Box 71, Item 1: Working draft of Australia's defence philosophy: investigations of the nonexistent # MX504
Title
Box 71, Item 1: Working draft of Australia's defence philosophy: investigations of the nonexistent # MX504
Subject
Computer printout of working draft. Paper published, Routley R (1984) 'On the alleged inconsistency, moral insensitivity and fanaticism of pacifism', Inquiry (Oslo), 27(1): 117-136. https://doi.org/10.1080/00201748408602030.
Description
Unnumbered paper from collection, item number assigned by library staff
Creator
Source
The University of Queensland's Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291, Box 71, Item 1
Contributor
This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, Dr. N.A.J. Taylor.
Rights
For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library.
Format
[48] leaves. 32.19 MB.
Type
Manuscript
Text
WORKING DRAFT
AUSTRALIA'S DEFENCE PHILOSOPHY? Investigations
of the nonexistent # MX504
'The opinions of philosophers, with regard to the conditions of the
possibility of a public peace,
shall be taken into consideration by
states armed for war'' (Kant,
'A [the only]
secret article for
perpetual
peace',
p.158,
an article flattering no doubt
to
philosophers, but neglecting their dominant bellicose tradition).
A defence philosophy is much more than a defence policy.
A policy can be
merely by a list of directives as to what do in various
given
at
even
its
philosophy
policy
best it need only involve practical
into a theoretical
setting,
contrast,
integration
of
a
the
which looks at the key concepts involved:
security, stability, control,
here,
By
wisdom.
goes deeper and requires theoretical wisdom,
circumstances;
protection, defence, interests, national
interests, intelligence, war, etc. Defence philosophy is a branch of political
and
social
philosophy,
and has long been treated as such,
though under such
more familiar and honest headings as "of war" and "of peace" (see Appendix
Like
most
of philosophy it can be applied,
parts
in
regional
3}.
among
ways
others.
defence
A
approaches
to
philosophy should embed appropriate defence arrangements
war
not merely
and peace,
or
superficially
into
and
"foreign
policy", but into the way and intended way of life of a country, both into on
going
culture
policy
defence
power
and
into the intended or planned
typically takes prevailing socio-political
structures for granted;
questioning
of
merits
cultural
arrangements.
arrangements
a defence philosophy again penetrates
or rejecting features of these structures,
enquiring as
things and institutions of which defence is planned,
society should be defended by what sort of appropriate
sort
of
what
lengths.
What,
for
instance,
1
is Australia
what
are
A
and
deeper,
to
asking
methods
the
what
and
Australi ans,
concerned to defend, aiming to defend?
defending,
How much of what others have,
Abroad?
region?
defending,
Does
preserving?
defending?
Would
Indonesians
made
anyone
a
Randwick
stage
a
or what we have,
Eagle
or
racecourse,
last stand
for
is
worth
Farm,
merit
Estate?
Oaks
strike in Australia .just
lightning
In the
Here in Australia?
to
If
remove
the
B.jelke-
Petersen, should we resist?
of the necessary prerequisites have been adequately thought about in
Few
Australia,
unplanned
where
muddling
through
immediate problem - reactive contingency
1
generous
- is the main style of political
"planning",
life,
immediate
if
you
help
to
supply it with one or more,
to
problem
want
and ipso facto
of
be
to
defence
Its phi1osophers
Australia does not yet have a defence philosophy.
planning.
could
from
and to inject
some
depth
into
broader defence theorizing.
1.
Australian
defence
inappropriate
"policy";
incoherent,
obsolescent
American,
Indeed Australia seems to lack even a clear and coherent defence
This
pol icy.
charge (made even by friends of Defence
commonplace
interested
in
2
obtaining extra public funding for defence and elements of C3I).
The reasons
is
concern
not
merely
the
major unsolved issues
of
exactly
what
is
being
defended, what things and objects and what interests, and whose, what freedoms
and
values;
and
what
role American defence facilities
in
Australia
supposed to have in this - but a range of more detailed lacunae such as:
of
clearly-defined
on what needs defending and how it is
priorities
accomplished;
doubtful
contingencies
in
are
lack
to
be
capacity of present defence forces to handle low-level
and to the north of Australia and in
maritime
zones;
and
1.
The point, which is not uncontroversial, is argued in effect in Gilbert.
2.
Amazingly,
in
the Strategic Basis Papers, Australia criticizes New
Zealand because 'it has still developed no policy for national
defence
and
tends to
look
to ...
the US as its primary source of defence
guidance''
(p.29) .
Note
that C3I abbreviates the mouthful ,
Command,
Control, Communications and Intelligence.
2
unsatisfactory (or no)
defence
civil
and
administration,
arrangements and planning for
use
of
protection
civil
infrastructure,
key facilities and
of
"defence-in-depth",
wartime
mobilisation,
areas,
and
for
post-nuclear
organization.
is
equally damaqinq, if its policy makers do have a coherent policy it
3
nowhere satisfactorily revealed to the peoples of Australia.
It is
left
to
.journalists
And,
what
out
installations may be for and to make various conjectures as
defence
the
newspaper-watching academics to winkle
and
policy
may
Australian policy makers
As to coherence,
be.
local
to
what
have
only
recently found out that Australia has a (purely) regional defence role,
one.
global
they
were told by the Americans in
Hashington
to clarify commitments under treaty arrangements with the
designed
begins
thus
This
to look as if Australia's defence policy is as
much
not a
talks
in
It
USA.
determined
abroad, by US policy makers, as it is locally in Australia.
Much
circumstantial
evidence can be assembled to confirm the claim
Australia defence policy can now be stamped Made in USA,
the last Nor Id Har (and British abandonment),
one
thing,
as it
that
before
used,
to be stamped Made in UK.
Australia has had a bipartisan defence policy,
For
so it is claimed.
That "policy" has however been essentially shaped by the Liberal party,
has
governed most of the time (as senior partner in a
for ANZUS)
Hashington
the
Liberal
and still does.
US
and
in
of
US
The Strategic Basis
give virtually unqualified support
Military practices and to the American view of
situation,
the
the latest package from
packaged under a local cover.
endorsed by the Labor Government,
Papers,
planned
Party "Defence and Foreign Policy Unit" consists largely
Defence Department material
to
For instance,
But
coalition).
Party simply took over US arrangements for Australia (as
Liberal
which
commit Australia to supporting,
the
global
strategic
without any due reservation,
3. An Australian policy should moreover fit with the genuine needs and
shared aspirations of the people - to the extent, presumably, that these
are
commendable.
3
4
American positions in world forums.
be reached by more devious arguments.
out it had a regional defence role?
could
longer
no
The same dependent policy conclusion can
When,
for example, did Australia find
afford to police the world on their own and would
delegate some of that role
have
to
and offload some of the heavy associated costs, on
towards
and also after Labor took some faltering steps
reliable dogs-bodies;
they
After the Americans had found that
a broader foreign policy with some indigenous elements (Hayden was
developing
promptly flattened by Schultz).
Australian
but Iags it.
respects,
and
foreign policy simply copies American
older American defence policy,
American
war policy.
American
administration
main
in
The Australian defence policy presented by the Labor
to the extent that it is visible,
government,
with
defence
is conservative;
and diverges from the new
it coincides
(.post-Reagan)
the
For Australian Labor defence policy supports what
used to support, namely
DI.
nuclear
Multilateral
disarmament (within the framework of a series of treaties and agreements), and
D2.
Deterrence in the interim, deterrence through mutual
The
presence
.justified
assured destruction.
of American military facilities in Australia is supposed to
in the framework of these assumptions.
For they are to assist
be
in
making deterrence under D2 effective and to provide verification for the
arms
There is
much
reduction arrangements under DI (both stabilizing functions).
evidence
indicating
however that American policy makers have
both DI and D2 and any serious attempts at nuclear arms
they
4.
have
now
5
control .
moved on to the following highly destabilizing
abandoned
Certainly
doctrines;
namely
For theJe amq^ing evidence that Australia falls into the inexact class of
cl ient states the following Australian contribution is noteworthy:
'The
US prefers to act as a member of a group, and a contribution by Australia
can also assist in demonstrating to Congressional and public opinion that
the objectives sought are significant enough to attract allied support'
(SB, p.28)
5.
As to DI and arms control,
see, e.g. Mack PR. As to D2, 'USA has now an
announced
first-strike
nuclear
targeting
policy'
technologically
reinforced (Hayes, p.4).
The goal
of the Reagan administration
is
superiority (a conveniently ambiguous term).
4
war-fighting;
Nuclear
war
American
government,
al 1
Labor
1985
may
policy
nuclear wars;
Limited
of these
government.
well be accepted by
military doctrines,
and
Star
the
next
this
While
wars.
coalition
Liberal
are explicitly rejected by the
Since the American "Joint" facilities in
Australia
also facilitate the rejected objectives, the problems concerning these dubious
facilities are much aggravated.
information
withholding
their
particularly
Government
concerning the full range of
war-fighting
certainly unsatisfactory,
the
The Government's approach concerning them
appears
their
functions,
roles from Parliament and the
as several of its members realise;
in not atypical
disarray,
further
public
and
- is
and as a result
grist
for
the
incoherence theme.
is a coherent Australian defence policy somewhere
6
public exposure, it is almost certainly an ol d American policy.
If
there
away
from
But in that
case it certainly lacks - what it in any case appears to lack - justification.
7
For American interests by no means coincide with Australian .
Consider,
for
such
instance,
matters as enriching Americans,
American business,
for
undercutting
to
Nicaragua,
differently
Allende's
government in Chile to
again,
its
escalation of the nuclear arms
and all
Europe
Southern
as
Consider,
practices
methods.
race.
against
Consider,
consider
Or
the game- and decisi on-theoretic models
concern just USA and its adversary USSR,
which
its
its extensive export of arms and violent
strategic planning,
American
American.
promoting Americans and things
American practices in Latin America (or elsewhere in the world),
differently,
from
making conditions favourable
part of the monolithic West,
perhaps
occasionally
adding
but rarely or never considering
Hemisphere - so that either Australia is part of America
as
the
Poland
It had better be away from too much public exposure because Australians,
no more* th-atffrNew Zealanders, mostly do not like being pushed around, even
by Americans.
7.
Nor, though this is a longer story , does Australian culture by any means
coincide with American:
see CPD.
Thus a uniform treatment is entirely
inappropriate.
Similarly,
a single overarching treatment for a mono
lithic West is thoroughly inadequate.
5
8
may be of Russia or it is nothing.
Or consider American interests not merely
in Soviet and communist containment, but. in containing socialism such as might
(under more auspicious conditions) flourish in Australia.
to
answering
inappropriate
American interests is accordingly inappropriate for
Australia,
for
their
defence
thinking
applies
also
and
to
work out a policy appropriate
Australian
do
Australians should
Antipodean socialism.
for
Australia.
representatives,
political
who
implausible American views and begin on developing
parroting
and original ones.)
local
An American policy
America,
like Russia,
own
(That
should
stop
genuinely
some
is busy meddling in Africa,
(SB, p.24) .
but 'Australian security interests are not directly involved'’
Should we be tagging along after the Americans in support of installation
of
the
their free-enterprise (rip-off) capitalism everywhere feasible (i.e.
socialists
state
seriously
course
- or
of
Much
opposition
governments,
in
has,
freedom umbrella,
active
already
this
sort
What
'keeping the free
world
of
context,
multiple
what mainstream American culture
to and undermining of social and
socialist
quite
free7?
Of
meanings
and
admits
mainstream Australian culture would exclude:
bullying
they
control)?
heavily
is it laughingly - call
freedom
associations.
don't
that
under
the
for instance,
programs
and
of smal1 countries that impose barriers to US business
part of "free enterprise"), etc.
freedom Misinformation,
agree about,
to live and work where one chooses,
on. These are certainly important freedoms, better upheld in
some parts of the unaligned West (e.g. Sweden, Switzerland)
of
the
Eastern Block.
But many of the older freedoms
century,
such as freedom to travel,
requires
permits,
8.
licences,
than in most parts
have
to work and live abroad,
passports,
...
vanished
etc.;
And many more of these
this
now one
former
Australian planning should be looking at strategic models (game-theoretic
and other) which include Australia.
For,
as argued below,
adandoning
the uniformity assumption of the monolithic West,
of the West as one
parish, makes very significant differences to the results yielded.
6
are being or have been eroded;
•freedoms
restricted
zones,
nuclearism
in
soon it will be identity documents-,
as already in parts of the "free
ID cards,
Now
West".
to
protect,
[the Greens] point to the new laws proposed in 1983 designed to keep
citizens
Europe 'is devouring the very freedom it is said
assembling to protest deployment of the Pershing II and cruise missiles'
from
of
security
'secrecy,
the
lack
state,
of
Further structural changes required for
pp.58-9).
(Capra and Spretnak,
incompatible
with
permanent
commentability,
freedoms,
democratic
emergency,
the
include
of
concentration
authority, peacetime militarism, extensive apparatus of state intelligence and
Nuclearism is not a smart strategy to preserve
police'’ (Falk, in Feith p.24) .
remaining freedoms.
Inherited
2.
other-reliance,
and
the
populist
and
elitist___ cases—for
patronaqe.
Australia's
defence
rather than regularly
policy,
such as it is,
(re)thought through.
the legal method of precedence,
may wel1,
furthermore
But that procedure - essentially
and here does,
applied to defence.
exclude significant
The unsatisfactory decision-making practices that will
For
al ternatives.
be revealed in the
of defence are by no means restricted to defence but are typical of
case
kind of advanced age (or aged)
1abours
those
both
inheri.ted
whatever its very limited satisfactoriness in
legalistic decision making - is defective when
precedence
is
under.
Cock
capi tali sm Australia operates under,
has summed up these practices neatly in
features of aged capitalism (what he calls
the
or rather
setting
the Corporate State)
New Left and the Alternative Australia movements were
the
down
which
reacting
revoI ting against:
Decisions were made from the top and on the basis of vested political
interests,
rather than by rational goals and means that served public
interests.
The people were rarely consulted effectively before a
decision and often only partially informed afterwards.
Pl an ni ng..was.
based on a mere extension of the present.
...
activists felt
they
were given little opportunity to choose how they lived or worked. The
availability of space,
time,
trees and air was also determined by
others . ..(2/(p.l8 italics added).
7
or
As also is one's defence,
military and civil, the matter of whether one lives
in a nuclear target or not, etc.
A major inherited assumption is that of other reliance,
defence depends on other more powerful allies.
Australia
That ally was firstly Britain,
but in any event the assumption is that to be
and since World War II America;
safe
that Australia's
needs a powerful patron,
a protector.
A corollary is
that
Australia adopts a suitably submissive relation to its patron, making expected
And for the most part it has;
10
policy does not come cheap.
concessions.
The
however such a defence insurance
other-reliance assumption is unsound,
important,
it
for
several
reasons.
characteristically depends upon the following themes,
Most
all
which lack solid foundation:
1.
Austral i ar/ is threatened - or at least
1A. Australia/ is likely to be threatened in the near future.
2.
Australia cannot defend itself.
3.
It can however rely upon its patron (or ally?, i.e. upon the USA.
three themes in fact make up what has been cal led the populist case for
11
the ANZUS alliance.
It is very different from the elitist case for ANZUS,
These
said to hold sway with the Australian government,
which, while insisting upon
premiss 3, essentially rejects 1 and 2 and claims instead
4.
Australia has a vital
interest in global stability.
9, (From previous page)
Cock goes on:
'These basic
issues
increasingly
become lost in the array of consumer choices'.
[Add Covernment__ react_ive
poi n t].
10.
It costs not only money,
but independence.'... the serf societies - more
or less willingly - accept the status of "allies",
i.e. protection with
rights and duties as in feudal societies.
They become client countries'
(Galtung, p.169).
11.
So-called by Mack PC.
But
the formulation presented follows G.
Davidson's more satisfactory account in Canberra Times, Wednesday, May 8,
1985,
p.2.
Mack considers that what amounts to the elitist case is the
'altogether more sophisticated argument
[which]
holds sway
...
in
government' (p.l).
8
Global
5.
stability is under threat (constantly)
by an expansionist
Soviet
Un ion.
6.
Only USA can contain the Soviet threat and hold the global balance.
But the USA technique for holding global balance is in part through a
network
of alliances like ANZUS.
further
Obviously
premisses are required to reach the
that
conclusion
Australia should be participating in an alliance, and what is more, hosting US
defence
facilities
and so forth.
A first such premise is
no-shirking
the
theme that Australia should be contributing its part to "holding the balance".
Even this first further step is pretty shaky;
in
a
rather ramshackle case,
(and
since premisses 5 and 6 are decidedly
4 may involve some equivocation).
Australia’s
vital
interests
as we shall see, one shaky step
are not
dubious
For it can be plausibly argued
guaranteed
by
US
techniques,
that
which
threaten to upset the whole applecart, and can be obtained by alternative more
satisfactory means outside of such soft alliances as ANZUS.
contends,
Mack
it
In any case,
is unclear that our contribution enhances global
as
nuclear
stability (see Davidson).
There
is a more pernicious regionalist version of the elitist
which might be called the offshore el i t i st. position.
Australia can defend itself against regional
2R)t.
position,
This position grants
threats, and can look after
i tself regional Iy.
But
it does not (as indeed other qualified elitist positions may
1A.
Nhat the offshore position insists is
1AH.
Since
these
interests
companies abroad,
internal
Australian
Australians
or
or whatever - may have little or nothing to
do
-perhaps
security,
concerned
with
this premiss
trade,
represents
an
extremely
important shift (a shift not unrelated to the inverse bureaucratic shift
war
In
grant
Australia's interests could be threatened in the near future.
Australian
with
not)
to defence).
extended
form
from
It goes further than what has been called forward defence.
the offshore position does call
9
for some
sort
of
global
or police force ready to intervene whenever a "free port"
policeman
looks like closing its doors,.
the
elitist
position
is
anywhere
Part of the difficulty in getting to grips with
that it tends to slide
to
through
the
offshore
position (by way of now evident immediate positions).
against both the populist and elitist cases,
arguments
The
against
virtually
justify
but a fairly brief outline of some of the main points
course
a
just
couple
of themes 1 through 7 are
but there have been
through
some
indeed
familiar
sufficiently
of defections from themes 1
both cases,
defeat
logically
al 1
and
Of
involved.
would
7
to
serve
repair
interesting
attempts, designed to float the arguments on diminished premisses.
3.
The brief against the popular populist case.
While Australia is not at present under notice of
Contra
1 and 1A.
veiled
threat or harassment from abroad,
appears
to
believe that it is.
or parliamentary view,
view
as
persists,
kept
deliberately
parties
are
populist
well
case
alliance (e.g.
the public.
in
way
in
the dark (or even
purposes.
enough
false,
are
aware that the
misinformed),
main
main
this
because
assumptions
the
to
interest
In particular they have gone out of their
cast doubt upon the connected assumption that US is
to
the
American
are much more difficult to sell
a
reliable
threats.
Thus long-standing Australian psychological
allowed
suits
underlying
Accordingly the parties and Government have no political
to
been
political
Australian
the reasons for which they support
those of the elitist case)
guarantor against all
been
informed,
the
The populace has
it has.
Although both
undermining the populist case.
not
not
it is worth inquiring why the popular
the opinion polls reveal
government
bipartisan
a (bare) majority of its population
As the popular view is
administrative,
threat,
stand,,
and
has
informational and educational effort.
10
not
been
insecurity about security has
assuaged
In particular,
by
any
requisite
older attitudes to Asia
X
persist not far below the surface of popular Australia:
fear,
and
mistrust
xenophobia, patched over by a pragmatic attachment to trade and tourism.
This
misplaced insecurity is fuelled by popular misconceptions of Australia and its
place in the world: metaphorically, that Australia is a luscious plum ripe for
instead of the Asian view that Australia, so far as they are
Eastern picking,
as a remote desiccated place perhaps good for some trade.
aware of it at all,
to get towards more concrete assumptions,
Or,
Australians apparently tend to
view their country as affluent but underpopulated,
resource rich but
largely
Yet not far to the north are Asian hordes who are impoverished,
defenceless.
12
resource poor, etc.
The view is seriously out of touch with reality.
Parts of Asia are
at least as affluent (on conventional economic indicators.)
do
not see themselves as overpopulated,
as Australia.
now
They
in a way that calls for mass exodus;
and in those areas which are as overpopulated as Europe,
such as Java, bribes
and force are required to move people on transmigration programs to relatively
unoccupied parts of the Indonesian empire.
can
So far as they require them, they
purchase Australian resources - which are not unique - much more
(even
carrying significant local
cheaply
subsidies) and easily than they could obtain
13
them by seizure.
For these sorts of reasons, and because Australia itself poses no threat,
no
other state has an interest in attempting to invade Australia.
for interests,
to
launch
so it is for capabilities.
a successful
invasion of Australia,
capacity in the near future.
TF.
No regional
As it
is
power has the capacity
or is likely to have
such
a
As the joint Parliamentary Committee concluded,
The
"Asian hordes" fd\dn one of the less spoken about successors
to
Yellow Peril,
of immediate past days of the Asian communist threat
the
and
the Domino theory.
13.
As Stephenson argued,
less fortunately, 20 years ago.
Even when around
World War
II
Japan,
did have interest in access
to strategic raw
materials,
the Japanese High Command decided against invading Australia
because of
the difficulty of dealing with the people - a point of much
impor tance.
11
Currently
only the United States would have the physical
launch a -full scale invasion of Australia,
motive to do so (TAS, p.94) .
to
capacity
and it clearly lacks
any
As the report also stated, quoting Synnot (former Chief of Defence Staff),
...
to raise the sort of force which would be required for a mass
invasion of Australia could not possibly be done in under five years
by other than the superpowers (TAS) .
But
neither superpower is at all
likely to expend effort or resources to such
an end.
obvious
An
which
at once arises is:
(A later serious question to entertain is:
defence?
on
question
security,
collectively provided global
forthwith
to unilateral disarmament?
now-standard
telling
bother
Why
with
why not be a free-rider
Why
such as it is?)
Mack for one,
then
not
proceed
having reassembled
the
for
the
case that Australia is not threatened 'now or
foreseeable future', and so having broken the populist argument, is confronted
by
the awkward option of unilateral disarmament for Australia.
proceeds
and
points to the dependence of premisses 1 and 1A on premiss
retreat,
hasty
to claim that 'the populist case for ANZUS is
without premisses 1 and 1A.
