Box 149, Item 1: War and peace I - On the ethics of large-scale nuclear war and nuclear deterrence and the political fallout
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Box 149, Item 1: War and peace I - On the ethics of large-scale nuclear war and nuclear deterrence and the political fallout
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Series: Discussion papers in environmental philosophy ; no. 5. Published by Australian National University. Department of Philosophy.
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The University of Queensland's Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291, Box 149, Item 1
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Discussion Papers
in environmental philosophy
Philosophy Departments
The Australian National University
PO Box 4, Canberra, Australia 2600.
NUMBER 5
WAR AND PEACE
Zgt
ON THE ETHICS OF LARGE-SCALE NUCLEAR WAR
AND NUCLEAR DETERRENCE AND THE POLITICAL FALL-OUT
<
RICHARD ROUTLEY
FOR CIRCULATION AND
EVENTUAL LIBRARY DEPOSIT
WAR AND PEACE.
I
ON THE ETHICS OF LARGE-SCALE NUCLEAR WAR
AND NUCLEAR DETERRENCE AND THE POLITICAL FALL-OUT
by
R. Routley
Number 5
Discussion Papers in Environmental Philosophy
Department of Philosophy
Australian National University
1984
INTRODUCTION.
Virtually all the philosophical literature on nuclear war is written from
either a superpower (predominantly American) or else European (mainly German,
British or French) viewpoint.
This article,
after connecting in initial
sections with Northern Catholic literature, adopts a very different Antipodean
stance.
Such regional perspectives, while the should not affect
the morality
of the matter, are highly politically relevant.
Much of the philosophical literature, especially that emanating from the
USA, also fails the test of morality.
It is concerned only or primarily with
what is good or "rational" or prudential for Americans, or for the American
state,
to do - whereas morality is independent of place, race, nationality and
the like. This article tries to take the morality of the matter, and the
resulting redistribution of moral and political obligations, seriously.
It
concludes, among other things, that the American and Russian states have no
moral business putting nonaligned peoples at such grave risk as present nuclear
arrangements involve.
CONTENTS AND OUTLINE: Italicised headings §3-§8 indicate the main
structure of the argument
Page No
§0.
Introduction. Nuclear vs conventional wars, and new moral
issues. Large-scale (LSN) vs limited nuclear wars, the focus on the
former, but the implications for the latter.
§1. How nuclear wars differ from other wars; wars and states, and the
resulting limited appropriateness of older models and theories of war.
War characterised. The essential role of the state. New and different
features of nuclear wars.
§2. The moral situation: the recent tendency of moral considerations
to become entirely submerged in the context of war.
The ancient distinction of morality and expediency. Strategic planning
based on expediency. Arguments that war must be expediency-based refuted.
Morality does not have to, and ought not to, give way to expediency.
Utilitarianism and expediency distinguished. Limits to consensus:
supermen and superhawks. National interest and expediency assimilated.
Limits of state entitlement.
§3. The initial argument to the immorality of LSN wars.
One key argument, from the wrongness of killing noncombatants in mass, is
presented, assessed, and criticisms met. Arguments for the premisses of
the key argument elaborated.
§4. Arguments from historical requirements on just wars, the important
argument from convergence, and environmental arguments.
Arguments from just war requirements: discrimination, proportionality,
prospect of success. The detailed convergence argument, from rival moral
positions. Arguments from environmental principles.
§5. The shift to nuclear deterrence: arguments to its immorality.
Deterrence seen as the only practical way to satisfy major desiderata:
prevention of war and maintenance of prudential values. Pure deterrence
not the policy. Deterrence as practiced has increased the probability of
nuclear war. The first argument to immorality of deterrence, from the
plausibility of probability of immorality. Further arguments through
deontic connecting principles: the probability linkage. Refuting the
counterargument from the success of deterrence. The way the onus of
1
2
5
11
14
17
Page No
proof falls on deterrence policy, which cannot meet evidential require
ments. The second connecting principle: the wrongness of serious
preparation for nuclear war. The general form of connecting principles;
separating out those that are correct. The third connecting principle:
the wrongness of serious threats of nuclear devastation. Criticism of
this principle leads to further connecting principles, through intention
and through commitment. Meeting counterarguments from utilitarianism.
Applying the connecting principles to argue to the immorality of
deterrence. Arguments from limited convergence: pro- and anti-utilitarian
versions. Other reasons for deep dissatisfaction with deterrence.
§6. Practical, prudential and more moral arguments from national
dangers to nuclear build-up of the superstates, and the genesis of
nuclear dilemmas.
The arguments from nuclear blackmail and foreign domination, and from
risk of nuclear destruction. The crucial argument from basic rights and
fundamental values. The argument from isolated people to superstate
immorality. The superstate theme, and reasons for its appeal. The much
less persuasive dependent state theme. Challenging the assumptions of
the underlying relatiatory model.
§7. The resulting nuclear dilemmas - for aligned states and their
supporters.
Character of the nuclear fix. Subsidiary dilemmas: national security vs
freedom and democratic arrangements; personal and role dilemmas. Features
of deontic dilemmas. Deterrence presented as second-best escape from the
nuclear fix. The nuclear fix a fix of states' own making. Interconnections
between the nuclear fix and nation-state arrangements.
§8. Ways out of nuclear dilemmas: initial political fall-out from the
ethical results.
The inevitability of limitations on national sovereignty. Interstate
and extrastate approaches. The Way Up and the Way Down of extrastate
approaches. Arguments for the Way Up, and the decisive case against it.
Failure of international agreements, especially on human rights and
genocide. Exclusion of nuclear deterrence under the Genocide Convention.
Need for the reexamination of current political arrangements imposed by
the nuclear fix. Deficiencies in present antiquated political arrange
ments revealed by nuclear problems. Further arguments from the nuclear
fix for political reassessment. The weak link: the sovereign nation
state. Forfeiture of political obligation by many states. Alternative
political arrangements vs nuclear time horizons.
The multi-track Way Out of the nuclear dilemma. The main political
means lie outside state governmental apparatus. Laying the spectre of
ideological domination. Social restructuring and devolution of power.
Graduated disarmament and transarmament, and letting state sovereignty
go. Dissolving the arguments from national dangers. State resistance to
loss of power. Further lines of organised action against nuclear states.
Appendix 1: On the fate of mankind and the earth, according to
Schell and Anders.
Nuclear prophets and prophetic rubbish. The extinction assumption.
Common emerging themes of Schell and Anders. The extravagant anthro
pocentric assumption, and some of what is wrong with it. Second death
dismissed. The universality of peril. The alleged universality of
responsibility: the Pogo theme. The correct, but undeveloped, whole
earth theme. Ultimately Schell offers little hope and superficiality.
Nuclear war is war. The logic and illogic of deterrence.
ii
37
43
49
Page No
Appendix 2:
On matters of collective and individual responsibility
and on regional strategies.
Individual and state responsibility. Opt-out positions, and arguments
to them.
Failure of the arguments, and the impact of group cooperation.
Arguments to direct obligations of individuals to the nuclear
dissociation.
Limitations of rival political obligations.
Different policy reorganisation for different regions.
Shallower and
deeper goals.
The important opportunity for deeper reorganisation
afforded by nuclear dilemmas.
Obligations of those in the Antipodes:
what is required, and justified.
Social and economic reorganisation
in the Antipodes, and reducing costs involved.
Blockages to social
and political adjustment.
iii
73
ON THE ETHICS OF LARGE-SCALE NUCLEAR WAR AND NUCLEAR DETERRENCE
AND THE POLITICAL FALL-OUT
Large-scale nuclear wars raise ethical questions not generated,
either
at
or nearly so forcefully, by previous human military encounters.This is at
all
bottom because of their projected effects, which are often
to
said
differ
so
those of even the largest conventional wars (the World Wars) as to yield a
from
difference in kind of war.
involve,
and
threatened
Certainly massive exchanges
such
as
nuclear
exchanges such as nuclear deterrence presupposes, are
neither envisaged nor fully accommodated by traditional theories of
Much
wars
just
wars.
new philosophical reflection and investigation is required, even if rather
well-tested and old-fashioned moral principles will
serve
as
initial
ethical
base.
Although nuclear wars are, thus
nonexistent
objects,
nuclear
wars
(extrapolated from a very limited
varieties.
In
far, only a decidedly
class
menacing
of
proper have several distinctive properties
nuclear
experience^)
and
come
in
several
particular, confined or limited nuclear wars, of which tactical
or strategic are subvarieties, contrast with Idrge-scale nuclear wars (LSN wars)
1.
The US Catholic Bishops in their Pastoral Letter (PL) make the point
forcefully:
'Nuclear weapons ... and nuclear warfare ... are new moral
issues ... There exists a capacity to do something no other age could
imagine:
we can threaten the created order ... We could destroy [God's]
work' (PL, p.312). While the independent analysis offered in what follows
has a great deal in common with the Bishop's position,
it differs
significantly in removing the religious backdrop and associated features
and, it is hoped,
in bringing out the logical structure of the argument
more clearly and sharply. To illustrate the differences that emerge with
removal of the religious backdrop and its the associated unity-of-evil
theme, consider what happens to two examples from PL,
p.323:- Firstly,
peace is possible without religious enlightenment if it is possible with
it:
religious enlightenment is not an essential condition as there
implied.
Secondly, violence does not take all the forms the Bishops try to
give it,
e.g.
sexual discrimination is hardly a form of violence,
pornography can operate without it, etc.
It is a serious mistake to try to
heap so many diverse and independent issues together under the one heading
(forms of violence) along with war as if they stood and fell together, e.g.
abortion and nuclear war.
Note that referencing, where not through an author's name, is by way of
acronym explained in the references at the end.
2.
an
The isolated, and unnecessary, bombing of two Japanese cities at the very
end of World War II did not render that war a genuine nuclear war. Nuclear
wars proper will be very different and very much more horrifying.
Nuclear
wars proper,
though elements of uncomfortably adjacent possible worlds,
ought therefore to be confined to merely possible worlds. Enough of their
features we can appreciate without their being brought to actuality.
2
A large-scale nuclear
which need not however be unlimited 3.
explosion
war
it is
of large quantities of nuclear devices over a sizeable region;
a function of two main parameters:
distribution.
war
strategic) nuclear
of
quantities
war
a
Such
quantity
markedly
differs
which
limited,
is
where
and
explosives,
(megatonnage
a
from
targets
to
are
and
explosive)
limited
assumption,
by
the
of
the
involves
(tactical
much
or
smaller
characteristically
circumscribed, for instance confined in principle to military installations in a
given
region.
Though
focus
the
in
what follows is upon LSN wars and their
prevention, limited nuclear wars are by no
a
separate
wars to LSN wars are high (given usual reasonable assumptions
second
strike,
since
issue,
a
is a prerequisite, and the probabilities of escalation of such
arsenal
nuclear
means
etc.).^
Because
of
these
of
follow-up
or
connections, much of the case made
against LSN wars transfers to more limited wars, as will become evident.
§1.
How nuclear wars
resulting
differ
from
other
wars
wars:
and
party
and
limited appropriateness of older models and theories of war.
of war that has dominated much thinking, including strategic
two
states
(or
thinking,
the
A model
is
the
several person) game or, as a complication of that, the clan or
tribe battle3.
A picture of
war
thus
on
requirements
for
legitimate and just wars, which technological
reflection
advances have
traditional
now
theory
rendered
of
war,
emerged,
inappropriate
hardly
and
especially
sometimes
surprisingly,
as
a
result
inapplicable.
of
The
made no allowance for such
3.
Another dimension of variation concerns the sequence of the war, especially
the type of strike involved.
Though the sequence is important for the
moral assessment, for example of the main actors, it in no way alters the
immorality of LSN wars, as will emerge.
4.
'The overwhelming probability [is] that a nuclear exchange would have no
limits'
(PL, p.314). Hence a major argument against limited nuclear wars:
that any such war risks, indeed renders highly probable, an unlimited war,
and the risk is far too large to take. The point in fact follows by
straightforward application of decision theory, multiplying the massive
undesirability (moral and otherwise) of an LSN war by its probability given
a limited nuclear war. Given the character of weapons development and
present communication arrangements,
the idea of a highly circumscribed
purely nuclear exchange between the superpowers, perhaps in the European
"theatre", is really a myth.
5.
There was a substantial element of sport (and connected features of
prowess)
in traditional wars that has been eroded in modern technological
wars. Nuclear wars may be not just unsporting, in that no notice is given,
etc.,
they are also remote and impersonal, and differently unjust, in a
much deeper way.
3
phenomena as mass bombing of large cities, such as
with
Dresden
and
nuclear bombing, with its many further crucial effects beyond mass
And
Tokyo.
occurred
bombing, adds further new dimensions.
Yet it is important for the argument
anchors,
retain
historical
were
accounted
unjust
war is essentially a matter of states and their control:
the Oxford English Dictionary account, war is 'hostile contention
armed
protagonists, antagonists or players;
of
contention
or
combat;
exchange is the actual experience.
but
other
are not literal, but transferred, metaphoric, etc.8
'war'
means
and
or
wrong.
to elaborate
by
means
of
forces, carried on between nations, states, or rulers, or between parties
in the same nation or state' for control of the state?;
noun
linkages
to be aware of what counted as war (the semantics of the matter^), and
of when, and why, wars and military actions
Firstly,
to
always
a
function
of
senses
of
the
States are the
forces comprising armed soldiers are
the
and combat or forceful and typically violent
Thus wars are external or internal
states or their rule.
(civil),
Thus too wars have grown in
quantity and frequency as states have expanded, wars have changed as states have
transformed,
and
nuclear
war
has
emerged 'with
nuclear states.
theoretical way then to eliminate wars is to remove states:
An obvious
in short, wars
are
6.
There are interesting sidelights concerning even the etymology of the term
'war', which was derived from a term meaning 'confusion'. In particular,
'it is a curious fact that no Germanic nation in early historic times had
in living use any word properly meaning 'war'':
Oxford English Dictionary
(OED) on war.
7.
But of course there can be something quite analogous to war waged between
clans,
gangs, multinational firms,
even against Nature, and still more
metaphorically against poverty, etc. To this extent, a strict definition
of 'war' is being insisted upon. Even so the diffusion of power structures
the argument will direct us to, has to extend beyond just the break-down of
nation-states .
8.
Into this category (since Nature is no nation)
falls the ubiquitous and
unwarranted war against Nature of modern times, which features just as
large in Marxism as in capitalism. As could have been guessed,
someone it was James - suggested channelling all war into "war" in the metaphorical
sense against that unarmed and nonaggressive "opponent", Nature.
James
proposed as a substitute for war proper, conscription of the youth for a
war against Nature (see Wasserstrom,
p.12).
What it boiled down to,
however, was that youth was to be channelled into all the dirty work, in
that way to acquire manly virtues military activities "rightly" instil,
especially discipline,
but also service, devotion, physical fitness,
constructive exertion, responsibility, and order. Another less diabolical
substitute for wars proper (in American ecotopian literature) is through
war games and other games of competitive cast.
Again specious arguments
enter for those bringing out the "best" in human males, etc.
4
an outcome of political and associated technological structure, and are
by
structure.
the
altering
state arrangements,
arrangements.
be
to
can thus be seen as a structural problem of
War
from
along
defective)
political organisation of states;
they are a
helps
these
This semantically based picture
situational fix, a structural malformation.
war
with
(otherwise
removed
arise
Wars
of
explain why the radical argument against nuclear wars and deterrence
argument
devolves into an
war-makers,
against
against
In
states.
the
fact
(self-legitimised)
on
and
war-declarers
traditional theory, wars were
the
restricted to external wars, which were construed as
the
right
or
states
of
rulers (princes) to conduct for certain political purposes;
their
removed
the argument
was that private persons with grievances had access to the courts^, while states
did
not (wars were, so to speak, the international analogue of the law courts).
But this is itself a very statist conception of the legitimate
place
of
wars;
the semantics is not so restrictive and permits internal wars within states, for
example to end wars, injustice, etc.
Let us however - to bring out what is different now - confine attention
a
basic and most familiar case, external wars between two states or sets (axes)
of states, two-player external wars,
games,
competitive
could
be
won,
attentuated form for some "victors")
the World Wars.
agglomerations
surrounding
traditionally
firstly
for
massive
armed
like
wars,
such
exchanges
as
there may well be no winning
in
areas
Northern
the
of
very
hemisphere
countryside.
Thus,
and
the
secondly,
for
waste
laying
the
point
of
of
substantially
substantially
obliterated^,
(exercised
and
most
as
nothing
all
worse off than at the outset of the "play".
are
huge
war
seen, to settle serious interstate disputes, is removed:
another point of difference, the phenomenon of wars that
prepared
that
That assumption still held good (though in
With LSN wars it no longer holds;
is settled with main protagonists
players
It was assumed
An LSN war could involve destruction of all main Western metropolitan
strategy.
9.
to
main
Hence
elaborately
for, etc.), but which can never be pointfully fought;
Thus Aquinas and Grotius for example (see Barnes,
p.776,
top).
The
argument
presupposes rather a lot,
including a neat public/private
distinction. Put Aquinas's way,
it looks as if it could be readily
transferred into an argument for international government, or at least
effective law-courts. Yet all Christendom was supposed at that time to be
one state!
5
hence the inevitable emphasis on pure deterrence.
and
the
other
elements of gamesmenship had a role in earlier wars, but it was
not pure deterrence.
military
to
Certainly, deterrence, bluff,
Lastly, traditional wars could be confined in
targets
and
military
principle
This feature is fundamental as
exchanges.
for, as will appear, wars that spill over in gross
regards just wars;
ways
to
The special effects of
uninvolved parties sacrifice any pretension to morality.
nuclear explosives, especially operated in mass, mean however that large nuclear
cannot
wars
be
legitimately
horrifying detail in popular sources
ozone
destruction,
These
confined.
shockwaves,
such
effects
gigantic fumigations
and
become
entirely
rapid
speed
include
pulses, fireball or firestorm
etc., etc.
As a result
of
these
of exchange, LSN wars will resemble
the
recent
tendency
submerged in the context of war.
of
moral
and expediency.
considerations
to
It is particularly important
in the case of war to maintain a firm grasp on the ancient
morality
radioactivity,
more than they resemble older-style wars.
The moral situation:
§2.
the
Schell)
electromagnetic
devastation, rogue bacteria and viruses, ...
compounded
as
special effects (presented in
distinction
between
What is done in war, especially for local or national
advantage, may be very different from what ought morally to be done, whether the
10. There is however the degenerate idea of war as involving annihilation or
extinction, and of winning a nuclear war as annihilation of the enemy while
not being entirely annihilated oneself:
the side that somehow "survives"
sufficiently to rebuild is said to "win".
But this is, at best, an
extremely tenuous sense of winning, which in any case neglects the medical
evidence concerning nuclear destruction.
Recent talk about winning or even surviving a nuclear war must
reflect a failure to appreciate a medical reality: Any nuclear
war would inevitably cause death, disease and suffering of
pandemonic proportions and without the possibility of effective
medical intervention ...
(PL, p.313).
Moreover any such phoenix war is radically unjust, because of violation of
the traditional requirement of proportionality, and for other reasons
developed in the text.
Unfortunately as documented in Scheer,
significant officials who are
responsible for the nuclear destiny of the USA - and so of the world think that the devastation of nuclear war can be survived by Americans and
that a global nuclear war can actually be "won"!
They rely, among other
things, on an incredibly low, and unacceptable, redefinition of "winning".
11.
In practice they often were not,they drained limited economies, they layed
waste countryside (though to a minor extent compared with nuclear or
chemical warfare or modern mining), impoverishing inhabitants, etc.
6
latter is determined using the codes and conventions
Much
not to be done in war i^ done, for one (alleged) advantage or
ought
that
otherwise^.
or
war,
of
another, despite modern military codes and conventions and the like.
we
not
live
go
a rather barbarous age:
in
unremarked,
the
if
Militarily
the horrors of the twentieth century will
history
gets
written
that
(accurately)
is.
Furthermore military thinking and strategic planning tend (as Nagel explains) to
induce a certain moral numbing, so that a range
as
such
wiping
rural populations, become real possibilities, included in
out
calculations.
consequentialist
characteristically
based
on
is
that
strategic
Each
side
in a military encounter
reasont
The
expediency
only
disadvantages,
its
own
gains
and
own
its
planning
advantages
is
and
losses as a result of alternative possible
it ought, morally, to consider those of the other side(s) as
moves:
actions,
excluded
morally
of
well.
In
this way strategic planning displaces morality.
Indeed it has been contended that war should be planned and conducted
way,
a
no-holds barred combat fought to the maximal (local) advantage, without
limits, moral or other (except insofar as technology limits the means of
etc.).
Such
the
classical
through
"bald
an
incremental
limit)
escalation
distinct
argument
terms.
from
an
that
the
It
would
And
(but
The
externally
will be broken by each player in turn for advantage.
an extraordinarily narrow motivational base is assumed.
the
argument
man" fallacy *3), that there can be no limit.
assumption is that any merely selected limit (as
enforced
force,
is the so-called "classic" view of Clausewicz, oft repeated.
Clausewicz tries to argue,
really
this
Thus too
follow
from
idea of a limited war is some sort of contradiction in
But it is not, though breaking off in the heat of war, or the
of a supposedly limited nuclear exchange, may be singularly improbable.
confusion
Nuclear
12.
For as Nagel contends (early on),
there are moral restrictions on the
conduct of warfare which are not legalistic only and which are neither
arbitrary nor merely conventional, nor a matter of usefulness.
These
themes run entirely counter to the classic theory of war of Clausewicz - a
theory outlined in Walzer.
13.
As one less hair doos not, at any stage, distinguish a bald man from a
hirsute man,
there are, starting from the hirsute end, no bald men. The
progressive escalation argument concerning war is an incremental argument
like the technical Sorites syllogisms, formalising the type of fallacious
argument which shows that one more straw never makes a heap.
The
fallacious escalation argument is part of the so-called "logic of war", for
more on which see the conclusion of Appendix 1.
7
wars thus appear decidedly Clausewiczian.
the
for
players
Still the argument
inconclusive;
is
can choose, at least in smaller calmer wars, not to escalate,
and, for example, agree to abide by arranged practices, types of weapons, etc.^
A state engaged in war seldom sees itself as entirely bound by
of
morality:
it is taken to be mere prudence on the part of those attacked to
take account of the no-immoral-holds-barred approach they
from the other side.
especially
constraints
the question not only
as
to
may
encounter,
well
So each group potentially engaged in war faces
ought
it
what
do
to
in
permissible
morally
situations, but also both what it ought really do, and what it can morally do in
the morally flawed situations it finds itself.
not,
But the last question does
in that case, reduce to one of expediency.
There is no question, then, of morality giving or having
even
expediency,
For it is not as if shaky considerations of
involves.
give
bound
are
morality
theoretical
fact
is
that
miraculously
deliver
us
from
value
the
theory.
to
Expediency
fact,
but
that
local values - of self, family, clan, class, or nation - are
considerations.
proper characterisation, a
therefore,
much
universalizable
more
universal
fairness,
equitability and
principles,
justice.
distribution
value
of
and,
And morality thereby imposes, through
principles.
intersubstitutivity
certain
requirements
of
general
Expediency yields an unfair, inequitable
value system, one that subscribers would not adhere to if differently
placed
\
deep theoretical unsatisfactoriness of expediency, and associated strategic
thinking, also derives from this failure
evaluations
14.
remote
By contrast, morality requires, as a matter of its
resultant
The
takes
It assumes, or
what really count, and override or are to be maximized at the expense of
foreign
not
does
simply
narrowly-construed local advantage or power as what is valuable.
urges,
crucial
But the
morality and* expediency fall within the same,
both
equally shaky or equally solid, domain of value
or
to
to the firm ground of expediency when the chips are down, since often
way
enough such moral erosion does not occur in crisis situations.
even
to
circumstances such as the prospect of LSN war
extreme
under
way
give
to
of
interreplacement,
from
the
same
and results not holding when persons X and Y are interchanged under
As Walzer argues, p.24. An historical example is the era of genuinely
limited wars in Europe following the barbarism of the Thirty Years war.
8
For expediency does not elude
expediency assessments^.
it
deontic
presentation:
be presented as through such popular slogans as "local might is right",
can
or given tight formal
characterisation.
The
will
characterisation
normally
that of utilitarianism, except that utilities are only assigned to, or
resemble
are biassed in favour of, certain individuals.
However, theories of utility
not have to be positions of expediency if utility is not locally confined.
do
Thus
utilitarianism proper is not to be dismissed as considering only expediency;
meet intersubstitutivity requirements of morality;
can
it
it does not, unlike the
methods of war game theory, assign different weights to the
individual
utility
of (certain) Americans, as opposed to Russians, say.
are
There
especially,
deontologists
regarding war^.
which
differences,
between
or
justify, ugly strategies and practices as regards
to
some
render
to
seemed
enemy civilians, that deontological principles would not permit.
effect
and
utilitarians
serve to further complicate the moral picture
In particular, utilitarian approaches have
permissible,
morally
significant
however
utilitarians
this
But
is
would
reject the
description of practices permitted under their principles as 'ugly';
whereas an
to
already
in
aim
what
follows
since
partisanship,
is
to
avoid
meta-ethical
meta-ethical neutrality, though of course not
there
is
a
moral
partisanship,
neutrality.
to
achieve
And
morally
large area of consensus, or at least moral convergence, from which
argument can begin.
Virtually all positions
agree
that
obliteration
of
several major cities in a LSN war would be wrong, indeed morally outrageous.
If
the
there is dissension, as there may be among nuclear strategists who seem to
feel
no qualms when it comes to trading loss of some American cities for some Russian
ones, simply increase the costs
involved,
up
to
loss
of
whole
nations
if
15.
The severe limitations of those lesser "virtues",
nationalism
and
patriotism, also come from the failure of replacement which excessive
applications of nationalism easily engender. Try for example swapping a
person from inside the homeland with one from outside as regards treatment.
The point of, and reasons for,
intersubstitutivity as a requirement of
morality,
is well explained in Hare, p.78ff. Hare applies the requirement
to make a telling case against nationalism (a case which extends to
strategic decision-theory).
Nationalism,
along with fanaticism, is the
main cause of war, so Hare contends, p.72.
16.
The case against expediency was developed in detail
especially the criticism of Thrasymachus in The Republic.
17.
Thus the differences between Nagel on the one side, and Brandt and Hare
the other, in Cohen et al.
by
Plato;
see
on
9
then try to work down
necessary, until moral repugnance ijs encountered;
The
again.
fact remains however that in the nuclear area things have got substantially
abandon
tended
Strategic thinking, in particular, has
out of perspective, morally.
to
suppress moral considerations (as indeed theories of the state also
or
do, sometimes flamboyantly, in favour of partisan values).
Naturally the fact of broad consensus as to the morality of the matter does
mean that there are none who would welcome such outrageous happenings, that
not
total nuclear destruction of the North even, would be
Consider
the
rising
world empire.
be
southern
(hemisphere)
no
advantage.
one's
strongman, SS, who has visions of
While the superpowers of the north remain, SS's dream can
realised.
Thus
his
best
strategy,
having
rid
submarines and southern lands of US bases, is to try
nuclear
to
exchange
in
the
North.
There
be
would
waters
southern
to
encourage
a
hardly
of US
all-out
an
point then in securing
institutional arrangements so that potential SS's do not accumulate much
given
especially
the
apparent instability of crucial world arrangements.
that is to anticipate:
the present point is that (the fact of) moral
has
and
its
power,
limitations,
is
an
inadequate
But
consensus
constraint without accompanying
structural adjustments.
national
For, typically,
differently
to
impose
interest
is
taken
hostages
or
override
morality,
even
holding
civilian
populations
as
of those
those of Eastern Europe.
things.
substitution
of
justification;
fails
in
The
first,
expediency
classes
regimes,
But morally national interest can do neither
the
overriding
for
morality,
of
morality,
which
the second, the alleged moral dominance of
important
And,
killing millions in the national interest*8).
unfortunately, these assumptions are not confined to more totalitarian
such
or
irresistible ethical claims that dominate more ordinary
ethical considerations (such as those concerning
nuclear
to
is
entirely
national
simply
lacks
the
moral
interests,
of cases, including, so the argument will go, the
case of LSN war.
18.
As Schell bluntly puts it, 'What is being claimed is that one or two
countries have the right to jeopardise all countries and their descendents
in the name of certain beliefs' (p.132). However this way of putting it
leaves room for ambiguity, since the beliefs may be morally grounded rather
than based on national interests.
10
States may insist upon operating on a selfish national interest basis,
let
it
not
be
that
pretended
expediency (namely,
that
of
is
it
a moral basis as distinct from one of
There
egoism").
"group
but
moral
special
no
is
dispensation
for governments.
individuals:
there is no logical difference in the pattern of justification, or
analysis of obligation.
Morality works in the same way for groups as for
For example, what ought to be as regards X is (analysed
semantically) what would happen as regards X in all ideal worlds;
no
whether
difference
is
an
reasons
aside,
just
behaving
as
system, group or
individual
or
individual
States such as Israel (in its recent invasion
organisation.
extenuating
X
immorally
of
as brigands or mass
Certainly there are grounds on which states or their agents
conceded, special moral dispensations;
been
more than that and do not stand up to criticism.
cannot
furnish
two
(incompatible)
claimed,
have
but the excuses offered are no
A
moralities,
satisfactory
a
state
theory
moral
or public one and a
private or individual citizen one — state expediency and individual
morality
because this would lead to violations of substitutivity, neutrality, etc.
instance, a state operative X could use state
cover
morally impermissible ways, ways ruled out (e.g.
Y are permuted.
special
are,
Lebanon)
there is no moral difference.
killers:
or
makes
and it
to
considerations
citizen
*
For
Y
in
by state interests) when X and
A group or organisation or person can be
derivative
damage
19
bound
of
course
by
in virtue of role, but these are derivative
principles - good for any such institution - which fit within and answer back to
general
moral principles.
So it is also with a state which is an institutional
arrangement justified (insofar as it is) by the way it answers back to some
least)
of
its
citizens:
its
charter does not legitimate emergent allegedly
moral principles which conveniently coincide with those of state expediency.
particular,
a
survival.
In
state is not (morally) entitled to risk the lives of many of its
own citizens and of other peoples and creatures for its own ends, even
own
(at
for
its
Thus it is not entitled to do what both nuclear war and nuclear
deterrence require, as will emerge.
19.
There are also other arguments against two (or
see Routley and Plumwood.
multiple)
morality
lines:
11
§3.
The initial argument
pacifism
yield
arguments
to
the
immorality
of
to
the
immorality
of war.
controversial in an area where there is no
LSN
for
But such arguments are
be
to
reason
good
Arguments
wars.
controversial.
Pacifism can accordingly be set aside as a special case, since the immorality of
LSN wars follows.
All but pacifist positions concede that war in itself is not a crime.
all
wars are immoral, though even inoffensive wars may be pointless or inferior
Among more or less admissible
ways of settling political issues between states.
wars
who
Not
are
the international "tournaments" of aristocratic young men or warriors
volunteer
as
and
soldiers
action
whose
not
does
spill
over
onto
noncombatants, and some early and medieval wars, where few or even no combatants
were killed in war.
conscription,
Since the establishment
press-gangs
and
recruitment
of
such
of
the
largely ceased to take these less offensive forms;
induction
practices
as
near-destitute, wars have
modern massive wars are
far
removed from the ideal war-tournament types (which feature now only in ecotopian
portrayals, in ways that are increasingly dubious).
immoral,
sorts
Most
of
wars
are
because of what is done to the essentially uninvolved, but few to such
an extent as LSN wars.
The first argument to the
immorality
of
LSN
and
wars
sufficiently
of
large-scale wars generally, takes the following form:
Pl.
The (deliberate) killing in mass of noncombatants is wrong.
P2.
LSN wars involve the killing in mass of noncombatants.
P3.
What involves what is wrong is wrong.
- (KA)
LSN wars are wrong.
The particular argument given is just one representative of a set
of
this
type.
taken
off
killing:
the
on
(KA)
replaces
But the
quite
'killing
sufficiently
evil.
creatures'.
can
Thus
a
first
in mass of noncombatants' by a suitable
clause concerning 'huge destruction of lifestyle of uninvolved or
involved
focus
destruction of lifestyle of nonhumans and humans
alike that an LSN war will bring is
variation
arguments
Characteristically, in Western culture, it is thought that mass
killing of humans is about the worst thing that can happen.
be
of
not
directly
Other variations will emerge in the discussion (including
that where the bracketed 'deliberate' figures).
but
The argument is valid,
attacked)
on
the
of
basis
be
may
attacked
(and
of its premisses.
each
has
in
effect
been
Let us consider these in
reverse order. The principle, P3, used in the argument, that what involves "what
is wrong" is wrong, has been challenged on rather Scholastic grounds. There are,
in particular, problems like those generated by Good Samaritan arguments,
purport to show that some proper obligations involve wrongdoing.
assisting an injured robbed person is said
robbed;
but, since the robbing is wrong,
"involve"
to
providing
For
which
instance,
that person's
assistance
being
is also wrong.
But these problems derive from too slack a notion of involvement; with a tighter
account of involvement the problems disappear and P3 stands.
As against P2, it may
legitimately
directed
be
argued
against
that
military
nuclear
targets.
20
can
wars
be
encounters
But given the character of
There is
nuclear weapons, LSN wars could in no way be confined to such targets.
not
merely
the likelihood that many missiles explode off target, there are all
the other effects of large-scale nuclear bombings.
fallout
down-wind
from
military
people, especially in the case of
targets
US
and
For example, the radioactive
will affect large concentrations of
European
targets,
and
may
affect
uninvolved countries such as Canada.
There may be an attempt to avoid the problem of massive civilian casualties
by
appeal
effect)21.
to such dubious principles as the doctrine of double effect (or side
if missiles were characteristically
reliably
on
target,
and
one
20.
The challenge to P3, which is often expanded to a "distribution of
obligation over entailment" principle, can be removed by a tighter
involvement connective, linked to a good paradox-free entailment.
For
details see Routley and Plumwood, where Good Samaritan problems are
diagnosed.
21.
According to the doctrine, which is one concerning responsibility, we are
responsible
only
for the intended effects or consequences of our
freely-chosen actions, and not for other (side) effects or consequences,
even if these are foreseen and/or intimately tied to the intended
consequences.
Unless carefully hedged, the doctrine is
pernicious,
allowing those who suitably adjust their intention to escape responsibility
for evil they knowingly perpetrate. Thus, for instance, a Russian supreme
command which intended only to take out US military targets would, under
double effect, have no responsibility for the resultant effect on American
and Canadian cities!
Taking the issues concerning double effect to a more
satisfactory
conclusion would however require a larger theory of action, which duly
distinguished acts (what is done) and outcomes from attached intentions.
13
which was
intended
unfortunately
went
only
off
to
destroy
an
underground
unmanned
course and destroyed a large city, it could be claimed
that the (unintended) mass destruction is legitimised under
principle.
a
make
Nonetheless
effect
double
the
circumstances
difference, for they may mitigate attitudes to those responsible
for firing the missile, since it was not as if they had
deliberately
aimed
at
The double effect principle conflates [diminution of] responsibility
city.
the
the
the action would be wrong, and the
Such claims should be rejected:
wrongness not lessened by the given intention.
could
silo
missile
assigned for an act with the [diminution of] wrongness of the act.
As against Pl, and as regards the middle term of
argued
that there is an important equivocation.
While it will
the bracketed term, 'deliberate'.
killing
and
Pl
P2,
may
it
be
The equivocation is induced by
conceded
be
that
deliberate
of genuine innocents is impermissible, two challenges will be made.
It
will be charged firstly that noncombatants, insofar as they are distinguishable,
are
no means all innocent, many being directly involved in military effort,
by
whether just as taxpayers or as suppliers of
military,
e.g.
farmers
or
goods
or
services
bootmakers or entertainers.
as
innocent.
The
second
defensible — version of premiss P2.
and
for
other
reasons,
it
properly
point concerns a much narrower - and less
Because P2 so amended is
is best to leave out the
less
defensible,
"modifier" 'deliberate'.
What is important for the present purposes is the moral status of what is
not
a
mixture
that with the motives of the perpetrators.
of
require
the
qualification
'deliberate'
or
done,
So 'deliberate'
gets left out, equivocation is avoided, P2 stands, and so does Pl.
not
the
Secondly, it will be
contended that LSN wars do not involve the deliberate killing of those
excluded
by
used
For Pl
does
'intentional' or the like.22
Admittedly also 'noncombatant' is a fuzzy term, but none the worse for that, and
there
is
noserious
people who are
is,
moreover,
problem
in
marking out a class of
notdirectly involved in the command and action
no need
to
adopt the practice, deriving
stating an initialversion of Pl in terms of innocents -
22.
clear noncombatants,
at
chains.
There
from Catholicism, of
least as problematic
Despite Nagel's suggestion that it does (p.158).
The suggestion depends
upon similar mistaken assimilations, of act with intention, and wrongness
with responsibility, to those of the double effect doctrine.
14
a class as that of noncombatants to try to characterize - and then
endeavouring
to make the difficult transition to noncombatants.
Not only can arguments against the premisses of the argument be met,
are
arguments
the
for
there
premisses, though for the substantive moral premiss Pl
they are of the characteristically nonconclusive moral sort
and
tend
will
For example, one argument for
vary somewhat with the underlying ethical theory.
Pl, and for objecting to the killing of noncombatants, is the Kantian one,
(to
seriously
understate
point)
the
doing
to
that
fails to treat them with the
so
minimal respect owed to them as persons 2 3.
§4.
Arguments
from
historical
requirements
on
just
argument from convergence, and environmental arguments.
wars,
The conclusion that LSN
wars cannot be justly waged - and accordingly are unjustified something
dreamed
up
by
contemporary
"free-enterprise" capitalist state (and
opponents
communist
important
the
of
is
America
inspired,
merely
not
or
the
of
The
etc).
same
conclusion falls out of various traditional requirements, worked out in medieval
times, for just wars.
One of the requirements gives but a variant on the
first
argument (KA). 2** For a necessary condition for fighting a war justly was that it
not be the case that large numbers of [innocent] noncombatants are bound
killed (cf.
to
be
Barnes, p.775).
A just war requires just means, that the war should be
means,
fought
by
morally
which
implies in particular that there is no indiscriminate
killing of noncombatants.
The implied principle was escapsulated in a principle
legitimate
of
discrimination
(between combatants and others) which 'prohibits all actions
directly intended to take the lives of
p.312)
25
.
civilians
and
of
noncombatants'
(PL,
LSN wars, where not only military installations are targeted, violate
this requirement 2 6.
23.
Of course there are counterarguments too, and not merely from the military
angle in the case of small numbers of obstructive noncombatants.
One
favored argument is a variation on the Bald Man:
there is no clear line
between combatants and noncombatants. However as Nagel argues (p.20) there
are distinctions between them, firstly in terms of their roles, e.g.
in
carrying or using arms or directing those who do, and secondly in terms of
their harmfulness, the threat they offer.
See also PL,
p.312, where a
simple and effective paradigm case argument is applied.
24.
Note that throughout, the text adopts the OED equations, reflecting common
usage,
of just with morally right or correct, and unjust with morally
15
Overlapping the requirement of just means is that of
being that of net evil to net good:
proportion
proportionality ,
'the damage to be inflicted and
costs incurred by the war must be proportionate to the good expected
up
arms'
(PL,
requirement:
the damage and costs,
to
goods
moral
proportionality requirement is
of
the
achieved
nationally
not
that
in
doctrine
through war.
"improvement"
are
which
way.
overall
consequences
of
war
conditions
way
bad,
(Barnes, p.782).
'a nation wages war
justly
the
than
Similarly
only
if
the
for that nation or the wronged nation it is supporting have a decent
chance of being better after the fighting ends' (Wakin, p.20).
no
and
According to the first, 'X wages war
abstaining from war'
improvement "puts wrongs to rights":
are
Entangled with the
"ameliorative"
of
confined,
justly upon Y if the overall consequences of war are better, or less
the
taking
by
p.312).2? It is not difficult to see that LSN wars violate this
disproportionate
criterion
the
satisfy
LSN wars can
in
these conditions, as scenarios depicting the aftermath of such
wars reveal.
Some of the lesser requirements for a just war are also
wars,
for
example
that
of
infringed
reasonable expectation of success.
by
LSN
It seems that
there can be no reasonable expectation of state success in an LSN war - whatever
the
very
differently,
exchanges.
limited
prospects
of
success
for
some
whatever the prospects of success in
What
small
strictly
state
limited
elite,
or
nuclear
is less clearcut is the question of whether LSN wars conflict
with the requirements of just cause or due fault, and of right
intention.
For
25.
The principle can be argued to in various ways.
One (by no means
conclusive) way is Nagel's way, from the requirements of directness and
relevance in combat, the underlying (controversial) principle being that,
'whatever one does to another person intentionally must be aimed at him as
a subject, with the intention that he receive it as a subject' (p.15).
26.
The situation with strictly limited nuclear wars where the targets are
essentially military ones, and noncombatants are unaccountably killed
"indirectly",would be different.
Such wars are not however excused by the
pernicious doctrine of double effect.
For such wars remain unjust on
several counts, e.g.
they inflict disproportionate damage, e.g.
on life
systems,
etc.
As Zuckermann says,
'It is still inevitable that were
military installations rather than cities to become the objectives of
nuclear attack, millions,
even tens of millions of civilians would be
killed ...' (quoted in Thompson and Smith,
p.14, where the italics are
added).
27.
This is not to be confused with what is very different, the vicious ancient
doctrine of proportional response - an eye for eye, tooth for tooth, and so
on - recently adapted by the Americans in their latest official policy of
flexible response, adjusted to the level of attack.
16
this depends on the sensitive issue of the weight assigned to what are
seen
as
basic human rights and fundamental values, and the extent to which just wars can
While the mainstream position
be ideologically justified.
theory
medieval
opposed to ideologically justified wars and "humanitarian" wars, these were
was
not definitively excluded by the traditional theory (cf.
is
of
merit,
little
when
(and
issues will arise again subsequently).
historical requirements
are
arguments
not
do
simply
not
There
in puzzling over dubiously effective requirements,
however,
when so many are decisive against LSN wars
sensitive
Barnes, p.778).
commit
arguments
any
from
matters
the
underlying
Finally, these arguments from
prescriptive
fallacy;
historical
authority
for
to
the
moral
conclusions, but use also premisses to the effect that the requirements imposed,
and sometimes applied, were justified.
As they are.
In the Christian tradition there were two main strands of reflection on the
moral
rightness
justness of wars, the just war theory and a rival pacifist
or
strand, prominent in early Christianity, but largely submerged from Augustine on
contemporary
until
times.
Both exclude nuclear wars, one strand because they
are inevitably unjust, the other because they are wars and
This
is
the
beginning of the convergence argument against nuclear wars:
that
is
duly
expediency
such wars are excluded from all ethical perspectives, once
removed
(and
even,
very
frequently, when it is not).
however you look at it morally.
consensus
violence^^.
involve
argument;
it
The argument is not
proceeds
They are morally wrong
the
same
as
the
weaker
from similar results from the full sweep of
genuinely ethical positions, not from massive agreement of opinion.
The detailed convergence argument is an exhaustive case by case
each
type
of
moral
theory.
Fortunately
details
can
be
deontological and contractual theories lead back to requirements
28.
one,
from
shortcut.
For
for
just
war
These alternatives are not as far removed practically as may appear.
For
the aim of just war theory is not 'to legitimize war but to prevent it.
The presumption is against the use of force' (PL, p.312). And most types
of wars are ruled out by the theory. However not all wars or violent
revolutions are excluded, and that is enough to guarantee the distinction
between the alternatives.
In particular, defensive wars are allowed - at
least for the defending side, though from a wider viewpoint these too may
be condemned 'the classic case [of the just war] ... was the use of
lethal force to prevent aggression against innocent victims'
(PL, p.311).
Under recent international law, defence, narrowly construed, is the only
legitimate basis for war;
Roman law was only slightly more generous,
in
allowing for the restitution of goods (see Barnes, p.780).
17
which, it has already been shown, LSN wars violate.
war
arrived
sometimes
were
defended through principles of such moral
or
at
In fact conditions for just
work
theories, so that a good deal of the requisite argumentative
been
The latter point holds also as regards utilitarianism, where it has
done.
in effect been shown that whatever brand of utilitarianism is
maximisation
utility
already
has
is
finally
LSN
accomplished,
adopted,
wars
however
excluded
are
utilitarian grounds.The reason for such convergence is not far to seek;
LSN
such massive infliction of pain and colossal removal of pleasure,
involve
wars
on
that this dominates in assessments however they are accomplished in
utilitarian
Thus any genuine alternative to LSN war is better30.
fashion.
The arguments
so
moral
overwhelming
far
case
outlined
against
principles
are
derivable
some
from
war
worse
substantially
are
of the theories just considered).
These
the obligation to maintain
to
accountable,
condition
than
the
these
we
violate
would
earth in proper shape and not degrade its systems:
we
exhaust
not
(again
LSN
principles include environmental ones, such as:
generations, to whom
do
wars
For there are other significant
wars.
such
moral principles which the waging of an
LSN
against
the
the responsibility to future
the
world
it".
Such
"pass
"received
on"
not
in
conservative
bound
principles - however they are finally satisfactorily formulated - are
to
be violated in the event of an LSN war.
§5.
The shift to nuclear deterrence:
support
nuclear
arguments to its immorality.
Those
arrangements have had a way of halting - and if not defeating,
certainly turning and deflating - arguments from the immorality of LSN wars,
engagement
done is, it is claimed, quite different from
is
most
important
precisely
in
preventing
LSN
in
such
war:
is
continued,
deterrence
is
the
only
practical
desiderata, prevention of war and maintenance of values.
way
indeed
wars from ever
occurring, as well as in maintaining other fundamental Western values.
it
by
What is being
pointing out that there is no actual engagement in any such wars.
deterrence
who
Indeed,
of obtaining both
Similar arguments
are
But compare Hardin.
29.
For details see, e.g., Lackey, especially MM.
30.
An argument of this sort is developed in more detail,
complete generality, in Goodin, especially 'Disarmament'.
though
not
in
18
advanced for all the various guises that deterrence is presented
in:
mutually
assured destruction as formerly, flexible response as latterly, or otherwise.
Such claims as to the roles and
dubious,
several
for
reasons.
objectives
of
If it were, "sufficiency" to deter would be an adequate goal.
superiority.
than
this,
and
sometimes
goal.
In fact there has
renewed
a
even
military
drive
for
Pure deterrence can account neither for actual nuclear weapons nor
for orthodox Western military strategy32.
process
decidedly
A first reason is that there is much evidence,
despite pronouncements, that deterrence is not the - the only -
been a quest for more
are
deterrence
Nor has deterrence set in motion
the
of disarmament to be expected to reduce armaments to levels appropriate
f<?r deterrence.
On the contrary, under "its"
impulse
there
has
been
almost
unlimited acceleration in building arms (to paraphrase PL p.318).
Another major reason for serious doubt about what
sold
31.
is
being
under "deterrence" labels concerns the probability factor:
marketed
and
deterrence has
It is important to observe that the discussion is not restricted to one
form of deterrence, such as that of mutually assured destruction (MAD), but
applies to all forms of response likely to engender LSN war. This includes
"flexible response",
since the likely further development is massive
retaliation to an initial Soviet nuclear raid. Part of the reason for this
is the extreme vulnerability of the US defence systems, especially the
communication systems, e.g.
to early strikes and to electromagnetic
pulses.
In the resulting great confusion, escalation appears the likely
outcome. In any case, flexible response includes massive retaliations, as
part of its range and is ultimately backed by it.
It is also important to observe that deterrence as practised is not
confined to responses to (nuclear) attack. The threat of nuclear action
has been made in cases where a rival encroaches on a zone of interest of a
nuclear power.
It is in part because deterrence includes nuclear responses
to what is construed as serious misbehaviour of rivals that the practice of
deterrence raises the probability of LSN war to the extent it does.
32.
As to the first point, there is not only overkill capacity and the drive
for superiority (often represented as "negotiating" strength) but the
matter of counterforce weapons which are offensive weapons. As regards the
second point, US policy has been decidedly expansionist with regular
intervention in other nations;
there have been repeated US threats to use
nuclear weapons,
especially to deal with revolutionary activities in the
third world, but also in Europe in "limited" nuclear war;
and in official
military strategy no sharp line has been drawn between conventional and
nuclear weapons:
on these and other related points see further Lackey MM,
p.l91ff., and also Thompson and Smith.
