical detail in R.
Routley and V.
Plumwood ’Moral dilemmas and the
logic of deontic notions’ in Paraconsistent Logic (ed.
G.
Priest and
others) 1983, to appear.
18.
An extreme pacifist would answer with an unqualified No.
19.
Directed against other creatures and more generally against ecological
systems such as ecosystems which can be hurt. There is a difference here
between live(go al-direct ed")~systerns and property, and comprehensive pacifism
does not necessarily exclude wilful damage to property. Thus eco-pacifists
may destroy, or at least disable, bulldozers but not harm those who use
bulldozers to destroy habitat.
However sensitive eco-pacifists will not
condone "violent" destruction of property either: disab^ling of equipment
is different.
20.
The methods also include anticipatory action, e.g., the policemen going off
to enact violence find their vehicles won’t start, e.g. because components
have been removed
21
the peace movement should be preparing for
B. Martin ’How
See e.g
of
Peace
Proposals 13 (1982) 149-159, and references
Bulletin
war
’
nuclear
cited therein pp.152-3.
Williams,
//.( Zc (V, /, ( 1
J n l »'
/? o C-, /
/ /'
/\ <. ?
/
< / / i ’'i
*7 z*
//4
’Conflict: of values’.
22.
Another comes from the necessary circumscription of permissible nonviolent
action, to ensure that it does not include actions worse than nontrivial
violent action.
23.
These organisations may be ruled out directly as violence-dispensing or else
because they have individuals, delegates, who effect violence on their
behalf.
24.
In the sufficiently comprehensive form that the coercive state is without
moral basis or legitimacy.
Of course the "state" may have nonviolent
methods available to it; it may not be a purely voluntary arrangement.
25.
See R. Routley and V.
Alternatives, (1982).
26.
As Singer has in the analogous case of vegetarianism.
27.
The position has been called 'pacificism*.
Plumwood 'The irrefutability of
22
anarchism’,
Social
On the alleged impracticality of pacifism in the real world.
Appendix §5.
Even if it is conceded that pacifism is a viable moral ideal, that it
does
not fall down as incoherent or ludicrous, still the feasibility of pacifism as a
sensible practice to live by will bo contested - despite, or perhaps because of,
major
examples
such
as Christ and Gandhi.
And it has to be admitted that the
real world, with all its horror and squalor, does put pacifism to severe tests.
Nowhere is the practice of
nonviolence
than in replacing war \
succeed
usually
been
given
a
dress rehearsal.
defence of a region can vary
convention
observed
is
or
less
likely
to
Yet nonviolent defence methods, to replace the
2
detail ,
usual violent methods, have been described in some
never
thought
though
they
have
The prospects for success of nonviolent
significantly,
depending
upon
whether
the
war
If the convention Is observed then pacifism
not.
stands reasonable prospects of success.
The difficult cases are where the war convention
unleashed,
perhaps
broken,
is
in massive ways, on noncombatants.
his superficially sympathetic sketch and assessment of
resistance,
'success ...
may
all
sorts
of
this:
According to Walzer, in
nonviolent
defence
and
This is presumably false.
that
The invaders may give up and depart
reasons, some of them irrelevant, e.g., they needed a quick
decisive victory, they got homesick.
like
is
attained - there is never any guarantee of it, without or with
be
war - even if some conventions are flouted.
for
violence
is possible only if the invaders are committed to the
3
war convention - and they won’t always be’ (Wp.331~).
Success
and
sufficiently
What Walzer no doubt
ruthless
invaders
sufficient time and sufficient support lines, etc.
23
means
is
something
in sufficient numbers with
can eventually succeed.
But
sort of thing is also true even if the defending side resorts to violence.
that
The difference lies in the pattern of events;
is
more
difficult
and
costly
for
if the defence is
invaders
the
to
well-armed
it
with and easier
start
afterwards than with well-prepared civil resistance-.
Walzer is thinking, however, like many who
jump
to
the
that
conclusion
nonviolent defence cannot succeed when the war convention is abandoned, in terms
of inappropriate examples.
command,
total
in
the
He is thinking of an extreme totalitarian state,
way
the
Nazis
were
in Germany, the Jews of Germany
The
providing the model of the enslaved population, the ’‘resistance".
is
highly misleading.
picture
The Nazis, who never invaded Germany, were in control of
all the infrastructure and had the cooperation (at least) of
the
bulk
of
the
For Walzer‘s comparison to work, there would have to be an enormous
population.
occupying army which took over and managed all key infrastructure.
island
With
such as Australia it is not even so clear that this is logistically
territories
feasible against a largely united and actively resisting
of
impression
in
the
acquiscence (e.g.
resistance
Walzer's
population.
fragmenting and the populace moving into dulled
Wp.332) might have got things
the
wrong
way
around,
the
test
with
4
disbelieving and frustrated soldiers ready to leave .