While
it
sustained'
assumptions
which
is
approximating
appears
capabilities
it
decisive
of potential
2,
even
may sometimes take
it is true that the arguments against 1 and 1A
resistance,
a
It is however a decidedly problematic retreat.
for granted that Australia can look after itself to some
some
He stages
far
from clear that
premiss 2.
given
the
invaders.
they
Consider the
(estimated)
put
up
essentially
on
extent,
depend
no-interests
argument,
limited
invasion
very
The main consideration adduced
appears
to depend in no essential way, indeed in no obvious way at all, on Australia s
dynamic
fighting forces.
Australia mineral
resources,
for
instance,
obtained more readily and cheaply by market methods than
simply
be
ones.
What this seems to show is that a rather minimal
military
streamlined force, if
any, would presently meet Australia's military requirements.
12
can
It
is
as
not
if
Australia
The whole
nonmilitary defence is available on a continent well
popular training in defence methods,
character
that
apparatus
of
suited to its use, though
requisite
to
Australia would be a difficult place
govern, Australians a difficult lot to subjugate.
Australian
a
But even without
a population trained in its techniques.
lacking
without
defenceless'’
'entirely
1 ike a babe-in-arms.
mi 1itary force,
conventional
is
deterred
It was such features of the
the Japanese
a
on
previous
occasion
^If
the invasion is attempted,
the Australians,
in view of
their
national
character, would resist to the end.
Also,
because
the
geographical
conditions of Australia present numerous difficulties in
a military sense,
it is apparent that a military venture in
that
country would be a diff icul t one** (.TAS, p.62) .
The
still hold good,
points
parts
any such program of nonmilitary
to
putting
and could be strengthened.
defence:
making
it
abroad (ideally with dinkum Australian exaggeration)
it
several
There are
happen,
and
that it
has
happened.
the issue of alternative defence we are bound to
To
when
Australia is not threatened,
appropriate,
is a good occasion to reconsider
adapt defence arrangements.
now,
For
return.
and,
if
For example, it looks very much as
if enormous sums, which could be valuably directed elsewhere, are being spent,
But a much more effective and
to make many Australians feel secure.
largely
inexpensive way to such results would be through requisite mass education
therapy - with,
psychological
if it were well
done,
much more
and
satisfactory
results, a more secure and better informa^~popu1 ace.
Contra
2.
As
capabilities,
basically
enormous
isolation.
well
in
a
a result of post-War developments in weapons systems and
the military defence of Australia has become much easier.
matter
advantages
strategic
In
advance
of enhancing through robust
particular,
of
and
Australia enjoys by
reliable
virtue
of
systems
through modern
destroyed by precision guided munitions.
radar
warning
It is
the
geographical
any maritime invading force can now be
arrival,
C3I
detected
systems,
and
And any invaders that did manage to
gain a foothold on Australian soil would face severe logistic problems, and be
13
subject
deal
There is
to disproportionate response -from local defence.
Boys'’
of
and
weapon
Own War Games stuff concerning contemporary
great
a
which would serve to turn Australia into a pretty invulnerable
systems
C3I
armed
fortress, and into an extremely difficult territory even were the oceanic moat
crossed and the fortress entered (see especially D. Martin).
such
Under
invasion
even
armed neutrality and fortified Australia defence
from outside the region by an inimical world
resisted with reasonable prospect of success.
to
such an invasion;
mount
There is no power at all
Nonetheless the threat
their
elected
representatives.
But
the
Soviet
undertaken such a long-range massive force projection,
so,
be
likely
one
ooviet
a
of
is taken seriously not only by the larger populace but by committees
invasion
of
could
there is apparently (according to TAS) only
the Australian population!).
of
power
our good ally the USA (reckoned however a likely invader by
power that could,
6-77.
scenarios,
has
military
never
is ill-equipped to
do
lacks any plausible reason to try such a stunt (for details see e.g.
and
The only credible Soviet threat to Australia is in the context of
D. Martin).
a superpower war, when American facilities in Australia and perhaps Australian
would be struck at by intercontinental missiles.
cities,
it is highly unlikely that it would be followed or accompanied by
bad enough,
an
Soviet forces are once again not sufficent,
invasion.
sufficient
elsewhere
While this would be
by the Soviets for that sort of diversion;
in a superpower war;
and
not
thought
they would be required
and they would be devastated,
unless UoA
is
militarily even more incompetent than sometimes depicted.
Contra
3.
cannot
be relied upon,
rash
What will be argued is not the negation of 3,
but that premiss 3 is dubious,
to place excess reliance on American protection.
that the Americans
and that it would
That
being
so,
be
and
other patrons being even less promising, Australia should look more to its own
resources, as the American administration is kindly advising.
Especially
since the American "Vietnam debacle" and the fall of
14
Saigon,
things
have changed in important ways which cast doubt on the reliability
of
American patronage.
The relative economic and military strength of the USA has declined.
a.
no longer has such a large share of world product(ivity)
a
of policy,
matter
(see Appendix 1);
US world warfighting aspirations have
Its ability to act as,
reduced.
It
as
explicitly
been
and afford to be, global policeman has also
significantly declined (see further Appendix 1) .
b.
The willingness of Americans to engage in foreign wars has correspondingly
tumbled.
hawks,
sure,
be
to
American administration includes
the
Although
more
people and Congress are no longer in
the
enough
than
for
a /mood
gratuitous foreign adventures, especially when the fun may not appear to be in
American
This "Vietnam syndrome"
popular opposition to overseas military involvement.
has
major
a
as
served
strong
US opinion polls regularly show
Since Vietnam,
interests.
constraint
on
US
military
policy
foreign
and
involvement.
c.
One
Doctrine
manifestation
important
called
which
196'?,
of
the foregoing
of
elements
upon US regional allies
responsibility for their own defence in regional conflicts.
to
the
is
take
Guam
primary
Another important
are
outcome is Defense statements to the pointed effect that before US troops
committed
abroad
there
must be reasonable assurance
no US vital
each
and
'such
is impossible to guarantee - especially for remote countries
where
national
Certainly
that
Congressional
As Mack comments,
popular support (Weinberger,
assurance
of
no
interests are at stake''.
more is assured under the ANZUS treaty which only
signatory
constitutional
consultation;
reported in PC p.14).
'act to meet the common danger in accordance
processes'
(article 4).
All
reassurances?
15
its
is
Isn't the treaty backed
None that are not undermined by
in American administrative multiple-speak.
with
the treaty strictly requires
there is no undertaking or commitment.
up by informal verbal
provide
others,
the elite view is that Australia has to 'work ...
Even
'the threshold of direct US combat involvement could be quite
For
the
of US support'" and that the Americans cannot be counted upon always.
prospect
to help Australia in other ways'".
a
However
special
case
has
been made
American
for
military undertakings (in Vietnam, Cambodia, Iran)
common
friendship,
and shared values and democratic
interests,
second,
and,
culture
earlier
traditions.
as
first,
and slow constitutional
already indicated, the basis is shaky.
And here, a
common
pleading:
hardly sustains the adequacy of the basis
evidence
in
to
as to the adequacy of the basis for the possibility
the American people,
Congress,
cases.
reliability
- on the basis of permanent
There are two difficul ties with this type of special
His tori cal
(SB, pp. 29-30) .
case - as opposed to examples of American abandonment of
Australia's
and
cannot rely upon Ub support in a
...
defence emer qen c y ar i s i n g w i t h i n ou r own n e i gh bou r h ood'
the basis,
high,
at the time could significantly limit US willingness or ability
circumstances
a
to maximize
significantly on quite crucial
issues.
rather
America:
shared by Australia and
processes.
analogous
in
For there is not
values
diverge
interests always common,
Even
as missile testing and nuclear ships issues in the South Pacific have recently
confirmed.
Common
Indonesia
opposing
did not appear wheir? Australia was
interests
claim
to West Papua.
It is
dubious
at
considering
least
that
American interests would coincide with Australian in disputes or confrontation
with Asian nations to the North, e.g. Indonesia, Japan, etc.
special
case argument did hold water, Australia and America really were mates,
There was in fact no treaty in operation in
then the treaty would be otiose.
1942;
Of course if the
but
by
then
American
interests
in
countering
the
are at
present
Japanese
were
independently aroused.
14.
Although
neighbourhood
contingencies ...
impossible', as the pauper ap-i+e-’
16
assessed
a
4.
Other-reliance and regional self-reliance
A major problem with other-reliance for defence is then that it cannot be
entirely reliable,
deemed
be tolerated.
yet this is a place where unreliability can hardly
for
When the Indonesians are rolling into Brisbane it won't do
Defence to call up with a message like that from Services, "We can't get there
tomorrow",
till
"Or
until
after Congress meets".
More
seriously,
handing
defence over to others means handing control of our lives over to others,
nuclear defence,
given
very
which Antipodean administrations have opted
means for many of us handing our lives
likely
In principle,
Another problem is its cost.
over,
and
for,
it
literally.
quite
if a btate hires out its defence
it would no doubt look, other things being equal, for the cheaper bidder - if,
that
defence
is,
meterological
market
is
complexion
is
a
services,
monopolistic,
15
,
who
commodity
a
sort,
like
The trouble with global
etc.
with
currently
only one
at a national
level,
All
shipping,
national
of
supplier
right
the
i •
making
and has
this part of the case,
the
that
defence is
accordingly can exact a very high price,
the whole country a nuclear target.
appreciated
of
enough
well,
for not trying to force defence,
which
is
plainly a collective good, into a marketable commodity.
When a country can provide its own defence,
it certainly makes very good
for it to do so, since it normally has a stronger interest in
sense
its
own
defence
than
matter,
then self-reliance not Just makes good sense but pays; other-reliance
does not.
most other parties.
Should it also be cheaper
in
costs
that
But in that event, it does not need nuclear patrons, or to farm out
some of its defence.
15.
The French, who operate a global network second only to the Americans and
more extensive than the Russians, with many forces in the Pacific region,
have never been seriously considered. Yet in certain significant respects
French social and cultural
arrangements are closer to Antipodean ones
than American arrangements are.
In these days of technological warfare,
the post-Waterloo loss record of the French should not be given too much
weight; we don't
after all look very hard at the American record of
defeats and incompetence.
17
r
self-reliance
Such
as ANZUS and much of the apparent point
such
alliances
undermines an important part of the older
such
of
alliances.
newer bipartisan approaches to defence try to combine them (thus e.g.
However
Beazley as reported by Davidson) - approaches which thus begin to empty
of
what
content it had.
little
understanding,
content,
a
but
are
merely
vague
ANZUS
clear
no
contain
of
articles
simple course is of course to allow them to be
emptied
an expensive and outdated insurance
that the alliance,
so
Since the arrangements
consultations
beyond
commitments
of
policy,
It may however be death by seizure or convulsion should
dies a natural death.
American
defence
facilities
American
nuclear
equipped or powered transport be excluded
passage
be c1osed or internationalised and
from
of
Australia.
treaty
would no doubt sacrifice the deterrence and other advantages the
That
for
case
16
supposedly
affords
,
while
making
way
for
the
greater
advantages
o+
neutralized nonalignment, of no longer being a nuclear target, etc.
self-reliance pure and simple is insufficient.
But
consist of separable isolated pieces,
dramatically,
picture
Australia
will
self-sufficient
not
as becomes increasingly evident.
Most
winter.
The
such as plants which are
not
not escape the effects of nuclear
is much the same as for other objects,
internally
The world does
but depend crucially on their
environment
- and
indeed as for States themselves. The question then is what form the additional
holistic component of policy should take?
that
appropriate
the
cricket
game
move is not taking sides (as in a kids'
that is already set up) and doing one's bit for
For that will not contribute to stability,
rather
to
Put this way, it is almost obvious
sectionalism and fragmentation,
war
game
or
confrontation.
to a proper holistic approach, but
and to
bringing
nuclear
winter
cIoser .
757
If Australia is not likely to be threatened there is no real
deterrence
advantage because nothinq to deter.
Other advantages of
the ANZUS
alliance such as access to high-level intelligence are not only dubious
(see PC, Martin) but not always guaranteed by
the alliance as the black
out of New Zealand shows.
18
Other-re 1iance and self-reliance typically present a false contract,
certainly
do with pure self-reliance - a false contrast like that of
partism
and
(EE,
or
p.223),
at a particular level
of
and
holism
versus
dependence
In between lie a range of positions, one of which - favoured by
isolationism.
a long line of peacefully-disposed philosophers from Rousseau and Kant onwards
- might be called integrated reliance or federated reliance.
reach only certain inadequate levels,
may
which
alignment,
the monolithic East (or West).
5.
Against elitist arguments
stability,
very
as
related arguments revolve around that
securi ty
and
side,
are
value-laden
terms,
of
are
which
But
security.
not
cultural
What stability comprehends in American administrative perception
invariants.
is
other
and
4 and 5 of the elitist argument turn around the crucial notion
Premisses
stabi1i ty
the level of modern alliances
are essentially coupled with opposition to an
e.g.
of
But integration
different from what highland villagers take it to
include.
In each case a system is stable if it returns to a given stationary state
But relevant states and
under perturbations of sufficiently small magnitude.
the stationary among them are both relative to given frames of reference, /e.g,
what
is stable at a macrolevel may well not be at a microlevel.
said
of the superpowers,
even
remote events can threaten their interests or their associates '
and
stability.
disturb
Trudeau
As
'they share a global perception according to
But lesser states or people,
not
counting
which
(p.10)
remote
IVA
business
or
military^ as
invariably
view
stability;
by
relevant,
report
bombs a* necessary to stability,
contrast philosophers
increasingly
terrorism and as characteristically antithetical
ad 4:
a vital
no
and the
see
nuclear
bombs
as
fix
a*
tools
of
to peace.
interest in global stability and secur i ty?
1?
Bureaucrats
instability.
Of course Australia
have,
does
what sizeable nation does not.
interpretation conceals crucial differences,
For
Australia.
in
highly material
to the argument.
stability may well mean something different in USA from
global
means
Certainly vitai
interests are different.
interested in containing socialism (in Australia as elsewhere),
in
rhetoric at least,
popular
more
to socialism (or Mon-Soviet communism)
global
upset
to
containing
equate
communism and both with Soviet containment.
containing
motherhood
But the determinable
stability
on
American
in Latin America,
it
America
is
and it tends,
wi th
socialism
A continental
swing
or i n Africa,
wou 1 d
indeed
wou I d
and
perception
what
significant effects on US business and investment; but it wou 1 d not on its own
or affect most Australians or directly threaten
upset
and it certainly need not affect nuclear stability.
Antipodean
stability,
Australians generally are
not opposed in principle to socialism or notably interested in containing
perhaps the opposite).
(indeed
spread
not
ought
to be interested in defence of the
the
in
system,
Australia is not interested
defence
(American)
it
in,
or
enterprise"
“free
wherever
of advanced capitalism
its
is
presently
initiated or imposed.
It can be conceded, without granting the main thrust of the premiss
Contra 5.
that
the Soviets are expansi onistic,
in
interested
empires,
extending their influence where they can.
including
American
academics and sales people).
spread,
Marxism-Leninism,
everywhere.
in at least a weak sense that they
The
and
are
So also
are
most
matter
are
many
Indonesian (so for that
But the Soviets have an ideological message
an
ideology
they
anticipate
Americans also have a capitalist message,
being
installed
free enterprise,
which they are working to sell pretty much everywhere accessible to them;
they
need to be expansi onistic to have it adopted,
Chinese
little
would
and
whereas the Russians
and
need simply wait for history to take its determined course (though
assistance
surely
- reflecting legitimate doubt about
spread progress wi thou t interfering).
message is pernicious:
this
a
determinism?
Bu t (^he\^jreb^ Russian
both are pernicious (for familiar reasons;
20
to
see
e.g.,
Erlichs).
some
in
threatens,
proper question is whether Soviet international activity
The
damaging
way,
stability.
global
Soviet-American
doubt
No
confrontation, as in the Cuba missile affair, does threaten stability; but not
in
way that has any bearing on Australian defence.
a
expansionary
none
Australia,
military
tendency,
or
has
otherwise,
fact
In
direct
a
of significance reaches into the Antipodes.
Russian
no
effect
on
bo what is all
the local excitement and anticipation about?
The effect of Soviet expansionism is much exaggerated and
from the Antipodes it is hardly a problem,
Viewed
qet
locked
addressed.
of
into
unless the Soviets
confrontation with USA - a real
military
internationalism,
be
hardly
the
heavies
But confrontation apart, Soviet
a great success story,
does not seriously
disturb
stability, as seen from Australia.
should
distinguished
be
military
access,
involvement
World
control
involving
anything
since
influence.
War II,
In actual
of
global
on
the
militarily,
that of Afghanistan,
have
accomplished,
especially in Europe.
but
success
in
western
strategic
lacks
Europe,
has
they
the force ratio
And
21
case
little
had
concerns
might.
not
attempt
lacking much plausibility.
needed to
be
assured
of
both by their own standards of what is required
standards.
by
But the idea of Soviet military adventure
Europe is a Western invention and bogey,
military
what
striking
conspicuous
The usual Western apprehension
stability.
and
expansion
the Russian record is hardly
new territory,
Soviets
military
The one
with
influence
military,
with the USA or several other states.
comparison
effect
mere
and
potential
-military,
expansion
types of
a proper assessment of Soviet internationalism,
For
Soviet
to
problem
a third nonaligned group which helps to referee and to prize
global
should
With that problem however, the Antipodes can better assist as part
apart, not by seconding and inciting the USA.
in
overexploited.
the
Soviets have
no
good
The
military
and
by
reasons
or
in undertaking such an exercise which would draw them into
interests
war.
They
client
nuclear
already -Face economic difficulties and trouble with East European
states which they cannot control satisfactorily.
The
of Soviet inf1uence has largely been in the Third
extension
But it has hardly been successful,
with as many failures and losses to record
as Soviet "gains" - gains which add to the imperial burden
countries wracked with problems,
world.
such as Uietnam.
since they involve
The Third World exercises
are marred by Soviet ineptitude and limited by the state of their own economy.
They scarcely displace the global
structure enough to test its stability;
and
they produce no shock waves or even ripples in the Antipodes.
6.
Contra
the
dancers
the
in
East-West dance
confrontation between the lead dancers.
have
destabilizing
new
weapons
arms
tension
control
an
from
escalating
the
With this US policies and
Recent US
practices
and indeed highly destabilising,
and weapons systems,
because of rejection of arms
race on earth and begin a new one in space.
A
vast
practices
more
are
because of
control
and because of star wars preparation which both
and
accelerate
increase
in
and suspicion accompanies the arms race which is in large measure due
to US intransigence and US war-fighting doctrines,
built-in
but
than Soviet ones,
Soviet proposals,
the
death,
of
as much to do as USSR ones.
least
at
of
The main current threat to world stability comes not from one
incentives
(see FAC).
alliance
or
for pre-emption,
new weapons systems,
and deliberate abandonment
of
with
arms
Such considerations duly assembled demolish the theme that
alignment
with
USA
helps
increase
stability.
American
practices are to be resisted as much as Soviet.
6.
The East-West balance argument; alignment versus neutrality.
The need for Australian alignment with the USA is supposed to be shown by
the
East-W^st
balance argument.
This balance argument,
which
17
premisses with the related elitist argument, runs as follows
;
7. Global
stability is the key to world peace.
shares
key
8.
of the international order is a matter of maintaining a
Stability
global
But
balance.
5. The global balance is constantly threatened by an expansionist USSR.
The threat is [only] checked by the USA, which (6A.1) guarantees an open
6A.
and pluralistic international
■?.
order.
indeed most vital
Australia's primary security concern,
is this
interest,
stability. Hence
Australia's
10.
role is to help America maintain the balance.
The rest of Australia's in tervolvement
to follow.
taken
then
before
practical
assumes much that has already been rebutted,
argument
threat
argument
But there are many reasons for halting the
reaches this stage of moral and
it
Soviet
with American military arrangements is
thesis is correct (i.e.
detail.
The
for instance that
the
stabilizing
5) and that US policy is
It also takes for granted,
balance
what now is at least
(part
of 6A).
doubt,
that American policy is directed at balance and deterrence, rather than
serious
in
what the administration appears to be aiming at, straight superiority.
event,
that
is not really engaged
Australia
balancing
in some longer term
so much as in helping USA win a nuclear war,
feat,
But in
contradicting the goal
of
world peace of premiss 7.
and its derivation.
Contra
10
follow
that
strength
is
indicate,
the
Ta
role is such a lackey's one.
leaning
America's direction,
in
as
be
If
most
the
Presumably
premiss
balance
of
seems
to
evidence
5A.1 is designed to exclude
putting its weight where it is effective,
this
not
does
team (that is what such images as the balanced tug-of-war
of Australia teaming up with totalitarians.
thouqht,
should
Australia's
it
then Australia should surely be throwing its slight weight in
Eastern
suggest).
The derivation is inadequate;
with
would
deplorable
Nevertheless Australia
given its
own
broader
(From previous page)
After some reconstruction,
that
is.
For
the
argument, curiously referred as that of "central balance in newspaper
level publications of academics, is never presented in requisite detail
which is one reason why it has proved hard to criticise and refute.
interests
objectives,
could
Australia
fulfil
and
principles.
which would enable it to make
to world peace,
contribution
There are several
satisfactory
more
among them nonalignment and neutrality.
A more direct approach may
Thus 10 is hardly wel1-supported or evident.
be
a
better than throwing our Australian weight unrefIectively on one
the balance.
roles
different
of
side
the balance images and argument
As a little reflection attests,
points not in the direction intended, but towards nonalignment.
Contra
4A
(and
peace,
the
preserves
if of course false.
USSR in this munitions dance,
the
escalation
(the
USSR
relation).
balance,
hence
and
Again it takes two at
least
to
checks
the
the history of the dance reveals that
pace flowed from the interaction of the one partner
of
with
the
but for the USA, the USA would not be required to check the
That is,
other.
the
it can be granted that the USA is interlocked with and
While
tango.
The theme that US maintains
4).
interaction
is
two-way
as
with
Hegel's
master-slave
famous
Furthermore it looks as if, on a different historical
trajectory,
the main states of Western Europe could match the Soviet Union militarily (for
they have comparable combined GNP,
etc.)