The argument can be pressed
further, to the alarming conclusion that deterrence is largely a front,
which plays only a minor,
but justificatory, role in actual US policy.
Among further evidence is behavioural data:
a government with a genuine
deterrence policy would repeatedly emphasize its strength (even when it
lacks strength), whereas the US government often parades its vulnerability
and weakness in public. For other evidence see Smith, e.g.
p.46ff.
19
of
increased the probability
type
arms-race
that
war.
LSN
deterrence
precisely,
More
of
the
is being practised, which involves full-scale preparation
for total nuclear war, has prepared the conditions for nuclear war to occur, and
has
to
that
extent
reasons also, connected with pure
the last 30 years.
deterrence
with
and
(its
war"
"cold
the
probability of a LSN war has increased considerably in
the
setting),
original
For other
least enhanced its prospects of occurring.
at
The reasons include the threatening posture
called
for
by
deterrence, the propaganda, which comes to be believed, that must be promulgated
to maintain credibility
overridden
or
with
"sacrificed
a
for
etc.
many
there
analysts
century, i.e
think
before 2000.
real
The situation has
is
a
high
There are several
are
interests
being
the dangerous and risky
military objectives!
state of military readiness;
sober
whose
population
now
where
reached
been
probability of an LSN war this
routes
to
a
such
probability
assignment.33 It would only require one incident with a 20% chance of leading to
an escalating war every 8 years between 1960 and
2000.
alerts,
Cuban missile crisis, carry a considerably higher chance
been
have
lucky
already.
In
of
nuclear
For
markedly.
the years ahead it appears likely that the
the
danger
supplicant
nations
resources declines.
and
the
worsens
and
the
extent
The danger is enhanced by
connected
increasing
chance
of
the
lot.
33.
Cox).
easily
as
the
plight
extractable
continuation
of
of
crucial
the
arms
of nuclear accident and human or
technical error, none of them negligible factors as
(cf.
increase
zones separating the superstates are increasing in
size and number, with Soviet and American expansionism, and
reveals
the
exchange.
number of incidents with a real chance of engendering nuclear war will
race,
on
side alone, have been at least as frequent, and sometimes, as with the
American
We
Full
past
experience
copiously
Such a sketch can of course be elaborated and tidied up a
Even so every substantial point involved can be contested,
and
many
are
Another route to a more than subjective assessment is to apply Delphi
methods:
weigh up the experts' assessments.
In this regard it is worth
noting that it is not only "nuclear doves" who consider the probability of
nuclear war has increased in recent years.
American officials have themselves admitted that the policies of
realising the strategic potential of counterforce attacks and of
selective and flexible responses have increased the probability
of nuclear war (Ball, p.128).
20
For better
contentious (though not always for good reasons).
way
no
seems
worse,
or
there
to make such an overall probability argument particularly tight;
and there are plausible arguments, from the complexity of the data concerned and
the contingency of the future, that it cannot be made tight.
It is bad enough however that it is decidedly plausible that it
that
probable
LSN
an
war
distribution principles) that it
probable
that
century.
And that is enough
grossly
a
is
immoral
to
decidedly
morally
on moral grounds, to change deterrence as
policy
is
immoral.
that
plausible
it
highly
is
sequence of events will be perpetrated this
evasive
warrant
morally to take action to avert the outcome.
deterrence
highly
For then it follows (by
occur this century.
will
is
action.
ought
We
That in turn implies taking steps,
presently
practised.
Thus
present
That is but the first of several ways we shall
arrive at that damaging conclusion for present super-state deterrence policies.
The plausibility of claims as to the high or increasing probability of
war has of course been disputed.
*
The main counterargument runs as follows:
Nuclear war is unlikely, because the consequences are too horrifying.
The underlying assumption is that wars and the like, with
are
LSN
improbable.
assumption.
Unfortunately
however
horrifying
outcomes,
much available evidence counters this
More than enough humans have not shrunk from brutal
exchanges
horrifying wars, or even from genocide, as human history attests (cf.
Kuper).
What is less assailable than the high probability claim, what the
certainly
have
already
got
into
since
LSN
thereby perhaps helping to bring it about, in the sense
war,
the probability.
immoral
of
raising
The more detailed underlying arguments, then,to the immorality
of nuclear deterrence proceed by
LSN
an
deterrence operates by the perverse practice of preparing for
situation,
against
evidence
seems to support, is that there is a non-negligible probability of an
Thereby, through deterrence, we
LSN war.
and
way
of
principles
mapping
war into arguments against deterrence of LSN war
might appropriately be called deontic
connecting
principles
moral
arguments
Such principles
The
first
of
these principles takes the following preliminary form:
Cl.
should
If it is wrong that X should occur, then not only
be
probable
is
it
wrong
that
it
that X occur, but, more important, it is wrong to directly
21
increase the probability that X occur.
Thus, for
example,
it
since
wrong
is
to
kill
large
a
noncombatant
population in LSN war (by §4) it is also wrong to put the population at risk and
wrong to increase the chance that the hostage population is wiped out,
which
both
of
For similar reasons a superstate is not morally
nuclear deterrence does.
entitled to impose nuclear risks upon uninvolved noncombatants, especially those
of third party nonaligned states.
most
Like
situations.
defeat by
example,
substantive
moral
Unless
counterexamples,
X
that
in
and
of
accordingly,
Cl
encounters
to
into
runs
require
dilemma
For
complication.
apparent trouble where clash of
order
to
that
the
passenger
he
plane
is
flying
sure that the troubled aircraft does not hit city
make
Such a defeating condition does not apply in the case of
where
deterrence,
Consider for example the
to avoid a greater evil.
occurs
apartment buildings 3**.
nuclear
Cl
dilemmas are duly allowed for, Cl appears liable to
pilot who increases the probability
crashes,
ethics,
in
Thus it may be argued that it is permissible to increase the
principles occurs.
probability
part
second
the
principles
(though
there
explains) wrongness of a practice is not
is
a
offset
or
principles, as §6
of
clash
removed
by
its
role
in
avoiding greater evil.
It can be argued that it is:
argument
the
from
previous
argument deserves little
perhaps
from
more
such is part of
success
credence
the
deterrence.
than
the
of
the
popular
However this inductive
driver's
racing
world
As Barnett argues,
argument,
'the
happy
accident
has survived the first thirty-five years of the nuclear era is
unimpressive evidence that we can avoid nuclear war
34.
point
a similar time base, that because he hasn't had a fatal crash yet
(despite some close calls), he won't.
that
of
the
in
the
coming
era,
...'
This dilemma example was supplied by D.
Johnston.
There are more
difficult putative counterexamples.
For example, in inciting people to
civil disobedience, the risk of state violence in retaliation is increased.
Thus,
to take C.
Pigden's example, in encouraging disobedience, Gandhi
increased the probability of wrongdoing by the British Raj.
But surely
Gandhi, unlike the Raj, did not act wrongly? It can be claimed that Gandhi
did not directly increase the probability of violence.
But spelling out
what
'directly'
means - in terms of short causal chains over which
responsibility can be distributed - is not only problematic but leads on to
other connecting principles.
22
(p.100).
He offers familiar reasons such as the changing power
increase
in
Russian
the
strength,
rise
the
relations,
of other nuclear powers, etc.
(cf.
similarly Cox).
There are, accordingly, powerful reasons for concluding that
Deterrence will not continue to work,
DI.
and, more important for the present argument, that
Deterrence does increase the probability of LSN war.
D2.
The themes are of course interrelated, and the reasons for them (which are again
persuasive but inconclusive) can be taken together:
some respects) weaker D2 - the probability factor.
proliferation,
the
but the focus is on the (in
An initial
of lesser nuclear powers.
emergence
reason
concerns
As a result there are
many more ways of starting a nuclear conflagration, and so enhanced prospect
it.3$
Some analysts consider that a very likely route to LSN war is the initial
use of nuclear weapons by
confrontation
a
lesser
state.
Moreover
scarcity
the
growing
and
weapon
systems,
more
or
terror
situations,
deterrence
power
involves 36,
being maintained:
balance
of
have an exceedingly bad historical track record.
increasing as the race proceeds.
of
With so many more
Arms races, and interwoven
There is substantial inductive evidence that
present
costs
widely distributed, the probability of war
through accident or error is increased.
power
resource
A second group of reasons concerns the
of cheaper supplies, etc.
nuclear arms race which deterrence, as practised, is tied to.
weapons
for
opportunities
to lead on to war are increasing, with increasing world political
instability, relating to third world economic decline,
and
of
lead
escalating
eventually
to
races,
arms
war,
with
such
as
probability
Next, deterrence depends on a certain
balance
if that balance is unduly disturbed, as can happen
during escalation, deterrence may well fail.
A related reason for
supposing
that
deterrence
practice
increases
the
35.
It can be theoretically argued
that the fewer the nations
nuclear weapons,
the less the chance of nuclear war: cf.
p.230n.
36.
The standard argument for
deterrence as significantly decreasing
the
probability of war,would
be decidedly better if the arms race were
abandoned, and weapons held at the much smaller levels required just for
deterrence.
Of course such a probability-well assumption is only one of
several things required if deterrence is to be justified.
armed with
Lackey, MM,
23
probability of war concerns the continuing shifts in US policy,
especially
the
renewed quest for superiority which is increasing the incentive of both sides to
resort to nuclear war, the USSR to avoid being
of
advantage
the
overwhelmed,
USA
to
take
superiority achieved.3? Recent dangerous shifts in US policy
the
towards war fighting are in part induced by a much increased accuracy of nuclear
missiles, which both weakens the case for MAD deterrence (since military targets
can be selected for strike and cities to some extent removed as
thereby
also
weakens
against
case
the
resort
to
leaders, and even some
nuclear
shared
understanding,
mutual
principles,
and
cooperation
Finally,
level
judgement
among
information
of
and
important)
of
soundness
transmission
war.
nuclear
deterrence requires a certain (admittedly rather minimal, yet
of
hostages),
between
It is not just that the increasing numbers of operators
super-states.
in a position to launch nuclear weapons must remain of "sound mind" and not, for
through on delusions of one sort or another.
follow
instance,
deterrence depends upon judgements
seriously
mistaken:
'each
is
regarding
other
the
It is also that
which
side,
side's
is to the other' (PL, p.313).
threat
we
But
think'.38
about
what
the
other
considerable, and perhaps catastrophic, margin of
evidence,
that
one
perception of what is
possible
result
As
side
thinks
side
error.
Not
thinks,
there
only
not
can be a
is
there
side (the USA) has misjudged the other side's (the USSR's)
rational,
as
regards
limited
nuclear
war,
of a first strike countered by massive retaliation;
must now be severe doubts
effectively.
"convincing"
There is a grain of truth in
the claim that 'deterrence is primarily about what the other
what
be
at the mercy of the other's perception of what
strategy is "rational", what kind of damage is "unacceptable", how
one
may
as
to
whether
rational
principles
are
with
the
but there
operating
to the last consider, to take just one example, the erroneous
37.
The point is discussed in Dahlitz, e.g. p.213, where the US quest for
superiority is documented. The vicissitudes of US "defence" policy - not
to say its shiftiness and occasional incoherence (as in strategic forward
defence) - have confused many of its supporters even. Perhaps there is
some advantage in the very incomplete and limited exposure of USSR war and
imperial policies:
we don't see, with alarm,
their incoherence and
irrationality.
38.
Pym, quoted in Thompson, p.19. Yet a fundamental problem Russia and the
West face,
it is sometimes claimed,
is not merely that they do not
understand one another but that 'there is a lack of a wish to understand'.
This casts into doubt the psychological basis of nuclear deterrence.
idea (already alluded to, as held in high places of power in USA and in UK) that
LSN war can be survived in rudimentary shelters, and also won.
The supporter of deterrence
connecting
such
principles
has
not
defeat
to
only
arguments
Cl, but, more difficult, to field a convincing
as
For the onus of proof lies in showing that the costly
rival case.
deterrence is justified.
through
practice
of
But far from the fairly decisive case that is required
(to contrast with the argument through Cl),
feeble
a
only
through
case
the
questionable obverse of Cl,
Clt.
If X is wrong then it is right to reduce the probability of X,
For it has to be shown that
appears open.
*
deterrence (substantially) reduces the probability of LSN war,
and strictly (this indicates part of the trouble with Clt) that
*
deterrence does this better (more morally) than available options.
The latter uniqueness condition certainly fails, so it will be argued.
reasons already given, does the probability claim.
up the very
conditions
probability
of
such
for
a
LSN
an
war,
it
So,
for
When nuclear deterrence sets
can
hardly
reduced
have
the
war, especially over the situation a mere 25 years ago
when such an LSN war was not technically possible.
More generally, in showing that nuclear deterrence is justified, it is
refute the theme that deterrence is wrong.
enough to
out that deterrence is permissible, or alright.
alternative
permissible
courses
action
of
deterrence, which appear more morally satisfactory.
uniqueness
condition has to be established;
to be not merely
alright,
but
right.
But
It is not enough to make
For there certainly seem to
without
not
be
the costs or problems of
To surpass these options, a
nuclear deterrence has to be shown
establishing
such
a
claim,
to
fear
or
acceptable evidential standards, is virtually impossible.39
Deterrence consists in preventing something (often some wrong) by
threats
including
fright
OED)**°.
(cf.
For
most
people,
portraying the horror of LSN wars would serve adequately enough
from
39.
LSN
wars,
without
all
the
enormous
expense,
trouble
vivid scenarios
to
deter
them
and wastage of
An analogous point will appear when it is asked whether deterrence is the
way out of the nuclear fix, the thing to persist with in the circumstances.
Given that there are apparently superior, less dangerous procedures,
the
answer has to be, No.
25
preparing to engage in them.
deterrence
And
deterrence
by
such
means
(which
in any case depends upon) is of course not immoral.
military
(Schell was not
immoral in publishing his graphic descriptions of the nuclear destruction of New
York.)
But though deterrence per se is permissible, nuclear deterrence, that is
deterrence by complete preparation for the object to be prevented, is not, where
this
object,
a
war, itself is not permissible.
LSN
The argument for this is
through the principle
If X is wrong then complete preparation for (carrying out) X is wrong.
C2.
Hence
since
preparation,
LSN
wars
nuclear
are
wrong
and
nuclear
deterrence
deterrence of LSN wars is wrong.
claimed that preparing for X is just as bad as doing X:
wrong and Z (much) worse than Y.
complete
It is not however being
Y and
may
Z
both
What is wrong is by no means uniformly evil
In 1945 there would have been little doubt that
LSN war was wrong.
implies
complete
preparation
be
41
for
Among the three types of crime specified in Article 6 of the
Charter for the International Military Tribunals
(which
tried
the
major
war
criminals at Nuremburg) were
Crimes against peace: namely planning,
preparation,
initiation or
waging of a war of aggression, or a war in violation of international
treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation in a common plan
or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the following (cited in
Kuper, p.21;
italics added).
But after many years of nuclear deterrence, the
become
increasingly
liable
to
question.
wrongness
implied
in
C2
has
However the doubts mainly come from
40.
Deterrence also commonly includes elements of mendacity,
deception,
misinformation, that is elements of what are, for the most part, morally
undesirable traits.
41.
Nor are
ordered
because
wrong,
equally
degrees of wrongness required:
wrongs can simply be partially
as regards relative worseness. The point requires some labouring
it has been quite erroneously assumed that if Y and Z are both
categorically or absolutely, then they must be equally "wrong" or
evil. Thus, e.g. Williams:
there is no moral difference between running a deterrent strategy
on the one hand, and intentionally - indeed wantonly - starting a
nuclear war on the other;
so that the first is as totally evil
as the second.
This is because both are held to be absolutely
forbidden.
Not at all. The arguments from "Y and Z are both absolutely forbidden"
to
"So Y is as totally evil as Z"
and
to "Therefore Y and Z do not differ
morally" are both entirely without validity.
Compare:
2 is a number,
and
3 is a number;
so 2 is the same number as 3, or does not differ
numerically from 3!
26
assuming that complete preparation includes less than it needs to or does.
Complete preparation for something, such as
several
other
LSN
war,
already
writes
in
In particular, it presupposes the preparation is not
features.
half-hearted but is serious, is not merely for show and is not simply
pretence.
Observe that mere pretence, or other more psychological ploys, cannot substitute
for complete preparation in nuclear deterrence.
too
sophisticated
bluff
for
alone
to
there
succeed:
preparation for war accompanying the threats involved in
the
other
has
is
now
be serious
to
deterrence.
But,
on
complete preparation does not imply that what is prepared for
hand,
will be attempted other than conditonally:
imply attempted X.
complete preparation for X does
not
It does however involve a conditional undertaking to proceed
with what is prepared
whether
intelligence
Military
under
for
certain
Complete
conditions.
preparation,
for a wedding or murder or whatever, would be pointless otherwise, so a
(proclaimed) commitment to proceed under given circumstances can
for
be
taken
of
connecting
granted.
Principle C2
A
principles.
is
part
way
not
the
in
line
a
series
principle of the same sort that is higher in the series is that
if X is wrong then attempted X is wrong
connecting X with attempted X:
perhaps
down
as bad), whether X succeeds or not.
But the series ends;
off well before the lower limits of intensionality, contrary to
various religious positions.
then
the
contemplation
consideration
of
of
it cuts
claims
of
For example, it does not follow that if X is wrong
X
is
wrong
carrying out X is wrong.
or
that
mere
non-action-oriented
The point applies equally to sexual
fantasies, power fantasies, and nuclear nightmares.
nothing
the
(though
In
particular,
there
is
wrong with contemplating nuclear war, or reflecting upon it, as we are:
nuclear wars, even if their horrors don't bear thinking on, are not unthinkable,
and in some senses are all too thinkable.
Indeed one of the reasons why the connecting principles appeal is that each
commonly
involves
it connects with.
decidedly increased probability of the wrongdoing or outcome
Accompanying the increased probability are
certain
reprehensible attitudes tied to the action the evil outcome involves;
not
those
of
mere
passive
contemplation*^.
However
all
the
sets
of
these are
connecting
27
principles
except Cl hold, where they do, even when the probability of
invoked
wrongdoing eventuating is not increased.
One reason for this is that the
means
to reprehensible ends may be inefficacious, for instance intending to do
chosen
someone harm using witchcraft.
The increased probability
evil
an
of
outcome
simply makes things worse.
announcement
Nuclear deterrence involves not only war preparation, but
this
threats
by
accompanied
and
a threatening posture.
For some party, the
if
potential enemy, has to be suitably frightened or moved,
of
deterrence
succeed:
the threat must be recognised as such and be credible.
nuclear
deterrence yields a further connecting principle:
is
to
This aspect of
If X is wrong then serious threatening of X under given conditions is also
C3.
or, in brief, If X is wrong then conditional threatening of X is wrong.
wrong;
The remaining connecting conditions invoked all take this general form
CG.
If X is wrong so is a conditional
requires
further
some
explanation.
intension
to
is some intensional functor,
threatening
from
Apart
intentions
that).
C
to
'the
the
most
is the
not
are
impossible
or even remote or improbable:
claim
in
what
(specifically those involving
commitment)
for
follows
certain
is
that
sorts
there
of
discussed
an
conditions
the conditions
typically concern those specifying a nuclear strike by a potential
fundamental
credible
functor:
To remove complication it can be assumed henceforth that the
involved
which
it is obligatory
in propositional rather than event style:
(or
form
a
e.g.
themselves,
conditional intensions are conditional obligations where
obligation
-
A conditional intension is a judgement of
the form, ^(X if C), where
of'.**3
X
do
enemy.
The
are intensional functors
threatening,
intending,
and
which CG holds, and that these versions suffice to demonstrate
of
Naturally
again
many
the
immorality
42.
There is plenty of scope for further
elaboration
here.
Passive
spectatorship of evil events where one is in an appropriate position to
make a difference is quite another thing,
from contemplation of other
worlds where evil occurs.
43.
The conditional intension, ^(X if C), which is an intension, should not be
confused with the provisional form,
if C then^X, which is not. The
Americans are threatening the Russians with retaliatory action if they
strike:
it is not that if the Russians strike the Americans will threaten
them with retaliatory action.
Such confusion has arisen because of the
problems of formalising conditional obligation given usual defective
theories of conditionality.
nuclear
deterrence.
there
are
28
non-action-oriented functors for which versions
contemplation,
thinking,
dreaming, etc.
GC
of
fail,
of
those
e.g.
There is also an interesting group of
more borderline functors, those of hoping (for),
expecting,
the
and
awaiting
like, for which CG is only dubiously correct.
Connecting principle C3 evolved from the simpler principle, if X
then
threatening
to do...
into
X is also wrong, or, as formulated by Ramsay:
is wrong to threaten...'**** The reason is that
practice
(e.g.
'What is wrong
putting
if
wrong
is
something
committing rape) is wrong then so also is what goes into
threatening to put that into practice, in particular the declared intent to
that
into
practice.
beginning as follows:
The
point
can
if worlds where
alternatively
X
are
happens
be
put
argued semantically,
excluded
so
then
are
adjacent worlds where X is poised to happen.
The complication of the simple form is required for two reasons.
only conditionally threatened, i.e.
is
should certain conditions
nuclear
war
obtain.
However the required conditional form can be derived
through
form,
the
following
argument:-
which is perfectly general, X if C.
particular,
by
earlier
arguments
44.
so
also
is
the
simple
Observe, furthermore that if something X is
if it weren't it wouldn't
(The converse route fails
(of
§§3-4)
LSN
opposition has struck, or not, and so wrong when it
wrong,
from
substitute for X in the simple form,
wrong, it is also wrong under restrictive conditions;
have been wrong in the first place.
Firstly,
threatening X if C.
war
has.
of
course.)
In
is wrong whether the
Hence,
where
X
is
More generally, to establish CG it is
Ramsay's formulation of simplified C3 is considered in Walzer,
p.272.
It
is this principle especially that forces Ramsay, a Protestant theologian
who is a nuclear hawk, into the awkward position he ends in, which as
Walzer explains, really leaves no room to move.
For in virtue o
simplified 03 it must be allowed that the threatened wars are permissible
to carry out. Ramsay tries to limit these to military exchanges. But to
be effective as a deterrent, the exchange permitted must both threaten a
also
in view of C3, not threaten nonmilitary targets, collateral
non-combatant populations.
It appears that Ramsay's position,
if worked
out, would be inconsistent.
see
Simplified principle C3 is also invoked by the US Catholic Bishops:
PL
p.316.
They put the point both in terms of threat and of declared
intent to use nuclear weapons, which they pronounce morally wrong.
simplified C3 is rejected by Hare and Joynt (pp.106-7), who want to
However
the moral status of a threat by way of expected utility. This is
assess all the objections to expected utility as a test of morality
open to
mentioned below.
29
enough to establish the simpler
If X is wrong so is an intension to do X.
CG'.
The second complication in C3, modifying the threat to
causes
threat,
Some modification appears required, because it is often
trouble.
more
serious
a
contended that empty threats or bluff are warranted on occasion even where
is wrong, to prevent the occurrence of something worse .**$ And in
threatened
is
what
fact one way of trying to vindicate deterrence, as morally permissible, has been
by presenting deterrence as involving threats which do not involve any intention
at all to proceed to action on
plausible
threats.
it
the
support
removes
basis
for
of
simplified C3.
sense
one that is not a pretence, empty or a bluff, but credible.
says
which
intended,
consider a
For the challenge
immoral
grossly
where
case
conduct
under
certain
not
and calls for moral double-think.
the
circumstances*
result
To bring this
an
from
improbable
intricate
Either the threat is followed through, automatically (as ordered, by
Doomsday Machine circuitry, etc.) or with further choice, or - somehow -
not.
is
Principle C3 is not
simplified and unqualified C3.
is unconvincing,
conditions,
accident.
is
in effect that itis perfectly morally permissible to issue serious
threats to undertake
out
this
Hence the shift to serious
A serious threat then, in the slightly technical
open to thesame challenges as
as
Insofar
threats.
Either
it
is
way the outcome is morally wrong, in the first case obviously, in
the second case because the intermediate reconsideration makes it plain that the
threat
nor
ought not to have been issued at all, being justifiable on neither moral
more
"practical"
representatives
Furthermore,
grounds.
natures,
to
the
kinds
of
themselves to be (as Benn explains).
insignificant
their
and
may accept moral double attitudes, such as morally assenting to
immoral threats, less corrupt agents cannot:
moral
states
while
proportion
morally
it
would
run
counter
to
their
principled agents they are or take
For such agents, who may
comprise
a
not
of the electorate of a nuclear state, principles such
as C3 are not in doubt.
The argument against nuclear deterrence using C3 is as follows:- Either the
45.
For a discussion of threats where the threatener has no intention of
carrying out the threat, or incentive to do so, see Schelling, p.35ff. The
question of the morality of these threats, where the item threatened is
immoral, can be left open.
30
threat involved in deterrence is serious or it is not.
is
then by C3 deterrence
wrong.
The
sub-argument
depends on serious threats is a practical one:
not
is
it
inadequate, so deterrence is not maintained.
is
it
then
If
serious
But if it is serious
nuclear
that
deterrence
namely, that if the threats were
not serious, but merely gave the impression that they would be followed through,
then
would find out, in one way or another.
opposition
the
could not be endorsed in an open or democratic political
A policy of bluff
system,
for
example,
gaining some discussion, and so giving the game away to the opposition.
without
Even in closed non-democratic systems
maintaining
a
such
policy
weapons, especially
during
there
the
down
of
times
would
be
major
difficulties
in
chains of command involved with nuclear
in
change
governing
elites,
and
the
opposition intelligence.
But then,
since the bluff could be called, deterrence would not have succeeded.
There are
as
likely
would
information
through
escape
well other arguments that the threats involved must be serious.
One is that
nuclear deterrence already faces a credibility problem, namely that doubts about
the
rationality
of
carrying out the big nuclear threat weaken the credibility
essential to its effectiveness.
To be effective then it must
serious
be
(cf.
Benn).
Meeting objections to principle C3 leads on to two further versions of
one
centred on intention, one on commitment.
CG,
Principle C3 is intimately linked
with, and it sometimes considered but a variant upon, the principle
C4.
If X is wrong then to conditionally intend to do X [knowing it is wrong] is
also wrong.
The principles are intimately associated because a threat is, according to
dictionaries,
etc.'.
of
'a
declaration
of
intent
to inflict punishment, loss, injury,
It is their interconnection which lies at the bottom of
which
deterrence,
intending to go to war.
principle,
that
turn
C4
is
some
paradoxes
on the problem of credibly threatening war without
Principle
04
is
justified
through
the
simplified
intending to do wrong is wrong, and so also is intending to do
wrong unless favourable circumstances for one's
principle
some
an
extremely
position
prevail.
Simplified
widely assumed moral thesis,*^ perhaps for the
excellent reason that it holds analytically.
Its elaboration C4 can be used
to
31
since proceeding to LSN war when
against nuclear deterrence, as follows:
argue
the enemy duly misbehaves is wrong (by §§3-4), by C4, intending to go to LSN war
the enemy duly misbehaves is also wrong.
when
Nuclear deterrence involves such
Hence
an intention, all the available evidence shows.
deterrence
nuclear
is
wrong.
But like virtually every
utilitarian
themselves,
principles
utilitarian grounds.
deontic
principle,
principles
For it is not difficult to
those
except
from
flowing
C3 and C4 can be challenged on
outline
strategic
situations
where maximum expected utility results from a policy of nuclear deterrence.
But
on its own this concession casts but little doubt upon
C4.
For
it
likewise
is
not
principles
difficult to outline situations where the hanging of
innocent people, or other injustices, are sanctioned or enjoined by
maximum
expected
and
C3
utility.
pursuit
Those who appeal to utilitarian assumptions try to
avoid such more obvious difficulties with reliance upon utilitarianism,
scrapping
the
spots
not
by
doctrine, but by hedging applications of their principles around
with qualifications, which, they hope, will
trouble
of
with
utilitarianism.
enable
it
So
them
evade
to
the
worst
is with Kavka, whose work nicely
illustrates that whatever (little) deterrence has in its
moral
favour
depends
upon utilitarian assumptions.
Kavka 'begin[s] by noting that any reasonable system of
substantial
utilitarian
elements'
(PD,
p.287).
Even
observation were correct — it is not, depending for one
consequential
elements
systems
include
must
infiltrate,
an
with
the
'assumption
if
thing
ethics
this
upon
must
have
astonishing
conflating
utilitarian - it would not follow that reasonable
particular
that
assumption
produces
normative assumption involved is that the
act
Kavka
thereupon
tries
the paradoxes of deterrence'.
with
maximum
expected
to
The
utility
'(the most useful act) should be performed whenever a very great deal of utility
46.
Kavka, who labels simplified C4 the Wrongful Intentions Principle (PD,
p.289), attributes the principle to Abelard, Aquinas, Butler, Bentham,
Kant, Sidgwick, Kenny and Narveson.
Kavka also gives reasons as to why the
principle appears 'so obviously true'. Kenny and others apply C4 to argue,
like the US Catholic Bishops, that 'nuclear deterrence is immoral'
(cf.
Kavka p.291).
It is the clash of C4 with certain utilitarian principles (especially the
maximisation principle of p.287)
that directly generates Kavka's first
paradox of deterrence and lies behind his other "paradoxes":
see PD.
32
is at stake' (p.287).
objections
This assumption is open to essentially the same batch
utilitarianism
as
it is mainly a matter of increasing or
itself:
varying the stakes involved sufficiently in any counterexample.
strategy
usual
of
Kavka tries the
weakening and fudging the normative assumption to avoid the
of
worst problems of distributive injustice, and the like, that maximising
utility
can morally enjoin.
But the crucial defect in Kavka's argument lies
follow
normative
the
from
overridden
supposed
to
assumptions
utilitarian
by
way, as if it dominated C4 (see especially p.290), what
C4
is
Though Kavka tends to apply the fudged normative assumptions in this
(p.287).**?
and
what
assumption however fudged, namely that 'this means
other moral assumptions are
that ...
in
when
produce,
situations,
are
moral
combined
situations
in
dilemmas.
These
are
the
cases
assumption
special
as
such
not
fudged
deterrent
one
where
deontic
principle, that yielded by utilitarianism, overrides others, but where there are
competing, even contradictory deontic principles, such as that it
is
right
to
to proceed to LSN war when the enemy misbehaves (on specious utilitarian
intend
grounds) and also wrong to intend to do so (by C4).
that judgement is not overriden.
wrong:
remains
Nuclear deterrence
Nor does it in any way follow that C4
is in need of qualification as a result (Kavka's assumption,
p.290).
situations,
However,
there
are
countervailing utilitarian considerations suggesting different imperatives.
For
what
is
in
these
is
wrong.
the
also
case
is
that
these
in
special
special circumstances a greater utility can be realised by doing what
However
it
is
hardly
news,
but
a
objection,
standing
that
utilitarianism sometimes enjoins what is wrong.
Special
sponsonship
deterrent
may
appear
situations,
where
under
utilitarian
to get a foot in the moral door, are very special.
characterised by Kavka, they are such that the
47
deterrence
deterrence
is
very
likely
As
to
Lackey's utilitarian approach rests on a similar fallacy, that utilitarian
considerations predominate where stakes are large enough:
see his argument
for the approach in MM p.192.
What happens is not that important consequences override moral principles,
but that application of one principle with important consequences conflicts
with that of another principle with less significant consequences,
and in
the weigh-up of what to do in the problematic circumstances the principle
with important consequence prevails.
33
succeed, and nothing else is likely to succeed (see p.286), i.e.
is
deterrence
This is very far removed from the real world
lodged in a deep probability-well.
situation where nuclear deterrence appears to be increasing the
probability
of
LSN war, and where other procedures such as graduated nuclear disarmament are at
least as likely to succeed as deterrence.
that
principles
deontic
Even if it were
supposed
mistakenly
to real-life dilemmas should be qualified to
subject
avoid dilemmas, there is little point in qualifying working
deontic
principles
such as C4, given the remoteness of the special deterrent situations.
Instead of pulling nuclear deterrence down though the immoral intentions it
involves, it can be criticized more broadly through the commitments it requires,
by way of the following principle:
If X is wrong then a conditional commitment to carry out X is also wrong.
C5.
The reason is that the commitment is a commitment
and
circumstances;
that
commitment
is
to
act
in
wrongly
certain
Nuclear deterrence is
itself wrong.
however a policy which commits states to war under certain conditions.
with
conditional
intention,
that
superstates
and
and
commitment
controlling
to
use
representatives
nuclear weapons.
not
did
occur)
is
to
enough
establish
have
relevant
the
The dangerous strategy of
launch-on-warning (which could, for instance, result in a
that
as
so with conditional commitment, there is no doubt
their
intention
And
response
to
attacks
the point, for which there is
otherwise quite sufficient factual evidence.
are
Now the connecting principles
suffice
but
logically,
nuclear
deterrence,
for
weighty
case.
instance
conditional commitment to LSN war, is wrong.
This
one
principle
would
By
detachment
from
the
by complete preparation for and
Deterrence of this type is
wrong.
also reveals why the suggestion, that the morality of the whole deterrence
trip depended on war itself never occurring, was so
paradoxical:
deterrence.
itself
sound
when all are liable to be disputed, several defensible
ones, ideally in concert, make for a
principles
applied:
it
out
the
connections
between
and
not
be
engaged
in
(unless
its
has
appeared
nuclear war and nuclear
Nuclear deterrence should not be practised given that
should
changed, e.g.
left
bizarre
nuclear
war
direction can be drastically
at least limited, per impossibile in the case of nuclear warfare,
34
to purely military targets).
The arguments through connecting principles, can be reinforced by different
sorts
arguments against the moral correctness of nuclear deterrence.
of
There
are arguments from limited convergence of ethical theories, which start from the
commonplace observation that
All the ethical arguments in
*
favour
of
nuclear
deterrence
broadly
are
utilitarian.
In fact most of the arguments in favour of deterrence, including many
that
infiltrated
have
the
ethical
literature,
are
of
those
generally drawn from game theory, and primarily interested in the
one
player,
the
USA.
Utilitarianism,
though
still
looking
of
those
expediency advantage
of
basically
at
advantages, interests and (typically individual) utilities, has to take
a
partisan
pain of
position,
and
forfeiting its claim to morality
supported
by
other
consider
nationalities
otherwise.
The
as
well,
commonplace
on
less
observation
is
the fact that such qualified moral support as deterrence obtains,
derives from utilitarianism.
48
There are two directions on to a general claim against
deterrence,
either
by way of the pro-utilitarian theme
*
Utilitarianism properly applied also comes out against deterrence
or, more strongly, by way of the anti-utilitarian theme,
*
Utilitarianism does not furnish satisfactory moral arguments.
Then, by the anti-utilitarian theme, there are no satisfactory
in
favour
direction:
48.
of deterrence.
moral
arguments
Naturally, it would be easy to strengthen the second
after all it is widely
thought
that
utilitarianism
is
a
false,
Thus the hedged utilitarian defences of Kavka and of Hare and Joynt, and
Showing that cogent
also within the broadly utilitarian range, of Gautier.
______
defences of nuclear deterrence have to take
a utilitarian route would be a
Though it is a reasonable conjecture that the
much tougher enterprise.
T'
' , much would depend on what was
enterprise could be carried through,
For certainly bizarre principles, e.g. obverses of the
connecting principles, can be introduced, which afford deontological routes
to deterrence.
despite some backsliding by bishops, all other ethical positions; can
A deontological
made to speak against deterrence and its continuation,
be 1___ —
.
connecting
deontic
case against deterrence,
primarily the way
of
principles, has been argued in some detail.
In the light of these
principles, it is not difficult to see how cases from other ethical
2 go..
After all C4 has been defended from a wide range of
positions would
Af--- -1......
And
stances, e.g.
contractual,
natural law, utilitarian even.
<—
35
seriously astray, or even shabby ethical position.
political
which
system
depends
in
some
utilitarian arguments for its policies.
It hardly does
measure
for
then
a
upon consensus, to rely on
Yet with nuclear deterrence
just
that
appears to be happening, with readily overturned arguments at that.
For whether even utilitarianism supports deterrence depends essentially on:
it
how
with
applied;
is
which
maximisation recipes; along with what other
restrictive assumptions (such as those of a deep probability-well);
are
generous
With
sovereignty, national security, etc.
or
assumptions,
different
arguably
(and
superior)
varying the guestimation methods, very different results
upon
The
emerge, opposing deterrence and favouring unilateral nuclear disarmament.
reason for this is straightforward (and like that ending §4).
basic
LSN war has an extremely large negative utility.
deterrence
out to
recipes
Any
policy
such
It is that
as
nuclear
which increases the probability of this, or even risks it, must lose
feasible
other
of
how
for such things as preservation of national
assignments
utility
and on
a
alternatives,
consequentialist
type
whatever
are
initially
applied
(e.g.
plausible
decision
Minimax, Dominance,
Disaster Avoidance, Expected Value).
The anti-utilitarian theme can be defended either by a full-scale criticism
of
utilitarianism,
beginning for instance with its well-known justification of
localised injustices, $0 or else
utilitarianism
when
applied
One obvious deficiency is this:
by
to
addressing
some
of
the
inadequacies
of
issues like that at hand, nuclear deterrence.
on standard utilitarianism, what to do, whether
to proceed with deterrence, depends on the probability of its success and on the
improbability of other options working.
deep,
utilitarianism
If the deterrence
probability-well
is
morally requires deterrence, otherwise not.$* But what is
morally required, or wrong, does not fluctuate with what outcomes are
probable.
49.
The instability of utilitarianism is illustrated by the
discussion
involving Kavka, Lackey and Hardin,
continued in Philosophy and Public
Affairs 12(3), 1983, where, on the basis of utilitarianism, diametrically
opposed conclusions are reached.
(Hardin's approach tends however to
expediency reasoning of the strategic type.)
50.
Such wider criticisms of utilitarianism, in all its forms, as an ethical
theory are too well-known to repeat.
Some of the main defects are
considered in another article in this series, 'An expensive repair kit for
utilitarianism' .
The point that utilitarianism gives no firm place to
stand comes from L. Mirlin.
36
Whether deterrence is morally wrong or not, is
likely
work
to
independent
it
is
are
princip]gs
Moral
not
through expected values, whether utilities or otherwise - though how
determined
bad some outcome is may be.
are
deterrence
decidedly
essentially
nowhere
whether
If nuclear deterrence is wrong where it increases the
or not.
probability of war, then is it wrong, simpliciter.
depend
of
upon
firm to stand.
Worse, since the expected utilities in the case
uncertain,
these
of
the results utilitarianism delivers
and
uncertainty
measures,
offers
utilitarianism
In contrast with the solid deontic ground of principle,
utilitarianism provides only shifting sand.
The objections made apply especially against act utilitarianism.
form
shows
special
interests,
such
as
conditions
security
(the
probability-well
state,
of
estimation rules are pulled in).
high
have
is
deep,
utilities,
nation-state
and
special
It does not yield a deterrence policy;
indeed
hardly yields policies at all (other than act utilitarianism itself).
and certain other difficulties may be avoided by considering instead a
of
act
most that nuclear deterrence is "wrong" according to its lights
at
under very
it
The
acts.52 But the method lacks stability;
These
sequence
different prescriptions will result
depending upon how the sequence is selected, what is included and what left
(as
also
associated probabilities depend critically on the sequence selected).
No unequivocal recipe is delivered.
selected
out
to
To
see
this,
suppose
the
sequence
is
include worst cases, for instance cases where deterrence fails and
war breaks out.
In this event it can hardly be argued that
deterrence
is
the
policy that maximizes utility over the sequence.
Along with the arguments, there are
dissatisfaction with nuclear deterrence.
other
conventional wars.
for
Firstly, the peace it has provided
only nuclear peace, or rather lack of nuclear war, as there
smaller-scale
reasons
concomitant
is
deep
is
shortage of
no
And the "peace" provided is at best a tenuous
peace, which is not stable, but liable to upset at
any
stage
by
a
range
of
51.
Though this is to oversimplify, the points made are not affected by the
simplification.
In any case the simplified picture reflects well enough
the differences between Kavka and Lackey that matter in their debate
(referred to in footnote 49).
52.
Whether this is rule utilitarianism, or still act utilitarianism
the sequence can be construed as one long act, may be left open.
because
37
factors, including error, both human and technical.
It does not
genuine
offer
of the sort required for a stable international life, but only a fragile
Peace,
peace of a sort
opportunity
is
enormous
the
cost,
moral
cost of deterrence, because expenditure on it excludes other urgent
moral priorities.
way,
Marxist
Secondly, there
(PL, p.316).
in
The US Bishops put this familiar
terms
of
'the
destructive capacity and what
is
for
in
between
contradiction
needed
point,
spent
is
what
constructive
surprisingly
a
for
(PL,
development'
p.316).
§6 -
Practical, prudential and more moral arguments from
dangers
national
nuclear build-up of the superstates, and the genesis of nuclear dilemmas.
to
While
there are arguments to the immorality of nuclear war preparation, there are also
counter-arguments,
that
have
Americans), to the moral
proved
justifiability
persuasive
remarkably
of
nuclear
war
(especially
preparation
in
to
the
present circumstances .
The underlying style of argument is simply an elaboration, or state-uplift,
of that for the escalation of weapons at the local level, for acquiring a gun or
for stocking-up the neighbourhood armoury - and every bit
argument
from
local dangers.
and
domination;
dubious
first
of
all
second of nuclear destruction.
atomic
surrender
and
so
avoid the destruction' (Walzer, p.273).
preparation is supposed to guard against more than these;
third
element,
namely,
loss
of
basic
rights
there
with these.
blackmail
of
foreign
appeasement
In fact nuclear
is
a
crucial
of
ways
life
This further set of elements is linked to the danger of
foreign domination - which is really a separate element from risk of
Though
and
(freedom, equality, etc.) and
fundamental values (upholding of truth, human dignity, etc.) and
integrated
that
The two go together,
since if we did not fear the blackmail, we might adopt a policy
or
as
It is that nuclear preparation, 'so we have been
told, guards against the double danger:
foreign
as
blackmail.
domination need not imply the loss of most basic values it does
imply the loss of at least of one, self-determination, freedom to choose various
national objectives;
conversely loss or erosion or infringement of basic values
can occur without foreign domination, for instance, as
is
commonplace
in
the
38
"free" world, by internal change of government or governmental approach, through
the increased security and control a
nuclear
risks,
increasingly
preparation
state
nuclear
demands,
But
etc.
what
nuclear destruction, also
extensive
involves loss of basic rights and values, through destruction
of
the
material
of the cherished life-style.^ So nuclear preparation is hardly a clearcut
base
means of guaranteeing basic values.5^
In other respects too the argument from loss of
lacks
cogency
rings
and
It
hollow.
is
basic
values
and
rights
hard to avoid the feeling that the
oft-appealed-to basic values often function as something of a front, like
citation
values at political ceremonies;
religious
of
clean cover for economic consideration of one sort
demands
from
of
of
wealth
private
appealed
to
category:
in
and
them
to
having
arising
with
do
the
an argument isn't, or
However
associations.
And
rights
the
and
But not all the values commonly appealed to fall into
particular nationalistic ones do not.
And one of the main
alleged values of deterrence, the resistance to and containment
or
many
another,
are, mostly, of the utmost importance, indeed fundamental,
and worth much sacrifice.
this
of
power.
and
oughtn't to be, defeated by its unsavoury
values
that the argument is a
military-industrial complex, many concerned with foreign
the
domination of other lesser states, and many
concentration
pious
"communism"
of
of "socialism", can hardly be accounted fundamental, any more than retention
of capitalism.
communism
has
happened
What has
been
here
with
confused
of
(the
totalitarianism, which does remove certain more
freedoms
(of
opinion,
association,
is
course
that
reality
basic
information,
of)
values,
etc.,
(the
ideal
of)
socialist
state
namely
certain
and
so does
etc.),
derivatively threaten basic values.
One critical question, then, is whether extensive nuclear
LSN
war,
and
indeed
for
rational way of preserving
nuclear
those
holocaust,
fundamenmtal
preparation
for
is a good or effective or even
values,
which
we
have
left.
53.
The converse obviously does not hold. Basic values and
cherished
life-style can be lost without nuclear destruction, or nuclear preparation,
as when a more powerful state imposes its values and way of life.
54.
The argument from freedom, advanced by Jaspers and repeatedly rolled out by
state representatives, is further considered early in Appendix 1.
39
arise
Similar questions
and
domination
as
regards
arguments
the
preparation depends essentially on an arrangement of hostile
structure
which
itself
is
open
questioned (in §8), both from the
serious
to
question,
view
of
point
foreign
of
danger
of the methods of extensive nuclear
Justification
blackmail.
from
and
basic
of
states,
nation
a
is subsequently
values,
such
as
freedom, and otherwise.
But whether ultimately justified or
dangers
not,
these
national
those that have been taken to morally underwrite extensive nuclear
are
preparation, and
have
They
justification.
been
accepted
outlook.
moral
by
policy
Within
particular, that extensive nuclear
the
as
affording
moral
arguments
preparation
do
not
such
Northern
conventional
a
It is within such a framework, in
framework the moral justification holds good.
however,
makers
fact been widely accepted, and undoubtedly form
in
have
part of many people's
others,
from
arguments
engenders
establish
moral
a
fix.
For
the morality of extensive
nuclear preparation, but only make a prudential case for such preparation.
people
face a nuclear dilemma, but, though evaluative in character, it is
also
not a specifically moral one.
And
for
many
others
and their respective rights and freedoms, there is no serious dilemma.
people
who
not
are
who
again,
so
or as familiar with Soviet and American culture and ways of life,
by
impressed
Such
beyond
live
For such
the "beneficial" reach of the superstates, prudential
counter-arguments from national dangers carry little weight, and the moral
case
against deterrence is not offset but stands unchallenged.
This is the genesis of the argument from isolated
people
who
Consider
some
a comparatively remote area, whose freedoms are not (yet)
in
live
people.
under threat from superpower expansionism, but whose lifestyle is put at risk by
nuclear
(as under principle Cl).
deterrence
For such isolated people, who may
have little interest in the preservation of nuclear states, there is no
nuclear
dilemma,
and
nuclear
locations may have problems
to
national
is wrong.
dangers,
People in less fortunate
but
in
meeting
these
they are not entitled to impose grave risks on the uninvolved isolated
problems
people.
as
deterrence
genuine
In doing so
immorally;
and
for
through
similar
nuclear
reasons
deterrence, superstates
the
are
proceeding
conventional Northern framework is
40
The same conclusion can be alternatively reached
impugned.
argument:
a
put
isolated person, and check
the
resulting
substitution
Russian in the position of such an
or
American
reflective
a
by
assessment
of
nuclear
deterrence.
it would be the same as that of a reflective isolated person, stripped of
Since
superstate bias, morally opposed to deterrence and not morally
transfixed,
the
conventional framework fails to satisfy requirements of morality.
The outcome of the arguments from dangers is, then,very different depending
on
the
whether
are
arguments
applied
regards a superstate or not.
as
The
superstate theme which emerges is, in brief,
SST.
Because of multiple connected dangers from other states which have
nuclear weapons, a state - any state that is too large to rely upon other states
- is obliged to invest in at least matching nuclear weapons.
Hence, by detachment, a super-nation-state, such as USA, ought to have something
in
the
the nuclear armoury that it has.
of
order
meet objections concerning excess,
a
least
at
retain
Or, weakening the theme to
"overkill" capacity, it
core of the nuclear devices it has.
solid
[morally]
ought
to
For subsequent
argument it can be left open whether the obligation involved is a moral one, for
instance
of
because
the
character
of
the
protected, or only (as argued above) one of
to
grounds
supporting
those
against
disarmament
a
the
SS
reason $5.
prudential
theme
nuclear
dangerous
Northern values supposedly being
on
similar
it can be argued that unilateral
opponent
would
be
prudentially
irrational.
It will be freely admitted that what is prudentially or morally required is
a
suboptimal
strategy,
like the familiar strategies of the prisoners' dilemma
situations and of certain related competitive games.
that
like could be achieved, would
agreement
would
be
cooperative
draining
of
For
such
resources,
the details are well-enough known.
future
55.
admitted
arrangements.