Nonviolent resistance is however unlikely to be put
adequate
way
in
present
state-determined
prepared to risk training its populace
(civil
defence
the police:
is different).
in
to
any
No state would be
circumstances.
full
in
action
nonviolent
techniques
It would then be. all to easy for them to "rout"
civil obedience, for example, could no longer
customary violent means.
24
be
ensured
by
the
FOOTNOTES
The replacement of the state is considered
op.cit.
For example, in Sharp, op.cit.
given there.
See also
in
Routley
Martin,
All page references prefixed by ’W’ are to M.
Allen Lane, London, 1977.
and
op.cit.,
Plumwood,
and
82,
references
Walzer, Just and Unjust: Wars,
The argument suggested in Walzer (e.g. p.333) that nonviolent methods would
increase evil, or at least its distribution, is weak.
It is countered by
Sharp’s observation that the suffering likely to be induced is less than in
comparable wars.
§6.
On the positive case for pacifism.
defensive,
meeting
itself is revealing.
deviations
enough:
a
The argument thus far has been largely
That in
of objections to comprehensive pacifism.
range
Pacifism
is
the
rest
position
from it are what require explanation.
and
state)
(inertial
-The reason for this is simple
violence is, on most ethical systems, at least a prima facie
evil,
so
use of it has to be justified.
Positive arguments for pacifdism
position
and
merely
try
supposed to be justified.
violent
opponent:
to
can
advantage
take
of
privileged
dispose of "exceptional cases" where violence is
The favourite exception
is
self-defence
against
a
the case is curious in that the defender (person or nation)
is already in a morally-excluded situation, since the attacker
moral bounds.
its
has
overstepped
Still the defender is not normally committed to violence whatever
he does - as in a dilemma situation.
And since
it
is
at
least
facie
prima
wrong, and he does not have to use it, he should not resort to it.
An elementary syllogistic argument, given by Narveson (Np.117), can
be
adapted
to give a similar result:Violence is (intrinsically) wrong
Violence in any excepted cases (e.g.
self-defence) is still violence
Violence in any excepted cases is still (intrinsically) wrong.
Naturally those opposed to pacifism will challenge
the
first
premiss,
and
a
dialectic already glimpsed will begin.
None of the
arguments
are
arguments
for
pacifism
are
conclusive,
since
even
where
deductively tight assumptions can be challenged (as above).
are all the arguments for pacificism particularly good ones.
26
One of the
Nor
poorer
positive arguments for pacifism, for example, makes similar assumptions to those
of the classic theory of war, namely that once war is embarked upon it cannot be
limited,
the
e.g.
that
hope
or
nuclear
selectively and restrictively is an illusion,
(moral)
limits
in
Although
the
chances
overstated.
war
-
of
whatever
they
eXcalation
are
exchanges
Limited
escalation
are
be
used
inevitable.
The
weapons
chemical
is
will
- are bound to be overstepped.
often
real
enough,
and confrontation are possible.
more social arrangements and much more conventional than
the
the
case
is
Wars are much
theory
classical
Wars can, for example, be started and stopped in midstream should more
allows.
important
things
intervene
(e.g.
pollution
a
crisis
affecting
other
neighbouring states).
The main reasons for pacifism are, inevitably, those for nonviolence.
They
include (as support for the first premiss above) a range of consequentialist and
practical reasons, e.g.
suffering
of modern industrial societies, the broader popular
avoidance
and
anguish
of
support
base
obtained
None of these well-known
types
are separately decisive, but their cumulative effect is considerable.
' Cz/
//
Z'1
1
Is Ct' i
L>
) s' *4
/
/
27
— >
A
by
of violence, the desirable social consequences of nonviolence such as
a more open, less furtive, society.
)
violent
futility and counterproductiveness of violence within the setting
the
methods,
the cost in pain,
? . z.. z .
of
reason
Collection
Citation
Richard Routley, “Box 59, Item 680: Draft of On the alleged inconsistency and moral insensitivity of pacifism,” Antipodean Antinuclearism, accessed May 4, 2024, https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/show/147.