Thus
it
is doubtful
see Appendix 1,
resources,
technological
that the current Soviet
build-up,
produced
in
interaction with the USA, could only be, or have been, checked by the US.
de
6A.1.
As the premiss is only of marginal relevance to the
argument,
need only be noted that the international order the USA helps maintain
very much to be desired.
In its intervention,
militarily,
it
leaves
economically and
indirectly, USA has assisted substantially in reducing plurality and openness,
as well as in establishing or propping up rotten regimes,
side of American imperialism is well enough documented,
etc.
The negative
if not widely
enough
read or known by Americans.
ad
8
and
maintaining
pass,
the
the
equivocation on the balance.
While balance is
one
stabi1i ty in the world arrangements that have presently
balance
structure can only carry so much loading.
24
way
of
come
to
Add too
much
weight (of arms,
and so forth)
tension,
The increasing probability of catastrophic
probably catastrophically.
fail,
to both sides and the structure will
breakdown, for a variety of reasons (accident, miscalculation, computer error,
human interference, etc.), has been argued elsewhere (e.g. WPI) .
While a certain neither overloaded nor overstressed balance may serve for
stability,
the present increasingly stressed balance will probably not.
however,
balance argument,
neglects this dynamical situation,
illegitimately
balance
switching from a (certain) balance in premiss 8 to the (on-going)
subsequent
premisses.
The
balance
argument
itself
The
breaks
in
down
through
of
removing
equivocati on.
What
dynamic picture also indicates is the importance
the
weight -from the balance,
some
reduction.
position
It
most obviously by arms limitation and
tension
to a
neutral
points to a different role for Australia,
too
within the nonaligned grouping.
It is to the emerging case
for
a
different role for Australia, and to action for achieving this different role,
that the positive argument will now gradually swing.
The
attacks
inadequate
upon
East-West
proposals
(its
to repair it.
alleged
good
administrators
This
For example,
Australia
than
with
American
trade
argue,
is a nonsequitur,
and
lots
to the argument, and do not
against nonalignment or neutralism is set
pervasiveness of nuclear winter.
for
for
The additions are inessential
confusion and dust.
the
for a different role
combined
The main effect of these additions is to generate extra
alliance and service.
serve
balance argument is typically
of
other
He might as well
things),
so
aligned
be
our
sagacious
because if the control balance fails we are all
worse than ex nihilo quodlibet (for it also
that balance is necessary for the stability).
dead.
suggests
But, in the main, the attack is
irrelevant because the point of nonalignment, is to help remove overload and to
break down confrontation and its escalation to war;
before winter descends,
it is a thing to do
to delay or halt its descent,
25
now,
and most important,
to
reduce its severity.
Australia's weight may be slight,
another irrelevant addition goes,
psychologically it is important for the West.
disease" would show the weakening
f or
Sovi e t ex pan s i on ism.
virtual 1y
alignment,
Australi a
gives
the
Bell,
Any further spread of the "Kiwi
of Western resolve, and give the green light
a leading exponent of the balance argument,
impression that if Australia dropped
through
the isles to
Russians would be on the road down
18
the
tomorrow.
Much of this sort of rhetoric i =■ reminiscent of
f
such military interests,
set
route,
major
American
of
out
the
The Russians have no
baseless fear-mongering of an earlier pre-Uietnam time,
and
but
out,
t ie
or present capabli
A
of
they would be met by substantial resistance along most
the
for one,
has
and
the
resistance obtaining Western assistance.
interests,
Philippines,
strengthening
And if they were to gear up
different
as well
the
from
Australia's,
as elsewhere in East Asia.
depends,
argument,
in
For America,
Indonesia
in both
The addition,
its "green light
from
so far
for
expansion"
comparison, on the previously faulted premiss 5 of Soviet expansionism.
or another
In fact most of the case against alignment of one sort
it is argued. for often nonalignment and neutrality are,
au th or i tar i an
assumptions.
style,
Cat 1ey,
simply
for
denounced
example,
- turns
- when
in good old-fashioned
upon
al ready
another exponent of "central
fau1 ted
balance",
presents the following 'consideration'':
... whatever the Swedes or Swiss may think about the matter, Australia
is
locked by considerations of culture,
economics,
and political
philosophy into the defence of the Western world.
It has both an obligation and a duty to contribute its share to that
cannot
easily be
defence
if necessary by hosting facilities which
located elsewhere (p.15).
The premiss is false for reasons essentially indicated:
Nay
sustains the conclusion,
prescriptive
18.
and the premiss in no
the argument involving among other things,
(is-ought) fallacy.
Consider the premiss.
Australia is
See the discussion of Bell's claims in D. Martin and in Mack PC.
26
the
not,
k
unless Catley has information withheld from most of the rest of us,locked into
Western nuclear defence,
its
but in principle free to reconsider and rethink
use of the "facilities" is not irrevocable,
and shortly
options.
(American
comes up .
>,
economics
and political philosophy provide locks and chains for Australia but
f©.r reconsideration.)
in principle at least,
not for nonaligned Western European states?
part
USA or altogether a client
of
frameworks
economic
and
They do not:
state;
and
philosophies
political
significantly different (for details,
defence
(as,
practices
e.g.,
ANZUS in al 1
of
culture,
Australia is not a
cultures,
the
interests,
are
nations
two
But even if the ideological
see CPD) .
frameworks were much more similar than they are,
the
How do
that would not entail
its weakness
similar
nor
shows),
any
defence obligations.
of
Most
worse.
the arguments against nonalignment are of Catley
Fortunately,
calibre
- or
the case against nonalignment is (as with several
then,
o-f the above points) developed in detail elsewhere, especially by 0. Martin in
his
examination
of counter-arguments to
Australian
armed
neutrality,
legally recognised nonbelligerent form of nonalignment he favours.
al 1
of Martin's argument is couched in negative form;
very brief.
make
this
his positive brief
us secure against such dangers as we may one day have to meet,
needlessless
is
exposes to other dangers,
correct enough,
Virtual 1y
alignment or alliance with the USA
It reduces to thi
including nuclear war'
and in need of wide propagation,
exhausts
the positive case for nonalignment.
posi t ive
case of much theoretical
interest,
the
it
cannot
while
means
no
In particular there is a
to be drawn from the
it
Wh i 1 e
(p.l).
by
is
more
burgeon i ng
theory of collective goods and action.
7.
Free riding, group size, and increasing variety.
The
with
strategic
more
convenience)
world situation we now confront can be viewed as
than 100 players,
major
a
game
counting in nation-states and leaving out
(for
organisations
such
as
the
largest
100
transnational
These
compan i es.
organisational players align themselves around
two
arge
poles. East and West, as indicated:
EAST
NON-ALIGNED
N
WEST
N
India
N
Sweden#
Swi tzer 1 and#
Tanzani a
Most Latin
.
American States!
##
Costa Rica
State
commmun i st
State
capitali st
N: Nuclear weapons states
#:
Neutral states
##: Nonmi 1i tary states
Key:
There are various - a great many - games these state players are playing,
Some of these
of which are practically important for peace and for stability.
such
games,
as
representation),
World
are
Empire
and
Chicken
(already
There
are several problems about East-Nest games:
have,
the
Russian
what
under
played
played essentially between the East-Nest
representation
negative sum characters of some games.
may,
as they will with the Big One),
end after one round,
And the monolithic East -
way
simplifications may).
So game theoretical
representation
they
like
the
monolithic
Nest dichotomy is misleading, and, as will appear, discards crucial detail
the
one
superplayers.
repeatability of the games (clearly some nuclear games
roulette,
=ome
will
(in
be
approached differently and more obliquely.
Nor 1d
security,
(technically,
in
like regional and local
joint
security,
is a collective good
supply and precluding exclusion).
28
That is not
of
to
course
say that there are not conditions under which security
for instance where security is guaranteed by a narrow and
much to be desired,
intolerant despotism;
provisioning,
it can be argued,
but then,
not the particular product.
collection of N nation-states.
It is,
the trouble lies with the
It is a collective good G for the
furthermore,
a collective good
permits the possibility of free-riding by nation-states.
perspective
the American complaint about its allies,
insufficient expenditure on defence,
their
leave
may
which
Looked at from this
and
Japan for example,
is a complaint about their
free
riding.
Within the balance of power framework the conditions for free-riding
extracted by Pettit) are satisfied,
disarming states.
For
to
the achievement (or maintenance) of G by any will make every member
and
any,
unilaterally
is available to all N members of the collective if it is available
G
1.
for instance by neutral and
(as
better off.
2.
G
is
achieved iff some number m^K contribute towards
its
provision,
where under the balance of power assumption
IICTK^N and II = (USA, USSR}.
The
3.
expected value of contributing to G or its maintenance is less
than
the expected value of not doing so, i.e. likely costs exceed likely benefits
except for perhaps members of II given that G is provided by II.
is
There
pegged
by
what
free-rider
problem,
members of II for whom the free-rider option is not open
- within
ran be called a pegged (or
asymmetric)
the confines of the balance of power assumption - and for whom condition 3
only satisfied under certain ways of looking at the matter (e.g.
a
war
10
years down the road so the expected costs
each—year
is
there will be
exceed
the
expected benefits).
There
regional)
is
a
straightforward
case
for
recommending
free riding on the balance of power provision of 6.
2?
Australian
(and
Some arguments,
beyond or adding to those already in effect presented, are these:-
Either
If it does then the region is better off than it would be if
or it does not.
(strongly)
the
as
and there is a large-scale war
stability breaks down catastrophically
aligned because it is unlikely to be (so heavily)
targetted.
(Here
dreadful new argument that nuclear winter means that the Antipodes
might
well
be involved gets challenged and rejected:
see
MF).
doesn't break down then the region has the benefits in any case,
enhances global
USA
stability,
indeed, as remarked and wi11
etc.;
regional
weight
significant?
of
delusional
the
in
That
power?
framework.
Ne shouldn't:
we
believe
seriously
it
and if we do we're
is
the
in
living
in
a
Australia has been left out of the picture in virtually
strategic planning exercises,
all
do
Australian voice makes much real difference
the
Northern
Western block,
be
As regards Australasian
further argued, the evidence points to the contrary.
halls
the
without
For there is no clear evidence that our alignment and cooperation with
costs.
the
stability
If
most difference-making peace
initiative^,
etc., etc.
Now
riding,
Eastern
rather
countries would hardly
block
th an
suppor t
of f ering
object
(h owever
to
free
Antipodean
c omf or t
trifling),
an d
Furthermore free riding is how the Americans,
incitement to their opposition.
the rational
would expect Australia to act,
on their theoretical principles
self interested procedure (see CPD). It is economically rational; contributing
is not.
But won't the Americans make things economically dear for Australia?
In threats and theory,
do
yes; but in practice, no more than they threatened
already in the case of New Zealand with the nuclear-ships issue.
short
term
arrangements:
aberrations,
America
will
never
give
up
trade
But
or
to
for
market
one gets the impression that America would trade with the Devil
Himself if it could open some new markets in Hell.
Despite its political stigma,
way
immoral or irregular.
voluntary payment system,
free riding need be no problem,
Perhaps the buses are free;
perhaps there
to which only some need contribute,
30
or in any
etc.
i =>
a
Hi th the
contributing is not (see
nuclear fix, free riding is indeed the moral course;
HPI).
Free riding, though often portrayed as a problem, is only a problem in
certain
and
desirable
sufficiently
riders.
collective
of
cases
is
This
in
Australia
stays
the
the escalating treadmill or gets
is,
off
is
involved
many
too
free
which
will
whether
or
security,
and precarious way that it
curious
on
good
will not be provided because of
the situation with global
not
the
provided,
where
provisioning,
rides
and
be
not
free.
Australia's free riding may be a problem for America; it is not for Australia.
Interests diverge again.
of
stability
by
building,
tripod
or
bipedal
one,
for example,
if it is a wind tower or
of
supports
increases stability.
instance in the theory of "spreading the risks"
certain
a
cybernetics.
free
The
increases
and
by
similar
Then
a
than
a
has
in
diversity
ecology,
for
The related theme,
(see EH).
stability,
that
theme
The
elaborated
been
in
core eco-systemic idea to be developed is that Australia's
and consequent nonalignment in defence
riding
variety,
variety
topple
point
the
Increasing the diversity,
with stability has been sharpened and confirmed
correlates
that
ground.
a quadrapod tower is much less likely to
and requires less guying to stay up.
variety,
certain
increasing its rigid ties or supports to the
better
terms,
pictorial
structure is typically increased up to a
it more adequately;
securing
or
a
In
riding increases stability.
free
Judicious
enhances
diversity
accordingly increases stability (especially if done in
and
concert
with other client states).
Two
hardly
interlocked
well
precarious
guyed,
structure
well dug
in
but
stability
of
the
Hhat makes engineering sense
is
not
supports in tension,
are
inadequate
of world peace.
East and Hest,
for the
long
term
however
strengthening the supports that are there,
balance
is disturbed by the Host's surging ahead and likely overburdening the
structure,
helping the East when the
but increasing the variety of supports, enlarging and diversifying
31
group size.
East-monolithic
monolithic
The
West
picture
misconceptualism perhaps convenient ■for some players.
in conceptualism,
main reason for mistakes concerns group size.
collective
but
is
significantly
differs
behaviour of large groups
theory
in
group size is a highly significant factor (though
group
■from that of smal I
One
Whereas 11+ = (West, East) is a
N of nation-states is not.
number
the
group,
a
It may ■force mistakes
convenient simplification, e.g. for strategic thinking.
smal1
than
more
much
is
i t s pr ec i se i mpor t is increasingly contested).
N of nation-states is a large
group
The
group,
of
interested parties, indeed of substantially economic actors.
the American theory of collective action applies:
that
interest,
counterintuitive way.
a
in
behave
self
essentially
So we may expect
wi 1 1
that the groups
Though expec ted to act
in
the
to obtain security in particular, the collection will not.
common
On this
account (that elaborated by Olson), the common interest can only be guaranteed
by outside influence or imposition (coercion in Olson's rapid thinking).
there is, as experience has shown, no outside
with the collective of nations,
mediator
collective
or
influence
good.
The
But
of sufficient authority to ensure attainment
prognosis
looks very
gloomy:
this
of
the
important
most
(though far from unique) collective good will not be provided.
Fortunately the reasoning,
has
been
containing
shift
economic
virtually
(subjectively)
back
actors
though large.
highly
is
to basics,
all
privileged,
for whom costs of war exceed benefits
in perspective from the earlier free riding condi t i on
important
that
The group,
too swift.
several
like much of the "logic" of collective action,
3).
effect of the knowledge of an ominous nuclear
actors involved should now be
expected
in
that
(note
in
the
Indeed
an
winter
is
posit i on;
costs of nuclear war have become very high.
for
go
Olson's grand theory is based on the accountants/-----tautology
(defining 'net')
32
gross agent benefits - gross agent costs.
net agent benefit
i.e.
A
for each agent or actor i
ymbols,
in
show
i
for virtually all
that
in N.
is positive for some i
is privi1eqed if A
group
(in collective N) ,
European
to
benefi t s
of global security are decidedly positive (e.g.
respective future GDPs would expectedly fal 1
needs
1
the
net
wi th a nuclear
war
nation-states
argument
their
It
to near zero).
The
fact
the group of nation-states is privileged does not however imply that the
that
good i nvo1ved,
c o1 Iec t i ve
longer term.
error,
stability
■ JI
instabi1i ty.
dynamics,
An
achieved
improved
particularly in
wi11 be supplied,
secur i ty,
dynami c ;
it takes no account of mistake.
through
superiority
modelling
or
intermediate
- which can take some account
iterated games — is gained by returning to
through
the
the
of
game theoretic
ground
A free rider "problem" is tantamount to a dilemma of some sort; according
to
conventional wisdom,
the
contrast
Taylor
and
Hard).
it is a prisoners'
(cf.
dilemma
The argument can go this
but
Pettit,
way;- a
free
rider
problem or issue is defined in terms of the provisioning of a collective good;
theory
the
but
of collective goods is equivalent to that
of
a
prisoners
20
dilemma.
dilemma;
in
detail
which
more
Certainly
the
global nuclear situation
as much is a commonplace claim.
appears
Elsewhere (HPI)
that it does indeed present a moral dilemma.
to
present
a
it has been argued
Here the argument
can proceed through the theoretical route just sketched above or in the
piecemeal way to be indicated - is that it is also a prudential
dilemma
21
(for members of N).
19.
The
less than perspicuous symbolism is that used in Hardin
(82,
p.20,
p.39),
but with agents'
costs or contributions,
C,
duly agent
relativized.
Hardin misleadingly treats C as a fixed parameter,
thus
strictly falsifying the tautology.
20.
Thus Hardin who (in 82) claims to 'demonstrate the equivalence of
the
logic of collective action and the Prisoners'
Dilemma'
(p.4).
The
demonstration, which will be contested elsewhere, is given on p.x.5ff.
21.
But of course the two types of dilemma interconnect.
the range of apparent two party games being played by the US
Hardin 83),
Union
Soviet
(labelled US and SU respectively)
administration
regards the moves of further nuclear armament.
(It is supposed,
A,
from
the
or nuclear disarmament, N.
It is important here,
as other
French
that
The American people seem rather
more
were clearly opposed to the new nuclear missiles their
people
the
towards nuclear disarmament than their administration;
inclined
to
proceeded
German
administration
The strategy games involved are then
install.
shots
It is administrations or governments
etc.
take people into war;
to
places,
administration - which for the most part calls the
the society and the people.
generally
as
that the game is set in some background context,
naturally,
Chinese nuclear armament).
distinguish
and
1985
in
nuclear disarmament is not considered in isolation from on-going
e.q.
and
(e.q.
since these have obtained some discussion
us consider -first,
Let
administration
which we can suppose to be played over successive time intervals, e.q.
games,
years; so there is interaction and feedback as the games go on - until
the Big
Ones explode.
The
apparent games of US and SU are those diagrammed next:
Pr i soners'
A
4,1
D
2,2
O
1,4
this
being
played.
According
professions!1ez
the
A
1,4
CP
presumably
also
represented US policy,
it
no
aggressive,
D
A
4,1
D
3,2
US
CP
1,4
to Hardin, 'giving evidence of
Dilemma
Prisoners'
ordering of virtually all
that
A
4,1
that
simplistic setting those represent the apparent games
Within
and
D
D
3,3
US
IJS
A
SU
SU
SU
D
New Initial Game
Revised Game
Dilemma Game
in
(PD)
'represents
[his]
deformation
the
preference
the articulate policy analysts in the United
the
Soviet Union'
(p.248) .
While
PD
there is considerable evidence (as already
longer does,
war-fighting,
34
That
is,
the
US has
States
may
have
indicated)
that the US administration has shifted to
phase.
are
a
interchanged
more
its
rankings of (D,D)
Soviets,
The
have
who
been
much
more consistent
no
(and
bound to try to keep up with the Americans,
their
changed
However they are
have stuck with deterrence and no-first-strike.
but
better
doubt
appear not to have
in their policy pronouncements,
censored)
game,
and (A,A), presumably some time between 1978 and 1984 games.
and so pushed towards the Revised
Game shown, which p1easan11y restores symmetry.
Stable or equilibrium outcomes for each game are circled.
said
be
to
stable
if neither player has
unilaterally on the strength of the game,
influencing
provide
in
broad sense,
a
and dangerous outcome.
strategy for each player;
dominant
that equilibirum
In all
All
strategies.
is
hence
its
economic fascination.
results
which
are
socially suboptimal
(and
games that might plausibly be taken to represent
situation,
and
A
recognisably
guaranteed by the independent "stable" strategies.
substantial
to
political
substantially
the
games
satisficing
the
suboptimal
superpower
outcome
socially
superior
is
there are
What is worse,
and military incentives for the superpower players
adjust their preferences in
after repeated games,
an
And the same applies to suggested
alternative
Chicken.
other
a
below
all
as
in
Pareto-
even
But as the
threshold),
such
achieved
yet in the PD game that is
these games are di 1emmas.
games
these
the apparent games arming is
and
suboptimal,
strategies
switch
i.e. to alter the outcome except by
player also to alter
other
dilemmas
undesirable
deliver
the
to
incentive
An outcome is
not
directions
but to do what the US appears to have done, to make the
situation worse.
socially preferable would be change to a coordination game of
Much
some
sort, for instance, to the game which neutrals tend to play (and which Lackey,
in contrast to other more bellicose utilitarians, sees utilitarian superpowers
playing;
hence Hardin's label
diagrammed,
WN
inclined neutral
represents
a
for this game,
'Lackey's Game').
Western-inclined
(e.g. Yugos1avi a):
neutral and
EN
In the game
an
Eastern
A
3,2
D
D
(D
A
2,3
NN
Now
4,4
dilemmatic and coordination games are not played in
the
integrated
since
[Other coordination games, with
(D,D) assigned (1,1) 1
in
settings
such as Uni ted Nations' committees
games
coordination
are
(and
games
peoples'
-frequently
but
isolation,
elsewhere,
as
well).
Superimposing the games, as applied to US and SU games, leads to the following
augmented games:
SU
SU
SU
A
D
A
2,2
4,1
1
2/3
3,3
•
1
4,1
.
2/3
1,4
•
2/3
2,2
D
J,3
■
4
1,4
■
A
2/3!
A
m represents a sequence of ms,
and 3s in some order.
As the agumented games reveal,
a stable deadlock.
on the superpowers.
4
i ■ e? ■
2/3
4
■
2/3 a sequence of 2s
m < m w rn
in fact in several ways.
on
For example,
would
For one, enough significant
much
greater
as a
Superpower
militarism
Australia's
nonaligned
free
impact,
rider
for disarmament and regional nuclear freedom (instead of by
wash polemics and token ambassadors,
US support) .
36
strategy
with less support, unilateral action by US
arms build-up can be exposed.
be
in
much more pressure can be brought to bear-
power excursions would stand naked, and unsupported.
seriously
<2,3
to play with a superpower is to help reinforce
For another,
towards disarmament.
particular,
1,4
A
a coordination game can alter the overall dominant
playing
administration
4,1
•
2/3
But playing an independent coordination game can help
breaking the deadlock,
players
3,2
■
D
1
US
US
US
A
D
D
D
New
Game, Augmented
Revi sed
Game, Augmented
Prisoners" Dilemma
Augmented
and
in
pressing
white
undermined by a none-too-tacit policy of
8.