Cooperation
and
be better not merely in removing the nuclear dilemma, but in a
range of other respects.
expensive,
be
strategy for nuclear adversaries, if sufficient trust and the
superior
a
So it should
arrangements
would
be
much
less
risky,
destructive of the environment, and so on;
However for the present and the
foreseeable
the prospects of cooperation appear - so we are repeatedly told by state
It can
still,
and
presumably
does,
amount
to
more
than
mere
expediency, since the 'freedom of Europe' is part of what is at issue.
local
41
representatives, who are (not always wittingly) helping to make
true
-
unfortunately
rather
remote:
only
the
policies
their
sure insurance is extensive
nuclear preparation and full preparedness to apply nuclear force.
At least this is so where one is a superstate:
proceed,
largely
unabated.
nuclear
preparation
Where one is not a superstate, but a lesser state
one must, the representatives continue, rely on a larger ally who has a
arsenal,
one's
nuclear
preparation,
one
under
huddles
and
which
contrasts
the lack of trust displayed, and encouraged elsewhere.
Does a
state, one which relies for its nuclear cover on a super-ally,
ground
for
another's
But here a level of trust and cooperation is^ called for, by
umbrella.
dependent states, which is far from foolproof,
with
nuclear
insurance (which is presumably not free) is obtained indirectly
through some superstate's
nuclear
confidence
in
its
rather
super-ally
strangely
dependent
have
exchange
on its territory?
much
that
its ally's opponent?
than
Confidence, for instance, that its ally will not render it a target or
nuclear
must
stage
a
Given the proclivity of states, especially
large states, to resort to expediency, and given the recent historical record of
superstates and their leaders, too much faith would.be misplaced.
Thus, whatever the limited force of the argument for the superstate
it
does
theme,
not extend to the analogous theme for a dependent state, which differs
from SST and ends as follows:
DST.
Because ..., a state without adequate (or any) nuclear weapons is obliged
to rely upon a superstate ally, and within that arrangement, to accommodate the
facilities and nuclear installations of the protecting ally.
In part for reasons already given, principle DST is not very plausible (and
same
goes for more obvious variants upon it).
Nor do the arguments offered for
SST transpose particularly well to direct arguments
strikingly
illustrated
by
the
case
the
for
DST.56
This
is
more
of more remote nuclear dependent states.
Consider the argument from basic values, for instance, from the angle of nuclear
dependent Australia.
Basic values in Australia are not threatened by, or put in
jeopardy through, the actions or plans
of
the
Soviet
Union.
Nor
are
they
threatened by the other superstate, the USA, the only country with 'the physical
56.
As is widely known, inadmissible and usually much overrated considerations
of expediency frequently enter into reasons why states allow foreign
nuclear facilities upon their territories, e.g.
economic considerations
such as trade or local revenue and short-term jobs.
42
capacity to launch a full scale invasion of Australia', but
'clearly
lack[ing]
motive to do so', so far.5? Clearly the argument from basic values does not
any
look convincing.
carries
reasons
For similar
In
weight.
little
the
with
fact,
from
argument
little care, the present level of
a
economic and political domination could be much reduced.
of
force
For there
only
is
questionable
of
because
danger
such
superstate
In this way
too,
nuclear
umbrella,
and
facilities
superstate
the
that would be removed with
danger
non-aligned practices.$8 With less remote dependent European states these
of
the
from danger of nuclear destruction could be nullified.
argument
the
domination
foreign
sorts
arguments from national dangers are only marginally more convincing, and may
be defeated along analogous lines.
The differences in the situations of states, and
peoples,
break
the
theme
of
a
of
situated
differently
This is a theme especially
monolithic West.
favoured by US and the West European representatives, who present the West,
its
freedom,
as threatened by Soviet domination.
undifferentiated unit.
dependent
states
with
But
this
leading
idea,
NATO
designed
powers,
and
In this the West is a single
in
part
to
align
lesser
to justify putting them at
and
nuclear risk is as much a myth as the idea of the Golden West.
not
The West is
so monolithic, it is not so comprehensive, some of it is not so free, much of it
(including the Antipodes) is not threatened by Soviet domination.
Principle DST - likewise what it depends upon, SST - is
now
under
coming
attack by European disarmament groups, who challenge the core assumptions of the
underlying retaliatory model that
*
Safety lies in weapons,
*
More weapons imply more securityS9.
Certainly, for more isolated states, such as New Zealand,
safety
from
nuclear
attack lies not in weapons but in excluding nuclear facilities (including visits
from nuclear submarines).
present
system
is
more
Europeans are arguing in
of
a
similar
way,
that
the
a risk, indeed liability, than a protection (e.g.
57.
For the quoted claim, and some of the
Australia's Security, p.94.
58.
The issue is further pursued in Appendix 2.
59.
See, for example, the last article in Thompson.
argument
for
it,
see
Threats
to
43
envisaged
the
and that without nuclear installations, Europe cannot be
Thompson, p.251);
theatre
limited nuclear war, in the way it is now seen by US
a
for
(but not Soviet) strategists.
Once the weapons
assumptions
are
questioned,
other
the
assumptions of
and its variants come up for examination, namely
retaliatory model
*
Whether
the proper response to danger is armament, in particular
,
Whether
the proper response is through nuclear armament,
asopposed,
say, to other military responses, such as conventional arms, or,
taking off from the previous point,
Whether military approaches and procedures (through
*
are
proper
methods,
etc.)
armaments,
or should be such dominant methods, of conflict
resolution at the international level.
It is plausibly argued, against military procedures, that at no
level
ordinary
do we sensibly set about meeting danger or settling disputes by acquiring lethal
weapons and threatening to use them - except perhaps on an out-dated, and
really
frontier
warranted,
ethics.
This leads into the issue of alternative
defence systems, a vital matter beginning to obtain the contemporary6°
and
explanation
it
deserves,
questioning of the framework
of
but
never
one
that
nation-states.
already
While
emphasis
anticipates subsequent
the
state
system
is
intact, force is far from exceptional and military procedures are to be expected
and are likely inevitable.
nation-state
system':
For 'force has
[a]
...
permanent
place
the
in
thus Ramsay (on p.xv), who uses this as part of his very
orthodox case for nuclear war arrangements.
§7.
The resulting nuclear dilemmas for aligned states
Assembling
referred
the
to
as
themes
the
so
far
nuclear
developed
fix:-
States
war-deterrence, because (as argued in §3-§5)
to engage in war-deterrence, at least
60.
the
yields
both
and__ their—supporter^.
deontic dilemma, often
ought
not
for prudential reasons (as
conversion to such arrangements.
engage
in
it is immoral, and also ought
Alternative defence systems were considered long ago in
Mohists.
For contemporary work on alternative systems, see
survey in Sharp. There is in fact a considerable literature
and social defence arrangements, and a growing literature on
i.e.
to
argued
using
China by the
especially the
on non-violent
transarmament,
44
SST and DST).
the
This dilemma is no idle construction
paraconsistent
of
virtues
but
logic),
(concocted
to
demonstrate
a serious real-life dilemma, the
outlines of which are repeatedly encountered in texts on
nuclear
and
war
its
aspects 61, as well as being virtually ubiquitous in nuclear war discussions.
The nuclear fix is in part simply a more intense
dilemma
produced
by
the
deontic
war itself &2, or at least war which spreads beyond purely
military targets, as larger wars inevitably
do
(since
military
arrangements,
The main dilemma arises
rail transport, typically rely on civilian ones).
e.g.
of
version
from a combination of the retaliatory model with the features of
War
war.
is
required for defence of the state and values it upholds (or pretends to uphold);
but war also involves immoral acts and evil consequences.
can
war"
under
certain
justified.
be
also
seen
as attempting a reconciliation by trying to show that
circumstances
Thus
'some
these
really
justifications
evil
consequences
aegis
of
war'
(Walls,
p.260).
acceptable than fallacious asymptotic
are
morally
of war aim to show that actions deemed
normally forbidden by moral mandates are now permissible
the
The doctrine of "just
But
this
arguments
when
under
performed
is no better or more morally
for
utilitarianism
being
as
correct when the stakes are large.
War and preparedness for
61.
war
also
generate
subsidiary
dilemmas
-
for
Thus Green, along with many others, 'find[s] nuclear deterrence ...
the
best of practical policies available to us now ... given the realities of
world politics' but 'still demur[s] because of moral qualms'
(p.xii).
Green
also represents both Morgenthau and Halle as having 'rather
agonisingly presented a ... case for a deterrence strategy,
even while
asserting that the strategy is morally indefensible according to the
traditional ethical codes' (p.252). Walzer ends in a similar dilemma (he
is committed to a stronger and less qualified form of it than he sets
down):
'...
though it [deterrence] is a bad way, there may well be no
other that is practical in a world of sovereign and suspicious states'
(p.274) - an indictment of the state system that Walzer does not pursue.
Similarly the US Catholic Bishops
dilemma;
they speak of 'the
dilemma of how to prevent the use
Paskins and Dockrill and in Benn
terms of moral dilemmas.
present the situation in terms of a moral
political paradox of deterrence ...
the
of nuclear weapons ...' (PL, p.313).
In
too the nuclear situation is presented in
The nuclear dilemma is of course not a dilemma for everyone, for those who
think they have seen the clear admissibility of deterrence, or differently
for those who have seen through the arguments from national dangers.
But
it is a dilemma for those locked into the conventional framework.
62.
Situations in war are also a major source of moral dilemmas:
see Routley
and Plumwood where several examples are given. A general logical account
of and theory of moral dilemmas is elaborated therein.
45
authority:
instance, a severe tension between freedom and
difficult
'one
of
most
the
of war involves defending a free society without destroying
problems
p.324).
the values that give it meaning and validity' (PL,
The
problems
are
greatly enhanced by modern nuclear arrangements.
The nuclear fix not only intensifies and complicates other dilemmas induced
by
the
contemporary sovereign state^^, in particular the deep tensions between
national security and the operation of liberal-democratic arrangements (such
individual
liberty, popular control of institutions, etc).
other more personal subsidiary dilemmas, as for
(political)
obligations
to
example
question
(the
It also accentuates
the
extent
one's
of
a nuclear state, and role-induced dilemmas such as
one's conflicting obligations as a doctor or a nuclear
researcher
as
of
political
obligations
armaments
and
their
processor
or
evasion
is
considered further in Appendix 2).
At the more personal level, that of individual and group action, there
several
questions
be disentangled - questions different from the key issue
to
'What should my state
be
doing
and
influence, depending on who one is.
do?',
on
which
one
may
exert
lives,
and
influences, i.e.
in
what
little
There is not only the question 'What should
I do?' - a question which will have a quite different force depending
one
are
on
where
sort of state, where one works, what one controls or
on who one is and one's roles - but also the
questions
'What
sort of person do I want to be?', 'What am I prepared to answer for morally?'^"
Answers to these latter character questions will feed back to influence those to
action-oriented
questions.
Each
of those questions can, in given situations,
induce subsidiary dilemmas.
The essential feature of a deontic dilemma is that both A and the
of
A
are
wrong
(or
differently,
pursuing a nuclear defence policy.
obligatory),
negation
for some suitable A, such as
The place and essential role of deontic
and
63.
The nuclear dilemma is not alone responsible for these other dilemmas.
Large-scale nuclear power generation, and other types of warfare and
security arrangements, also contribute.
But a conflict of
ree om a
authority is already an outcome of the large central state.
64.
For group formulation of the questions replace 'I' by 'my group', etc. The
importance of distilling out these questions, and the moral undesirability
of deterrence in terms of what it does to people morally, are brought out
in Benn, where however the issues are made to look somewhat more separate
than they are.
46
moral dilemmas are not
widely
well
or
particularly
understood,
ethical
in
This is partly because currently dominant ethical positions like
literature^^.
utilitarianism cannot at all easily accommodate moral dilemmas or the data which
gives
to
rise
them
then such positions do not really offer reportive
but
-
accounts of wrong and obligation anyway.
Contrary to utilitarian perceptions
a
dilemma does not necessarily have any moral solution, though there may be better
and worse ways out.
By
assessments,
form
which
contrast
the
with
ethical
such
preanalytical
theories,
of sensitive theories, do recognise moral
basis
dilemmas and reflect their features.
Reactions and responses that are characteristic of deontic dilemmas
the
from
There is an unsteadiness, an uncertainty as to what to
fix.
nuclear
do, which way to proceed, which principles in watered-down form to
temporary
crutch.
for
Thus,
as
way
a
of
never
exercising
"morally
our
world'66, that is in a morally-strapped world.
best"
ethical
Bishops who
the
of
A similar
'strictly
conditional'
Deterrence has a strictly temporary role
the
object
must
and
deterrence
circumstances.
deterrence,
is
"morally
in a fallen
acceptability'
certainly
one
strictly
wrong,
is
of
from the
conditional
option
as
to
of
what
nuclear
the
to
do
nevertheless
the
policy
to
fix.
awkward
in
Thus Walzer, for example, struggles to the conclusion
though
"second
a
to
be to move beyond deterrence, 'towards a
world free of the threat of deterrence' (PL, p.317), out
And
be
try to escape 'the paradox of deterrence', i.e.
moral fix.
but
shift
'moral
while
acceptability,
can
good",
responsibility
moral
deterrence
we
a
(as from good to acceptable) is made by the US Catholic
functor
speak
as
grasp
example, the Bishop of London contends that the
possession of nuclear weapons 'while
acceptable"
emerge
that
war
in
the
pursue
circumstances (p.274).6? However as more than an immediate stepping stone
to
a
65.
There are exceptions of course, e.g.
in the Catholic educated such as
Sartre;
and Nagel's final example is very instructive. For a fuller
theory of moral dilemmas see however Routley and Plumwood.
66.
Reported in The Economist;
reprinted in
1983, Weekend Magazine p.2.
67.
As a response to a moral dilemma, Walzer's approach is perfectly in order
logically. Those who, like Benn, 'find it neither coherent nor acceptable'
The
have not grasped the logic of moral dilemmas.
Australian,
February
12-13
47
superior
it
policy,
(in
assembled
is
reasons
§5-§6),
of
option,
poor
decidedly
a
the
sort
reasons
for
are
that
decisive
for those,
outside the conventional Northern framework, who find
sufficiently
already
no
genuine
of
nuclear
nuclear dilemma.
To make matters worse the nuclear fix is, furthermore,
own making.
states'
a
fix
It is not something they blundered into, by accident.
initial nuclear involvement was deliberately chosen, primarily by the
the
the USA and the USSR in interaction.
and
In these respects the
situation
is
like
people who deliberately let themselves be involved in two incompatible
of
relationships, and build up conflicting obligations
though
USA,
has by and large also been deliberately chosen, again mainly by
escalation
that
The
build-up, in North America occurred on a defensive basis in response
nuclear
to
Soviet
The fact is that the USA initiated nuclear armament, and has
build-up.
frequently led escalation, and apparently still does.
programme is to be in addition to existing
resources
myth,
a
is
some currency, that adoption of nuclear weaponry, and nuclear
with
one
It
thereby.
are
(which
agreed
generally
The recent (1980)
United
States'
strategic
be already in excess of
to
Russia's, and which always have been so) (Thompson, p.21).
The present dilemma, that many people feel acutely, is then a direct outcome
state
policy,
allies, and
Naturally
not
the
USSR policies.
that
indicates
especially
a
merely
route
by
taken
advanced
response
to
capitalist
the
USA and its NATO
nations,
Soviets
(or
of
socialism).
state
would not have been feasible without complementing
And independent evidence,
such
as
Soviet-Sino
confrontation,
is a strong internal military dynamic in state socialist
there
nations.
There is a two-way connection between world political arrangements
nation-states
the
and
nuclear
fix.
arrangements are an evident source of the
nuclear
situation
is
increasingly
present world political structure.
is
widely
promulgated
arrangements:
it is '...
seen
On
the
dilemma
as
one
hand,
with
the
these
result
through
political
that
the
indicating the inadequacy of the
Indeed it is no longer a radical
theme
but
that the source of the nuclear problem comes from state
a world of sovereign states ...
which
brought
the
48
world
the present dangerous situation' (PL, p.313).
to
nuclear fix tends to lock political arrangements into
On the other hand, the
the
statist
form,
into
The
arrangements of an increasingly authoritarian and centralist cast.
statist
espoused purpose of nuclear weapons may be to keep the
national
defend
to
and
security,
interests,
reasons such as perpetuating the system
state
advantageous
confrontation,
and
provide
to
but underneath there are other
sovereign
of
(!),
peace
and
states
of
framework
the
military-industrial interests, dependent state exploitation, and
politically
favoured
inequality
it
supports.
The emerging theme is then that the very nuclear situation arising from the
statist
and
arrangements
interrelations
(economic
ideologies, etc.) tends to, and is used to, lock
arrangements
of
states and zones of interest.
sovereign
theme is a piecemeal practical one.
where
side
the
pattern
world
the
conflicting
rivalries,
into
the
present
The argument to this
Consider first, the matter from the
Soviet
of national control and progressive military-economic
reorientation common to all nuclear states is clearer.
The threat from the West, whether it exists or not (and in Soviet
perception it certainly does), has become a necessary legitimation for
the power of the ruling elites, an excuse for their many economic and
social failures, and an argument to isolate and silence critics within
their own borders.
In the West we have ... carefully controlled
...
and selective release of 'official information' (Thompson, p.20).
"We" in the West, especially the Americans, also
integrated
with
state
apparatus,
have,
in
forms
increasingly
the military-industrial complex, which is a
major beneficiary and promoter of the nuclear arms race.68
Secondly, there is evidence of entrenchment of the arrangements,
by
things
such
as
the
SALT negotiations;
there are fixed superpowers and a
(growing) nuclear club of nations all governed by a
rules, partly held in place by deterrence.
shown
as
flimsy
negotiated
set
Connected with this, there are cases
revealing the fixing of zones of interest, such as the Afghanistan example.
Soviet
US is
68.
of
The
invasion is not regarded as threatening US "vital interests", and so the
not
overduly
worried
about
Afghanistan
and
its
people.
What
was
The role of the military-industrial complex in present US escalation is
sketched in Cox. Marxists, with their dogma of economic determinism, would
assign even more weight to this point.
As some of them would freely
concede, a similar complex has figured prominently in USSR escalation.
49
different, what it was worried about and made nuclear threats
adjacent
Western
oil
supplies:
were
concerning,
these lay within the US zone of interest (cf.
the discussion in Schell, p.212).
§8.
initial political fall-out from the ethical
Ways out of nuclear dilemmas:
Virtually all the ways are ways of limitation, and they all involve in
results.
one way or another limitations on nuclear arms or the way they are deployed, and
limitations
the
on
thus inevitable.
and
more
powers of states.
Limitations on national sovereignty are
The limitations may be reached by agreement
and
negotiation,
less voluntarily agreed to^^, or they may be imposed, or possibly
or
worst of all, they may emerge from an initial war.
As with other fixes produced by
are
there
suggested
the
structural
arrangements
of
states,
out which do not interfere with these arrangements,
ways
interstate approaches, and there are ways which do seriously alter the structure
and
power
relations
extrastate approaches.
of
states
(and,
in the limit, remove them altogether),
All the familiar, allegedly
practical
and
realistic ,
attempts to resolve the nuclear problem, for instance disarmament by mutual arms
limitations, etc., are interstate;
sovereign
state.
The
same
goes
(graduated) unilateral disarmament.
about the nation-state;
they do not tamper with that sacred cow, the
for
less
"realistic"
But in fact there is
proposals,
nothing
or
empirical
fact,
is it particularly a stable one.
nor,
and
its
replacement by alternative arrangements.
as
a
We are certainly
free - in more liberal states, it should be everywhere - to theorise as
demise
sacred
it is not a particularly well justified political form;
it is not even a very long-standing form of political arrangement;
matter
very
such as
to
its
And nuclear dilemmas
should have encouraged such reflection.
69.
In principle it would be relatively easy for states to agree to settlement
of their disputes by less damaging and expensive contests than military
ones, e.g. by contests of selected representatives, and not just through
fighting in some form, but by contests of footballers, singers, dancers,
lawyers, or etc.
In practice, however, such more civilized alternatives
are never much considered in these days of superstates. Animals, by
contrast, are smart enough to settle disputes by means much more like
these.
Even the ancient Greeks - though they had a clear appreciation of
limits, which has been lost by post-Enlightenment leaders - regarded the
institution of war as final (allegedly inevitable) means of arbitration
between city-states, not seeing
its
social,
structurally-emergent,
character.
50
Extrastate approaches take one of
international
of states.
routes,
the
way
up,
to
genuine
power, or the way down, through fractionation or deunionisation
The ways up and down are by no means one and the same;
but they are
Some of the important machinery, for a way up to
necessarily incompatible.
not
two
world government,is already there in the
international
Were
law-courts.
the
courts assigned sufficient authority and power, the remedy, namely through legal
action, that medieval
theorists
saw
all
to
intrastate
and T superseded by the just case of S versus T.
sufficient
war deterrence,
though
Law courts, as usually conceived, are not
equivalent
super—statist
But if
the
law
courts
were
power then their authority and efficacy would likely rely (at
upon
least initially)
their
in
could
be extended to interstate disputes, and the just war between states S
principle
given
disputes,
back-up
equivalent
for
of
economic
perhaps
not by military means.
effective without police and jails or
and
other
penalties;
and
the
either will involve the capacity to inflict quite
substantial amounts of damage on "delinquents" - which, because delinquents will
be
typically
organisations,
will also involve damage to innocent, and perhaps
dissenting, participants in those organisations, as well as to other
In
parties.
uninvolved
short, such an approach does not resolve the problem but tends to
repeat it.
The Way Up is one more statist, legalistic, authoritarian way of trying
get
to
grips
with
the
nuclear
though mostly in passing to be
70.
to
problem, and accordingly is often mentioned,
dismissed
in
orthodox
strategic
texts
on
Americans, for example, tend to forget that their state (like the USSR)
is
a union, of fairly recent origin, and that a differently-oriented State of
the Union message could well consider dissolution of the union.
Regional
movements in USA unfortunately lack much popular support at present.
By
contrast, there are significant separation movements,
some deserving aid
and encouragement, which affect most other nuclear states, especially USSR,
UK and France. The USSR already has trouble in holding its (supposedly
voluntarily integrated)
satellite empire together;
and the one recent
attempted addition right on its frontier is proving extremely recalcitrant.
Nor should powerful political unions under centralised state apparatus be
fostered elsewhere.
The same applies to state empire expansion, as
illustrated in contemporary Indonesia. Most important,
the reunification
of
Germany
should be resisted;
instead a more rational regional
deunification than the present East-West division of post-war Germany
should be sought, along with removal of nuclear weapons from the border
region, and so on.
71.
Thus for example, Kahn, where such a "solution" is quickly dismissed as,
impractical, etc.
Hardly necessary to say the Way Up has won most favour
with the legal fraternity, and from more authoritarian organisations.
51
the
By contrast, the Way Down, though like
thermonuclear war.
an appearance (a comeback) in some more radical discussions,
with the Way Up (in "world order" models:
combined
unlike the Way Down, is
considered
however
beginning
is
and
more
much
international
system';
and
'the
'towards
a
no
sometimes
sympathetically
There is
by those who take a moral rather than strategic viewpoint.
a renewed emphasis on world order, in reaching
by
The Way Up,
Galtung).
cf.
be
to
Up
but it is making
new, is scarcely mentioned in the orthodox discussions;
means
Way
integrated
morally
missing element of world order today is the
absence of a properly constituted political authority' (PL, p.320).
A main argument for the Way Up is
just
repetition
a
that
of
which
is
commonly supposed to underpin statist arrangements in the first place, namely an
argument from (generous) variations upon the Prisoners'
of the Commons.
Tragedy
traditionally,
ecological order.
not
as
best
regards
problems
to
solutions
nation-states,
of superstate.
of
organisation,
and one of the prospects is destruction of a
said
to
be
some
Of course, this begins to undermine an earlier application
of the "tragedy" argument, since states will lose their sovereignty and some
their
order—imposing
correspondingly weakened.
arguments
role,
and
But all
obligation
political
this
is
assume
to
,
only sound under quite restrictive assumptions.
There are, then, many problems
through
that
states
will
these
tragedy
A
further
theoretical
with
the
hitch
is
Way
Up,
that
a
both
theoretical
and
the Way Up merely repeats
arrangements.
It
is
contingency, of there being no rival intelligent civilisations
nearby, that the problems of interstate relations are not repeated
72.
be
72
statist arrangements at a level up, by way of superstate
only
to
of
good ones in the first place, when in fact they are not, but are
are
practical.
the
public order and, more recently, as to
good part of the commons by nuclear war, the solution is now
sort
as
So with the "tragedy of nation-states", where the players are
but
herdsmen
such
It is that authority and coercion - in the form of the
state * are required to ensure
especially,
Dilemma,
See further Routley and Routley
and
material
referred
to
a
level
therein,
up
and
especially Griffin.
The real reasons for the state are of course very different from the
theoretical cover such arguments afford. Among other things, the state
enables and guarantees the accumulation of power, privilege and capital.
The major practical hitch is that there is no prospect at all of getting
again.
such a "solution" to work in time to serve its intended purpose.
In reality, we are no nearer a world government than we were a century
ago,
....
In fact, it is even arguable that since World War II we
have moved further away from a world government than we were before
World
War
II.
The disintegration of empires has multiplied
sovereignties. It is true that we have something called the United
Nations, but even the United Nations has declined in power as it has
grown in membership. By the beginning of the 1970's the United
Nations had become, in some ways, a less powerful and even less
influential organisation than it was at the end of the 1950's (Mazrui,
pp.2-3).
For
The reasons for this Mazrui goes on to outline.
future
foreseeable
the
nuclear
ideological differences between states, including especially differences
as to how political arrangements should be effected, exclude any prospect of
an
world government or a world legal system capable of resolving nuclear
operative
In some ways, this is just as well.
hostilities.
monolithic,
extremely
would
World
would
government
foster economism, would entrench bureaucracy with
all its damaging features, and could easily tend to totalitarianism.
whatever
certainly,
its
be
(gray?)
colour,
political
exploitative economic system which would do immense
impose
damage
It
would
the world an
on
many
remaining
crucial
respects,
to
natural systems.?3
The Way Up thus presupposes an unlikely
undesirable
ideological,
requisite
of
level
indeed
unity
political
cannot
be
economic
and
paradigmatic,
and,
separation
in
some
Moreover,
unity.
of
main
Northern
within nuclear deadlines.
expected
given
cultures,
When not even
nuclear weapons limitations can be worked out, how much less likely is
more
much
sovereignty, could
blockages
agreements,
sweeping
and
be
negotiated?
deadlocks
in
the
involving
genuine
There
an
way
is
endless
(e.g.
of
of
state
series
of such state reconciliation.
applies to interstate arrangements, which may make limited use
that
it
limitations
almost
the
the
of
The same
Way
Up
negotiations or other conciliation procedures within a framework arranged
through the United Nations) .?**
73.
For a more detailed (but decidedly mediocre) critique of the idea of a
world
government,
see Galtung.
Naturally the objections to world
government, and difficulties in the way of obtaining it, do not extend to
more flexible world arrangements, such a world federation of cultures (cf.
Mazrui).
Such a pluralistic anarchistic Way Up can
be
genuinely
synthesized with the Way Down.
53
There is
regrettably
and
arrangements
much
also
conventions
are
evidence
frequently
concerning war and human rights?$), and are
sentiments
smoothly
not
not
observed (especially those
worth
into despicable deeds.
not
bode
convention
in
great
a
deal:
Even agreements states have
openly
violated.
Indeed there already appears to be at least one
any
force,
of
It
to
which
international
all the major nuclear states are signatories,
which would rule out LSN war and nuclear deterrence, that on genocide.
includes
lofty
for nuclear arms limitations, should sufficient agreement
well
ever be reached.
treaties,
international
are often enough disregarded, skirted around, or
signed
does
slide
that
the
following
Genocide
acts committed, in time of peace or war, with
intent to destroy in whole or part a natural, ethical, racial or religious group
killing members of the group, causing serious bodily or mental harm to
as such:
the members of the group, deliberately inflicting conditions of life
to
bring about physical
destruction
direct
and
public
shall
conspiracy to
commit
be
Persons committing genocide or any of
punished,
whether
they
are
the
other
acts
responsible rulers, private
individuals or public officials.?6 it is not difficult to argue
nuclear
genocide,
incitement to commit genocide, attempts to commit genocide,
complicity in genocide.
mentioned
Beside genocide the
in whole or in part.
following associated acts are also punishable:
calculated
that
larger
a
strike (such as deterrence policy requires as a back-up response) would
almost certainly constitute an act of genocide, through what
minority
groups.
to
does
some
But then, by virtue of connecting principles like 05, nuclear
deterrence stands indicted
particular
it
conspiracy
representatives of the
and
as
involving
incitement.
nuclear
states
acts
associated
with
genocide,
in
Some well-known political and military
would
thus
appear
to
be
liable
to
indictment and punishment under international law.
74.
Even Dahlitz, who gives a detailed and sympathetic account of nuclear arms
control attempts and lost opportunities,
is by no means confident that
suitable arrangements can now be achieved (see pp.
210-13).
Reasons
include technological advances now taking place, and the renewed American
drive for strategic superiority.
75.
See Brownlie, Kuper, and Amnesty International reports.
in this paragraph were suggested by C. Pigden.
76.
The account of genocide given is taken directly from the
Genocide Convention, which is reproduced in Kuper, p.210ff.
Most of the points
text
of
the
54
The nuclear fix emerging from nation-state arrangements - combined with the
impotence
apparent
interstate relations to alleviate the situation, indeed
of
with the apparent ability only to push the world further into the situation
nearer
to
the
nuclear
"brink"
—
taken
now
is
to
contemporary angle) the inadequacy of nation-state political
has
given
new
impetus
sovereignty
the best-seller
and
to consideration of other extrastate resolutions.
The
the
indicates
the
namely
nuclear
in
The
Schell's
situation
should
reexamination of the foundations of political thought'
world's
political
unsatisfactoriness
radical
of
the present system of nation states has even reached
stands
Schell
to
According
and
book
a new
arrangements,
thesis that the nuclear problem
national
(from
indicate
and
of
Fate
lead
to
required
Earth.
the
a
full-scale
to
make
'the
consonant with the global reality in which
institutions ...
they operate ...' and in 'work[ing] out the practical steps by which mankind ...
can
reorganise
political
its
life' (p.219).
However Schell himself tries to
avoid these 'awesome urgent tasks, which, imposed on us by
the
political
work of our age' ??.
else overimpressed
by
the
history,
constitute
So, not feeling the pressures of history or
realities
of
(unstable)
nation-states,
do
most
But there is no good reason to avoid the task of political
political theorists.
reassessment, made so much more urgent by the nuclear situation.
There is little doubt but that we live (too
unthinkingly)
with
an
antiquated
system
many
present
state
arrangements,
communications
condition;
especially,
were
in
a
of
(allegedly
when
17th
century
very
different
and
the main outlines of the modern totalitarian state
and its manifold deficiencies recognised, even earlier.
77.
willingly,
The features
representative
government, were largely fashioned in the
us
even
of political arrangements which the
nuclear impasse, among others, calls into question.
best
of
even
democratic)
technology,
more
were
the
and
primitive
discerned,
In the briefs presented
A similar theme, similarly questioning 'such sacred traditions as absolute
national sovereignty', was pressed by Bradley, a significant US general
(see Cox, p.225).
Schell (like Bradley) does not make it entirely clear whether he is
thinking of the Way Up or the Way Down, but the names he drops suggest the
Way Up.
So does the main thrust of what he says, e.g.
'Thus the peril of
extinction is the price that the world pays not for "safety" or "survival"
but for its [sic!] insistence on continuing to divide itself up into
sovereign nations'
(p.210),
as if the natural or original state were an
undivided one? On Schell's position, see further Appendix 1.
55
for political arrangements such as representative government, the excessive size
and complexity of modern states was not envisaged.
But such systems continue to
operate, insufficiently questioned, though their justificatory bases
undermined.
present
Nuclear
representative
emphasized
have
problems
political
have
been
several other deficiencies in
arrangements.
particular,
In
they
have
revealed how governments can thwart popular opinion, and act against the evident
will of the people on an issue, for instance in installing US missiles
European
Now that modern communications and information-processing
countries.
make it feasible to determine the mix of public positions on major
case for representative procedures is dissolved.
century
19th
issues,
a
issues.
The
reduced
power
excessive
back
at
developments,
issue-regulated
and
large
imposes
complex
other
modern
What
requirements.
by
states
government
recent
technological
Firstly,
smaller
initial
grouping
than
giant
states,
integration of groups by principles of federation.
as it is
to
informed
citizens
of
satisfactory
a
approximate
goodwill.
As
there are serious deficiencies in
the
information
in
present
progressive
and
procedure,
depends
control,
nation-states,
even
and
release
the
distribution
information,
channels, and so forth.
acceptable
the
from
These
distortion
restrictive
of
most liberal of them (and
Again, especially with new and less
But there are
evidently vested interests which stand to benefit from the limited
of
upon
nuclear problems have again made patent,
systems, there is little excuse for this.
information
upward
Secondly, democracy, insofar
political
related deficiencies as regards education).
publicly
democratic
like many other social arrangements, appear to function better with
procedures,
flow
and
called for are smaller
are
groupings, information flow, communication and education.
and
major
on
governmental power to more participatory democratic forms, a route made
possible even in
expensive
least
of governments would, to that extent at
But the route down through
least, be reduced.
much
elected
way that is thoroughly ambiguous on most issues) are not given an almost
free hand on every issue, but are required to answer
policy
the
It is past time
for more issue-controlled democratic procedures, where governments once
(in
some
in
of
data
features
in
have
availability
major communication
helped
in
making
present deliberately fostered pattern of nation-state
56
confrontation, and in establishing the prisoner's
superstates
nuclear
are
often
seen
to
be
dilemma
type
the
situation
locked into (on which see, e.g.,
Hardin).
A central argument, arising from the nuclear fix, for
current
questioning
arrangements and seriously considering their adjustment (in theory at
political
least), takes the following shape:e
Political arrangements should answer back to certain
in
justified
terms
doing
of
at
where
least
are
so.These requirements include such things as
enabling good and meaningful and moral lives for those
arrangements,
and
requirements
(as
certainly
in
who
under
operate
the
much of the West) the basic
material conditions for such lives are met.
*
Because of the nuclear fix, nation-state arrangements have
these
requirements.
For
guarantee the prospect of
arrangements.
nation-states,
good
and
at least in the North, can no longer
meaningful
to
lives
their
yet there is a non-negligible probability that
person's morality is jeopardised if the person is obliged
a
under
those
such lives may terminate, less than fulfilled, in this way.
support
meet
A life's meaningfulness is certainly diminished if it ends before
its prime in a nuclear disaster;
many
to
ceased
state
to
Furthermore a
in
acquiesce
or
engaged in nuclear war preparation or nuclear deterrence (cf.
Benn).
Therefore, nation-state arrangements have
should
be
not all) nation-states:
have
their
justification,
and
Variations on this type of argument apply to many (though
amended.
nation-states
forfeited
it is not only because of the
forfeited
their
mandate.
nuclear
Political
fix
that
some
obligations to such
states are correspondingly dissolved.
There is enough evidence that power-brokers who control
sight
of,
or
worse
have
lost
don't care about, the point of political arrangements, of
what justifies or is supposed to justify their states.
78.
states
This
applies
both
to
How they answer back admits of expansion in various ways, depending on the
underlying political theory.
Rawls,
for example,
puts it in familiar
contractual form:
that the political order is 'a cooperative venture for
mutual advantage' (p.4). Mao puts it in a standard democratic way:
'since
the purpose of all political processes is nothing but to serve the people
and their interests,
it is the people who should control in a meaningful
way, the government' (see Soo, p.68).
57
more powerful states and to lesser states, both
claim
popular
to
a
put
value
higher
on
military situations:
sovereignty
they do on human
than
for copious evidence see
principles
the
just
of
warfare
repeatedly, as have many other principles.
violated
'nuclear
where
Kuper).
This
by Israel, Vietnam and many other states in nonnuclear
illustrated
already
some
have
more often, they act without it or
as
national
survival' (Schell's conclusion, p.210;
is
brokers
The situation has been reached
against the will of the people.
powers
where,
and
mandate
the
where
blatantly
been
have
Such states have forfeited
much of what claim they had to external respect or internal political obedience;
so, on other grounds, have many other states.
It could just be, of course, as is often
alternatives,
that have
or
been
insinuated,
though
effort
little
but
option of world government).
for
dismissed,
As
to
all
whether
little
opportunity
not
do
to
and
work,
appear
to
we
Down.
There
working towards the weakening
especially
on
the
alternatives
can
be
may
and
have
given
been
know very little about how humans
sufficient
give
organising and trying out alternative
Way
such
alternatives
But,
operate under substantially different arrangements.
accessible
expended
been
has
instance as lacking feasibility, it is difficult to be entirely
sure without taking the risk of being dogmatic;
deadlines
no
the range of alternatives or their features (except perhaps for the
researching
very
are
there
But alternatives there are,
no possibly better alternatives.
glimpsed,
that
to
time
arrangements,
even
again,
once
very far on
proceed
those
nuclear
of
the
more
be time to proceed a little way however, in
breakdown
of
the
larger
superunions, which are the immediate problem.
invalid to simply conclude that alternative political and
nuclear
states,
Thus it would be
social
arrangements,
theoretically feasible and certainly a longer-term goal, do not presently
while
offer a part of the practical response to the nuclear fix.
But there is no need to insist upon a single-track Way Out of
dilemma
to
the
exclusion of all others:
quite the contrary.
the
nuclear
We can not only
afford to be fairly catholic about "second best" approaches and embrace whatever
seems to be working or looks like helping, within recognised ethical (and other)
constraints;
indeed, given the urgency,
the
direness
of
the
situation,
we
58
should
as
fairly catholic and not inflexibly committed to narrow methods, such
be
bogged
down
(and
very
on
arms
limitations
negotiations
should
methods
perservered
be
unrepresentative)
certainly
and
between main nuclear states.
made
attempts
and
with,
No-first-use declaration, a ban on weapons in space, etc.
But even such
to
e.g.
superstates,
the
from
concessions
significant
undemocratic
further
wring
jointly
a
signed
The direction of most
hope for progress has however come into view, a direction that is not especially
The political means of the Way Out are what they have
new.
larger
every
liberal
on
issue that has mattered:
humanitarian
or
been
from outside
state governmental apparatus by organised pressure from within or
and
it,
characteristically Bottom-Up
methods
are
considerations
familiar
alternatives
self-organising
furnishing
by
and
practically
virtually
upon
without
bypass
which
it,
Top-Down.
never
Such
but part of the more general, and very effective,
case against reliance upon states for a range of things they are now supposed to
but
supply,
which
can
almost
that
effectively and for
invariably
matter
be
obtained, where required, more
expensively
less
without
(and
them
their
monopolies).
In the case of security it is states, with very few exceptions,
imposed,
or
frequently
The opposition to the
local
from
have
in, military solutions involving nuclear installations
acquiesced
and nuclear weapons.
that
neighbourhood
and
escalating
groups,
fix
nuclear
has
come
some of them now federated
across nations (so the direction is not really interstate).
These
have
groups
been successful in blocking some nuclear installations and establishing, for the
time
being,
against
movement
nuclear-free
some
nuclear
neighbourhoods.
equipment
The
patchwork
grass-roots
is strongest in Europe, which is - as the
movement realised, and what gave it impetus - a leading theatre, on US strategic
thinking,
for
a
limited
nuclear
war
not
touching
extremely doubtful that increasing NATO and American
Europe
will
make
it
a
safer
place:
American shores.
nuclear
installations
removed
installations
in
on the contrary it seems probable that
Europe will become much safer if the anti-nuclear movements
these
It is
succeed
and Europe rendered nuclear-free.
grossly immoral conduct will thereby also be considerably reduced.
in
having
The chances of
59
What of the spectre of Soviet domination, military, ideological and
in
Except
case
the
Europe,
of
other?
where the inexcusable suppression of Eastern
Europe all too evidently persists, this is an obvious fabrication.
Does
anyone
expect the united Soviets to absorb China, let alone take over Canada
seriously
or Brasil say?
And even in Western Europe the spectre is
failing
partly
giant
fashioned
financially
dominated
and
economically
politically and ideologically, by the USA.
ideologically,
dominated
propped
exaggerated,
up by the NATO powers'
and
some
in
and,
some measure,
Indeed much of the "free"
world
is
adequately
not
countered
military
by
The
means.
domination to which nuclear weapons are considered relevant
insofar
as
is
basic
any
in
mode of
But
military.
military, and associated political, domination of Western Europe by
the Soviets is a
problem,
there
are
several
ways
other
predominantly American nuclear weapons to mitigate it.
only local defence arrangements - whether top-down
alternative
is
it dominated economically, by the USA.
of
That is not generally considered so much of a problem (as it is?9), and
case
a
Since the last World War, Western Europe has been
military-industrial alliance.
increasingly
largely
and
much
methods
social
—
but
also
some
on
methods,
or
restructuring, such as
social
power
to
dispersed
local
more cooperation and interchange with the Soviets and
much
and
reliance
These should include not
state-supplied
decentralisation, regionalisation and devolution of
organisations,
than
Eastern Europe.
Part of the point of
whether
external
or
restructuring
internal,
so
is
especially
situations, is to
state-contrived
79.
break
make
military
any
takeover,
much more difficult and pointless, and the
restoration of local control easier.Part of
interchange,
to
the
point
of
cooperation
and
at the level of more ordinary people, in more ordinary
down
conditions
of
hostility
and
distrust
and
to
sabotage
the
West-East confrontations, and thereby to remove
For many peoples of the world, and in its impact on the natural world,
advanced corporate capitalism is an oppressive and damaging doctrine. But,
in contrast with austere Marxism-Leninism which would improve the lot of
some of the oppressed world while even worsening the impact on the natural
world, corporate capitalism admits a certain pluralism, and recognises many
more individual rights and liberties. Certainly Marxism-Leninism which
appears to degenerate in practice to an authoritarian and totalitarian
position is a less welcome alternative.
It is fortunate, then, that we need
be saddled with neither:
there are superior options.
60
other
expenditures.81
popular
and
for,
motives
Western
support
Europe,
for
for,
long
military
much
too
adventures
partial
to
and
military
adventures, should now be helping itself rather than relying on a leaky American
nuclear
umbrella
for its defence.
Moreover it ought to be, at the very least,
uncomfortable about the risks of catastrophically damaging
the
world
in
the
of
interests
its own security.
extensive
parts
of
Nor should other "nuclear
dependent" states be prepared to acquiesce in this not uncharacteristic European
imposition.
world, what
There
LSN
is
war
no
risks,
enormous
for
virtue
Western
in sacrificing other parts of the
Europe,
military-based domination to other parts of the world.
which
has
long
exported
There are better options
than dubious and risky nuclear shields for Europe.
80.
Thus, for example, to the extent that local defence groups are integrated
under more centralised direction, it would be a built-in principle that
surrender of the central directing section absolved the federated groups
from following suit or following further directions. That is, through
devolution of power,
surrender becomes structurally impossible (though
individuals or basic groups may surrender). Moreover, the central section
would hold only limited information about the federated
units
it
integrated.
The locally organised groups themselves, which would merge
with local populations, would be trained in tactics of passive resistance,
sabotage,
(nonviolent) guerilla warfare, etc.
The net effect (as C.
Pigden, who made most of these points, argues) would be to make the cost of
military conquest, occupations and exploitation prohibitively high.
One reason why the Japanese Army High Command decided against invasion of
Australia in March 1942 was the character of Australians and the fact that
they 'would resist to the end' (Threats to Australia's Security, p.62).
Yet
the 1942 (war reduced) Australian population was substantially
untrained and unorganised for locally—based defence. With such a defence
restructuring, Australia would not only much reduce its vulnerability to
military adventures, but remove standard reasons for succumbing to threats
of outside military domination, blackmail, and the like.
81.
In particular, with sufficient cooperation
and
trust,
competitive
prisoner's dilemma situations, which depend on the prisoners being kept
separate, are removed.
So too a main model supporting deterrence policy
would be undercut.
And the arguments from national dangers would be
further corroded.
In the same direction, it is important to extend cooperation between USA
and USSR down below the level of state trade deals, e.g.
in grain and gas,
to communication and cooperation between people. For such commercial deals
there is sufficient trust, even in periods of intensive confrontation: why
should it not be so also at more significant people-to-people levels? Many
further sorts of interrelationship are feasible, and inexpensive by
military standards, e.g. sister cities, common clubs, worker exchanges,
gift projects.
If, for instance, 100,000 or more ordinary Americans were
living, working or holidaying in USSR (and vice versa), Americans would
feel less enthusiasm for hurling nuclear missiles into Russia (or vice
versa).
Only quite inadequate efforts have been made to build up mutual
respect and trust; on the contrary, a lot of resources have been expended
to encourage precisely the opposite attitudes, e.g.
as part of the
strategy of the "cold war".
61
What the anti-nuclear movements must press
for
and disarmament (and, on the more
perceptive
transarmament,
to
conversion
i.e.
outer
of
edges
graduated
movements,
the
alternative social defence arrangements).
But the argument also makes it clearer how far this should go,
through
in
in part it is what they have been pushing for, nuclear reduction
broad outline:
way
clear
accordingly
is
namely
all
the
disarmament^^ to total nuclear disarmament,
unilateral
certainly to local disarmament across progressively larger parts of the planet's
surface,
including
especially
Europe.
For
once
state is demoted, its
the
importance and the necessity of its maintenance properly downgraded and reliance
on
decision-making
its
diminished
decision-making - once all that is
happen),
in
duly
of
favour
more localised control and
for
allowed
not
does
(it
need
to
major component in the nuclear fix is removed, namely the problem
one
of reduction or even loss of state sovereignty.
Maintenance of that sovereignty
has been assigned a mistaken importance, which in turn accounts for the mistaken
weight assigned to the arguments from national dangers.
What is
and
important
worth preserving is not the sovereign state, but certain ways of life within the
state.
The nation-state and dangers to it, and accompanying
features
such
as
misplaced nationalism, are the weakest links in the nuclear fix situation.
Once the demise of the sovereign nation-state is allowed for, the arguments
from
national
concerning
particular.
dangers
individual
also
and
group
rights
and
In
freedoms,
by
the
that
nation-state.
matter
The
are
82.
to
arguments
liberties
in
for
them,
as
smaller
exclusively
or
nation-state is neither sufficient for
are
disappearing,
nor
community arrangements can ensure them.
But
arguments from individual and group dangers remain, do they not?
risks
are
civil
necessarily
them, since in increasingly many states these liberties
necessary
place
their
None of these require national sovereignty or even a national life.
None of the rights and freedoms
guaranteed
disintegrate.
individuals and groups remain:
To
be
sure,
that has always been so,83 and is not
The initial but important steps are at zero cost as regards deterrence.
Were deterrence really the policy there would be little case for more than
a fraction of present nuclear arsenals.
The steps to disarmament are
well-known, e.g.
the scrapping of obsolete weapons, and an end to
modernisation, the removal of nuclear weapons in crucial theatres such as
Europe, etc.
62
being changed but only worsened in this age of
mostly
to
want
that
sure
be
or
other
outsiders.
People
their lives will continue to run their course,
ideally in a flourishing fashion, and will not be
Russians
nation-states.
nuclear
controlled
Americans
by
or
Nuclear arrangements which threaten their lives
are not a rational route to these ends.
In the weigh-up that should occur in charting a way
as
dilemmas
the
out
of
deontic
such
fix and its subsidiary dilemmas, there are then much
nuclear
more important elements than features of the nation-state, namely some of
those
the state is supposed to safeguard, such as individual and local welfare
things
and autonomy;
weapons.
but those things are better ensured by
main reasons are familiar:
The
threaten the loss of basic values,
such
removal
the
nuclear
of
in particular, nuclear circumstances
as
and
welfare
autonomy,
many
for
creatures and regions, and the potential loss is in general much greater than in
a nuclear-free situation (even should another
with
example, the production of nuclear weapons reduces both local
of
the
opportunity
remain
armed
There are also well-known supplementary reasons;
weapons).
nuclear
party
ideological
welfare
for
(because
costs of weapons manufacture) and autonomy (because of the
accompanying security measures).
Thus
the
appropriately
devices
and
fix
nuclear
resolved,
it
can
deploy,
and
considerable reduction of state sovereignty.
how),
and
since
rate,
any
by
by
allowing
for
the
But, although that is a reasonable
Way Out, at little cost in the circumstances, it will be
practice,
at
theoretically
sovereignty of the state (especially as to what nuclear
limiting
weapons
is
strongly
resisted
in
those who hold power hold it, in one way or another, under the
auspices of the state.
This is a main reason why people must organise
and
act
against the state.
Again the resolution also looks practical enough, since
sovereignty
reduction
in
need apply essentially only to the the production and deployment of
nuclear weapons.
83.
the
Indeed
it
could
in
principle
be
obtained
by
negotiated
It will remain so under any satisfactory political arrangements.
Until
human social arrangements change substantially, there is no substitute for
on-going vigilance to ensure or maintain political liberty.
63
agreement (at the top levels of state).
However
to
get
this
far
with
the
superstates, the limitations of state-power will likely have to proceed further:
for nuclear weaponry does not stand in splendid isolation.
into
both
concerned.
systems
military
and
(civil)
Rather
it
tied
is
industrial production of the states
So, unsurprisingly, practical-looking resolutions are being
solidly
resisted by superstates.
Accordingly more popular (bottom up) action against nuclear-involved states
especially
and
the superstates, after all the states causing the most
against
serious dilemmas, will have to be taken much further.
variety
of
organised
forms.
Once again it will take a
These include a refusal to contribute to nuclear
of
war preparation, either directly or
indirectly.
widely,
blockading of shipments of uranium, and the
from
such
steps
as
the
forms
The
action
range
refusal of supplies and services to sailors on nuclear ships and submarines,
to
withholding or redirection of taxes destined for nuclear security purposes.
the
They include as well the whole
nuclear
installations
and
range
of
nonviolent
facilities
protest
which
(methods
methods
against
do
exclude
not
incapacitation and decommissioning of equipment, and which do include new
model
resistance and defence organisations). 8**
It is important to realise that petitioning of
power
state
representatives
and
holders, for instance through letter campaigns, demonstrations and direct
appeal, is far from a complete strategy, and may be ineffective or ignored,
the results discouraging.
and
This is one reason why popular action should be based
on a more comprehensive political
strategy,
which
also
involves
withdrawing
support from prevailing state arrangements, and working out and participating in
alternative arrangements, especially
alternative
defence
forms.Sufficient
details as to what to do are already known, enough to make an immediate start.
84.
For some impression of the range of methods, see again Sharp.
85.
For much more on all these points, see e.g.
further Appendix 2.
Martin.
As to what to do, see
64
APPENDIX 1. ON THE FATE OF MANKIND AND THE EARTH,
according to Schell, and to Anders.
A
series
of
nuclear
prophets
has
produced
a
series
of
philosophically-oriented works on nuclear war and the alleged implications of
human extinction.^ The series is important for its deeper penetration into the
nuclear dilemma, down to metaphysical levels;
in this the series contrasts with
the transient superficialities of much of the political commentary.
The most
widely circulated and influential text of the series is undoubtedly that of the
slightest of the "prophets , Schell's The Fate of the Earth.
This skillful
piece of media—philosophy uncannily redeploys some of the apparently deep
phenomenological themes of Anders. So, conveniently, main assumptions of Schell
and Anders can often be considered together. To criticise their assumptions is
not of course to belittle their work.
In particular, Schell's little book, for
all its political shortcomings, is having a significant and much needed effect
in shifting attitudes towards nuclear arrangements.
It is especially valuable
for its vivid and horrifying scenarios of the aftermath of nuclear attack.
Unfortunately it also exhibits, both philosophically and factually,
severe
defects.
Some of it is simply garbage:
to select one example,
consider
the
claim
that
'without ... a world-wide program of action for preserving the
[human] species .... nothing else that we undertake together can make
any practical or moral sense ...
(p.173, rearranged).
This should certainly be rejected philosophically; for there is no separate
moral issue of such overwhelming importance that all other issues become morally
neutral. Moral issues remain moral issues:
they don't cease to be so when
compared with more important moral issues (as Schell effectively acknowledges
elsewhere, p.130). And the claim should also be junked on more factual grounds.
Humans form a highly resilient species, like rabbits in Australia a survivor
species,
unlikely to be exterminated under
presently
arranged
nuclear
holocausts.
1.
The distinguishing term is from Foley's Nuclear Prophets, where many of the
leading prophets are assessed. One well-known prophet not so considered
there is Jaspers, presumably because his main work (which might equally
well have been translated as The Fate of Mankind) comes out in entirely the
wrong direction.
For it gives heavy philosophical attire
to
the
better-dead-than-red abomination.
A main argument against Jaspers so presented is simple. However bad being
red might become (at present it is debatably worse than living under some
of the totalitarian regimes the free West props up), it still gives humans
a further chance for good lives, since regimes fall or can be toppled: but
total annihilation removes that all-important opportunity.
But Jaspers does not present his position so simply. Rather his contention
is that there are circumstances where and principles for which a person or
group of persons ought to sacrifice even their lives. Freedom is such:
a
life worth living is a free life. But the latter point can be granted
without conceding that sacrifice is a possible means to it.
While the
sacrifice of one or a few lives may be a possible (if dubiously effective)
way to free lives for others, certainly the sacrifice of all lives is not a
possible route to free lives for all, since no human lives remain.
To this
extent Schell is right (on p.131) in accusing Jaspers of an each to__ all
fallacy.
Jasper's idea that "the free life that they try to save by all
possible means is more than mere life or lives" breaks down when applied to
all participating people. None can gain free lives by extinction of all:
that is not a possible route to life even.
65
The example was selected however because it leads into, indeed presupposes,
two of the major defective assumptions in the work of Schell and Anders:
51.
Nuclear war will eliminate life, human life at least, on earth (the
extinction assumption);
and
52.
In the absence of humans, very many notions, not only those of morality
and value, but those of time and space for example, make no sense; or, to put
it into a more sympathetic philosophical form, these notions depend for their
sense on an actual human context (the extravagant anthropocentric assumption).
It is applications of S2 which give Anders'
and Schell's work ^ some of its
apparent philosophical depth, and certainly induce much philosophical puzzlement
through the paradoxical propositions generated. But the frequent applications
of S2 depend essentially on SI. For without total extinction there will be
humans about, to make past and future, good and evil, go on making sense!
Granted the factual assumption SI is by no means ruled out as a real
possibility; granted the technological means are now available to make it true,
to render Homo sapiens extinct;^
granted the prospect of nuclear war does
threaten leading centres of Western civilization with obliteration. Even so SI
appears unlikely in the light of present - admittedly inadequate - information.
Even in Canada, which lies on the polar route of Soviet missiles, human life
should be able to continue in certain northern areas (according to Canadian
medical studies). Schell's argument to SI is extremely flimsy. It depends, for
example, on an unjustified extrapolation from the Northern to the Southern
Hemisphere, but for the most part it does that very North American thing, of
contracting the world to North America.
(All that matters, all worthwhile
civilization,
is in USA, or at least, to be more charitable, in North America
and Europe, which will also be wiped out, i.e. its human population will be
eliminated in the nuclear holocaust.) Some of the data Schell relies upon, for
example the effect of nuclear explosions on the ozone layer, is significantly
out of date. Other effects than ozone destruction apparently transfer even less
well from North to South. A factually superior study of nuclear disaster than
Schell's,
by Preddey and others,
indicates that parts of the Southern
Hemisphere, New Zealand and southern latitudes of Africa and Latin America could
escape relatively unscathed from even most massive northern exchanges.*'
Both Anders and Schell remark on the "impossibility of unlearning" the
means of manufacturing nuclear bombs.
It would seem that extinction, which they
both foresee as at least a live possibility, would furnish a good medium for
unlearning nuclear technology (something very like this emerges from van
Daniken's theory of an earlier "high" technology). In virtue of S2, they would
however exclude such a possibility as a case of unlearning, contending wrongly
2.
For a detailed comparison of Schell and Anders' remarkably similar versions
of S2, see Foley JS.
3.
Thus the Last Man argument, important in environmental ethics, is no longer
merely hypothetical, awaiting the remote death of the Sun, but assumes new
urgency.
It is this sort of argument that connects environmental ethics
and nuclear ethics, at a deeper metaphysical level. The Bomb and Bulldozer
are out of the same technological Pandora's box.
Nuclear technology is not the only route to human extinction, nor the only
Pandora's box.
Biological and chemical means are perhaps even more
effective, and certainly can be more selective in what gets extinguished.
4.
However, new modellings and estimates, none so far very reliable, keep
appearing, and amending the picture. On the basis of one recent scenario,
generated by a computer modelling of a 5000 megaton nuclear exchange,
the
immunity of the Southern Hemisphere to the dire consequences of a northern
LSN war has been questioned.
In particular, Sagan, no doubt overreaching
the evidence, has 'warn[ed] that the nuclear blasts would create enormous
differences in temperature between south and north,
shifting normal wind
patterns and carrying smoke and radioactivity south' (Newsweek, November 7
1983, p.56).
Some sections of the environmental and peace movements have a
vested interest in exaggerating the probable effects of nuclear holocaust
for life on earth, much as many statesmen have an interest in minimizing
them.
66
that the notion no longer made sense.
But what they seem to want to suggest
with the impossibility-of-unlearning message is the inevitability of the
development and eventual use of the technology - as if having learnt the means
all else was determined, and manufacture and use ceased to be a matter of
choice. Certainly such views have been floated $.
But they are not tenable.
There are many examples of technological advances that have not been taken
advantage of, and there are even cases of technological developments that have
been manufactured but not marketed or used. There is not something very special
about nuclear apparatus that puts it beyond the scope of such generalisations.
Both Schell and Anders do claim that there are very special things about
nuclear weapons, in particular that they do not allow "experiments . Even if
this were true - it is certainly not of smaller weapons - it would not tell
against the previous argument against the inevitability of nuclear weapons. And
in fact Anders and (even) Schell hedge their claims about testing, and the
limits to nuclear scientific work,
to large-scale weapons and independent
experiments which do not interfere with the observers and those outside the
"laboratories".
Again they have latched onto major points:
in particular, we
have at present no way of testing the cumulative effects of large nuclear
weapons in concert, e.g.
for more holistic effects such as fireballs or
firestorms, electromagnetic pulse or ozone destruction. Short of an LSN war,
and likely enough with it, these crucial effects must remain largely untested
and hypothetical in character.
The penetration of human chauvinism, as in S2, is not something peculiar to
Schell, but is a product of Western philosophy, European philosophy especially.
This chauvinism is unfortunately alive and still well, Anders'
version of S2
being just one striking illustration(cf. AA
p.252ff.).
It has also deeply
penetrated Anglo-American philosophy,
and has
recently been extended
by
Wittgenstein's work, where even the necessary truths of mathematics are taken to
be a product of human conventions, and would vanish with humans!
Such are
alleged implications of
extinction;
but the
fact is that the truths of
arithmetic are in no way dependent on the existence of humans or humanoids or of
gods or giraffes.
In Schell, human chauvinism is dished up in a particularly
powerful and obnoxious Kantian form.
Thoughts and propositions, time and
tenses, history and memories, values and morality, all depend on the life-giving
presence of human beings — past or future or merely potential humans are not
enough,
persons that are not humans are certainly not enough. Thus, according
to Schell (p.140, e.g.), '...
the thought "Humanity is now extinct" is an
impossible one for a rational person, because as soon as tt is, we^ are not.
In
imagining any other event, we look ahead to a moment that is still within the
stream of human time,
...
'. The thought is however perfectly possible for
humans; we can have it right now. Though we no doubt have it falsely, a later
rational creature may well be able to have it truly.
Schell erroneously denies
that:
there is no "later" '... outside the human tenses of past, present, and
future
...'
(p.140)6.
Human extinction eliminates 'the creature that divides
time into past, present and future':
so annihilation cannot
'come to pass'
(p.143).
But it is simply false that the tenses are human;
the tenses depend
on a local time ordering (perceptible to many creatures other than humans, but
not depending at all on that perceptibility for its viability) relating other
times to the present, to now (also a human-independent location,
evident to
other creatures, and borne witness to by such sequences as the passing seasons).
And annihilation may also too easily come to pass, for many humans in the North
at least, as it came to pass in recent geological times that humans began to
exist upon earth. Before that there was a time before there were any human
beings.
5.
Not merely by technological determinists of marxist persuasion. Hackworth,
a former US general, argues by straight induction, that if the US military
has a weapon it will use it.
6.
The appalling theme that humans create past, present and future
repeated elsewhere, e.g.
p.173.
(etc.)
is
67
Anders' argument for the demise of time, that 'what has been will no longer
be even what has been', is also explicitly and narrowly verificationist:
'for
what would the difference be between what has only been and what has never been,
if there is no one to remember the things that have been' (AA p.245). There
would still remain many sorts of difference;
for one, the history recorded in
many
other organisms would be different.
Temporal themes do not lack
'legitimacy because not registered [or
verified]
by
anyone';
truth,
significance, still less meaning, are not matters of human verification.
Here, as elsewhere, the human chauvinism is mixed with other distorting
metaphysical assumptions of our Western heritage, in particular, verificationism
and ontological assumptions (to the effect that there are severe difficulties in
talking about what does not exist).
Thus,
for example, Schell takes over
dubious metaphysics from Freud, according to whom "it is indeed impossible to
imagine our own death; and whenever we attempt to do so, we can perceive that
we are in fact still present as spectators" (p.138). The second clause goes a
good distance towards refuting the first.
In fact there is no great difficulty
in describing counterfactual situations which undermine both Freud's claims.
The same goes for Schell's extensions of human chauvinism into one of its main
traditional strongholds, value theory:
'...
the simple and basic fact [sic!]
that before there can be good or evil, service or harm, lamenting or rejoicing
there must be life', human life (p.171).
These are no facts, but deeply
entrenched
philosophical
dogmas which have been exposed and criticised
elsewhere?.
Naturally some things will disappear with the extinction of humans:
trivially there will be no more humans (unless humans re-evolve or are
recreated), and thus no more human institutions,
human activities, human
emotions, and so forth. But it is already going too far to suggest, as Anders
does, that there will accordingly be 'no thought, no love, no struggle, no pain,
no hope,
no comfort, no sacrifice, no image, no song
For there are, and
may continue to exist, other creatures than humans with emotion,
struggles,
songs..........
Nor will the ending of all such human ventures, if it comes to
pass, show that all past human ventures have been 'all in vain', meaningless,
and already so to say dead. The decay of the solar system, or the heat-death of
the universe even, will not show that worthwhile human activities were not
worthwhile.
Several of the other notions and themes common to Schell and Anders derive
from their shared assumptions SI and S2. It is these that underlie the biblical
notion (in Revelations) of a Second Death, redeployed by both.
'The death of
mankind', under SI, is reckoned a 'second death', because by S2 and SI remaining
life is rendered meaningless and already 'seems to be dead' (AA p.244, S p.166)
and is already 'overhung with death' (S p.166). Thus, too, more trivially, a
person faces 'a second death', not merely one's own but in addition that greater
death of the species and all future generations (S p.166, p.115). However even
if nuclear extinction came to pass, the stronger notion would not be vindicated,
because it depends on the fallacious inference to the meaninglessness of
preceding life and on the
very
questionable
representation
of
this
meaninglessness as a sort of death. There is no Second Death: creatures die
just once, perhaps all at about the same time. The idea of a Second Death lacks
even a solid metaphysical base.
From SI, together with the minor principle that extinction being an
absolute doesn't differ in degree, comes the universality of peril theme that
'we are all exposed to peril in the same degree', which is accordingly
'disguised' and 'difficult to recognise', because there is no contrast (AE p.64;
S p.150). This theme falls with SI.
In any event, not all peoples are equally
imperilled by the nuclear situation, the Indians of southern Patagonia being
7.
See, e.g., 'Human chauvinism and environmental ethics',
in Environmental
Philosophy (edited D.
Mannison and others), Research School of Social
Sciences, Australian National University, 1980.
8.
Anders is here (AA pp.244-5) relying upon a version of the
perserverence, criticised in detail in Routley and Griffin.
argument
from
68
rather better placed than the Germans of northern Europe. Nor are all people
equally locked into the situation or incapacitated by it;
as explained, the
position is different in different countries and places.
Nor, likewise, are all people equally responsible, an obnoxious theme,
which Schell (in contrast to Anders) repeatedly infiltrates. This is the Pogo
theme, according to which
S3. Responsibility for the present
nuclear
situation (fiasco,
really)
distributes onto everybody, it belongs to every human in the world.
But there is also, mixed in, a weaker more plausible claim that gives lie to the
stronger one, namely that we have some responsibility (the Nazi situation is
compared). An especially blatant example of the Pogo themeruns as follows:
'...
the world's political leaders ...
though they now menace the earth with
nuclear weapons, do so only with our permission, and even at our bidding.
At
least,
this is true for democracies'
(pp.229-30). The theme is elaborated
elsewhere:
'... we are the authors of that extinction. (For the populations
of the superpowers this is true in a positive sense, since we pay for extinction
and support the governments that pose the threat of it, while for the peoples of
the non-nuclear-armed world it is true only in the negative sense that they fail
to try to do anything about the danger)'
(p.152).
But this is more of an
argument indicting representative government, by revealing its insensitivity and
unresponsiveness to many of the populace they allegedly govern, not to mention
those affected by its activities who are not represented at all (namely
foreigners). But Schell conveniently neglects all such points:
'...
we are
potential mass killers. The moral cost of nuclear armaments is that it makes of
all of us underwriters of the slaughter of hundreds of millions'
(p.152).
And
again '[as]
perpetrators
... we convey the steady message ...
that life not
only is not sacred but is worthless;
that ...
it had been judged acceptable
for everyone to be killed' (p.153). Little of this is true. Those who campaign
against nuclear arrangements, vote against nuclear-committed parties so far as
is possible,
and the like, are certainly not the authors of potential
destruction, and responsibility for the nuclear situation does not simply
distribute onto them. Nor does responsibility - or the unlikely opinions as to
worth Schell illegitimately attributes to everyone - fall on those who have done
less.
Responsibility for decisions taken in "liberal democracies" even by
representatives (in the unlikely event of this happening in the case of anything
as important as defence) cannot be traced back to those represented, since among
9.
An interesting converse of this theme is sometimes advanced, that no one is
responsible, the whole thing is out of control. The technological version
of this no-responsibility theme is discussed shortly. More satisfactory is
the theme that nuclear arrangements are out of political control, but for
reasons, in terms of vested interests in keeping nuclear things going,
which enable responsibility to be distributed. The vested interests, which
bear considerable responsibility, include the military weapons industry,
and research and academic communities. Under pressures for re-election
especially, politicians give in to these powerful groups, so losing control
of political processes. The argument fails at its final stage. For many
politicians either belong to or represent vested interests. Thus political
processes
tend rather to reflect vested interests than to run out of
political control.
10.
Another example of spreading the responsibility runs as follows:
'The
self-extinction of our species is not an act that anyone describes as sane
or sensible; nevertheless, it is an act that, without quite admitting it
to ourselves, we plan in certain circumstances to commit' (p.186). Even
for most of the planners, extinction is presumably not part of "the plan",
but an unintended consequence; and most of us have little or no role in
the planning, enough of us even campaign against the planning.
Further
'the world
... chose the course of attempting to refashion the system of
sovereignty to accommodate nuclear weapons'
(p.194):
the world?
This
connects
of
course with the ideological argument from defence of
fundamentals,
e.g.
for liberty,
for the (USA) nation,
and against
socialism.
In the course of this argument yet another fallacious
assumption is rolled out:
'The means to the end are not limited, for the
end itself sets the limits in each case' (p.189).
69
many other things, a representative is only representative of a party which
offers a complex and often ill-characterised package of policies, and a voter
may vote for zero or more policies of this package.
Only in the (uncommon)
event of a clear single issue referendum, which is adopted, can responsibility,
still of a qualified sort, be sheeted home, to those who voted for it, not to
every one in the community. While S3 is false, there is an important related
theme that is much more plausible; namely that the present nuclear situation
generates responsibilities for every socially involved person (this theme is
discussed in Appendix 2).
When moreover the Pogo assumption is disentangled from accompanying themes,
part of what results is decidedly along the right lines; namely
S4. The controllers [not to be confused, in Schell's fashion, with all of us]
have failed to change our pre-nuclear institutions. The sovereign system is out
of step with the nuclear age, the one-earth system,
etc.
(the whole earth
theme). Though Schell remains relatively clear about the serious defects of the
state and the frequently immoral purposes for which the state is used,
unfortunately he often loses sight of this important theme (indicated pp.187-8).
Yet S4 forms part of Schell's critique of the state which is, by and large,
scattered and fragmentary.
As observed (in §8),
Schell arrives at the
conclusion that the nation-state has outlasted its usefulness, and that new
political institutions more 'consonant with the global reality' are required as
a matter of urgency. But he evades what he admits is the major task, making out
viable alternatives.
At most he makes some passing gestures, some pointing
towards the Way Up.
Solutions to the nuclear dilemma come,
if not easily,
in a similar
simplistic way,
from the Top Down;
those who can must appeal to the Top (cf.
p.230). Schell places his hope in treaties for arms reduction and limitations
(such as SALT) and in world government (as with the United Nations).
Given the
record of these organisations and treaties, the negotiations and regulators,
it
is by now a pathetic faith. Nor is a serious need felt for further analysis of
the nuclear situation, to investigate the origins of nuclear technology,
to
explore the roots of nuclear blindness,
to consider effective changes to
military-industrial organisation and ways of life.
But some of the requisite deeper analysis of the nuclear situation and,
more generally,
of the roots of war can be found elsewhere.*2 The roots of the
nuclear fix are not confined to the ideologically-aligned arrangements of
nation-states, but penetrate also into key components of those states, their
military, their controlling classes, and their supporting bureaucracies.
And
both within the arrangements of states, what accounts in part for the
arrangements, and in key components of the states, a conspicuous and crucial
feature is the drive for power and domination.^ Thus the push for [nuclear]
superiority by the super-states,
to be achieved through military-oriented
science and technology, which involves and enables domination, in several
interrelated forms. The main power-base is the large nation-state, where enough
surplus product can be accumulated (from at home and from abroad, and bled from
nature) to proceed with military and bureaucratic ambitions and to found the
high-technology research and development means to ever more expendable power and
energy.
In changing the structural arrangements to eliminate the prospect of
nuclear war, it is not ultimately enough just to downgrade the main power-base,
it is also important to alter key components of the state,
the nation-state;
and, more sweepingly,
to remove trouble-making patterns embedded in all these
social and political arrangements, namely patterns of domination, patterns
manifested not only in state political organisation, but in white-coloured
relations,
male-female
relations,
human-animal
relations,
human-nature
relations;
to remove, in short, chauvinistic relations. However not everything
and especially p.227, bottom paragraph.
11.
See p.225ff.
12.
In Anders and elaborated in Foley, and more straightforwardly,
in Martin.
The incomplete list of items given above, to be investigated in a deeper
analysis of the nuclear situation, paraphrases Foley JS p.164.
70
needs to be accomplished at once;
and the cluster of damaging power and
domination relations tied into war can be tackled separately. And there the
problems can largely be narrowed to certain problems of states and certain key
components of states.
In what analysis he does offer of the problem with states,
Schell repeats
the familiar false contrast of state expediency with morality, as a contrast
between "raison d'etat and the Socratic—Christian ethics.
The teaching that
'the end justifies the means is the basis on which governments, in all times,
have licensed themselves to commit crimes of every sort'
(p.134).
So
'states
may do virtually anything whatever in the name of [their] survival'.
Schell
then argues however,
that extinction nullifies end-means justification by
destroying every end; but again the argument is far from sound, and depends on
human chauvinism (as under S2) combined with ontological assumptions.
Even if
all humans were extinguished (as under SI) ends could remain, for instance for
nonhumans such as animals and extraterrestrials, actual or not. The ends—means
argument can however be repaired to remove such objections:
instead it is
13.
These motivating drives form part of a larger integrated
package,
comprising maximisation drives for power, knowledge,
control, wealth,
energy, speed,
satisfaction,
...,
for the "newer" Enlightenment (but
Faustian) virtues.
Frequently there are attempts (the human failing for
excessive neatness and simplicity manifested) to reduce the package to one
main component, preference—satisfaction for instance, or utility. And the
type of drive is justified (especially for those who have it, but worry
about it) not only as virtuous, which it is not, but also as rational,
which again it is not. Rationality, the deeply entrenched myth has it,
consists in maximisation, of the virtues.
Maximisation of the objects of the drives runs, however,
into limitation
theorems and associated paradoxes. The maximisation of power, as with the
Christian-Islamic God, encounters the paradox of omnipotence, the parallel
maximisation
of knowledge,
paradoxes of omniscience.
There are no
consistent objects which are omnipotent or omniscient.
The drive for
maximum consistency,
often taken to be the epitome of rationality, also
leads to inconsistency in the case of more important theories,
such as
arithmetic and set theory (Godel's theorem and associated limitative
theorems).
14.
R & D, though directed by military requirements and the arms race, also
drives the arms race. Its role is partly disguised by the myth of neutral
science.
have been attempts, not only by those committed to technological
determinism, to involve technology more deeply as the main, or single,
source of the nuclear fix.
It is technology, the mega-machine, running out
of control,
that has brought us to this predicament, the nuclear abyss.
Sometimes this serves to exonerate states and their key components and
those
who
control
them,
for they are simply caught up by this
out—of—control machine;
but sometimes the state itself is seen as a
machine also running out of control. But technological determinism, like
other varieties of stronger (nonanalytic) determinism, is false.
Nuclear
technology was selected and proceeded with, after a well-known political
dispute involving distinguished scientists;
it was deliberated, funded and
promoted, while other alternatives were not.
Damaging
technologies of the nuclear age were not inevitable,
but
deliberately chosen by certain components of the large nation-states. And
much as they need not have been chosen, so they do not have to be persisted
with.
The fashionable inevitability/determinism themes admit not only of
refutation by bringing out the many choices made in persisting with often
recalcitrant
technologies.
They also admit of being made to look
ridiculous.
If the Bomb is determined, as part of human evolution, then if
it functions (as it probably will, a matter also determined), it will serve
as a human population control device, a matter also determined.
That is,
the Bomb has its fixed evolutionary place in human population regulation.
71
claimed that extinction nullifies ends-means justification by frustrating the
realisation of every relevant end - meaning by 'relevant', in this context,
those ends the realisation of which the state appeals to in justification of its
nuclear policies.1$
An LSN-war, even without human extinction but with severe
enough losses, would undoubtedly frustrate the realisation of relevant state
ends.
So even from an expediency perspective, superstate policies are open to
severe criticism, for example as motivationally irrational.
As to the part of the state and (state) sovereignty in war, Schell leaves
us in no doubt. A sovereign state is virtually defined as one that enjoys the
right and power to go to war in defence or pursuit of its interests (p.187).
War arises from how things are; from the arrangement of political affairs via
jealous nation states (p.188).
Indeed there is a two-way linkage between having
sovereignty and capacity to wage war. On the one side, sovereignty is, Schell
contends, necessary for people to organise for war. On the other side, without
war it is impossible to preserve sovereignty. Neither of these contentions is
transparently clear as they stand. The first is damaged by civil war and the
like, the second by the persistence of small nonmilitary states. Now that the
macro-state system is entrenched, it is however easy for conservatives (in
particular)
to argue from the "realities" of international life, which include
self-interest, aggression, fear, hatred.
It is on this basis that peace
arrangements are readily dismissed as unrealistic, utopian, even (amusingly) as
extremist (cf. p.185).
Schell's further theme that nuclear "war" is not war threatens, however, to
undermine his case against the sovereign state;
for example, his ends-means
argument and the argument based on its nuclear war-making capacity. Fortunately
the not-war theme needs much qualification, and starts out from an erroneous
characterisation of war as 'a violent means employed by a nation to achieve an
end'
(p.189):
but this is neither necessary nor sufficient for war. What is
right (so it is argued in §1) is that nuclear wars are very different from
earlier conventional wars.
Schell goes on to claim that war requires an end
which nuclear "war" does not have. But nuclear attacks can certainly have ends
(even if LSN wars cannot be won in the older sense: but not all wars or games
are won).
It is also claimed that war depends on weakness;
on one side being
defeated on a decision by arms. But in nuclear "war" this doesn't happen, 'no
one's strength fails until both sides have been annihilated' (p.190). But what
these sorts of considerations contribute to showing is again not that nuclear
wars are not wars, but that they are not wars of certain sorts, e.g., not just
wars (because they fail on such criteria as reasonable prospect of success and
improvement), not rational wars (in a good sense), and so on. That conventional
wars have persisted into nuclear times does damage to Schell's argument that
nuclear weapons have also ruined "conventional" wars, and his connected theme
that the demise of war has left no means to finally settle disputes between
nations, for the final court of appeal has been removed (pp.192-193). The theme
depends on the mistaken proposition concerning the demise of conventional war
and the mistaken proposition that war of some sort has to be the final "court of
appeal" between nations (for, as observed, there are other types of contests
that could serve, and there is also the possibility of more cooperative
behaviour,
e.g. joint referenda). The theme also imports the social-Darwinian
assumption of Clausewicz (the "logic of war" theme criticised in §2) that war
has to proceed to the technological limit - as if war and violence were
thoroughly natural activities independent of recognised social settings (for
winning,
surrender,
etc.) and rule-less activities. On the contrary, wars are
parasitic on social organisations such as states and are governed by a range of
understandings, conventions and rules.
They are a social phenomenon, with a
rule structure, if not a logic.
Much capital has been made not merely from "the logic of war" but from what
is now called "the logic of deterrence" and the "logic of nuclear [strategic]
planning". The message that is usually supposed to emerge is that the massive
nuclear arrangements the world is now entangled in are perfectly logical, sound,
15.
This reformulation was proposed by N. Griffin, who suggested that the main
qualification can be inferred from Schell's context.
72
reasonable,
rational.
However this represents little more than a cheap
semantical trick.
Logic in no way justifies the present arrangements, or
anything like them, or renders them reasonable. There is a logic of decision
(as presented, e.g.,
in Jeffrey) which can be applied in strategic planning;
but it does not yield specific results without desirability measures being
assigned to alternative outcomes,
that is without values being pumped in,
extralogically.
There are various ways these value assignments may
be
determined,
to meet moral requirements or not;
but in nuclear strategic
planning they have invariably been settled on the basis of expediency.In
fact,
'logic of'
tends to be used very generously,
as a word of general
commendation, to cover something like 'rational considerations entering into the
policy or strategy of'.
In these terms, Schell, who like others enjoys playing
with the term 'logic of', should write of 'the illogic of deterrence',
for he
emphasizes (p.213) the disparity between the supposed rationality of threatening
use of nuclear weapons and the irrationality (even from a national interest
viewpoint)
of actually using them should the threat fail: 7 yet the success of
deterrence doctrine depends on the credibility of the threat
of
this
unjustifiable and irrational use.
Indeed Schell wants to go still further and
locate a contradiction in deterrence (e.g.
pp.201-2): but the argument depends
on an interesting confusion of contradiction with cancellation,18 along with the
assumption that deterrence involves cancellation. Nuclear deterrence may well
be irrational, it is immoral, but it is not inconsistent.
16.
Selecting the usual game theory setting sees to this almost automatically;
for it is then assumed that each player plays to maximize his or her own
advantage. Thus too the presumption in Walzer, p.277, that 'the logic of
deterrence' is based on eye—for—eye and tooth—for—tooth assumptions.
17.
Even the irrationality of the use has been contested, e.g.
it
wishfully
thought that America will rise like a phoenix
radioactive ashes.
has been
from the
There is moreover a simple solution to Schell's problem of the missing
motive for retaliating to a first strike (p.204), namely, not a retributive
one, but an ideological one:
eliminate the prospect of the future
dominance of the rival ideology.
18.
An analogous confusion of negation with cancellation or obliteration
appears in recent US "star war" thinking, where US missiles are supposed to
"negate" incoming USSR missiles.
Moral paradoxes of deterrence take a different direction;
although
involving negation they depend upon perhaps questionable interconnexions of
intensional functors. One type of paradox (considered in §5) derives from
a policy of credibly threatening LSN war without however intending to
proceed to LSN war, though credible threats [appear to] imply an intention
to proceed.
Another style derives from acclaimed intention to reduce the
number of nuclear missiles when the persistent practice, which implies an
intention,
is to increase the number. This paradox is technically removed
- how satisfactorily i& another matter - by a distinction between
longer-term aims and immediate practice, a time-honoured method of removing
contradictions by conveniently discerned temporal distinctions.
73
APPENDIX 2. On the Matter of Collective and Individual Responsibility
and on Regional Strategies
What one does depends, naturally, on where one lives and what means one
has, as well as on what one should do and what sort of person one seeks to be.
So too what strategy a state should adopt depends on where it is located and
what sort of power it is, on national as well as on moral considerations.
In
present circumstances states have an evident responsibility to work out their
policies.
There are however some persuasive arguments that this is where all
responsibility ends:
these major responsibilities accrue entirely to states,
and there is no individual, or (smaller scale) collective, responsibility to
work out a policy or stance on such matters as nuclear arrangements and still
less to act, perhaps against a state, on the basis of such a stance. While such
a no-responsibility or opt-out position no doubt suits many people - many for
themselves,
some (especially more authoritarian power-holders) on behalf of
others - it does involve inadmissibly opting out of moral responsibilities,
responsibilities acquired by virtue of being a person within the framework of
certain social arrangements.
Now there is no doubt that individuals and groups can do this, can opt out.
They can neglect their moral responsibilities;
but they are not justified in
doing so. Against this claim, which is based ultimately upon each person's
being set in a web of responsibility-inducing social relations, whether they
like it or not so long as they choose to live with others, there are some neat
arguments which appear to permit, or even warrant, opting out. One influential
argument takes the following lines:
1.
The (ordinary) individual,
or group, has no possibility of making a
difference to what happens. Therefore
2.
Such individuals,
or groups, have no obligation to try to make a
difference. Hence
3.
Such individuals, or groups, are not morally responsible, for instance when
things go wrong.
There are two main assumptions in this argument, both of which should be
resisted:
firstly, in getting from 1 to 2, a variant of the "ought implies can"
themel, and secondly, the assumption that individuals can't make a difference.
While it is true that individuals cannot accomplish much on their own, together
they can. What an individual can achieve depends on what sufficiently many
other individuals do.
In highly competitive communities,
full of hopeful
free-riders, a person may encounter a familiar impasse:
that he or she acts in
manner
M
(e.g.
morally,
against nuclear arrangements, rationally), at
considerable personal cost, with no guarantee that others will also act M-ly.
Such an impasse no longer faces so many in the West, at least as regards initial
steps against nuclear arrangements. The individual can cooperate with others in
ways that do make a difference.
An individual is not exonerated from
responsibility by the argument.
While individuals can respond by joining organisations whose activities are
directed at making some difference, many individuals also have the option of
more individualistic action in such forms as boycotts, go slows,
political
disobedience.
An important form of individual resistance, already adopted in
Canada and north-western USA, is refusal to pay income taxes directed towards
defence
or various parts thereof (e.g.
nuclear weapons production and
deployment), or alternatively redirection of such taxes, for instance to peace
funds.
Evidently,
however,
all these more individualistic forms of political
activity work more effectively if individuals integrate their activities,
since
the impacts aggregate (and appear after a certain stage to exponentiate). As
well collective action helps in distributing the impact of retribution or
punitive action by state authorities.
1.
Any satisfactory deontic theory which takes moral dilemmas with due
seriousness is bound
to reject this theme.
There are also independent
grounds for jettisoning this Kantian theme:
see Routley and Plumwood.
74
There are, furthermore, arguments of some weight that individuals are under
some sort of moral obligation to take political action to disaffiliate
themselves from what contributes to the prospects of nuclear war. What type of
action this is depends on the sort of state one resides in, for instance,
whether it is a nuclear power, whether it provides nuclear bases or facilities,
etc.,
and on such complicating issues as what kind of preventive action the
state is likely to take in return.
(Any state seriously practising deterrence
is bound to take some action against effective protest,
or risk losing
credibility;
but there are limits to the amount of state coercion any one
individual need bear.)
One argument - it is one of a type that can be varied from making nuclear
weapons to,
for example,
providing facilities for them - proceeds from the
wrongness of nuclear war to the position that it is not right to be making the
weapons for such war.
The argument here applies connecting principles (like
those of §5), while appealing to such background information as that the
manufacture and deployment of such weapons increases the risk of such war. But
if it is not morally right to be making such weapons then those who live in a
state that is doing so ought to disaffiliate themselves from such defence
production, and disaffiliation includes not paying for such production through
defence taxes .
The argument is not without substantive assumption, but the
assumptions appear morally reasonable and defensible.
Another
effective
argument proceeds from the question of the type of moral person one wants to be:
Does one want to be, or effectively to be seen as, the kind of person who goes
along with the nuclear destruction of human populations?
Or with making
credible a threat to do so, or the like?
What follows applies primarily to
people who do not want to be, or be seen as, such people.
Arguments like these not only put opt-outers and do-nothingers on the spot
insofar as
they contribute to national objectives;
they also raise questions,
perhaps even dilemmas, as to political obligation for those who would take
action,
even limited action such as redirection of taxes 3. For are there not
political obligations to the state, such as paying due taxes and supporting the
national defence effort?
It is usually assumed that there are. However, no
dilemma occurs under a theory which, properly, takes political obligations to be
regulated in some fashion by moral obligations;
for in this case moral
obligations override political obligations.
In fact political obligations are
already significantly limited by moral constraints. The nuclear situation does
not so much bring out new limits on political obligation,
as emphasize the
respects in which those obligations are already limited, and introduce further
moral considerations against sponsorship of national defence arrangements.
An obligation to try ** to dissociate oneself from
preparation
for
nuclear
war or from nuclear-deterrence,
for instance by not spending part of one's
working life contributing indirectly to it, does not commit one to more than
this:
to an obligation, for example,
to work for an alternative national
defence policy which avoids nuclear elements. But no doubt this would be a good
thing to try to contribute towards. Once again, what one attempts depends on
where one lives, the level of one's commitments, e.g.
to nonviolence, and so
forth. For not only are different types of policy reorientation appropriate for
different nations and regions, but there are more superficial and deeper
reorientations that can be worked out and promoted, e.g.
schemes that leave
2.
An argument of this type was deployed by Bishop Hunthaussen of
support of his refusal to pay defense taxes.
3.
This dilemma and option is now removed in practice for most wage earners by
Pay As You Earn taxation schemes - schemes apparently introduced to give
the state interest on gross earnings,
but obviously very effective in
removing taxation power from most workers, and so in further transferring
power from individuals to the state.
4.
Given the power of institutions and the state one may be able to do little
more than try, without giving up one's work and thereby one's ability to
contribute to other deserving causes. For example,
it may be virtually
impossible for one to avoid contributing to a superannuation fund which is
investing in projects which one opposes or ought to oppose, or both.
Seattle
in
75
"conventional" warfare apparatus more or less intact,
schemes that change that.
and
deeper
(ecological)
The US Bishops, for example, present a rather shallow set of goals for a
superpower such as the USA, which includes such objectives as preventing the
development and deployment of destabilizing nuclear weapons systems and working
for better control of already operational systems (see PL, p.317). The nuclear
situation affords an important opportunity to press however for a much deeper
set of changes in the superstates.
For those whose very limited political
influence is exerted in considerably less powerful states, even the shallow
goals may look quite different:
there are no nuclear weapons (except perhaps
those of another power stationed on local territory) to redeploy or to better
control.
The view from the very minor powers in the Antipodes is furthermore
different from that of the medium powers in Europe. There is some prospect in
much of the Antipodes of avoiding the more immediate effects of an LSN war,
while there is little such prospect in Europe (cf. Preddey and others).
There
is accordingly some obligation — an obligation little considered and not grasped
by the power holders - on those in the Antipodes to make some effort to preserve
there in the South elements of what is valuable in world civilization. Local
and regional self-interest would also suggest substantial steps
towards
self-preservation that (foolishly) have not been initiated.
What is broadly required in the Antipodes is not difficult to discern once
Steps include withdrawal from the American alliance,
the goals are glimpsed.
which is in any case of questionable merit since its main advantages lie with
the US and it affords no guarantee of local defence;$ closure of American bases
and withdrawal of American access rights for nuclear—carrying equipment to
ports, air bases and other facilities, especially so as to remove local nuclear
targets; pursuit of a more evenhanded policy of nonalignment (something quite
small powers elsewhere have managed to achieve).
That much is easy, in
principle;
and justified.
It is justified because local commitment to the
American military operations in the region lacks a solid foundation;
it is
premissed primarily on the acceptance of deterrence, which,
so it has been
argued (in §5ff.),
lacks justification. That Australian commitment to joint
Australian—US facilities and to US military operations in the region is
explicitly based on acceptance of deterrence emerges from several recent
statements of government policy. The joint facilities are 'part of a system of
deterrence'. &
More difficult to ensure, at least without much preparation, is that
economic and cultural collapse does not follow an LSN war in the North.
Secondly, then, the building of increased socio-economic independence in the
Antipodes is required. It is not enough to make the region a nuclear-free zone
not worth targeting militarily:
the region must also have a sustainable life of
its own. For a small region, that looks a very costly exercise unless combined
with other desirable objectives;
for example,
in Preddey and others it is
estimated that a substantial portion of GDP would have to be diverted to build
up New Zealand's economic independence.? For a larger region which included
Australia,
the costs would be less. They would compare favourably with many
Northern military budgets, and have the advantage that much of the expenditure
is genuinely productive.
If furthermore - what seems unlikely - the structural
readjustment were combined with the independently desirable aims of moving the
5.
See the discussion in Ball, chapter 13, especially pp.140-1.
How slight
the commitments are, under the ANZUS treaty in particular, has been
emphasized again in recent defence discussions between Australia and the
USA.
Of course,
the ANZUS Treaty is only one, and a comparatively minor
one, of the many military treaties that should be terminated:
from a
European and world viewpoint the winding down of NATO and the Warsaw Pact
arrangements, and the removal of American and Russian forces from Europe
(and elsewhere), are very much more important.
A fuller discussion of Australia's defence philosophy
will appear in a subsequent publication in this series.
and
alternatives,
76
whole region towards a multi-cultural conserver society and perhaps even
diverting "defence" spending to connected self—management and social defence
goals, the costs would be very considerably lessened. They only appear so great
in the setting of a consumer-satellite society.
In any case, where life and
culture themselves are concerned, the costs do not appear excessive.
In sum, Southern countries should be severing their military linkages with
Northern
nuclear
powers^,
and
should be preparing now,
socially and
economically, for the time after the LSN war, the great Northern war.
However
there are serious blockages in the way of such things in the Antipodes, and
indeed impeding any substantial attempts to lessen the impact of LSN war.
Some
of the blockages derive again from the fact that present nuclear arrangements
favour many of the power holders and suit strong corporate interests which wield
political power.
But the main blockages to more popular action are sloganised
in the false dichotomy:
"either it won't happen or we're all dead anyway;
so
why bother".
One reason for blockage is then the extinction assumption (SI of
Appendix 1), the unwarranted adoption of which is excessively nihilistic.
A
more important reason is that most people, and most of their political
representatives, do not believe that major repercussions of LSN war are going to
befall them.
These are events which, like starvation and torture, happen to
other (remote) people, not them.
It is not that LSN war is unthinkable:
rather it is that it seems
unbelievable that it should make any difference. Most people in the Antipodes
really do not believe that their lives are likely to be shattered by nuclear
war.
Waking up and mobilising these people is a major part of the problem in
6.
See the letter by R.G. Hawke, Prime Minister, replying to a symposium on
consequences of nuclear war, Canberra Times, Saturday July 23, 1983. The
point is also made by the Foreign Minister in his Evatt Memorial Lecture,
as Hawke notes.
The point is softened by representing the facilities as
also having a role in verification, as well as deterrence, 'that makes arms
control and reduction feasible':
the known role of the facilities in war
fighting is not alluded to, and nor is the fact that any verification role
can be alternatively accomplished using satellites. However the matter is
not in any doubt:
'successive Australian governments ...
have taken the
view that our primary concern should be to support the effectiveness of the
United States deterrent to war itself' (D.J. Killen, Minister for Defence;
quoted in Threats to Australia's Security, p.17).
Government representatives (e.g. Hawke) concede that the joint facilities
put Australia at nuclear risk.
'However it is the judgement of this
Government that the benefits to Australia in terms of its immediate
interest and global strategic consideration outweigh potential risks'. A
proper decision-theoretic analysis would not support Hawke's claim:
since
Australia is known to be a nuclear target because of American bases (cf.
Ball, pp.130-8),
the potential risks given that an LSN war has
a
non-negligible probability far outweigh any immediate benefits.
Since
Australia has only a regional strategic role,
the global strategic
considerations are, as could be otherwise inferred, primarily those of the
main user of the facilities, the USA. The Government is prepared to put
Australia,
its peoples and ecosystems, at what is decidedly serious risk
for immediate and American interests.
A
worthwhile
representative
government does not hold its peoples hostage for such reasons. Not only is
that short-sighted expediency decision making:
it seems virtually certain
that the details of the decision making, were they ever revealed, would not
justify the policy in the longer term even on the basis of expediency, but
would turn on such things as present trade advantages and short-term
commercial considerations.
7.
As to the economic and social problems Australia would face in the event of
an LSN war, see Coombs for a preliminary assessment.
8.
Ideally the removal of significant nuclear targets should take place across
the whole Southern Hemisphere, because this is the zone that is relatively
insulated, atmospherically, from the Northern Hemisphere.
77
achieving requisite social and political adjustment.
Even those who believe
that LSN war is not improbable (but may well not be totally destructive of life)
do little to reorganise their lives in a way that would reflect their
assessment.
Richard Routley*
9.
Again, for some of what to do,
for
some
ways
to
reorganise,
see
e.g.
Martin.
There is also much intellectual work to be undertaken, for
example, searching out details of alternative arrangements, and also
discrediting establishment experts, especially economists and political
scientists, who intellectually underwrite present nuclear arrangements.
*
The text has been much improved as a result of detailed comments by C.
Pigden, R.
Goodin, N.
Griffin, B. Martin and L. Mirlin, and through
correspondence with G.
Foley.
J.
Norman has helped in its final
organisation.
The initial outlines of the paper were worked out in
Victoria, Canada;
and an early version was read at Simon Fraser University
in 1982.
78
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OF SOCIAL SCIENCES, AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY
School Publications
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1974, Third edition 1975.
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n
w
w
[j
in environmental philosophy
Philosophy Departments
The Australian National University
PO Box 4, Canberra, Australia 2600.
NUMBER 5
WAR AND PEACE
Zgt
ON THE ETHICS OF LARGE-SCALE NUCLEAR WAR
AND NUCLEAR DETERRENCE AND THE POLITICAL FALL-OUT
<
RICHARD ROUTLEY
FOR CIRCULATION AND
EVENTUAL LIBRARY DEPOSIT
WAR AND PEACE.
I
ON THE ETHICS OF LARGE-SCALE NUCLEAR WAR
AND NUCLEAR DETERRENCE AND THE POLITICAL FALL-OUT
by
R. Routley
Number 5
Discussion Papers in Environmental Philosophy
Department of Philosophy
Australian National University
1984
INTRODUCTION.
Virtually all the philosophical literature on nuclear war is written from
either a superpower (predominantly American) or else European (mainly German,
British or French) viewpoint.
This article,
after connecting in initial
sections with Northern Catholic literature, adopts a very different Antipodean
stance.
Such regional perspectives, while the should not affect
the morality
of the matter, are highly politically relevant.
Much of the philosophical literature, especially that emanating from the
USA, also fails the test of morality.
It is concerned only or primarily with
what is good or "rational" or prudential for Americans, or for the American
state,
to do - whereas morality is independent of place, race, nationality and
the like. This article tries to take the morality of the matter, and the
resulting redistribution of moral and political obligations, seriously.
It
concludes, among other things, that the American and Russian states have no
moral business putting nonaligned peoples at such grave risk as present nuclear
arrangements involve.
CONTENTS AND OUTLINE: Italicised headings §3-§8 indicate the main
structure of the argument
Page No
§0.
Introduction. Nuclear vs conventional wars, and new moral
issues. Large-scale (LSN) vs limited nuclear wars, the focus on the
former, but the implications for the latter.
§1. How nuclear wars differ from other wars; wars and states, and the
resulting limited appropriateness of older models and theories of war.