On the need for, possibility of, and prospect of basic structural change-
The
peace
(in
world has changed enormously since the time of Kant's proposals
and even since the time of Veblen's more cynical
(of 1795),
additions
Hard science and destructive power have grown enormously; and even
1917).
especially that admitting
knowledge of collective behaviour,
theoretical
game-theoretic treatment,
what
for
though still
has increased markedly.
slight,
be accomplished politically has in certain
can
little, since Rousseau complained (around 1761)
of
respects
But
changed
very
that governments were probably
too short-sighted to appreciate the merits of his project for perpetual peace.
Governments
have
obstacles to peace.
long
of
source
been seen as Xthe main (contingent)
if the peace is
Thus Veblen rightly maintains that ' ...
to be kept it will have to come about irrespective of governmental management,
- in spite of the State rather than by its good offices'- (p.7) .
against
the
State
on the basis that 'governmental
Veblen argues
and
establishments
powers ... are derived from feudal establishments of the Middle Ages; which in
turn,
However
a predatory origin and of an irresponsible
of
are
character
Christian-feudal origin of the State provides only one
the
(p.r).
- and
a
coercive - evolutionary pattern of organisation (pp. 12-13).
There are major blockages to peace proposals and projects at two main and
critical
levels
of
organisation,
that,
organisation of collectives of states and,
organisation
deep,
and
domination
of
removal
and
to
nothing
set
in part by devolution,
themselves.
these blockages,
and
exploitation of other forms,
sights rather lower,
short
organisation
of
states,
upon,
The problems involved
ones
intertangled
appears to call
genuine global
appear
adequate.
impossible in present political climates.
37
Yet even much
the
for
are
concerning
extensive
reached,
to
be
attained,
levels
of
political
stability
of extensive structural changes at both
would
of
that of the
Indeed if a permanent and satisfactory peace is to be
adjustments.
or
individual
focussed
already
smaller
changes
look
There is little doubt that certain sorts of structural change are
to
conducive
peace and that certain fundamental
permanent peace.
for
changes would be
With that in view they have long been
least from Rousseau and Kant onwards.
transform the structures that lead to war'- (B.
theme
immune
to
criticisms,
obvious
further desiderata,
modest material
freedoms,
~ at
advocated
for
'it is also necessary
instance
to
To render this
Martin, p.12).
that
straightforward
extension of certain established structures could bring an
authoritarian
to war,
sufficient
But it has also long been supposed that
such changes are necessary for lasting peace:
some
highly
end
typically presupposed, are invoked, e.g. certain
standards of life, etc., and the type of necessity
involved is set at some lower technical
level
(not excluded however by present
These adjustments make the necessity theme more difficult to
practicalities).
assess, but also difficult to sustain.
are
There
part,
critical
positive
part,
part
negative
According
marxist
demolishing
and
range of arguments
a
defence,
from
a
negative
determinism,
of
comprising
direct arguments for
the
theme.
22
this enterprise will simply be illustrated.
to deterministic and mechanistic approaches,
technological
determinism,
human
nuclear
weapons,
The
large
such as that
like
of
megamachines
They are an integral part of the business of
generally,
are
no aberration.
industrial
and
ecological conquest,
a further stage in
human
intervention
which has already involved substantial disruption through pesticides,
etc.
The argument tends to the fatalistic.
made,
and once made they wi11
22.
and
etc., that arrangements have to be more or less the way they are, and
nature,
a
parts to its assessment
two
be used.
wastes,
The megamachines of conquest are
No change in political
arrangement,
More of the negative enterprise is attempted elsewhere,
e.g.
a critique
of
the supposed strait-jacket of human nature is begun
in CPD.
From
Plato through Hegel and into contemporary times it has been supposed that
war,
like aggression,
is part of human nature,
that war is a permanent
condition of human and social existence.
38
would
which
enthusiasts
any
make
difference,
possible.
is
their position and luck,
push
While there is, unfortunately, a
induction from the manufacture of weapons,
batches
machines
are
to this one,
depl oyed) ,
never
(and
organisation
deterministic
position
would
possible either; political
not frustrate
the
and
other,
is false,
Different political arrangements,
been
have
inductions.
broader
The
are
changes
arrangements too, like the rest of social
not
life, are
But (nonanalytical) determinism,
technologically or economically determined.
technological
many
that a change in background
of course that such background
is
made
of
But even the good inductions do not
that weapons of various sorts must be used,
political
many
invention
from
induction's:-
machines that do eventually get
many
reinvented or independently discovered).
show
of any given type (for
or the like to their manufacture are unreliable and subject to
counterexamples
or
weapon
there is no stopping progress.
But in doing so they overextend themsleves.
fair
technological
that a
even further,
once invented by humans will be used:
device
Sometimes
so it is argued
which alleviate problems,
are
possible and would be different in differently evolved worlds.
CPD).
(JB,
elsewhere
technically
Things did not
and do not have to be the way they are or the social and political sort of way
they are.
Many routes,
dominant
require
none of deductive strength,
political
extensive
lead to the conclusion that the
structures of our time,
evolved from feudal
structural alteration.
In particular,
institutions,
they need
to
superseded by alternative structures which do not promote or lead to war.
theme has been argued directly from the nuclear fix (see e.g.
But
suppose,
improbable as it may seem,
thereby removing the current nuclear fix;
quietly
seif-destructing,or
nuclear
disarmament
HF I,
p.4/ft.).
that nuclear weapons all
vanished,
for instance,
thermodynamic
actually took place.
The
they turned out to be
miracle
occurred,
or
not
be
The problem of war would
t-hat of nuclear war would only be given a short respite.
23
Conventional
the structural arrangements for war would remain intact.
removed
For
a massive
be
and
even
3'?
remain,
weapons
would
weapons
such as chemical and biological ones,
were
they
prevent
the
in sot ar
3S
could seem
be
Nu clear weapon s,
if nuclear power plants remained
especially
nothing
and
intact;
development of (Star wars) weapons more
nuclear-
as
dangerous
caches are easily hidden away),
removed ("for smal 1
replaced,
would
along with weapons perhaps as
than
diabolical
nuclear ones.
War cannot be eliminated while leaving the rest of society as it is
by freezing the status quo.
... The structural conditions for war
need to be removed - not reinforced as appeals to elites may do - and
superseded by alternative structures which do not lead to war
(B.
Martin, p.12).
Structural adjustments
peace.
An
can provide conditions for
Kantian
initial
for the
argument
satisfactory
lasting
proposition
that
is
peace
possible, presented by Latta (introducing Permanent Peace), runs as follows:Peace, perpetual peace, is an ideal, not merely of a speculative kind but a
practical
ideal, a moral principle.
ought to be realised, i.e. there ought (morally)
Hence this ideal
to be peace.
But ought entails can; therefore peace is possible.
From
Heracleitus
philosophers
by
24
be
with war as one limit, is essential
swarm
more
widely
conceded,
ought
to
though
often
not
on
of
Some are even captivated
stop,
to motion and progress.
the recent shift in philosophical fashions the second premiss would
Kantian
grounds,
now
but
Such grounds do support the theme that peace ...is—desirable
be realised,
indicate what sort of peace.
but are more discriminating in
Unfortunately,
premiss does not sustain the conclusion,
23?
impressive
such extravagant counter-claims as that with peace everything would
consequentialist.
and
there buzzes an
Hegel
who have rejected the second premiss.
that competition,
With
through
that
they
help
however/ it is done, the second
ought does not entail can,
as
many
(From previous page)
As B. Martin, who uses this important form of
argument for institutional change to get his thick book
started,
points
ou t (pp. 12-13).
24.
The
swarm includes some anomalies,
ecology, Spinoza: see Appendix 3.
40
such as that tarnished hero of
deep
dilemmas reveal
moral
Fortunately
(see MD) .
conclusion that peace is possible,
method of (semantical) modelling:
societies
where
recall
persists
present in detail
scenarios
of
it may be
necessary
to
(for the sceptical
with n = 1 or n = 0).
n-human models,
the
to
That is the more
and indeed is feasible.
elaborate
peace
route
a more satisfactory and revealing
is
there
This sort of thing is of course
in more pleasing fashion than logicians could hope to emulate if
25
less precisely,
by novelists.
Hhat all these scenarios point
to,
already done,
rather
however,
are societies considerably different from our own, not in the people
involved
who have their weaknesses,
forth,
and so
their power drives,
but
because of significant structural alterations in the societies depi c ted.
way of such modellings we can not merely argue to the feasibi1i ty
By
peace,
sorts
restructured
push ahead with the argument - that societies
but
desirable alternatives to contemporary
are
For those of us
industrial arrangements.
pacific
the
alternatives,
Heilbroner
is
has
and
possible
said
thoroughly entrenched,
of
the
desirable,
human
and enforced,
power.
That has not deterred social
before
him and many after him,
Kant,
25.
in
his
search
these
military
or
then who want to move towards such
from
inference,
feasibility
and
we shou1d begin on the real work of structural change.
desirability is clear:
Peace
practical
of
of
but
the
prospect).
prospects
Present
poor
(as
arrangements
are
are
both ideologically and by much physical
theorists such as Kant, who like Rousseau
were concerned with obtaining lasting
for the indispensible conditions
peace.
for__ 1 asting—peace,
Perhaps Kant had some such modellings in view in his theme that peace is
empirically possible, which he coupled with his striking claim that it is
morally and rationally imperative.
The latter claim,
running in direct
opposition
to the longline of bellicose philosophers,
really relies on
the correct but controversial assumption that states are subject to
the
same moral relations as individual persons.
Both then have an obligation
to seek peace derived from forms of the categorial morality, notably from
rational autonomy , the universality of maxims, and the ultimate value of
persons (or, more chauvinistically, of humanity).
41
claimed,
others
as
have claimed since,
that peace is
not
possible
present structural arrangements of a competing nation-states kind.
times
changed,
have
and so have state structural
In particular there is now,
under
To be sure
since
arrangements,
in the shape of the United
Kant
Nations,
a
very weak reflection of what Kant looked for, a world (or European) federation
of nations.
namely,
But crucial
the
at
ingredients in Kant's resolution are still
upper level,
what is required for a standard resolution
Dilemma type situations - some surrender of
Prisoners
lacking:-
of
sovereignty,
national
26
especially as regards war;
Much
has now accumulated that more
evidence
the
and, at the lower level, "republican" state*.
nation-state level
far-reaching
changes
if peace is to be secured,
or
required
at
movement
is even to get its message through already fixed channels
control
systems.
succeed,
tn
informational
and democratic
are
practical
27.
and
not
(p.52) ,
to
alter
which
the
theoretical arguments for
not that it has fallen very
Kant's
claim,
as
well
as
arguments of an inductive sort.
Such is also the new message from America:
for the peace movement to get
through to the administration, American democracy must be overhauled and
revitalised,
capitalist democracy superseded by
true democracy or
"republicanism"
(see e.g.
Cohen and Ragers).
But the message, like the
US peace movements'" very limited demands for peace,
leaves the state, as
the bringer of wars, and the main source of violence, essentially intac.;
the structural changes suggested, which will be slow to achieve, are much
too narrowly conceived.
28.
state
has traced some of the economic consequences of 'the rise and
subsequent fall of the American imperium'’
There
to
The significant decline of the American imperium
Heilbroner
26^
peace
Movements on a single front, such as peace, are unlikely to
channels,
27
character and membership of state control system^.
widen
APPENDIX 1;
a
need to be linked into a broader plurality of movements,
but
are
My thanks for information to David Bennett and Andrew Mack.
'Empires
f ar .
empire
was
no
Thp =h<=pr military cost ... for the United States a 1 one ...
12
px c e p t i on «
is
always been expensive and the American
have
ten
roughly
imperial
American
dol1ars)".
GNP for the last 25 years
...
percent of
supplemented
spending
enhanced poverty,
countries fueled inflation,
what it was represented as required by,
$2X10
in
capitalist
other
by
1972
etc., and was complemented by,
counterexpenditure and efforts by the
USSR.
establishment of an American hegemony [consisted and] resulted
'The
just
in
American
large
very
capital
American-owned
billion"
payments
and
Between 1950 and 1970,
equipment abroad 1 eaped from $ 12
(negative
build-up
of
value
of
the
to
billion
"capital
flows" and
balances),
and
a
$78
growing
On this sort of basis Heilbroner speculates that
of IOUs.
operation
rapid
A result of the expenditure abroad was a serious balance of
problem
accumulation
mere
investments abroad.
plant
(p.54).
but in the
military expenditures,
not
of the American imperium by itself - deemed of such
'the
critical
importance to preserve the peace and security of the capitalist world - was in
likelihood
all
a
inflationary phenomena'
the
for
the
globalisation
of
the
(p.57 with insert from p.56).
According to Heilbroner,
that
condition
sufficient
'Long before the Vietnam debacle,
it was clear
American arms could not prevent the rise of revolutionary governments in
under-developed
collapse
there
world"
(p.57).
is presented by Heilbroner;
But
and seemingly there
little
is
evidence
little.
is more substantial evidence for is the marked dec H ng of *he
imperium in the period (1973-3) concerned.
decline
really very
in
America's
select leading national
share of World GDP,
economies:
43
of
What
American
One piece of evidence is the sharp
shown in the following
table
of
POPULATION
SHARE
(1984 est)
SHARE OF WORLD GDP (X)
RANK
1968
1975
1984
USA
1
35.0
24.3
25.0
5.2
USSR
2
11.1
11.0
13.8
6.2
.JAPAN
3
5.2
3.0
9.5
2.7
GERMANY FDR
4
5.1
6.7
5.7
1.5
FRANCE
5
4.6
5.4
4.4
1.3
CHINA
6
2.9
4.8
4.3
22.6
UK
8
2.8
2.8
2.3
1.3
INDIA
12
1.3
1.5
1.1
15.1
AUSTRALIA
15
1.1
1.4
1.0
0.3
COUNTRY
The
qrand
table
empire,
also make it clear that if the USA cannot
should
nor can the USSR.
sustain
A totalitarian Pax Sovietica is even
a
le=s
likely than a capitalistic Pax Americana was.
APPENDIX 2:
A pluralistic framework for defence policy
The policy (broadeni ng Cami11 er izs suggest ions)
1.
ensures Australian security to some minimal but reasonable extent;
2.
is entirely non-nuclear (.and so is not aligned);
3.
is
defensive
in
posture
with
weapons
system
devoid
of
offensive
application and capacity, focussing on direct defence of Continent,
is decentralised, comprising wel1-trained, dispersed but coordinated small
units.
is partly at least social,
defence,
nonmilitary
deploying,
in combination [?] with territorial
forms of popular resistance trained in
noncooperat i on.
44
sabotage
a
APPENDIX 3?
The philosophical record; a preliminary tabulation.
Reflection on war and peace has had a strong polarising effect,
dividing
philosophers into two main groups:
Group B.
Those who regard war as inevitable, perhaps even as desirable;
Group G.
Those who consider war an evil, capable of being replaced by lasting
and
peace through goodwill or improved social arrangements.
The groups are not however exhaustive;
fence-sitters;
and
there
are
there are ambivalent philosophers, and
those who have
the
supported
battered themes of a war to end wars and of world empire.
at one stage in his development,
to
a despotic world state,
peace.
Russell,
idealists.
reached by imposition or war,
B and G are sometimes described,
But
while
Thus, for example,
who looked, like Dante before him,
So strictly the classification is (once again)
Groups
historically-
as a guarantor
of
four valued.
respectively,
as realists
and
these overworked terms reflect accurately enough
the
historic human condition and the present prospects,
they are prejudicial, and
they conflict with other classifications using these terms; for instance, both
Plato
and
Hegel,
condition
of human existence.
idealists
would
Northedge,
accept war as
normally accounted idealists,
have
been
a
Such concoctions as war-realists
preferable
to the
labels
from whom much of the record is drawn,
the
c on serva t i ve t r ad i t i on a n d aboli t i on i sts.
the
concoctions,
45
terms
and
of
sets the contrast:
peace-
which
namely
We shall prefer adaptions
namely war-riors and peace-niks,
simply (real) baddies and goodies.
in
permanent
or,
not to be
of
partisan,
DEFINING POLES
R adi c a 1 s
GROUP 8:
war-riors
RESIDUE GROUP
GROUP G
peace-niks
Virtually all classic
Greek phi1osophers
except early Stoics:
especially Heracleitus,
Plato (P)
Author of
Revel at ions
Early Christians
(non-violence
pr i n c i p 1 e)
Dubois (1306);
but with anti
Musi im aim
Erasmus ( 1570)
Cruce (1623; early
world order model
Roman Stoics and Christians
Scholastics: Aquinas (P)
Dante
•Just war theorists:
(Au Qu s t i n e) , SuIr ez,
Grotius (1425)
IJ t op i an s: More (war
games of modern
utopias in direct
descen t)
European peace
projects, some extended
to (Christian)
wor1d:
Bel 1ers ( 1710),
Penn (1693), abb£ de
Saint-Pierre (1713)
European peace
and hegemony:
Duke of Sully
(1620)
Nation-state theorists
Machiave1 1 i, Hobbes,
Locke, Spinoza
I-<2'1 b n /f’-j
German idealists:
Hegel, Schopenhauer
Perpetual peace:
Rousseau, Kant
Mili t ar i st s: Nietzsche;
Treitschke, Bernhardi,
Clausewi tz
Some utili tar i ans:
Bentham, the Mil Is,
Bren tano
Some anarchists and
1ibertarians:
Kropotkin (?),
Spencer
Russel 1
■James
Hi t tgenstei n
Key:
In
Dewey
P, peace a prime objective.
sort of investigation there are disappointments as
this
Spinoza
was
admiration
madness
to
a
major disappointment,
of Greek thought,
allow
Brentano a
find.
well
For,
as
finds.
despite
his
'Brentano was a decided pacifist and thought it
questions of international
fortunes of war'- (Kraus in Brentano, p.122).
46
justice to be
decided
by
the
REFERENCES
H.G. Andrewortha
Birch,
and L.C.
University of Chicago
The Ecological Neb,
1984.
Press,
H.R. Ashby, Design -for a Brain, Second edition. Hi ley. New York,
I960.
S. Beer, Desiqninq Freedom, Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, Toronto,
F. Brentano,
The
Origin of our Knowledge of Right and Wrong,
Keegan Paul, London
1969.
'Setting
the
J. Camilleri,
disarmament
agenda",
l?/4.
Routledge
and
Peace------ Studies
9,
( 1984) ,17-19.
F. Capra and C. Spretnak, Green Politics, Hutchinson, London,
R. Catley,
with the Bomb ...
'Along
Australian Magazine, 7-8 April,
(Review o-f
1984.
Martin),
D.
The—Weekend
1984.
1979.
P. Cock, Alternative Australia, Qu ar t er Book s, Me1 hourn e,
J. Cohen and J. Rogers, On Democracy, Penguin, New York,
1984.
P. and A. Erlich, Popu1 ation, Resourses, Environment, Second edition, Freeman,
San Francisco,
H. Feith,
197x.
'Richard Falk,
Peace Studies 24 (June 1985)
World order radical',
24-5.
J. Galtung, There are Alternatives, Spokesman, Nottingham,
17’84.
A. Gilbert,
'The state and nature in Australia', Au s t r a 1i an Cu 1 t yral—Hist or
1981 (ed. S. Goldberg and F.B. Smith), Canberra, 1982, pp.9-28.
R. Hardin, Co 1 1 ec 1 tive Action , Resources -for the Future, Washington,
R. Hardin,
M.D.
Hayes,
Ph i 1 osop_hy—and—Pub He
236-254.
'Defending
September 1983)
mutual disarmament',
versus
'Unilateral
Affairs 12 (1983)
the sunburnt country',
Chain Reaction
33
(August
11-17.
R.L. Heilbroner, Beyond Boom and Bust, Norton, New York,
19/8.
I. Kant,
Perpetual
Peace (trans,
and
introd. M.
Campbell
Sonnerschein, London, 1903 (first published 1795).
A. Mack, 'Farewell
1?82.
Smith),
Swan
to Arms Controls' 9 (1984) 9ff.
A. Mack, 'The pros and cons of ANZUS', Fabian ANZUS Conference, Lome, 4-5 May
1985;
referred to as PC.
B. Martin, Uprooting War, Freedom Press, London,
1984.
D. Martin, Armed Neutrality for Australia, Drummond Books, Melbourne,
47
1984.
Northedge,
'Peace , war and philosophy',
in Encyclopedia of Phi 1osophy
(ed. P. Edwards), Volume 6, Macmillan, New York, 1767, 63 t>< .
M. Olson, The Logic of Collective Action, Harvard University Press, Cambridge,
Mass.,
1965.
P. Pettit, 'Tree riding and foul
dealing', typescript, Canberra,
J.-J. Rousseau, A Project for Perpetual Peace C trans.
1927 (first published 1761).
E.M.
1985
Nut tai), London,
large-scale nuclear war and nuclear deterrence,
'On the ethics of
R. Rout ley,
out' ,
Discussion__ Papers__ in
Environmental
and
the political
fall
School of Social Sciences, Australian National
Ph i1osophy #5,
Research
University, 1984.
R.
R.
Routlpy,
'Metaphysical fall-out from the nuclear predicament', 1 Ph 11osophy
"and 1 Social Criticism 3/4 ( 1984) 19-34; referred to as MF.
Rout ley and V. Plumwood, 'Moral dilemmas and the logic of deontic^notions ,
'ni\r,.^.ign Papers in Environmen tai ..Philosophy #4,
Research School
of
SociaT~Sciences, Australian National University, 1984; referred to as MD.
P.R. Stephen son, The Foundation s of Cu1t u r e, N.J. M i1es, oydn ey,
R. Sylvan,
'Culture
Canberra,
1985;
and
the
roots of
political
divergence',
1 ? 36.
typescript,
referred to as CPD.
M. Taylor and H. Hard, 'Chickens, whales, and bumpy goods: al ternative models
of public-goods provision', Poli tical Studies 30 (19821 350 370.
The Strategic Basis of Australian Defence .Policy,
the National Times, March 30-April 5,
leaked extracts published in
1984, 23-30.
to Australian Security,
Pariiamentary Joint Committee for Foreign
Affairs and Defence, Australian Government Printer, Canberra; referred .o
3. s TAS.
T. Veblen, An
Inquiry into the Nature of Peace and the Terms of
Perpetuation, Viking Press, New York, 1945 (first published 191,).
48
its
AUSTRALIA'S DEFENCE PHILOSOPHY? Investigations
of the nonexistent # MX504
'The opinions of philosophers, with regard to the conditions of the
possibility of a public peace,
shall be taken into consideration by
states armed for war'' (Kant,
'A [the only]
secret article for
perpetual
peace',
p.158,
an article flattering no doubt
to
philosophers, but neglecting their dominant bellicose tradition).
A defence philosophy is much more than a defence policy.
A policy can be
merely by a list of directives as to what do in various
given
at
even
its
philosophy
policy
best it need only involve practical
into a theoretical
setting,
contrast,
integration
of
a
the
which looks at the key concepts involved:
security, stability, control,
here,
By
wisdom.
goes deeper and requires theoretical wisdom,
circumstances;
protection, defence, interests, national
interests, intelligence, war, etc. Defence philosophy is a branch of political
and
social
philosophy,
and has long been treated as such,
though under such
more familiar and honest headings as "of war" and "of peace" (see Appendix
Like
most
of philosophy it can be applied,
parts
in
regional
3}.
among
ways
others.
defence
A
approaches
to
philosophy should embed appropriate defence arrangements
war
not merely
and peace,
or
superficially
into
and
"foreign
policy", but into the way and intended way of life of a country, both into on
going
culture
policy
defence
power
and
into the intended or planned
typically takes prevailing socio-political
structures for granted;
questioning
of
merits
cultural
arrangements.
arrangements
a defence philosophy again penetrates
or rejecting features of these structures,
enquiring as
things and institutions of which defence is planned,
society should be defended by what sort of appropriate
sort
of
what
lengths.
What,
for
instance,
1
is Australia
what
are
A
and
deeper,
to
asking
methods
the
what
and
Australi ans,
concerned to defend, aiming to defend?
defending,
How much of what others have,
Abroad?
region?
defending,
Does
preserving?
defending?
Would
Indonesians
made
anyone
a
Randwick
stage
a
or what we have,
Eagle
or
racecourse,
last stand
for
is
worth
Farm,
merit
Estate?
Oaks
strike in Australia .just
lightning
In the
Here in Australia?
to
If
remove
the
B.jelke-
Petersen, should we resist?
of the necessary prerequisites have been adequately thought about in
Few
Australia,
unplanned
where
muddling
through
immediate problem - reactive contingency
1
generous
- is the main style of political
"planning",
life,
immediate
if
you
help
to
supply it with one or more,
to
problem
want
and ipso facto
of
be
to
defence
Its phi1osophers
Australia does not yet have a defence philosophy.
planning.
could
from
and to inject
some
depth
into
broader defence theorizing.
1.
Australian
defence
inappropriate
"policy";
incoherent,
obsolescent
American,
Indeed Australia seems to lack even a clear and coherent defence
This
pol icy.
charge (made even by friends of Defence
commonplace
interested
in
2
obtaining extra public funding for defence and elements of C3I).
The reasons
is
concern
not
merely
the
major unsolved issues
of
exactly
what
is
being
defended, what things and objects and what interests, and whose, what freedoms
and
values;
and
what
role American defence facilities
in
Australia
supposed to have in this - but a range of more detailed lacunae such as:
of
clearly-defined
on what needs defending and how it is
priorities
accomplished;
doubtful
contingencies
in
are
lack
to
be
capacity of present defence forces to handle low-level
and to the north of Australia and in
maritime
zones;
and
1.
The point, which is not uncontroversial, is argued in effect in Gilbert.
2.
Amazingly,
in
the Strategic Basis Papers, Australia criticizes New
Zealand because 'it has still developed no policy for national
defence
and
tends to
look
to ...
the US as its primary source of defence
guidance''
(p.29) .
Note
that C3I abbreviates the mouthful ,
Command,
Control, Communications and Intelligence.
2
unsatisfactory (or no)
defence
civil
and
administration,
arrangements and planning for
use
of
protection
civil
infrastructure,
key facilities and
of
"defence-in-depth",
wartime
mobilisation,
areas,
and
for
post-nuclear
organization.
is
equally damaqinq, if its policy makers do have a coherent policy it
3
nowhere satisfactorily revealed to the peoples of Australia.
It is
left
to
.journalists
And,
what
out
installations may be for and to make various conjectures as
defence
the
newspaper-watching academics to winkle
and
policy
may
Australian policy makers
As to coherence,
be.
local
to
what
have
only
recently found out that Australia has a (purely) regional defence role,
one.
global
they
were told by the Americans in
Hashington
to clarify commitments under treaty arrangements with the
designed
begins
thus
This
to look as if Australia's defence policy is as
much
not a
talks
in
It
USA.
determined
abroad, by US policy makers, as it is locally in Australia.
Much
circumstantial
evidence can be assembled to confirm the claim
Australia defence policy can now be stamped Made in USA,
the last Nor Id Har (and British abandonment),
one
thing,
as it
that
before
used,
to be stamped Made in UK.
Australia has had a bipartisan defence policy,
For
so it is claimed.
That "policy" has however been essentially shaped by the Liberal party,
has
governed most of the time (as senior partner in a
for ANZUS)
Hashington
the
Liberal
and still does.
US
and
in
of
US
The Strategic Basis
give virtually unqualified support
Military practices and to the American view of
situation,
the
the latest package from
packaged under a local cover.
endorsed by the Labor Government,
Papers,
planned
Party "Defence and Foreign Policy Unit" consists largely
Defence Department material
to
For instance,
But
coalition).
Party simply took over US arrangements for Australia (as
Liberal
which
commit Australia to supporting,
the
global
strategic
without any due reservation,
3. An Australian policy should moreover fit with the genuine needs and
shared aspirations of the people - to the extent, presumably, that these
are
commendable.
3
4
American positions in world forums.
be reached by more devious arguments.
out it had a regional defence role?
could
longer
no
The same dependent policy conclusion can
When,
for example, did Australia find
afford to police the world on their own and would
delegate some of that role
have
to
and offload some of the heavy associated costs, on
towards
and also after Labor took some faltering steps
reliable dogs-bodies;
they
After the Americans had found that
a broader foreign policy with some indigenous elements (Hayden was
developing
promptly flattened by Schultz).
Australian
but Iags it.
respects,
and
foreign policy simply copies American
older American defence policy,
American
war policy.
American
administration
main
in
The Australian defence policy presented by the Labor
to the extent that it is visible,
government,
with
defence
is conservative;
and diverges from the new
it coincides
(.post-Reagan)
the
For Australian Labor defence policy supports what
used to support, namely
DI.
nuclear
Multilateral
disarmament (within the framework of a series of treaties and agreements), and
D2.
Deterrence in the interim, deterrence through mutual
The
presence
.justified
assured destruction.
of American military facilities in Australia is supposed to
in the framework of these assumptions.
For they are to assist
be
in
making deterrence under D2 effective and to provide verification for the
arms
There is
much
reduction arrangements under DI (both stabilizing functions).
evidence
indicating
however that American policy makers have
both DI and D2 and any serious attempts at nuclear arms
they
4.
have
now
5
control .
moved on to the following highly destabilizing
abandoned
Certainly
doctrines;
namely
For theJe amq^ing evidence that Australia falls into the inexact class of
cl ient states the following Australian contribution is noteworthy:
'The
US prefers to act as a member of a group, and a contribution by Australia
can also assist in demonstrating to Congressional and public opinion that
the objectives sought are significant enough to attract allied support'
(SB, p.28)
5.
As to DI and arms control,
see, e.g. Mack PR. As to D2, 'USA has now an
announced
first-strike
nuclear
targeting
policy'
technologically
reinforced (Hayes, p.4).
The goal
of the Reagan administration
is
superiority (a conveniently ambiguous term).
4
war-fighting;
Nuclear
war
American
government,
al 1
Labor
1985
may
policy
nuclear wars;
Limited
of these
government.
well be accepted by
military doctrines,
and
Star
the
next
this
While
wars.
coalition
Liberal
are explicitly rejected by the
Since the American "Joint" facilities in
Australia
also facilitate the rejected objectives, the problems concerning these dubious
facilities are much aggravated.
information
withholding
their
particularly
Government
concerning the full range of
war-fighting
certainly unsatisfactory,
the
The Government's approach concerning them
appears
their
functions,
roles from Parliament and the
as several of its members realise;
in not atypical
disarray,
further
public
and
- is
and as a result
grist
for
the
incoherence theme.
is a coherent Australian defence policy somewhere
6
public exposure, it is almost certainly an ol d American policy.
If
there
away
from
But in that
case it certainly lacks - what it in any case appears to lack - justification.
7
For American interests by no means coincide with Australian .
Consider,
for
such
instance,
matters as enriching Americans,
American business,
for
undercutting
to
Nicaragua,
differently
Allende's
government in Chile to
again,
its
escalation of the nuclear arms
and all
Europe
Southern
as
Consider,
practices
methods.
race.
against
Consider,
consider
Or
the game- and decisi on-theoretic models
concern just USA and its adversary USSR,
which
its
its extensive export of arms and violent
strategic planning,
American
American.
promoting Americans and things
American practices in Latin America (or elsewhere in the world),
differently,
from
making conditions favourable
part of the monolithic West,
perhaps
occasionally
adding
but rarely or never considering
Hemisphere - so that either Australia is part of America
as
the
Poland
It had better be away from too much public exposure because Australians,
no more* th-atffrNew Zealanders, mostly do not like being pushed around, even
by Americans.
7.
Nor, though this is a longer story , does Australian culture by any means
coincide with American:
see CPD.
Thus a uniform treatment is entirely
inappropriate.
Similarly,
a single overarching treatment for a mono
lithic West is thoroughly inadequate.
5
8
may be of Russia or it is nothing.
Or consider American interests not merely
in Soviet and communist containment, but. in containing socialism such as might
(under more auspicious conditions) flourish in Australia.
to
answering
inappropriate
American interests is accordingly inappropriate for
Australia,
for
their
defence
thinking
applies
also
and
to
work out a policy appropriate
Australian
do
Australians should
Antipodean socialism.
for
Australia.
representatives,
political
who
implausible American views and begin on developing
parroting
and original ones.)
local
An American policy
America,
like Russia,
own
(That
should
stop
genuinely
some
is busy meddling in Africa,
(SB, p.24) .
but 'Australian security interests are not directly involved'’
Should we be tagging along after the Americans in support of installation
of
the
their free-enterprise (rip-off) capitalism everywhere feasible (i.e.
socialists
state
seriously
course
- or
of
Much
opposition
governments,
in
has,
freedom umbrella,
active
already
this
sort
What
'keeping the free
world
of
context,
multiple
what mainstream American culture
to and undermining of social and
socialist
quite
free7?
Of
meanings
and
admits
mainstream Australian culture would exclude:
bullying
they
control)?
heavily
is it laughingly - call
freedom
associations.
don't
that
under
the
for instance,
programs
and
of smal1 countries that impose barriers to US business
part of "free enterprise"), etc.
freedom Misinformation,
agree about,
to live and work where one chooses,
on. These are certainly important freedoms, better upheld in
some parts of the unaligned West (e.g. Sweden, Switzerland)
of
the
Eastern Block.
But many of the older freedoms
century,
such as freedom to travel,
requires
permits,
8.
licences,
than in most parts
have
to work and live abroad,
passports,
...
vanished
etc.;
And many more of these
this
now one
former
Australian planning should be looking at strategic models (game-theoretic
and other) which include Australia.
For,
as argued below,
adandoning
the uniformity assumption of the monolithic West,
of the West as one
parish, makes very significant differences to the results yielded.
6
are being or have been eroded;
•freedoms
restricted
zones,
nuclearism
in
soon it will be identity documents-,
as already in parts of the "free
ID cards,
Now
West".
to
protect,
[the Greens] point to the new laws proposed in 1983 designed to keep
citizens
Europe 'is devouring the very freedom it is said
assembling to protest deployment of the Pershing II and cruise missiles'
from
of
security
'secrecy,
the
lack
state,
of
Further structural changes required for
pp.58-9).
(Capra and Spretnak,
incompatible
with
permanent
commentability,
freedoms,
democratic
emergency,
the
include
of
concentration
authority, peacetime militarism, extensive apparatus of state intelligence and
Nuclearism is not a smart strategy to preserve
police'’ (Falk, in Feith p.24) .
remaining freedoms.
Inherited
2.
other-reliance,
and
the
populist
and
elitist___ cases—for
patronaqe.
Australia's
defence
rather than regularly
policy,
such as it is,
(re)thought through.
the legal method of precedence,
may wel1,
furthermore
But that procedure - essentially
and here does,
applied to defence.
exclude significant
The unsatisfactory decision-making practices that will
For
al ternatives.
be revealed in the
of defence are by no means restricted to defence but are typical of
case
kind of advanced age (or aged)
1abours
those
both
inheri.ted
whatever its very limited satisfactoriness in
legalistic decision making - is defective when
precedence
is
under.
Cock
capi tali sm Australia operates under,
has summed up these practices neatly in
features of aged capitalism (what he calls
the
or rather
setting
the Corporate State)
New Left and the Alternative Australia movements were
the
down
which
reacting
revoI ting against:
Decisions were made from the top and on the basis of vested political
interests,
rather than by rational goals and means that served public
interests.
The people were rarely consulted effectively before a
decision and often only partially informed afterwards.
Pl an ni ng..was.
based on a mere extension of the present.
...
activists felt
they
were given little opportunity to choose how they lived or worked. The
availability of space,
time,
trees and air was also determined by
others . ..(2/(p.l8 italics added).
7
or
As also is one's defence,
military and civil, the matter of whether one lives
in a nuclear target or not, etc.
A major inherited assumption is that of other reliance,
defence depends on other more powerful allies.
Australia
That ally was firstly Britain,
but in any event the assumption is that to be
and since World War II America;
safe
that Australia's
needs a powerful patron,
a protector.
A corollary is
that
Australia adopts a suitably submissive relation to its patron, making expected
And for the most part it has;
10
policy does not come cheap.
concessions.
The
however such a defence insurance
other-reliance assumption is unsound,
important,
it
for
several
reasons.
characteristically depends upon the following themes,
Most
all
which lack solid foundation:
1.
Austral i ar/ is threatened - or at least
1A. Australia/ is likely to be threatened in the near future.
2.
Australia cannot defend itself.
3.
It can however rely upon its patron (or ally?, i.e. upon the USA.
three themes in fact make up what has been cal led the populist case for
11
the ANZUS alliance.
It is very different from the elitist case for ANZUS,
These
said to hold sway with the Australian government,
which, while insisting upon
premiss 3, essentially rejects 1 and 2 and claims instead
4.
Australia has a vital
interest in global stability.
9, (From previous page)
Cock goes on:
'These basic
issues
increasingly
become lost in the array of consumer choices'.
[Add Covernment__ react_ive
poi n t].
10.
It costs not only money,
but independence.'... the serf societies - more
or less willingly - accept the status of "allies",
i.e. protection with
rights and duties as in feudal societies.
They become client countries'
(Galtung, p.169).
11.
So-called by Mack PC.
But
the formulation presented follows G.
Davidson's more satisfactory account in Canberra Times, Wednesday, May 8,
1985,
p.2.
Mack considers that what amounts to the elitist case is the
'altogether more sophisticated argument
[which]
holds sway
...
in
government' (p.l).
8
Global
5.
stability is under threat (constantly)
by an expansionist
Soviet
Un ion.
6.
Only USA can contain the Soviet threat and hold the global balance.
But the USA technique for holding global balance is in part through a
network
of alliances like ANZUS.
further
Obviously
premisses are required to reach the
that
conclusion
Australia should be participating in an alliance, and what is more, hosting US
defence
facilities
and so forth.
A first such premise is
no-shirking
the
theme that Australia should be contributing its part to "holding the balance".
Even this first further step is pretty shaky;
in
a
rather ramshackle case,
(and
since premisses 5 and 6 are decidedly
4 may involve some equivocation).
Australia’s
vital
interests
as we shall see, one shaky step
are not
dubious
For it can be plausibly argued
guaranteed
by
US
techniques,
that
which
threaten to upset the whole applecart, and can be obtained by alternative more
satisfactory means outside of such soft alliances as ANZUS.
contends,
Mack
it
In any case,
is unclear that our contribution enhances global
as
nuclear
stability (see Davidson).
There
is a more pernicious regionalist version of the elitist
which might be called the offshore el i t i st. position.
Australia can defend itself against regional
2R)t.
position,
This position grants
threats, and can look after
i tself regional Iy.
But
it does not (as indeed other qualified elitist positions may
1A.
Nhat the offshore position insists is
1AH.
Since
these
interests
companies abroad,
internal
Australian
Australians
or
or whatever - may have little or nothing to
do
-perhaps
security,
concerned
with
this premiss
trade,
represents
an
extremely
important shift (a shift not unrelated to the inverse bureaucratic shift
war
In
grant
Australia's interests could be threatened in the near future.
Australian
with
not)
to defence).
extended
form
from
It goes further than what has been called forward defence.
the offshore position does call
9
for some
sort
of
global
or police force ready to intervene whenever a "free port"
policeman
looks like closing its doors,.
the
elitist
position
is
anywhere
Part of the difficulty in getting to grips with
that it tends to slide
to
through
the
offshore
position (by way of now evident immediate positions).
against both the populist and elitist cases,
arguments
The
against
virtually
justify
but a fairly brief outline of some of the main points
course
a
just
couple
of themes 1 through 7 are
but there have been
through
some
indeed
familiar
sufficiently
of defections from themes 1
both cases,
defeat
logically
al 1
and
Of
involved.
would
7
to
serve
repair
interesting
attempts, designed to float the arguments on diminished premisses.
3.
The brief against the popular populist case.
While Australia is not at present under notice of
Contra
1 and 1A.
veiled
threat or harassment from abroad,
appears
to
believe that it is.
or parliamentary view,
view
as
persists,
kept
deliberately
parties
are
populist
well
case
alliance (e.g.
the public.
in
way
in
the dark (or even
purposes.
enough
false,
are
aware that the
misinformed),
main
main
this
because
assumptions
the
to
interest
In particular they have gone out of their
cast doubt upon the connected assumption that US is
to
the
American
are much more difficult to sell
a
reliable
threats.
Thus long-standing Australian psychological
allowed
suits
underlying
Accordingly the parties and Government have no political
to
been
political
Australian
the reasons for which they support
those of the elitist case)
guarantor against all
been
informed,
the
The populace has
it has.
Although both
undermining the populist case.
not
not
it is worth inquiring why the popular
the opinion polls reveal
government
bipartisan
a (bare) majority of its population
As the popular view is
administrative,
threat,
stand,,
and
has
informational and educational effort.
10
not
been
insecurity about security has
assuaged
In particular,
by
any
requisite
older attitudes to Asia
X
persist not far below the surface of popular Australia:
fear,
and
mistrust
xenophobia, patched over by a pragmatic attachment to trade and tourism.
This
misplaced insecurity is fuelled by popular misconceptions of Australia and its
place in the world: metaphorically, that Australia is a luscious plum ripe for
instead of the Asian view that Australia, so far as they are
Eastern picking,
as a remote desiccated place perhaps good for some trade.
aware of it at all,
to get towards more concrete assumptions,
Or,
Australians apparently tend to
view their country as affluent but underpopulated,
resource rich but
largely
Yet not far to the north are Asian hordes who are impoverished,
defenceless.
12
resource poor, etc.
The view is seriously out of touch with reality.
Parts of Asia are
at least as affluent (on conventional economic indicators.)
do
not see themselves as overpopulated,
as Australia.
now
They
in a way that calls for mass exodus;
and in those areas which are as overpopulated as Europe,
such as Java, bribes
and force are required to move people on transmigration programs to relatively
unoccupied parts of the Indonesian empire.
can
So far as they require them, they
purchase Australian resources - which are not unique - much more
(even
carrying significant local
cheaply
subsidies) and easily than they could obtain
13
them by seizure.
For these sorts of reasons, and because Australia itself poses no threat,
no
other state has an interest in attempting to invade Australia.
for interests,
to
launch
so it is for capabilities.
a successful
invasion of Australia,
capacity in the near future.
TF.
No regional
As it
is
power has the capacity
or is likely to have
such
a
As the joint Parliamentary Committee concluded,
The
"Asian hordes" fd\dn one of the less spoken about successors
to
Yellow Peril,
of immediate past days of the Asian communist threat
the
and
the Domino theory.
13.
As Stephenson argued,
less fortunately, 20 years ago.
Even when around
World War
II
Japan,
did have interest in access
to strategic raw
materials,
the Japanese High Command decided against invading Australia
because of
the difficulty of dealing with the people - a point of much
impor tance.
11
Currently
only the United States would have the physical
launch a -full scale invasion of Australia,
motive to do so (TAS, p.94) .
to
capacity
and it clearly lacks
any
As the report also stated, quoting Synnot (former Chief of Defence Staff),
...
to raise the sort of force which would be required for a mass
invasion of Australia could not possibly be done in under five years
by other than the superpowers (TAS) .
But
neither superpower is at all
likely to expend effort or resources to such
an end.
obvious
An
which
at once arises is:
(A later serious question to entertain is:
defence?
on
question
security,
collectively provided global
forthwith
to unilateral disarmament?
now-standard
telling
bother
Why
with
why not be a free-rider
Why
such as it is?)
Mack for one,
then
not
proceed
having reassembled
the
for
the
case that Australia is not threatened 'now or
foreseeable future', and so having broken the populist argument, is confronted
by
the awkward option of unilateral disarmament for Australia.
proceeds
and
points to the dependence of premisses 1 and 1A on premiss
retreat,
hasty
to claim that 'the populist case for ANZUS is
without premisses 1 and 1A.
While
it
sustained'
assumptions
which
is
approximating
appears
capabilities
it
decisive
of potential
2,
even
may sometimes take
it is true that the arguments against 1 and 1A
resistance,
a
It is however a decidedly problematic retreat.
for granted that Australia can look after itself to some
some
He stages
far
from clear that
premiss 2.
given
the
invaders.
they
Consider the
(estimated)
put
up
essentially
on
extent,
depend
no-interests
argument,
limited
invasion
very
The main consideration adduced
appears
to depend in no essential way, indeed in no obvious way at all, on Australia s
dynamic
fighting forces.