War characterised. The essential role of the state. New and different
features of nuclear wars.
§2. The moral situation: the recent tendency of moral considerations
to become entirely submerged in the context of war.
The ancient distinction of morality and expediency. Strategic planning
based on expediency. Arguments that war must be expediency-based refuted.
Morality does not have to, and ought not to, give way to expediency.
Utilitarianism and expediency distinguished. Limits to consensus:
supermen and superhawks. National interest and expediency assimilated.
Limits of state entitlement.
§3. The initial argument to the immorality of LSN wars.
One key argument, from the wrongness of killing noncombatants in mass, is
presented, assessed, and criticisms met. Arguments for the premisses of
the key argument elaborated.
§4. Arguments from historical requirements on just wars, the important
argument from convergence, and environmental arguments.
Arguments from just war requirements: discrimination, proportionality,
prospect of success. The detailed convergence argument, from rival moral
positions. Arguments from environmental principles.
§5. The shift to nuclear deterrence: arguments to its immorality.
Deterrence seen as the only practical way to satisfy major desiderata:
prevention of war and maintenance of prudential values. Pure deterrence
not the policy. Deterrence as practiced has increased the probability of
nuclear war. The first argument to immorality of deterrence, from the
plausibility of probability of immorality. Further arguments through
deontic connecting principles: the probability linkage. Refuting the
counterargument from the success of deterrence. The way the onus of
1
2
5
11
14
17
Page No
proof falls on deterrence policy, which cannot meet evidential require
ments. The second connecting principle: the wrongness of serious
preparation for nuclear war. The general form of connecting principles;
separating out those that are correct. The third connecting principle:
the wrongness of serious threats of nuclear devastation. Criticism of
this principle leads to further connecting principles, through intention
and through commitment. Meeting counterarguments from utilitarianism.
Applying the connecting principles to argue to the immorality of
deterrence. Arguments from limited convergence: pro- and anti-utilitarian
versions. Other reasons for deep dissatisfaction with deterrence.
§6. Practical, prudential and more moral arguments from national
dangers to nuclear build-up of the superstates, and the genesis of
nuclear dilemmas.
The arguments from nuclear blackmail and foreign domination, and from
risk of nuclear destruction. The crucial argument from basic rights and
fundamental values. The argument from isolated people to superstate
immorality. The superstate theme, and reasons for its appeal. The much
less persuasive dependent state theme. Challenging the assumptions of
the underlying relatiatory model.
§7. The resulting nuclear dilemmas - for aligned states and their
supporters.
Character of the nuclear fix. Subsidiary dilemmas: national security vs
freedom and democratic arrangements; personal and role dilemmas. Features
of deontic dilemmas. Deterrence presented as second-best escape from the
nuclear fix. The nuclear fix a fix of states' own making. Interconnections
between the nuclear fix and nation-state arrangements.
§8. Ways out of nuclear dilemmas: initial political fall-out from the
ethical results.
The inevitability of limitations on national sovereignty. Interstate
and extrastate approaches. The Way Up and the Way Down of extrastate
approaches. Arguments for the Way Up, and the decisive case against it.
Failure of international agreements, especially on human rights and
genocide. Exclusion of nuclear deterrence under the Genocide Convention.
Need for the reexamination of current political arrangements imposed by
the nuclear fix. Deficiencies in present antiquated political arrange
ments revealed by nuclear problems. Further arguments from the nuclear
fix for political reassessment. The weak link: the sovereign nation
state. Forfeiture of political obligation by many states. Alternative
political arrangements vs nuclear time horizons.
The multi-track Way Out of the nuclear dilemma. The main political
means lie outside state governmental apparatus. Laying the spectre of
ideological domination. Social restructuring and devolution of power.
Graduated disarmament and transarmament, and letting state sovereignty
go. Dissolving the arguments from national dangers. State resistance to
loss of power. Further lines of organised action against nuclear states.
Appendix 1: On the fate of mankind and the earth, according to
Schell and Anders.
Nuclear prophets and prophetic rubbish. The extinction assumption.
Common emerging themes of Schell and Anders. The extravagant anthro
pocentric assumption, and some of what is wrong with it. Second death
dismissed. The universality of peril. The alleged universality of
responsibility: the Pogo theme. The correct, but undeveloped, whole
earth theme. Ultimately Schell offers little hope and superficiality.
Nuclear war is war. The logic and illogic of deterrence.
ii
37
43
49
Page No
Appendix 2:
On matters of collective and individual responsibility
and on regional strategies.
Individual and state responsibility. Opt-out positions, and arguments
to them.
Failure of the arguments, and the impact of group cooperation.
Arguments to direct obligations of individuals to the nuclear
dissociation.
Limitations of rival political obligations.
Different policy reorganisation for different regions.
Shallower and
deeper goals.
The important opportunity for deeper reorganisation
afforded by nuclear dilemmas.
Obligations of those in the Antipodes:
what is required, and justified.
Social and economic reorganisation
in the Antipodes, and reducing costs involved.
Blockages to social
and political adjustment.
iii
73
ON THE ETHICS OF LARGE-SCALE NUCLEAR WAR AND NUCLEAR DETERRENCE
AND THE POLITICAL FALL-OUT
Large-scale nuclear wars raise ethical questions not generated,
either
at
or nearly so forcefully, by previous human military encounters.This is at
all
bottom because of their projected effects, which are often
to
said
differ
so
those of even the largest conventional wars (the World Wars) as to yield a
from
difference in kind of war.
involve,
and
threatened
Certainly massive exchanges
such
as
nuclear
exchanges such as nuclear deterrence presupposes, are
neither envisaged nor fully accommodated by traditional theories of
Much
wars
just
wars.
new philosophical reflection and investigation is required, even if rather
well-tested and old-fashioned moral principles will
serve
as
initial
ethical
base.
Although nuclear wars are, thus
nonexistent
objects,
nuclear
wars
(extrapolated from a very limited
varieties.
In
far, only a decidedly
class
menacing
of
proper have several distinctive properties
nuclear
experience^)
and
come
in
several
particular, confined or limited nuclear wars, of which tactical
or strategic are subvarieties, contrast with Idrge-scale nuclear wars (LSN wars)
1.
The US Catholic Bishops in their Pastoral Letter (PL) make the point
forcefully:
'Nuclear weapons ... and nuclear warfare ... are new moral
issues ... There exists a capacity to do something no other age could
imagine:
we can threaten the created order ... We could destroy [God's]
work' (PL, p.312). While the independent analysis offered in what follows
has a great deal in common with the Bishop's position,
it differs
significantly in removing the religious backdrop and associated features
and, it is hoped,
in bringing out the logical structure of the argument
more clearly and sharply. To illustrate the differences that emerge with
removal of the religious backdrop and its the associated unity-of-evil
theme, consider what happens to two examples from PL,
p.323:- Firstly,
peace is possible without religious enlightenment if it is possible with
it:
religious enlightenment is not an essential condition as there
implied.
Secondly, violence does not take all the forms the Bishops try to
give it,
e.g.
sexual discrimination is hardly a form of violence,
pornography can operate without it, etc.
It is a serious mistake to try to
heap so many diverse and independent issues together under the one heading
(forms of violence) along with war as if they stood and fell together, e.g.
abortion and nuclear war.
Note that referencing, where not through an author's name, is by way of
acronym explained in the references at the end.
2.
an
The isolated, and unnecessary, bombing of two Japanese cities at the very
end of World War II did not render that war a genuine nuclear war. Nuclear
wars proper will be very different and very much more horrifying.
Nuclear
wars proper,
though elements of uncomfortably adjacent possible worlds,
ought therefore to be confined to merely possible worlds. Enough of their
features we can appreciate without their being brought to actuality.
2
A large-scale nuclear
which need not however be unlimited 3.
explosion
war
it is
of large quantities of nuclear devices over a sizeable region;
a function of two main parameters:
distribution.
war
strategic) nuclear
of
quantities
war
a
Such
quantity
markedly
differs
which
limited,
is
where
and
explosives,
(megatonnage
a
from
targets
to
are
and
explosive)
limited
assumption,
by
the
of
the
involves
(tactical
much
or
smaller
characteristically
circumscribed, for instance confined in principle to military installations in a
given
region.
Though
focus
the
in
what follows is upon LSN wars and their
prevention, limited nuclear wars are by no
a
separate
wars to LSN wars are high (given usual reasonable assumptions
second
strike,
since
issue,
a
is a prerequisite, and the probabilities of escalation of such
arsenal
nuclear
means
etc.).^
Because
of
these
of
follow-up
or
connections, much of the case made
against LSN wars transfers to more limited wars, as will become evident.
§1.
How nuclear wars
resulting
differ
from
other
wars
wars:
and
party
and
limited appropriateness of older models and theories of war.
of war that has dominated much thinking, including strategic
two
states
(or
thinking,
the
A model
is
the
several person) game or, as a complication of that, the clan or
tribe battle3.
A picture of
war
thus
on
requirements
for
legitimate and just wars, which technological
reflection
advances have
traditional
now
theory
rendered
of
war,
emerged,
inappropriate
hardly
and
especially
sometimes
surprisingly,
as
a
result
inapplicable.
of
The
made no allowance for such
3.
Another dimension of variation concerns the sequence of the war, especially
the type of strike involved.
Though the sequence is important for the
moral assessment, for example of the main actors, it in no way alters the
immorality of LSN wars, as will emerge.
4.
'The overwhelming probability [is] that a nuclear exchange would have no
limits'
(PL, p.314). Hence a major argument against limited nuclear wars:
that any such war risks, indeed renders highly probable, an unlimited war,
and the risk is far too large to take. The point in fact follows by
straightforward application of decision theory, multiplying the massive
undesirability (moral and otherwise) of an LSN war by its probability given
a limited nuclear war. Given the character of weapons development and
present communication arrangements,
the idea of a highly circumscribed
purely nuclear exchange between the superpowers, perhaps in the European
"theatre", is really a myth.
5.
There was a substantial element of sport (and connected features of
prowess)
in traditional wars that has been eroded in modern technological
wars. Nuclear wars may be not just unsporting, in that no notice is given,
etc.,
they are also remote and impersonal, and differently unjust, in a
much deeper way.
3
phenomena as mass bombing of large cities, such as
with
Dresden
and
nuclear bombing, with its many further crucial effects beyond mass
And
Tokyo.
occurred
bombing, adds further new dimensions.
Yet it is important for the argument
anchors,
retain
historical
were
accounted
unjust
war is essentially a matter of states and their control:
the Oxford English Dictionary account, war is 'hostile contention
armed
protagonists, antagonists or players;
of
contention
or
combat;
exchange is the actual experience.
but
other
are not literal, but transferred, metaphoric, etc.8
'war'
means
and
or
wrong.
to elaborate
by
means
of
forces, carried on between nations, states, or rulers, or between parties
in the same nation or state' for control of the state?;
noun
linkages
to be aware of what counted as war (the semantics of the matter^), and
of when, and why, wars and military actions
Firstly,
to
always
a
function
of
senses
of
the
States are the
forces comprising armed soldiers are
the
and combat or forceful and typically violent
Thus wars are external or internal
states or their rule.
(civil),
Thus too wars have grown in
quantity and frequency as states have expanded, wars have changed as states have
transformed,
and
nuclear
war
has
emerged 'with
nuclear states.
theoretical way then to eliminate wars is to remove states:
An obvious
in short, wars
are
6.
There are interesting sidelights concerning even the etymology of the term
'war', which was derived from a term meaning 'confusion'. In particular,
'it is a curious fact that no Germanic nation in early historic times had
in living use any word properly meaning 'war'':
Oxford English Dictionary
(OED) on war.
7.
But of course there can be something quite analogous to war waged between
clans,
gangs, multinational firms,
even against Nature, and still more
metaphorically against poverty, etc. To this extent, a strict definition
of 'war' is being insisted upon. Even so the diffusion of power structures
the argument will direct us to, has to extend beyond just the break-down of
nation-states .
8.
Into this category (since Nature is no nation)
falls the ubiquitous and
unwarranted war against Nature of modern times, which features just as
large in Marxism as in capitalism. As could have been guessed,
someone it was James - suggested channelling all war into "war" in the metaphorical
sense against that unarmed and nonaggressive "opponent", Nature.
James
proposed as a substitute for war proper, conscription of the youth for a
war against Nature (see Wasserstrom,
p.12).
What it boiled down to,
however, was that youth was to be channelled into all the dirty work, in
that way to acquire manly virtues military activities "rightly" instil,
especially discipline,
but also service, devotion, physical fitness,
constructive exertion, responsibility, and order. Another less diabolical
substitute for wars proper (in American ecotopian literature) is through
war games and other games of competitive cast.
Again specious arguments
enter for those bringing out the "best" in human males, etc.
4
an outcome of political and associated technological structure, and are
by
structure.
the
altering
state arrangements,
arrangements.
be
to
can thus be seen as a structural problem of
War
from
along
defective)
political organisation of states;
they are a
helps
these
This semantically based picture
situational fix, a structural malformation.
war
with
(otherwise
removed
arise
Wars
of
explain why the radical argument against nuclear wars and deterrence
argument
devolves into an
war-makers,
against
against
In
states.
the
fact
(self-legitimised)
on
and
war-declarers
traditional theory, wars were
the
restricted to external wars, which were construed as
the
right
or
states
of
rulers (princes) to conduct for certain political purposes;
their
removed
the argument
was that private persons with grievances had access to the courts^, while states
did
not (wars were, so to speak, the international analogue of the law courts).
But this is itself a very statist conception of the legitimate
place
of
wars;
the semantics is not so restrictive and permits internal wars within states, for
example to end wars, injustice, etc.
Let us however - to bring out what is different now - confine attention
a
basic and most familiar case, external wars between two states or sets (axes)
of states, two-player external wars,
games,
competitive
could
be
won,
attentuated form for some "victors")
the World Wars.
agglomerations
surrounding
traditionally
firstly
for
massive
armed
like
wars,
such
exchanges
as
there may well be no winning
in
areas
Northern
the
of
very
hemisphere
countryside.
Thus,
and
the
secondly,
for
waste
laying
the
point
of
of
substantially
substantially
obliterated^,
(exercised
and
most
as
nothing
all
worse off than at the outset of the "play".
are
huge
war
seen, to settle serious interstate disputes, is removed:
another point of difference, the phenomenon of wars that
prepared
that
That assumption still held good (though in
With LSN wars it no longer holds;
is settled with main protagonists
players
It was assumed
An LSN war could involve destruction of all main Western metropolitan
strategy.
9.
to
main
Hence
elaborately
for, etc.), but which can never be pointfully fought;
Thus Aquinas and Grotius for example (see Barnes,
p.776,
top).
The
argument
presupposes rather a lot,
including a neat public/private
distinction. Put Aquinas's way,
it looks as if it could be readily
transferred into an argument for international government, or at least
effective law-courts. Yet all Christendom was supposed at that time to be
one state!
5
hence the inevitable emphasis on pure deterrence.
and
the
other
elements of gamesmenship had a role in earlier wars, but it was
not pure deterrence.
military
to
Certainly, deterrence, bluff,
Lastly, traditional wars could be confined in
targets
and
military
principle
This feature is fundamental as
exchanges.
for, as will appear, wars that spill over in gross
regards just wars;
ways
to
The special effects of
uninvolved parties sacrifice any pretension to morality.
nuclear explosives, especially operated in mass, mean however that large nuclear
cannot
wars
be
legitimately
horrifying detail in popular sources
ozone
destruction,
These
confined.
shockwaves,
such
effects
gigantic fumigations
and
become
entirely
rapid
speed
include
pulses, fireball or firestorm
etc., etc.
As a result
of
these
of exchange, LSN wars will resemble
the
recent
tendency
submerged in the context of war.
of
moral
and expediency.
considerations
to
It is particularly important
in the case of war to maintain a firm grasp on the ancient
morality
radioactivity,
more than they resemble older-style wars.
The moral situation:
§2.
the
Schell)
electromagnetic
devastation, rogue bacteria and viruses, ...
compounded
as
special effects (presented in
distinction
between
What is done in war, especially for local or national
advantage, may be very different from what ought morally to be done, whether the
10. There is however the degenerate idea of war as involving annihilation or
extinction, and of winning a nuclear war as annihilation of the enemy while
not being entirely annihilated oneself:
the side that somehow "survives"
sufficiently to rebuild is said to "win".
But this is, at best, an
extremely tenuous sense of winning, which in any case neglects the medical
evidence concerning nuclear destruction.
Recent talk about winning or even surviving a nuclear war must
reflect a failure to appreciate a medical reality: Any nuclear
war would inevitably cause death, disease and suffering of
pandemonic proportions and without the possibility of effective
medical intervention ...
(PL, p.313).
Moreover any such phoenix war is radically unjust, because of violation of
the traditional requirement of proportionality, and for other reasons
developed in the text.
Unfortunately as documented in Scheer,
significant officials who are
responsible for the nuclear destiny of the USA - and so of the world think that the devastation of nuclear war can be survived by Americans and
that a global nuclear war can actually be "won"!
They rely, among other
things, on an incredibly low, and unacceptable, redefinition of "winning".
11.
In practice they often were not,they drained limited economies, they layed
waste countryside (though to a minor extent compared with nuclear or
chemical warfare or modern mining), impoverishing inhabitants, etc.
6
latter is determined using the codes and conventions
Much
not to be done in war i^ done, for one (alleged) advantage or
ought
that
otherwise^.
or
war,
of
another, despite modern military codes and conventions and the like.
we
not
live
go
a rather barbarous age:
in
unremarked,
the
if
Militarily
the horrors of the twentieth century will
history
gets
written
that
(accurately)
is.
Furthermore military thinking and strategic planning tend (as Nagel explains) to
induce a certain moral numbing, so that a range
as
such
wiping
rural populations, become real possibilities, included in
out
calculations.
consequentialist
characteristically
based
on
is
that
strategic
Each
side
in a military encounter
reasont
The
expediency
only
disadvantages,
its
own
gains
and
own
its
planning
advantages
is
and
losses as a result of alternative possible
it ought, morally, to consider those of the other side(s) as
moves:
actions,
excluded
morally
of
well.
In
this way strategic planning displaces morality.
Indeed it has been contended that war should be planned and conducted
way,
a
no-holds barred combat fought to the maximal (local) advantage, without
limits, moral or other (except insofar as technology limits the means of
etc.).
Such
the
classical
through
"bald
an
incremental
limit)
escalation
distinct
argument
terms.
from
an
that
the
It
would
And
(but
The
externally
will be broken by each player in turn for advantage.
an extraordinarily narrow motivational base is assumed.
the
argument
man" fallacy *3), that there can be no limit.
assumption is that any merely selected limit (as
enforced
force,
is the so-called "classic" view of Clausewicz, oft repeated.
Clausewicz tries to argue,
really
this
Thus too
follow
from
idea of a limited war is some sort of contradiction in
But it is not, though breaking off in the heat of war, or the
of a supposedly limited nuclear exchange, may be singularly improbable.
confusion
Nuclear
12.
For as Nagel contends (early on),
there are moral restrictions on the
conduct of warfare which are not legalistic only and which are neither
arbitrary nor merely conventional, nor a matter of usefulness.
These
themes run entirely counter to the classic theory of war of Clausewicz - a
theory outlined in Walzer.
13.
As one less hair doos not, at any stage, distinguish a bald man from a
hirsute man,
there are, starting from the hirsute end, no bald men. The
progressive escalation argument concerning war is an incremental argument
like the technical Sorites syllogisms, formalising the type of fallacious
argument which shows that one more straw never makes a heap.
The
fallacious escalation argument is part of the so-called "logic of war", for
more on which see the conclusion of Appendix 1.
7
wars thus appear decidedly Clausewiczian.
the
for
players
Still the argument
inconclusive;
is
can choose, at least in smaller calmer wars, not to escalate,
and, for example, agree to abide by arranged practices, types of weapons, etc.^
A state engaged in war seldom sees itself as entirely bound by
of
morality:
it is taken to be mere prudence on the part of those attacked to
take account of the no-immoral-holds-barred approach they
from the other side.
especially
constraints
the question not only
as
to
may
encounter,
well
So each group potentially engaged in war faces
ought
it
what
do
to
in
permissible
morally
situations, but also both what it ought really do, and what it can morally do in
the morally flawed situations it finds itself.
not,
But the last question does
in that case, reduce to one of expediency.
There is no question, then, of morality giving or having
even
expediency,
For it is not as if shaky considerations of
involves.
give
bound
are
morality
theoretical
fact
is
that
miraculously
deliver
us
from
value
the
theory.
to
Expediency
fact,
but
that
local values - of self, family, clan, class, or nation - are
considerations.
proper characterisation, a
therefore,
much
universalizable
more
universal
fairness,
equitability and
principles,
justice.
distribution
value
of
and,
And morality thereby imposes, through
principles.
intersubstitutivity
certain
requirements
of
general
Expediency yields an unfair, inequitable
value system, one that subscribers would not adhere to if differently
placed
\
deep theoretical unsatisfactoriness of expediency, and associated strategic
thinking, also derives from this failure
evaluations
14.
remote
By contrast, morality requires, as a matter of its
resultant
The
takes
It assumes, or
what really count, and override or are to be maximized at the expense of
foreign
not
does
simply
narrowly-construed local advantage or power as what is valuable.
urges,
crucial
But the
morality and* expediency fall within the same,
both
equally shaky or equally solid, domain of value
or
to
to the firm ground of expediency when the chips are down, since often
way
enough such moral erosion does not occur in crisis situations.
even
to
circumstances such as the prospect of LSN war
extreme
under
way
give
to
of
interreplacement,
from
the
same
and results not holding when persons X and Y are interchanged under
As Walzer argues, p.24. An historical example is the era of genuinely
limited wars in Europe following the barbarism of the Thirty Years war.
8
For expediency does not elude
expediency assessments^.
it
deontic
presentation:
be presented as through such popular slogans as "local might is right",
can
or given tight formal
characterisation.
The
will
characterisation
normally
that of utilitarianism, except that utilities are only assigned to, or
resemble
are biassed in favour of, certain individuals.
However, theories of utility
not have to be positions of expediency if utility is not locally confined.
do
Thus
utilitarianism proper is not to be dismissed as considering only expediency;
meet intersubstitutivity requirements of morality;
can
it
it does not, unlike the
methods of war game theory, assign different weights to the
individual
utility
of (certain) Americans, as opposed to Russians, say.
are
There
especially,
deontologists
regarding war^.
which
differences,
between
or
justify, ugly strategies and practices as regards
to
some
render
to
seemed
enemy civilians, that deontological principles would not permit.
effect
and
utilitarians
serve to further complicate the moral picture
In particular, utilitarian approaches have
permissible,
morally
significant
however
utilitarians
this
But
is
would
reject the
description of practices permitted under their principles as 'ugly';
whereas an
to
already
in
aim
what
follows
since
partisanship,
is
to
avoid
meta-ethical
meta-ethical neutrality, though of course not
there
is
a
moral
partisanship,
neutrality.
to
achieve
And
morally
large area of consensus, or at least moral convergence, from which
argument can begin.
Virtually all positions
agree
that
obliteration
of
several major cities in a LSN war would be wrong, indeed morally outrageous.
If
the
there is dissension, as there may be among nuclear strategists who seem to
feel
no qualms when it comes to trading loss of some American cities for some Russian
ones, simply increase the costs
involved,
up
to
loss
of
whole
nations
if
15.
The severe limitations of those lesser "virtues",
nationalism
and
patriotism, also come from the failure of replacement which excessive
applications of nationalism easily engender. Try for example swapping a
person from inside the homeland with one from outside as regards treatment.
The point of, and reasons for,
intersubstitutivity as a requirement of
morality,
is well explained in Hare, p.78ff. Hare applies the requirement
to make a telling case against nationalism (a case which extends to
strategic decision-theory).
Nationalism,
along with fanaticism, is the
main cause of war, so Hare contends, p.72.
16.
The case against expediency was developed in detail
especially the criticism of Thrasymachus in The Republic.
17.
Thus the differences between Nagel on the one side, and Brandt and Hare
the other, in Cohen et al.
by
Plato;
see
on
9
then try to work down
necessary, until moral repugnance ijs encountered;
The
again.
fact remains however that in the nuclear area things have got substantially
abandon
tended
Strategic thinking, in particular, has
out of perspective, morally.
to
suppress moral considerations (as indeed theories of the state also
or
do, sometimes flamboyantly, in favour of partisan values).
Naturally the fact of broad consensus as to the morality of the matter does
mean that there are none who would welcome such outrageous happenings, that
not
total nuclear destruction of the North even, would be
Consider
the
rising
world empire.
be
southern
(hemisphere)
no
advantage.
one's
strongman, SS, who has visions of
While the superpowers of the north remain, SS's dream can
realised.
Thus
his
best
strategy,
having
rid
submarines and southern lands of US bases, is to try
nuclear
to
exchange
in
the
North.
There
be
would
waters
southern
to
encourage
a
hardly
of US
all-out
an
point then in securing
institutional arrangements so that potential SS's do not accumulate much
given
especially
the
apparent instability of crucial world arrangements.
that is to anticipate:
the present point is that (the fact of) moral
has
and
its
power,
limitations,
is
an
inadequate
But
consensus
constraint without accompanying
structural adjustments.
national
For, typically,
differently
to
impose
interest
is
taken
hostages
or
override
morality,
even
holding
civilian
populations
as
of those
those of Eastern Europe.
things.
substitution
of
justification;
fails
in
The
first,
expediency
classes
regimes,
But morally national interest can do neither
the
overriding
for
morality,
of
morality,
which
the second, the alleged moral dominance of
important
And,
killing millions in the national interest*8).
unfortunately, these assumptions are not confined to more totalitarian
such
or
irresistible ethical claims that dominate more ordinary
ethical considerations (such as those concerning
nuclear
to
is
entirely
national
simply
lacks
the
moral
interests,
of cases, including, so the argument will go, the
case of LSN war.
18.
As Schell bluntly puts it, 'What is being claimed is that one or two
countries have the right to jeopardise all countries and their descendents
in the name of certain beliefs' (p.132). However this way of putting it
leaves room for ambiguity, since the beliefs may be morally grounded rather
than based on national interests.
10
States may insist upon operating on a selfish national interest basis,
let
it
not
be
that
pretended
expediency (namely,
that
of
is
it
a moral basis as distinct from one of
There
egoism").
"group
but
moral
special
no
is
dispensation
for governments.
individuals:
there is no logical difference in the pattern of justification, or
analysis of obligation.
Morality works in the same way for groups as for
For example, what ought to be as regards X is (analysed
semantically) what would happen as regards X in all ideal worlds;
no
whether
difference
is
an
reasons
aside,
just
behaving
as
system, group or
individual
or
individual
States such as Israel (in its recent invasion
organisation.
extenuating
X
immorally
of
as brigands or mass
Certainly there are grounds on which states or their agents
conceded, special moral dispensations;
been
more than that and do not stand up to criticism.
cannot
furnish
two
(incompatible)
claimed,
have
but the excuses offered are no
A
moralities,
satisfactory
a
state
theory
moral
or public one and a
private or individual citizen one — state expediency and individual
morality
because this would lead to violations of substitutivity, neutrality, etc.
instance, a state operative X could use state
cover
morally impermissible ways, ways ruled out (e.g.
Y are permuted.
special
are,
Lebanon)
there is no moral difference.
killers:
or
makes
and it
to
considerations
citizen
*
For
Y
in
by state interests) when X and
A group or organisation or person can be
derivative
damage
19
bound
of
course
by
in virtue of role, but these are derivative
principles - good for any such institution - which fit within and answer back to
general
moral principles.
So it is also with a state which is an institutional
arrangement justified (insofar as it is) by the way it answers back to some
least)
of
its
citizens:
its
charter does not legitimate emergent allegedly
moral principles which conveniently coincide with those of state expediency.
particular,
a
survival.
In
state is not (morally) entitled to risk the lives of many of its
own citizens and of other peoples and creatures for its own ends, even
own
(at
for
its
Thus it is not entitled to do what both nuclear war and nuclear
deterrence require, as will emerge.
19.
There are also other arguments against two (or
see Routley and Plumwood.
multiple)
morality
lines:
11
§3.
The initial argument
pacifism
yield
arguments
to
the
immorality
of
to
the
immorality
of war.
controversial in an area where there is no
LSN
for
But such arguments are
be
to
reason
good
Arguments
wars.
controversial.
Pacifism can accordingly be set aside as a special case, since the immorality of
LSN wars follows.
All but pacifist positions concede that war in itself is not a crime.
all
wars are immoral, though even inoffensive wars may be pointless or inferior
Among more or less admissible
ways of settling political issues between states.
wars
who
Not
are
the international "tournaments" of aristocratic young men or warriors
volunteer
as
and
soldiers
action
whose
not
does
spill
over
onto
noncombatants, and some early and medieval wars, where few or even no combatants
were killed in war.
conscription,
Since the establishment
press-gangs
and
recruitment
of
such
of
the
largely ceased to take these less offensive forms;
induction
practices
as
near-destitute, wars have
modern massive wars are
far
removed from the ideal war-tournament types (which feature now only in ecotopian
portrayals, in ways that are increasingly dubious).
immoral,
sorts
Most
of
wars
are
because of what is done to the essentially uninvolved, but few to such
an extent as LSN wars.
The first argument to the
immorality
of
LSN
and
wars
sufficiently
of
large-scale wars generally, takes the following form:
Pl.
The (deliberate) killing in mass of noncombatants is wrong.
P2.
LSN wars involve the killing in mass of noncombatants.
P3.
What involves what is wrong is wrong.
- (KA)
LSN wars are wrong.
The particular argument given is just one representative of a set
of
this
type.
taken
off
killing:
the
on
(KA)
replaces
But the
quite
'killing
sufficiently
evil.
creatures'.
can
Thus
a
first
in mass of noncombatants' by a suitable
clause concerning 'huge destruction of lifestyle of uninvolved or
involved
focus
destruction of lifestyle of nonhumans and humans
alike that an LSN war will bring is
variation
arguments
Characteristically, in Western culture, it is thought that mass
killing of humans is about the worst thing that can happen.
be
of
not
directly
Other variations will emerge in the discussion (including
that where the bracketed 'deliberate' figures).
but
The argument is valid,
attacked)
on
the
of
basis
be
may
attacked
(and
of its premisses.
each
has
in
effect
been
Let us consider these in
reverse order. The principle, P3, used in the argument, that what involves "what
is wrong" is wrong, has been challenged on rather Scholastic grounds. There are,
in particular, problems like those generated by Good Samaritan arguments,
purport to show that some proper obligations involve wrongdoing.
assisting an injured robbed person is said
robbed;
but, since the robbing is wrong,
"involve"
to
providing
For
which
instance,
that person's
assistance
being
is also wrong.
But these problems derive from too slack a notion of involvement; with a tighter
account of involvement the problems disappear and P3 stands.
As against P2, it may
legitimately
directed
be
argued
against
that
military
nuclear
targets.
20
can
wars
be
encounters
But given the character of
There is
nuclear weapons, LSN wars could in no way be confined to such targets.
not
merely
the likelihood that many missiles explode off target, there are all
the other effects of large-scale nuclear bombings.
fallout
down-wind
from
military
people, especially in the case of
targets
US
and
For example, the radioactive
will affect large concentrations of
European
targets,
and
may
affect
uninvolved countries such as Canada.
There may be an attempt to avoid the problem of massive civilian casualties
by
appeal
effect)21.
to such dubious principles as the doctrine of double effect (or side
if missiles were characteristically
reliably
on
target,
and
one
20.
The challenge to P3, which is often expanded to a "distribution of
obligation over entailment" principle, can be removed by a tighter
involvement connective, linked to a good paradox-free entailment.
For
details see Routley and Plumwood, where Good Samaritan problems are
diagnosed.
21.
According to the doctrine, which is one concerning responsibility, we are
responsible
only
for the intended effects or consequences of our
freely-chosen actions, and not for other (side) effects or consequences,
even if these are foreseen and/or intimately tied to the intended
consequences.
Unless carefully hedged, the doctrine is
pernicious,
allowing those who suitably adjust their intention to escape responsibility
for evil they knowingly perpetrate. Thus, for instance, a Russian supreme
command which intended only to take out US military targets would, under
double effect, have no responsibility for the resultant effect on American
and Canadian cities!
Taking the issues concerning double effect to a more
satisfactory
conclusion would however require a larger theory of action, which duly
distinguished acts (what is done) and outcomes from attached intentions.
13
which was
intended
unfortunately
went
only
off
to
destroy
an
underground
unmanned
course and destroyed a large city, it could be claimed
that the (unintended) mass destruction is legitimised under
principle.
a
make
Nonetheless
effect
double
the
circumstances
difference, for they may mitigate attitudes to those responsible
for firing the missile, since it was not as if they had
deliberately
aimed
at
The double effect principle conflates [diminution of] responsibility
city.
the
the
the action would be wrong, and the
Such claims should be rejected:
wrongness not lessened by the given intention.
could
silo
missile
assigned for an act with the [diminution of] wrongness of the act.
As against Pl, and as regards the middle term of
argued
that there is an important equivocation.
While it will
the bracketed term, 'deliberate'.
killing
and
Pl
P2,
may
it
be
The equivocation is induced by
conceded
be
that
deliberate
of genuine innocents is impermissible, two challenges will be made.
It
will be charged firstly that noncombatants, insofar as they are distinguishable,
are
no means all innocent, many being directly involved in military effort,
by
whether just as taxpayers or as suppliers of
military,
e.g.
farmers
or
goods
or
services
bootmakers or entertainers.
as
innocent.
The
second
defensible — version of premiss P2.
and
for
other
reasons,
it
properly
point concerns a much narrower - and less
Because P2 so amended is
is best to leave out the
less
defensible,
"modifier" 'deliberate'.
What is important for the present purposes is the moral status of what is
not
a
mixture
that with the motives of the perpetrators.
of
require
the
qualification
'deliberate'
or
done,
So 'deliberate'
gets left out, equivocation is avoided, P2 stands, and so does Pl.
not
the
Secondly, it will be
contended that LSN wars do not involve the deliberate killing of those
excluded
by
used
For Pl
does
'intentional' or the like.22
Admittedly also 'noncombatant' is a fuzzy term, but none the worse for that, and
there
is
noserious
people who are
is,
moreover,
problem
in
marking out a class of
notdirectly involved in the command and action
no need
to
adopt the practice, deriving
stating an initialversion of Pl in terms of innocents -
22.
clear noncombatants,
at
chains.
There
from Catholicism, of
least as problematic
Despite Nagel's suggestion that it does (p.158).
The suggestion depends
upon similar mistaken assimilations, of act with intention, and wrongness
with responsibility, to those of the double effect doctrine.
14
a class as that of noncombatants to try to characterize - and then
endeavouring
to make the difficult transition to noncombatants.
Not only can arguments against the premisses of the argument be met,
are
arguments
the
for
there
premisses, though for the substantive moral premiss Pl
they are of the characteristically nonconclusive moral sort
and
tend
will
For example, one argument for
vary somewhat with the underlying ethical theory.
Pl, and for objecting to the killing of noncombatants, is the Kantian one,
(to
seriously
understate
point)
the
doing
to
that
fails to treat them with the
so
minimal respect owed to them as persons 2 3.
§4.
Arguments
from
historical
requirements
on
just
argument from convergence, and environmental arguments.
wars,
The conclusion that LSN
wars cannot be justly waged - and accordingly are unjustified something
dreamed
up
by
contemporary
"free-enterprise" capitalist state (and
opponents
communist
important
the
of
is
America
inspired,
merely
not
or
the
of
The
etc).
same
conclusion falls out of various traditional requirements, worked out in medieval
times, for just wars.
One of the requirements gives but a variant on the
first
argument (KA). 2** For a necessary condition for fighting a war justly was that it
not be the case that large numbers of [innocent] noncombatants are bound
killed (cf.
to
be
Barnes, p.775).
A just war requires just means, that the war should be
means,
fought
by
morally
which
implies in particular that there is no indiscriminate
killing of noncombatants.
The implied principle was escapsulated in a principle
legitimate
of
discrimination
(between combatants and others) which 'prohibits all actions
directly intended to take the lives of
p.312)
25
.
civilians
and
of
noncombatants'
(PL,
LSN wars, where not only military installations are targeted, violate
this requirement 2 6.
23.
Of course there are counterarguments too, and not merely from the military
angle in the case of small numbers of obstructive noncombatants.
One
favored argument is a variation on the Bald Man:
there is no clear line
between combatants and noncombatants. However as Nagel argues (p.20) there
are distinctions between them, firstly in terms of their roles, e.g.
in
carrying or using arms or directing those who do, and secondly in terms of
their harmfulness, the threat they offer.
See also PL,
p.312, where a
simple and effective paradigm case argument is applied.
24.
Note that throughout, the text adopts the OED equations, reflecting common
usage,
of just with morally right or correct, and unjust with morally
15
Overlapping the requirement of just means is that of
being that of net evil to net good:
proportion
proportionality ,
'the damage to be inflicted and
costs incurred by the war must be proportionate to the good expected
up
arms'
(PL,
requirement:
the damage and costs,
to
goods
moral
proportionality requirement is
of
the
achieved
nationally
not
that
in
doctrine
through war.
"improvement"
are
which
way.
overall
consequences
of
war
conditions
way
bad,
(Barnes, p.782).
'a nation wages war
justly
the
than
Similarly
only
if
the
for that nation or the wronged nation it is supporting have a decent
chance of being better after the fighting ends' (Wakin, p.20).
no
and
According to the first, 'X wages war
abstaining from war'
improvement "puts wrongs to rights":
are
Entangled with the
"ameliorative"
of
confined,
justly upon Y if the overall consequences of war are better, or less
the
taking
by
p.312).2? It is not difficult to see that LSN wars violate this
disproportionate
criterion
the
satisfy
LSN wars can
in
these conditions, as scenarios depicting the aftermath of such
wars reveal.
Some of the lesser requirements for a just war are also
wars,
for
example
that
of
infringed
reasonable expectation of success.
by
LSN
It seems that
there can be no reasonable expectation of state success in an LSN war - whatever
the
very
differently,
exchanges.
limited
prospects
of
success
for
some
whatever the prospects of success in
What
small
strictly
state
limited
elite,
or
nuclear
is less clearcut is the question of whether LSN wars conflict
with the requirements of just cause or due fault, and of right
intention.
For
25.
The principle can be argued to in various ways.
One (by no means
conclusive) way is Nagel's way, from the requirements of directness and
relevance in combat, the underlying (controversial) principle being that,
'whatever one does to another person intentionally must be aimed at him as
a subject, with the intention that he receive it as a subject' (p.15).
26.
The situation with strictly limited nuclear wars where the targets are
essentially military ones, and noncombatants are unaccountably killed
"indirectly",would be different.
Such wars are not however excused by the
pernicious doctrine of double effect.
For such wars remain unjust on
several counts, e.g.
they inflict disproportionate damage, e.g.
on life
systems,
etc.
As Zuckermann says,
'It is still inevitable that were
military installations rather than cities to become the objectives of
nuclear attack, millions,
even tens of millions of civilians would be
killed ...' (quoted in Thompson and Smith,
p.14, where the italics are
added).
27.
This is not to be confused with what is very different, the vicious ancient
doctrine of proportional response - an eye for eye, tooth for tooth, and so
on - recently adapted by the Americans in their latest official policy of
flexible response, adjusted to the level of attack.
16
this depends on the sensitive issue of the weight assigned to what are
seen
as
basic human rights and fundamental values, and the extent to which just wars can
While the mainstream position
be ideologically justified.
theory
medieval
opposed to ideologically justified wars and "humanitarian" wars, these were
was
not definitively excluded by the traditional theory (cf.
is
of
merit,
little
when
(and
issues will arise again subsequently).
historical requirements
are
arguments
not
do
simply
not
There
in puzzling over dubiously effective requirements,
however,
when so many are decisive against LSN wars
sensitive
Barnes, p.778).
commit
arguments
any
from
matters
the
underlying
Finally, these arguments from
prescriptive
fallacy;
historical
authority
for
to
the
moral
conclusions, but use also premisses to the effect that the requirements imposed,
and sometimes applied, were justified.
As they are.
In the Christian tradition there were two main strands of reflection on the
moral
rightness
justness of wars, the just war theory and a rival pacifist
or
strand, prominent in early Christianity, but largely submerged from Augustine on
contemporary
until
times.
Both exclude nuclear wars, one strand because they
are inevitably unjust, the other because they are wars and
This
is
the
beginning of the convergence argument against nuclear wars:
that
is
duly
expediency
such wars are excluded from all ethical perspectives, once
removed
(and
even,
very
frequently, when it is not).
however you look at it morally.
consensus
violence^^.
involve
argument;
it
The argument is not
proceeds
They are morally wrong
the
same
as
the
weaker
from similar results from the full sweep of
genuinely ethical positions, not from massive agreement of opinion.
The detailed convergence argument is an exhaustive case by case
each
type
of
moral
theory.
Fortunately
details
can
be
deontological and contractual theories lead back to requirements
28.
one,
from
shortcut.
For
for
just
war
These alternatives are not as far removed practically as may appear.
For
the aim of just war theory is not 'to legitimize war but to prevent it.
The presumption is against the use of force' (PL, p.312). And most types
of wars are ruled out by the theory. However not all wars or violent
revolutions are excluded, and that is enough to guarantee the distinction
between the alternatives.
In particular, defensive wars are allowed - at
least for the defending side, though from a wider viewpoint these too may
be condemned 'the classic case [of the just war] ... was the use of
lethal force to prevent aggression against innocent victims'
(PL, p.311).
Under recent international law, defence, narrowly construed, is the only
legitimate basis for war;
Roman law was only slightly more generous,
in
allowing for the restitution of goods (see Barnes, p.780).
17
which, it has already been shown, LSN wars violate.
war
arrived
sometimes
were
defended through principles of such moral
or
at
In fact conditions for just
work
theories, so that a good deal of the requisite argumentative
been
The latter point holds also as regards utilitarianism, where it has
done.
in effect been shown that whatever brand of utilitarianism is
maximisation
utility
already
has
is
finally
LSN
accomplished,
adopted,
wars
however
excluded
are
utilitarian grounds.The reason for such convergence is not far to seek;
LSN
such massive infliction of pain and colossal removal of pleasure,
involve
wars
on
that this dominates in assessments however they are accomplished in
utilitarian
Thus any genuine alternative to LSN war is better30.
fashion.
The arguments
so
moral
overwhelming
far
case
outlined
against
principles
are
derivable
some
from
war
worse
substantially
are
of the theories just considered).
These
the obligation to maintain
to
accountable,
condition
than
the
these
we
violate
would
earth in proper shape and not degrade its systems:
we
exhaust
not
(again
LSN
principles include environmental ones, such as:
generations, to whom
do
wars
For there are other significant
wars.
such
moral principles which the waging of an
LSN
against
the
the responsibility to future
the
world
it".
Such
"pass
"received
on"
not
in
conservative
bound
principles - however they are finally satisfactorily formulated - are
to
be violated in the event of an LSN war.
§5.
The shift to nuclear deterrence:
support
nuclear
arguments to its immorality.
Those
arrangements have had a way of halting - and if not defeating,
certainly turning and deflating - arguments from the immorality of LSN wars,
engagement
done is, it is claimed, quite different from
is
most
important
precisely
in
preventing
LSN
in
such
war:
is
continued,
deterrence
is
the
only
practical
desiderata, prevention of war and maintenance of values.
way
indeed
wars from ever
occurring, as well as in maintaining other fundamental Western values.
it
by
What is being
pointing out that there is no actual engagement in any such wars.
deterrence
who
Indeed,
of obtaining both
Similar arguments
are
But compare Hardin.
29.
For details see, e.g., Lackey, especially MM.
30.
An argument of this sort is developed in more detail,
complete generality, in Goodin, especially 'Disarmament'.
though
not
in
18
advanced for all the various guises that deterrence is presented
in:
mutually
assured destruction as formerly, flexible response as latterly, or otherwise.
Such claims as to the roles and
dubious,
several
for
reasons.
objectives
of
If it were, "sufficiency" to deter would be an adequate goal.
superiority.
than
this,
and
sometimes
goal.
In fact there has
renewed
a
even
military
drive
for
Pure deterrence can account neither for actual nuclear weapons nor
for orthodox Western military strategy32.
process
decidedly
A first reason is that there is much evidence,
despite pronouncements, that deterrence is not the - the only -
been a quest for more
are
deterrence
Nor has deterrence set in motion
the
of disarmament to be expected to reduce armaments to levels appropriate
f<?r deterrence.
On the contrary, under "its"
impulse
there
has
been
almost
unlimited acceleration in building arms (to paraphrase PL p.318).
Another major reason for serious doubt about what
sold
31.
is
being
under "deterrence" labels concerns the probability factor:
marketed
and
deterrence has
It is important to observe that the discussion is not restricted to one
form of deterrence, such as that of mutually assured destruction (MAD), but
applies to all forms of response likely to engender LSN war. This includes
"flexible response",
since the likely further development is massive
retaliation to an initial Soviet nuclear raid. Part of the reason for this
is the extreme vulnerability of the US defence systems, especially the
communication systems, e.g.
to early strikes and to electromagnetic
pulses.
In the resulting great confusion, escalation appears the likely
outcome. In any case, flexible response includes massive retaliations, as
part of its range and is ultimately backed by it.
It is also important to observe that deterrence as practised is not
confined to responses to (nuclear) attack. The threat of nuclear action
has been made in cases where a rival encroaches on a zone of interest of a
nuclear power.
It is in part because deterrence includes nuclear responses
to what is construed as serious misbehaviour of rivals that the practice of
deterrence raises the probability of LSN war to the extent it does.
32.
As to the first point, there is not only overkill capacity and the drive
for superiority (often represented as "negotiating" strength) but the
matter of counterforce weapons which are offensive weapons. As regards the
second point, US policy has been decidedly expansionist with regular
intervention in other nations;
there have been repeated US threats to use
nuclear weapons,
especially to deal with revolutionary activities in the
third world, but also in Europe in "limited" nuclear war;
and in official
military strategy no sharp line has been drawn between conventional and
nuclear weapons:
on these and other related points see further Lackey MM,
p.l91ff., and also Thompson and Smith.
The argument can be pressed
further, to the alarming conclusion that deterrence is largely a front,
which plays only a minor,
but justificatory, role in actual US policy.
Among further evidence is behavioural data:
a government with a genuine
deterrence policy would repeatedly emphasize its strength (even when it
lacks strength), whereas the US government often parades its vulnerability
and weakness in public. For other evidence see Smith, e.g.
p.46ff.
19
of
increased the probability
type
arms-race
that
war.
LSN
deterrence
precisely,
More
of
the
is being practised, which involves full-scale preparation
for total nuclear war, has prepared the conditions for nuclear war to occur, and
has
to
that
extent
reasons also, connected with pure
the last 30 years.
deterrence
with
and
(its
war"
"cold
the
probability of a LSN war has increased considerably in
the
setting),
original
For other
least enhanced its prospects of occurring.
at
The reasons include the threatening posture
called
for
by
deterrence, the propaganda, which comes to be believed, that must be promulgated
to maintain credibility
overridden
or
with
"sacrificed
a
for
etc.
many
there
analysts
century, i.e
think
before 2000.
real
The situation has
is
a
high
There are several
are
interests
being
the dangerous and risky
military objectives!
state of military readiness;
sober
whose
population
now
where
reached
been
probability of an LSN war this
routes
to
a
such
probability
assignment.33 It would only require one incident with a 20% chance of leading to
an escalating war every 8 years between 1960 and
2000.
alerts,
Cuban missile crisis, carry a considerably higher chance
been
have
lucky
already.
In
of
nuclear
For
markedly.
the years ahead it appears likely that the
the
danger
supplicant
nations
resources declines.
and
the
worsens
and
the
extent
The danger is enhanced by
connected
increasing
chance
of
the
lot.
33.
Cox).
easily
as
the
plight
extractable
continuation
of
of
crucial
the
arms
of nuclear accident and human or
technical error, none of them negligible factors as
(cf.
increase
zones separating the superstates are increasing in
size and number, with Soviet and American expansionism, and
reveals
the
exchange.
number of incidents with a real chance of engendering nuclear war will
race,
on
side alone, have been at least as frequent, and sometimes, as with the
American
We
Full
past
experience
copiously
Such a sketch can of course be elaborated and tidied up a
Even so every substantial point involved can be contested,
and
many
are
Another route to a more than subjective assessment is to apply Delphi
methods:
weigh up the experts' assessments.