Australia mineral
resources,
for
instance,
obtained more readily and cheaply by market methods than
simply
be
ones.
What this seems to show is that a rather minimal
military
streamlined force, if
any, would presently meet Australia's military requirements.
12
can
It
is
as
not
if
Australia
The whole
nonmilitary defence is available on a continent well
popular training in defence methods,
character
that
apparatus
of
suited to its use, though
requisite
to
Australia would be a difficult place
govern, Australians a difficult lot to subjugate.
Australian
a
But even without
a population trained in its techniques.
lacking
without
defenceless'’
'entirely
1 ike a babe-in-arms.
mi 1itary force,
conventional
is
deterred
It was such features of the
the Japanese
a
on
previous
occasion
^If
the invasion is attempted,
the Australians,
in view of
their
national
character, would resist to the end.
Also,
because
the
geographical
conditions of Australia present numerous difficulties in
a military sense,
it is apparent that a military venture in
that
country would be a diff icul t one** (.TAS, p.62) .
The
still hold good,
points
parts
any such program of nonmilitary
to
putting
and could be strengthened.
defence:
making
it
abroad (ideally with dinkum Australian exaggeration)
it
several
There are
happen,
and
that it
has
happened.
the issue of alternative defence we are bound to
To
when
Australia is not threatened,
appropriate,
is a good occasion to reconsider
adapt defence arrangements.
now,
For
return.
and,
if
For example, it looks very much as
if enormous sums, which could be valuably directed elsewhere, are being spent,
But a much more effective and
to make many Australians feel secure.
largely
inexpensive way to such results would be through requisite mass education
therapy - with,
psychological
if it were well
done,
much more
and
satisfactory
results, a more secure and better informa^~popu1 ace.
Contra
2.
As
capabilities,
basically
enormous
isolation.
well
in
a
a result of post-War developments in weapons systems and
the military defence of Australia has become much easier.
matter
advantages
strategic
In
advance
of enhancing through robust
particular,
of
and
Australia enjoys by
reliable
virtue
of
systems
through modern
destroyed by precision guided munitions.
radar
warning
It is
the
geographical
any maritime invading force can now be
arrival,
C3I
detected
systems,
and
And any invaders that did manage to
gain a foothold on Australian soil would face severe logistic problems, and be
13
subject
deal
There is
to disproportionate response -from local defence.
Boys'’
of
and
weapon
Own War Games stuff concerning contemporary
great
a
which would serve to turn Australia into a pretty invulnerable
systems
C3I
armed
fortress, and into an extremely difficult territory even were the oceanic moat
crossed and the fortress entered (see especially D. Martin).
such
Under
invasion
even
armed neutrality and fortified Australia defence
from outside the region by an inimical world
resisted with reasonable prospect of success.
to
such an invasion;
mount
There is no power at all
Nonetheless the threat
their
elected
representatives.
But
the
Soviet
undertaken such a long-range massive force projection,
so,
be
likely
one
ooviet
a
of
is taken seriously not only by the larger populace but by committees
invasion
of
could
there is apparently (according to TAS) only
the Australian population!).
of
power
our good ally the USA (reckoned however a likely invader by
power that could,
6-77.
scenarios,
has
military
never
is ill-equipped to
do
lacks any plausible reason to try such a stunt (for details see e.g.
and
The only credible Soviet threat to Australia is in the context of
D. Martin).
a superpower war, when American facilities in Australia and perhaps Australian
would be struck at by intercontinental missiles.
cities,
it is highly unlikely that it would be followed or accompanied by
bad enough,
an
Soviet forces are once again not sufficent,
invasion.
sufficient
elsewhere
While this would be
by the Soviets for that sort of diversion;
in a superpower war;
and
not
thought
they would be required
and they would be devastated,
unless UoA
is
militarily even more incompetent than sometimes depicted.
Contra
3.
cannot
be relied upon,
rash
What will be argued is not the negation of 3,
but that premiss 3 is dubious,
to place excess reliance on American protection.
that the Americans
and that it would
That
being
so,
be
and
other patrons being even less promising, Australia should look more to its own
resources, as the American administration is kindly advising.
Especially
since the American "Vietnam debacle" and the fall of
14
Saigon,
things
have changed in important ways which cast doubt on the reliability
of
American patronage.
The relative economic and military strength of the USA has declined.
a.
no longer has such a large share of world product(ivity)
a
of policy,
matter
(see Appendix 1);
US world warfighting aspirations have
Its ability to act as,
reduced.
It
as
explicitly
been
and afford to be, global policeman has also
significantly declined (see further Appendix 1) .
b.
The willingness of Americans to engage in foreign wars has correspondingly
tumbled.
hawks,
sure,
be
to
American administration includes
the
Although
more
people and Congress are no longer in
the
enough
than
for
a /mood
gratuitous foreign adventures, especially when the fun may not appear to be in
American
This "Vietnam syndrome"
popular opposition to overseas military involvement.
has
major
a
as
served
strong
US opinion polls regularly show
Since Vietnam,
interests.
constraint
on
US
military
policy
foreign
and
involvement.
c.
One
Doctrine
manifestation
important
called
which
196'?,
of
the foregoing
of
elements
upon US regional allies
responsibility for their own defence in regional conflicts.
to
the
is
take
Guam
primary
Another important
are
outcome is Defense statements to the pointed effect that before US troops
committed
abroad
there
must be reasonable assurance
no US vital
each
and
'such
is impossible to guarantee - especially for remote countries
where
national
Certainly
that
Congressional
As Mack comments,
popular support (Weinberger,
assurance
of
no
interests are at stake''.
more is assured under the ANZUS treaty which only
signatory
constitutional
consultation;
reported in PC p.14).
'act to meet the common danger in accordance
processes'
(article 4).
All
reassurances?
15
its
is
Isn't the treaty backed
None that are not undermined by
in American administrative multiple-speak.
with
the treaty strictly requires
there is no undertaking or commitment.
up by informal verbal
provide
others,
the elite view is that Australia has to 'work ...
Even
'the threshold of direct US combat involvement could be quite
For
the
of US support'" and that the Americans cannot be counted upon always.
prospect
to help Australia in other ways'".
a
However
special
case
has
been made
American
for
military undertakings (in Vietnam, Cambodia, Iran)
common
friendship,
and shared values and democratic
interests,
second,
and,
culture
earlier
traditions.
as
first,
and slow constitutional
already indicated, the basis is shaky.
And here, a
common
pleading:
hardly sustains the adequacy of the basis
evidence
in
to
as to the adequacy of the basis for the possibility
the American people,
Congress,
cases.
reliability
- on the basis of permanent
There are two difficul ties with this type of special
His tori cal
(SB, pp. 29-30) .
case - as opposed to examples of American abandonment of
Australia's
and
cannot rely upon Ub support in a
...
defence emer qen c y ar i s i n g w i t h i n ou r own n e i gh bou r h ood'
the basis,
high,
at the time could significantly limit US willingness or ability
circumstances
a
to maximize
significantly on quite crucial
issues.
rather
America:
shared by Australia and
processes.
analogous
in
For there is not
values
diverge
interests always common,
Even
as missile testing and nuclear ships issues in the South Pacific have recently
confirmed.
Common
Indonesia
opposing
did not appear wheir? Australia was
interests
claim
to West Papua.
It is
dubious
at
considering
least
that
American interests would coincide with Australian in disputes or confrontation
with Asian nations to the North, e.g. Indonesia, Japan, etc.
special
case argument did hold water, Australia and America really were mates,
There was in fact no treaty in operation in
then the treaty would be otiose.
1942;
Of course if the
but
by
then
American
interests
in
countering
the
are at
present
Japanese
were
independently aroused.
14.
Although
neighbourhood
contingencies ...
impossible', as the pauper ap-i+e-’
16
assessed
a
4.
Other-reliance and regional self-reliance
A major problem with other-reliance for defence is then that it cannot be
entirely reliable,
deemed
be tolerated.
yet this is a place where unreliability can hardly
for
When the Indonesians are rolling into Brisbane it won't do
Defence to call up with a message like that from Services, "We can't get there
tomorrow",
till
"Or
until
after Congress meets".
More
seriously,
handing
defence over to others means handing control of our lives over to others,
nuclear defence,
given
very
which Antipodean administrations have opted
means for many of us handing our lives
likely
In principle,
Another problem is its cost.
over,
and
for,
it
literally.
quite
if a btate hires out its defence
it would no doubt look, other things being equal, for the cheaper bidder - if,
that
defence
is,
meterological
market
is
complexion
is
a
services,
monopolistic,
15
,
who
commodity
a
sort,
like
The trouble with global
etc.
with
currently
only one
at a national
level,
All
shipping,
national
of
supplier
right
the
i •
making
and has
this part of the case,
the
that
defence is
accordingly can exact a very high price,
the whole country a nuclear target.
appreciated
of
enough
well,
for not trying to force defence,
which
is
plainly a collective good, into a marketable commodity.
When a country can provide its own defence,
it certainly makes very good
for it to do so, since it normally has a stronger interest in
sense
its
own
defence
than
matter,
then self-reliance not Just makes good sense but pays; other-reliance
does not.
most other parties.
Should it also be cheaper
in
costs
that
But in that event, it does not need nuclear patrons, or to farm out
some of its defence.
15.
The French, who operate a global network second only to the Americans and
more extensive than the Russians, with many forces in the Pacific region,
have never been seriously considered. Yet in certain significant respects
French social and cultural
arrangements are closer to Antipodean ones
than American arrangements are.
In these days of technological warfare,
the post-Waterloo loss record of the French should not be given too much
weight; we don't
after all look very hard at the American record of
defeats and incompetence.
17
r
self-reliance
Such
as ANZUS and much of the apparent point
such
alliances
undermines an important part of the older
such
of
alliances.
newer bipartisan approaches to defence try to combine them (thus e.g.
However
Beazley as reported by Davidson) - approaches which thus begin to empty
of
what
content it had.
little
understanding,
content,
a
but
are
merely
vague
ANZUS
clear
no
contain
of
articles
simple course is of course to allow them to be
emptied
an expensive and outdated insurance
that the alliance,
so
Since the arrangements
consultations
beyond
commitments
of
policy,
It may however be death by seizure or convulsion should
dies a natural death.
American
defence
facilities
American
nuclear
equipped or powered transport be excluded
passage
be c1osed or internationalised and
from
of
Australia.
treaty
would no doubt sacrifice the deterrence and other advantages the
That
for
case
16
supposedly
affords
,
while
making
way
for
the
greater
advantages
o+
neutralized nonalignment, of no longer being a nuclear target, etc.
self-reliance pure and simple is insufficient.
But
consist of separable isolated pieces,
dramatically,
picture
Australia
will
self-sufficient
not
as becomes increasingly evident.
Most
winter.
The
such as plants which are
not
not escape the effects of nuclear
is much the same as for other objects,
internally
The world does
but depend crucially on their
environment
- and
indeed as for States themselves. The question then is what form the additional
holistic component of policy should take?
that
appropriate
the
cricket
game
move is not taking sides (as in a kids'
that is already set up) and doing one's bit for
For that will not contribute to stability,
rather
to
Put this way, it is almost obvious
sectionalism and fragmentation,
war
game
or
confrontation.
to a proper holistic approach, but
and to
bringing
nuclear
winter
cIoser .
757
If Australia is not likely to be threatened there is no real
deterrence
advantage because nothinq to deter.
Other advantages of
the ANZUS
alliance such as access to high-level intelligence are not only dubious
(see PC, Martin) but not always guaranteed by
the alliance as the black
out of New Zealand shows.
18
Other-re 1iance and self-reliance typically present a false contract,
certainly
do with pure self-reliance - a false contrast like that of
partism
and
(EE,
or
p.223),
at a particular level
of
and
holism
versus
dependence
In between lie a range of positions, one of which - favoured by
isolationism.
a long line of peacefully-disposed philosophers from Rousseau and Kant onwards
- might be called integrated reliance or federated reliance.
reach only certain inadequate levels,
may
which
alignment,
the monolithic East (or West).
5.
Against elitist arguments
stability,
very
as
related arguments revolve around that
securi ty
and
side,
are
value-laden
terms,
of
are
which
But
security.
not
cultural
What stability comprehends in American administrative perception
invariants.
is
other
and
4 and 5 of the elitist argument turn around the crucial notion
Premisses
stabi1i ty
the level of modern alliances
are essentially coupled with opposition to an
e.g.
of
But integration
different from what highland villagers take it to
include.
In each case a system is stable if it returns to a given stationary state
But relevant states and
under perturbations of sufficiently small magnitude.
the stationary among them are both relative to given frames of reference, /e.g,
what
is stable at a macrolevel may well not be at a microlevel.
said
of the superpowers,
even
remote events can threaten their interests or their associates '
and
stability.
disturb
Trudeau
As
'they share a global perception according to
But lesser states or people,
not
counting
which
(p.10)
remote
IVA
business
or
military^ as
invariably
view
stability;
by
relevant,
report
bombs a* necessary to stability,
contrast philosophers
increasingly
terrorism and as characteristically antithetical
ad 4:
a vital
no
and the
see
nuclear
bombs
as
fix
a*
tools
of
to peace.
interest in global stability and secur i ty?
1?
Bureaucrats
instability.
Of course Australia
have,
does
what sizeable nation does not.
interpretation conceals crucial differences,
For
Australia.
in
highly material
to the argument.
stability may well mean something different in USA from
global
means
Certainly vitai
interests are different.
interested in containing socialism (in Australia as elsewhere),
in
rhetoric at least,
popular
more
to socialism (or Mon-Soviet communism)
global
upset
to
containing
equate
communism and both with Soviet containment.
containing
motherhood
But the determinable
stability
on
American
in Latin America,
it
America
is
and it tends,
wi th
socialism
A continental
swing
or i n Africa,
wou 1 d
indeed
wou I d
and
perception
what
significant effects on US business and investment; but it wou 1 d not on its own
or affect most Australians or directly threaten
upset
and it certainly need not affect nuclear stability.
Antipodean
stability,
Australians generally are
not opposed in principle to socialism or notably interested in containing
perhaps the opposite).
(indeed
spread
not
ought
to be interested in defence of the
the
in
system,
Australia is not interested
defence
(American)
it
in,
or
enterprise"
“free
wherever
of advanced capitalism
its
is
presently
initiated or imposed.
It can be conceded, without granting the main thrust of the premiss
Contra 5.
that
the Soviets are expansi onistic,
in
interested
empires,
extending their influence where they can.
including
American
academics and sales people).
spread,
Marxism-Leninism,
everywhere.
in at least a weak sense that they
The
and
are
So also
are
most
matter
are
many
Indonesian (so for that
But the Soviets have an ideological message
an
ideology
they
anticipate
Americans also have a capitalist message,
being
installed
free enterprise,
which they are working to sell pretty much everywhere accessible to them;
they
need to be expansi onistic to have it adopted,
Chinese
little
would
and
whereas the Russians
and
need simply wait for history to take its determined course (though
assistance
surely
- reflecting legitimate doubt about
spread progress wi thou t interfering).
message is pernicious:
this
a
determinism?
Bu t (^he\^jreb^ Russian
both are pernicious (for familiar reasons;
20
to
see
e.g.,
Erlichs).
some
in
threatens,
proper question is whether Soviet international activity
The
damaging
way,
stability.
global
Soviet-American
doubt
No
confrontation, as in the Cuba missile affair, does threaten stability; but not
in
way that has any bearing on Australian defence.
a
expansionary
none
Australia,
military
tendency,
or
has
otherwise,
fact
In
direct
a
of significance reaches into the Antipodes.
Russian
no
effect
on
bo what is all
the local excitement and anticipation about?
The effect of Soviet expansionism is much exaggerated and
from the Antipodes it is hardly a problem,
Viewed
qet
locked
addressed.
of
into
unless the Soviets
confrontation with USA - a real
military
internationalism,
be
hardly
the
heavies
But confrontation apart, Soviet
a great success story,
does not seriously
disturb
stability, as seen from Australia.
should
distinguished
be
military
access,
involvement
World
control
involving
anything
since
influence.
War II,
In actual
of
global
on
the
militarily,
that of Afghanistan,
have
accomplished,
especially in Europe.
but
success
in
western
strategic
lacks
Europe,
has
they
the force ratio
And
21
case
little
had
concerns
might.
not
attempt
lacking much plausibility.
needed to
be
assured
of
both by their own standards of what is required
standards.
by
But the idea of Soviet military adventure
Europe is a Western invention and bogey,
military
what
striking
conspicuous
The usual Western apprehension
stability.
and
expansion
the Russian record is hardly
new territory,
Soviets
military
The one
with
influence
military,
with the USA or several other states.
comparison
effect
mere
and
potential
-military,
expansion
types of
a proper assessment of Soviet internationalism,
For
Soviet
to
problem
a third nonaligned group which helps to referee and to prize
global
should
With that problem however, the Antipodes can better assist as part
apart, not by seconding and inciting the USA.
in
overexploited.
the
Soviets have
no
good
The
military
and
by
reasons
or
in undertaking such an exercise which would draw them into
interests
war.
They
client
nuclear
already -Face economic difficulties and trouble with East European
states which they cannot control satisfactorily.
The
of Soviet inf1uence has largely been in the Third
extension
But it has hardly been successful,
with as many failures and losses to record
as Soviet "gains" - gains which add to the imperial burden
countries wracked with problems,
world.
such as Uietnam.
since they involve
The Third World exercises
are marred by Soviet ineptitude and limited by the state of their own economy.
They scarcely displace the global
structure enough to test its stability;
and
they produce no shock waves or even ripples in the Antipodes.
6.
Contra
the
dancers
the
in
East-West dance
confrontation between the lead dancers.
have
destabilizing
new
weapons
arms
tension
control
an
from
escalating
the
With this US policies and
Recent US
practices
and indeed highly destabilising,
and weapons systems,
because of rejection of arms
race on earth and begin a new one in space.
A
vast
practices
more
are
because of
control
and because of star wars preparation which both
and
accelerate
increase
in
and suspicion accompanies the arms race which is in large measure due
to US intransigence and US war-fighting doctrines,
built-in
but
than Soviet ones,
Soviet proposals,
the
death,
of
as much to do as USSR ones.
least
at
of
The main current threat to world stability comes not from one
incentives
(see FAC).
alliance
or
for pre-emption,
new weapons systems,
and deliberate abandonment
of
with
arms
Such considerations duly assembled demolish the theme that
alignment
with
USA
helps
increase
stability.
American
practices are to be resisted as much as Soviet.
6.
The East-West balance argument; alignment versus neutrality.
The need for Australian alignment with the USA is supposed to be shown by
the
East-W^st
balance argument.
This balance argument,
which
17
premisses with the related elitist argument, runs as follows
;
7. Global
stability is the key to world peace.
shares
key
8.
of the international order is a matter of maintaining a
Stability
global
But
balance.
5. The global balance is constantly threatened by an expansionist USSR.
The threat is [only] checked by the USA, which (6A.1) guarantees an open
6A.
and pluralistic international
■?.
order.
indeed most vital
Australia's primary security concern,
is this
interest,
stability. Hence
Australia's
10.
role is to help America maintain the balance.
The rest of Australia's in tervolvement
to follow.
taken
then
before
practical
assumes much that has already been rebutted,
argument
threat
argument
But there are many reasons for halting the
reaches this stage of moral and
it
Soviet
with American military arrangements is
thesis is correct (i.e.
detail.
The
for instance that
the
stabilizing
5) and that US policy is
It also takes for granted,
balance
what now is at least
(part
of 6A).
doubt,
that American policy is directed at balance and deterrence, rather than
serious
in
what the administration appears to be aiming at, straight superiority.
event,
that
is not really engaged
Australia
balancing
in some longer term
so much as in helping USA win a nuclear war,
feat,
But in
contradicting the goal
of
world peace of premiss 7.
and its derivation.
Contra
10
follow
that
strength
is
indicate,
the
Ta
role is such a lackey's one.
leaning
America's direction,
in
as
be
If
most
the
Presumably
premiss
balance
of
seems
to
evidence
5A.1 is designed to exclude
putting its weight where it is effective,
this
not
does
team (that is what such images as the balanced tug-of-war
of Australia teaming up with totalitarians.
thouqht,
should
Australia's
it
then Australia should surely be throwing its slight weight in
Eastern
suggest).
The derivation is inadequate;
with
would
deplorable
Nevertheless Australia
given its
own
broader
(From previous page)
After some reconstruction,
that
is.
For
the
argument, curiously referred as that of "central balance in newspaper
level publications of academics, is never presented in requisite detail
which is one reason why it has proved hard to criticise and refute.
interests
objectives,
could
Australia
fulfil
and
principles.
which would enable it to make
to world peace,
contribution
There are several
satisfactory
more
among them nonalignment and neutrality.
A more direct approach may
Thus 10 is hardly wel1-supported or evident.
be
a
better than throwing our Australian weight unrefIectively on one
the balance.
roles
different
of
side
the balance images and argument
As a little reflection attests,
points not in the direction intended, but towards nonalignment.
Contra
4A
(and
peace,
the
preserves
if of course false.
USSR in this munitions dance,
the
escalation
(the
USSR
relation).
balance,
hence
and
Again it takes two at
least
to
checks
the
the history of the dance reveals that
pace flowed from the interaction of the one partner
of
with
the
but for the USA, the USA would not be required to check the
That is,
other.
the
it can be granted that the USA is interlocked with and
While
tango.
The theme that US maintains
4).
interaction
is
two-way
as
with
Hegel's
master-slave
famous
Furthermore it looks as if, on a different historical
trajectory,
the main states of Western Europe could match the Soviet Union militarily (for
they have comparable combined GNP,
etc.)
Thus
it
is doubtful
see Appendix 1,
resources,
technological
that the current Soviet
build-up,
produced
in
interaction with the USA, could only be, or have been, checked by the US.
de
6A.1.
As the premiss is only of marginal relevance to the
argument,
need only be noted that the international order the USA helps maintain
very much to be desired.
In its intervention,
militarily,
it
leaves
economically and
indirectly, USA has assisted substantially in reducing plurality and openness,
as well as in establishing or propping up rotten regimes,
side of American imperialism is well enough documented,
etc.
The negative
if not widely
enough
read or known by Americans.
ad
8
and
maintaining
pass,
the
the
equivocation on the balance.
While balance is
one
stabi1i ty in the world arrangements that have presently
balance
structure can only carry so much loading.
24
way
of
come
to
Add too
much
weight (of arms,
and so forth)
tension,
The increasing probability of catastrophic
probably catastrophically.
fail,
to both sides and the structure will
breakdown, for a variety of reasons (accident, miscalculation, computer error,
human interference, etc.), has been argued elsewhere (e.g. WPI) .
While a certain neither overloaded nor overstressed balance may serve for
stability,
the present increasingly stressed balance will probably not.
however,
balance argument,
neglects this dynamical situation,
illegitimately
balance
switching from a (certain) balance in premiss 8 to the (on-going)
subsequent
premisses.
The
balance
argument
itself
The
breaks
in
down
through
of
removing
equivocati on.
What
dynamic picture also indicates is the importance
the
weight -from the balance,
some
reduction.
position
It
most obviously by arms limitation and
tension
to a
neutral
points to a different role for Australia,
too
within the nonaligned grouping.
It is to the emerging case
for
a
different role for Australia, and to action for achieving this different role,
that the positive argument will now gradually swing.
The
attacks
inadequate
upon
East-West
proposals
(its
to repair it.
alleged
good
administrators
This
For example,
Australia
than
with
American
trade
argue,
is a nonsequitur,
and
lots
to the argument, and do not
against nonalignment or neutralism is set
pervasiveness of nuclear winter.
for
for
The additions are inessential
confusion and dust.
the
for a different role
combined
The main effect of these additions is to generate extra
alliance and service.
serve
balance argument is typically
of
other
He might as well
things),
so
aligned
be
our
sagacious
because if the control balance fails we are all
worse than ex nihilo quodlibet (for it also
that balance is necessary for the stability).
dead.
suggests
But, in the main, the attack is
irrelevant because the point of nonalignment, is to help remove overload and to
break down confrontation and its escalation to war;
before winter descends,
it is a thing to do
to delay or halt its descent,
25
now,
and most important,
to
reduce its severity.
Australia's weight may be slight,
another irrelevant addition goes,
psychologically it is important for the West.
disease" would show the weakening
f or
Sovi e t ex pan s i on ism.
virtual 1y
alignment,
Australi a
gives
the
Bell,
Any further spread of the "Kiwi
of Western resolve, and give the green light
a leading exponent of the balance argument,
impression that if Australia dropped
through
the isles to
Russians would be on the road down
18
the
tomorrow.
Much of this sort of rhetoric i =■ reminiscent of
f
such military interests,
set
route,
major
American
of
out
the
The Russians have no
baseless fear-mongering of an earlier pre-Uietnam time,
and
but
out,
t ie
or present capabli
A
of
they would be met by substantial resistance along most
the
for one,
has
and
the
resistance obtaining Western assistance.
interests,
Philippines,
strengthening
And if they were to gear up
different
as well
the
from
Australia's,
as elsewhere in East Asia.
depends,
argument,
in
For America,
Indonesia
in both
The addition,
its "green light
from
so far
for
expansion"
comparison, on the previously faulted premiss 5 of Soviet expansionism.
or another
In fact most of the case against alignment of one sort
it is argued. for often nonalignment and neutrality are,
au th or i tar i an
assumptions.
style,
Cat 1ey,
simply
for
denounced
example,
- turns
- when
in good old-fashioned
upon
al ready
another exponent of "central
fau1 ted
balance",
presents the following 'consideration'':
... whatever the Swedes or Swiss may think about the matter, Australia
is
locked by considerations of culture,
economics,
and political
philosophy into the defence of the Western world.
It has both an obligation and a duty to contribute its share to that
cannot
easily be
defence
if necessary by hosting facilities which
located elsewhere (p.15).
The premiss is false for reasons essentially indicated:
Nay
sustains the conclusion,
prescriptive
18.
and the premiss in no
the argument involving among other things,
(is-ought) fallacy.
Consider the premiss.
Australia is
See the discussion of Bell's claims in D. Martin and in Mack PC.
26
the
not,
k
unless Catley has information withheld from most of the rest of us,locked into
Western nuclear defence,
its
but in principle free to reconsider and rethink
use of the "facilities" is not irrevocable,
and shortly
options.
(American
comes up .
>,
economics
and political philosophy provide locks and chains for Australia but
f©.r reconsideration.)
in principle at least,
not for nonaligned Western European states?
part
USA or altogether a client
of
frameworks
economic
and
They do not:
state;
and
philosophies
political
significantly different (for details,
defence
(as,
practices
e.g.,
ANZUS in al 1
of
culture,
Australia is not a
cultures,
the
interests,
are
nations
two
But even if the ideological
see CPD) .
frameworks were much more similar than they are,
the
How do
that would not entail
its weakness
similar
nor
shows),
any
defence obligations.
of
Most
worse.
the arguments against nonalignment are of Catley
Fortunately,
calibre
- or
the case against nonalignment is (as with several
then,
o-f the above points) developed in detail elsewhere, especially by 0. Martin in
his
examination
of counter-arguments to
Australian
armed
neutrality,
legally recognised nonbelligerent form of nonalignment he favours.
al 1
of Martin's argument is couched in negative form;
very brief.
make
this
his positive brief
us secure against such dangers as we may one day have to meet,
needlessless
is
exposes to other dangers,
correct enough,
Virtual 1y
alignment or alliance with the USA
It reduces to thi
including nuclear war'
and in need of wide propagation,
exhausts
the positive case for nonalignment.
posi t ive
case of much theoretical
interest,
the
it
cannot
while
means
no
In particular there is a
to be drawn from the
it
Wh i 1 e
(p.l).
by
is
more
burgeon i ng
theory of collective goods and action.
7.
Free riding, group size, and increasing variety.
The
with
strategic
more
convenience)
world situation we now confront can be viewed as
than 100 players,
major
a
game
counting in nation-states and leaving out
(for
organisations
such
as
the
largest
100
transnational
These
compan i es.
organisational players align themselves around
two
arge
poles. East and West, as indicated:
EAST
NON-ALIGNED
N
WEST
N
India
N
Sweden#
Swi tzer 1 and#
Tanzani a
Most Latin
.
American States!
##
Costa Rica
State
commmun i st
State
capitali st
N: Nuclear weapons states
#:
Neutral states
##: Nonmi 1i tary states
Key:
There are various - a great many - games these state players are playing,
Some of these
of which are practically important for peace and for stability.
such
games,
as
representation),
World
are
Empire
and
Chicken
(already
There
are several problems about East-Nest games:
have,
the
Russian
what
under
played
played essentially between the East-Nest
representation
negative sum characters of some games.
may,
as they will with the Big One),
end after one round,
And the monolithic East -
way
simplifications may).
So game theoretical
representation
they
like
the
monolithic
Nest dichotomy is misleading, and, as will appear, discards crucial detail
the
one
superplayers.
repeatability of the games (clearly some nuclear games
roulette,
=ome
will
(in
be
approached differently and more obliquely.
Nor 1d
security,
(technically,
in
like regional and local
joint
security,
is a collective good
supply and precluding exclusion).
28
That is not
of
to
course
say that there are not conditions under which security
for instance where security is guaranteed by a narrow and
much to be desired,
intolerant despotism;
provisioning,
it can be argued,
but then,
not the particular product.
collection of N nation-states.
It is,
the trouble lies with the
It is a collective good G for the
furthermore,
a collective good
permits the possibility of free-riding by nation-states.
perspective
the American complaint about its allies,
insufficient expenditure on defence,
their
leave
may
which
Looked at from this
and
Japan for example,
is a complaint about their
free
riding.
Within the balance of power framework the conditions for free-riding
extracted by Pettit) are satisfied,
disarming states.
For
to
the achievement (or maintenance) of G by any will make every member
and
any,
unilaterally
is available to all N members of the collective if it is available
G
1.
for instance by neutral and
(as
better off.
2.
G
is
achieved iff some number m^K contribute towards
its
provision,
where under the balance of power assumption
IICTK^N and II = (USA, USSR}.
The
3.
expected value of contributing to G or its maintenance is less
than
the expected value of not doing so, i.e. likely costs exceed likely benefits
except for perhaps members of II given that G is provided by II.
is
There
pegged
by
what
free-rider
problem,
members of II for whom the free-rider option is not open
- within
ran be called a pegged (or
asymmetric)
the confines of the balance of power assumption - and for whom condition 3
only satisfied under certain ways of looking at the matter (e.g.
a
war
10
years down the road so the expected costs
each—year
is
there will be
exceed
the
expected benefits).
There
regional)
is
a
straightforward
case
for
recommending
free riding on the balance of power provision of 6.
2?
Australian
(and
Some arguments,
beyond or adding to those already in effect presented, are these:-
Either
If it does then the region is better off than it would be if
or it does not.
(strongly)
the
as
and there is a large-scale war
stability breaks down catastrophically
aligned because it is unlikely to be (so heavily)
targetted.
(Here
dreadful new argument that nuclear winter means that the Antipodes
might
well
be involved gets challenged and rejected:
see
MF).
doesn't break down then the region has the benefits in any case,
enhances global
USA
stability,
indeed, as remarked and wi11
etc.;
regional
weight
significant?
of
delusional
the
in
That
power?
framework.
Ne shouldn't:
we
believe
seriously
it
and if we do we're
is
the
in
living
in
a
Australia has been left out of the picture in virtually
strategic planning exercises,
all
do
Australian voice makes much real difference
the
Northern
Western block,
be
As regards Australasian
further argued, the evidence points to the contrary.
halls
the
without
For there is no clear evidence that our alignment and cooperation with
costs.
the
stability
If
most difference-making peace
initiative^,
etc., etc.
Now
riding,
Eastern
rather
countries would hardly
block
th an
suppor t
of f ering
object
(h owever
to
free
Antipodean
c omf or t
trifling),
an d
Furthermore free riding is how the Americans,
incitement to their opposition.
the rational
would expect Australia to act,
on their theoretical principles
self interested procedure (see CPD). It is economically rational; contributing
is not.
But won't the Americans make things economically dear for Australia?
In threats and theory,
do
yes; but in practice, no more than they threatened
already in the case of New Zealand with the nuclear-ships issue.
short
term
arrangements:
aberrations,
America
will
never
give
up
trade
But
or
to
for
market
one gets the impression that America would trade with the Devil
Himself if it could open some new markets in Hell.
Despite its political stigma,
way
immoral or irregular.
voluntary payment system,
free riding need be no problem,
Perhaps the buses are free;
perhaps there
to which only some need contribute,
30
or in any
etc.
i =>
a
Hi th the
contributing is not (see
nuclear fix, free riding is indeed the moral course;
HPI).
Free riding, though often portrayed as a problem, is only a problem in
certain
and
desirable
sufficiently
riders.
collective
of
cases
is
This
in
Australia
stays
the
the escalating treadmill or gets
is,
off
is
involved
many
too
free
which
will
whether
or
security,
and precarious way that it
curious
on
good
will not be provided because of
the situation with global
not
the
provided,
where
provisioning,
rides
and
be
not
free.
Australia's free riding may be a problem for America; it is not for Australia.
Interests diverge again.
of
stability
by
building,
tripod
or
bipedal
one,
for example,
if it is a wind tower or
of
supports
increases stability.
instance in the theory of "spreading the risks"
certain
a
cybernetics.
free
The
increases
and
by
similar
Then
a
than
a
has
in
diversity
ecology,
for
The related theme,
(see EH).
stability,
that
theme
The
elaborated
been
in
core eco-systemic idea to be developed is that Australia's
and consequent nonalignment in defence
riding
variety,
variety
topple
point
the
Increasing the diversity,
with stability has been sharpened and confirmed
correlates
that
ground.
a quadrapod tower is much less likely to
and requires less guying to stay up.
variety,
certain
increasing its rigid ties or supports to the
better
terms,
pictorial
structure is typically increased up to a
it more adequately;
securing
or
a
In
riding increases stability.
free
Judicious
enhances
diversity
accordingly increases stability (especially if done in
and
concert
with other client states).
Two
hardly
interlocked
well
precarious
guyed,
structure
well dug
in
but
stability
of
the
Hhat makes engineering sense
is
not
supports in tension,
are
inadequate
of world peace.
East and Hest,
for the
long
term
however
strengthening the supports that are there,
balance
is disturbed by the Host's surging ahead and likely overburdening the
structure,
helping the East when the
but increasing the variety of supports, enlarging and diversifying
31
group size.
East-monolithic
monolithic
The
West
picture
misconceptualism perhaps convenient ■for some players.
in conceptualism,
main reason for mistakes concerns group size.
collective
but
is
significantly
differs
behaviour of large groups
theory
in
group size is a highly significant factor (though
group
■from that of smal I
One
Whereas 11+ = (West, East) is a
N of nation-states is not.
number
the
group,
a
It may ■force mistakes
convenient simplification, e.g. for strategic thinking.
smal1
than
more
much
is
i t s pr ec i se i mpor t is increasingly contested).
N of nation-states is a large
group
The
group,
of
interested parties, indeed of substantially economic actors.
the American theory of collective action applies:
that
interest,
counterintuitive way.
a
in
behave
self
essentially
So we may expect
wi 1 1
that the groups
Though expec ted to act
in
the
to obtain security in particular, the collection will not.
common
On this
account (that elaborated by Olson), the common interest can only be guaranteed
by outside influence or imposition (coercion in Olson's rapid thinking).
there is, as experience has shown, no outside
with the collective of nations,
mediator
collective
or
influence
good.
The
But
of sufficient authority to ensure attainment
prognosis
looks very
gloomy:
this
of
the
important
most
(though far from unique) collective good will not be provided.
Fortunately the reasoning,
has
been
containing
shift
economic
virtually
(subjectively)
back
actors
though large.
highly
is
to basics,
all
privileged,
for whom costs of war exceed benefits
in perspective from the earlier free riding condi t i on
important
that
The group,
too swift.
several
like much of the "logic" of collective action,
3).
effect of the knowledge of an ominous nuclear
actors involved should now be
expected
in
that
(note
in
the
Indeed
an
winter
is
posit i on;
costs of nuclear war have become very high.
for
go
Olson's grand theory is based on the accountants/-----tautology
(defining 'net')
32
gross agent benefits - gross agent costs.
net agent benefit
i.e.
A
for each agent or actor i
ymbols,
in
show
i
for virtually all
that
in N.
is positive for some i
is privi1eqed if A
group
(in collective N) ,
European
to
benefi t s
of global security are decidedly positive (e.g.
respective future GDPs would expectedly fal 1
needs
1
the
net
wi th a nuclear
war
nation-states
argument
their
It
to near zero).
The
fact
the group of nation-states is privileged does not however imply that the
that
good i nvo1ved,
c o1 Iec t i ve
longer term.
error,
stability
■ JI
instabi1i ty.
dynamics,
An
achieved
improved
particularly in
wi11 be supplied,
secur i ty,
dynami c ;
it takes no account of mistake.
through
superiority
modelling
or
intermediate
- which can take some account
iterated games — is gained by returning to
through
the
the
of
game theoretic
ground
A free rider "problem" is tantamount to a dilemma of some sort; according
to
conventional wisdom,
the
contrast
Taylor
and
Hard).
it is a prisoners'
(cf.
dilemma
The argument can go this
but
Pettit,
way;- a
free
rider
problem or issue is defined in terms of the provisioning of a collective good;
theory
the
but
of collective goods is equivalent to that
of
a
prisoners
20
dilemma.
dilemma;
in
detail
which
more
Certainly
the
global nuclear situation
as much is a commonplace claim.
appears
Elsewhere (HPI)
that it does indeed present a moral dilemma.
to
present
a
it has been argued
Here the argument
can proceed through the theoretical route just sketched above or in the
piecemeal way to be indicated - is that it is also a prudential
dilemma
21
(for members of N).
19.
The
less than perspicuous symbolism is that used in Hardin
(82,
p.20,
p.39),
but with agents'
costs or contributions,
C,
duly agent
relativized.
Hardin misleadingly treats C as a fixed parameter,
thus
strictly falsifying the tautology.
20.
Thus Hardin who (in 82) claims to 'demonstrate the equivalence of
the
logic of collective action and the Prisoners'
Dilemma'
(p.4).
The
demonstration, which will be contested elsewhere, is given on p.x.5ff.
21.
But of course the two types of dilemma interconnect.
the range of apparent two party games being played by the US
Hardin 83),
Union
Soviet
(labelled US and SU respectively)
administration
regards the moves of further nuclear armament.
(It is supposed,
A,
from
the
or nuclear disarmament, N.
It is important here,
as other
French
that
The American people seem rather
more
were clearly opposed to the new nuclear missiles their
people
the
towards nuclear disarmament than their administration;
inclined
to
proceeded
German
administration
The strategy games involved are then
install.
shots
It is administrations or governments
etc.
take people into war;
to
places,
administration - which for the most part calls the
the society and the people.
generally
as
that the game is set in some background context,
naturally,
Chinese nuclear armament).
distinguish
and
1985
in
nuclear disarmament is not considered in isolation from on-going
e.q.
and
(e.q.
since these have obtained some discussion
us consider -first,
Let
administration
which we can suppose to be played over successive time intervals, e.q.
games,
years; so there is interaction and feedback as the games go on - until
the Big
Ones explode.
The
apparent games of US and SU are those diagrammed next:
Pr i soners'
A
4,1
D
2,2
O
1,4
this
being
played.
According
professions!1ez
the
A
1,4
CP
presumably
also
represented US policy,
it
no
aggressive,
D
A
4,1
D
3,2
US
CP
1,4
to Hardin, 'giving evidence of
Dilemma
Prisoners'
ordering of virtually all
that
A
4,1
that
simplistic setting those represent the apparent games
Within
and
D
D
3,3
US
IJS
A
SU
SU
SU
D
New Initial Game
Revised Game
Dilemma Game
in
(PD)
'represents
[his]
deformation
the
preference
the articulate policy analysts in the United
the
Soviet Union'
(p.248) .
While
PD
there is considerable evidence (as already
longer does,
war-fighting,
34
That
is,
the
US has
States
may
have
indicated)
that the US administration has shifted to
phase.
are
a
interchanged
more
its
rankings of (D,D)
Soviets,
The
have
who
been
much
more consistent
no
(and
bound to try to keep up with the Americans,
their
changed
However they are
have stuck with deterrence and no-first-strike.
but
better
doubt
appear not to have
in their policy pronouncements,
censored)
game,
and (A,A), presumably some time between 1978 and 1984 games.
and so pushed towards the Revised
Game shown, which p1easan11y restores symmetry.
Stable or equilibrium outcomes for each game are circled.
said
be
to
stable
if neither player has
unilaterally on the strength of the game,
influencing
provide
in
broad sense,
a
and dangerous outcome.
strategy for each player;
dominant
that equilibirum
In all
All
strategies.
is
hence
its
economic fascination.
results
which
are
socially suboptimal
(and
games that might plausibly be taken to represent
situation,
and
A
recognisably
guaranteed by the independent "stable" strategies.
substantial
to
political
substantially
the
games
satisficing
the
suboptimal
superpower
outcome
socially
superior
is
there are
What is worse,
and military incentives for the superpower players
adjust their preferences in
after repeated games,
an
And the same applies to suggested
alternative
Chicken.
other
a
below
all
as
in
Pareto-
even
But as the
threshold),
such
achieved
yet in the PD game that is
these games are di 1emmas.
games
these
the apparent games arming is
and
suboptimal,
strategies
switch
i.e. to alter the outcome except by
player also to alter
other
dilemmas
undesirable
deliver
the
to
incentive
An outcome is
not
directions
but to do what the US appears to have done, to make the
situation worse.
socially preferable would be change to a coordination game of
Much
some
sort, for instance, to the game which neutrals tend to play (and which Lackey,
in contrast to other more bellicose utilitarians, sees utilitarian superpowers
playing;
hence Hardin's label
diagrammed,
WN
inclined neutral
represents
a
for this game,
'Lackey's Game').
Western-inclined
(e.g. Yugos1avi a):
neutral and
EN
In the game
an
Eastern
A
3,2
D
D
(D
A
2,3
NN
Now
4,4
dilemmatic and coordination games are not played in
the
integrated
since
[Other coordination games, with
(D,D) assigned (1,1) 1
in
settings
such as Uni ted Nations' committees
games
coordination
are
(and
games
peoples'
-frequently
but
isolation,
elsewhere,
as
well).
Superimposing the games, as applied to US and SU games, leads to the following
augmented games:
SU
SU
SU
A
D
A
2,2
4,1
1
2/3
3,3
•
1
4,1
.
2/3
1,4
•
2/3
2,2
D
J,3
■
4
1,4
■
A
2/3!
A
m represents a sequence of ms,
and 3s in some order.
As the agumented games reveal,
a stable deadlock.
on the superpowers.
4
i ■ e? ■
2/3
4
■
2/3 a sequence of 2s
m < m w rn
in fact in several ways.
on
For example,
would
For one, enough significant
much
greater
as a
Superpower
militarism
Australia's
nonaligned
free
impact,
rider
for disarmament and regional nuclear freedom (instead of by
wash polemics and token ambassadors,
US support) .
36
strategy
with less support, unilateral action by US
arms build-up can be exposed.
be
in
much more pressure can be brought to bear-
power excursions would stand naked, and unsupported.
seriously
<2,3
to play with a superpower is to help reinforce
For another,
towards disarmament.
particular,
1,4
A
a coordination game can alter the overall dominant
playing
administration
4,1
•
2/3
But playing an independent coordination game can help
breaking the deadlock,
players
3,2
■
D
1
US
US
US
A
D
D
D
New
Game, Augmented
Revi sed
Game, Augmented
Prisoners" Dilemma
Augmented
and
in
pressing
white
undermined by a none-too-tacit policy of
8.
On the need for, possibility of, and prospect of basic structural change-
The
peace
(in
world has changed enormously since the time of Kant's proposals
and even since the time of Veblen's more cynical
(of 1795),
additions
Hard science and destructive power have grown enormously; and even
1917).
especially that admitting
knowledge of collective behaviour,
theoretical
game-theoretic treatment,
what
for
though still
has increased markedly.
slight,
be accomplished politically has in certain
can
little, since Rousseau complained (around 1761)
of
respects
But
changed
very
that governments were probably
too short-sighted to appreciate the merits of his project for perpetual peace.