In this regard it is worth
noting that it is not only "nuclear doves" who consider the probability of
nuclear war has increased in recent years.
American officials have themselves admitted that the policies of
realising the strategic potential of counterforce attacks and of
selective and flexible responses have increased the probability
of nuclear war (Ball, p.128).
20
For better
contentious (though not always for good reasons).
way
no
seems
worse,
or
there
to make such an overall probability argument particularly tight;
and there are plausible arguments, from the complexity of the data concerned and
the contingency of the future, that it cannot be made tight.
It is bad enough however that it is decidedly plausible that it
that
probable
LSN
an
war
distribution principles) that it
probable
that
century.
And that is enough
grossly
a
is
immoral
to
decidedly
morally
on moral grounds, to change deterrence as
policy
is
immoral.
that
plausible
it
highly
is
sequence of events will be perpetrated this
evasive
warrant
morally to take action to avert the outcome.
deterrence
highly
For then it follows (by
occur this century.
will
is
action.
ought
We
That in turn implies taking steps,
presently
practised.
Thus
present
That is but the first of several ways we shall
arrive at that damaging conclusion for present super-state deterrence policies.
The plausibility of claims as to the high or increasing probability of
war has of course been disputed.
*
The main counterargument runs as follows:
Nuclear war is unlikely, because the consequences are too horrifying.
The underlying assumption is that wars and the like, with
are
LSN
improbable.
assumption.
Unfortunately
however
horrifying
outcomes,
much available evidence counters this
More than enough humans have not shrunk from brutal
exchanges
horrifying wars, or even from genocide, as human history attests (cf.
Kuper).
What is less assailable than the high probability claim, what the
certainly
have
already
got
into
since
LSN
thereby perhaps helping to bring it about, in the sense
war,
the probability.
immoral
of
raising
The more detailed underlying arguments, then,to the immorality
of nuclear deterrence proceed by
LSN
an
deterrence operates by the perverse practice of preparing for
situation,
against
evidence
seems to support, is that there is a non-negligible probability of an
Thereby, through deterrence, we
LSN war.
and
way
of
principles
mapping
war into arguments against deterrence of LSN war
might appropriately be called deontic
connecting
principles
moral
arguments
Such principles
The
first
of
these principles takes the following preliminary form:
Cl.
should
If it is wrong that X should occur, then not only
be
probable
is
it
wrong
that
it
that X occur, but, more important, it is wrong to directly
21
increase the probability that X occur.
Thus, for
example,
it
since
wrong
is
to
kill
large
a
noncombatant
population in LSN war (by §4) it is also wrong to put the population at risk and
wrong to increase the chance that the hostage population is wiped out,
which
both
of
For similar reasons a superstate is not morally
nuclear deterrence does.
entitled to impose nuclear risks upon uninvolved noncombatants, especially those
of third party nonaligned states.
most
Like
situations.
defeat by
example,
substantive
moral
Unless
counterexamples,
X
that
in
and
of
accordingly,
Cl
encounters
to
into
runs
require
dilemma
For
complication.
apparent trouble where clash of
order
to
that
the
passenger
he
plane
is
flying
sure that the troubled aircraft does not hit city
make
Such a defeating condition does not apply in the case of
where
deterrence,
Consider for example the
to avoid a greater evil.
occurs
apartment buildings 3**.
nuclear
Cl
dilemmas are duly allowed for, Cl appears liable to
pilot who increases the probability
crashes,
ethics,
in
Thus it may be argued that it is permissible to increase the
principles occurs.
probability
part
second
the
principles
(though
there
explains) wrongness of a practice is not
is
a
offset
or
principles, as §6
of
clash
removed
by
its
role
in
avoiding greater evil.
It can be argued that it is:
argument
the
from
previous
argument deserves little
perhaps
from
more
such is part of
success
credence
the
deterrence.
than
the
of
the
popular
However this inductive
driver's
racing
world
As Barnett argues,
argument,
'the
happy
accident
has survived the first thirty-five years of the nuclear era is
unimpressive evidence that we can avoid nuclear war
34.
point
a similar time base, that because he hasn't had a fatal crash yet
(despite some close calls), he won't.
that
of
the
in
the
coming
era,
...'
This dilemma example was supplied by D.
Johnston.
There are more
difficult putative counterexamples.
For example, in inciting people to
civil disobedience, the risk of state violence in retaliation is increased.
Thus,
to take C.
Pigden's example, in encouraging disobedience, Gandhi
increased the probability of wrongdoing by the British Raj.
But surely
Gandhi, unlike the Raj, did not act wrongly? It can be claimed that Gandhi
did not directly increase the probability of violence.
But spelling out
what
'directly'
means - in terms of short causal chains over which
responsibility can be distributed - is not only problematic but leads on to
other connecting principles.
22
(p.100).
He offers familiar reasons such as the changing power
increase
in
Russian
the
strength,
rise
the
relations,
of other nuclear powers, etc.
(cf.
similarly Cox).
There are, accordingly, powerful reasons for concluding that
Deterrence will not continue to work,
DI.
and, more important for the present argument, that
Deterrence does increase the probability of LSN war.
D2.
The themes are of course interrelated, and the reasons for them (which are again
persuasive but inconclusive) can be taken together:
some respects) weaker D2 - the probability factor.
proliferation,
the
but the focus is on the (in
An initial
of lesser nuclear powers.
emergence
reason
concerns
As a result there are
many more ways of starting a nuclear conflagration, and so enhanced prospect
it.3$
Some analysts consider that a very likely route to LSN war is the initial
use of nuclear weapons by
confrontation
a
lesser
state.
Moreover
scarcity
the
growing
and
weapon
systems,
more
or
terror
situations,
deterrence
power
involves 36,
being maintained:
balance
of
have an exceedingly bad historical track record.
increasing as the race proceeds.
of
With so many more
Arms races, and interwoven
There is substantial inductive evidence that
present
costs
widely distributed, the probability of war
through accident or error is increased.
power
resource
A second group of reasons concerns the
of cheaper supplies, etc.
nuclear arms race which deterrence, as practised, is tied to.
weapons
for
opportunities
to lead on to war are increasing, with increasing world political
instability, relating to third world economic decline,
and
of
lead
escalating
eventually
to
races,
arms
war,
with
such
as
probability
Next, deterrence depends on a certain
balance
if that balance is unduly disturbed, as can happen
during escalation, deterrence may well fail.
A related reason for
supposing
that
deterrence
practice
increases
the
35.
It can be theoretically argued
that the fewer the nations
nuclear weapons,
the less the chance of nuclear war: cf.
p.230n.
36.
The standard argument for
deterrence as significantly decreasing
the
probability of war,would
be decidedly better if the arms race were
abandoned, and weapons held at the much smaller levels required just for
deterrence.
Of course such a probability-well assumption is only one of
several things required if deterrence is to be justified.
armed with
Lackey, MM,
23
probability of war concerns the continuing shifts in US policy,
especially
the
renewed quest for superiority which is increasing the incentive of both sides to
resort to nuclear war, the USSR to avoid being
of
advantage
the
overwhelmed,
USA
to
take
superiority achieved.3? Recent dangerous shifts in US policy
the
towards war fighting are in part induced by a much increased accuracy of nuclear
missiles, which both weakens the case for MAD deterrence (since military targets
can be selected for strike and cities to some extent removed as
thereby
also
weakens
against
case
the
resort
to
leaders, and even some
nuclear
shared
understanding,
mutual
principles,
and
cooperation
Finally,
level
judgement
among
information
of
and
important)
of
soundness
transmission
war.
nuclear
deterrence requires a certain (admittedly rather minimal, yet
of
hostages),
between
It is not just that the increasing numbers of operators
super-states.
in a position to launch nuclear weapons must remain of "sound mind" and not, for
through on delusions of one sort or another.
follow
instance,
deterrence depends upon judgements
seriously
mistaken:
'each
is
regarding
other
the
It is also that
which
side,
side's
is to the other' (PL, p.313).
threat
we
But
think'.38
about
what
the
other
considerable, and perhaps catastrophic, margin of
evidence,
that
one
perception of what is
possible
result
As
side
thinks
side
error.
Not
thinks,
there
only
not
can be a
is
there
side (the USA) has misjudged the other side's (the USSR's)
rational,
as
regards
limited
nuclear
war,
of a first strike countered by massive retaliation;
must now be severe doubts
effectively.
"convincing"
There is a grain of truth in
the claim that 'deterrence is primarily about what the other
what
be
at the mercy of the other's perception of what
strategy is "rational", what kind of damage is "unacceptable", how
one
may
as
to
whether
rational
principles
are
with
the
but there
operating
to the last consider, to take just one example, the erroneous
37.
The point is discussed in Dahlitz, e.g. p.213, where the US quest for
superiority is documented. The vicissitudes of US "defence" policy - not
to say its shiftiness and occasional incoherence (as in strategic forward
defence) - have confused many of its supporters even. Perhaps there is
some advantage in the very incomplete and limited exposure of USSR war and
imperial policies:
we don't see, with alarm,
their incoherence and
irrationality.
38.
Pym, quoted in Thompson, p.19. Yet a fundamental problem Russia and the
West face,
it is sometimes claimed,
is not merely that they do not
understand one another but that 'there is a lack of a wish to understand'.
This casts into doubt the psychological basis of nuclear deterrence.
idea (already alluded to, as held in high places of power in USA and in UK) that
LSN war can be survived in rudimentary shelters, and also won.
The supporter of deterrence
connecting
such
principles
has
not
defeat
to
only
arguments
Cl, but, more difficult, to field a convincing
as
For the onus of proof lies in showing that the costly
rival case.
deterrence is justified.
through
practice
of
But far from the fairly decisive case that is required
(to contrast with the argument through Cl),
feeble
a
only
through
case
the
questionable obverse of Cl,
Clt.
If X is wrong then it is right to reduce the probability of X,
For it has to be shown that
appears open.
*
deterrence (substantially) reduces the probability of LSN war,
and strictly (this indicates part of the trouble with Clt) that
*
deterrence does this better (more morally) than available options.
The latter uniqueness condition certainly fails, so it will be argued.
reasons already given, does the probability claim.
up the very
conditions
probability
of
such
for
a
LSN
an
war,
it
So,
for
When nuclear deterrence sets
can
hardly
reduced
have
the
war, especially over the situation a mere 25 years ago
when such an LSN war was not technically possible.
More generally, in showing that nuclear deterrence is justified, it is
refute the theme that deterrence is wrong.
enough to
out that deterrence is permissible, or alright.
alternative
permissible
courses
action
of
deterrence, which appear more morally satisfactory.
uniqueness
condition has to be established;
to be not merely
alright,
but
right.
But
It is not enough to make
For there certainly seem to
without
not
be
the costs or problems of
To surpass these options, a
nuclear deterrence has to be shown
establishing
such
a
claim,
to
fear
or
acceptable evidential standards, is virtually impossible.39
Deterrence consists in preventing something (often some wrong) by
threats
including
fright
OED)**°.
(cf.
For
most
people,
portraying the horror of LSN wars would serve adequately enough
from
39.
LSN
wars,
without
all
the
enormous
expense,
trouble
vivid scenarios
to
deter
them
and wastage of
An analogous point will appear when it is asked whether deterrence is the
way out of the nuclear fix, the thing to persist with in the circumstances.
Given that there are apparently superior, less dangerous procedures,
the
answer has to be, No.
25
preparing to engage in them.
deterrence
And
deterrence
by
such
means
(which
in any case depends upon) is of course not immoral.
military
(Schell was not
immoral in publishing his graphic descriptions of the nuclear destruction of New
York.)
But though deterrence per se is permissible, nuclear deterrence, that is
deterrence by complete preparation for the object to be prevented, is not, where
this
object,
a
war, itself is not permissible.
LSN
The argument for this is
through the principle
If X is wrong then complete preparation for (carrying out) X is wrong.
C2.
Hence
since
preparation,
LSN
wars
nuclear
are
wrong
and
nuclear
deterrence
deterrence of LSN wars is wrong.
claimed that preparing for X is just as bad as doing X:
wrong and Z (much) worse than Y.
complete
It is not however being
Y and
may
Z
both
What is wrong is by no means uniformly evil
In 1945 there would have been little doubt that
LSN war was wrong.
implies
complete
preparation
be
41
for
Among the three types of crime specified in Article 6 of the
Charter for the International Military Tribunals
(which
tried
the
major
war
criminals at Nuremburg) were
Crimes against peace: namely planning,
preparation,
initiation or
waging of a war of aggression, or a war in violation of international
treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation in a common plan
or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the following (cited in
Kuper, p.21;
italics added).
But after many years of nuclear deterrence, the
become
increasingly
liable
to
question.
wrongness
implied
in
C2
has
However the doubts mainly come from
40.
Deterrence also commonly includes elements of mendacity,
deception,
misinformation, that is elements of what are, for the most part, morally
undesirable traits.
41.
Nor are
ordered
because
wrong,
equally
degrees of wrongness required:
wrongs can simply be partially
as regards relative worseness. The point requires some labouring
it has been quite erroneously assumed that if Y and Z are both
categorically or absolutely, then they must be equally "wrong" or
evil. Thus, e.g. Williams:
there is no moral difference between running a deterrent strategy
on the one hand, and intentionally - indeed wantonly - starting a
nuclear war on the other;
so that the first is as totally evil
as the second.
This is because both are held to be absolutely
forbidden.
Not at all. The arguments from "Y and Z are both absolutely forbidden"
to
"So Y is as totally evil as Z"
and
to "Therefore Y and Z do not differ
morally" are both entirely without validity.
Compare:
2 is a number,
and
3 is a number;
so 2 is the same number as 3, or does not differ
numerically from 3!
26
assuming that complete preparation includes less than it needs to or does.
Complete preparation for something, such as
several
other
LSN
war,
already
writes
in
In particular, it presupposes the preparation is not
features.
half-hearted but is serious, is not merely for show and is not simply
pretence.
Observe that mere pretence, or other more psychological ploys, cannot substitute
for complete preparation in nuclear deterrence.
too
sophisticated
bluff
for
alone
to
there
succeed:
preparation for war accompanying the threats involved in
the
other
has
is
now
be serious
to
deterrence.
But,
on
complete preparation does not imply that what is prepared for
hand,
will be attempted other than conditonally:
imply attempted X.
complete preparation for X does
not
It does however involve a conditional undertaking to proceed
with what is prepared
whether
intelligence
Military
under
for
certain
Complete
conditions.
preparation,
for a wedding or murder or whatever, would be pointless otherwise, so a
(proclaimed) commitment to proceed under given circumstances can
for
be
taken
of
connecting
granted.
Principle C2
A
principles.
is
part
way
not
the
in
line
a
series
principle of the same sort that is higher in the series is that
if X is wrong then attempted X is wrong
connecting X with attempted X:
perhaps
down
as bad), whether X succeeds or not.
But the series ends;
off well before the lower limits of intensionality, contrary to
various religious positions.
then
the
contemplation
consideration
of
of
it cuts
claims
of
For example, it does not follow that if X is wrong
X
is
wrong
carrying out X is wrong.
or
that
mere
non-action-oriented
The point applies equally to sexual
fantasies, power fantasies, and nuclear nightmares.
nothing
the
(though
In
particular,
there
is
wrong with contemplating nuclear war, or reflecting upon it, as we are:
nuclear wars, even if their horrors don't bear thinking on, are not unthinkable,
and in some senses are all too thinkable.
Indeed one of the reasons why the connecting principles appeal is that each
commonly
involves
it connects with.
decidedly increased probability of the wrongdoing or outcome
Accompanying the increased probability are
certain
reprehensible attitudes tied to the action the evil outcome involves;
not
those
of
mere
passive
contemplation*^.
However
all
the
sets
of
these are
connecting
27
principles
except Cl hold, where they do, even when the probability of
invoked
wrongdoing eventuating is not increased.
One reason for this is that the
means
to reprehensible ends may be inefficacious, for instance intending to do
chosen
someone harm using witchcraft.
The increased probability
evil
an
of
outcome
simply makes things worse.
announcement
Nuclear deterrence involves not only war preparation, but
this
threats
by
accompanied
and
a threatening posture.
For some party, the
if
potential enemy, has to be suitably frightened or moved,
of
deterrence
succeed:
the threat must be recognised as such and be credible.
nuclear
deterrence yields a further connecting principle:
is
to
This aspect of
If X is wrong then serious threatening of X under given conditions is also
C3.
or, in brief, If X is wrong then conditional threatening of X is wrong.
wrong;
The remaining connecting conditions invoked all take this general form
CG.
If X is wrong so is a conditional
requires
further
some
explanation.
intension
to
is some intensional functor,
threatening
from
Apart
intentions
that).
C
to
'the
the
most
is the
not
are
impossible
or even remote or improbable:
claim
in
what
(specifically those involving
commitment)
for
follows
certain
is
that
sorts
there
of
discussed
an
conditions
the conditions
typically concern those specifying a nuclear strike by a potential
fundamental
credible
functor:
To remove complication it can be assumed henceforth that the
involved
which
it is obligatory
in propositional rather than event style:
(or
form
a
e.g.
themselves,
conditional intensions are conditional obligations where
obligation
-
A conditional intension is a judgement of
the form, ^(X if C), where
of'.**3
X
do
enemy.
The
are intensional functors
threatening,
intending,
and
which CG holds, and that these versions suffice to demonstrate
of
Naturally
again
many
the
immorality
42.
There is plenty of scope for further
elaboration
here.
Passive
spectatorship of evil events where one is in an appropriate position to
make a difference is quite another thing,
from contemplation of other
worlds where evil occurs.
43.
The conditional intension, ^(X if C), which is an intension, should not be
confused with the provisional form,
if C then^X, which is not. The
Americans are threatening the Russians with retaliatory action if they
strike:
it is not that if the Russians strike the Americans will threaten
them with retaliatory action.
Such confusion has arisen because of the
problems of formalising conditional obligation given usual defective
theories of conditionality.
nuclear
deterrence.
there
are
28
non-action-oriented functors for which versions
contemplation,
thinking,
dreaming, etc.
GC
of
fail,
of
those
e.g.
There is also an interesting group of
more borderline functors, those of hoping (for),
expecting,
the
and
awaiting
like, for which CG is only dubiously correct.
Connecting principle C3 evolved from the simpler principle, if X
then
threatening
to do...
into
X is also wrong, or, as formulated by Ramsay:
is wrong to threaten...'**** The reason is that
practice
(e.g.
'What is wrong
putting
if
wrong
is
something
committing rape) is wrong then so also is what goes into
threatening to put that into practice, in particular the declared intent to
that
into
practice.
beginning as follows:
The
point
can
if worlds where
alternatively
X
are
happens
be
put
argued semantically,
excluded
so
then
are
adjacent worlds where X is poised to happen.
The complication of the simple form is required for two reasons.
only conditionally threatened, i.e.
is
should certain conditions
nuclear
war
obtain.
However the required conditional form can be derived
through
form,
the
following
argument:-
which is perfectly general, X if C.
particular,
by
earlier
arguments
44.
so
also
is
the
simple
Observe, furthermore that if something X is
if it weren't it wouldn't
(The converse route fails
(of
§§3-4)
LSN
opposition has struck, or not, and so wrong when it
wrong,
from
substitute for X in the simple form,
wrong, it is also wrong under restrictive conditions;
have been wrong in the first place.
Firstly,
threatening X if C.
war
has.
of
course.)
In
is wrong whether the
Hence,
where
X
is
More generally, to establish CG it is
Ramsay's formulation of simplified C3 is considered in Walzer,
p.272.
It
is this principle especially that forces Ramsay, a Protestant theologian
who is a nuclear hawk, into the awkward position he ends in, which as
Walzer explains, really leaves no room to move.
For in virtue o
simplified 03 it must be allowed that the threatened wars are permissible
to carry out. Ramsay tries to limit these to military exchanges. But to
be effective as a deterrent, the exchange permitted must both threaten a
also
in view of C3, not threaten nonmilitary targets, collateral
non-combatant populations.
It appears that Ramsay's position,
if worked
out, would be inconsistent.
see
Simplified principle C3 is also invoked by the US Catholic Bishops:
PL
p.316.
They put the point both in terms of threat and of declared
intent to use nuclear weapons, which they pronounce morally wrong.
simplified C3 is rejected by Hare and Joynt (pp.106-7), who want to
However
the moral status of a threat by way of expected utility. This is
assess all the objections to expected utility as a test of morality
open to
mentioned below.
29
enough to establish the simpler
If X is wrong so is an intension to do X.
CG'.
The second complication in C3, modifying the threat to
causes
threat,
Some modification appears required, because it is often
trouble.
more
serious
a
contended that empty threats or bluff are warranted on occasion even where
is wrong, to prevent the occurrence of something worse .**$ And in
threatened
is
what
fact one way of trying to vindicate deterrence, as morally permissible, has been
by presenting deterrence as involving threats which do not involve any intention
at all to proceed to action on
plausible
threats.
it
the
support
removes
basis
for
of
simplified C3.
sense
one that is not a pretence, empty or a bluff, but credible.
says
which
intended,
consider a
For the challenge
immoral
grossly
where
case
conduct
under
certain
not
and calls for moral double-think.
the
circumstances*
result
To bring this
an
from
improbable
intricate
Either the threat is followed through, automatically (as ordered, by
Doomsday Machine circuitry, etc.) or with further choice, or - somehow -
not.
is
Principle C3 is not
simplified and unqualified C3.
is unconvincing,
conditions,
accident.
is
in effect that itis perfectly morally permissible to issue serious
threats to undertake
out
this
Hence the shift to serious
A serious threat then, in the slightly technical
open to thesame challenges as
as
Insofar
threats.
Either
it
is
way the outcome is morally wrong, in the first case obviously, in
the second case because the intermediate reconsideration makes it plain that the
threat
nor
ought not to have been issued at all, being justifiable on neither moral
more
"practical"
representatives
Furthermore,
grounds.
natures,
to
the
kinds
of
themselves to be (as Benn explains).
insignificant
their
and
may accept moral double attitudes, such as morally assenting to
immoral threats, less corrupt agents cannot:
moral
states
while
proportion
morally
it
would
run
counter
to
their
principled agents they are or take
For such agents, who may
comprise
a
not
of the electorate of a nuclear state, principles such
as C3 are not in doubt.
The argument against nuclear deterrence using C3 is as follows:- Either the
45.
For a discussion of threats where the threatener has no intention of
carrying out the threat, or incentive to do so, see Schelling, p.35ff. The
question of the morality of these threats, where the item threatened is
immoral, can be left open.
30
threat involved in deterrence is serious or it is not.
is
then by C3 deterrence
wrong.
The
sub-argument
depends on serious threats is a practical one:
not
is
it
inadequate, so deterrence is not maintained.
is
it
then
If
serious
But if it is serious
nuclear
that
deterrence
namely, that if the threats were
not serious, but merely gave the impression that they would be followed through,
then
would find out, in one way or another.
opposition
the
could not be endorsed in an open or democratic political
A policy of bluff
system,
for
example,
gaining some discussion, and so giving the game away to the opposition.
without
Even in closed non-democratic systems
maintaining
a
such
policy
weapons, especially
during
there
the
down
of
times
would
be
major
difficulties
in
chains of command involved with nuclear
in
change
governing
elites,
and
the
opposition intelligence.
But then,
since the bluff could be called, deterrence would not have succeeded.
There are
as
likely
would
information
through
escape
well other arguments that the threats involved must be serious.
One is that
nuclear deterrence already faces a credibility problem, namely that doubts about
the
rationality
of
carrying out the big nuclear threat weaken the credibility
essential to its effectiveness.
To be effective then it must
serious
be
(cf.
Benn).
Meeting objections to principle C3 leads on to two further versions of
one
centred on intention, one on commitment.
CG,
Principle C3 is intimately linked
with, and it sometimes considered but a variant upon, the principle
C4.
If X is wrong then to conditionally intend to do X [knowing it is wrong] is
also wrong.
The principles are intimately associated because a threat is, according to
dictionaries,
etc.'.
of
'a
declaration
of
intent
to inflict punishment, loss, injury,
It is their interconnection which lies at the bottom of
which
deterrence,
intending to go to war.
principle,
that
turn
C4
is
some
paradoxes
on the problem of credibly threatening war without
Principle
04
is
justified
through
the
simplified
intending to do wrong is wrong, and so also is intending to do
wrong unless favourable circumstances for one's
principle
some
an
extremely
position
prevail.
Simplified
widely assumed moral thesis,*^ perhaps for the
excellent reason that it holds analytically.
Its elaboration C4 can be used
to
31
since proceeding to LSN war when
against nuclear deterrence, as follows:
argue
the enemy duly misbehaves is wrong (by §§3-4), by C4, intending to go to LSN war
the enemy duly misbehaves is also wrong.
when
Nuclear deterrence involves such
Hence
an intention, all the available evidence shows.
deterrence
nuclear
is
wrong.
But like virtually every
utilitarian
themselves,
principles
utilitarian grounds.
deontic
principle,
principles
For it is not difficult to
those
except
from
flowing
C3 and C4 can be challenged on
outline
strategic
situations
where maximum expected utility results from a policy of nuclear deterrence.
But
on its own this concession casts but little doubt upon
C4.
For
it
likewise
is
not
principles
difficult to outline situations where the hanging of
innocent people, or other injustices, are sanctioned or enjoined by
maximum
expected
and
C3
utility.
pursuit
Those who appeal to utilitarian assumptions try to
avoid such more obvious difficulties with reliance upon utilitarianism,
scrapping
the
spots
not
by
doctrine, but by hedging applications of their principles around
with qualifications, which, they hope, will
trouble
of
with
utilitarianism.
enable
it
So
them
evade
to
the
worst
is with Kavka, whose work nicely
illustrates that whatever (little) deterrence has in its
moral
favour
depends
upon utilitarian assumptions.
Kavka 'begin[s] by noting that any reasonable system of
substantial
utilitarian
elements'
(PD,
p.287).
Even
observation were correct — it is not, depending for one
consequential
elements
systems
include
must
infiltrate,
an
with
the
'assumption
if
thing
ethics
this
upon
must
have
astonishing
conflating
utilitarian - it would not follow that reasonable
particular
that
assumption
produces
normative assumption involved is that the
act
Kavka
thereupon
tries
the paradoxes of deterrence'.
with
maximum
expected
to
The
utility
'(the most useful act) should be performed whenever a very great deal of utility
46.
Kavka, who labels simplified C4 the Wrongful Intentions Principle (PD,
p.289), attributes the principle to Abelard, Aquinas, Butler, Bentham,
Kant, Sidgwick, Kenny and Narveson.
Kavka also gives reasons as to why the
principle appears 'so obviously true'. Kenny and others apply C4 to argue,
like the US Catholic Bishops, that 'nuclear deterrence is immoral'
(cf.
Kavka p.291).
It is the clash of C4 with certain utilitarian principles (especially the
maximisation principle of p.287)
that directly generates Kavka's first
paradox of deterrence and lies behind his other "paradoxes":
see PD.
32
is at stake' (p.287).
objections
This assumption is open to essentially the same batch
utilitarianism
as
it is mainly a matter of increasing or
itself:
varying the stakes involved sufficiently in any counterexample.
strategy
usual
of
Kavka tries the
weakening and fudging the normative assumption to avoid the
of
worst problems of distributive injustice, and the like, that maximising
utility
can morally enjoin.
But the crucial defect in Kavka's argument lies
follow
normative
the
from
overridden
supposed
to
assumptions
utilitarian
by
way, as if it dominated C4 (see especially p.290), what
C4
is
Though Kavka tends to apply the fudged normative assumptions in this
(p.287).**?
and
what
assumption however fudged, namely that 'this means
other moral assumptions are
that ...
in
when
produce,
situations,
are
moral
combined
situations
in
dilemmas.
These
are
the
cases
assumption
special
as
such
not
fudged
deterrent
one
where
deontic
principle, that yielded by utilitarianism, overrides others, but where there are
competing, even contradictory deontic principles, such as that it
is
right
to
to proceed to LSN war when the enemy misbehaves (on specious utilitarian
intend
grounds) and also wrong to intend to do so (by C4).
that judgement is not overriden.
wrong:
remains
Nuclear deterrence
Nor does it in any way follow that C4
is in need of qualification as a result (Kavka's assumption,
p.290).
situations,
However,
there
are
countervailing utilitarian considerations suggesting different imperatives.
For
what
is
in
these
is
wrong.
the
also
case
is
that
these
in
special
special circumstances a greater utility can be realised by doing what
However
it
is
hardly
news,
but
a
objection,
standing
that
utilitarianism sometimes enjoins what is wrong.
Special
sponsonship
deterrent
may
appear
situations,
where
under
utilitarian
to get a foot in the moral door, are very special.
characterised by Kavka, they are such that the
47
deterrence
deterrence
is
very
likely
As
to
Lackey's utilitarian approach rests on a similar fallacy, that utilitarian
considerations predominate where stakes are large enough:
see his argument
for the approach in MM p.192.
What happens is not that important consequences override moral principles,
but that application of one principle with important consequences conflicts
with that of another principle with less significant consequences,
and in
the weigh-up of what to do in the problematic circumstances the principle
with important consequence prevails.
33
succeed, and nothing else is likely to succeed (see p.286), i.e.
is
deterrence
This is very far removed from the real world
lodged in a deep probability-well.
situation where nuclear deterrence appears to be increasing the
probability
of
LSN war, and where other procedures such as graduated nuclear disarmament are at
least as likely to succeed as deterrence.
that
principles
deontic
Even if it were
supposed
mistakenly
to real-life dilemmas should be qualified to
subject
avoid dilemmas, there is little point in qualifying working
deontic
principles
such as C4, given the remoteness of the special deterrent situations.
Instead of pulling nuclear deterrence down though the immoral intentions it
involves, it can be criticized more broadly through the commitments it requires,
by way of the following principle:
If X is wrong then a conditional commitment to carry out X is also wrong.
C5.
The reason is that the commitment is a commitment
and
circumstances;
that
commitment
is
to
act
in
wrongly
certain
Nuclear deterrence is
itself wrong.
however a policy which commits states to war under certain conditions.
with
conditional
intention,
that
superstates
and
and
commitment
controlling
to
use
representatives
nuclear weapons.
not
did
occur)
is
to
enough
establish
have
relevant
the
The dangerous strategy of
launch-on-warning (which could, for instance, result in a
that
as
so with conditional commitment, there is no doubt
their
intention
And
response
to
attacks
the point, for which there is
otherwise quite sufficient factual evidence.
are
Now the connecting principles
suffice
but
logically,
nuclear
deterrence,
for
weighty
case.
instance
conditional commitment to LSN war, is wrong.
This
one
principle
would
By
detachment
from
the
by complete preparation for and
Deterrence of this type is
wrong.
also reveals why the suggestion, that the morality of the whole deterrence
trip depended on war itself never occurring, was so
paradoxical:
deterrence.
itself
sound
when all are liable to be disputed, several defensible
ones, ideally in concert, make for a
principles
applied:
it
out
the
connections
between
and
not
be
engaged
in
(unless
its
has
appeared
nuclear war and nuclear
Nuclear deterrence should not be practised given that
should
changed, e.g.
left
bizarre
nuclear
war
direction can be drastically
at least limited, per impossibile in the case of nuclear warfare,
34
to purely military targets).
The arguments through connecting principles, can be reinforced by different
sorts
arguments against the moral correctness of nuclear deterrence.
of
There
are arguments from limited convergence of ethical theories, which start from the
commonplace observation that
All the ethical arguments in
*
favour
of
nuclear
deterrence
broadly
are
utilitarian.
In fact most of the arguments in favour of deterrence, including many
that
infiltrated
have
the
ethical
literature,
are
of
those
generally drawn from game theory, and primarily interested in the
one
player,
the
USA.
Utilitarianism,
though
still
looking
of
those
expediency advantage
of
basically
at
advantages, interests and (typically individual) utilities, has to take
a
partisan
pain of
position,
and
forfeiting its claim to morality
supported
by
other
consider
nationalities
otherwise.
The
as
well,
commonplace
on
less
observation
is
the fact that such qualified moral support as deterrence obtains,
derives from utilitarianism.
48
There are two directions on to a general claim against
deterrence,
either
by way of the pro-utilitarian theme
*
Utilitarianism properly applied also comes out against deterrence
or, more strongly, by way of the anti-utilitarian theme,
*
Utilitarianism does not furnish satisfactory moral arguments.
Then, by the anti-utilitarian theme, there are no satisfactory
in
favour
direction:
48.
of deterrence.
moral
arguments
Naturally, it would be easy to strengthen the second
after all it is widely
thought
that
utilitarianism
is
a
false,
Thus the hedged utilitarian defences of Kavka and of Hare and Joynt, and
Showing that cogent
also within the broadly utilitarian range, of Gautier.
______
defences of nuclear deterrence have to take
a utilitarian route would be a
Though it is a reasonable conjecture that the
much tougher enterprise.
T'
' , much would depend on what was
enterprise could be carried through,
For certainly bizarre principles, e.g. obverses of the
connecting principles, can be introduced, which afford deontological routes
to deterrence.
despite some backsliding by bishops, all other ethical positions; can
A deontological
made to speak against deterrence and its continuation,
be 1___ —
.
connecting
deontic
case against deterrence,
primarily the way
of
principles, has been argued in some detail.
In the light of these
principles, it is not difficult to see how cases from other ethical
2 go..
After all C4 has been defended from a wide range of
positions would
Af--- -1......
And
stances, e.g.
contractual,
natural law, utilitarian even.
<—
35
seriously astray, or even shabby ethical position.
political
which
system
depends
in
some
utilitarian arguments for its policies.
It hardly does
measure
for
then
a
upon consensus, to rely on
Yet with nuclear deterrence
just
that
appears to be happening, with readily overturned arguments at that.
For whether even utilitarianism supports deterrence depends essentially on:
it
how
with
applied;
is
which
maximisation recipes; along with what other
restrictive assumptions (such as those of a deep probability-well);
are
generous
With
sovereignty, national security, etc.
or
assumptions,
different
arguably
(and
superior)
varying the guestimation methods, very different results
upon
The
emerge, opposing deterrence and favouring unilateral nuclear disarmament.
reason for this is straightforward (and like that ending §4).
basic
LSN war has an extremely large negative utility.
deterrence
out to
recipes
Any
policy
such
It is that
as
nuclear
which increases the probability of this, or even risks it, must lose
feasible
other
of
how
for such things as preservation of national
assignments
utility
and on
a
alternatives,
consequentialist
type
whatever
are
initially
applied
(e.g.
plausible
decision
Minimax, Dominance,
Disaster Avoidance, Expected Value).
The anti-utilitarian theme can be defended either by a full-scale criticism
of
utilitarianism,
beginning for instance with its well-known justification of
localised injustices, $0 or else
utilitarianism
when
applied
One obvious deficiency is this:
by
to
addressing
some
of
the
inadequacies
of
issues like that at hand, nuclear deterrence.
on standard utilitarianism, what to do, whether
to proceed with deterrence, depends on the probability of its success and on the
improbability of other options working.
deep,
utilitarianism
If the deterrence
probability-well
is
morally requires deterrence, otherwise not.$* But what is
morally required, or wrong, does not fluctuate with what outcomes are
probable.
49.
The instability of utilitarianism is illustrated by the
discussion
involving Kavka, Lackey and Hardin,
continued in Philosophy and Public
Affairs 12(3), 1983, where, on the basis of utilitarianism, diametrically
opposed conclusions are reached.
(Hardin's approach tends however to
expediency reasoning of the strategic type.)
50.
Such wider criticisms of utilitarianism, in all its forms, as an ethical
theory are too well-known to repeat.
Some of the main defects are
considered in another article in this series, 'An expensive repair kit for
utilitarianism' .
The point that utilitarianism gives no firm place to
stand comes from L. Mirlin.
36
Whether deterrence is morally wrong or not, is
likely
work
to
independent
it
is
are
princip]gs
Moral
not
through expected values, whether utilities or otherwise - though how
determined
bad some outcome is may be.
are
deterrence
decidedly
essentially
nowhere
whether
If nuclear deterrence is wrong where it increases the
or not.
probability of war, then is it wrong, simpliciter.
depend
of
upon
firm to stand.
Worse, since the expected utilities in the case
uncertain,
these
of
the results utilitarianism delivers
and
uncertainty
measures,
offers
utilitarianism
In contrast with the solid deontic ground of principle,
utilitarianism provides only shifting sand.
The objections made apply especially against act utilitarianism.
form
shows
special
interests,
such
as
conditions
security
(the
probability-well
state,
of
estimation rules are pulled in).
high
have
is
deep,
utilities,
nation-state
and
special
It does not yield a deterrence policy;
indeed
hardly yields policies at all (other than act utilitarianism itself).
and certain other difficulties may be avoided by considering instead a
of
act
most that nuclear deterrence is "wrong" according to its lights
at
under very
it
The
acts.52 But the method lacks stability;
These
sequence
different prescriptions will result
depending upon how the sequence is selected, what is included and what left
(as
also
associated probabilities depend critically on the sequence selected).
No unequivocal recipe is delivered.
selected
out
to
To
see
this,
suppose
the
sequence
is
include worst cases, for instance cases where deterrence fails and
war breaks out.
In this event it can hardly be argued that
deterrence
is
the
policy that maximizes utility over the sequence.
Along with the arguments, there are
dissatisfaction with nuclear deterrence.
other
conventional wars.
for
Firstly, the peace it has provided
only nuclear peace, or rather lack of nuclear war, as there
smaller-scale
reasons
concomitant
is
deep
is
shortage of
no
And the "peace" provided is at best a tenuous
peace, which is not stable, but liable to upset at
any
stage
by
a
range
of
51.
Though this is to oversimplify, the points made are not affected by the
simplification.
In any case the simplified picture reflects well enough
the differences between Kavka and Lackey that matter in their debate
(referred to in footnote 49).
52.
Whether this is rule utilitarianism, or still act utilitarianism
the sequence can be construed as one long act, may be left open.
because
37
factors, including error, both human and technical.
It does not
genuine
offer
of the sort required for a stable international life, but only a fragile
Peace,
peace of a sort
opportunity
is
enormous
the
cost,
moral
cost of deterrence, because expenditure on it excludes other urgent
moral priorities.
way,
Marxist
Secondly, there
(PL, p.316).
in
The US Bishops put this familiar
terms
of
'the
destructive capacity and what
is
for
in
between
contradiction
needed
point,
spent
is
what
constructive
surprisingly
a
for
(PL,
development'
p.316).
§6 -
Practical, prudential and more moral arguments from
dangers
national
nuclear build-up of the superstates, and the genesis of nuclear dilemmas.
to
While
there are arguments to the immorality of nuclear war preparation, there are also
counter-arguments,
that
have
Americans), to the moral
proved
justifiability
persuasive
remarkably
of
nuclear
war
(especially
preparation
in
to
the
present circumstances .
The underlying style of argument is simply an elaboration, or state-uplift,
of that for the escalation of weapons at the local level, for acquiring a gun or
for stocking-up the neighbourhood armoury - and every bit
argument
from
local dangers.
and
domination;
dubious
first
of
all
second of nuclear destruction.
atomic
surrender
and
so
avoid the destruction' (Walzer, p.273).
preparation is supposed to guard against more than these;
third
element,
namely,
loss
of
basic
rights
there
with these.
blackmail
of
foreign
appeasement
In fact nuclear
is
a
crucial
of
ways
life
This further set of elements is linked to the danger of
foreign domination - which is really a separate element from risk of
Though
and
(freedom, equality, etc.) and
fundamental values (upholding of truth, human dignity, etc.) and
integrated
that
The two go together,
since if we did not fear the blackmail, we might adopt a policy
or
as
It is that nuclear preparation, 'so we have been
told, guards against the double danger:
foreign
as
blackmail.
domination need not imply the loss of most basic values it does
imply the loss of at least of one, self-determination, freedom to choose various
national objectives;
conversely loss or erosion or infringement of basic values
can occur without foreign domination, for instance, as
is
commonplace
in
the
38
"free" world, by internal change of government or governmental approach, through
the increased security and control a
nuclear
risks,
increasingly
preparation
state
nuclear
demands,
But
etc.
what
nuclear destruction, also
extensive
involves loss of basic rights and values, through destruction
of
the
material
of the cherished life-style.^ So nuclear preparation is hardly a clearcut
base
means of guaranteeing basic values.5^
In other respects too the argument from loss of
lacks
cogency
rings
and
It
hollow.
is
basic
values
and
rights
hard to avoid the feeling that the
oft-appealed-to basic values often function as something of a front, like
citation
values at political ceremonies;
religious
of
clean cover for economic consideration of one sort
demands
from
of
of
wealth
private
appealed
to
category:
in
and
them
to
having
arising
with
do
the
an argument isn't, or
However
associations.
And
rights
the
and
But not all the values commonly appealed to fall into
particular nationalistic ones do not.
And one of the main
alleged values of deterrence, the resistance to and containment
or
many
another,
are, mostly, of the utmost importance, indeed fundamental,
and worth much sacrifice.
this
of
power.
and
oughtn't to be, defeated by its unsavoury
values
that the argument is a
military-industrial complex, many concerned with foreign
the
domination of other lesser states, and many
concentration
pious
"communism"
of
of "socialism", can hardly be accounted fundamental, any more than retention
of capitalism.
communism
has
happened
What has
been
here
with
confused
of
(the
totalitarianism, which does remove certain more
freedoms
(of
opinion,
association,
is
course
that
reality
basic
information,
of)
values,
etc.,
(the
ideal
of)
socialist
state
namely
certain
and
so does
etc.),
derivatively threaten basic values.
One critical question, then, is whether extensive nuclear
LSN
war,
and
indeed
for
rational way of preserving
nuclear
those
holocaust,
fundamenmtal
preparation
for
is a good or effective or even
values,
which
we
have
left.
53.
The converse obviously does not hold. Basic values and
cherished
life-style can be lost without nuclear destruction, or nuclear preparation,
as when a more powerful state imposes its values and way of life.
54.
The argument from freedom, advanced by Jaspers and repeatedly rolled out by
state representatives, is further considered early in Appendix 1.
39
arise
Similar questions
and
domination
as
regards
arguments
the
preparation depends essentially on an arrangement of hostile
structure
which
itself
is
open
questioned (in §8), both from the
serious
to
question,
view
of
point
foreign
of
danger
of the methods of extensive nuclear
Justification
blackmail.
from
and
basic
of
states,
nation
a
is subsequently
values,
such
as
freedom, and otherwise.
But whether ultimately justified or
dangers
not,
these
national
those that have been taken to morally underwrite extensive nuclear
are
preparation, and
have
They
justification.
been
accepted
outlook.
moral
by
policy
Within
particular, that extensive nuclear
the
as
affording
moral
arguments
preparation
do
not
such
Northern
conventional
a
It is within such a framework, in
framework the moral justification holds good.
however,
makers
fact been widely accepted, and undoubtedly form
in
have
part of many people's
others,
from
arguments
engenders
establish
moral
a
fix.
For
the morality of extensive
nuclear preparation, but only make a prudential case for such preparation.
people
face a nuclear dilemma, but, though evaluative in character, it is
also
not a specifically moral one.
And
for
many
others
and their respective rights and freedoms, there is no serious dilemma.
people
who
not
are
who
again,
so
or as familiar with Soviet and American culture and ways of life,
by
impressed
Such
beyond
live
For such
the "beneficial" reach of the superstates, prudential
counter-arguments from national dangers carry little weight, and the moral
case
against deterrence is not offset but stands unchallenged.
This is the genesis of the argument from isolated
people
who
Consider
some
a comparatively remote area, whose freedoms are not (yet)
in
live
people.
under threat from superpower expansionism, but whose lifestyle is put at risk by
nuclear
(as under principle Cl).
deterrence
For such isolated people, who may
have little interest in the preservation of nuclear states, there is no
nuclear
dilemma,
and
nuclear
locations may have problems
to
national
is wrong.
dangers,
People in less fortunate
but
in
meeting
these
they are not entitled to impose grave risks on the uninvolved isolated
problems
people.
as
deterrence
genuine
In doing so
immorally;
and
for
through
similar
nuclear
reasons
deterrence, superstates
the
are
proceeding
conventional Northern framework is
40
The same conclusion can be alternatively reached
impugned.
argument:
a
put
isolated person, and check
the
resulting
substitution
Russian in the position of such an
or
American
reflective
a
by
assessment
of
nuclear
deterrence.
it would be the same as that of a reflective isolated person, stripped of
Since
superstate bias, morally opposed to deterrence and not morally
transfixed,
the
conventional framework fails to satisfy requirements of morality.
The outcome of the arguments from dangers is, then,very different depending
on
the
whether
are
arguments
applied
regards a superstate or not.
as
The
superstate theme which emerges is, in brief,
SST.
Because of multiple connected dangers from other states which have
nuclear weapons, a state - any state that is too large to rely upon other states
- is obliged to invest in at least matching nuclear weapons.
Hence, by detachment, a super-nation-state, such as USA, ought to have something
in
the
the nuclear armoury that it has.
of
order
meet objections concerning excess,
a
least
at
retain
Or, weakening the theme to
"overkill" capacity, it
core of the nuclear devices it has.
solid
[morally]
ought
to
For subsequent
argument it can be left open whether the obligation involved is a moral one, for
instance
of
because
the
character
of
the
protected, or only (as argued above) one of
to
grounds
supporting
those
against
disarmament
a
the
SS
reason $5.
prudential
theme
nuclear
dangerous
Northern values supposedly being
on
similar
it can be argued that unilateral
opponent
would
be
prudentially
irrational.
It will be freely admitted that what is prudentially or morally required is
a
suboptimal
strategy,
like the familiar strategies of the prisoners' dilemma
situations and of certain related competitive games.
that
like could be achieved, would
agreement
would
be
cooperative
draining
of
For
such
resources,
the details are well-enough known.
future
55.
admitted
arrangements.
Cooperation
and
be better not merely in removing the nuclear dilemma, but in a
range of other respects.
expensive,
be
strategy for nuclear adversaries, if sufficient trust and the
superior
a
So it should
arrangements
would
be
much
less
risky,
destructive of the environment, and so on;
However for the present and the
foreseeable
the prospects of cooperation appear - so we are repeatedly told by state
It can
still,
and
presumably
does,
amount
to
more
than
mere
expediency, since the 'freedom of Europe' is part of what is at issue.
local
41
representatives, who are (not always wittingly) helping to make
true
-
unfortunately
rather
remote:
only
the
policies
their
sure insurance is extensive
nuclear preparation and full preparedness to apply nuclear force.
At least this is so where one is a superstate:
proceed,
largely
unabated.
nuclear
preparation
Where one is not a superstate, but a lesser state
one must, the representatives continue, rely on a larger ally who has a
arsenal,
one's
nuclear
preparation,
one
under
huddles
and
which
contrasts
the lack of trust displayed, and encouraged elsewhere.
Does a
state, one which relies for its nuclear cover on a super-ally,
ground
for
another's
But here a level of trust and cooperation is^ called for, by
umbrella.
dependent states, which is far from foolproof,
with
nuclear
insurance (which is presumably not free) is obtained indirectly
through some superstate's
nuclear
confidence
in
its
rather
super-ally
strangely
dependent
have
exchange
on its territory?
much
that
its ally's opponent?
than
Confidence, for instance, that its ally will not render it a target or
nuclear
must
stage
a
Given the proclivity of states, especially
large states, to resort to expediency, and given the recent historical record of
superstates and their leaders, too much faith would.be misplaced.
Thus, whatever the limited force of the argument for the superstate
it
does
theme,
not extend to the analogous theme for a dependent state, which differs
from SST and ends as follows:
DST.
Because ..., a state without adequate (or any) nuclear weapons is obliged
to rely upon a superstate ally, and within that arrangement, to accommodate the
facilities and nuclear installations of the protecting ally.
In part for reasons already given, principle DST is not very plausible (and
same
goes for more obvious variants upon it).
Nor do the arguments offered for
SST transpose particularly well to direct arguments
strikingly
illustrated
by
the
case
the
for
DST.56
This
is
more
of more remote nuclear dependent states.
Consider the argument from basic values, for instance, from the angle of nuclear
dependent Australia.
Basic values in Australia are not threatened by, or put in
jeopardy through, the actions or plans
of
the
Soviet
Union.