Governments
have
obstacles to peace.
long
of
source
been seen as Xthe main (contingent)
if the peace is
Thus Veblen rightly maintains that ' ...
to be kept it will have to come about irrespective of governmental management,
- in spite of the State rather than by its good offices'- (p.7) .
against
the
State
on the basis that 'governmental
Veblen argues
and
establishments
powers ... are derived from feudal establishments of the Middle Ages; which in
turn,
However
a predatory origin and of an irresponsible
of
are
character
Christian-feudal origin of the State provides only one
the
(p.r).
- and
a
coercive - evolutionary pattern of organisation (pp. 12-13).
There are major blockages to peace proposals and projects at two main and
critical
levels
of
organisation,
that,
organisation of collectives of states and,
organisation
deep,
and
domination
of
removal
and
to
nothing
set
in part by devolution,
themselves.
these blockages,
and
exploitation of other forms,
sights rather lower,
short
organisation
of
states,
upon,
The problems involved
ones
intertangled
appears to call
genuine global
appear
adequate.
impossible in present political climates.
37
Yet even much
the
for
are
concerning
extensive
reached,
to
be
attained,
levels
of
political
stability
of extensive structural changes at both
would
of
that of the
Indeed if a permanent and satisfactory peace is to be
adjustments.
or
individual
focussed
already
smaller
changes
look
There is little doubt that certain sorts of structural change are
to
conducive
peace and that certain fundamental
permanent peace.
for
changes would be
With that in view they have long been
least from Rousseau and Kant onwards.
transform the structures that lead to war'- (B.
theme
immune
to
criticisms,
obvious
further desiderata,
modest material
freedoms,
~ at
advocated
for
'it is also necessary
instance
to
To render this
Martin, p.12).
that
straightforward
extension of certain established structures could bring an
authoritarian
to war,
sufficient
But it has also long been supposed that
such changes are necessary for lasting peace:
some
highly
end
typically presupposed, are invoked, e.g. certain
standards of life, etc., and the type of necessity
involved is set at some lower technical
level
(not excluded however by present
These adjustments make the necessity theme more difficult to
practicalities).
assess, but also difficult to sustain.
are
There
part,
critical
positive
part,
part
negative
According
marxist
demolishing
and
range of arguments
a
defence,
from
a
negative
determinism,
of
comprising
direct arguments for
the
theme.
22
this enterprise will simply be illustrated.
to deterministic and mechanistic approaches,
technological
determinism,
human
nuclear
weapons,
The
large
such as that
like
of
megamachines
They are an integral part of the business of
generally,
are
no aberration.
industrial
and
ecological conquest,
a further stage in
human
intervention
which has already involved substantial disruption through pesticides,
etc.
The argument tends to the fatalistic.
made,
and once made they wi11
22.
and
etc., that arrangements have to be more or less the way they are, and
nature,
a
parts to its assessment
two
be used.
wastes,
The megamachines of conquest are
No change in political
arrangement,
More of the negative enterprise is attempted elsewhere,
e.g.
a critique
of
the supposed strait-jacket of human nature is begun
in CPD.
From
Plato through Hegel and into contemporary times it has been supposed that
war,
like aggression,
is part of human nature,
that war is a permanent
condition of human and social existence.
38
would
which
enthusiasts
any
make
difference,
possible.
is
their position and luck,
push
While there is, unfortunately, a
induction from the manufacture of weapons,
batches
machines
are
to this one,
depl oyed) ,
never
(and
organisation
deterministic
position
would
possible either; political
not frustrate
the
and
other,
is false,
Different political arrangements,
been
have
inductions.
broader
The
are
changes
arrangements too, like the rest of social
not
life, are
But (nonanalytical) determinism,
technologically or economically determined.
technological
many
that a change in background
of course that such background
is
made
of
But even the good inductions do not
that weapons of various sorts must be used,
political
many
invention
from
induction's:-
machines that do eventually get
many
reinvented or independently discovered).
show
of any given type (for
or the like to their manufacture are unreliable and subject to
counterexamples
or
weapon
there is no stopping progress.
But in doing so they overextend themsleves.
fair
technological
that a
even further,
once invented by humans will be used:
device
Sometimes
so it is argued
which alleviate problems,
are
possible and would be different in differently evolved worlds.
CPD).
(JB,
elsewhere
technically
Things did not
and do not have to be the way they are or the social and political sort of way
they are.
Many routes,
dominant
require
none of deductive strength,
political
extensive
lead to the conclusion that the
structures of our time,
evolved from feudal
structural alteration.
In particular,
institutions,
they need
to
superseded by alternative structures which do not promote or lead to war.
theme has been argued directly from the nuclear fix (see e.g.
But
suppose,
improbable as it may seem,
thereby removing the current nuclear fix;
quietly
seif-destructing,or
nuclear
disarmament
HF I,
p.4/ft.).
that nuclear weapons all
vanished,
for instance,
thermodynamic
actually took place.
The
they turned out to be
miracle
occurred,
or
not
be
The problem of war would
t-hat of nuclear war would only be given a short respite.
23
Conventional
the structural arrangements for war would remain intact.
removed
For
a massive
be
and
even
3'?
remain,
weapons
would
weapons
such as chemical and biological ones,
were
they
prevent
the
in sot ar
3S
could seem
be
Nu clear weapon s,
if nuclear power plants remained
especially
nothing
and
intact;
development of (Star wars) weapons more
nuclear-
as
dangerous
caches are easily hidden away),
removed ("for smal 1
replaced,
would
along with weapons perhaps as
than
diabolical
nuclear ones.
War cannot be eliminated while leaving the rest of society as it is
by freezing the status quo.
... The structural conditions for war
need to be removed - not reinforced as appeals to elites may do - and
superseded by alternative structures which do not lead to war
(B.
Martin, p.12).
Structural adjustments
peace.
An
can provide conditions for
Kantian
initial
for the
argument
satisfactory
lasting
proposition
that
is
peace
possible, presented by Latta (introducing Permanent Peace), runs as follows:Peace, perpetual peace, is an ideal, not merely of a speculative kind but a
practical
ideal, a moral principle.
ought to be realised, i.e. there ought (morally)
Hence this ideal
to be peace.
But ought entails can; therefore peace is possible.
From
Heracleitus
philosophers
by
24
be
with war as one limit, is essential
swarm
more
widely
conceded,
ought
to
though
often
not
on
of
Some are even captivated
stop,
to motion and progress.
the recent shift in philosophical fashions the second premiss would
Kantian
grounds,
now
but
Such grounds do support the theme that peace ...is—desirable
be realised,
indicate what sort of peace.
but are more discriminating in
Unfortunately,
premiss does not sustain the conclusion,
23?
impressive
such extravagant counter-claims as that with peace everything would
consequentialist.
and
there buzzes an
Hegel
who have rejected the second premiss.
that competition,
With
through
that
they
help
however/ it is done, the second
ought does not entail can,
as
many
(From previous page)
As B. Martin, who uses this important form of
argument for institutional change to get his thick book
started,
points
ou t (pp. 12-13).
24.
The
swarm includes some anomalies,
ecology, Spinoza: see Appendix 3.
40
such as that tarnished hero of
deep
dilemmas reveal
moral
Fortunately
(see MD) .
conclusion that peace is possible,
method of (semantical) modelling:
societies
where
recall
persists
present in detail
scenarios
of
it may be
necessary
to
(for the sceptical
with n = 1 or n = 0).
n-human models,
the
to
That is the more
and indeed is feasible.
elaborate
peace
route
a more satisfactory and revealing
is
there
This sort of thing is of course
in more pleasing fashion than logicians could hope to emulate if
25
less precisely,
by novelists.
Hhat all these scenarios point
to,
already done,
rather
however,
are societies considerably different from our own, not in the people
involved
who have their weaknesses,
forth,
and so
their power drives,
but
because of significant structural alterations in the societies depi c ted.
way of such modellings we can not merely argue to the feasibi1i ty
By
peace,
sorts
restructured
push ahead with the argument - that societies
but
desirable alternatives to contemporary
are
For those of us
industrial arrangements.
pacific
the
alternatives,
Heilbroner
is
has
and
possible
said
thoroughly entrenched,
of
the
desirable,
human
and enforced,
power.
That has not deterred social
before
him and many after him,
Kant,
25.
in
his
search
these
military
or
then who want to move towards such
from
inference,
feasibility
and
we shou1d begin on the real work of structural change.
desirability is clear:
Peace
practical
of
of
but
the
prospect).
prospects
Present
poor
(as
arrangements
are
are
both ideologically and by much physical
theorists such as Kant, who like Rousseau
were concerned with obtaining lasting
for the indispensible conditions
peace.
for__ 1 asting—peace,
Perhaps Kant had some such modellings in view in his theme that peace is
empirically possible, which he coupled with his striking claim that it is
morally and rationally imperative.
The latter claim,
running in direct
opposition
to the longline of bellicose philosophers,
really relies on
the correct but controversial assumption that states are subject to
the
same moral relations as individual persons.
Both then have an obligation
to seek peace derived from forms of the categorial morality, notably from
rational autonomy , the universality of maxims, and the ultimate value of
persons (or, more chauvinistically, of humanity).
41
claimed,
others
as
have claimed since,
that peace is
not
possible
present structural arrangements of a competing nation-states kind.
times
changed,
have
and so have state structural
In particular there is now,
under
To be sure
since
arrangements,
in the shape of the United
Kant
Nations,
a
very weak reflection of what Kant looked for, a world (or European) federation
of nations.
namely,
But crucial
the
at
ingredients in Kant's resolution are still
upper level,
what is required for a standard resolution
Dilemma type situations - some surrender of
Prisoners
lacking:-
of
sovereignty,
national
26
especially as regards war;
Much
has now accumulated that more
evidence
the
and, at the lower level, "republican" state*.
nation-state level
far-reaching
changes
if peace is to be secured,
or
required
at
movement
is even to get its message through already fixed channels
control
systems.
succeed,
tn
informational
and democratic
are
practical
27.
and
not
(p.52) ,
to
alter
which
the
theoretical arguments for
not that it has fallen very
Kant's
claim,
as
well
as
arguments of an inductive sort.
Such is also the new message from America:
for the peace movement to get
through to the administration, American democracy must be overhauled and
revitalised,
capitalist democracy superseded by
true democracy or
"republicanism"
(see e.g.
Cohen and Ragers).
But the message, like the
US peace movements'" very limited demands for peace,
leaves the state, as
the bringer of wars, and the main source of violence, essentially intac.;
the structural changes suggested, which will be slow to achieve, are much
too narrowly conceived.
28.
state
has traced some of the economic consequences of 'the rise and
subsequent fall of the American imperium'’
There
to
The significant decline of the American imperium
Heilbroner
26^
peace
Movements on a single front, such as peace, are unlikely to
channels,
27
character and membership of state control system^.
widen
APPENDIX 1;
a
need to be linked into a broader plurality of movements,
but
are
My thanks for information to David Bennett and Andrew Mack.
'Empires
f ar .
empire
was
no
Thp =h<=pr military cost ... for the United States a 1 one ...
12
px c e p t i on «
is
always been expensive and the American
have
ten
roughly
imperial
American
dol1ars)".
GNP for the last 25 years
...
percent of
supplemented
spending
enhanced poverty,
countries fueled inflation,
what it was represented as required by,
$2X10
in
capitalist
other
by
1972
etc., and was complemented by,
counterexpenditure and efforts by the
USSR.
establishment of an American hegemony [consisted and] resulted
'The
just
in
American
large
very
capital
American-owned
billion"
payments
and
Between 1950 and 1970,
equipment abroad 1 eaped from $ 12
(negative
build-up
of
value
of
the
to
billion
"capital
flows" and
balances),
and
a
$78
growing
On this sort of basis Heilbroner speculates that
of IOUs.
operation
rapid
A result of the expenditure abroad was a serious balance of
problem
accumulation
mere
investments abroad.
plant
(p.54).
but in the
military expenditures,
not
of the American imperium by itself - deemed of such
'the
critical
importance to preserve the peace and security of the capitalist world - was in
likelihood
all
a
inflationary phenomena'
the
for
the
globalisation
of
the
(p.57 with insert from p.56).
According to Heilbroner,
that
condition
sufficient
'Long before the Vietnam debacle,
it was clear
American arms could not prevent the rise of revolutionary governments in
under-developed
collapse
there
world"
(p.57).
is presented by Heilbroner;
But
and seemingly there
little
is
evidence
little.
is more substantial evidence for is the marked dec H ng of *he
imperium in the period (1973-3) concerned.
decline
really very
in
America's
select leading national
share of World GDP,
economies:
43
of
What
American
One piece of evidence is the sharp
shown in the following
table
of
POPULATION
SHARE
(1984 est)
SHARE OF WORLD GDP (X)
RANK
1968
1975
1984
USA
1
35.0
24.3
25.0
5.2
USSR
2
11.1
11.0
13.8
6.2
.JAPAN
3
5.2
3.0
9.5
2.7
GERMANY FDR
4
5.1
6.7
5.7
1.5
FRANCE
5
4.6
5.4
4.4
1.3
CHINA
6
2.9
4.8
4.3
22.6
UK
8
2.8
2.8
2.3
1.3
INDIA
12
1.3
1.5
1.1
15.1
AUSTRALIA
15
1.1
1.4
1.0
0.3
COUNTRY
The
qrand
table
empire,
also make it clear that if the USA cannot
should
nor can the USSR.
sustain
A totalitarian Pax Sovietica is even
a
le=s
likely than a capitalistic Pax Americana was.
APPENDIX 2:
A pluralistic framework for defence policy
The policy (broadeni ng Cami11 er izs suggest ions)
1.
ensures Australian security to some minimal but reasonable extent;
2.
is entirely non-nuclear (.and so is not aligned);
3.
is
defensive
in
posture
with
weapons
system
devoid
of
offensive
application and capacity, focussing on direct defence of Continent,
is decentralised, comprising wel1-trained, dispersed but coordinated small
units.
is partly at least social,
defence,
nonmilitary
deploying,
in combination [?] with territorial
forms of popular resistance trained in
noncooperat i on.
44
sabotage
a
APPENDIX 3?
The philosophical record; a preliminary tabulation.
Reflection on war and peace has had a strong polarising effect,
dividing
philosophers into two main groups:
Group B.
Those who regard war as inevitable, perhaps even as desirable;
Group G.
Those who consider war an evil, capable of being replaced by lasting
and
peace through goodwill or improved social arrangements.
The groups are not however exhaustive;
fence-sitters;
and
there
are
there are ambivalent philosophers, and
those who have
the
supported
battered themes of a war to end wars and of world empire.
at one stage in his development,
to
a despotic world state,
peace.
Russell,
idealists.
reached by imposition or war,
B and G are sometimes described,
But
while
Thus, for example,
who looked, like Dante before him,
So strictly the classification is (once again)
Groups
historically-
as a guarantor
of
four valued.
respectively,
as realists
and
these overworked terms reflect accurately enough
the
historic human condition and the present prospects,
they are prejudicial, and
they conflict with other classifications using these terms; for instance, both
Plato
and
Hegel,
condition
of human existence.
idealists
would
Northedge,
accept war as
normally accounted idealists,
have
been
a
Such concoctions as war-realists
preferable
to the
labels
from whom much of the record is drawn,
the
c on serva t i ve t r ad i t i on a n d aboli t i on i sts.
the
concoctions,
45
terms
and
of
sets the contrast:
peace-
which
namely
We shall prefer adaptions
namely war-riors and peace-niks,
simply (real) baddies and goodies.
in
permanent
or,
not to be
of
partisan,
DEFINING POLES
R adi c a 1 s
GROUP 8:
war-riors
RESIDUE GROUP
GROUP G
peace-niks
Virtually all classic
Greek phi1osophers
except early Stoics:
especially Heracleitus,
Plato (P)
Author of
Revel at ions
Early Christians
(non-violence
pr i n c i p 1 e)
Dubois (1306);
but with anti
Musi im aim
Erasmus ( 1570)
Cruce (1623; early
world order model
Roman Stoics and Christians
Scholastics: Aquinas (P)
Dante
•Just war theorists:
(Au Qu s t i n e) , SuIr ez,
Grotius (1425)
IJ t op i an s: More (war
games of modern
utopias in direct
descen t)
European peace
projects, some extended
to (Christian)
wor1d:
Bel 1ers ( 1710),
Penn (1693), abb£ de
Saint-Pierre (1713)
European peace
and hegemony:
Duke of Sully
(1620)
Nation-state theorists
Machiave1 1 i, Hobbes,
Locke, Spinoza
I-<2'1 b n /f’-j
German idealists:
Hegel, Schopenhauer
Perpetual peace:
Rousseau, Kant
Mili t ar i st s: Nietzsche;
Treitschke, Bernhardi,
Clausewi tz
Some utili tar i ans:
Bentham, the Mil Is,
Bren tano
Some anarchists and
1ibertarians:
Kropotkin (?),
Spencer
Russel 1
■James
Hi t tgenstei n
Key:
In
Dewey
P, peace a prime objective.
sort of investigation there are disappointments as
this
Spinoza
was
admiration
madness
to
a
major disappointment,
of Greek thought,
allow
Brentano a
find.
well
For,
as
finds.
despite
his
'Brentano was a decided pacifist and thought it
questions of international
fortunes of war'- (Kraus in Brentano, p.122).
46
justice to be
decided
by
the
REFERENCES
H.G. Andrewortha
Birch,
and L.C.
University of Chicago
The Ecological Neb,
1984.
Press,
H.R. Ashby, Design -for a Brain, Second edition. Hi ley. New York,
I960.
S. Beer, Desiqninq Freedom, Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, Toronto,
F. Brentano,
The
Origin of our Knowledge of Right and Wrong,
Keegan Paul, London
1969.
'Setting
the
J. Camilleri,
disarmament
agenda",
l?/4.
Routledge
and
Peace------ Studies
9,
( 1984) ,17-19.
F. Capra and C. Spretnak, Green Politics, Hutchinson, London,
R. Catley,
with the Bomb ...
'Along
Australian Magazine, 7-8 April,
(Review o-f
1984.
Martin),
D.
The—Weekend
1984.
1979.
P. Cock, Alternative Australia, Qu ar t er Book s, Me1 hourn e,
J. Cohen and J. Rogers, On Democracy, Penguin, New York,
1984.
P. and A. Erlich, Popu1 ation, Resourses, Environment, Second edition, Freeman,
San Francisco,
H. Feith,
197x.
'Richard Falk,
Peace Studies 24 (June 1985)
World order radical',
24-5.
J. Galtung, There are Alternatives, Spokesman, Nottingham,
17’84.
A. Gilbert,
'The state and nature in Australia', Au s t r a 1i an Cu 1 t yral—Hist or
1981 (ed. S. Goldberg and F.B. Smith), Canberra, 1982, pp.9-28.
R. Hardin, Co 1 1 ec 1 tive Action , Resources -for the Future, Washington,
R. Hardin,
M.D.
Hayes,
Ph i 1 osop_hy—and—Pub He
236-254.
'Defending
September 1983)
mutual disarmament',
versus
'Unilateral
Affairs 12 (1983)
the sunburnt country',
Chain Reaction
33
(August
11-17.
R.L. Heilbroner, Beyond Boom and Bust, Norton, New York,
19/8.
I. Kant,
Perpetual
Peace (trans,
and
introd. M.
Campbell
Sonnerschein, London, 1903 (first published 1795).
A. Mack, 'Farewell
1?82.
Smith),
Swan
to Arms Controls' 9 (1984) 9ff.
A. Mack, 'The pros and cons of ANZUS', Fabian ANZUS Conference, Lome, 4-5 May
1985;
referred to as PC.
B. Martin, Uprooting War, Freedom Press, London,
1984.
D. Martin, Armed Neutrality for Australia, Drummond Books, Melbourne,
47
1984.
Northedge,
'Peace , war and philosophy',
in Encyclopedia of Phi 1osophy
(ed. P. Edwards), Volume 6, Macmillan, New York, 1767, 63 t>< .
M. Olson, The Logic of Collective Action, Harvard University Press, Cambridge,
Mass.,
1965.
P. Pettit, 'Tree riding and foul
dealing', typescript, Canberra,
J.-J. Rousseau, A Project for Perpetual Peace C trans.
1927 (first published 1761).
E.M.
1985
Nut tai), London,
large-scale nuclear war and nuclear deterrence,
'On the ethics of
R. Rout ley,
out' ,
Discussion__ Papers__ in
Environmental
and
the political
fall
School of Social Sciences, Australian National
Ph i1osophy #5,
Research
University, 1984.
R.
R.
Routlpy,
'Metaphysical fall-out from the nuclear predicament', 1 Ph 11osophy
"and 1 Social Criticism 3/4 ( 1984) 19-34; referred to as MF.
Rout ley and V. Plumwood, 'Moral dilemmas and the logic of deontic^notions ,
'ni\r,.^.ign Papers in Environmen tai ..Philosophy #4,
Research School
of
SociaT~Sciences, Australian National University, 1984; referred to as MD.
P.R. Stephen son, The Foundation s of Cu1t u r e, N.J. M i1es, oydn ey,
R. Sylvan,
'Culture
Canberra,
1985;
and
the
roots of
political
divergence',
1 ? 36.
typescript,
referred to as CPD.
M. Taylor and H. Hard, 'Chickens, whales, and bumpy goods: al ternative models
of public-goods provision', Poli tical Studies 30 (19821 350 370.
The Strategic Basis of Australian Defence .Policy,
the National Times, March 30-April 5,
leaked extracts published in
1984, 23-30.
to Australian Security,
Pariiamentary Joint Committee for Foreign
Affairs and Defence, Australian Government Printer, Canberra; referred .o
3. s TAS.
T. Veblen, An
Inquiry into the Nature of Peace and the Terms of
Perpetuation, Viking Press, New York, 1945 (first published 191,).
48
its
Collection
Citation
Richard Sylvan, “Box 71, Item 1: Working draft of Australia's defence philosophy: investigations of the nonexistent # MX504,” Antipodean Antinuclearism, accessed May 4, 2024, https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/show/153.