Nor
are
they
threatened by the other superstate, the USA, the only country with 'the physical
56.
As is widely known, inadmissible and usually much overrated considerations
of expediency frequently enter into reasons why states allow foreign
nuclear facilities upon their territories, e.g.
economic considerations
such as trade or local revenue and short-term jobs.
42
capacity to launch a full scale invasion of Australia', but
'clearly
lack[ing]
motive to do so', so far.5? Clearly the argument from basic values does not
any
look convincing.
carries
reasons
For similar
In
weight.
little
the
with
fact,
from
argument
little care, the present level of
a
economic and political domination could be much reduced.
of
force
For there
only
is
questionable
of
because
danger
such
superstate
In this way
too,
nuclear
umbrella,
and
facilities
superstate
the
that would be removed with
danger
non-aligned practices.$8 With less remote dependent European states these
of
the
from danger of nuclear destruction could be nullified.
argument
the
domination
foreign
sorts
arguments from national dangers are only marginally more convincing, and may
be defeated along analogous lines.
The differences in the situations of states, and
peoples,
break
the
theme
of
a
of
situated
differently
This is a theme especially
monolithic West.
favoured by US and the West European representatives, who present the West,
its
freedom,
as threatened by Soviet domination.
undifferentiated unit.
dependent
states
with
But
this
leading
idea,
NATO
designed
powers,
and
In this the West is a single
in
part
to
align
lesser
to justify putting them at
and
nuclear risk is as much a myth as the idea of the Golden West.
not
The West is
so monolithic, it is not so comprehensive, some of it is not so free, much of it
(including the Antipodes) is not threatened by Soviet domination.
Principle DST - likewise what it depends upon, SST - is
now
under
coming
attack by European disarmament groups, who challenge the core assumptions of the
underlying retaliatory model that
*
Safety lies in weapons,
*
More weapons imply more securityS9.
Certainly, for more isolated states, such as New Zealand,
safety
from
nuclear
attack lies not in weapons but in excluding nuclear facilities (including visits
from nuclear submarines).
present
system
is
more
Europeans are arguing in
of
a
similar
way,
that
the
a risk, indeed liability, than a protection (e.g.
57.
For the quoted claim, and some of the
Australia's Security, p.94.
58.
The issue is further pursued in Appendix 2.
59.
See, for example, the last article in Thompson.
argument
for
it,
see
Threats
to
43
envisaged
the
and that without nuclear installations, Europe cannot be
Thompson, p.251);
theatre
limited nuclear war, in the way it is now seen by US
a
for
(but not Soviet) strategists.
Once the weapons
assumptions
are
questioned,
other
the
assumptions of
and its variants come up for examination, namely
retaliatory model
*
Whether
the proper response to danger is armament, in particular
,
Whether
the proper response is through nuclear armament,
asopposed,
say, to other military responses, such as conventional arms, or,
taking off from the previous point,
Whether military approaches and procedures (through
*
are
proper
methods,
etc.)
armaments,
or should be such dominant methods, of conflict
resolution at the international level.
It is plausibly argued, against military procedures, that at no
level
ordinary
do we sensibly set about meeting danger or settling disputes by acquiring lethal
weapons and threatening to use them - except perhaps on an out-dated, and
really
frontier
warranted,
ethics.
This leads into the issue of alternative
defence systems, a vital matter beginning to obtain the contemporary6°
and
explanation
it
deserves,
questioning of the framework
of
but
never
one
that
nation-states.
already
While
emphasis
anticipates subsequent
the
state
system
is
intact, force is far from exceptional and military procedures are to be expected
and are likely inevitable.
nation-state
system':
For 'force has
[a]
...
permanent
place
the
in
thus Ramsay (on p.xv), who uses this as part of his very
orthodox case for nuclear war arrangements.
§7.
The resulting nuclear dilemmas for aligned states
Assembling
referred
the
to
as
themes
the
so
far
nuclear
developed
fix:-
States
war-deterrence, because (as argued in §3-§5)
to engage in war-deterrence, at least
60.
the
yields
both
and__ their—supporter^.
deontic dilemma, often
ought
not
for prudential reasons (as
conversion to such arrangements.
engage
in
it is immoral, and also ought
Alternative defence systems were considered long ago in
Mohists.
For contemporary work on alternative systems, see
survey in Sharp. There is in fact a considerable literature
and social defence arrangements, and a growing literature on
i.e.
to
argued
using
China by the
especially the
on non-violent
transarmament,
44
SST and DST).
the
This dilemma is no idle construction
paraconsistent
of
virtues
but
logic),
(concocted
to
demonstrate
a serious real-life dilemma, the
outlines of which are repeatedly encountered in texts on
nuclear
and
war
its
aspects 61, as well as being virtually ubiquitous in nuclear war discussions.
The nuclear fix is in part simply a more intense
dilemma
produced
by
the
deontic
war itself &2, or at least war which spreads beyond purely
military targets, as larger wars inevitably
do
(since
military
arrangements,
The main dilemma arises
rail transport, typically rely on civilian ones).
e.g.
of
version
from a combination of the retaliatory model with the features of
War
war.
is
required for defence of the state and values it upholds (or pretends to uphold);
but war also involves immoral acts and evil consequences.
can
war"
under
certain
justified.
be
also
seen
as attempting a reconciliation by trying to show that
circumstances
Thus
'some
these
really
justifications
evil
consequences
aegis
of
war'
(Walls,
p.260).
acceptable than fallacious asymptotic
are
morally
of war aim to show that actions deemed
normally forbidden by moral mandates are now permissible
the
The doctrine of "just
But
this
arguments
when
under
performed
is no better or more morally
for
utilitarianism
being
as
correct when the stakes are large.
War and preparedness for
61.
war
also
generate
subsidiary
dilemmas
-
for
Thus Green, along with many others, 'find[s] nuclear deterrence ...
the
best of practical policies available to us now ... given the realities of
world politics' but 'still demur[s] because of moral qualms'
(p.xii).
Green
also represents both Morgenthau and Halle as having 'rather
agonisingly presented a ... case for a deterrence strategy,
even while
asserting that the strategy is morally indefensible according to the
traditional ethical codes' (p.252). Walzer ends in a similar dilemma (he
is committed to a stronger and less qualified form of it than he sets
down):
'...
though it [deterrence] is a bad way, there may well be no
other that is practical in a world of sovereign and suspicious states'
(p.274) - an indictment of the state system that Walzer does not pursue.
Similarly the US Catholic Bishops
dilemma;
they speak of 'the
dilemma of how to prevent the use
Paskins and Dockrill and in Benn
terms of moral dilemmas.
present the situation in terms of a moral
political paradox of deterrence ...
the
of nuclear weapons ...' (PL, p.313).
In
too the nuclear situation is presented in
The nuclear dilemma is of course not a dilemma for everyone, for those who
think they have seen the clear admissibility of deterrence, or differently
for those who have seen through the arguments from national dangers.
But
it is a dilemma for those locked into the conventional framework.
62.
Situations in war are also a major source of moral dilemmas:
see Routley
and Plumwood where several examples are given. A general logical account
of and theory of moral dilemmas is elaborated therein.
45
authority:
instance, a severe tension between freedom and
difficult
'one
of
most
the
of war involves defending a free society without destroying
problems
p.324).
the values that give it meaning and validity' (PL,
The
problems
are
greatly enhanced by modern nuclear arrangements.
The nuclear fix not only intensifies and complicates other dilemmas induced
by
the
contemporary sovereign state^^, in particular the deep tensions between
national security and the operation of liberal-democratic arrangements (such
individual
liberty, popular control of institutions, etc).
other more personal subsidiary dilemmas, as for
(political)
obligations
to
example
question
(the
It also accentuates
the
extent
one's
of
a nuclear state, and role-induced dilemmas such as
one's conflicting obligations as a doctor or a nuclear
researcher
as
of
political
obligations
armaments
and
their
processor
or
evasion
is
considered further in Appendix 2).
At the more personal level, that of individual and group action, there
several
questions
be disentangled - questions different from the key issue
to
'What should my state
be
doing
and
influence, depending on who one is.
do?',
on
which
one
may
exert
lives,
and
influences, i.e.
in
what
little
There is not only the question 'What should
I do?' - a question which will have a quite different force depending
one
are
on
where
sort of state, where one works, what one controls or
on who one is and one's roles - but also the
questions
'What
sort of person do I want to be?', 'What am I prepared to answer for morally?'^"
Answers to these latter character questions will feed back to influence those to
action-oriented
questions.
Each
of those questions can, in given situations,
induce subsidiary dilemmas.
The essential feature of a deontic dilemma is that both A and the
of
A
are
wrong
(or
differently,
pursuing a nuclear defence policy.
obligatory),
negation
for some suitable A, such as
The place and essential role of deontic
and
63.
The nuclear dilemma is not alone responsible for these other dilemmas.
Large-scale nuclear power generation, and other types of warfare and
security arrangements, also contribute.
But a conflict of
ree om a
authority is already an outcome of the large central state.
64.
For group formulation of the questions replace 'I' by 'my group', etc. The
importance of distilling out these questions, and the moral undesirability
of deterrence in terms of what it does to people morally, are brought out
in Benn, where however the issues are made to look somewhat more separate
than they are.
46
moral dilemmas are not
widely
well
or
particularly
understood,
ethical
in
This is partly because currently dominant ethical positions like
literature^^.
utilitarianism cannot at all easily accommodate moral dilemmas or the data which
gives
to
rise
them
then such positions do not really offer reportive
but
-
accounts of wrong and obligation anyway.
Contrary to utilitarian perceptions
a
dilemma does not necessarily have any moral solution, though there may be better
and worse ways out.
By
assessments,
form
which
contrast
the
with
ethical
such
preanalytical
theories,
of sensitive theories, do recognise moral
basis
dilemmas and reflect their features.
Reactions and responses that are characteristic of deontic dilemmas
the
from
There is an unsteadiness, an uncertainty as to what to
fix.
nuclear
do, which way to proceed, which principles in watered-down form to
temporary
crutch.
for
Thus,
as
way
a
of
never
exercising
"morally
our
world'66, that is in a morally-strapped world.
best"
ethical
Bishops who
the
of
A similar
'strictly
conditional'
Deterrence has a strictly temporary role
the
object
must
and
deterrence
circumstances.
deterrence,
is
"morally
in a fallen
acceptability'
certainly
one
strictly
wrong,
is
of
from the
conditional
option
as
to
of
what
nuclear
the
to
do
nevertheless
the
policy
to
fix.
awkward
in
Thus Walzer, for example, struggles to the conclusion
though
"second
a
to
be to move beyond deterrence, 'towards a
world free of the threat of deterrence' (PL, p.317), out
And
be
try to escape 'the paradox of deterrence', i.e.
moral fix.
but
shift
'moral
while
acceptability,
can
good",
responsibility
moral
deterrence
we
a
(as from good to acceptable) is made by the US Catholic
functor
speak
as
grasp
example, the Bishop of London contends that the
possession of nuclear weapons 'while
acceptable"
emerge
that
war
in
the
pursue
circumstances (p.274).6? However as more than an immediate stepping stone
to
a
65.
There are exceptions of course, e.g.
in the Catholic educated such as
Sartre;
and Nagel's final example is very instructive. For a fuller
theory of moral dilemmas see however Routley and Plumwood.
66.
Reported in The Economist;
reprinted in
1983, Weekend Magazine p.2.
67.
As a response to a moral dilemma, Walzer's approach is perfectly in order
logically. Those who, like Benn, 'find it neither coherent nor acceptable'
The
have not grasped the logic of moral dilemmas.
Australian,
February
12-13
47
superior
it
policy,
(in
assembled
is
reasons
§5-§6),
of
option,
poor
decidedly
a
the
sort
reasons
for
are
that
decisive
for those,
outside the conventional Northern framework, who find
sufficiently
already
no
genuine
of
nuclear
nuclear dilemma.
To make matters worse the nuclear fix is, furthermore,
own making.
states'
a
fix
It is not something they blundered into, by accident.
initial nuclear involvement was deliberately chosen, primarily by the
the
the USA and the USSR in interaction.
and
In these respects the
situation
is
like
people who deliberately let themselves be involved in two incompatible
of
relationships, and build up conflicting obligations
though
USA,
has by and large also been deliberately chosen, again mainly by
escalation
that
The
build-up, in North America occurred on a defensive basis in response
nuclear
to
Soviet
The fact is that the USA initiated nuclear armament, and has
build-up.
frequently led escalation, and apparently still does.
programme is to be in addition to existing
resources
myth,
a
is
some currency, that adoption of nuclear weaponry, and nuclear
with
one
It
thereby.
are
(which
agreed
generally
The recent (1980)
United
States'
strategic
be already in excess of
to
Russia's, and which always have been so) (Thompson, p.21).
The present dilemma, that many people feel acutely, is then a direct outcome
state
policy,
allies, and
Naturally
not
the
USSR policies.
that
indicates
especially
a
merely
route
by
taken
advanced
response
to
capitalist
the
USA and its NATO
nations,
Soviets
(or
of
socialism).
state
would not have been feasible without complementing
And independent evidence,
such
as
Soviet-Sino
confrontation,
is a strong internal military dynamic in state socialist
there
nations.
There is a two-way connection between world political arrangements
nation-states
the
and
nuclear
fix.
arrangements are an evident source of the
nuclear
situation
is
increasingly
present world political structure.
is
widely
promulgated
arrangements:
it is '...
seen
On
the
dilemma
as
one
hand,
with
the
these
result
through
political
that
the
indicating the inadequacy of the
Indeed it is no longer a radical
theme
but
that the source of the nuclear problem comes from state
a world of sovereign states ...
which
brought
the
48
world
the present dangerous situation' (PL, p.313).
to
nuclear fix tends to lock political arrangements into
On the other hand, the
the
statist
form,
into
The
arrangements of an increasingly authoritarian and centralist cast.
statist
espoused purpose of nuclear weapons may be to keep the
national
defend
to
and
security,
interests,
reasons such as perpetuating the system
state
advantageous
confrontation,
and
provide
to
but underneath there are other
sovereign
of
(!),
peace
and
states
of
framework
the
military-industrial interests, dependent state exploitation, and
politically
favoured
inequality
it
supports.
The emerging theme is then that the very nuclear situation arising from the
statist
and
arrangements
interrelations
(economic
ideologies, etc.) tends to, and is used to, lock
arrangements
of
states and zones of interest.
sovereign
theme is a piecemeal practical one.
where
side
the
pattern
world
the
conflicting
rivalries,
into
the
present
The argument to this
Consider first, the matter from the
Soviet
of national control and progressive military-economic
reorientation common to all nuclear states is clearer.
The threat from the West, whether it exists or not (and in Soviet
perception it certainly does), has become a necessary legitimation for
the power of the ruling elites, an excuse for their many economic and
social failures, and an argument to isolate and silence critics within
their own borders.
In the West we have ... carefully controlled
...
and selective release of 'official information' (Thompson, p.20).
"We" in the West, especially the Americans, also
integrated
with
state
apparatus,
have,
in
forms
increasingly
the military-industrial complex, which is a
major beneficiary and promoter of the nuclear arms race.68
Secondly, there is evidence of entrenchment of the arrangements,
by
things
such
as
the
SALT negotiations;
there are fixed superpowers and a
(growing) nuclear club of nations all governed by a
rules, partly held in place by deterrence.
shown
as
flimsy
negotiated
set
Connected with this, there are cases
revealing the fixing of zones of interest, such as the Afghanistan example.
Soviet
US is
68.
of
The
invasion is not regarded as threatening US "vital interests", and so the
not
overduly
worried
about
Afghanistan
and
its
people.
What
was
The role of the military-industrial complex in present US escalation is
sketched in Cox. Marxists, with their dogma of economic determinism, would
assign even more weight to this point.
As some of them would freely
concede, a similar complex has figured prominently in USSR escalation.
49
different, what it was worried about and made nuclear threats
adjacent
Western
oil
supplies:
were
concerning,
these lay within the US zone of interest (cf.
the discussion in Schell, p.212).
§8.
initial political fall-out from the ethical
Ways out of nuclear dilemmas:
Virtually all the ways are ways of limitation, and they all involve in
results.
one way or another limitations on nuclear arms or the way they are deployed, and
limitations
the
on
thus inevitable.
and
more
powers of states.
Limitations on national sovereignty are
The limitations may be reached by agreement
and
negotiation,
less voluntarily agreed to^^, or they may be imposed, or possibly
or
worst of all, they may emerge from an initial war.
As with other fixes produced by
are
there
suggested
the
structural
arrangements
of
states,
out which do not interfere with these arrangements,
ways
interstate approaches, and there are ways which do seriously alter the structure
and
power
relations
extrastate approaches.
of
states
(and,
in the limit, remove them altogether),
All the familiar, allegedly
practical
and
realistic ,
attempts to resolve the nuclear problem, for instance disarmament by mutual arms
limitations, etc., are interstate;
sovereign
state.
The
same
goes
(graduated) unilateral disarmament.
about the nation-state;
they do not tamper with that sacred cow, the
for
less
"realistic"
But in fact there is
proposals,
nothing
or
empirical
fact,
is it particularly a stable one.
nor,
and
its
replacement by alternative arrangements.
as
a
We are certainly
free - in more liberal states, it should be everywhere - to theorise as
demise
sacred
it is not a particularly well justified political form;
it is not even a very long-standing form of political arrangement;
matter
very
such as
to
its
And nuclear dilemmas
should have encouraged such reflection.
69.
In principle it would be relatively easy for states to agree to settlement
of their disputes by less damaging and expensive contests than military
ones, e.g. by contests of selected representatives, and not just through
fighting in some form, but by contests of footballers, singers, dancers,
lawyers, or etc.
In practice, however, such more civilized alternatives
are never much considered in these days of superstates. Animals, by
contrast, are smart enough to settle disputes by means much more like
these.
Even the ancient Greeks - though they had a clear appreciation of
limits, which has been lost by post-Enlightenment leaders - regarded the
institution of war as final (allegedly inevitable) means of arbitration
between city-states, not seeing
its
social,
structurally-emergent,
character.
50
Extrastate approaches take one of
international
of states.
routes,
the
way
up,
to
genuine
power, or the way down, through fractionation or deunionisation
The ways up and down are by no means one and the same;
but they are
Some of the important machinery, for a way up to
necessarily incompatible.
not
two
world government,is already there in the
international
Were
law-courts.
the
courts assigned sufficient authority and power, the remedy, namely through legal
action, that medieval
theorists
saw
all
to
intrastate
and T superseded by the just case of S versus T.
sufficient
war deterrence,
though
Law courts, as usually conceived, are not
equivalent
super—statist
But if
the
law
courts
were
power then their authority and efficacy would likely rely (at
upon
least initially)
their
in
could
be extended to interstate disputes, and the just war between states S
principle
given
disputes,
back-up
equivalent
for
of
economic
perhaps
not by military means.
effective without police and jails or
and
other
penalties;
and
the
either will involve the capacity to inflict quite
substantial amounts of damage on "delinquents" - which, because delinquents will
be
typically
organisations,
will also involve damage to innocent, and perhaps
dissenting, participants in those organisations, as well as to other
In
parties.
uninvolved
short, such an approach does not resolve the problem but tends to
repeat it.
The Way Up is one more statist, legalistic, authoritarian way of trying
get
to
grips
with
the
nuclear
though mostly in passing to be
70.
to
problem, and accordingly is often mentioned,
dismissed
in
orthodox
strategic
texts
on
Americans, for example, tend to forget that their state (like the USSR)
is
a union, of fairly recent origin, and that a differently-oriented State of
the Union message could well consider dissolution of the union.
Regional
movements in USA unfortunately lack much popular support at present.
By
contrast, there are significant separation movements,
some deserving aid
and encouragement, which affect most other nuclear states, especially USSR,
UK and France. The USSR already has trouble in holding its (supposedly
voluntarily integrated)
satellite empire together;
and the one recent
attempted addition right on its frontier is proving extremely recalcitrant.
Nor should powerful political unions under centralised state apparatus be
fostered elsewhere.
The same applies to state empire expansion, as
illustrated in contemporary Indonesia. Most important,
the reunification
of
Germany
should be resisted;
instead a more rational regional
deunification than the present East-West division of post-war Germany
should be sought, along with removal of nuclear weapons from the border
region, and so on.
71.
Thus for example, Kahn, where such a "solution" is quickly dismissed as,
impractical, etc.
Hardly necessary to say the Way Up has won most favour
with the legal fraternity, and from more authoritarian organisations.
51
the
By contrast, the Way Down, though like
thermonuclear war.
an appearance (a comeback) in some more radical discussions,
with the Way Up (in "world order" models:
combined
unlike the Way Down, is
considered
however
beginning
is
and
more
much
international
system';
and
'the
'towards
a
no
sometimes
sympathetically
There is
by those who take a moral rather than strategic viewpoint.
a renewed emphasis on world order, in reaching
by
The Way Up,
Galtung).
cf.
be
to
Up
but it is making
new, is scarcely mentioned in the orthodox discussions;
means
Way
integrated
morally
missing element of world order today is the
absence of a properly constituted political authority' (PL, p.320).
A main argument for the Way Up is
just
repetition
a
that
of
which
is
commonly supposed to underpin statist arrangements in the first place, namely an
argument from (generous) variations upon the Prisoners'
of the Commons.
Tragedy
traditionally,
ecological order.
not
as
best
regards
problems
to
solutions
nation-states,
of superstate.
of
organisation,
and one of the prospects is destruction of a
said
to
be
some
Of course, this begins to undermine an earlier application
of the "tragedy" argument, since states will lose their sovereignty and some
their
order—imposing
correspondingly weakened.
arguments
role,
and
But all
obligation
political
this
is
assume
to
,
only sound under quite restrictive assumptions.
There are, then, many problems
through
that
states
will
these
tragedy
A
further
theoretical
with
the
hitch
is
Way
Up,
that
a
both
theoretical
and
the Way Up merely repeats
arrangements.
It
is
contingency, of there being no rival intelligent civilisations
nearby, that the problems of interstate relations are not repeated
72.
be
72
statist arrangements at a level up, by way of superstate
only
to
of
good ones in the first place, when in fact they are not, but are
are
practical.
the
public order and, more recently, as to
good part of the commons by nuclear war, the solution is now
sort
as
So with the "tragedy of nation-states", where the players are
but
herdsmen
such
It is that authority and coercion - in the form of the
state * are required to ensure
especially,
Dilemma,
See further Routley and Routley
and
material
referred
to
a
level
therein,
up
and
especially Griffin.
The real reasons for the state are of course very different from the
theoretical cover such arguments afford. Among other things, the state
enables and guarantees the accumulation of power, privilege and capital.
The major practical hitch is that there is no prospect at all of getting
again.
such a "solution" to work in time to serve its intended purpose.
In reality, we are no nearer a world government than we were a century
ago,
....
In fact, it is even arguable that since World War II we
have moved further away from a world government than we were before
World
War
II.
The disintegration of empires has multiplied
sovereignties. It is true that we have something called the United
Nations, but even the United Nations has declined in power as it has
grown in membership. By the beginning of the 1970's the United
Nations had become, in some ways, a less powerful and even less
influential organisation than it was at the end of the 1950's (Mazrui,
pp.2-3).
For
The reasons for this Mazrui goes on to outline.
future
foreseeable
the
nuclear
ideological differences between states, including especially differences
as to how political arrangements should be effected, exclude any prospect of
an
world government or a world legal system capable of resolving nuclear
operative
In some ways, this is just as well.
hostilities.
monolithic,
extremely
would
World
would
government
foster economism, would entrench bureaucracy with
all its damaging features, and could easily tend to totalitarianism.
whatever
certainly,
its
be
(gray?)
colour,
political
exploitative economic system which would do immense
impose
damage
It
would
the world an
on
many
remaining
crucial
respects,
to
natural systems.?3
The Way Up thus presupposes an unlikely
undesirable
ideological,
requisite
of
level
indeed
unity
political
cannot
be
economic
and
paradigmatic,
and,
separation
in
some
Moreover,
unity.
of
main
Northern
within nuclear deadlines.
expected
given
cultures,
When not even
nuclear weapons limitations can be worked out, how much less likely is
more
much
sovereignty, could
blockages
agreements,
sweeping
and
be
negotiated?
deadlocks
in
the
involving
genuine
There
an
way
is
endless
(e.g.
of
of
state
series
of such state reconciliation.
applies to interstate arrangements, which may make limited use
that
it
limitations
almost
the
the
of
The same
Way
Up
negotiations or other conciliation procedures within a framework arranged
through the United Nations) .?**
73.
For a more detailed (but decidedly mediocre) critique of the idea of a
world
government,
see Galtung.
Naturally the objections to world
government, and difficulties in the way of obtaining it, do not extend to
more flexible world arrangements, such a world federation of cultures (cf.
Mazrui).
Such a pluralistic anarchistic Way Up can
be
genuinely
synthesized with the Way Down.
53
There is
regrettably
and
arrangements
much
also
conventions
are
evidence
frequently
concerning war and human rights?$), and are
sentiments
smoothly
not
not
observed (especially those
worth
into despicable deeds.
not
bode
convention
in
great
a
deal:
Even agreements states have
openly
violated.
Indeed there already appears to be at least one
any
force,
of
It
to
which
international
all the major nuclear states are signatories,
which would rule out LSN war and nuclear deterrence, that on genocide.
includes
lofty
for nuclear arms limitations, should sufficient agreement
well
ever be reached.
treaties,
international
are often enough disregarded, skirted around, or
signed
does
slide
that
the
following
Genocide
acts committed, in time of peace or war, with
intent to destroy in whole or part a natural, ethical, racial or religious group
killing members of the group, causing serious bodily or mental harm to
as such:
the members of the group, deliberately inflicting conditions of life
to
bring about physical
destruction
direct
and
public
shall
conspiracy to
commit
be
Persons committing genocide or any of
punished,
whether
they
are
the
other
acts
responsible rulers, private
individuals or public officials.?6 it is not difficult to argue
nuclear
genocide,
incitement to commit genocide, attempts to commit genocide,
complicity in genocide.
mentioned
Beside genocide the
in whole or in part.
following associated acts are also punishable:
calculated
that
larger
a
strike (such as deterrence policy requires as a back-up response) would
almost certainly constitute an act of genocide, through what
minority
groups.
to
does
some
But then, by virtue of connecting principles like 05, nuclear
deterrence stands indicted
particular
it
conspiracy
representatives of the
and
as
involving
incitement.
nuclear
states
acts
associated
with
genocide,
in
Some well-known political and military
would
thus
appear
to
be
liable
to
indictment and punishment under international law.
74.
Even Dahlitz, who gives a detailed and sympathetic account of nuclear arms
control attempts and lost opportunities,
is by no means confident that
suitable arrangements can now be achieved (see pp.
210-13).
Reasons
include technological advances now taking place, and the renewed American
drive for strategic superiority.
75.
See Brownlie, Kuper, and Amnesty International reports.
in this paragraph were suggested by C. Pigden.
76.
The account of genocide given is taken directly from the
Genocide Convention, which is reproduced in Kuper, p.210ff.
Most of the points
text
of
the
54
The nuclear fix emerging from nation-state arrangements - combined with the
impotence
apparent
interstate relations to alleviate the situation, indeed
of
with the apparent ability only to push the world further into the situation
nearer
to
the
nuclear
"brink"
—
taken
now
is
to
contemporary angle) the inadequacy of nation-state political
has
given
new
impetus
sovereignty
the best-seller
and
to consideration of other extrastate resolutions.
The
the
indicates
the
namely
nuclear
in
The
Schell's
situation
should
reexamination of the foundations of political thought'
world's
political
unsatisfactoriness
radical
of
the present system of nation states has even reached
stands
Schell
to
According
and
book
a new
arrangements,
thesis that the nuclear problem
national
(from
indicate
and
of
Fate
lead
to
required
Earth.
the
a
full-scale
to
make
'the
consonant with the global reality in which
institutions ...
they operate ...' and in 'work[ing] out the practical steps by which mankind ...
can
reorganise
political
its
life' (p.219).
However Schell himself tries to
avoid these 'awesome urgent tasks, which, imposed on us by
the
political
work of our age' ??.
else overimpressed
by
the
history,
constitute
So, not feeling the pressures of history or
realities
of
(unstable)
nation-states,
do
most
But there is no good reason to avoid the task of political
political theorists.
reassessment, made so much more urgent by the nuclear situation.
There is little doubt but that we live (too
unthinkingly)
with
an
antiquated
system
many
present
state
arrangements,
communications
condition;
especially,
were
in
a
of
(allegedly
when
17th
century
very
different
and
the main outlines of the modern totalitarian state
and its manifold deficiencies recognised, even earlier.
77.
willingly,
The features
representative
government, were largely fashioned in the
us
even
of political arrangements which the
nuclear impasse, among others, calls into question.
best
of
even
democratic)
technology,
more
were
the
and
primitive
discerned,
In the briefs presented
A similar theme, similarly questioning 'such sacred traditions as absolute
national sovereignty', was pressed by Bradley, a significant US general
(see Cox, p.225).
Schell (like Bradley) does not make it entirely clear whether he is
thinking of the Way Up or the Way Down, but the names he drops suggest the
Way Up.
So does the main thrust of what he says, e.g.
'Thus the peril of
extinction is the price that the world pays not for "safety" or "survival"
but for its [sic!] insistence on continuing to divide itself up into
sovereign nations'
(p.210),
as if the natural or original state were an
undivided one? On Schell's position, see further Appendix 1.
55
for political arrangements such as representative government, the excessive size
and complexity of modern states was not envisaged.
But such systems continue to
operate, insufficiently questioned, though their justificatory bases
undermined.
present
Nuclear
representative
emphasized
have
problems
political
have
been
several other deficiencies in
arrangements.
particular,
In
they
have
revealed how governments can thwart popular opinion, and act against the evident
will of the people on an issue, for instance in installing US missiles
European
Now that modern communications and information-processing
countries.
make it feasible to determine the mix of public positions on major
case for representative procedures is dissolved.
century
19th
issues,
a
issues.
The
reduced
power
excessive
back
at
developments,
issue-regulated
and
large
imposes
complex
other
modern
What
requirements.
by
states
government
recent
technological
Firstly,
smaller
initial
grouping
than
giant
states,
integration of groups by principles of federation.
as it is
to
informed
citizens
of
satisfactory
a
approximate
goodwill.
As
there are serious deficiencies in
the
information
in
present
progressive
and
procedure,
depends
control,
nation-states,
even
and
release
the
distribution
information,
channels, and so forth.
acceptable
the
from
These
distortion
restrictive
of
most liberal of them (and
Again, especially with new and less
But there are
evidently vested interests which stand to benefit from the limited
of
upon
nuclear problems have again made patent,
systems, there is little excuse for this.
information
upward
Secondly, democracy, insofar
political
related deficiencies as regards education).
publicly
democratic
like many other social arrangements, appear to function better with
procedures,
flow
and
called for are smaller
are
groupings, information flow, communication and education.
and
major
on
governmental power to more participatory democratic forms, a route made
possible even in
expensive
least
of governments would, to that extent at
But the route down through
least, be reduced.
much
elected
way that is thoroughly ambiguous on most issues) are not given an almost
free hand on every issue, but are required to answer
policy
the
It is past time
for more issue-controlled democratic procedures, where governments once
(in
some
in
of
data
features
in
have
availability
major communication
helped
in
making
present deliberately fostered pattern of nation-state
56
confrontation, and in establishing the prisoner's
superstates
nuclear
are
often
seen
to
be
dilemma
type
the
situation
locked into (on which see, e.g.,
Hardin).
A central argument, arising from the nuclear fix, for
current
questioning
arrangements and seriously considering their adjustment (in theory at
political
least), takes the following shape:e
Political arrangements should answer back to certain
in
justified
terms
doing
of
at
where
least
are
so.These requirements include such things as
enabling good and meaningful and moral lives for those
arrangements,
and
requirements
(as
certainly
in
who
under
operate
the
much of the West) the basic
material conditions for such lives are met.
*
Because of the nuclear fix, nation-state arrangements have
these
requirements.
For
guarantee the prospect of
arrangements.
nation-states,
good
and
at least in the North, can no longer
meaningful
to
lives
their
yet there is a non-negligible probability that
person's morality is jeopardised if the person is obliged
a
under
those
such lives may terminate, less than fulfilled, in this way.
support
meet
A life's meaningfulness is certainly diminished if it ends before
its prime in a nuclear disaster;
many
to
ceased
state
to
Furthermore a
in
acquiesce
or
engaged in nuclear war preparation or nuclear deterrence (cf.
Benn).
Therefore, nation-state arrangements have
should
be
not all) nation-states:
have
their
justification,
and
Variations on this type of argument apply to many (though
amended.
nation-states
forfeited
it is not only because of the
forfeited
their
mandate.
nuclear
Political
fix
that
some
obligations to such
states are correspondingly dissolved.
There is enough evidence that power-brokers who control
sight
of,
or
worse
have
lost
don't care about, the point of political arrangements, of
what justifies or is supposed to justify their states.
78.
states
This
applies
both
to
How they answer back admits of expansion in various ways, depending on the
underlying political theory.
Rawls,
for example,
puts it in familiar
contractual form:
that the political order is 'a cooperative venture for
mutual advantage' (p.4). Mao puts it in a standard democratic way:
'since
the purpose of all political processes is nothing but to serve the people
and their interests,
it is the people who should control in a meaningful
way, the government' (see Soo, p.68).
57
more powerful states and to lesser states, both
claim
popular
to
a
put
value
higher
on
military situations:
sovereignty
they do on human
than
for copious evidence see
principles
the
just
of
warfare
repeatedly, as have many other principles.
violated
'nuclear
where
Kuper).
This
by Israel, Vietnam and many other states in nonnuclear
illustrated
already
some
have
more often, they act without it or
as
national
survival' (Schell's conclusion, p.210;
is
brokers
The situation has been reached
against the will of the people.
powers
where,
and
mandate
the
where
blatantly
been
have
Such states have forfeited
much of what claim they had to external respect or internal political obedience;
so, on other grounds, have many other states.
It could just be, of course, as is often
alternatives,
that have
or
been
insinuated,
though
effort
little
but
option of world government).
for
dismissed,
As
to
all
whether
little
opportunity
not
do
to
and
work,
appear
to
we
Down.
There
working towards the weakening
especially
on
the
alternatives
can
be
may
and
have
given
been
know very little about how humans
sufficient
give
organising and trying out alternative
Way
such
alternatives
But,
operate under substantially different arrangements.
accessible
expended
been
has
instance as lacking feasibility, it is difficult to be entirely
sure without taking the risk of being dogmatic;
deadlines
no
the range of alternatives or their features (except perhaps for the
researching
very
are
there
But alternatives there are,
no possibly better alternatives.
glimpsed,
that
to
time
arrangements,
even
again,
once
very far on
proceed
those
nuclear
of
the
more
be time to proceed a little way however, in
breakdown
of
the
larger
superunions, which are the immediate problem.
invalid to simply conclude that alternative political and
nuclear
states,
Thus it would be
social
arrangements,
theoretically feasible and certainly a longer-term goal, do not presently
while
offer a part of the practical response to the nuclear fix.
But there is no need to insist upon a single-track Way Out of
dilemma
to
the
exclusion of all others:
quite the contrary.
the
nuclear
We can not only
afford to be fairly catholic about "second best" approaches and embrace whatever
seems to be working or looks like helping, within recognised ethical (and other)
constraints;
indeed, given the urgency,
the
direness
of
the
situation,
we
58
should
as
fairly catholic and not inflexibly committed to narrow methods, such
be
bogged
down
(and
very
on
arms
limitations
negotiations
should
methods
perservered
be
unrepresentative)
certainly
and
between main nuclear states.
made
attempts
and
with,
No-first-use declaration, a ban on weapons in space, etc.
But even such
to
e.g.
superstates,
the
from
concessions
significant
undemocratic
further
wring
jointly
a
signed
The direction of most
hope for progress has however come into view, a direction that is not especially
The political means of the Way Out are what they have
new.
larger
every
liberal
on
issue that has mattered:
humanitarian
or
been
from outside
state governmental apparatus by organised pressure from within or
and
it,
characteristically Bottom-Up
methods
are
considerations
familiar
alternatives
self-organising
furnishing
by
and
practically
virtually
upon
without
bypass
which
it,
Top-Down.
never
Such
but part of the more general, and very effective,
case against reliance upon states for a range of things they are now supposed to
but
supply,
which
can
almost
that
effectively and for
invariably
matter
be
obtained, where required, more
expensively
less
without
(and
them
their
monopolies).
In the case of security it is states, with very few exceptions,
imposed,
or
frequently
The opposition to the
local
from
have
in, military solutions involving nuclear installations
acquiesced
and nuclear weapons.
that
neighbourhood
and
escalating
groups,
fix
nuclear
has
come
some of them now federated
across nations (so the direction is not really interstate).
These
have
groups
been successful in blocking some nuclear installations and establishing, for the
time
being,
against
movement
nuclear-free
some
nuclear
neighbourhoods.
equipment
The
patchwork
grass-roots
is strongest in Europe, which is - as the
movement realised, and what gave it impetus - a leading theatre, on US strategic
thinking,
for
a
limited
nuclear
war
not
touching
extremely doubtful that increasing NATO and American
Europe
will
make
it
a
safer
place:
American shores.
nuclear
installations
removed
installations
in
on the contrary it seems probable that
Europe will become much safer if the anti-nuclear movements
these
It is
succeed
and Europe rendered nuclear-free.
grossly immoral conduct will thereby also be considerably reduced.
in
having
The chances of
59
What of the spectre of Soviet domination, military, ideological and
in
Except
case
the
Europe,
of
other?
where the inexcusable suppression of Eastern
Europe all too evidently persists, this is an obvious fabrication.
Does
anyone
expect the united Soviets to absorb China, let alone take over Canada
seriously
or Brasil say?
And even in Western Europe the spectre is
failing
partly
giant
fashioned
financially
dominated
and
economically
politically and ideologically, by the USA.
ideologically,
dominated
propped
exaggerated,
up by the NATO powers'
and
some
in
and,
some measure,
Indeed much of the "free"
world
is
adequately
not
countered
military
by
The
means.
domination to which nuclear weapons are considered relevant
insofar
as
is
basic
any
in
mode of
But
military.
military, and associated political, domination of Western Europe by
the Soviets is a
problem,
there
are
several
ways
other
predominantly American nuclear weapons to mitigate it.
only local defence arrangements - whether top-down
alternative
is
it dominated economically, by the USA.
of
That is not generally considered so much of a problem (as it is?9), and
case
a
Since the last World War, Western Europe has been
military-industrial alliance.
increasingly
largely
and
much
methods
social
—
but
also
some
on
methods,
or
restructuring, such as
social
power
to
dispersed
local
more cooperation and interchange with the Soviets and
much
and
reliance
These should include not
state-supplied
decentralisation, regionalisation and devolution of
organisations,
than
Eastern Europe.
Part of the point of
whether
external
or
restructuring
internal,
so
is
especially
situations, is to
state-contrived
79.
break
make
military
any
takeover,
much more difficult and pointless, and the
restoration of local control easier.Part of
interchange,
to
the
point
of
cooperation
and
at the level of more ordinary people, in more ordinary
down
conditions
of
hostility
and
distrust
and
to
sabotage
the
West-East confrontations, and thereby to remove
For many peoples of the world, and in its impact on the natural world,
advanced corporate capitalism is an oppressive and damaging doctrine. But,
in contrast with austere Marxism-Leninism which would improve the lot of
some of the oppressed world while even worsening the impact on the natural
world, corporate capitalism admits a certain pluralism, and recognises many
more individual rights and liberties. Certainly Marxism-Leninism which
appears to degenerate in practice to an authoritarian and totalitarian
position is a less welcome alternative.
It is fortunate, then, that we need
be saddled with neither:
there are superior options.
60
other
expenditures.81
popular
and
for,
motives
Western
support
Europe,
for
for,
long
military
much
too
adventures
partial
to
and
military
adventures, should now be helping itself rather than relying on a leaky American
nuclear
umbrella
for its defence.
Moreover it ought to be, at the very least,
uncomfortable about the risks of catastrophically damaging
the
world
in
the
of
interests
its own security.
extensive
parts
of
Nor should other "nuclear
dependent" states be prepared to acquiesce in this not uncharacteristic European
imposition.
world, what
There
LSN
is
war
no
risks,
enormous
for
virtue
Western
in sacrificing other parts of the
Europe,
military-based domination to other parts of the world.
which
has
long
exported
There are better options
than dubious and risky nuclear shields for Europe.
80.
Thus, for example, to the extent that local defence groups are integrated
under more centralised direction, it would be a built-in principle that
surrender of the central directing section absolved the federated groups
from following suit or following further directions. That is, through
devolution of power,
surrender becomes structurally impossible (though
individuals or basic groups may surrender). Moreover, the central section
would hold only limited information about the federated
units
it
integrated.
The locally organised groups themselves, which would merge
with local populations, would be trained in tactics of passive resistance,
sabotage,
(nonviolent) guerilla warfare, etc.
The net effect (as C.
Pigden, who made most of these points, argues) would be to make the cost of
military conquest, occupations and exploitation prohibitively high.
One reason why the Japanese Army High Command decided against invasion of
Australia in March 1942 was the character of Australians and the fact that
they 'would resist to the end' (Threats to Australia's Security, p.62).
Yet
the 1942 (war reduced) Australian population was substantially
untrained and unorganised for locally—based defence. With such a defence
restructuring, Australia would not only much reduce its vulnerability to
military adventures, but remove standard reasons for succumbing to threats
of outside military domination, blackmail, and the like.
81.
In particular, with sufficient cooperation
and
trust,
competitive
prisoner's dilemma situations, which depend on the prisoners being kept
separate, are removed.
So too a main model supporting deterrence policy
would be undercut.
And the arguments from national dangers would be
further corroded.
In the same direction, it is important to extend cooperation between USA
and USSR down below the level of state trade deals, e.g.
in grain and gas,
to communication and cooperation between people. For such commercial deals
there is sufficient trust, even in periods of intensive confrontation: why
should it not be so also at more significant people-to-people levels? Many
further sorts of interrelationship are feasible, and inexpensive by
military standards, e.g. sister cities, common clubs, worker exchanges,
gift projects.
If, for instance, 100,000 or more ordinary Americans were
living, working or holidaying in USSR (and vice versa), Americans would
feel less enthusiasm for hurling nuclear missiles into Russia (or vice
versa).
Only quite inadequate efforts have been made to build up mutual
respect and trust; on the contrary, a lot of resources have been expended
to encourage precisely the opposite attitudes, e.g.
as part of the
strategy of the "cold war".
61
What the anti-nuclear movements must press
for
and disarmament (and, on the more
perceptive
transarmament,
to
conversion
i.e.
outer
of
edges
graduated
movements,
the
alternative social defence arrangements).
But the argument also makes it clearer how far this should go,
through
in
in part it is what they have been pushing for, nuclear reduction
broad outline:
way
clear
accordingly
is
namely
all
the
disarmament^^ to total nuclear disarmament,
unilateral
certainly to local disarmament across progressively larger parts of the planet's
surface,
including
especially
Europe.
For
once
state is demoted, its
the
importance and the necessity of its maintenance properly downgraded and reliance
on
decision-making
its
diminished
decision-making - once all that is
happen),
in
duly
of
favour
more localised control and
for
allowed
not
does
(it
need
to
major component in the nuclear fix is removed, namely the problem
one
of reduction or even loss of state sovereignty.
Maintenance of that sovereignty
has been assigned a mistaken importance, which in turn accounts for the mistaken
weight assigned to the arguments from national dangers.
What is
and
important
worth preserving is not the sovereign state, but certain ways of life within the
state.
The nation-state and dangers to it, and accompanying
features
such
as
misplaced nationalism, are the weakest links in the nuclear fix situation.
Once the demise of the sovereign nation-state is allowed for, the arguments
from
national
concerning
particular.
dangers
individual
also
and
group
rights
and
In
freedoms,
by
the
that
nation-state.
matter
The
are
82.
to
arguments
liberties
in
for
them,
as
smaller
exclusively
or
nation-state is neither sufficient for
are
disappearing,
nor
community arrangements can ensure them.
But
arguments from individual and group dangers remain, do they not?
risks
are
civil
necessarily
them, since in increasingly many states these liberties
necessary
place
their
None of these require national sovereignty or even a national life.
None of the rights and freedoms
guaranteed
disintegrate.
individuals and groups remain:
To
be
sure,
that has always been so,83 and is not
The initial but important steps are at zero cost as regards deterrence.
Were deterrence really the policy there would be little case for more than
a fraction of present nuclear arsenals.
The steps to disarmament are
well-known, e.g.
the scrapping of obsolete weapons, and an end to
modernisation, the removal of nuclear weapons in crucial theatres such as
Europe, etc.
62
being changed but only worsened in this age of
mostly
to
want
that
sure
be
or
other
outsiders.
People
their lives will continue to run their course,
ideally in a flourishing fashion, and will not be
Russians
nation-states.
nuclear
controlled
Americans
by
or
Nuclear arrangements which threaten their lives
are not a rational route to these ends.
In the weigh-up that should occur in charting a way
as
dilemmas
the
out
of
deontic
such
fix and its subsidiary dilemmas, there are then much
nuclear
more important elements than features of the nation-state, namely some of
those
the state is supposed to safeguard, such as individual and local welfare
things
and autonomy;
weapons.
but those things are better ensured by
main reasons are familiar:
The
threaten the loss of basic values,
such
removal
the
nuclear
of
in particular, nuclear circumstances
as
and
welfare
autonomy,
many
for
creatures and regions, and the potential loss is in general much greater than in
a nuclear-free situation (even should another
with
example, the production of nuclear weapons reduces both local
of
the
opportunity
remain
armed
There are also well-known supplementary reasons;
weapons).
nuclear
party
ideological
welfare
for
(because
costs of weapons manufacture) and autonomy (because of the
accompanying security measures).
Thus
the
appropriately
devices
and
fix
nuclear
resolved,
it
can
deploy,
and
considerable reduction of state sovereignty.
how),
and
since
rate,
any
by
by
allowing
for
the
But, although that is a reasonable
Way Out, at little cost in the circumstances, it will be
practice,
at
theoretically
sovereignty of the state (especially as to what nuclear
limiting
weapons
is
strongly
resisted
in
those who hold power hold it, in one way or another, under the
auspices of the state.
This is a main reason why people must organise
and
act
against the state.
Again the resolution also looks practical enough, since
sovereignty
reduction
in
need apply essentially only to the the production and deployment of
nuclear weapons.
83.
the
Indeed
it
could
in
principle
be
obtained
by
negotiated
It will remain so under any satisfactory political arrangements.
Until
human social arrangements change substantially, there is no substitute for
on-going vigilance to ensure or maintain political liberty.
63
agreement (at the top levels of state).
However
to
get
this
far
with
the
superstates, the limitations of state-power will likely have to proceed further:
for nuclear weaponry does not stand in splendid isolation.
into
both
concerned.
systems
military
and
(civil)
Rather
it
tied
is
industrial production of the states
So, unsurprisingly, practical-looking resolutions are being
solidly
resisted by superstates.
Accordingly more popular (bottom up) action against nuclear-involved states
especially
and
the superstates, after all the states causing the most
against
serious dilemmas, will have to be taken much further.
variety
of
organised
forms.
Once again it will take a
These include a refusal to contribute to nuclear
of
war preparation, either directly or
indirectly.
widely,
blockading of shipments of uranium, and the
from
such
steps
as
the
forms
The
action
range
refusal of supplies and services to sailors on nuclear ships and submarines,
to
withholding or redirection of taxes destined for nuclear security purposes.
the
They include as well the whole
nuclear
installations
and
range
of
nonviolent
facilities
protest
which
(methods
methods
against
do
exclude
not
incapacitation and decommissioning of equipment, and which do include new
model
resistance and defence organisations). 8**
It is important to realise that petitioning of
power
state
representatives
and
holders, for instance through letter campaigns, demonstrations and direct
appeal, is far from a complete strategy, and may be ineffective or ignored,
the results discouraging.
and
This is one reason why popular action should be based
on a more comprehensive political
strategy,
which
also
involves
withdrawing
support from prevailing state arrangements, and working out and participating in
alternative arrangements, especially
alternative
defence
forms.Sufficient
details as to what to do are already known, enough to make an immediate start.
84.
For some impression of the range of methods, see again Sharp.
85.
For much more on all these points, see e.g.
further Appendix 2.
Martin.
As to what to do, see
64
APPENDIX 1. ON THE FATE OF MANKIND AND THE EARTH,
according to Schell, and to Anders.
A
series
of
nuclear
prophets
has
produced
a
series
of
philosophically-oriented works on nuclear war and the alleged implications of
human extinction.^ The series is important for its deeper penetration into the
nuclear dilemma, down to metaphysical levels;
in this the series contrasts with
the transient superficialities of much of the political commentary.
The most
widely circulated and influential text of the series is undoubtedly that of the
slightest of the "prophets , Schell's The Fate of the Earth.
This skillful
piece of media—philosophy uncannily redeploys some of the apparently deep
phenomenological themes of Anders. So, conveniently, main assumptions of Schell
and Anders can often be considered together. To criticise their assumptions is
not of course to belittle their work.
In particular, Schell's little book, for
all its political shortcomings, is having a significant and much needed effect
in shifting attitudes towards nuclear arrangements.
It is especially valuable
for its vivid and horrifying scenarios of the aftermath of nuclear attack.
Unfortunately it also exhibits, both philosophically and factually,
severe
defects.
Some of it is simply garbage:
to select one example,
consider
the
claim
that
'without ... a world-wide program of action for preserving the
[human] species .... nothing else that we undertake together can make
any practical or moral sense ...
(p.173, rearranged).
This should certainly be rejected philosophically; for there is no separate
moral issue of such overwhelming importance that all other issues become morally
neutral. Moral issues remain moral issues:
they don't cease to be so when
compared with more important moral issues (as Schell effectively acknowledges
elsewhere, p.130). And the claim should also be junked on more factual grounds.
Humans form a highly resilient species, like rabbits in Australia a survivor
species,
unlikely to be exterminated under
presently
arranged
nuclear
holocausts.
1.
The distinguishing term is from Foley's Nuclear Prophets, where many of the
leading prophets are assessed. One well-known prophet not so considered
there is Jaspers, presumably because his main work (which might equally
well have been translated as The Fate of Mankind) comes out in entirely the
wrong direction.
For it gives heavy philosophical attire
to
the
better-dead-than-red abomination.
A main argument against Jaspers so presented is simple. However bad being
red might become (at present it is debatably worse than living under some
of the totalitarian regimes the free West props up), it still gives humans
a further chance for good lives, since regimes fall or can be toppled: but
total annihilation removes that all-important opportunity.
But Jaspers does not present his position so simply. Rather his contention
is that there are circumstances where and principles for which a person or
group of persons ought to sacrifice even their lives. Freedom is such:
a
life worth living is a free life. But the latter point can be granted
without conceding that sacrifice is a possible means to it.
While the
sacrifice of one or a few lives may be a possible (if dubiously effective)
way to free lives for others, certainly the sacrifice of all lives is not a
possible route to free lives for all, since no human lives remain.
To this
extent Schell is right (on p.131) in accusing Jaspers of an each to__ all
fallacy.
Jasper's idea that "the free life that they try to save by all
possible means is more than mere life or lives" breaks down when applied to
all participating people. None can gain free lives by extinction of all:
that is not a possible route to life even.
65
The example was selected however because it leads into, indeed presupposes,
two of the major defective assumptions in the work of Schell and Anders:
51.
Nuclear war will eliminate life, human life at least, on earth (the
extinction assumption);
and
52.
In the absence of humans, very many notions, not only those of morality
and value, but those of time and space for example, make no sense; or, to put
it into a more sympathetic philosophical form, these notions depend for their
sense on an actual human context (the extravagant anthropocentric assumption).
It is applications of S2 which give Anders'
and Schell's work ^ some of its
apparent philosophical depth, and certainly induce much philosophical puzzlement
through the paradoxical propositions generated. But the frequent applications
of S2 depend essentially on SI. For without total extinction there will be
humans about, to make past and future, good and evil, go on making sense!
Granted the factual assumption SI is by no means ruled out as a real
possibility; granted the technological means are now available to make it true,
to render Homo sapiens extinct;^
granted the prospect of nuclear war does
threaten leading centres of Western civilization with obliteration. Even so SI
appears unlikely in the light of present - admittedly inadequate - information.
Even in Canada, which lies on the polar route of Soviet missiles, human life
should be able to continue in certain northern areas (according to Canadian
medical studies). Schell's argument to SI is extremely flimsy. It depends, for
example, on an unjustified extrapolation from the Northern to the Southern
Hemisphere, but for the most part it does that very North American thing, of
contracting the world to North America.
(All that matters, all worthwhile
civilization,
is in USA, or at least, to be more charitable, in North America
and Europe, which will also be wiped out, i.e. its human population will be
eliminated in the nuclear holocaust.) Some of the data Schell relies upon, for
example the effect of nuclear explosions on the ozone layer, is significantly
out of date. Other effects than ozone destruction apparently transfer even less
well from North to South. A factually superior study of nuclear disaster than
Schell's,
by Preddey and others,
indicates that parts of the Southern
Hemisphere, New Zealand and southern latitudes of Africa and Latin America could
escape relatively unscathed from even most massive northern exchanges.*'
Both Anders and Schell remark on the "impossibility of unlearning" the
means of manufacturing nuclear bombs.
It would seem that extinction, which they
both foresee as at least a live possibility, would furnish a good medium for
unlearning nuclear technology (something very like this emerges from van
Daniken's theory of an earlier "high" technology). In virtue of S2, they would
however exclude such a possibility as a case of unlearning, contending wrongly
2.
For a detailed comparison of Schell and Anders' remarkably similar versions
of S2, see Foley JS.
3.
Thus the Last Man argument, important in environmental ethics, is no longer
merely hypothetical, awaiting the remote death of the Sun, but assumes new
urgency.
It is this sort of argument that connects environmental ethics
and nuclear ethics, at a deeper metaphysical level. The Bomb and Bulldozer
are out of the same technological Pandora's box.
Nuclear technology is not the only route to human extinction, nor the only
Pandora's box.
Biological and chemical means are perhaps even more
effective, and certainly can be more selective in what gets extinguished.
4.
However, new modellings and estimates, none so far very reliable, keep
appearing, and amending the picture. On the basis of one recent scenario,
generated by a computer modelling of a 5000 megaton nuclear exchange,
the
immunity of the Southern Hemisphere to the dire consequences of a northern
LSN war has been questioned.
In particular, Sagan, no doubt overreaching
the evidence, has 'warn[ed] that the nuclear blasts would create enormous
differences in temperature between south and north,
shifting normal wind
patterns and carrying smoke and radioactivity south' (Newsweek, November 7
1983, p.56).
Some sections of the environmental and peace movements have a
vested interest in exaggerating the probable effects of nuclear holocaust
for life on earth, much as many statesmen have an interest in minimizing
them.
66
that the notion no longer made sense.
But what they seem to want to suggest
with the impossibility-of-unlearning message is the inevitability of the
development and eventual use of the technology - as if having learnt the means
all else was determined, and manufacture and use ceased to be a matter of
choice. Certainly such views have been floated $.
But they are not tenable.
There are many examples of technological advances that have not been taken
advantage of, and there are even cases of technological developments that have
been manufactured but not marketed or used. There is not something very special
about nuclear apparatus that puts it beyond the scope of such generalisations.
Both Schell and Anders do claim that there are very special things about
nuclear weapons, in particular that they do not allow "experiments . Even if
this were true - it is certainly not of smaller weapons - it would not tell
against the previous argument against the inevitability of nuclear weapons. And
in fact Anders and (even) Schell hedge their claims about testing, and the
limits to nuclear scientific work,
to large-scale weapons and independent
experiments which do not interfere with the observers and those outside the
"laboratories".
Again they have latched onto major points:
in particular, we
have at present no way of testing the cumulative effects of large nuclear
weapons in concert, e.g.
for more holistic effects such as fireballs or
firestorms, electromagnetic pulse or ozone destruction. Short of an LSN war,
and likely enough with it, these crucial effects must remain largely untested
and hypothetical in character.
The penetration of human chauvinism, as in S2, is not something peculiar to
Schell, but is a product of Western philosophy, European philosophy especially.
This chauvinism is unfortunately alive and still well, Anders'
version of S2
being just one striking illustration(cf. AA
p.252ff.).
It has also deeply
penetrated Anglo-American philosophy,
and has
recently been extended
by
Wittgenstein's work, where even the necessary truths of mathematics are taken to
be a product of human conventions, and would vanish with humans!
Such are
alleged implications of
extinction;
but the
fact is that the truths of
arithmetic are in no way dependent on the existence of humans or humanoids or of
gods or giraffes.
In Schell, human chauvinism is dished up in a particularly
powerful and obnoxious Kantian form.
Thoughts and propositions, time and
tenses, history and memories, values and morality, all depend on the life-giving
presence of human beings — past or future or merely potential humans are not
enough,
persons that are not humans are certainly not enough. Thus, according
to Schell (p.140, e.g.), '...
the thought "Humanity is now extinct" is an
impossible one for a rational person, because as soon as tt is, we^ are not.
In
imagining any other event, we look ahead to a moment that is still within the
stream of human time,
...
'. The thought is however perfectly possible for
humans; we can have it right now. Though we no doubt have it falsely, a later
rational creature may well be able to have it truly.
Schell erroneously denies
that:
there is no "later" '... outside the human tenses of past, present, and
future
...'
(p.140)6.
Human extinction eliminates 'the creature that divides
time into past, present and future':
so annihilation cannot
'come to pass'
(p.143).
But it is simply false that the tenses are human;
the tenses depend
on a local time ordering (perceptible to many creatures other than humans, but
not depending at all on that perceptibility for its viability) relating other
times to the present, to now (also a human-independent location,
evident to
other creatures, and borne witness to by such sequences as the passing seasons).
And annihilation may also too easily come to pass, for many humans in the North
at least, as it came to pass in recent geological times that humans began to
exist upon earth. Before that there was a time before there were any human
beings.
5.
Not merely by technological determinists of marxist persuasion. Hackworth,
a former US general, argues by straight induction, that if the US military
has a weapon it will use it.
6.
The appalling theme that humans create past, present and future
repeated elsewhere, e.g.
p.173.
(etc.)
is
67
Anders' argument for the demise of time, that 'what has been will no longer
be even what has been', is also explicitly and narrowly verificationist:
'for
what would the difference be between what has only been and what has never been,
if there is no one to remember the things that have been' (AA p.245). There
would still remain many sorts of difference;
for one, the history recorded in
many
other organisms would be different.
Temporal themes do not lack
'legitimacy because not registered [or
verified]
by
anyone';
truth,
significance, still less meaning, are not matters of human verification.
Here, as elsewhere, the human chauvinism is mixed with other distorting
metaphysical assumptions of our Western heritage, in particular, verificationism
and ontological assumptions (to the effect that there are severe difficulties in
talking about what does not exist).
Thus,
for example, Schell takes over
dubious metaphysics from Freud, according to whom "it is indeed impossible to
imagine our own death; and whenever we attempt to do so, we can perceive that
we are in fact still present as spectators" (p.138). The second clause goes a
good distance towards refuting the first.
In fact there is no great difficulty
in describing counterfactual situations which undermine both Freud's claims.
The same goes for Schell's extensions of human chauvinism into one of its main
traditional strongholds, value theory:
'...
the simple and basic fact [sic!]
that before there can be good or evil, service or harm, lamenting or rejoicing
there must be life', human life (p.171).
These are no facts, but deeply
entrenched
philosophical
dogmas which have been exposed and criticised
elsewhere?.
Naturally some things will disappear with the extinction of humans:
trivially there will be no more humans (unless humans re-evolve or are
recreated), and thus no more human institutions,
human activities, human
emotions, and so forth. But it is already going too far to suggest, as Anders
does, that there will accordingly be 'no thought, no love, no struggle, no pain,
no hope,
no comfort, no sacrifice, no image, no song
For there are, and
may continue to exist, other creatures than humans with emotion,
struggles,
songs..........
Nor will the ending of all such human ventures, if it comes to
pass, show that all past human ventures have been 'all in vain', meaningless,
and already so to say dead. The decay of the solar system, or the heat-death of
the universe even, will not show that worthwhile human activities were not
worthwhile.
Several of the other notions and themes common to Schell and Anders derive
from their shared assumptions SI and S2. It is these that underlie the biblical
notion (in Revelations) of a Second Death, redeployed by both.
'The death of
mankind', under SI, is reckoned a 'second death', because by S2 and SI remaining
life is rendered meaningless and already 'seems to be dead' (AA p.244, S p.166)
and is already 'overhung with death' (S p.166). Thus, too, more trivially, a
person faces 'a second death', not merely one's own but in addition that greater
death of the species and all future generations (S p.166, p.115). However even
if nuclear extinction came to pass, the stronger notion would not be vindicated,
because it depends on the fallacious inference to the meaninglessness of
preceding life and on the
very
questionable
representation
of
this
meaninglessness as a sort of death. There is no Second Death: creatures die
just once, perhaps all at about the same time. The idea of a Second Death lacks
even a solid metaphysical base.
From SI, together with the minor principle that extinction being an
absolute doesn't differ in degree, comes the universality of peril theme that
'we are all exposed to peril in the same degree', which is accordingly
'disguised' and 'difficult to recognise', because there is no contrast (AE p.64;
S p.150). This theme falls with SI.
In any event, not all peoples are equally
imperilled by the nuclear situation, the Indians of southern Patagonia being
7.
See, e.g., 'Human chauvinism and environmental ethics',
in Environmental
Philosophy (edited D.
Mannison and others), Research School of Social
Sciences, Australian National University, 1980.
8.
Anders is here (AA pp.244-5) relying upon a version of the
perserverence, criticised in detail in Routley and Griffin.
argument
from
68
rather better placed than the Germans of northern Europe. Nor are all people
equally locked into the situation or incapacitated by it;
as explained, the
position is different in different countries and places.
Nor, likewise, are all people equally responsible, an obnoxious theme,
which Schell (in contrast to Anders) repeatedly infiltrates. This is the Pogo
theme, according to which
S3. Responsibility for the present
nuclear
situation (fiasco,
really)
distributes onto everybody, it belongs to every human in the world.
But there is also, mixed in, a weaker more plausible claim that gives lie to the
stronger one, namely that we have some responsibility (the Nazi situation is
compared). An especially blatant example of the Pogo themeruns as follows:
'...
the world's political leaders ...
though they now menace the earth with
nuclear weapons, do so only with our permission, and even at our bidding.
At
least,
this is true for democracies'
(pp.229-30). The theme is elaborated
elsewhere:
'... we are the authors of that extinction. (For the populations
of the superpowers this is true in a positive sense, since we pay for extinction
and support the governments that pose the threat of it, while for the peoples of
the non-nuclear-armed world it is true only in the negative sense that they fail
to try to do anything about the danger)'
(p.152).
But this is more of an
argument indicting representative government, by revealing its insensitivity and
unresponsiveness to many of the populace they allegedly govern, not to mention
those affected by its activities who are not represented at all (namely
foreigners). But Schell conveniently neglects all such points:
'...
we are
potential mass killers. The moral cost of nuclear armaments is that it makes of
all of us underwriters of the slaughter of hundreds of millions'
(p.152).
And
again '[as]
perpetrators
... we convey the steady message ...
that life not
only is not sacred but is worthless;
that ...
it had been judged acceptable
for everyone to be killed' (p.153). Little of this is true. Those who campaign
against nuclear arrangements, vote against nuclear-committed parties so far as
is possible,
and the like, are certainly not the authors of potential
destruction, and responsibility for the nuclear situation does not simply
distribute onto them. Nor does responsibility - or the unlikely opinions as to
worth Schell illegitimately attributes to everyone - fall on those who have done
less.
Responsibility for decisions taken in "liberal democracies" even by
representatives (in the unlikely event of this happening in the case of anything
as important as defence) cannot be traced back to those represented, since among
9.
An interesting converse of this theme is sometimes advanced, that no one is
responsible, the whole thing is out of control. The technological version
of this no-responsibility theme is discussed shortly. More satisfactory is
the theme that nuclear arrangements are out of political control, but for
reasons, in terms of vested interests in keeping nuclear things going,
which enable responsibility to be distributed. The vested interests, which
bear considerable responsibility, include the military weapons industry,
and research and academic communities. Under pressures for re-election
especially, politicians give in to these powerful groups, so losing control
of political processes. The argument fails at its final stage. For many
politicians either belong to or represent vested interests. Thus political
processes
tend rather to reflect vested interests than to run out of
political control.
10.
Another example of spreading the responsibility runs as follows:
'The
self-extinction of our species is not an act that anyone describes as sane
or sensible; nevertheless, it is an act that, without quite admitting it
to ourselves, we plan in certain circumstances to commit' (p.186). Even
for most of the planners, extinction is presumably not part of "the plan",
but an unintended consequence; and most of us have little or no role in
the planning, enough of us even campaign against the planning.
Further
'the world
... chose the course of attempting to refashion the system of
sovereignty to accommodate nuclear weapons'
(p.194):
the world?
This
connects
of
course with the ideological argument from defence of
fundamentals,
e.g.
for liberty,
for the (USA) nation,
and against
socialism.
In the course of this argument yet another fallacious
assumption is rolled out:
'The means to the end are not limited, for the
end itself sets the limits in each case' (p.189).
69
many other things, a representative is only representative of a party which
offers a complex and often ill-characterised package of policies, and a voter
may vote for zero or more policies of this package.
Only in the (uncommon)
event of a clear single issue referendum, which is adopted, can responsibility,
still of a qualified sort, be sheeted home, to those who voted for it, not to
every one in the community. While S3 is false, there is an important related
theme that is much more plausible; namely that the present nuclear situation
generates responsibilities for every socially involved person (this theme is
discussed in Appendix 2).
When moreover the Pogo assumption is disentangled from accompanying themes,
part of what results is decidedly along the right lines; namely
S4. The controllers [not to be confused, in Schell's fashion, with all of us]
have failed to change our pre-nuclear institutions. The sovereign system is out
of step with the nuclear age, the one-earth system,
etc.
(the whole earth
theme). Though Schell remains relatively clear about the serious defects of the
state and the frequently immoral purposes for which the state is used,
unfortunately he often loses sight of this important theme (indicated pp.187-8).
Yet S4 forms part of Schell's critique of the state which is, by and large,
scattered and fragmentary.
As observed (in §8),
Schell arrives at the
conclusion that the nation-state has outlasted its usefulness, and that new
political institutions more 'consonant with the global reality' are required as
a matter of urgency. But he evades what he admits is the major task, making out
viable alternatives.
At most he makes some passing gestures, some pointing
towards the Way Up.
Solutions to the nuclear dilemma come,
if not easily,
in a similar
simplistic way,
from the Top Down;
those who can must appeal to the Top (cf.
p.230). Schell places his hope in treaties for arms reduction and limitations
(such as SALT) and in world government (as with the United Nations).
Given the
record of these organisations and treaties, the negotiations and regulators,
it
is by now a pathetic faith. Nor is a serious need felt for further analysis of
the nuclear situation, to investigate the origins of nuclear technology,
to
explore the roots of nuclear blindness,
to consider effective changes to
military-industrial organisation and ways of life.
But some of the requisite deeper analysis of the nuclear situation and,
more generally,
of the roots of war can be found elsewhere.*2 The roots of the
nuclear fix are not confined to the ideologically-aligned arrangements of
nation-states, but penetrate also into key components of those states, their
military, their controlling classes, and their supporting bureaucracies.
And
both within the arrangements of states, what accounts in part for the
arrangements, and in key components of the states, a conspicuous and crucial
feature is the drive for power and domination.^ Thus the push for [nuclear]
superiority by the super-states,
to be achieved through military-oriented
science and technology, which involves and enables domination, in several
interrelated forms. The main power-base is the large nation-state, where enough
surplus product can be accumulated (from at home and from abroad, and bled from
nature) to proceed with military and bureaucratic ambitions and to found the
high-technology research and development means to ever more expendable power and
energy.
In changing the structural arrangements to eliminate the prospect of
nuclear war, it is not ultimately enough just to downgrade the main power-base,
it is also important to alter key components of the state,
the nation-state;
and, more sweepingly,
to remove trouble-making patterns embedded in all these
social and political arrangements, namely patterns of domination, patterns
manifested not only in state political organisation, but in white-coloured
relations,
male-female
relations,
human-animal
relations,
human-nature
relations;
to remove, in short, chauvinistic relations. However not everything
and especially p.227, bottom paragraph.
11.
See p.225ff.
12.
In Anders and elaborated in Foley, and more straightforwardly,
in Martin.
The incomplete list of items given above, to be investigated in a deeper
analysis of the nuclear situation, paraphrases Foley JS p.164.
70
needs to be accomplished at once;
and the cluster of damaging power and
domination relations tied into war can be tackled separately. And there the
problems can largely be narrowed to certain problems of states and certain key
components of states.
In what analysis he does offer of the problem with states,
Schell repeats
the familiar false contrast of state expediency with morality, as a contrast
between "raison d'etat and the Socratic—Christian ethics.
The teaching that
'the end justifies the means is the basis on which governments, in all times,
have licensed themselves to commit crimes of every sort'
(p.134).
So
'states
may do virtually anything whatever in the name of [their] survival'.
Schell
then argues however,
that extinction nullifies end-means justification by
destroying every end; but again the argument is far from sound, and depends on
human chauvinism (as under S2) combined with ontological assumptions.
Even if
all humans were extinguished (as under SI) ends could remain, for instance for
nonhumans such as animals and extraterrestrials, actual or not. The ends—means
argument can however be repaired to remove such objections:
instead it is
13.
These motivating drives form part of a larger integrated
package,
comprising maximisation drives for power, knowledge,
control, wealth,
energy, speed,
satisfaction,
...,
for the "newer" Enlightenment (but
Faustian) virtues.
Frequently there are attempts (the human failing for
excessive neatness and simplicity manifested) to reduce the package to one
main component, preference—satisfaction for instance, or utility. And the
type of drive is justified (especially for those who have it, but worry
about it) not only as virtuous, which it is not, but also as rational,
which again it is not. Rationality, the deeply entrenched myth has it,
consists in maximisation, of the virtues.
Maximisation of the objects of the drives runs, however,
into limitation
theorems and associated paradoxes. The maximisation of power, as with the
Christian-Islamic God, encounters the paradox of omnipotence, the parallel
maximisation
of knowledge,
paradoxes of omniscience.
There are no
consistent objects which are omnipotent or omniscient.
The drive for
maximum consistency,
often taken to be the epitome of rationality, also
leads to inconsistency in the case of more important theories,
such as
arithmetic and set theory (Godel's theorem and associated limitative
theorems).
14.
R & D, though directed by military requirements and the arms race, also
drives the arms race. Its role is partly disguised by the myth of neutral
science.
have been attempts, not only by those committed to technological
determinism, to involve technology more deeply as the main, or single,
source of the nuclear fix.
It is technology, the mega-machine, running out
of control,
that has brought us to this predicament, the nuclear abyss.
Sometimes this serves to exonerate states and their key components and
those
who
control
them,
for they are simply caught up by this
out—of—control machine;
but sometimes the state itself is seen as a
machine also running out of control. But technological determinism, like
other varieties of stronger (nonanalytic) determinism, is false.
Nuclear
technology was selected and proceeded with, after a well-known political
dispute involving distinguished scientists;
it was deliberated, funded and
promoted, while other alternatives were not.
Damaging
technologies of the nuclear age were not inevitable,
but
deliberately chosen by certain components of the large nation-states. And
much as they need not have been chosen, so they do not have to be persisted
with.
The fashionable inevitability/determinism themes admit not only of
refutation by bringing out the many choices made in persisting with often
recalcitrant
technologies.
They also admit of being made to look
ridiculous.
If the Bomb is determined, as part of human evolution, then if
it functions (as it probably will, a matter also determined), it will serve
as a human population control device, a matter also determined.
That is,
the Bomb has its fixed evolutionary place in human population regulation.
71
claimed that extinction nullifies ends-means justification by frustrating the
realisation of every relevant end - meaning by 'relevant', in this context,
those ends the realisation of which the state appeals to in justification of its
nuclear policies.1$
An LSN-war, even without human extinction but with severe
enough losses, would undoubtedly frustrate the realisation of relevant state
ends.
So even from an expediency perspective, superstate policies are open to
severe criticism, for example as motivationally irrational.
As to the part of the state and (state) sovereignty in war, Schell leaves
us in no doubt. A sovereign state is virtually defined as one that enjoys the
right and power to go to war in defence or pursuit of its interests (p.187).
War arises from how things are; from the arrangement of political affairs via
jealous nation states (p.188).
Indeed there is a two-way linkage between having
sovereignty and capacity to wage war. On the one side, sovereignty is, Schell
contends, necessary for people to organise for war. On the other side, without
war it is impossible to preserve sovereignty. Neither of these contentions is
transparently clear as they stand. The first is damaged by civil war and the
like, the second by the persistence of small nonmilitary states. Now that the
macro-state system is entrenched, it is however easy for conservatives (in
particular)
to argue from the "realities" of international life, which include
self-interest, aggression, fear, hatred.
It is on this basis that peace
arrangements are readily dismissed as unrealistic, utopian, even (amusingly) as
extremist (cf. p.185).
Schell's further theme that nuclear "war" is not war threatens, however, to
undermine his case against the sovereign state;
for example, his ends-means
argument and the argument based on its nuclear war-making capacity. Fortunately
the not-war theme needs much qualification, and starts out from an erroneous
characterisation of war as 'a violent means employed by a nation to achieve an
end'
(p.189):
but this is neither necessary nor sufficient for war. What is
right (so it is argued in §1) is that nuclear wars are very different from
earlier conventional wars.
Schell goes on to claim that war requires an end
which nuclear "war" does not have. But nuclear attacks can certainly have ends
(even if LSN wars cannot be won in the older sense: but not all wars or games
are won).
It is also claimed that war depends on weakness;
on one side being
defeated on a decision by arms. But in nuclear "war" this doesn't happen, 'no
one's strength fails until both sides have been annihilated' (p.190). But what
these sorts of considerations contribute to showing is again not that nuclear
wars are not wars, but that they are not wars of certain sorts, e.g., not just
wars (because they fail on such criteria as reasonable prospect of success and
improvement), not rational wars (in a good sense), and so on. That conventional
wars have persisted into nuclear times does damage to Schell's argument that
nuclear weapons have also ruined "conventional" wars, and his connected theme
that the demise of war has left no means to finally settle disputes between
nations, for the final court of appeal has been removed (pp.192-193). The theme
depends on the mistaken proposition concerning the demise of conventional war
and the mistaken proposition that war of some sort has to be the final "court of
appeal" between nations (for, as observed, there are other types of contests
that could serve, and there is also the possibility of more cooperative
behaviour,
e.g. joint referenda). The theme also imports the social-Darwinian
assumption of Clausewicz (the "logic of war" theme criticised in §2) that war
has to proceed to the technological limit - as if war and violence were
thoroughly natural activities independent of recognised social settings (for
winning,
surrender,
etc.) and rule-less activities. On the contrary, wars are
parasitic on social organisations such as states and are governed by a range of
understandings, conventions and rules.
They are a social phenomenon, with a
rule structure, if not a logic.
Much capital has been made not merely from "the logic of war" but from what
is now called "the logic of deterrence" and the "logic of nuclear [strategic]
planning". The message that is usually supposed to emerge is that the massive
nuclear arrangements the world is now entangled in are perfectly logical, sound,
15.
This reformulation was proposed by N. Griffin, who suggested that the main
qualification can be inferred from Schell's context.
72
reasonable,
rational.
However this represents little more than a cheap
semantical trick.
Logic in no way justifies the present arrangements, or
anything like them, or renders them reasonable. There is a logic of decision
(as presented, e.g.,
in Jeffrey) which can be applied in strategic planning;
but it does not yield specific results without desirability measures being
assigned to alternative outcomes,
that is without values being pumped in,
extralogically.
There are various ways these value assignments may
be
determined,
to meet moral requirements or not;
but in nuclear strategic
planning they have invariably been settled on the basis of expediency.In
fact,
'logic of'
tends to be used very generously,
as a word of general
commendation, to cover something like 'rational considerations entering into the
policy or strategy of'.
In these terms, Schell, who like others enjoys playing
with the term 'logic of', should write of 'the illogic of deterrence',
for he
emphasizes (p.213) the disparity between the supposed rationality of threatening
use of nuclear weapons and the irrationality (even from a national interest
viewpoint)
of actually using them should the threat fail: 7 yet the success of
deterrence doctrine depends on the credibility of the threat
of
this
unjustifiable and irrational use.
Indeed Schell wants to go still further and
locate a contradiction in deterrence (e.g.
pp.201-2): but the argument depends
on an interesting confusion of contradiction with cancellation,18 along with the
assumption that deterrence involves cancellation. Nuclear deterrence may well
be irrational, it is immoral, but it is not inconsistent.
16.
Selecting the usual game theory setting sees to this almost automatically;
for it is then assumed that each player plays to maximize his or her own
advantage. Thus too the presumption in Walzer, p.277, that 'the logic of
deterrence' is based on eye—for—eye and tooth—for—tooth assumptions.
17.
Even the irrationality of the use has been contested, e.g.
it
wishfully
thought that America will rise like a phoenix
radioactive ashes.
has been
from the
There is moreover a simple solution to Schell's problem of the missing
motive for retaliating to a first strike (p.204), namely, not a retributive
one, but an ideological one:
eliminate the prospect of the future
dominance of the rival ideology.
18.
An analogous confusion of negation with cancellation or obliteration
appears in recent US "star war" thinking, where US missiles are supposed to
"negate" incoming USSR missiles.
Moral paradoxes of deterrence take a different direction;
although
involving negation they depend upon perhaps questionable interconnexions of
intensional functors. One type of paradox (considered in §5) derives from
a policy of credibly threatening LSN war without however intending to
proceed to LSN war, though credible threats [appear to] imply an intention
to proceed.
Another style derives from acclaimed intention to reduce the
number of nuclear missiles when the persistent practice, which implies an
intention,
is to increase the number. This paradox is technically removed
- how satisfactorily i& another matter - by a distinction between
longer-term aims and immediate practice, a time-honoured method of removing
contradictions by conveniently discerned temporal distinctions.
73
APPENDIX 2. On the Matter of Collective and Individual Responsibility
and on Regional Strategies
What one does depends, naturally, on where one lives and what means one
has, as well as on what one should do and what sort of person one seeks to be.
So too what strategy a state should adopt depends on where it is located and
what sort of power it is, on national as well as on moral considerations.
In
present circumstances states have an evident responsibility to work out their
policies.
There are however some persuasive arguments that this is where all
responsibility ends:
these major responsibilities accrue entirely to states,
and there is no individual, or (smaller scale) collective, responsibility to
work out a policy or stance on such matters as nuclear arrangements and still
less to act, perhaps against a state, on the basis of such a stance. While such
a no-responsibility or opt-out position no doubt suits many people - many for
themselves,
some (especially more authoritarian power-holders) on behalf of
others - it does involve inadmissibly opting out of moral responsibilities,
responsibilities acquired by virtue of being a person within the framework of
certain social arrangements.
Now there is no doubt that individuals and groups can do this, can opt out.
They can neglect their moral responsibilities;
but they are not justified in
doing so. Against this claim, which is based ultimately upon each person's
being set in a web of responsibility-inducing social relations, whether they
like it or not so long as they choose to live with others, there are some neat
arguments which appear to permit, or even warrant, opting out. One influential
argument takes the following lines:
1.
The (ordinary) individual,
or group, has no possibility of making a
difference to what happens. Therefore
2.
Such individuals,
or groups, have no obligation to try to make a
difference. Hence
3.
Such individuals, or groups, are not morally responsible, for instance when
things go wrong.
There are two main assumptions in this argument, both of which should be
resisted:
firstly, in getting from 1 to 2, a variant of the "ought implies can"
themel, and secondly, the assumption that individuals can't make a difference.
While it is true that individuals cannot accomplish much on their own, together
they can. What an individual can achieve depends on what sufficiently many
other individuals do.
In highly competitive communities,
full of hopeful
free-riders, a person may encounter a familiar impasse:
that he or she acts in
manner
M
(e.g.
morally,
against nuclear arrangements, rationally), at
considerable personal cost, with no guarantee that others will also act M-ly.
Such an impasse no longer faces so many in the West, at least as regards initial
steps against nuclear arrangements. The individual can cooperate with others in
ways that do make a difference.
An individual is not exonerated from
responsibility by the argument.
While individuals can respond by joining organisations whose activities are
directed at making some difference, many individuals also have the option of
more individualistic action in such forms as boycotts, go slows,
political
disobedience.
An important form of individual resistance, already adopted in
Canada and north-western USA, is refusal to pay income taxes directed towards
defence
or various parts thereof (e.g.
nuclear weapons production and
deployment), or alternatively redirection of such taxes, for instance to peace
funds.
Evidently,
however,
all these more individualistic forms of political
activity work more effectively if individuals integrate their activities,
since
the impacts aggregate (and appear after a certain stage to exponentiate). As
well collective action helps in distributing the impact of retribution or
punitive action by state authorities.
1.
Any satisfactory deontic theory which takes moral dilemmas with due
seriousness is bound
to reject this theme.
There are also independent
grounds for jettisoning this Kantian theme:
see Routley and Plumwood.
74
There are, furthermore, arguments of some weight that individuals are under
some sort of moral obligation to take political action to disaffiliate
themselves from what contributes to the prospects of nuclear war. What type of
action this is depends on the sort of state one resides in, for instance,
whether it is a nuclear power, whether it provides nuclear bases or facilities,
etc.,
and on such complicating issues as what kind of preventive action the
state is likely to take in return.
(Any state seriously practising deterrence
is bound to take some action against effective protest,
or risk losing
credibility;
but there are limits to the amount of state coercion any one
individual need bear.)
One argument - it is one of a type that can be varied from making nuclear
weapons to,
for example,
providing facilities for them - proceeds from the
wrongness of nuclear war to the position that it is not right to be making the
weapons for such war.
The argument here applies connecting principles (like
those of §5), while appealing to such background information as that the
manufacture and deployment of such weapons increases the risk of such war. But
if it is not morally right to be making such weapons then those who live in a
state that is doing so ought to disaffiliate themselves from such defence
production, and disaffiliation includes not paying for such production through
defence taxes .
The argument is not without substantive assumption, but the
assumptions appear morally reasonable and defensible.
Another
effective
argument proceeds from the question of the type of moral person one wants to be:
Does one want to be, or effectively to be seen as, the kind of person who goes
along with the nuclear destruction of human populations?
Or with making
credible a threat to do so, or the like?
What follows applies primarily to
people who do not want to be, or be seen as, such people.
Arguments like these not only put opt-outers and do-nothingers on the spot
insofar as
they contribute to national objectives;
they also raise questions,
perhaps even dilemmas, as to political obligation for those who would take
action,
even limited action such as redirection of taxes 3. For are there not
political obligations to the state, such as paying due taxes and supporting the
national defence effort?
It is usually assumed that there are. However, no
dilemma occurs under a theory which, properly, takes political obligations to be
regulated in some fashion by moral obligations;
for in this case moral
obligations override political obligations.
In fact political obligations are
already significantly limited by moral constraints. The nuclear situation does
not so much bring out new limits on political obligation,
as emphasize the
respects in which those obligations are already limited, and introduce further
moral considerations against sponsorship of national defence arrangements.
An obligation to try ** to dissociate oneself from
preparation
for
nuclear
war or from nuclear-deterrence,
for instance by not spending part of one's
working life contributing indirectly to it, does not commit one to more than
this:
to an obligation, for example,
to work for an alternative national
defence policy which avoids nuclear elements. But no doubt this would be a good
thing to try to contribute towards. Once again, what one attempts depends on
where one lives, the level of one's commitments, e.g.
to nonviolence, and so
forth. For not only are different types of policy reorientation appropriate for
different nations and regions, but there are more superficial and deeper
reorientations that can be worked out and promoted, e.g.
schemes that leave
2.
An argument of this type was deployed by Bishop Hunthaussen of
support of his refusal to pay defense taxes.
3.
This dilemma and option is now removed in practice for most wage earners by
Pay As You Earn taxation schemes - schemes apparently introduced to give
the state interest on gross earnings,
but obviously very effective in
removing taxation power from most workers, and so in further transferring
power from individuals to the state.
4.
Given the power of institutions and the state one may be able to do little
more than try, without giving up one's work and thereby one's ability to
contribute to other deserving causes. For example,
it may be virtually
impossible for one to avoid contributing to a superannuation fund which is
investing in projects which one opposes or ought to oppose, or both.
Seattle
in
75
"conventional" warfare apparatus more or less intact,
schemes that change that.
and
deeper
(ecological)
The US Bishops, for example, present a rather shallow set of goals for a
superpower such as the USA, which includes such objectives as preventing the
development and deployment of destabilizing nuclear weapons systems and working
for better control of already operational systems (see PL, p.317). The nuclear
situation affords an important opportunity to press however for a much deeper
set of changes in the superstates.
For those whose very limited political
influence is exerted in considerably less powerful states, even the shallow
goals may look quite different:
there are no nuclear weapons (except perhaps
those of another power stationed on local territory) to redeploy or to better
control.
The view from the very minor powers in the Antipodes is furthermore
different from that of the medium powers in Europe. There is some prospect in
much of the Antipodes of avoiding the more immediate effects of an LSN war,
while there is little such prospect in Europe (cf. Preddey and others).
There
is accordingly some obligation — an obligation little considered and not grasped
by the power holders - on those in the Antipodes to make some effort to preserve
there in the South elements of what is valuable in world civilization. Local
and regional self-interest would also suggest substantial steps
towards
self-preservation that (foolishly) have not been initiated.
What is broadly required in the Antipodes is not difficult to discern once
Steps include withdrawal from the American alliance,
the goals are glimpsed.
which is in any case of questionable merit since its main advantages lie with
the US and it affords no guarantee of local defence;$ closure of American bases
and withdrawal of American access rights for nuclear—carrying equipment to
ports, air bases and other facilities, especially so as to remove local nuclear
targets; pursuit of a more evenhanded policy of nonalignment (something quite
small powers elsewhere have managed to achieve).
That much is easy, in
principle;
and justified.
It is justified because local commitment to the
American military operations in the region lacks a solid foundation;
it is
premissed primarily on the acceptance of deterrence, which,
so it has been
argued (in §5ff.),
lacks justification. That Australian commitment to joint
Australian—US facilities and to US military operations in the region is
explicitly based on acceptance of deterrence emerges from several recent
statements of government policy. The joint facilities are 'part of a system of
deterrence'. &
More difficult to ensure, at least without much preparation, is that
economic and cultural collapse does not follow an LSN war in the North.
Secondly, then, the building of increased socio-economic independence in the
Antipodes is required. It is not enough to make the region a nuclear-free zone
not worth targeting militarily:
the region must also have a sustainable life of
its own. For a small region, that looks a very costly exercise unless combined
with other desirable objectives;
for example,
in Preddey and others it is
estimated that a substantial portion of GDP would have to be diverted to build
up New Zealand's economic independence.? For a larger region which included
Australia,
the costs would be less. They would compare favourably with many
Northern military budgets, and have the advantage that much of the expenditure
is genuinely productive.
If furthermore - what seems unlikely - the structural
readjustment were combined with the independently desirable aims of moving the
5.
See the discussion in Ball, chapter 13, especially pp.140-1.
How slight
the commitments are, under the ANZUS treaty in particular, has been
emphasized again in recent defence discussions between Australia and the
USA.
Of course,
the ANZUS Treaty is only one, and a comparatively minor
one, of the many military treaties that should be terminated:
from a
European and world viewpoint the winding down of NATO and the Warsaw Pact
arrangements, and the removal of American and Russian forces from Europe
(and elsewhere), are very much more important.
A fuller discussion of Australia's defence philosophy
will appear in a subsequent publication in this series.
and
alternatives,
76
whole region towards a multi-cultural conserver society and perhaps even
diverting "defence" spending to connected self—management and social defence
goals, the costs would be very considerably lessened. They only appear so great
in the setting of a consumer-satellite society.
In any case, where life and
culture themselves are concerned, the costs do not appear excessive.
In sum, Southern countries should be severing their military linkages with
Northern
nuclear
powers^,
and
should be preparing now,
socially and
economically, for the time after the LSN war, the great Northern war.
However
there are serious blockages in the way of such things in the Antipodes, and
indeed impeding any substantial attempts to lessen the impact of LSN war.
Some
of the blockages derive again from the fact that present nuclear arrangements
favour many of the power holders and suit strong corporate interests which wield
political power.
But the main blockages to more popular action are sloganised
in the false dichotomy:
"either it won't happen or we're all dead anyway;
so
why bother".
One reason for blockage is then the extinction assumption (SI of
Appendix 1), the unwarranted adoption of which is excessively nihilistic.
A
more important reason is that most people, and most of their political
representatives, do not believe that major repercussions of LSN war are going to
befall them.
These are events which, like starvation and torture, happen to
other (remote) people, not them.
It is not that LSN war is unthinkable:
rather it is that it seems
unbelievable that it should make any difference. Most people in the Antipodes
really do not believe that their lives are likely to be shattered by nuclear
war.
Waking up and mobilising these people is a major part of the problem in
6.
See the letter by R.G. Hawke, Prime Minister, replying to a symposium on
consequences of nuclear war, Canberra Times, Saturday July 23, 1983. The
point is also made by the Foreign Minister in his Evatt Memorial Lecture,
as Hawke notes.
The point is softened by representing the facilities as
also having a role in verification, as well as deterrence, 'that makes arms
control and reduction feasible':
the known role of the facilities in war
fighting is not alluded to, and nor is the fact that any verification role
can be alternatively accomplished using satellites. However the matter is
not in any doubt:
'successive Australian governments ...
have taken the
view that our primary concern should be to support the effectiveness of the
United States deterrent to war itself' (D.J. Killen, Minister for Defence;
quoted in Threats to Australia's Security, p.17).
Government representatives (e.g. Hawke) concede that the joint facilities
put Australia at nuclear risk.
'However it is the judgement of this
Government that the benefits to Australia in terms of its immediate
interest and global strategic consideration outweigh potential risks'. A
proper decision-theoretic analysis would not support Hawke's claim:
since
Australia is known to be a nuclear target because of American bases (cf.
Ball, pp.130-8),
the potential risks given that an LSN war has
a
non-negligible probability far outweigh any immediate benefits.
Since
Australia has only a regional strategic role,
the global strategic
considerations are, as could be otherwise inferred, primarily those of the
main user of the facilities, the USA. The Government is prepared to put
Australia,
its peoples and ecosystems, at what is decidedly serious risk
for immediate and American interests.
A
worthwhile
representative
government does not hold its peoples hostage for such reasons. Not only is
that short-sighted expediency decision making:
it seems virtually certain
that the details of the decision making, were they ever revealed, would not
justify the policy in the longer term even on the basis of expediency, but
would turn on such things as present trade advantages and short-term
commercial considerations.
7.
As to the economic and social problems Australia would face in the event of
an LSN war, see Coombs for a preliminary assessment.
8.
Ideally the removal of significant nuclear targets should take place across
the whole Southern Hemisphere, because this is the zone that is relatively
insulated, atmospherically, from the Northern Hemisphere.
77
achieving requisite social and political adjustment.
Even those who believe
that LSN war is not improbable (but may well not be totally destructive of life)
do little to reorganise their lives in a way that would reflect their
assessment.
Richard Routley*
9.
Again, for some of what to do,
for
some
ways
to
reorganise,
see
e.g.
Martin.
There is also much intellectual work to be undertaken, for
example, searching out details of alternative arrangements, and also
discrediting establishment experts, especially economists and political
scientists, who intellectually underwrite present nuclear arrangements.
*
The text has been much improved as a result of detailed comments by C.
Pigden, R.
Goodin, N.
Griffin, B. Martin and L. Mirlin, and through
correspondence with G.
Foley.
J.
Norman has helped in its final
organisation.
The initial outlines of the paper were worked out in
Victoria, Canada;
and an early version was read at Simon Fraser University
in 1982.
78
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12
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T. Regan (ed.), Matters of Life and Death, Random House, New York, 1980.
R. Routley and N. Griffin, 'Unravelling the meanings of life', Discussion Papers
in Environmental Philosophy #3, Australian National University, Canberra,
1982.
R.
Routley and V. Routley,
'The
Alternatives 2 (1982), 23-8.
irrefutability
of
anarchism',
Social
80
R. Routley and V. Plumwood, 'Moral dilemmas and the logic of deontic notions' in
Paraconsistent Logic (ed. G. Priest, and others), Philosophia Verlag, 1984.
R. Scheer, With Enough Shovels: Reagan, Bush and Nuclear War, Random House,
York, 1982.
New
J. Schell, 'Reflections (Nuclear Arms - Parts 1-111)', The New Yorker, February
1, 8,
and 15,
1982,
pp.47-113,
48-109, and 45-107, respectively. This
series, subtitled The Fate of the Earth, has now appeared as a book with
that title (Knopf, New York, 1982). References in the text are to the book.
T.C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, Harvard University Press, 1980.
G. Sharp, Exploring Nonviolent Alternatives, Boston, 1971.
D. and R. Smith, The Economics of Militarism, Pluto, London, 1983.
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American
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1981.
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probability,
Australian
R.W. Tucker, The Just War, John Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1960.
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Colorado. 1979.
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Society
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(Nov.
18,
OTHER PUBLICATIONS OF THE PHILOSOPHY DEPARTMENT, RESEARCH SCHOOL
OF SOCIAL SCIENCES, AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY
School Publications
R. and V. Routley, The Fight
1974, Third edition 1975.
for
the Forests,
First edition
1973, Second
edition
Departmental Publications
M.K. Rennie, Some Uses of Type Theory in the Analysis of Language, 1974.
D. Mannison, M. McRobbie and R. Routley, editors, Environmental Philosophy, 1980.
R. Routley, Exploring Meinong's Jungle and Beyond, 1980.
Yellow series (Research Papers of the Logic Group):
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
R.K. Meyer, Why I am not a relevantist, 1978.
R.K. Meyer, Sentential constants in R, 1979.
R.K. Meyer and M.A. McRobbie, Firesets and relevant implication, 1979.
R.K. Meyer, A Boolean-valued semantics for R, 1979.
R.K. Meyer, Almost Skolem forms for relevant (and other) logics, 1979.
R.K. Meyer, A note on R matrices, 1979.
R.K. Meyer and J. Slaney, Abelian logic (from A to Z), 1980.
C. Mortensen, Relevant algebras and relevant model structures, 1980.
R.K. Meyer, Relevantly interpolating in RM*, 1980.
C. Mortensen, Paraconsistency and Ci, 1981.
R.K. Meyer and J. Slaney, De Morgan monoids, 1983.
R. Routley, Relevantism and the problem as to when Material Detachment
can be correctly used, and N. da Costa, Essay on the foundations of
logic, 1983.
R. Routley and G. Priest, On Paraconsistency, 1983.
R. Routley, Research in logic in Australia, New Zealand and Oceania,
1983.
R.K. Meyer, S. Giambrone and R. Brady, Where gamma fails.
R. Brady, R.K. Meyer, C. Mortensen and R. Routley, Algebraic analyses of
relevant affixing logics, and other Polish connections, 1983.
Green Series (Discussion papers in environmental philosophy)
1. R. Routley, Roles and limits of paradigms in environmental thought and
action, 1982.
2. R. Routley,
In defence of cannibalism I. Types
of admissible and
inadmissible cannibalism, 1982.
3. R. Routley and N. Griffin, Unravelling the meanings of life?, 1982.
4. R. Routley, Nihilisms, and nihilist logics, 1983.
5. R. Routley, War and peace I. On the ethics of large-scale nuclear war and
nuclear-deterrence and the political fall-out, 1984.
6. R. Routley and V. Plumwood, Moral dilemmas and the logic of deontic
notions.
7. R. Routley and V. Plumwood, An expensive repair-kit for utilitarianism.
8. N. Griffin, Lifeboat U.S.A., 1984.
9. R. Routley, War and peace II.
On the alleged inconsistency, moral
insensitivity and fanaticism of pacifism, 1983.
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Collection
Citation
Richard Routley, “Box 149, Item 1: War and peace I - On the ethics of large-scale nuclear war and nuclear deterrence and the political fallout,” Antipodean Antinuclearism, accessed May 4, 2024, https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/show/155.